

ISALINE BLEW HORNER

THE
EARLY BUDDHIST THEORY
OF MAN PERFECTED

A STUDY
OF THE ARAHAN CONCEPT AND OF THE IMPLICATIONS
OF THE
AIM TO PERFECTION IN RELIGIOUS LIFE
TRACED
IN EARLY CANONICAL AND POST-CANONICAL PALI LITERATURE
WITH NOTES, REFERENCES, AND
INDEXES OF NAMES, SUBJECTS, AND PALI AND SANSKRIT WORDS



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PRONUNCIATION

Vowels in Pali and Sanskrit as in German or Italian. All unaccented syllables are short, except *e* and *o* when ending a syllable. Thus Peṭakopadesa=Pay-t'koh-paday-sa; O-gha; Go-tama. But Mēt-tā, Mōg-gallāna.

*Consonants*¹: The *ṇ* (sometimes in quotations I have used the *m* instead) is the guttural nasal=*ng*. The *t*, *d*, etc., are pronounced as in English and are not pure dentals. *C* is always *ch*, as in chime. In doubled consonants each consonant is sounded, as dham' ma, kam' ma, bud' dha.

ABBREVIATIONS

A.	.	. Anguttara Nikāya.
AA.	.	. Cmý. on A. (Manorathapūraṇī).
Asl.	.	. Atthasālinī (Cmý. on Dhs.).
Brhad.	.	. Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad.
Bu.	.	. Buddhaghosa.
Chān.	.	. Chāndogya Upaniṣad.
C.H.I.	.	. <i>Cambridge History of India.</i>
Cmý.	.	. Commentary.
Comp. Phil.	.	. <i>Compendium of Philosophy.</i>
D.	.	. Dīgha Nikāya.
DA.	.	. Cmý. on Dīgha (Sumaṅgalavilāsini).
DhA.	.	. Cmý. on Dhp. (Dhammapadatthakathā).
Dhp.	.	. Dhammapada.
Dhs.	.	. Dhammasaṅgaṇi.
Dial.	.	. <i>Dialogues of the Buddha.</i>
Divyā.	.	. Divyāvadāna.
E.R.E.	.	. <i>Encyclopædia of Religion and Ethics.</i>
Fur. Dial.	.	. <i>Further Dialogues of the Buddha.</i>
G.S.	.	. <i>The Book of the Gradual Sayings.</i>
H.O.S.	.	. <i>Harvard Oriental Series.</i>

I.A.	. <i>Indian Antiquary.</i>
It.	. <i>Itivuttaka.</i>
Jā.	. <i>Jātaka.</i>
J.P.T.S.	. <i>Journal of the Pali Text Society.</i>
J.R.A.S.	. <i>Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society.</i>
Khu.	. <i>Khuddakapāṭha.</i>
KhuA.	. <i>Cmy. on Khu. (Paramatthajotikā).</i>
K.S.	. <i>The Book of the Kindred Sayings.</i>
Kvu.	. <i>Kathāvatthu.</i>
M.	. <i>Majjhima Nikāya.</i>
MA.	. <i>Cmy. on M. (Papañcasūdanī).</i>
Miln.	. <i>Milindapañha.</i>
Nd.	. <i>Niddesa.</i>
Netti.	. <i>Nettipakaraṇa.</i>
<i>Pss. Breth.</i>	. <i>Psalm of the Brethren.</i>
<i>Pss. Sisters</i>	. <i>Psalm of the Sisters.</i>
Pṭs.	. <i>Paṭisambhidāmagga.</i>
<i>Pts. of Contr.</i>	. <i>Points of Controversy.</i>
Pug.	. <i>Puggalapaññatti.</i>
PugA.	. <i>Cmy. on Pug. (Puggalapaññatti-atthakathā).</i>
Pv.	. <i>Petavatthu.</i>
PvA.	. <i>Cmy. on Pv. (Paramatthadīpanī).</i>
S.	. <i>Saṃyutta Nikāya.</i>
SA.	. <i>Cmy. on S. (Sāratthappakāsinī).</i>

S.B.B.	. <i>Sacred Books of the Buddhists.</i>
S.B.E.	. <i>Sacred Books of the East.</i>
Sn.	. <i>Sutta-Nipāta.</i>
SnA.	. <i>Cmy. on Sn. (Paramatthajotikā).</i>
Sta.	. <i>Sutta.</i>
Thag.	. <i>Theragāthā.</i>
Thig.	. <i>Therīgāthā.</i>
ThigA.	. <i>Cmy. on Thig. (Paramatthadīpanī).</i>
Ud.	. <i>Udāna.</i>
UdA.	. <i>Cmy. on Ud. (Paramatthadīpanī).</i>
Vbh.	. <i>Vibhaṅga.</i>
VbhA.	. <i>Cmy. on Vbh. (Sammohāvinodanī).</i>
Vin.	. <i>Vinaya.</i>
VinA.	. <i>Cmy. on Vin. (Samantapāsādikā).</i>
<i>Vin. Texts</i>	. <i>Vinaya Texts.</i>
Vism.	. <i>Visuddhimagga.</i>
Vv.	. <i>Vimānavatthu.</i>
VvA.	. <i>Cmy. on Vv. (Paramatthadīpanī).</i>

TABLE OF PALI LITERATURE¹

A. CANONICAL—

I. VINAYA PIṬAKA : “basket” (*piṭaka*) of Rules for the Orders of *Bhikkhus* and *Bhikkhunis*.

1. Pātimokkha : a list of 227 Rules, and Expositions on them.
2. Khandhakas : belonging to the whole body of the worded teaching.
3. Parivāra : a synopsis of 1 and 2.

II. SUTTA PIṬAKA : “basket” of threads, i.e. a Collection of connected sayings.

1. Dīgha Nikāya : Long Collection.
2. Majjhima Nikāya : Middle-length Collection.
3. Saṃyutta Nikāya : Connected or Kindred Collection.
4. Anguttara Nikāya : Further-Parts or Graduated Collection.
5. Khuddaka Nikāya : Short Collection (of Anthologies).
 - i. Khuddakapāṭha : Text of the Short Sayings.
 - ii. Dhammapada : Verses on Dhamma.
 - iii. Udāna : Verses of Uplift.
 - iv. Itivuttaka : Short Sayings.

¹ For this Table I am indebted to Mrs Rhys Davids, *Manual of Buddhism*, London, 1932, p. 24 ff.

- v. Sutta-Nipāta : *The Bunch of Threads.*
- vi. Vimānavatthu : *Mansion Stories.*
- vii. Petavatthu : *Stories of those Gone Before.*
- viii. Thera-therī-gāthā : *Verses of the Elder Bhikkhus and Bhikkhunis.*
- ix. Jātaka : *Birth Stories.*
- x. Niddesa : *Main (Mahā) and Sequel (Cūḷa) Expositions.*
- xi. Paṭisambhidāmagga : *Way of Analysis.*
- xii. Apadāna : *Episodes by or about Buddhas, Pacceka Buddhas, Bhikkhus and Bhikkhunis.*
- xiii. Buddhavaṇsa : *The Lineage of a Buddha.*
- xiv. Cariyā-piṭaka : *Basket of Deeds.*

III. ABHIDHAMMA PIṬAKA: "Basket" of Super-doctrine (or Supplementary Teaching).

- 1. Dhammasaṅgaṇi : *Compendium of Things, or Mental Experiences.*
- 2. Vibhaṅga : *Dividings, i.e. exposition of subjects specially inquired into.*
- 3. Dhātukathā : *Talks on Elements.*
- 4. Puggalapaññatti : *Designation of (Kinds of) Men.*
- 5. Kathāvatthu : *Bases of Talk or Teaching.*
- 6. Yamaka : *The Pairs-Book.*
- 7. Paṭṭhāna : *A book on relations between the agent, as cause, and some mode of producing an effect.*

(NOTE.—All the above, with the exception of the Jātaka, have been published by the Pali Text Society. The Jātaka has been edited in six vols., with Index vol. by V. Fausböll, London, 1877-1897.)

B. POST CANONICAL—

I. VARIOUS WORKS :

- 1. Milindapañho : *Questions of King Milinda.*
- 2. Nettipakaraṇa : *Book of Guidance.*
- 3. Peṭakopadesa : *Piṭaka-References.*
- 4. Visuddhimagga : *Path of Purity.*
- 5. Mahā-vaṇsa : *Great Chronicle.*
- 6. Cūḷa-vaṇsa : *Sequel to the Great Chronicle.*
- 7. Other Lesser Works.

(NOTE.—All the above, with the exception of the Milindapañho, have been published by the Pali Text Society. This work was edited by V. Trenckner for the Royal Asiatic Society in 1928. The Peṭakopadesa is in course of preparation.)

II. COMMENTARIES ON THE CANONICAL WORKS.

(NOTE.—Most of these have been published by the Pali Text Society. The remainder are in the course of preparation.)

C. TRANSLATIONS INTO ENGLISH—

- A. I. 1, 2, 3 . . . Translated as *Vinaya Texts*, 3 vols., by T. W. Rhys Davids in S.B.E. vols. XIII., XVII., XX. I. 1 is translated without the expositions. I. 3 is not yet translated.
- A. II. 1 . . . Translated as *Dialogues of the Buddha*, 3 vols. by T. W. Rhys Davids (vol. I.), assisted by Mrs Rhys Davids (vols. II., III.) in S.B.B., II., III., IV.
- A. II. 2 . . . Translated as *Further Dialogues of the Buddha*, 2 vols., by Lord Chalmers in S.B.B., V., VI.
- A. II. 3 . . . Translated as *The Book of the Kindred Sayings*, 5 vols., by Mrs Rhys Davids (vols. I., II.), F. L. Woodward (vols. III., IV., V.).

- A. II. 4 . . . Translated as *The Book of the Gradual Sayings*, 5 vols. published, by F. L. Woodward (vols. I., II., V.), E. M. Hare (vols. III., IV.).
- A. II. 5, i. . . . Translated as *The Text of the Minor Sayings*, by Mrs Rhys Davids in S.B.B., VII.
- A. II. 5, ii. . . . Translated often; most recently as *Verses on Dhamma*, by Mrs Rhys Davids in S.B.B., VII.
- A. II. 5, iii. . . . Translated as *Verses of Uplift* by F. L. Woodward in S.B.B., VIII.
- A. II. 5, iv. . . . Translated as *As it was Said* by F. L. Woodward in S.B.B., VIII.
- A. II. 5, v. . . . Translated as *A Collection of Discourses* by V. Fausbøll in S.B.E., X.; as *Buddha's Teachings* by Lord Chalmers in H.O.S., vol. XXXVII.
- A. II. 5, vi., vii. . . Translation being prepared for S.B.B.
- A. II. 5, viii. . . . Translated as *Psalms of the Brethren, Psalms of the Sisters* by Mrs Rhys Davids.
- A. II. 5, ix. . . . Translated by E. B. Cowell as director and by four fellow-workers: R. (Lord) Chalmers, W. H. D. Rouse, H. T. Francis, R. A. Neil, 6 vols. and Index vol. as *The Jātaka or Stories of the Buddha's Former Births*, Cambridge, 1895-1913.
- A. III. 1 Translated as *Buddhist Psychological Ethics* by Mrs Rhys Davids for the Royal Asiatic Society.
- A. III. 4 Translated as *Designation of Human Types* by B. C. Law.
- A. III. 5 Translated as *Points of Controversy* by S. Z. Aung and Mrs Rhys Davids.

- B. I. 1 Translated as *The Questions of King Milinda* 2 vols., by T. W. Rhys Davids in S.B.E., XXXV., XXXVI.
- B. I. 4 Translated as *The Path of Purity*, 3 vols., by Pe Maung Tin.
- B. I. 5 Translated as *The Great Chronicle of Ceylon* by W. Geiger, assisted by M. H. Bode.
- B. II. There is as yet a translation of only one Cmy., i.e. the *Atthasālinī* (Cmy. on *Dhammasaṅgaṇi*), translated as *The Expositor*, 2 vols., by Pe Maung Tin.

(NOTE.—Unless otherwise stated, all the above have been published by the Pali Text Society in the *Translation Series*.)



THE EARLY BUDDHIST THEORY OF MAN PERFECTED

CHAPTER I

ORIGINAL SĀKYA AND MONASTIC BUDDHISM

INDIA has gone down to history as a land remarkable for intense religious devotion, high spiritual endeavour, and daring philosophical speculation. Literary testimony to the creativeness of thought is abundant. The earliest sayings or *mantras* belonging to the great religious movement which swept India are the four collections of hymns known as the Vedas. These, as sayings though not as writings, date from about 4000 B.C. The earliest of these is the Ṛg-Veda. It shows how the Vedic Indians worshipped and adored. Their wonder and awe were evoked by the powers of nature, such as the wind, the rains, the dawn, the sun, the night, and the storms. To these powers, as *devas* (shining ones¹), many hymns are addressed. There are also wedding hymns and funeral hymns. Again the Ṛg-Veda shows in the Creation hymns and some old riddle-hymns the

¹ I believe that etymologically *deva* is "shining one." Dr Coomaraswamy in *A New Approach to the Vedas*, London, 1933, puts forward "angels," e.g. at pp. 55, 60.

beginnings of a philosophical curiosity: a desire to understand.

In spite of the multiplicity of devas to whom the Vedic Indians sang songs of praise and adoration, there is, in the R̥g-Veda, a certain tendency towards monotheism. This is especially noticeable in the cult of Varuṇa, a god who possessed some ethical attributes. On the whole, however, Vedism, or Vedic Hinduism, is a polytheistic system, with the curious quality of what Max Müller called *henotheism*. This is the equal worship of various gods, but the one who is the subject of a hymn is there regarded and for the time being as higher than the other gods.

Appended to the Vedas were Saṃhitās, or hymn-books. To these were appended the ritual Brāhmaṇas. Their minute directions for the proper conduct of the sacrifice show that the sacrifice had become more important than either the priest who made it or the deva to whom it was offered. This is a sacerdotal phase in which the priests, as the repositories of the sacred knowledge which was needed for performing the sacrifice, had arrogated to themselves the highest social importance.

Appended to the Brāhmaṇas are the Upaniṣads. These are instructional in nature. Their dates and their numbers are alike uncertain. Many, however, have been preserved. With these we enter another phase of Indian thought, which shows no trace of nature-worship, nor is it connected with sacerdotalism. It brings the faint monotheistic tendency discernible in

the R̥g-Veda to a very distinctive and new culmination. The Upaniṣads, although they may cover several centuries, on the whole agree that Reality is One without a second,¹ whole, undying, the All. This world-ground was called Brahman (neuter). Probably independently of this concept was developed the concept of Ātman as the supreme Self, the inmost and most essential being. The two as Brahman-Ātman, the world-self, were then combined as an expression of the Highest. Now, since this Brahman-Ātman was the All, man's relation to It was regarded as one of subsumption. His position was summed up in the phrases, now become classical, "I am Brahman," "Thou art That" (Brahman, That All, *idaṃ sarvaṃ*).

Professor Rawson considers² that "the six early prose Upaniṣads in their main portions, the Iṣā and the first *adhyāya* (section) of the Kaṭha are almost certainly pre-Buddhist and may roughly be assigned to the seventh and sixth centuries B.C." If this is so, we have now taken a very brief glimpse of Indian thought from about 4000 B.C. to the early Buddhist epoch. The debt of Buddhism to its precursors has hardly yet been measured.³ When it is, I believe it will be found that Buddhism owes more to them than at present has been fully established. Writers on Buddhism have mostly

¹ *Advaitya*, more exactly "not-twoness."

² J. N. Rawson, *The Kaṭha Upaniṣad*, London, 1934.

³ A most interesting evaluation has, however, recently appeared: Mrs Rhys Davids, *The Birth of Indian Psychology and its Development in Buddhism*, London, 1936.

been so much engaged with the subject itself, that there has only lately emerged any attempt to treat it historically, and to correlate ideas and concepts found in it with ideas and concepts found in previous or contemporary systems. This much we can say to-day : that Buddhism can only be truly evaluated if it be not regarded as an isolated subject, complete and entire in itself, but as a part of the great religious upheaval which persisted for centuries in India.

Nor is Buddhism itself so simple a matter historically as its treatment would often lead us to suppose. Since it was an expression of part of a vast spiritual unrest, we should expect to find it not only borrowing from its forerunners and influenced by them, but also exhibiting various historical trends at work within the teaching itself.

The early history of the teaching which we call Buddhism may be differentiated roughly into two phases. There is no obvious cleavage between these two phases ; no distinctive name which marks a change of thought, outlook, or background as the earlier phase merges into the later. Hitherto Early Buddhism has, in the main, been regarded as forming an integral body of teaching, now enshrined in the works called "canonical." These have been made accessible to students of Pali Buddhism through the unremitting labours of the Pali Text Society.¹ A more critical examination of these "texts" than any, with one or two exceptions, hitherto accorded them, cannot fail to

¹ See Table of Pali Buddhist Literature, above, p. 15 ff.

reveal the existence of two phases of Early Buddhist thought.

I have suggested that the distinction between these two phases is far from sharp. It is therefore not always possible to know whether particular passages, sayings, or even whole Suttas belong to the earlier or the later time. Many Suttas which appear ancient bear signs of later interpolations. The more important the *mantra*, such as the First Mantra, the more it will have been repeated and altered, glossed and edited. The inclusion of formulæ in the "texts," repeated often and in set words, the appearance of the same simile time and again, the recurrence of the same stock-phrases, all lend weight to a difference existing within "Early Buddhism." For such unnecessary and irrelevant interpolations, together with the many formulated, stereotyped passages, betray the finishing hand of the later editor.

If it be borne in mind that "Early Buddhism" is not a homogeneous whole, it will fall into a truer perspective and be more readily understood. The many interpretations that have been put upon it, the many "central conceptions" which have been read into it, alone suggest that homogeneity is not one of its leading characteristics. If this were acknowledged, "Early Buddhism" would no longer be treated as a strange, isolated phenomenon, arising independently of previous Indian thought. It would be found that it is linked with the Upaniṣad philosophy on the one side, and further, that through its own development, it leads down to the (later) Mahāyānist Buddhism on the other.

Two such widely divergent systems as the Upaniṣads and Mahāyāna could only be linked by an intervening body of thought if this, like Sākya, far from being static, contained within itself the seeds of change.

The first of these phases of "Early Buddhism" covers the original core of the teaching, the primitive Sākya, the starting-point of the whole movement, now called Buddhism. The second is a period dominated by monkdom. I refer to this as "Monastic Buddhism." This, in other words, is Hīnayāna, a phase intermediate between early Sākya and Mahāyāna. The Mahāyānists also made the mistake of taking Hīnayāna as the original teaching of Gotama.

Original Sākya may be regarded as the words uttered by Gotama, the Founder of this movement, and by his contemporary co-workers, "the Co-founders of Buddhism," as Mrs Rhys Davids calls them.¹ These will have flourished sometime between about 530 and 483 B.C. if, following the most widely accepted view, we hold that Gotama died in 483 B.C. It is recorded that he died when he was in the eighties, having begun his teaching when he was twenty-nine years old. According to this reckoning he would have been born about 563 B.C.² These first co-workers who lived during Gotama's ministry, Gotama himself, who was their comrade and shower of the Way (*maggakkhāyin*),³

¹ J.R.A.S., April 1927 and April 1928.


² E. J. Thomas, *The Life of Buddha as Legend and History*, London, 1927, p. 27, for short discussion of these dates.

³ M. III. 6.

and the early disciples also following the faith at that time, were called Sakyaputtā or Sakyaputtiyā, children of the Sākyas. Sākya was the name of the clan to which Gotama and some of his fellow-teachers belonged. His own name was Siddhattha, Gotama being his family name. He was very occasionally referred to as Sakyamuni, the Sākyan sage. The term "Buddhism" and its derivative "Buddhist" are purely Western inventions. They originate from the title "buddha" which later came to be an epithet given to Gotama as the Enlightened One, the One who is Awake. Even so, this epithet was probably not accorded to him until more than a century after his *parinibbāna*.¹ Yet these terms "Buddhism" and "Buddhist" have come to stay. Hence, when I wish to speak of the stage of monk-ascendancy, I am forced to say that it belongs to the second "Early Buddhist period." During this period, the original *dhamma*, a teaching which would appeal to every man, was transformed into a gospel in which "stopping" (*nirodha*) was taught as a cure for ill (*dukkha*). Such was the monkish contribution to Gotama's doctrine.

Monks and nuns forming corporate communities and bound together by a common discipline, were a new feature in Indian life—how new we cannot say, since we do not precisely know for how long the Nigaṇṭha, or Jain, monks and nuns had been in existence before the Orders of Gotama were founded. The influence of Gotama's female Order on the intellectual

¹ Mrs Rhys Davids, *Outlines of Buddhism*, London, 1934, p. 44.



and religious outlook of the day was by no means negligible. It was adorned by many famous women teachers and preachers, great exponents of *dhmma*. But the influence of the monks was considerably greater. Both, however, were responsible for handing down orally, to other monks and nuns and to disciple after disciple, the sayings and teachings which were ascribed to Gotama. This oral teaching went on for about two centuries. For Gotama had lived in a "bookless world," where writing, although probably known, was only undertaken with great difficulty. Since no suitable materials on which to write had been discovered in Magadha, the "Middle Country," where Gotama lived and taught, and where his doctrine mainly flourished for the first few centuries after his *parinibbāna*, unorthodoxy had crept into his teaching. In order to eliminate this, a Sangīti,¹ known to Hīnayāna as the Third Council, was convened at Patna (Pāṭaliputta) during the reign of King Asoka, "but after the middle of the third century B.C."² At the time of this revision of the Piṭakas, monks came as "repeaters" (*bhāṇakā*) to other monks to recite to them what they remembered of those sayings and discourses which they had received by word of mouth.

These "repeaters" are referred to in various parts of the post-canonical literature. There is no room for doubting that the great Nikāya authorities were monks.

¹ Lit. : a "together-chanting," a Council or Congress.

² See Mrs Rhys Davids, *Śākyā*, London, 1931, p. 356 ff. and *Buddhism*, 1934, p. 97, for a discussion on the Third Council.

In the Visuddhimagga the therā (or Elder) Abhaya is specified as a Dīgha-bhāṇakā,¹ the therā Reva as a Majjhima-bhāṇakā² and the therā Cūḷa-Siva as a Saṇyutta-bhāṇakā.³ It is not necessary to believe that any one man could keep in his head the medley of verse and prose, the pithy sayings, the exhortations, catalogues, catechisms, discourses, and narratives which fill each Nikāya. It is not necessary to believe that one man could remember or even know by heart all the five hundred and forty-seven Jātaka stories. For besides Abhaya, Reva, and Cūḷa-Siva, other *bhāṇakā* (in the masculine plural) are spoken of, especially in the Visuddhimagga,⁴ as knowing one or other of the Nikāyas. Although these other *bhāṇakā* have no further personal identification, they will have been the men who helped the great authority on each Nikāya at the Council or Congress where the editors met in order to give a definite and recognised form on orthodox lines to the teaching. It is reasonable to suppose that these other now anonymous "repeaters" of each *bhāṇavāra*, or portion of a Nikāya, were also monks. In the Sumaṅgala-vilāsinī mention is made of "theras who were Dīghabhāṇakā."⁵ Monks would have been

¹ Vism. 36, 266.

² Vism. 95.

³ Vism. 313.

⁴ Vism. 74, 76, Anguttara-bhāṇakā; Vism. 275, Dīgha, Saṇyutta, and Majjhima-bhāṇakā; Vism. 286, Dīgha, Majjhima-bhāṇakā; Vism. 431, Majjhima, Saṇyutta-bhāṇakā; DA. I. 15, Dīgha, Majjhima-bhāṇakā; Jā. I. 59, Dīgha-bhāṇakā. At Miln. 341-42 the "repeaters" of all five Nikāyas and the Jātaka are mentioned (not by name).

⁵ DA. I. 131, *Dīghabhāṇakatttherā*.

able to acquire a sounder knowledge and understanding of *dhmma* than was possible for a man living in the world. The actual work of revision and of selection was of course in the hands of monks, probably under the direction of Tissa.¹

Records of talks given by Gotama or by his great disciples to householders are much rarer than those given to the monks: the inference being that those parts of the Teacher's teaching (*satthu-sāsana*) which referred to the homeless life naturally made a greater appeal to monks than did any others. For their main interest was in homelessness rather than in the household state. Hence such parts were both remembered and recorded by monks to the exclusion of the sayings addressed to the householder. Monks, moreover, were the teachers both of other monks and nuns and of the laity. The laity did not teach, or taught to no large extent. The propagation of the doctrine was therefore almost entirely the prerogative of those who had entered the Orders. And naturally they would have been looked upon as the fount of authority.

Monks were, however, under no obligation to remember the Teacher's utterances, nor those of his co-workers, word for word. They would have incurred no bad *karma*, as would the reciters of the Vedas, if they forgot a word here, a phrase there, if they altered the significance of a passage or a concept, or even if they dismissed from their minds a whole discourse as being not applicable to their purposes and therefore

¹ Mrs Rhys Davids, *Sākyā*, p. 359.

unimportant. But although they altered (and so much may be deduced from the inconsistencies apparent in the "texts" as we have them to-day) and although they forgot, yet when the need arose, a great deal was remembered and poured forth to the recensionists.

Nuns, apparently, were not "repeaters": not once do we hear of a *Nikāya-bhāṇikā*. Had they been present at the final revision the term might have read *Nikāya-bhāṇika-bhāṇakā*, or, on analogy with *Theratherī-gāthā*, *Nikāya-bhāṇaka-bhāṇikā*, female and male repeaters of a *Nikāya*; but only the masculine form appears. Certainly there are in Pali general terms, such as *putta* (child) covering both sexes; but usually both the feminine and the masculine forms of a word are given, such as *dāsi-dāsa*, maid- and man-servant, *dārikā* and *dāraka*, girl and boy, when reference is made to the corresponding members of the female and male sex. The nun known as *Thullanandā* is called *bhāṇikā* in the *Bhikkhunivibhaṅga* of the *Vinaya*.¹ But she is clearly regarded as living during Gotama's ministry. Hence she is not meant to be a *bhāṇikā* in the technical sense of a "repeater" of teachings recited to "editors."

Yet even had nuns been among the "repeaters," it is likely that the result would have been much the same as we have it now. For nuns subscribed to the monkish outlook: the teaching and discipline was in all important points identical for both. The part that women played in the religious life might have been made to appear more dominant than it actually does from a

¹ *Vin. IV. 285.*

reading of the texts. But that is probably all. Any feminine phraseology reflecting feminine mentality would scarcely have been "passed" by the recensionists. Nuns were only admired in so far as they showed intellectual and spiritual powers on a level with those exhibited by monks. I refer to the nuns rather to remind readers of their existence, than to call attention to any inherent differences between them and the monks.

Nor is the question whether the doctrine was developed by men alone, or whether it was a joint effort of monks and nuns of any great importance. The two essential points to grasp in connection with original Buddhism are that, in the first place, the "texts" do not date from Gotama's time, but are about two centuries later; and that, in the second place, they are very largely fruits of monkish labours.

If these two points be held firmly before the mind, the existence of a difference between original Śākya and Monastic Buddhism, to which I referred at the beginning of this chapter, will be more readily seen. These "texts" are all that we have as records of the Founder's deeds, thoughts, and speech. Some exponents of Buddhism, notably Mrs Rhys Davids, are making valiant attempts to establish a critical interpretation of the texts. It is no easy task to sift the material, overgrown with monkish theorisings and monkish dreads, thinned by omissions, changed by a variety of emphasis, and altered by very reason of the dynamic power of the whole movement. It is no easy task to re-create

Gotama's own contribution to the thought of his day, and to judge which are the fragments left in,¹ and where Gotama's debt to other earlier and contemporary philosophical systems is apparent.

I will take two points in order to illustrate what I mean by saying that under Monastic Buddhism some concepts bear a different significance from that possessed by these same concepts under original Śākya. First, I will take the "Eightfold Way" as it appears in two contexts: (1) as one of the seven groups of things helpful to enlightenment; and (2) as the eighth answer in an ancient catechism.² Secondly, I will take "the four worthy true things" (*ariyasaccāni*) as these appear in answer to question IV. of this same catechism. It may be found that these two points resolve themselves into one.

I want to show that throughout Early Buddhism the eightfold Way was not necessarily regarded as the Way of the eight "fitnesses" or "rightnesses"; but that it might have been regarded as the Way divided into four stages, each of which was called *magga*, and

¹ Mrs Rhys Davids, in her revised edition of *Buddhism in the Home University Library*, gives a brilliant exposition of "Fragments" left in, which she judges to belong to the original stratum.

² Three versions of this catechism survive, Khu. IV. ; A. V. 50 ff. and 54 ff. Anyone wishing to know more about the answers as found in the Khu. and A. V. 54 ff. should consult Mrs Rhys Davids, *Minor Anthologies of the Pali Canon*, intr. to Khu. Section IV. I have compared the three versions in *The Ceylon Daily News*, *Vesak* No., May 1935.

their fruits. And I want to show that the four worthy true things (*ariyasaccāni*) were not throughout necessarily regarded as the four truths of Ill, but that they may sometimes have been taken to stand for these same four Ways, and sometimes for another concept.

The Majjhima Commentary, in quoting a saying (which hitherto is untraced) throws light on these points. This quotation runs: *bodhi* (enlightenment) is called knowledge of the four Ways.¹ In the group of things helpful to enlightenment the *bojjhaṅgā* (factors of enlightenment) are clearly thought of as being in close connection with the Way. Moreover, the *bojjhaṅgā* are said to be elements of *bodhi*.² Therefore enlightenment (*bodhi*) is closely connected with the Way, the Majjhima Commentary going so far as to say that "enlightenment is the Way" (*bodhi ti maggo*).³ Now, the groups of things serviceable to enlightenment are old; it is only their naming as the *bodhipakkhehiyadhammā* and their numbering as thirty-seven that belong to a later date. And the Way which was the Way to arahanship was more essentially the fourfold Way than the Way of the rather haphazard eight fitnesses. In view of these considerations and of the quotation found in the Majjhima Commentary, I am strongly tempted to see in the eightfold Way, as a group of enlightenment accessories, the four stages of the Way by which a

¹ MA. I. 54 = VinA. I. 139.

² Pts. I. 115; AA. I. 81; DA. III. 785 ff.; MA. I. 289; ThigA. 27; VbhA. 310.

³ MA. I. 54 = VinA. 139.

disciple could advance towards arahanship, and their fruits.

Reasoning now from the enlightenment accessories to the catechism, we find that in the three versions of this catechism which have survived the questions are the same. Beginning with "The One—what is it?" followed by "The Two—what are they?" the questions go down to a tenth: "The Ten—what are they?" But the answers show some interesting variations. In one version the answers are ascribed to the un-named bhikkhunī of Kajaṅgala.¹ Four out of her ten answers are drawn from the groups of things helpful to enlightenment. In fact, she takes all the answers she can from these groups, including the eightfold Way. But if the eightfold Way, as a category among these groups, had meant the fourfold Way and their fruits, it would most probably again have meant the four Ways and their four fruits in the bhikkhunī's answer to the catechism.

We will now consider the four worthy true things. These are answer IV. to the catechism as given in the Khuddakapāṭha version. Are we to take them as the four truths of Ill, which is the meaning most commonly ascribed to them? I do not think we need. We can compare the Majjhima Commentary's quotation that "*bodhi* is called knowledge of the four Ways," to which I have already referred, with a similar passage in the Vibhaṅga Commentary.² Here it is said that enlightenment (*bodhi*) is penetration into the four worthy

¹ A. V. 54 ff.

² VbhA. 310.

true things. But it is not said that these are the four truths of Ill. We may thus trace the four worthy true things to a possible source. This, as the four Ways, would have represented the outlook of a time when the four ways of developing—when the prowess of going from strength to strength, from beyond to beyond (*uttaruttariy paṇitapaṇitaṇ*)¹—were held to be of more account than the truths of Ill. Further, esteem for the four Ways points to a time when the majority, and not the minority of bhikkhus and laymen were still the first consideration; and not to a time when the domination of monkdōm, insisting on the escape from Ill, had begun its work of deterioration.

It may now be asked, since I am tampering with revered associations, whether, besides signifying the four Ways, the four worthy true things originally stood for anything else? I think it may be found that they had another and possibly a more likely origin in the four *satipaṭṭhānā*, the uprisings of mindfulness, which the bhikkhunī gives as her fourth answer in the catechism, while the Khuddakapāṭha gives the four worthy true things. Now, if the bhikkhunī were drawing, as I have suggested, on the groups of enlightenment accessories, it is clear that she could not give either the four worthy true things, or the four truths of Ill as her answer; for, strange as it may be, neither of these categories appears among the groups of things serviceable to enlightenment. Further, we find that the Khuddakapāṭha has six out of its ten answers in common

See A. III. 218 for this grand expression.

with those of the bhikkhunī. But its tenth answer clearly appears to belong to a later date than her tenth answer. Hence the Khuddakapāṭha seems to have been subjected to some editorial handling. I therefore suggest that its answer IV., that the Four are the worthy true things, also belongs to a later time; but that nevertheless these may be merely a generalisation of the four “uprisings of mindfulness,” or acts of introspection, answer IV of the bhikkhunī, and not necessarily the four truths of Ill.

If this is so, we have found two possible origins for the four worthy true things: the four Ways, and the four uprisings of mindfulness. Some disciples and teachers may have found the former category nobler and truer, others may have preferred the latter. As I said earlier in this chapter, there was nothing to prevent teachers and disciples from taking up interpretations which appealed to them and definitions which they liked to the exclusion of other equally important interpretations and rational definitions. I repeat that it is possible that owing to some divergence of outlook both the four Ways and the four uprisings of mindfulness came to be regarded as the four worthy true things; but that both these meanings became all but lost to view when Ill and the escape from it had grown to be the all-absorbing and predominating interest.

It is impossible—although it has been held to be possible—to think of “Buddhism,” especially as manifested in the two phases to which I have referred, as

springing fully-fledged from the lips of Gotama. Had this been the case, probably a homogeneous body of doctrine would have been the result. It is impossible to believe that anyone of his dynamic personality did not "make insight and knowledge to grow" as he became more experienced and mature. And yet, in examining some topics, it is not always possible to discriminate between what was original and what was later accretion; and if later accretion, then whether it came in Gotama's day or after. Such a topic forms the subject of this essay. The arahān taken as a purely canonical Buddhist concept is practically unyielding to historical investigation. We can see how the noun (Sanskrit, *arhat*; Pali, *arahān*) and the verb (Sanskrit, *arhati*; Pali, *arahati*) were used in systems prior to the rise of Buddhism (Ch. II.); and how this noun and verb were used by non-Buddhist sects, such as the Jains, who were both previous to and co-existent with Buddhism (Ch. II.). We also find records of several contemporaries of Gotama, claiming to be arahāns. These were sometimes ascetics given over to the practice of *tapas*, physical austerities, and sometimes people possessing psychic powers (*iddhi*) (Ch. III.). But these were not arahāns in any Sākyan sense, and their claims to the name of arahān were repudiated by Gotama. They were "not worthy." But this is all that we have to go upon. In Pali literature we do not find the arahān emerging as an *ṛṣi*, a recluse. There are no positive instances of the word as growing, as disclosing a development of thought, and

becoming gradually more and more pregnant with meaning.

The available documentary evidence shows the arahān already emerged as a man or woman who has won perfection here and now; and arahānship as a highly desirable state to be won here and now. The arahān and arahānship so regarded are the offspring of Monastic Buddhism. Monastic Buddhism dreaded renewed becomings, and the notion of consummation was contracted to something that a man might conceive and name in this rebirth. It is possible that original Buddhism had held a different view. It is possible that in using, however infrequently, the compound term *tat-uttariṇ*,¹ "beyond that," Śākya was trying to say that after rebirth in various deva-worlds, consummation would be finally realised "beyond that," i.e. beyond the Brahmā-world. *Tat-uttariṇ* is characterised no further. We do not know whether it represents one world, or a number of worlds, beyond that (Brahmā-world). We are told that the bourn of arahāns is not revealed. Is it possible that their bourn was thought of as being *tat-uttariṇ*, but that it could not be described since *tat-uttariṇ* does not appear to be the name of any particular deva-world?

Although the concept of arahān appears as a ready-made concept each time it is met with in the texts, considerations such as the one just advanced make it seem possible that this concept has Sākyan history behind it; and that, as is the case with other important

¹ A. I. 210; III. 287.

notions such as *dhmma*, *magga*, *nibbāna*, it also underwent some changes. If these concepts changed, why should that of arahān have remained static throughout?

The arahān, as a "worthy man," listening to his inner guide (*dhmma*), seeking to purge himself of passion, hatred, and confusion (*nibbāna*),¹ faring along the Way (*magga*) and mounting ever upwards, is a notion which would have fitted in with early Śākya thought. The arahān, as man perfected, listening to an externalised body of doctrine (*dhmma*) which taught him how to win this perfection, seeking a state where all effort is stilled (*nibbāna*) and where he will have attained the undying (*amata*), using as a tool in this search the eight "fitnesses" or "rightnesses" into which the Way became divided, is a notion which fits in with Monastic Buddhism. But positive materials for re-creating the place of the arahān concept in earlier thought are lacking. This is not to say that the word had no Śākya history, that the moment it was adopted into Śākya terminology it became endowed with all the meaning which we find it carrying in the texts. But it does mean that we cannot get at this history. Therefore this monograph is concerned with Monastic Buddhism, with a time when leading ideas had become more rigid and standardised than they had been under original Śākya.

The arahān concept, in spite of its probably contemporary existence with that of the *anattā* doctrine, is a vindication of the rights of *attā*, the self. The arahān

¹ S. IV. 251.

is never once said to be *anattā*; nor was this among the ideals set before him. He might be praiseworthy if he had made the stuff of existence (*upādāna*) to wane, but he was not exhorted to make the self to wane. On the contrary, arahanship sometimes was won, as it is recorded, after a monk had been zealous, ardent, with a self that had striven (*pahitatta*).¹ As Mrs Rhys Davids says, *pahitatta*² "swore with *anattā*." The arahān was not exhorted to get rid of the self—false views about the self, yes; but that is very different from becoming "devoid of self," *pesitatta*. This is a word by which the Commentators were almost bound to paraphrase *pahitatta*, since they lived under the shadow of the *anattā* doctrine.

In the Second Mantra the reality of the self had been virtually attested: the self is not body, it is not mind. This has curiously and startlingly been taken, by those anxious to see a "non-soul" theory in Buddhism, as a denial of the self. But to say that the self is not mind nor body does not exhaust the possibilities of what it can be. Nor does it constitute a denial of its existence. The self (*attā*) as both divine and human was no more repudiated by early Śākya than were either the Ātman as Brahman, or *ātman* as the self of man by the Upaniṣads. I give some examples of these *attā* couples of sayings on pp. 236, 238.

¹ For (roughly) this translation, see Mrs Rhys Davids, *Birth of Indian Psychology, etc.*, p. 295; also p. 347.

² In review of Lord Chalmers's transl. of *Sutta-Nipāta, Buddha's Teachings*, H.O.S. No. 37, in H.O.S. Bulletin, 1934.

The discrepancy of running the *anattā* doctrine alongside a theory which depends for its rational working out on belief in the reality of self, suggests that the arahān concept was brought over from earlier days; and that, whatever revision the concept received, it yet did not become completely harmonious with every changed value that was evolved by Monastic Buddhism.

Failure to keep pace with changing values is evinced in another way. I have drawn attention to this in Chapter VI. In spite of all the stress laid on arahanship as attainable *here and now*, it is apparent in the teaching on the four Ways that it was also thought to be attainable after a person had left this earth. He might pass on as a non-returner, and although he would not return to this world to win arahanship here, he might yet attain it in some future rebirth. This would be the *same* person who had been known here, some Nandā or Sālha.¹ He would not have become without self on his way through his successive rebirths, and they might have been many, which culminated in his attainment of the Highest.

The whole arahān-theory is based upon the belief in the perfectibility of man, either here and now, or in some future state. To think of human perfectibility is meaningless unless there is a self which is held to be perfectible. The idea that man had potential capabilities, potential powers, must have been very present to the minds of the early Sākyans. Although there was no word for "potential," other expressions were made

¹ D. II. 91 ff.

to serve. For example, the words *bhabba*, "might become," and *bhāvanīya*, "ought to become, must become," and other forms of $\sqrt{bhā}$, "to become," no less than the stress laid upon stirring up effort (*āradbhaviriya*), are attempts to express these latent potentialities.

Nor, I think, were these latent potentialities ever wholly lost sight of, so long as *attā* was not completely discarded. In its treatment of the arahān, Monastic Buddhism held that it was possible to make these potentialities actual, to realise them here and now. I have spoken in this essay more of the arahān as a finished product, more of the arahān's tasks as accomplished, more of the epithets used to describe him (as these are given in the literary remains) than of the processes preliminary to arahanship. So long as it was held that man could undertake these processes and master them, it was held that the potential in him could be made actual.

All earnest bhikkhus would have followed much the same prescribed training. Those who fully grasped the training were set fair to progress far on the Way. But until they had got to the end, held to be *arahatta*, and had become adepts (*asekha*), they were one and all probationers or learners (*sekha*).

While they were still at this stage much had to be done. Passion, hatred, and confusion (*rāga*, *dosa*, and *moha*) had to be consistently suppressed. Proficiency in the threefold training, which comprised the higher morality, the higher thought and the higher insight, would result in the rooting out of these wrong states of

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mind.¹ *Taṇhā* (craving, thirst) had to be quenched; the five *nīvaraṇāni*, a technical term, meaning hindrances, had to be abandoned. It was held that if the mind was not stained by these hindrances, it could concentrate on the destruction of the cankers (*āsavas*),² with the further possibility of gaining arahanship. Thus, although the rejection of the *nīvaraṇāni* did not immediately bring about the winning of arahanship, it prepared the ground for the destruction of the cankers. And when *this* had been accomplished, then a person was said to be *khīṇāsava*, or, in the earlier terminology, "the cankers are destroyed," *āsava* *khīṇā*, both of which states are tantamount to arahanship.

In this essay, besides the term *arahan*, I have left several other words untranslated. These are words for which no altogether suitable translation has yet been suggested: either because in English, or in any other European language for that matter, there is no precise equivalent for conveying the grandeur and depth and richness of these old Indian notions; or because the meanings of these words vary to a larger or smaller degree in different contexts, showing that their significance was not steady and unchanging.

1. The word *bhikkhu* and its feminine *bhikkhunī* do not exactly represent what we mean by "monk" and "nun" respectively. Bhikkhus and bhikkhunīs did not live a cloistered life. They were not rigidly segregated from one another nor from the laity. They were

¹ A. I. 230.² A. II. 210 = A. III. 92.

bound by no vows of poverty, chastity, and obedience. They were allowed to return to "the low life of the layman" if they could not continue in the good life (*brahmacariya*). Again, they were much more than "almsmen" and "almswomen" as Lord Chalmers calls them in his *Further Dialogues* and his translation of the Sutta-Nipāta,¹ and as I have called them in an earlier work.² These are correct renderings as far as they go. For bhikkhus and bhikkhunīs did then, as they do now, subsist on the generosity of the laity. They took the begging-bowl round every morning. Some had special families who supported them. The laity acquired merit (*puñña*) by giving almsfood, medicine, shelter, and robes. To-day in non-Buddhist South Asiatic countries the holy man, the *sannyāsin* or *sādhu*, or by whatever name he is called, is not allowed to starve. He lives on alms offered by the laity. But bhikkhus and bhikkhunīs did not merely beg for alms (*bhikkhā*). They did far more than this. According to some commentarial explanations they break (\sqrt{bhid}) the obstructions,³ or the seven bad qualities leading to rebirth;⁴ they see ($\sqrt{bhī}$ to see) fear ($\sqrt{bhī}$ in *saysāra*, the round of rebirth).⁵ The Vinaya gives a list of sixteen grounds on which bhikkhuship is established.⁶ This includes going for alms, wearing the patchwork cloth, being a recluse, being a probationer or adept, being in harmony

¹ No mention of the bhikkhunī in the Sutta-Nipāta.² I. B. Horner, *Women under Primitive Buddhism*, London, 1930.³ VbhA. 328.⁴ Nd. I. 70 = Nd. II. 477 a.⁵ Vism. 3.⁶ Vin. III. 24; cf. Vbh. 245-246.

with the Sangha, being steadfast, being the auspicious (*bhadra*), the essential (*sāra*), and having the attributes of an arahant. Clearly neither "monk" nor "alms-man" is an adequate rendering for all that *bhikkhu* implies.

2. *Āsava* in its primary meaning is that which flows, the intoxicating extract or secretion of a plant or tree or flower. It thus came to be something which befogs the mind. It has been rendered by the "Drugs," the "Intoxicants," the "Deadly Floods or Taints" (Rhys Davids), the "Cankers" (Lord Chalmers). A list of more than twenty translations into English, French, and German has been compiled by Har Dayal.¹ The one which seems to have found the most favour, although it arrived but comparatively late, is "the cankers." Mr Woodward left *āsava* untranslated in *Gradual Sayings*, I. and II., but Mr Hare revived the use of "canker" in volume III. He says that "canker," though not a precise etymological equivalent, has the meaning in one sense of "a disease with a discharge."² And this is the meaning to be conveyed and thought of in connection with *āsava*. The discharge of the four *āsavā* is dangerous, evil and harmful; for sensual pleasures, becoming, false views and ignorance are as sores which exude their matter to the detriment of the sufferer's prospects and character. It is not so much the *desire* for the first two *āsavas*, as is sometimes said to be the case, which is harmful, as that the conditions themselves are pernicious. No doubt the desire for

¹ *The Bodhisattva Doctrine*, London, 1932, p. 116 f.

² *G.S.*, III. xv.

them is also bad, but *āsava* does not actually imply this. Sensual pleasures as such swamp the mind, deflecting it from its true course. Becoming (rebirth) as such clogs the mind, and dims the understanding that the attainment of perfection should not be postponed but should be sought here and now.

3. *Nibbāna* is a word which, because it is so heavily charged with meaning, defies an accurate translation. Any attempt to translate this word could but emphasise one aspect of it only. It was first a negative term which stood for the waning of wrong states of mind; the positive aim being then *attha*, *paramattha*, the goal.¹ But with the shrinkage of these two terms to mean nothing more than "meaning," *nibbāna* took their place as the goal. In doing so it retained its early meaning of "waning," but no longer as waning of wrong states of mind, but of the stuff of (physical) existence, so that there should be no more coming again to this state of things. It is therefore wrong to say that it means "extinction" or "annihilation." That it came to be the same as "deathlessness" or, more precisely, not-dead (*amata*),² is quite different from saying that it means extinction of the self.

4. *Dhamma* is another word which is the despair of translators. Mrs Rhys Davids has written on its

¹ See Mrs Rhys Davids, *Minor Anthologies of the Pali Canon*, p. xxxi. and cf. *Dhp.* ver. 203; *Eranos Jahrbuch*, 1935; *Indian Culture*, January 1936.

² Deathlessness (*amata*) being an abstract noun, whereas *amata*, not-dead, is not abstract.

significance at some length in her book *Sākya*. She warns us that if we see it as "Doctrine," "Norm," or "Law" we are thinking purely in terms of Monastic Buddhism. The word is older than that. In original Sākya it was not the externalised body of doctrine telling you what you might do and might think, as opposed to Vinaya, the Discipline, or *saṃvara*, the Restraint. The Vinaya consists of the Rules which were drawn up to prevent bhikkhus from doing that which they might not do. In early Sākya *dhamma* corresponded to the "moral ought," the moral, inner guide by which man recognised the divinity immanent within him, the will toward the highest, toward the right. This highest, this right, was *Dhamma*. In seeing it, one saw the Highest in man. "Enough, Vakkali! What is there in seeing this vile body of mine? He who sees *dhamma* sees me; he who sees me sees *dhamma*."¹ In one of the most famous chariot-parables in Pali literature,² *dhamma* is the driver, the directing power which is within.

"Straight" is the name that Way is called, and "Free
From fear" the Quarter whither thou art bound,
Thy chariot is the "Silent Runner" named
With wheels of Righteous Effort fitted well.
Conscience the Leaning-board; the Drapery
Is heedfulness; Dhamma the Driver is,
I tell you; Right View he who runs before.
And be it woman, be it man for whom
Such chariot doth wait, by that same car
Near to Nibbāna they shall come.

¹ S. III. 120.² S. I. 33.

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CHAPTER II

THE ARAHAN CONCEPT IN NON-BUDDHIST LITERATURE

"THE great teacher is always a reformer as well as an innovator."¹ These words of Mr Holmes are particularly applicable to Gotama, not only as a teacher, but as an inspirer of a new meaning into various old and familiar words which had been current in the philosophical and religious terminology prior to his day. He re-formed the connotation of certain words, so that they came to contain, either in addition to their old meaning or on the basis of their old meaning, a new import, a new significance in accordance with his teaching.

Lord Chalmers, in the introduction to his translation of Majjhima, draws attention to several terms which became affected and altered as they were drawn into Sākyan usage.² He says "that with practical sagacity he" (Gotama) "or they" (his followers for him) "appropriated current terms and familiar nomenclature. Thus while retaining the accepted doctrines of transmigration and 'gods,' he was the true 'brahmin' and master of the 'threefold lore'; he was the true

¹ E. Holmes, *The Creed of Buddha*, 2nd edn. London, 1919, p. vii.

² Lord Chalmers, *Further Dialogues*, vol. I. p. xxiv.

'superman' (mahāpuṭṭisa), the true 'victor' (jina), the true 'saint' (arahant), and the veritable Truthfinder (tathāgata). He borrowed from brahminism the title of Almsman (bhikkhu) for his enrolled followers, and called their enrolment (pabbajjā) after the paribbājakas (Wanderers). But in each instance he altered the connotation of the familiar words which he retained from the past, while importing into them his own novel content of meaning. The old labels were reassuring, even though the wine was a new brand."

Although I am in agreement with the gist of this passage, there are one or two points which cannot be passed by without a word of question. In the first place, it is debatable whether Gotama retained "the accepted doctrine . . . of 'gods.'" These are the devas. Now in the Upaniṣadic philosophy the devas of the Vedas, Agni the fire, Vāyu the wind, and the others had already undergone a change; and they were no longer considered to be separate entities with supreme power of operating in the "different departments of nature or to be coerced into man's service."¹ For in the monism of the Upaniṣads the devas themselves are merged into Brahma: "he himself is all the gods,"² and the worship of the gods is seen to be futile. But they remained as devas, as something different from men. Mrs Rhys Davids implies in her treatment of the devas of Śākya that the Upaniṣadic devas were not

¹ R. E. Hume, *Thirteen Principal Upanishads*, London, 1921, p. 52 ff.

² Bṛhad. I. 4. 6.

retained by the new creed. She suggests that a great change had come over the meaning of the word *deva* in the sixth century B.C., and that the devas had virtually become "fellow-men of other worlds," "brave and pious gentlemen who have passed as devas to the next world," the world of the Tidasas; or to the next world but one, the Brahmaloḥa, "only to come back (to earth) one day as men."¹ If this is the case, and I think that the Pali Scriptures give good grounds for supposing that it is, it would be truer to say, not that the doctrine of the "gods" was retained, but that it was given a new meaning. *Deva* would then take its place beside the other terms which Lord Chalmers cites as old skins filled with new wine.

In the second place, it is very doubtful whether Gotama "borrowed from brahminism the title of almsman (*bhikkhu*)," for the word *bhikkṣu* is not found in the pre-Buddhistic Upaniṣads.

With these reservations we can pass on to the term *arahāṇa*, which is the one that concerns us here. An investigation of earlier material puts the antiquity of the term beyond all doubt, showing that it is not of Buddhist origin, although it may have been one of the words appropriated by Śākya from older times. Whether this be so or not, the word undoubtedly has a long history. This ranges from the Vedic epoch through the early Buddhist period to times later still. Arahāṇa, from having meant a worthy person, a person fit for, "deserving, entitled to; able, allowed to;

¹ Mrs Rhys Davids, *Manual of Buddhism*, London, 1932, p. 92.

worthy ; venerable, respectable ; praised, celebrated,"¹ but in no specially exalted sense, grew under Monastic Buddhism to be a word of tremendous import. It was "adopted by the Buddhists as a technical term for one who has attained the Summum Bonum of religious aspiration (nibbāna)." ² It was thus possessed of the highest significance, which however it lost again under Mahāyāna Buddhism.

There are four Pali forms of the noun : arahā, arahat, and arahant, from \sqrt{arh} , and each of them is grammatically correct. The Sanskrit form of the noun *arahan* is *arhat*. The present indicative of the verb is *arhati* (Sanskrit), *arabati* (Pali), meaning "to be worthy, to deserve, to merit."³

This is akin to the Sanskrit *arghati*, Pali *agghati*, to be worth, to have the value of. This form frequently appears in a stock-phrase recurring in Pali literature : *kalaṇ nāgghati (nāgghanti) soḷasiṇ*, not to be worth the sixteenth part of. But the etymology of the word *arahan* is uncertain.

In this chapter I will attempt to give some examples of the way in which the Vedic and Sanskrit form of the noun *arahan* and of the verb *arabati* are used in the Vedas, Upaniṣads, and other pre-Buddhist literature ; and how *arhati* is used in the Bhagavadgītā ; and *arhat* in the Jaina Sūtras.

¹ Monier Williams, *A Sanskrit-English Dictionary*, Oxford, 1872 ; cf. Lord Chalmers, *Fur. Dial.* vol. I. p. 2, n. 3, "literally is worshipful." See also Mrs Rhys Davids, *Birth of Indian Psychology, etc.*, p. 346 ff.

² P.T.S. Dictionary, art. *arahant*.

³ *Ibid.* art. *arabati*.

Beginning with the Vedas as representing undoubtedly the oldest Indian literature, we find that in the R̥g-Veda, the word *arhat* is sometimes applied to the god Agni. For example, he is called the worthy one who is the sacrificer (or, he who is worthy of being the sacrificer),¹ he who has deservedly (*arhaṇa*) become the banner of the sacrifice² ; and he is mentioned under his epithet Jātadevas,³ as he to whom, as the worthy one (*arhat*), a song of praise has been sent forward, like a chariot.⁴

In pre-Buddhist days *arhat* was, however, more commonly applied to a saintly person than to a god. It probably has this meaning in two and possibly in three passages in the Śatapatha-Brāhmaṇa. One of these states that during the "guest-offering"⁵ it is argued that if people do not show respect to a worthy person (*arhat*) who has come to them, he becomes angry.⁶ But if all the inmates of the house bestir themselves when he comes, then he⁷ is honoured.⁸ Possibly, however, in these two passages *arhat* is an honorific title bestowed upon some high official, who is called worthy on account of his position in the world, rather than because his spirituality, ethical standard, or virtuous conduct is outstanding. In yet another passage the

¹ R̥g-Veda, II. 3. 3. S.B.E. XLVI.

² *Ibid.* I. 127. 6.

³ For note on this name see S.B.E. XXVI. p. xxxi ; and Berriedale Keith, *Religion and Philosophy of the Veda and Upaniṣads*, p. 160.

⁴ R̥g-Veda, I. 94. 1. S.B.E. XLVI.

⁵ *i.e.* the sacrifice to Soma.

⁶ Śat. Br. III. 4, 1, 3, S.B.E. XXVI.

⁷ Or "then Soma." The reading is not clear.

⁸ Śat. Br. III. 4, 1, 6.

term may refer to some secular person. The editor of the Satapatha Brāhmaṇa thinks that it probably means "ruler"¹ in a certain passage which states that "when-ever people cook food for some worthy person (*arhat*) then the attendants about him, the non-royal king-makers, the heralds and headmen, have their share (of the food) assigned to them after (or along with their master)."² On the other hand, *arhat* in this connection may possibly contain an obscure allusion to a leader of some religious sect, for by the period of the Brāhmaṇas these were probably a feature of Indian life. Whether it means ruler, priest, or saintly person, it is clear that he, the *arhat*, is entitled to receive respect and gifts of food, and that the word was used with little or no ethical connotation. In Buddhist days the gift of food and other alms was thought to bring merit to the donor.³

Again in the Satapatha-Brāhmaṇa the verb *arhati* is twice used in connection with Soma. In one passage it is said, "King Soma, surely, is worth more than that (*bhīyo vā atah somo rājārhati*),"⁴ and in another passage it is said, "Ye are not worthy of a Soma offering."⁵ Here the word *arhati* is used in close association with Soma, which as the drink of Indra or as the sacrifice which yields all strength and prowess and redemption from death, was held in the highest veneration and

¹ S.B.E. XXVI. p. 87, n. 3.

² Śat. Br. III. 4, 1, 8.

³ S. I. 76, 97, 100; D.I. 144.

⁴ Śat. Br. III. 3, 3, 1, S.B.E. XXVI.

⁵ Śat. Br. III. 6. 2. 19. S.B.E. XXVI.

respect by the brahmins. A Buddhist arahan is considered to possess all strength and prowess and to have achieved redemption from death (or, from repeated rebirths in Buddhist terminology). But whether the Buddhists deliberately used the connection of *arhati* with Soma as a pattern for the arahan conception, or whether *arhati* and *arahan* represent a development of ideas which was not consciously borrowed from any particular source, are questions for whose solution all definite evidence is totally lacking.

In tracing the occurrence of the verb *arhati* in the Upaniṣads (where the noun *arhat* does not seem to appear), we find that, according to Jacob's Concordance,¹ it is used five times, as follows :

- (1) A non-Brahman would not "be able" to explain this (*vevaktum arhati*).²
- (2) For who "is able" to refuse you (*bruvantam arhati*).³
- (3) Who else than I "is able" to know the god who rejoices and rejoices not (*jātum arhati*).⁴
- (4) "Be pleased" to deliver me (*udvartum arhasi*).⁵
- (5) "Would I not" have told you (*tasmānnârhamy-ahamanutamvaktum*).⁶

It is clear from the above translations that the word *arhati* as used in the Upaniṣads bears no special or

¹ G. A. Jacob, *A Concordance to the Principal Upaniṣads and Bhagavadgītā*, Bombay, 1891.

² Chāṇ. 4. 4. 5. This and the following quotations are taken from R. E. Hume's *The Thirteen Principal Upaniṣads*.

³ Brhad. 6. 2. 8.

⁴ Kaṭha. 2. 21.

⁵ Maitrī. 1. 4.

⁶ Prāśna. 6. 1.

technical meaning. Moreover, the term occurs extremely seldom, whereas in Buddhist literature it is met with constantly. This only shows that, although some of the older Upaniṣads were most probably composed before the Buddhist epoch, while some were probably contemporaneous with it, Buddhism borrowed little if anything as regards the contents of the terms *arabat* and *arabati* from Upaniṣad sources.

The verb *arhati*, according to Jacob's Concordance, occurs ten times in the Bhagavadgītā, but again in apparently no definite technical sense. As in the Upaniṣads, so in the Gītā the noun does not appear at all. Dr E. J. Thomas, in his translation of the Gītā,¹ renders the passages which contain *arhati*, as follows :

- (1) No one "can" work (*arhati kartum*) the destruction of this changeless one ;²
- (2) "Thou shouldst" not sorrow (*arhasi citum*) ;³
- (3) "Thou shouldst" not tremble (*arhasi vikam pitum*) ;⁴
- (4) "Thou shouldst" do action (*kartum arhasi*) ;⁵
- (5) "Deign," O Kṛṣṇa, to dispel (*chektum arhasi*) ;⁶
- (6) "Deign" to tell in full (*vaktum arhasi*) ;⁷
- (7) "So do thou deign" to spare me (*arhasi sodhum*) ;⁸
- (8) "So do" action (*karmakartum ihārhasi*).⁹

¹ *Song of the Lord*, Wisdom of the East Series, London, 1931.

² Gītā, II. 17.

³ *Ibid.* II. 25, 26, 27.

⁴ *Ibid.* II. 31.

⁵ *Ibid.* III. 20.

⁶ *Ibid.* VI. 39, "Deign" in (5), (6), (7), might be rendered "be pleased" as in Upaniṣad (4) above.

⁷ *Ibid.* X. 16 = Manu I. 2.

⁸ *Ibid.* XI. 44.

⁹ *Ibid.* XVI. 24.

It is, I think, apparent that in the Gītā, *arhati* connoted nothing exalted, and nothing even so definite as it does in the supposedly early Buddhist records. It might be argued that the non-technical use of the word in the Gītā helps to prove that the Song was prior to the rise of Buddhism. But at a quite early date there was a number of technical terms, and it does not follow that, whatever the date of the Gītā, the work would have had the same sense there as it came to have under Monastic Buddhism. Even if it were later than Buddhism, all that would then be certain would be that the Gītā had not grafted on to its doctrine any coherent notion of the arahan, whether derived from Buddhist or other sources.

I do not think, therefore, that the use of the word *arhati* in the Gītā can be taken as providing any evidence for the date of this work, which, as Vincent Smith remarks, is "quite uncertain."¹

Dasgupta cites² Senart and Bühler as acknowledging that the Gītā is of great antiquity, while he bases his own arguments on those of Telang. Garbe considers that Telang's reasonings are baseless. Telang devotes the major portion of the introduction to his prose version of the Gītā³ to a consideration of the vexed question of its date. His arguments are

¹ Vincent Smith, *The Oxford History of India*, 2nd edn. Oxford, 1928, p. 32. The various theories as to the date of the Gītā are admirably set forth by E. Lamotte in his *Notes sur la Bhagavadgītā*, Paris, 1929.

² *A History of Indian Philosophy*, vol. II. p. 550.

³ S.B.E. VIII.

based upon an examination of internal evidence, and he says that "the various items falling under that heading may be marshalled into four groups."¹ He finds that "the work bears on the face of it very plain marks indicating that it belongs to an age prior to the system-making age of Sanskrit philosophy." This may very well be, but it would not necessarily follow that it was therefore pre-Buddhist. Secondly, he finds that the style of the *Gītā* is "quite archaic in its simplicity," and that some words are no longer used in the classical literature with the significance they bear in the *Gītā*. Personally I do not find this line of argument very convincing, since a particular linguistic style may have lasted through several centuries. Thirdly, he finds that, although the versification of the *Gītā* marks an advance in metrical scheme upon that of the Vedic *Śaṅhitās*, "there are still sundry verses which do not so conform."² Fourthly, Telang finds that the attitude taken in the *Gītā* towards the Vedas, the identity of a few *Gītā* stanzas with some Upaniṣadic stanzas, and the view taken in the *Gītā* of caste, all point to the fact that it is contemporary with the Upaniṣads. But this is a very vague conclusion. The composition of the Upaniṣads is almost certainly a work which occupied centuries; and Telang does not say whether he considers the *Bhagavadgītā* to be contemporary with the earlier or with the later Upaniṣads. I think that Garbe gives the true explanation: that the *Gītā* is a patchwork of older material, edited.

¹ S.B.E. VIII. p. 7.

² *Ibid.* p. 15.

In the introduction to his translation of the *Gītā*, Garbe says¹ that the Song as we have it is composed of some older material which he calls the genuine *Gītā*, and of some other material added at a later date. This later part, Garbe thinks, consists in the theistic doctrine of Kṛṣṇa as the sole Highest God, the creator and ruler of the world; and as he sees it, this has been grafted on to the pantheistic doctrine of the Vedānta, which he considers to be beyond all question earlier. Garbe brings forward other evidence based mainly on linguistic considerations for fixing the date of the revised version of the *Gītā*. His evidence for the age of the genuine *Gītā* is based on *Gītā* IV. 1-3, which mentions the decadence of the Yoga system; and Garbe thinks that this may correspond with an historical reality. He further thinks that it would have been impossible to put these verses into the mouth of Kṛṣṇa if Yoga had already received the new life infused into it by the composition of Patañjali's *Yoga-Sūtras*. He therefore reasons that the author of the genuine *Gītā* lived before Patañjali, presumably in the first half of the second century B.C.; for Garbe considers that the contents and language of the *Gītā* are against a much earlier date. He concludes, "Nach meiner Ansicht stammt also die ursprüngliche *Gītā* aus der ersten Hälfte des 2. Jahrhunderts vor Chr. und die Umarbeitung des Gedichts aus dem 2. Jahrhundert nach Chr."²

Following the conclusions arrived at by Garbe and

¹ R. Garbe, *Die Bhagavadgītā*, Leipzig, 1905, intr.

² *Loc. cit.* 64.

those arrived at by Dr Thomas, who says that "the Gītā is later than the great movement represented by the early Upaniṣads, and earlier than the period when the orthodox philosophic systems were expounded in sūtras,"¹ the question of the relation of the Gītā to Buddhism may appear superfluous. But in the absence of any indubitable proof of the age of the Gītā the question is perhaps legitimate. The answer shows with a certain amount of decisiveness that were the Gītā either earlier than Buddhism or later than Buddhism, each seems to have arisen in ignorance of the other. The Gītā does not mention Sakyamuni, or the movement now known as Buddhism; and the Buddhist records do not mention the Gītā. Neither do they mention Kṛṣṇa, whose conversation with Arjuna at the beginning of the battle constitutes the Bhagavadgītā. Nor does the Gītā, as Dr Thomas points out,² make any "reference to particular anti-brahminical systems like Buddhism." He goes on to say that "this only shows that it" (the Gītā) "was not in any close contact with them." Now the worship of Kṛṣṇa originated in the west of India, whereas Buddhism originated in the east. Again, the action of the Gītā is laid in "the field of right, the Kuru field"³ (Kurukshetra), near where the modern city of Delhi stands, and where it is not likely that Buddhism in its beginnings would have penetrated. For even if the Gītā and Buddhism both originated about the period of the composition of the later Upaniṣads, time must be allowed for such teachings to become well

¹ *Song of the Lord*, p. 12.

² *Ibid.*

³ Gītā, I. 1.

established in their place of origin, and also for their fame and importance to spread to districts farther afield. Again, if the Gītā, original and remodelled, were posterior to Buddhism, the apparent ignorance of the Buddhist "repeaters" concerning Kṛṣṇa and the Bhagavadgītā itself would be understandable. Indeed, had Buddhism been acquainted with the Gītā, I think it reasonable to suppose that the Song would have been mentioned in Buddhist writings, for they mention sixty-two other heretical sects.

Against this negative evidence may be adduced the fact that Buddhism and the Gītā occupy some ground in common. Both are protests against the authority of the Veda, and both are protests against caste distinctions; but on these topics the Gītā is not so wholehearted as Buddhism. Further, Telang in the footnotes to his prose translation draws attention to coincidences in doctrines between the Gītā and Buddhist writings. His references are mostly to the Sutta-Nipāta, with a very few to the Dhammapada, translations of which¹ were apparently the only Buddhist works to which he had access. Lord Chalmers considers that three portions of the Sutta-Nipāta, namely, the Aṭṭhakavagga, the Pārāyanavagga and the Khaggavisāṇasutta, are among the oldest portions of the Buddhist Canon.²

¹ Telang used M. C. Swamy's translation of the Sutta-Nipāta, London, 1874.

² Lord Chalmers, *Buddha's Teachings, being the Sutta-Nipāta or Discourse-Collection*, Harvard Oriental Series, vol. 37, Cambridge, Mass., 1932, p. xv. f.

The discovery of similar passages in the *Gītā* and in these portions of *Sutta-Nipāta*, and nowhere else in Buddhist literature, would indeed have had the appearance of a possible clue for dating the *Gītā*, and for dating it within narrow limits. But the *Sutta-Nipāta* passages which Telang compares with the *Gītā* passages are not confined to those parts of the *Sutta-Nipāta* which Lord Chalmers suggests are older, but are scattered throughout the whole work, only five occurring in the *Khaggavisāṇasutta*, and none in the *Aṭṭhaka* and *Pārāyana Vaggaś*. Moreover, these passages are not peculiar to the *Sutta-Nipāta*, but are repeated, if not word for word, then in substance, in many other Pali works. Nor do they reflect any particularly Buddhist teaching, but appear to be common to India's heritage of thought, and in all probability have the Upaniṣads or some other teaching, as their fount. For example, the necessity of solitude for the man intent upon salvation, the eradication of anger and all wrong states of mind, the uprooting of indolence, the vanity of grieving, the notion of karma, the desirability of release from rebirth are all doctrines which antedate Buddhism—and the *Gītā*. Moreover, some of the *Gītā* and Pali passages which Telang compares are not really so similar as he thought them. Much canonical and commentarial material has been edited since Telang made his translation of the *Gītā*, and some of these passages have now to be rendered in quite a different way from that adopted (by Swamy) sixty years ago. Thus *āraddhaviṛiya* can now no longer

be translated, "possessed of courage" as Telang, following Swamy, thought, but "putting forth energy" or "stirring up energy."¹ Undoubtedly some of these similarities are interesting, but I do not think that as evidence for borrowing (which is not, however, what Mr Telang suggests) they can be considered.


In the absence of any positive evidence, we must conclude that such "coincidences" must be looked upon as coincidences and as nothing more. Thus until sufficient evidence is forthcoming on which to establish the date of the *Gītā*, it is best to assume that it and Buddhism "were alike the outward manifestation of one and the same spiritual upheaval which shook to its centre the current religion,"² and that they arose, whether contemporaneously or not, independently of one another. In this case it would be profitless for our present purpose to try further to elucidate the meaning of *arhati* as used in the *Gītā*. It is sufficient to mention its occurrence in the Song, but as a word which has no special significance.

In studying the history of Jainism it is found that, however much or however little else it has in common with Buddhism, these two creeds are alike in so far as both ascribe the same epithets to their great teachers: Jina, Arhat, Mahāvīra, Sarvajña, Sugata, Tathāgata, Siddha, Buddha, Sambuddha, Parinibbuta, Mukta, etc., as has been noted by Jacobi.³ This authority goes on

¹ Sn. 68.

² S.B.E. VIII. p. 25.

³ *Jaina Sūtras*, vol. I. ed. H. Jacobi, S.B.E. XXII. p. xix.



to say that "all these words occur more or less frequently in the writings of both sects; but there is this difference, that with the exception of Jina and perhaps Sramaṇa, the preference is given to some sets of titles by one sect, and to another set by the rival sect." Jacobi does not comment upon arhat as an epithet of the two teachers. Yet Gotama is more often designated by the epithet arahan than by any other name, whereas the Jain leader is most often referred to as Jina and Mahāvīra. He is but seldom called by his name, which was Vardhamāna.

Jacobi, in the introduction to volume I. of his translation of the Jaina Sūtras, is at pains to prove that the Jains did not borrow anything from the Buddhists; and it is by now fairly well agreed by those competent to judge that Mahāvīra¹ had begun his teaching before Gotama attained his so-called enlightenment. Also that Mahāvīra was a reformer rather than an innovator. That is to say, he was a leader of the religion now called Jainism, although this had been founded before his day. If it did not originate in the very remote past, as Jaina tradition holds, it is fairly certain that it was founded by Pārśva, whom the Jains claim as their twenty-third Tīrthāṅkara,² Mahāvīra being the twenty-fourth. Jacobi notes "the common

¹ Identified with Nigaṇṭha Nātaputta of the Pali texts—Nātaputta being the Pali equivalent of the Prākṛit Jñātriputra. Mahāvīra's father belonged to the clan of the Jñātri-Kshatriyas.

² The name applied by the Jains to the revealers of their religion. Lit. a ford-maker (through the ocean of saṃsāra).

tradition that Mahāvīra came 250 years after Pārśva," whom he believes to have been an historical personage.

It is further agreed that Vesālī¹ was a flourishing centre of the Jains. It is also beyond doubt that Gotama and his followers often stayed here. It would therefore seem as if some intercommunication between the two sects, some exchange of ideas, to which in fact the Pali texts make references, together with several accounts of conversions of Jains to Buddhism, did actually take place. In view of these Buddhist references to the Jains, it is most curious that no mention of the Buddhists is apparent in the Jain sacred literature. Jacobi explains this by saying² that, "If the sects of the Bauddhas and Jains were of equal antiquity . . . we should expect either sect mentioned in the books of their opponents. But this is not the case. The Nigranthas³ are frequently mentioned by the Buddhists, even in the oldest parts of the *Piṭakas*. But I have not yet met with a distinct mention of the Buddhhas in any of the old Jaina *Sūtras*, though they contain lengthy legends about Jamālī, Gosāla, and other heterodox teachers. . . . It follows that the Nigranthas were considered by the Buddhhas an important sect, whilst the Nigranthas could ignore their adversaries. . . . We are

¹ For a long note on Vesālī, see A. R. F. Hoernle, *Uvāsagadasāo*, vol. II. Bibliotheca Indica, Calcutta, 1888, p. 3, n. 8.

² Jacobi, I. A. IX. p. 161.

³ Sanskrit, Nigrantha; Prākṛit, Niggantha; Pali, Nigaṇṭha: a name by which the Jains were often called, meaning lit.: "without fetters."

driven to the conclusion that the Nigranthas were not a newly-founded sect in Buddha's time." But the matter of the Upāli Sutta¹ is referred to in the Jaina Aṅgas,² which looks as if each was drawing from some common source.

It would not, however, be possible to say with any degree of exactitude to what extent the Buddhists took over any particular word from the Jains, or, in the absence of evidence, the Jains from the Buddhists. Thus we cannot say whether the word arhat was in use first among the Jains, which, however, considering their almost certain historical priority, seems probable, or first among the Buddhists. And should it have been in use first among the Jains, we have no certain knowledge that the Buddhists borrowed it from them, although this seems possible. Another possibility will at once present itself, namely, that both sects derived this word from the terminology of the brahmins.

— We can only examine the sense which the term arhat carries in Jaina literature, before going on to the more lengthy and intricate investigation of the mighty scope of arahan in Pali literature. The only certain thing is that if the first Sākyans adopted this word from the Jains, under their system it developed a far greater and deeper significance than it possessed under Jainism, or under any other teaching.

It may be mentioned, for example, that Hemacandra describes an arhat as one "entitled to the homage of

¹ M. Sta. 56.

² S.B.E. XLV. pp. xvi.-xvii.

gods and men,"¹ which is far from completing the Monastic Buddhist concept as it came to be. But this phrase is probably intended to describe only one aspect of the Jaina arhat.

A more important quotation, from the Jaina Sūtras, is this,² "All arhats, and bhagavats of the past, present, and future all say thus . . . all breathing, existent, living, sentient creatures should not be slain, nor treated with violence, nor abused, nor tormented, nor driven away." This is the first of the precepts binding on the Jain ascetics. It is also the first of the ten precepts for Buddhist bhikkhus, and the first of the precepts binding the Buddhist lay-followers. Jacobi shows,³ I think conclusively, that both Jains and Buddhists borrowed their major precepts from the brahman ascetics (*sannyāsin*), for whom abstention from injury to any living being was also the first of the major rules. In the above quotation from the Jaina Sūtras the arhats are spoken of as existing in the past, present, and future, and also as sanctioning and upholding the first and most fundamental Jain precept. They were therefore looked upon as highly important beings.

In the Kalpasūtra there is also a long litany of praise to arhats and bhagavats,⁴ as follows: "Reverence to the arhats and bhagavats; to the beginning-makers, the ford-makers, the perfectly enlightened ones; to the

¹ Hemacandra, *Abhidhānacintāmaṇi*, chap. I. vv. 24-25, quoted by Shah, *Jainism in North India*, London, 1932, p. 2.

² *Jaina Sūtras*, vol. I. p. 36. S.B.E. XXII.

³ S.B.E. XXII. p. xxii.

⁴ *Jaina Sūtras*, vol. I. p. 224.

highest of men, the lions among men, the flowers among mankind,¹ the great perfumed ones among men; to the highest in the world, the guides of the world, the benefactors of the world, the lights of the world, the enlighteners of the world; to the givers of safety, to the givers of sight, to the givers of shelter, to the givers of life, to the givers of knowledge; to the givers of Dharma, the preachers of Dharma, the lords of Dharma, the leaders of Dharma, the universal emperors of best Dharma; to the light, the help, the shelter, the refuge, the resting-place, the possessors of unchecked knowledge and intuition who have got rid of unrighteousness; to the conquerors and granters of conquest, the saved and the saviours, the enlightened and the enlighteners, the liberated and the liberators, to the all-knowing ones, to the all-seeing ones, to those who have reached the happy, stable, unstained, infinite, imperishable, undecaying place, called the path of perfection, whence there is no return; reverence to the Jinās who have conquered fear."

This passage descriptive of the Jain arhat bears so many affinities with stock descriptions of Monastic Buddhism's enlightened one, whom we now call the Buddha, that it is difficult to believe that there was not some borrowing, and if so, it is more than likely that the Buddhists, being later, would have borrowed from the Jains. Although I hope to adduce passages later to show the humble beginnings of the word *arahān* in

¹ "The text has, literally, the best lotus among men," vol. I, 224, n. 2.

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ಅರಹಣ ಶಬ್ದ (೧೦-ನೇ)
ಅರಹಣ.

Pali literature, it must be admitted that these passages are much rarer than those denoting the arahān as a finished product. It therefore seems to me highly probable that the Buddhists heard this or some similar passages cited by the Jains, and that these descriptions may well have been influential in moulding the Buddhist concept of the arahān.

Again Pārśva, whom the Jains recognise as the Tīrthāṅkara immediately preceding Mahāvīra, is referred to in that portion of the Kalpasūtra dealing with his life¹ as "the arhat Pārśva, the people's favourite."² Jacobi, in a note on this expression says, "purisādāmya, explained: who is to be chosen among men because of his preferable karman." Hence it seems as if arhat meant a worthy man here, especially if it be remembered that the Jains attach more importance to karma than do, for example, the Buddhists. Since in the Sūtras Pārśva is referred to as an arhat, it is possible that the Buddhists also heard the Jains speak of him, using this epithet. I do not wish, however, to suggest that this was necessarily the case, especially in view of the fact that Rhys Davids, in his translation of the Dīgha,³ calls in question the evidence adduced by Jacobi. Jacobi bases this evidence⁴ on what he considers a "significant mistake" made by the Buddhist compilers of the Dīgha,⁵ and

¹ *Jaina Sūtras*, vol. I. p. 271 ff.

² This is Jacobi's translation. Charpentier, C.H.I. vol. I. p. 144, says that it may either mean this or "the man of high birth."

³ *Dial.* vol. I. p. 75, n. 1.

⁴ *Jaina Sūtras*, vol. II. p. xxi.

⁵ D. I. 57 f.

which he thinks shows that followers of Pârsva existed at the time of Mahāvīra, and that the Buddhists heard a certain creed from them even before the reforms of Mahāvīra had been generally adopted.

It is noteworthy that in an Ācārāṅga passage describing the venerable ascetic Mahāvīra's attainment of nirvāṇa, "the complete, the full, the unobstructed, unimpeded, infinite, and supreme, best knowledge and intuition called *kevala*," he is also called an arhat. "When the Venerable One had become an Arhat and a Jina, he was a *kevalin*, omniscient and comprehending all objects, he knew all conditions of the world, of gods, men, and demons; whence they come, where they go, whether they are born as men or animals (*kyavana*), or become gods or hell-beings (*upapāda*); their food, drink, doings, desires, open and secret deeds, their conversation and gossip, and the thoughts of their minds; he saw and knew all conditions in the whole world of all living beings."¹ This passage occurs also in the Kalpasūtra, but with an enlarged ending: "he, the Arhat, from whom there is no secret, knew and saw all conditions of living beings in the world, what they thought, spoke, or did at any moment."² This is an entirely intellectual conception of the arhat which, although by no means absent from the Monastic Buddhist conception, is not the whole of it.

¹ S.B.E. XXII. p. 201 f.

² *Ibid.* p. 263-264.

However, Shah quotes from Meyer¹ a canonical Jaina passage which ascribes other attributes to the arhat: "The Arhat, who is free from love, hatred, and delusion,² who knows everything, who is endowed with the right miraculous powers, who wears the form of the supreme god of gods, may he grant me a sight of himself"—a passage in which every description has its counterpart in the Buddhist descriptions of the arahān. It is certainly tempting to believe that such affinities are more than coincidences.

On the other hand, the views of Charpentier must be briefly stated. He appears to consider³ that "the whole doctrine and mode of life adopted by the Buddhists was too widely different from that of the Jains to give occasion for more than somewhat temporary relations." He would, therefore, perhaps think, since he states that rivalry and hatred existed between Buddhists and Jains and that they did their best to annoy one another, that any borrowing by one from the other would have been out of the question.

I think that Charpentier puts his case too strongly. Although the Jain mode of life may have differed in some respects, such as in not wearing clothes (Digambaras), from the Buddhist bhikkhus' way of life, in others, such as their both being monastic systems, there were similarities.

¹ Shah, *loc. cit.* p. 71, quoting J. J. Meyer, *Hindu Tales*, London, 1909, p. 105.

² Cf. the Buddhist *rāga*, *dosa*, *moha*, the three stains which being wiped out denote nibbāna. S. III. 160; IV. 251.

³ C.H.I. vol. I. p. 161 f.

There were similarities also in the teachings. Both laid stress on the subduing of desires and attachment ; and the five major moral precepts binding on those who had entered the Jain Order agree very nearly with the first five major precepts binding on those who had entered the Buddhist Order. And since there were affinities in their ethical outlook, the borrowing of words and the development of words along similar lines would probably not have been an obnoxious proceeding to either sect.

But in this development of the word arahān and arhat, there is one remarkable difference between the Jain and the Buddhist usage. It will be clear from the above quotations that, to the Jain, an Arhat means one of the revealers of the religion. Jacobi confirms this : "Arhat, Bhagavat, Jina, etc., are titles common to all Tīrthakaras,"¹ and Bühler is in agreement with this view.² Hence the invocation with which the Kalpasūtra opens, "obeisance to the arhats, obeisance to the liberated ones," etc., as well as those (later) inscriptions found on Jain monuments which invoke arhats, must be taken as referring to the Tīrthāṅkaras,³ and not

¹ E.R.E. vol. VII. p. 467.

² Bühler, *The Indian Sect of the Jainas*, trans. Burgess, London, 1903, p. 1 ff.

³ Hence I cannot agree that Mon Mohan Chakravarti's interpretation of some Jain monuments is correct. He says, "only the Tīrthāṅkaras are nude. . . . Females, Kings, *Devas*, Arhats . . . are generally represented dressed." What Chakravarti calls Arhats may possibly be Śvetāmbara ascetics. Quoted by Shah, *loc. cit.* p. 73.

to any followers in the faith, no matter to what degree of eminence they had attained. As far as I know, no passage in the Jaina texts sets before the monks and nuns the ideal or arhatship as a goal to be attained, either in this life, or in future births. Down the ages there can only be, according to Jainism, a limited number of the revealers of the religion ; and it is they, and they alone, who are the Arhats. In this way Jainism differs widely from Buddhism, where the attainment of arahanship was the great aim of every man or woman leading the religious life. The aim of Mahāvīra's followers was nirvāṇa, and the means to attain this was said to be asceticism. It is only fair, however, to say that the Jaina Aṅgas, as we have them now, are relatively late, and hence are not only "edited" but possibly rewritten after destruction by fire. Hence we do not know to what extent asceticism was a feature of original Jainism, or to what extent references to asceticism were introduced into the Aṅgas, when and if these were rewritten after the fire. Yet some of the converts from Jainism to Buddhism are recorded as having spoken of the austerities practised by them when they were disciples of Mahāvīra. Bhaddā Kuṇḍalakesā says that she was "hairless, dirt-laden, wearing one garment."¹ And Nanduttarā refers to the hardships she endured in her former religious exercises.²

" . . . I shaved one half my head,
Nor laid me down to rest save on the earth,
Nor ever broke my fast at close of day."

¹ Thig. 107.

² Thig. 88.

Under Gotama it was taught that mental development and self-mastery, of which it was believed that every monk and nun was potentially capable, would bring the aspirant into the presence of *nibbāna*, and *ipso facto* to *arabatta*, the state of being an arahan. Thus in the Jain system, the term Arhat was reserved for the Tirthaṅkaras; but in the Buddhist system arahan was applicable to others, and they were many, besides the greatest Teacher himself.

CHAPTER III

THE ARAHAN CONCEPT: ITS NON-BUDDHIST USE IN THE PĪṬAKAS

SOMETHING has now been said of the significance attaching to the terms *arhat* and *arhati* in various non-Buddhist literary remains which are believed to date from a pre-Buddhist period, or from an epoch contemporaneous with the rise of Buddhism in India.

Before proceeding to the main topic of this book, the Early Buddhist theory of the Araham, it may be interesting to note a few passages in the Pali Canon where the verb *arabati* and the noun *arahan* are used either by non-Buddhists thought to be contemporaries of Gotama, or used by followers of Gotama but in a non-Buddhist sense. In this way some light may be thrown on the development of the word under Buddhism, since possible sources of borrowings will be brought within reach of Gotama's own time and place.

The verb is less interesting semantically than the noun. It is found now and again in the Pali Canon, used both by non-Buddhists and by the followers of Gotama. Yet these occasions do not mark any great change from the sense that *arhati* apparently bears in earlier literature, such as the Upaniṣads. For example,

Upaka, an Ājīvika, seems to use it in this earlier way when he is recorded to have said to Gotama, "You should be a Universal Conqueror (*arabasi anantajino*).¹ In yet other passages in the Pali texts judged to be among the oldest, the verb *arabati* retains its pre-Buddhist meaning of to be fit or worthy, to deserve. In the Dhammapada *arabati* is used with the negative to denote a man who is unfit or unworthy to wear the yellow robe;² and again to denote one who is fit or worthy to wear it.³ And in a third Dhammapada verse it is asked who is fit to blame a man of flawless life.⁴ Hence in none of these cases is *arabati* used in any special sense.

The meaning of *arabati* as "to be fit" is well brought out in a passage in the Dīgha,⁵ where Soṇadaṇḍa the brahmin is recorded to have said, "we are fit to (*mayham arabāma*) go and see the Lord Gotama, but it is not fit for (*na arabati*) the Lord to come and see us."

In the Sutta-Nipāta it is said that Māra is fit (*arabati*) to speak to those who lack "merit."⁶ In the Saṃyutta, Somā is represented as giving an unflinching reply to the jibes of Māra.⁷ She tells him that he is only fit to talk to those who think that men alone are capable of rightly understanding dhamma, with its consequence, the attainment of arahanship; and she declares that woman's nature is no hindrance to this. The inference

¹ M. I. 171; Vin. I. 8, referred to at ThigA. 220, which both read *arab'asi*.

² Dh. 9.

³ D. I. 114; cf. pp. 115, 113.

⁴ Dh. 10.

⁵ Sn. 431.

⁶ Dh. 230.

⁷ S. I. 129.

is that Māra is not fit to speak to those who maintain that there is no sex-barrier in this matter. Again in the Sutta-Nipāta¹ Sela the brahmin is made to praise Gotama, saying to him, "You are worthy to (or deserve to or should) become a king," the reference here being to the worldly and not to the religious status. It is noteworthy that in a Jātaka passage also, the older connection of *arabati* with important people is apparent.² A certain minister had committed some indiscretion in the women's quarters of the palace. The King of Benares sent for him and said, "Thou art not worthy (*arabasi*) to live in my kingdom," and dismissed him. Here again the reference is to the worldly status.

In these occurrences of the verb *arabati*, it might just as well, if not better, have been translated by "should" or "should not." As far as I know, the verb never gained the tremendous significance with which the noun soon came to be impregnated. In a word, it never came to mean "is perfect" or anything comparable to this, as the noun came to mean "a man perfected."

The arahan concept must now be traced to its possible sources, as these appear in Pali Canonical writings.

A Cūlavagga passage³ depicts a *seṭṭhi*⁴ of Rājagaha causing a sandalwood bowl to be hoisted high up in the air on the top of a succession of bamboo poles, and then making it be known: "If any samaṇa or brāhmaṇa

¹ Sn. 552.

² Vin. II. 210-211.

³ Jā. I. 262.

⁴ Great merchant.

be an *arabā* and possessed of supernormal powers (*iddhimā*), let him get down the bowl." Accordingly six men went one after the other to the *seṭṭhi*, and each declared that he was an *arabā* and possessed of supernormal powers, but none of these was apparently able to get down the bowl. For the *Cūlavagga* states that this feat was accomplished by Piṇḍola Bhāradvāja,¹ one of Gotama's followers. The other six men who had approached the *seṭṭhi* were the renowned leaders of six of the heretical sects opposed to Buddhism.² Their names are: Pūraṇa Kassapa, who held the theory of

¹ At A. I. 23 he is called topmost of those who roar the lion's roar. In the *Cmy.*, AA. I. 198, the Vinaya legend is cited; cf. *Pss. Brethren*, pp. 110, 415; S. IV. 110 (SA. II. 393) and K.S. IV. 68, n.

² These six are mentioned at D. I. 47 ff.; D. II. 150; Sn. p. 92; M.I. 198, 250; II. 2; S. I. 68; IV. 398; Jā. I. 509; V. 246 (Saṅjaya omitted); Miln. 4.

They were well known, reputed teachers, each with a large following. At most of these passages they are referred to in a stock-phrase, in which they are described, among other things, as *tiṭṭhakara* (= *tīrthāṅkara*, which in Jaina literature is the name applied to the revealers of the religion). In Pali *tiṭṭha* means a landing-place, a ford, and one of the secondary meanings is "unsound view," or the teacher of it. See J.P.T.S. 1913-14, p. 117, n. 5. In the *Cmys.* on these passages *tiṭṭhakara* = *laddhikara*, tenet- or opinion- or hypothesis-makers, usually translated "founders of a sect," but by Mrs Rhys Davids, K.S. I. 93, "theorisers." At M. II. 2, they are also called *bhagavant*, Lords, a "style commonly appropriated by Gotama's disciples for their master," see *Fur. Dial.* II. p. 2, note. The *Cmy.* on this passage (MA. III. 236) says that Pūraṇa Kassapa is a "bhagavā, inasmuch as distinguishing thirty-eight conditions (*ārammaṇāni*) he made many fords for going down to nibbāna."

non-action (*akiriyaṇ vyākāsi*), and who, according to Buddhaghosa, was one of the teachers who went about naked; ¹ Makkhali Gosāla, ² the non-causationist (*ahetu-vādiṇ*), who was the leader of the Ājīvika (Naked Ascetics) sect; Ajita-Kesakambali, who went about in a hair-shirt, and was an annihilationist ³; Pakudha Kaccāyana, who held the doctrine of non-creation; ⁴

¹ The legend of how he lost his clothes is told below, p. 91. For his theory, see D. I. 53, and cf. Vin. I. 234 = III. 2; A. I. 62; *Dial.* I. 70; K.S. III. 168. He therefore saw no harm in killing, S. I. 66.

² The legend of how he lost his clothes is given at DA. I. 143 f. = MA. II. 233. He had been a follower of Mahāvīra, and they had led a life of asceticism together for six years, when a doctrinal difference arose between them and they separated. He henceforth became as great a rival of Mahāvīra as he was of Gotama. Gotama considered him to be one of the worst of the sophists: cf. A. I. 33; S. I. 66. At A. I. 286 he is called *moghapurisa*, a foolish man. In the *Uvāsagadasāo* (Hoernle's edn. vol. ii. p. 108 = D. I. 53) his theory is stated only to be overthrown. There are many other references to him in Jaina literature. And for a long and interesting note giving non-Pali references to Gosāla, and an account of his life, including his relations with Mahāvīra, etc., see A. F. R. Hoernle, *Uvāsagadasāo*, Calcutta, 1888, vol. ii. p. 108, n. 253, and Appendix II. of the same work.

³ *Kesakambalin* means "wearing a hair blanket." In the case of Ajita this was made, according to Bu., DA. I. 144 = MA. II. 233, from human hair. His maxims occur at D. I. 55; M. I. 287, 515; A. I. 268; IV. 226; V. 265. His doctrine is also given at *Sūtrakṛitāṅga*, II. 1. 22, *Jaina Sūtras*, II. 343 (S.B.E. XLV.). Part of D. I. 55 = *Sūtrakṛitāṅga* II. 1. 15. For comparison in readings of the Pali and Prakrit texts, see *Jaina Sūtras*, II. p. xxiv. n. 2.

⁴ He was an ascetic who held that there were seven uncreated impermanent things—the four elements, pleasure, pain, and the soul. D. I. 56, and see *Jaina Sūtras*, II. p. xxiv.

Sañjaya Belatthiputta, the "eel-wiggler";¹ and Nigaṇṭha Nātaputta, who was the leader of the Jains.²

This legend doubtless purports to show that only a Sākya of a certain spiritual status would be able to perform so difficult a task as fetching down the bowl from its lofty position; and that the leaders of other sects, although claiming to be arahans were, in reality, nothing of the kind.

To the historian this passage is interesting in two ways. First, an intensive study of the doctrines of two of these heretical teachers shows that, although, so far as I am aware, they did not themselves use the word arahan in their teachings, yet the idea of this was not totally absent. According to the Uvāsagadasāo³ and the Dīgha,⁴ the Law of Gosāla Makkhaliputta says that "there is no such thing as exertion or labour or power or vigour or manly strength, but that all things are unalterably fixed" by fate (*niyati*)—the fruit of the

¹ He was a Wanderer (Vin. I. 39) and an eel-wiggler (D. I. 58, and cf. *Jaina Sūtras*, II. p. xxvi., where Jacobi calls him an agnostic). Jacobi thinks that "Agnosticism seems to have prepared the way for the Buddhist doctrine of nirvāṇa," on the grounds that Gotama was always loath to express any views on this, *loc. cit.* xxviii. Barua, p. 319 (see next n.) warns us against confusing Agnostic with Sceptic. Before they became Gotama's disciples, Sāriputta and Moggallāna had been Sañjaya's followers (Vin. I. 39).

² Nātaputta is Mahāvīra, the Jain leader, see above, Ch. I. Anyone wishing to know more about these six leaders of thought should consult B. Barua, *A History of pre-Buddhist Indian Philosophy*, Calcutta, 1921.

³ Vol. ii. p. 108, from which the following quotation is taken.

⁴ D. I. 53.

life of a samaṇa being, according to the Dīgha's interpretation of Makkhali's doctrine,¹ purification during saṃsāra (*saṃsārasuddhi*). In Appendix II. to the Uvāsagadasāo, Hoernle states that by denying *attakāra*, *parakāra*, *purisakāra*, *balan*, *viriyān*, *purisatthāma*, and *purisaparakkama*, Gosāla is denying that mankind can attain "human happiness and all other conditions including arhat-ship," either by the exertions of others or by the effort of the individual. Since Gotama's teaching was sometimes polemical, it is possible that the attempt to overthrow such denials as these by positive affirmations was instrumental in leading him to characterise the arahan as the man who, by his own efforts and those of others, by putting forth strength and energy and by being steadfast attains to the highest perfection. It is curious that, in the Anguttara,² Gotama on hearing a "brahman" deny *attakāra* and *parakāra* says that he has never heard or seen such a doctrine, such a view. This Anguttara passage, however, although it resembles Makkhali's doctrine, is not the same. "That was a denial of effective causation. This is a denial of the causer, the man, the invisible spiritual being, the soul, the self. And we have Gotama denying all knowledge of this denial, which he is by most writers declared to have made his central doctrine."³ He proceeds to show the "brahman" that the denial is absurd, by getting him to agree (which he seems perfectly willing to do) that there is such a thing as initiative (*ārabh-badhātu*), and that men are known to initiate; and then

¹ D. I. 54.

² A. III. 337 f.

³ G.S. III. intr: p. xii.

stating that "this is among men the self-agency, this is the other-agency."

Ajita-Kesakambali is another heterodox teacher whose doctrine may perhaps contain a suggestion on which the future theory of the arahān was partly based. His doctrine included the maxim that there are no *samaṇas* or *brāhmaṇas* who are *sammaggata*, a word which Lord Chalmers translates as "triumphantly walk aright,"¹ and Rhys Davids as "gone to the highest point."² Rhys Davids points out³ that Buddhaghosa gives no explanation of this word: this is true of both the *Sumaṅgala-vilāsinī* and the *Papañcasūdanī*⁴ versions. But, as Rhys Davids goes on to say, "the *Jātaka Commentary* on *Jāt. III. 305* says it means the man who has attained the highest fruit, that is, arahatship." If this is the correct interpretation, Kesakambali is implicitly denying the existence of arahāns. At all events he is denying the existence of people who have become perfected, whether these were called arahāns or not at the time when Kesakambali formulated his doctrine. In such a denial he might have given Gotama a handle for his affirmation of the opposite view. This is the more plausible because of a *Saṃyutta* passage⁵ which states that "as compared with these teachers" (meaning the six who have been mentioned above), "Gotama is young in years and a novice in the life of religion." Thus before Gotama began to build up his arahān

¹ Lord Chalmers, *Fur. Dial. I. p. 364*, cf. p. 202.

² *Dial. I. 73.*

⁴ *MA. II. 332.*

³ *Dial. I. 73*, n. 2.

⁵ *S. I. 68.*

concept he may easily have been acquainted with words such as *sammaggata*, and later have found it convenient to incorporate them into his arahān concept. *Sammaggata* is certainly used in Buddhist literature as a synonym for an arahān,¹ and this not merely in those passages where Gotama is affirming the direct opposite, word for word, of what Kesakambali denied.²

The *Vinaya* passage about the *setṭhi* and his bowl is also historically interesting, for it indicates that, at some early date, the notion of arahān was connected with that of supernormal powers. The display of these would easily impress the many-folk (*puthujjana*), who are always more ready to compute worth by unusual physical prowess than by outstanding mental achievements. It cannot, therefore, be said that this *Cūlavagga* passage is representative of the term *arahā* as it came to be under Early Buddhism. But since a parallel, outer and inner, bodily and mental, often runs through Gotama's teaching, it may be that the reality on which this legend is based provided some initial data for the elaboration of the Buddhist arahān concept.

The term arahān is apparently used again in connection with those people who are able to perform mystic wonders, and again this is in a long passage in the *Vinaya*.³ The *Jaṭila*,⁴ *Uruvelā Kassapa*, repeats

¹ *Vin. II. 203* ; *S. I. 76.*

² *A. I. 269.*

³ *Vin. I. 25-32.*

⁴ One belonging to the sect of those who wear their hair in braids. To do so was the rule for the orthodox hermits of the brahmanical *vānaprasthas* or *tāpasas*, Gautama, *III. 34*. They recognised the authority of the *Vedas*, *Vin. I. 245* ; *Vin. Texts, I. 118, Dial. I. 221*.

eight times that Gotama is not such a worthy man (*arahā*) as he himself is, although he had been amazed at Gotama's supernormal powers and at the miracles he had performed, in order that he might convince Uruvelā Kassapa of his worth. Even after Gotama had walked upon the waters and had levitated himself in the air above them, he knew that Kassapa still thought himself more worthy than Gotama. The teacher decided to move the Jaṭila's mind,¹ and said to him: "You are not a worthy man (*arahā*), nor have you entered the way to arahanship (*arahattamagga*); you have not the means either to be a worthy man or to enter on the Way to arahanship." It is not recorded that Gotama elaborated his address, for the Jaṭila immediately asked for ordination. In the Nidāna² it is stated that Uruvelā Kassapa, now leading the best life (*brahmacariya*) under the Great Recluse (*Mahā-Samaṇa*), showed his adherence to his Master by rising into the air seven times, the seventh time to the height of seven palm-trees; and descending again, he saluted the tathāgata,³ and sat down to one side. Seeing this wonder the multitude said: "How great is the power of the Buddhas—even so mighty a thinker as this Uruvelā Kassapa, thinking them arahans, has broken through the net of delusion and is tamed by the tathāgata." I have cited this episode in Uruvelā Kassapa's life in order to show what is to my mind an interesting discrepancy between the

¹ Vin. I. 32.

² Jā. I. 83.

³ "Bringing the Truth," see Chalmers, *Sutta-Nipāta*, H.O.S. 37, p. xix. f.; "Wayfarer," see G.S. V, xiii. and Index for references.

Nidāna and some passages thought to be earlier, such as in the Vinaya and the Dīgha. For in the Nidāna, the multitude is stated to be composed of brahmins and of householders; yet in the Vinaya bhikkhus are expressly forbidden to make supernormal displays before the laity.¹ And in the Dīgha, Gotama is represented as saying, "It is because I perceive danger in the practice of supernormal wonders that I loathe and abhor them and am ashamed of them."² It is possible, therefore, since this Nidāna passage allows Kassapa's feat to pass unreprimanded, that the Jātaka compilers had forgotten that displays in such circumstances were not considered desirable. It is said that Gotama put the wonder of education in the place of these other wonders.³ And by "education" he meant here, I think, the *iddhipādā*, the four bases of *iddhi* or supernormal powers. But he did not regard these as the bases of supernormal displays, but as a powerful and vigorous concentration on desire, energy, thought, and study.⁴

It is therefore apparent that, in the Vinaya passage describing Gotama's encounter with the Jaṭila, he did not mean by the words *arahā* and *arahattamagga* the same things as the Jaṭila meant. Not magic wonders, not the use of the so-called supernormal powers, such as telepathy and levitation, make a man an arahant. In different cases these may or may not happen to be present as concomitants of this state, but they are not

¹ Vin. II. 112.

³ D. I. 214.

² D. I. 213.

⁴ M. I. 103.

the cause of it, nor are they of the essence of it. It is recorded that Gotama on a certain occasion and before a large concourse of people rose in the air, projecting flames still higher, and prevented his rival from getting up to come to him.¹ Rhys Davids suggests that this story does not belong to the time when the rule forbidding bhikkhus to make displays before the laity was still valid, but was a later accretion to the conception of the Buddha, collected by the editor or editors of the Pāṭika Suttanta.² Again, Moggallāna was credited with the power to perform supernormal acts, but it was not on this that his claim to arahanship rested. For the possession of such power does not make a man truly worthy, although it may succeed in making him appear to be so to the unwary.

Thus Citta the householder was very much impressed by a magic wonder worked by a novice called Mahaka.³ This youth had so wrought as to cause a thunderstorm, rain, and a cool wind to abate the heat of a sweltering day. Citta, not content with this, asked Mahaka to perform some other miracle of psychic power (*iddhi*) surpassing the reach of men. The novice sent fire through the keyhole on to Citta's verandah; it burnt up some grass which had been scattered out there round his cloak, but it left the cloak unscathed. Citta at once promised to supply Mahaka with the four requisites of the Brahma-life; and Mahaka incurred no blame for this display. There is no record that he became an arahān. But this passage indicates the extent to which

¹ D. III. 27.

² *Dial.* III. 2 f.

³ S. IV. 289-91.

the performance of magic called forth the public admiration. It also shows that, for Sakya, the possibility of arahanship was not co-existent with the possession of these peculiar psychic potencies.¹ It was open to all those who could tame themselves and develop themselves by the power of the intellect, so that they might become perfect. According to Gotama everyone is potentially capable of becoming perfect; but the achievement depends upon the will to train aright the whole being, and not upon the power to cultivate certain unusual gifts. Thus converts were to be made and retained, not by manifestations of supernormal powers, but by the sound preaching of dhamma, which shows the way to go in order to live here and now in the pursuit of that highest goal, for the sake of which young men of noble family go forth from home into homelessness.²

Associated with this early notion that the man who possesses psychic potencies (*iddhimant*) is therefore an arahān, is the notion that the man who practises austerities (*tapas*, lit. glowing, burning) is also an arahān. For until Gotama began to teach the doctrine of the Middle Way, in which he denounces austerities, public opinion had been much swayed and influenced by the exhibition of self-inflicted torture done in the

¹ Cf. 2 Kings iv. 9, where the Shunammite woman calls Elisha "a holy man of God." Elisha had a bigger popular reputation as a wonder-worker than any other prophet.

² Vin. I. 9, for one of the earliest appearances of this formula.

name of holiness. The practice of austerities had been inculcated in some of the latest hymns included in the Rg-Veda. By this time also *tapas* had acquired its secondary meaning of retirement into the forest for the sake of solitude and for the practice of bodily mortification,¹ with the idea that this would bring about magical results. The value of seclusion was acknowledged by Sakya and made of some importance as an occasion for meditation and contemplation, as opposed to bodily sufferings. In bringing about this change, Sakya had the weight of the Upaniṣad authority to overcome. For the Taittiriya Upaniṣad makes austerities (*tapas*) of great importance together with the study of the Vedas. Further, a passage in the Aitareya Brāhmaṇa declares "Heaven is established on the air, the air on the earth, the earth on the waters, the waters on the truth, the truth on the mystic lore (of the sacrifice), and that on *tapas*."² While various old legends have it that one god or another brought forth the world by *tapas*.³

This association of *tapas* with worth persists in various parts of the Pali texts. It is, for example, recorded that some devas saw Gotama, in the days before he had attained enlightenment, practising such severe austerities that at first they thought he must be

¹ Cf. Gautama, III. 34, where orthodox hermits are called *vānaprasthas* or *tāpasas*. This is the third stage in a brahman's life.

² Aitareya Br. XI. 6. 4.

³ Śat. Br. VI. 1. 1. 13 and ff. Cf. also Creation Hymn of Rg-Veda, given by E. J. Thomas in *Vedic Hymns*, p. 127.

dead, or dying. But some of the devas declared that he must be an arahān and that arahāns lived like that.¹ This use of the word arahān is, to quote Lord Chalmers, "a significant instance of the vogue of the term, before Buddhism, to indicate a man of worth, and therefore an ascetic Saint."² This passage also represents a noteworthy change in the use of the term arahān. It is losing its reference to kings and rulers and important people of the world, and is being popularly applied instead to ascetics.

There are, in fact, various passages which show that it was the ascetic, the man who practised austerities and self-mortification who, in the eyes of the populace (*puthujjana*) was worthy of respect, of honour, and of gifts. This non-Buddhist use of the term is sometimes found in connection with the Acelas and the Ājīvikas, who were both sects of Naked Ascetics.³

For example, Sunakkhatta, a Licchavi who was unable to subscribe to Gotama's doctrine, saw the Cynic Kora of the Acela sect.⁴ Kora behaved like a dog, walking on all fours, sprawling on the ground and

¹ M. I. 245.

² *Fur. Dial.* I. 175, n.

³ At *Dial.* I. 220 Rhys Davids, following a passage in the Anguttara (III. 276 ?), gives a list of ten sects of ascetics, all contemporaries of Gotama. He says that the name probably means "those who claimed to be especially strict in their rules as to their means of livelihood." Cf. the fifth division of the eightfold Way, *sammā ājīva*.

⁴ D. III. 6. ff. Cf. Jā. I. 389. Bu. explains Kora as a nickname, having the feet turned in. Cf. the Greek Cynics.

taking up food with his mouth instead of using his hands. Sunakkhatta, seeing his behaviour, exclaimed: "How beautiful he looks, the arahā, the recluse." But Gotama, in order to prevent him from believing that such Naked Ascetics were true arahans, predicted that Kora would soon die of epilepsy, and would be reborn as one of the Kālakañjas¹; and it is recorded that this fate befell him.

Sunakkhatta also called another Acela, Kandaramasuka,² an arahā.³ Sunakkhatta having asked Kandaramasuka a question, found that he did not understand it and therefore showed anger and resentment. The Licchavi, in some alarm, said: "We might come into conflict with this admirable arahā recluse." He was not rebuked by Gotama for calling Kandaramasuka an arahā. Indeed, Gotama said that he begrudged arahanship to no one. But to make it clear that to him an arahā meant something different from what it did to the Licchavi, Gotama predicted that before long this Naked Ascetic would break the seven vows, including those of chastity and nakedness, which he had laid upon himself, and would die fallen from his fame. This happened, so it is recorded, as Gotama had foretold.

¹ One of the lowest of the Asura groups. Cf. D. II. 259, *kālakañjā mahābhīṣā* (the Kālakañjas all of fearful shape, *Dial.* II. 289). The *Cmy. DA.* II. 689 says that having been transformed, they pass to a large and dreadful shape.

² For a note on this name, not yet met with elsewhere, see *Dial.* III. 14, n. 2.

³ D. III. 10.

According to Buddhaghosa,¹ Pūraṇa Kassapa was another ascetic who went about naked. For one day some thieves stole his clothes, and he, not knowing how to cover himself with leaves or grass, went into the village just as he was. The people seeing him, said, "This recluse is an *arabā*, he wants very little, there is nothing like him." From this time he did not wear clothes, but entered the homeless state; and many people were ordained under him. Naturally Buddhaghosa, writing centuries after the event, could not know the actual words the people uttered on seeing Kassapa. Had they really called him *arabā* it would have been very significant. For since the six heretical teachers, including Pūraṇa Kassapa, were well advanced in years when Gotama was a young man,² it would have meant that the term *arabā* was in current use before Gotama began his teaching. But we do not know whether Buddhaghosa was introducing into the mouths of these village people a word whose connotation may have been unknown to them; or whether he was merely intending them to exclaim at seeing what was to them simply a worthy man. That is to say, we do not know whether to interpret *arabā* in this commentarial passage narrating an event which must have taken place before Gotama began his teaching, as indicating the finished product with all the connotation which had accrued to the term by Buddhaghosa's day; or as indicating a far simpler conception.

In other commentarial passages the term arahā is

¹ DA. I. 142 = MA. II. 233.

² S. I. 68.

සුඤ්ඤානාදි
භාවනාදි පාඨවලින්
මෙයින් පෙනෙයි.

applied again to ascetics. The Ājīvika Upaka, who has been already mentioned,¹ lived near some trappers in the Vankahāra country, and was apparently admired by them. One day when the head trapper was going off on a long hunt with his sons and brothers, he said to his daughter, "Do not neglect our holy man (*mayhaṃ arahante mā pamajjī*)."² This is a case where the term is applied to a member of a non-Buddhist community and no objection is raised. When Visākhā, on the other hand, realised that her father-in-law, the treasurer Migāra, was calling the Jains (to whose sect he had belonged before he was converted to Buddhism) by the name of arahans, she was deeply shocked. She declared that men like these who have no shame in outward things are not arahans.³ Nor are they, any more than are the Acelas and the Ājīvikas, in the sense that was being developed in the Buddhist interpretation of the term. For it is not by discarding the clothes and wearing the hair in braids that a man becomes a brahman true.⁴

Yet these types of asceticism made a strong appeal to the public imagination. They bespoke a man who was superior to or indifferent to the ordinary comforts of life, a man who thought that by hurting himself he could gain more from life, who believed indeed that physical pain would lead to happiness, and for this end, renouncing mundane pleasure, adopted in its stead physical pain. It was not unnatural that such a figure commanded awe and respect. The untutored mind is

¹ See above, p. 76.

² ThigA. 220, 221.

³ DhA. I. 400.

⁴ Cf. DhA. 393.

impressed by behaviour which it cannot emulate and by feats which it cannot practise, and is liable to believe that those who can manage such mortifications must be very holy people. Gotama himself had been to the extremes of asceticism, and thus had sympathy with those who practised it. To the ascetics Seniya the Canine and Puṇṇa the Bovine, he spoke kindly, and told them, much against his will but in accordance with theirs, what their destinies would be if they continued in these austerities. Seniya decided to become a bhikkhu in Gotama's following, and it is said that not long after he was ordained he became an arahan.¹ Gotama knew that Seniya by following the Middle Way could win that noble understanding which was the quest of all those who entered his Order. It was only when Gotama himself found that the nature of austerity was as negative and barren as the luxury in which, so it is stated, he had been brought up (or, at any rate, knew to exist), that he realised the beauty and poise of normality, of moderation, of the Middle Way. Preservation of the mind and body in health, not destruction of their functions, gives a surer foundation for the higher knowledge. It needs considerable intelligence not to be dazzled by the extraordinary, but to see wherein lie the uses and advantages of the ordinary.

In view of the close connection in the popular mind between the arahan and the possession of supernormal power, and again, between the arahan and the practice of self-mortification, it must be mentioned that there

¹ This story is told at M. I. Sutta 57.

are passages in the Canon where the term arahān is used by non-Buddhists, but without either of these associations.


For example, it is recorded that Saccaka, the son of a Jain (woman) said to Gotama at the end of a long conversation with him :¹ "It is wonderful how, while you were being spoken to so offensively and with such insinuations, you have not changed colour, nor has your countenance altered—quite like an Arahat all-enlightened."

Again, when Sāriputta was still a Wanderer under Sañjaya² he saw the venerable Assaji, and because of his dignified deportment, Sāriputta said to himself: "Indeed this person is one of those bhikkhus who are arahans in the world, or have entered the Way to arahanship." And Sāriputta at once asked Assaji whose doctrine he professed. Now this passage may be a later interpolation into the Vinaya; and may be intended to convey the complete notion of the arahān. Or, since the Vinaya was written down later than the occurrence of this event, the compilers of it may have been thinking of the meaning the term would have had at a time when Gotama had not long been preaching. In this case it naturally would not be meant to convey the complete connotation which, as his system developed, it came to possess. But, even if deliberately incomplete, a new notion of arahān is evident in this passage. For here it is used of a man whose demeanour made Sāriputta curious to know who was his teacher. He

¹ M. I. 250.

² Vin. I. 39.

detected the man's inner worth through his outward appearance. Thus a change has come into the term arahān. A man is thought to be worthy because of his dignity of bearing, and not because he inflicts tortures on himself or performs supernormal tricks.



CHAPTER IV

THE BUDDHIST CONCEPT OF THE ARAHAN IN THE PIṬAKAS

AS Buddhism developed, the notion of the arahān came to be, in its essence, entirely dissociated from the notions of psychic powers and of austerities, as these were ordinarily understood. In place of the psychic powers, such as levitation, passing through material objects, going through the air and so on, was substituted the supreme spiritual prowess of the arahān as exhibited in the potency of his victory, of his emancipation. In place of the bodily asceticism practised by both the brahmin precursors and the Jain contemporaries of Buddhism was substituted mental asceticism, mental discipline. Nor was this altogether a new idea. For in spite of the Taittirīya Upaniṣad and the emphasis it lays on bodily mortification, there are indications in some of the other Upaniṣads that the forest dwellers insisted (and for the first time in the religious history of India) that a mental sacrifice in contrast to a material one promoted that discipline of self whereby heaven was won. Gotama had himself been to the extremes of bodily mortification before he won enlightenment, and had found in them nothing of value but much of hindrance. He therefore became inimical to the practice

of physical austerities, calling them ill, ignoble, not belonging to the Goal.¹ In fact, so strongly did Buddhism become opposed to bodily self-mortification that it is said that "those recluses and brahmins who uphold self-mortification² are incapable of crossing the flood³ . . . are incapable of knowledge and insight, of the enlightenment which is unsurpassed."⁴ Thus, according to Gotama, bodily austerities are in direct opposition to the achievement of arahanship, and can form no part of the content of the arahān-concept. Their place is taken by mental austerity, by mental renunciation, by mental purification, and by the true mental asceticism of consistently choosing the higher way in preference to the lower.

Thus the arahān-concept came instead, and apparently rapidly, to be a concept involving many high ethical and intellectual qualities. These were thought to be brought to perfection only after a long and rigorous training in virtue and knowledge, lasting, even in the case of Buddhas, through countless life-spans. For it must never be forgotten that Buddhism is unintelligible apart from the allied doctrines of karma and rebirth. If a man or woman becomes an arahān in this existence, it is because in previous rebirths "he" has been working towards this end. The more steadily he works, the fewer his backslidings and wrong-doings, the more quickly will he attain his end and aim. As, in

¹ Vin. I. 10.

² *Tapo-jigucchā*, described at D. III. 40 ff. = A. II. 206 ff.

³ See below, Chapter VII.

⁴ A. II. 200.

the philosophy of a later time it was explicitly held that nature does not proceed by jumps, so also in Sakya this view was held, although implicitly. What has been called the Law of Causation was apparently held to work smoothly and relentlessly, every event proceeding from a cause or from a series of causes. The working of the Law even traverses the span made by physical death, since it was held that the character resulting from previous rebirths survives into the succeeding chain of rebirths.

It might almost be said that the connotation which accrued to the term *arahān* under Buddhism is a case of spontaneous generation, so different did it become in scope and depth from the meanings attaching to it in any previous or contemporary system. For to the disciples of Gotama the arahān came to mean not only the Founder of the creed, or the revealer of the religion, as it did in Jainism, not only the person worthy of reverence and gifts, but the man or woman who, with mind always alert, having attained to freedom of heart and mind, to insight and knowledge is an adept (*asekha*), is perfect, a finished product; one who has crossed over the flood and gone beyond (*pāragata*); who has rooted out craving and cut off desire; who has destroyed the *āsavas*; who is versed in the threefold lore (*tevijja*); who has won excellence in the thirty-seven things associated with enlightenment; who has attained nibbāna; ¹ the man or woman who has completed many

¹ In some Sutta fragments the phrase *nibbānass'eva santike* is used: S. I. 33; IV. 75; A. II. 39. At G.S. II. 45 and at K.S. IV. 44 this is translated as "near to nibbāna." I agree rather

other attainments, all of them implying finality. The arahān has, in a word, achieved some static condition, where he is beyond the workings of what is now called the Law of Causation. He has no need of further development, of further progress.

The Brahma of the Upaniṣads may have been taken by Sākya as the pattern on which to build its glowing and manifold descriptions of the arahān. For there can be no doubt, I think, that the perfection which every true devotee of the creed of Buddhism sought, was of the nature of what is now called an Absolute Perfection. A process, that of making-to-become, led to a state, that of perfection, which was above the laws of Change, and from which, once he had gained it, a man did not fall away.

In the Upaniṣads there are descriptions of Brahma, of which Gotama or those of his followers who were mainly responsible for the development of the concept of arahān must have been more or less consciously aware, as they must also have been aware of the monistic or pantheistic trend of the whole system. Hence what man is said to *be* (intellectually) in the teaching found in the Brhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad may have provided Gotama with some material for that which he would like his disciples to become.

with the transl. at K.S. I. 45 "in the presence of nibbāna." For *eva* in the Pīṭakas is "just" (he or there or then); the American "right" (here). It is mere emphasis; the German enclitic *ja*. The arahāns did not claim to be only near to nibbāna, but to have concluded the cathartic process which, in some Sutta fragments, it means.

"He is the unseen Seer, the unheard Hearer, the unthought Thinker, the understood Understander. Other than He there is no seer. Other than He there is no hearer. Other than He there is no thinker. Other than He there is no understander. He is your Self, the Inner Controller, the Immortal."¹

But this great monistic conception was too overwhelming—and too facile. If it is true that "That art thou," then you must prove it. And it may be said that Early Buddhism was an attempt to bring into the lives of people, however lowly and humble, however much wrong-doing they might have committed, a realisation that they might become even as That which the Upaniṣads declare that they essentially are, in all circumstances and without fighting for it; whereas in Buddhism the ideal was held to be attainable only as the result of strenuous and steadfast effort.

Hence we see that under Buddhism the great Upaniṣadic doctrine of the immanent divinity of man, expressed in the classical phrase, "That art thou" (*tat tvam asi*, with the emphasis on the *tvam*) was no longer accepted. It was replaced by a corresponding doctrine of man *becoming* Brahma-like, as opposed to his *being* Brahma-like. This was the arahān theory: it claimed to see man accomplishing perfection, not simulating it. And for the accomplishing process the exercise of the will, a constant putting forth of energy, was necessary. This new theory is well expressed in passages in the

¹ Bṛhad. 3. 7. 23.

Majjhima and the Anguttara:¹ a person who "is neither a tormentor of self nor of another . . . in this very life hungers no more, he is allayed, become cool, he abides in the experience of bliss with a self that has become Brahma."² The *new* word for India was, that man, ever in the process of change, can *become* that which the more static brahminical attitude held that he essentially *is*. Indian thought had scarcely held this to be rational; but Śākya taught it. In this respect Gotama's teaching is a remarkable precursor of Hegel's triad of Being, of its antithesis Not-Being and of the synthesis of the two, Becoming. It must be assumed that in putting his emphasis on Becoming Gotama was influenced by the Upaniṣadic ideal to the extent of opposing it and of expanding it. He opposed, in contradicting the externals and accidents of brahminism. He expanded, by seeing man as potentially capable of developing his qualities to a higher and higher degree, as potentially capable of making himself to *become*. I think that the dawnings of this view were not altogether absent from the Upaniṣads, but that they were implied rather than stressed.

From the unreal lead me to the Real,
From darkness lead me to Light,
From death lead me to the Undying³

is a verse which strongly suggests that however much one might *be* the Real, yet a closer contact with it by

¹ M. I. 344; II. 159; A. II. 211. Cf. A. V. 226.

² *Brahmabbūta*; cf. Gītā 5. 24, 6. 27, 18. 54.

³ Bṛhad. I. 3. 28.

means of the *ñāṇamārga* (or way of knowledge) was essential for salvation which was to be gained, as is here shown, through intellectual apprehension of the real, through spiritual light, and by cutting through the ocean of *saṃsāra* (rebirth or faring-on). So much then had man to achieve in order that for him Being might become a reality. In Primitive Buddhism it is amply apparent that this process could only be valid, the end could only be assured, if man made himself, his powers and his faculties, become greater and greater still. Surely this is a step in advance of the somewhat complacent theory that man *is* That (Brahma).

Ever since they came to be uttered, over an indefinitely long or short period of time, the Upaniṣads have greatly influenced India and her teachers. And although Gotama, being an innovator and a reformer, did not blindly follow them, it is reasonable to suppose that his mind was by no means uninfluenced by the great philosophical system to which he fell heir. But the Upaniṣad ideal was one which, in accordance with Gotama's more practical and more unphilosophic outlook, made no essential demands on the development of human character. If a man actually *was* Brahma, if he partook of the nature of Brahma, might it not follow that his moral sense would fall into abeyance? The belief in the workings of karma counteracted this possibility to some extent, for it was held to be more profitable to do right than to do wrong.¹ Yet it was

¹ That this view persists at the present day is well put by L. S. S. O'Malley, *Popular Hinduism*, Cambridge, 1935, p. 70.

considered that a man's destiny necessitated his doing the wrong he did; and because it was his destiny his evil-doing was condoned. Gotama reintroduced into Indian thought an ethical outlook; and taught that the exercise of right thoughts, words, and deeds, and of strict self-control, led a man to become Brahma-like, to become more developed than he was before.

Further, the Upaniṣads demand that a man should "know" Brahma in order to be saved. This must have appeared as an incomplete doctrine to Gotama, for man is far more than intellect. But a man could become perfect from a human point of view, with a perfection less large and comprehensive than the perfection of Brahma. If he followed the training, if his will was set towards the highest Good, if it had been so set for many life-spans, then—so the Arahān theory came to hold—he could become here and now (*diṭṭhe va dhamme*, lit. : in these very seen conditions) an arahān; he could attain arahanship and nibbāna, the state which the achievement of arahanship came to denote. It was the most and the best which he could do; and whether being humanly perfect he was also divine, is a question which we need not attempt to answer here. All that I wish to show is that primitive Buddhism was an attempt to expand the *tat tvam asi* of the Upaniṣads into *tat tvam bhavasi*. Man was not to be regarded as being That Self Which was the Highest, but as potentially capable of becoming even as That Self.

It might be argued that a great weakness of the whole notion lies in the belief that the perfection aimed at, the attainment of arahanship or nibbāna, is capable of realisation by human beings in the flesh.¹ Such a notion is heavily handicapped by the existence of the physical body itself, for the flesh is a burden on the free use of the mental powers, preventing their unrestrained activity, and narrowing the scope of that which they might otherwise attain. Now this notion presupposes that the human mind and character are perfectible in this existence, in this physical body. But by Westerners the body is regarded as a cloying hindrance to the mind, an obstruction on the way to perfection, so much so that a human being made perfect—and by definition a human being is incarnate—is a contradiction in terms. For if he is perfect, then he is divine. And to Western thought, at any rate, what is divine is not subject to the laws of death and dissolution which govern physical existence.

I think that the founders of Buddhism were aware of this difficulty, for emphasis is laid by them on the proper control of the body. It is undoubtedly true that Indians have powers of rising above bodily limitations and of nullifying them to an amazing degree by mental processes not understood, and possibly not possessed, by Western peoples. Yet all modern Buddhists agree that there has not been an arahān for

¹ Cf. Mrs Rhys Davids, *The Birth of Indian Psychology*, etc., London, 1936, p. 353, who in this connection speaks of "the fearful cost of a shrinkage in the idea of perfection."

hundreds of years;¹ the Commentaries do not mention any of their own day; and even the texts, with an occasional backward glance to a Golden Age, sometimes lament that there are not so many arahans as formerly.² Yet the fact remains that, according to the Suttas (which, however, it must be remembered were not written down until after the Founder had died), in Gotama's day many men and women were acclaimed as arahans. It can therefore only be held to be possible that if, as is the case, arahanship is an equivalent of perfection, then that perfection must be susceptible to definition in terms of human values; and this is the way in which Buddhism defines the perfection which it has in mind. One aspect of the perfection so defined is to my mind, however, in a different category from the other aspects, namely, the belief that this is the arahān's last rebirth, and that he is now "bearing his last body" (*antimāy debhāy dhārento*). For this view, however tenaciously held, is no more than a belief. The human mind has so far been unable to penetrate the mystery of death, and to discover with the certainty of a knowledge which can be tested what, if anything, lies beyond.

These notions of arahān and nibbāna, I suggest,

¹ I was once told by a Buddhist monk in Ceylon that even if a man were to become an arahān he could not explain or describe his state. He would be utterly devoid of self and therefore could not refer to himself. But there are various records, especially in the Thera-theri-gāthā, of various aspects of arahanship described by those who claimed that they had attained to this state.

² e.g. S. II. 224.

came to take on the rigid meaning of the finality or accomplishment of perfection because, if this was judged to be possible, the goal was brought near. An infinite development is a notion which perhaps put too much strain on the faith and patience of those who came after Gotama. They probably wished for concrete examples: they wished for it to be empirically possible to point to a man and to say that he was an arahān and perfect, and to believe that they, too, even in this life, might become perfect, might attain the end of the Way. They wanted an ideal that had to their knowledge actually been achieved, and one which, so the monks thought, made an end of that Ill which monasticism had come to take as its basis and starting-point and apologia in turning its back on the world's work. It is probable that for reasons such as these the word arahān grew in meaning in a way that had not been expected by the Founder.

It is true that, as recorded in the texts, Gotama referred to nibbāna in his First Utterance as a state to which the middle course (*majjhima paṭipadā*) would lead. But it is unlikely that at that early time nibbāna was the many-sided conception it later came to be. If it had then little more than its primary Buddhist meaning of a dying-out in the heart of the fires of passion, ill-will, and confusion,¹ and the coolness (*nibbuti*) resulting from their extinction, this in itself is a remarkable purification and a high ambition.

¹ See S. IV. 251, 261; "*rāgakkhaya dosakkhaya mohakkhaya idaṃ vuccati nibbānaṃ ti.*"

Nibbāna, from meaning as it primarily and etymologically does, the dying-out or extinguishing of fire, came to be a heavily-laden concept, positive in sentiment. It included among other aspects—and this is the secondary Buddhist meaning—the sense of supreme bliss, of great calm and peace, of spiritual welfare, of safety, of emancipation from undesirable mental states, of the deathless (*amata*), and of security. The texts leave us in absolutely no doubt that this is the kind of state that nibbāna is; and that the arahān is the man or woman who here and now (*diṭṭhe va dhamme*¹ or *idh' eva*, just here) has attained to that state.

The achievement of arahanship was not thought to be confined to any one sect or caste or sex. No longer could brahmins claim the monopoly of being rightfully designated as worthy or holy. No longer were women precluded from the most vital spiritual knowledge, the most supreme spiritual endeavours. If Buddhism had been built upon the same foundations as brahminism, it would have preserved secret knowledge as something fitted for men alone, withholding it from women. It would have shut women out from the ways to arahanship, as the brahmins forbade them² and men not "twice-born" to study the Vedas.

But the new teaching was not esoteric. The Founder had declared, it is recorded, that women will become

¹ The Comys. almost invariably explain this as *imasmiṃ yeva attabbhāve*, in this very existence.

² Manu, IX. 18; cf. XI. 36, 37.

(*bhaddha*)¹ those to attain the fruits of the three lower Ways and arahanship. And Somā declared,² and she is supported by the whole of the Therīgāthā, that in this matter "woman's nature" is no hindrance. Sakya further held that a person becomes worthy not because of birth, clan, family, or sex, but because of training and character. Therefore a member of any of the four classes (*vanna*),³ from which later arose the complex caste-system, might become an arahān. He would then be declared chief in his class by reason of dhamma (*dhammena*), and not because of anything that is not dhamma.⁴

Be he noble, brahmin, merchant,
A low-caste man, or of a pariah caste,
Who stirs up effort, the self bestriven,
Advances with an ever vigorous stride,
He can attain the Purity Supreme.
Brahmin, know this !⁵

And again :

Ask not of birth, ask of the course of conduct.
From any sticks verily fire doth take birth.
The steadfast seer, though his descent be lowly,
To sterling birth is raised, curbed by sense of shame,
Tamed by the truth, and victor through that taming,
Master of knowledge, the good life fulfilling.⁶

¹ Vin. II. 254. For note on *bhaddha*, see Mrs Rhys Davids, *J.R.A.S.* January 1932 ; *Manual of Buddhism* (1932), p. 128.

² Thig. XXXVI., and S. I. 129.

³ D. III. 82. Khattiya, brāhmaṇa, vessa, sudda. At Vin. IV. 272 these four are called the four families (*kula*). They are the basis of the caste-system which, at the time of the rise of Buddhism, had not yet dominated the social structure of India.

⁴ D. III. 83. ⁵ S. I. 166. ⁶ S. I. 168 = Sn. 462, 463.

In spite of the stress that the texts lay upon monk-life, it was possible to become an arahān without entering into either of Gotama's Orders. But, as a rule, lay-people do not live in surroundings as conducive to the development of their highest powers as those who have sought the quiet and seclusion of the monastic life.¹ Yet there are examples of lay-people, contemporaries of Gotama, who attained arahanship.² But the great majority of those who wished to perfect themselves entered the Order, and it is recorded that many of them, both men and women and even children,³ became arahāns. An analysis showing the class to which some people belonged before they were ordained has been made for the Theras⁴ and another for the Therīs,⁵ to whom the Thera-therī-gāthā are attributed ; and nearly all of these claimed to have attained arahanship. A glance at these tables will show that whatever the worldly class or status of these people might have been, it was no hindrance to their winning of the goal. The Theras were drawn principally from brahmin families ; some came from the warrior caste, others from families who owned or tenanted land, or who

¹ An ardent young Hindu whom I met at Conjeeveram told me that it is impossible to obtain *bhakti* in the noise and turmoil of modern mundane life.

² Vin. I. 17 ; S. V. 94 ; Kvu. 267 ; Dhpa. I. 308 ; Jā. II. 229 ; Miln. 243, 352 ; *Pss. Sisters*, p. 84. A. III. 451 gives a list of twenty.

³ *Pss. Breth.* XXXIII., LX. See also V., where the boy Dabba realised the way to Arahanship.

⁴ *Pss. Breth.*, p. xxviii.

⁵ Horner, *Women under Primitive Buddhism*, p. 167-168.

were great merchants, or craftsmen. There were also elephant-trainers, caravan-guiders, pariahs, slaves, and illegitimate sons of kings. One was a fisherman, one an actor. The Therīs were also drawn from brahmin families, eminent, unimportant, or poor. Some came from royal and warrior families, and others from the families of great merchants. Four had been courtesans. One had been married to a rush-plaiter, one was a trapper's daughter, and one a goldsmith's daughter.

We will now consider the arahān as he appears in the Vinaya, in the Sutta-Piṭaka, and then in Abhidhamma literature.

VINAYA-PIṬAKA

Since it is without doubt true that at the time when the texts were written down people believed in the existence of arahāns alive among them, and in the possibility of the attainment of arahanship here and now, it will be of interest to consider some of the ways in which the contemporary admiration of arahāns expressed itself.

There are, however, but few references to the arahān as such in the Vinaya. The main source for our knowledge of the attainments of the man perfected, of synonyms for this state, and of the preliminary steps leading up to it, are the five Nikāyas. With the exception of one chapter in the Kathāvatthu, the Abhidhamma does not say much about the arahān; while in the Milindapañha the concept is already undergoing another change.

In the Vinaya the arahān appears as a worthy man, the most worthy man; but the details and characteristics by reason of which his worth is computed are as sparse in this first Piṭaka as they are profuse in the Nikāyas.

There is, however, one passage in the Vinaya which makes a special contribution of its own to our knowledge of the arahān. In this passage he is not called by this name—possibly the term was not then fully developed—but some of his achievements, set forth here, are those which we have come, largely through a study of the Nikāyas, to associate with arahanship. In this passage the arahān concept is therefore possibly emerging. It is a passage where the man who has *become* most is to be honoured most, as is also to be honoured the high plane of mentality and spirituality which he has won. Surely such a view bears the true stamp of early Sākyā. I am, of course, referring to the teaching on *uttarimanussadhammā*, the conditions of the further-men. In order to make my meaning clear, I must say something of the Pārājika Rules of Vinaya III.¹

The Vinaya consists largely of stories of various kinds of wrong behaviour on the part of the bhikkhus, and of the rules laid down for the prevention and punishment of occurrences of the same sort in the future. Thus offences against the course of training laid down by the lord for the bhikkhus are codified. Vinaya III. opens with three of the very gravest kinds of offence, known as Pārājika Offences: those of

¹ As it is in the P.T.S. edn.

unchastity, stealing, and depriving of life. These are indeed condemned by all civilised communities, valuing as they do safety of person and property.

But the fourth (and last) Pārājika shows, I think, a mode of thought which could only arise in circumstances where the notion that man can *become* is an absolutely vital force, commanding if not awe, then a tremendous respect. This Pārājika, well tempered as are all the Rules by the quality of mercy, declares that if a bhikkhu mistakenly claims a condition of the further-men, unless he does so with undue confidence in himself, with an undue estimate of himself, then he falls into defeat. He is defeated by the course of training, morally he is too weak to support it, he has to leave the Order, there is no hope of rehabilitation for him.

This offence was so grave, ranking as it did with unchastity, stealing, and depriving of life, not because the transgressor showed conceit, not because it was tantamount to lying, although this certainly came in, but above all because the claim put forward was an assumption, unjustifiable and unfounded, amounting to a theft¹ of conditions (*dharmā*) to be won only by steadfast determination to reach the further (*uttari*), to make the higher become. Those who had truly achieved such aims are called in Pārājika IV. *uttari-manussā*, the further-men—the best men (*seṭṭha-purisā*) according to the commentarial exegesis. It cannot be too much emphasised that the powers won did not

¹ Vin. III. 90.

surpass those which men were capable of developing, were not superhuman, did not go beyond man's conditions, as various translators have suggested. It was not that the conditions won were beyond man in the flesh, beyond his grasp, severed from the spheres in which he could move and discipline himself. It was that there were men here in this world who differed from others in that they were bound to become (*bhāva*), and who hence had gone further on the Way, achieving as they did so certain conditions denied to those who had not travelled so far. They were not devas, nor those reborn in other worlds: they were the further-men, but *men* nevertheless.

Now what are these conditions which mark off the zealous, ardent bhikkhus whose inmost self has striven (*pābitatta*) from those others who cannot for long raise their thoughts above the pleasures of the senses? Pārājika IV. has several answers to this question. For example, those lax bhikkhus who spent a vassa (rains) on the banks of the river Vaggamudā thought, and rightly so, that the conditions of the further-men include possession of one or more of the four musings (*jhāna*), attainment of one or more of the four stages of the Way (stream-entry, once returning, non-returning, arahanship), the mastery of the threefold knowledge (*tevijjā*), the mastery of the sixfold knowledge (*chaḷabhiññā*). These two knowledges include knowledge of previous rebirths, of destruction of the cankers (*āśava*, Skrt. *āsrāva*), and of what we should now call telepathy, clairvoyance, and clairaudience. The Old Commentary

on Pārājika IV. adds to these conditions those of freedom, attainment, concentration, making the Way to become (*maggabhāvanā*), realisation of the fruits of the Way, and the destruction of the corruptions (*kilesa*). This last it defines in terms strongly reminiscent of the Saṅgyutta's definition of both *nibbāna* and *arahatta* (arahanship): destruction of passion, of hatred, and of confusion.¹

Towards the end of Pārājika IV. the great disciple Moggallāna is accused by the bhikkhus of claiming for himself conditions of the further-men. In alleging that he saw shapes and forms going through the air, that he heard their cries of distress, and that he knew what they had been in previous rebirths, he was undoubtedly claiming these conditions for himself. But he was supported by Gotama, so it is stated, who said that Moggallāna spoke truly and that therefore there was no offence for him. He was a further-man, removed by his own power of endeavour, by his own spiritual development both from the pious, moderate bhikkhus, and from the mass of depraved, evil bhikkhus who figure so largely in the Vinaya, and who are accountable for the framing of the rules. Only in a teaching where such a qualitative difference between *men* was fully recognised, only where spiritual progress with its load of conditions as yet unattained by those lower on the Way was accounted of supreme importance, could the claiming of those conditions by one who did not truly possess them be ranked as one of the four gravest offences, entailing expulsion from the Monastic Order.

¹ S. IV. 253, 254.

In addition to this definite stress on becoming, on the further, the Vinaya, being largely old, affords a certain amount of evidence that the teaching on the "Four Ways" also belongs to Early Śākya. In several other passages the arahan is mentioned in association with men who are on the three preceding ways: with men who are, in fact, stream-entrants, once-returners, and non-returners. For example, it is recorded that Gotama told the bhikkhus that these four types of men are worthy (*arahati*) of the best water, the best seat, and the best almsfood.¹ Again, in praise of the Order, Gotama is said to have used the simile of the Ocean: ² as the ocean contains mighty beings, so the Order contains mighty beings—those who are on the Four Ways, and those who have won the fruit (*phala*) of the Four Ways. These will be discussed later.

Now since the Vinaya is probably early and the arahan is not explained and described in it in such great detail as in the Nikāyas, it is possible that at the time of the Vinaya the arahan concept had not attained its final form, and that the beginnings of the Buddhist arahan were but emerging. This is the more plausible since the synonyms selected in this *uttarimanussadhammā* passage have the appearance of being the reflection of the thought of a date earlier still. *Jhāna* (Sanskrit *dhyāna*) had been duly recognised in the Upaniṣads as of great importance in the pursuit of the holy; "versed in the threefold lore" (*tevijja*) is but a substitute for the brahminical knowledge of the three Vedas, and is an

¹ Vin. II. 161.

² *Ibid.* 240; A. IV. 204, 208.

example of an old word which received a new meaning under Buddhism; and the *abhiññās* are also based on older material. Although the arahan in these Vinaya passages does not appear as the tremendous figure he was soon to become in the Nikāya literature, it is yet apparent that the man who was progressing, who had attained to further conditions, who was proficient in the Ways, was held in vast respect.

Moreover, a theory was developing as to the sanctity of the arahan. It was sometimes held that he could do no wrong. When a certain woman misbehaved with a bhikkhu who was lying down for the day-sojourn, Gotama on hearing of the incident from the bhikkhu said, "Bhikkhus, this bhikkhu is an arahan; there is no offence for this bhikkhu."¹ Yet this view was not universally held. It is recorded that King Pasenadi saw some bhikkhus playing in the water and kicking it up, and that he said to his Queen, Mallikā, "These people who are playing in the water are arahans." And they agreed that such behaviour was contrary to the teaching set forth by the lord. But when the royal pair told Gotama, he did not confirm their view that these bhikkhus were arahans. Instead he upbraided the bhikkhus and called them *moghapurisa*, foolish men. It must, therefore, be supposed either that Pasenadi was mistaken in thinking that they were arahans, or that at that time infallible virtuous conduct was not a *sine qua non* of an arahan.

In the Vinaya are also to be found the beginnings

¹ Vin. III. 38.

of the view that it was both dangerous and disgraceful for a person to call himself an arahan, knowing that he was not. With the Buddhist emphasis on the mischief done if one person incites another to wrong-doing, it is not surprising to find it recorded that some bhikkhus are filled with remorse when a brahmin calls them arahans.¹ They declare that they are not arahans (*anarahanto*), "and this brahmin converses with us with talk about arahans (*arahantavādena*). What course should be followed by us?" But the Lord exculpates them. For to be called an arahan by others, and in consequence to be shocked at the appellation and to confess the incident to Gotama is not thought to be comparable to the great offence committed if a bhikkhu calls himself an arahan with intent to deceive. This is a Pārājika offence.² And offences of this type include only the most serious that a bhikkhu or a bhikkhunī could commit.

Coming for a moment to the Khuddaka-Nikāya, we find that in the Sutta-Nipāta³ the misappropriation of the term arahan is again severely commented upon. There is a long diatribe against the "wastrel"⁴ or the "outcast,"⁵ the *vasala*, the concluding verse of which runs as follows:

"The unsaintly (*anarahā*), claiming saint (*araham*) to be,
is master-thief of all the universe,
the vilest wastrel of all the wastrel crowd."

¹ Vin. III. 103.

² *Ibid.* 104.

³ Sn. 135.

⁴ Lord Chalmers' transl. Sutta-Nipāta, H.O.S. 37.

⁵ Fausbøll's transl. Sutta-Nipāta, S.B.E. X.

In a land where and at a time when the doctrine of *ahiṃsā* (non-injury) was held in almost universal veneration, it was yet considered specially disgraceful to murder an arahān, which only shows the overwhelming importance of his state. But because, according to his karma, the murderer would receive his deserts in his subsequent becomings, it was not for his fellow-men to punish him. The most that they could do was to protect themselves, and by closing the Order to such murderers prevent them from living in an environment for which they were as yet spiritually unfit. Gotama, it is said, attempted to enforce this measure by decreeing that the murderer of an arahān should not receive the *upasampadā* ordination; or if he had received it, then he was to be expelled from the Order.¹ We know, from the Vinaya, that expulsion from the Order was the greatest disgrace that a bhikkhu could incur; and further, that he never was expelled without some exceedingly grave cause.

We also find horror expressed at the abuser of an arahān.² The arahān is also called here a noble (*ariya*) and one who lives according to dhamma, and his abuser is said to engender a crop (of evil) to the undoing of self.

SUTTA-PĪṬAKA

When we turn to the Nikāyas, we find that in these the arahān theory was at its height. It here appears as a prominent concept; and the attainment of arahanship came to be ranked as a goal of vital importance by

¹ Vin. I. 89.

² Dh. 164.

some of those who had entered both the Order of Bhikkhus and the Order of Bhikkhunīs. A very large proportion of the Nikāya literature is devoted to the topic of arahanship, many Suttas taking it as their chief subject, while others deal with it more incidentally; but throughout there are references to arahans, mention of the qualities which distinguish them, and longer or shorter descriptions of the state of arahanship.

A striking example of the interest in this subject is afforded by the first volume of the Dīgha-Nikāya, where each of the thirteen Suttas approaches the topic from different points of view. The first Dialogue sets forth various current speculations in turn, and then destroys them, implying that they are not conducive to entering on the Way to Arahanship. The second one, after a lengthy analysis on the advantages of the life of a recluse, ends with a dissertation on the supreme advantage of arahanship: it is visible in this world, and there is no higher or sweeter fruit of the life of a bhikkhu. This supreme advantage is not called arahanship; but, as Buddhaghosa says, it means this. The whole Dialogue leads up to this, eventually through the three-fold knowledge, the mastery of which makes a man or woman an arahān. Some of the succeeding Dialogues also follow this same line in developing their theme. The third Dialogue is concerned with social rank, and declares that arahanship is the highest. The fourth one identifies the arahān with the true brahman, still a term of praise among the followers of Gotama. In the fifth a protest is entered against the usual forms of

sacrifice in vogue at that date, and arahanship is declared to be the only form of sacrifice worth making, or indeed justifiable. The sixth is concerned with the aim of the best life (*brahmacariya*), which is arahanship; and so also is the seventh. The eighth professes that the Way to arahanship is the best asceticism; and so on with the remaining five Dialogues.

It is significant that the first Suttas of the first collection of Dialogues concentrate on the subject of arahanship, and insist over and over again that it is the climax. Again, many Dialogues in the Majjhima are devoted to this topic.

The first Sutta in the Majjhima sets out to show that the bhikkhu who is an arahan recognises things and states of consciousness as they really are, and is not led astray by acquisitive ideas. A list of twenty-six such things is given. It comprises earth, water, fire, and air; creatures, devas, Pajāpati,¹ Brahmā; three classes of deities; Abhibhū; four Realms; what is apprehended by the six senses (*manasa*, mind being the sixth); unity, multiplicity, and universality; and nibbāna. Such a bhikkhu is also said to be one in whom passion, hatred, and confusion have been extirpated. The second Sutta is concerned with getting rid of the āsavas; and concludes by saying that he who has got rid of them "is said to have all his āsavas in restraint; he has cut off craving, shed his bonds, and by fathoming false pride, has made an end of Ill." He is, in fact, an arahan. In the fourth Sutta, it is recorded that Gotama

¹ MA. I. 33 = Māra.

explains how he, having successfully mastered the four musings (*jhāna*), obtained the knowledge which recalled his previous existences; the knowledge of the passage hence, and the reappearance elsewhere of other beings; and the knowledge of the eradication of ill and of the āsavas. This is the threefold knowledge (*vidyā, vijjā*), the possession of which makes a man or woman an arahan. These three knowledges also form the climax, in the sixth Sutta, of Gotama's talk with some bhikkhus. Again these contents of the arahan-concept are included in the answer to the question: "How does a bhikkhu become an arahan?" The answer is: "He is far removed from wrong, evil things (*dhammā*) which are depraved and lead to rebirth; which are burdensome, ripening into ill, and which hereafter entail birth, decay, and death."¹ The arahan, in fact, lives aright, although a positive statement to this effect and in opposition to this negative description of him, is not presented. That this is the inference to be made is, however, indubitable, since this negative description of him concludes a long discourse in which emphasis has been laid upon cultivating right and good things, the four states of musing, and the threefold knowledge.

The arahan-note on which the Majjhima harps most often is perhaps the necessity for rooting out the āsavas, which destroy and consume; and hence an arahan who has eradicated the āsavas is more often mentioned than one who has knowledge of his own previous existences or of the passing-away and coming-to-be of other

¹ M. I. 280.

creatures. Indeed, it seems certain that although the mastery of the threefold knowledge as a whole constitutes a man an arahān, only one branch of it—the knowledge of the destruction of the āsavas—has this power alone and apart from the other two branches. For neither of the other two knowledges ever appears alone as a synonym for an arahān, whereas he who is *khiṇāsava* is the synonym perhaps most frequently used. Thus in the seventh Sutta of the Majjhima, it is said that if a bhikkhu knows and sees that Deliverance lies beyond this realm of consciousness, his heart is delivered from the āsavas of sensuous pleasure, of lives (*bhavā*), and of ignorance.¹ And to him so delivered comes arahānship. He is *inly washen*.

It should perhaps be mentioned here that in the sixth Sutta (referred to above) the threefold knowledge is appended to three other knowledges: that of *iddhi*; that of using the deva-ear, or clairaudience as it is called nowadays; and that of comprehending with one's own heart the heart of other creatures so as to know them exactly for what they are. These six knowledges are usually called the *chaḷ-abhiññā*, or six profound or super-knowings. The first five constitute five psychic gifts; but the sixth, the knowledge of the destruction of the āsavas, is not psychic at all. Mrs Rhys Davids sees in the first five an original category, and suggests that to these, both in the second Suttanta of the Dīgha and in the Book of Fives in the Anguttara ² "is appended

a sixth item, which has nothing in common with the Five: the extirpation of the three *āsavā*."¹ She considers that the inclusion of a sixfold category in the Book of Fives strongly suggests that the sixth category is a later addition. But against this we have the passage in the fourth Majjhima Sutta, already referred to,² which definitely ignores the first three super-knowledges, and says of the last three that they are knowledges which the Buddha won for himself successively in the three watches of a night: "This was the first knowledge attained by me in the first watch of that night . . . this was the second . . . this was the third knowledge attained by me in the third watch of that night." Nothing could knit these knowledges together more firmly. This passage is paralleled by one which is identical in the Vinaya,³ all allusion to the first three super-knowledges being omitted; and there is another identical passage in the Book of Threes in the Anguttara,⁴ although here Gotama is not purporting to be speaking autobiographically, but to be telling the brahman Tikaṇṇa what one does in the discipline of the Ariyan to become a possessor of the threefold lore.

I think that if the *abhiññās* were originally five, the incorporation of the sixth can be well accounted for by the intimate association which this for some reason came to have with two of these self-same *abhiññās*. The destruction of the āsavas came to be regarded as

¹ Later the āsavas included as well *diṭṭhi*, false views.

² A. III. 15 ff.

¹ Intr. G.S. III. p. viii.

³ Vin. III. 4 f.

² M. I. 22 ff.

⁴ A. I. 164 f.

all-important, and as possible only for one who had grasped the knowledge of the means to destroy them. Hence such knowledge figures in two categories: in the six profound knowledges, and in the threefold knowledge: the remaining two members of this latter category (namely, knowledge of one's own previous rebirths, and knowledge of the destiny of others) being also identical with two members of the former. Mrs Rhys Davids speaks of the "naïve confusion" of "first 'five abhiññās' referred to, then 'six,' then again 'five'" at *Saṃyutta II.*, pp. 216, 222. But this is not quite the whole story. For the last "five" alluded to by Mrs Rhys Davids are again followed by another "six." So that we get at the end of one Sutta "five," "six," and at the end of the next Sutta again "five" and "six." This looks to me more intentional than "naïve"; and although I admit that it is baffling, I do not think that this regular, repeated sequence was necessarily accidental. The Commentary here is of no help.¹ It simply speaks of the Thera Mahākassapa roaring his lion's roar with the six *abhiññās*.

In the 112th Majjhima Sutta² a bhikkhu is judged to be an arahān if he has extirpated the āsavas. In this Sutta Gotama is represented as speaking with some bhikkhus. No reason is given for his working out the theme of the Sutta as he does: no difficulties appear to have prepared the way for it. Gotama is shown attacking his subject at once. He argues, it is said, that supposing a bhikkhu makes a profession of having

¹ SA. II. 176.

² M. III. 29 ff.

risen to the fullest knowledge (*aññā*), the following question should be asked of him: "The lord has defined four categories of discoveries—the man who has discovered by vision in the domain of vision, by hearing in the domain of hearing, by sensing in the domain of taste, smell, and touch, by apprehending in the domain of apprehending. By what manner of ken and vision (*kathaṃ jānāto kathaṃ passato*) under these four heads has your reverence's heart been absolutely delivered from the āsavas?" If the bhikkhu who is being questioned is one in whom the āsavas are dead and gone, then he makes this answer: "In the domain of seeing and in each of the other three domains I dwell, without leanings and without aversion, without dependence and without being enamoured, but with heart untrammelled."

Other questions are then put to the bhikkhu, who is now an arahān, as to the manner of knowledge and vision by which he comes to know that, in respect of the different subjects of the questions put to him, his heart is freed from the āsavas. He is asked about the five factors of attachment (or grasping), namely, form, feeling, perception, the constituents and consciousness; then about the six elements: earth, water, fire, air, space, and mentality; and then about the six internal sense-organs and the six external sense-objects. Of the first group he says that he knows the five factors of attachment to be weak, evanescent, and comfortless; of the second that he approaches the various elements as being non-self, with no basing of self on the element;

and of the third he says that he knows his heart to be delivered from desire, passion, delight, and craving. And of all the groups he repeats, in the style of a refrain : "I know that my heart is delivered from the heart's attractions and attachments which implant obstinacy, prejudice, and bias—is delivered therefrom by destroying them, by losing all passion for them, by laying them to rest, by removing them, and by forsaking them altogether. This is the manner of ken and vision whereby [in respect of the subjects of these various questions] I know my heart to be absolutely delivered from the āsavas."

The import of all these questions is to ascertain whether the bhikkhu who professes to be an arahān knows and sees things as they really are, so that he will not be led astray by their appearances or by his longings and desires. He is to have a self that has striven, and he is to be devoid of all grasping if he is to qualify as an arahān. If he answers these questions to the satisfaction of his interlocutors, there is one more question to come : "By what manner of ken and vision has the bias of pride in 'I' and 'mine' been extirpated both in respect of this mind-informed body and of all external phenomena?"

The answer is a long, detailed, and comprehensive account, word for word the same as in the twenty-seventh Sutta, of the morality, of the mastery in various spheres, of the practices and the knowledge on account of which a man was considered worthy to merit the title of arahān. This compendium includes adherence

to the ten *sīlas*¹ in many of their aspects. Thus the arahān is not content with merely saying that he has put away from him all onslaught on creatures. He elaborates this theme. "Laying aside cudgel and sword, I live a life of innocence and mercy, full of kindness and compassion for everything that lives"; and so with the other *sīlas*. Added to these is the observance of the minor precepts of morality, such as the refusal to accept gold, women, domestic animals, or land; abstinence from bribery or cheating, and contentment with whatever robes and almsfood are given. Further, the arahān claims to be a master in the code of virtue—he controls his sense-perceptions so that no feelings of covetousness or discontent should arise; he is purposeful in all he does; he resorts to a lonely lodging and there purges all his heart of the Five Hindrances.² He then enters on the Four Musings (*jhāna*). And finally, with his heart steadfast, clarified, tempered, firm, and immutable, he applies his heart (as is also described in the fourth Majjhima Sutta, mentioned above) to the threefold lore, of which it will be remembered that the destruction of the āsavas is the third branch. "When I knew and saw this, my mind was delivered from the āsava of sensuous pleasure, from the āsava of continuing existence, and from the āsava of

¹ *Sīla* is "habit," "moral habit" by secondary use. The first five *sīlas* were binding on laity and bhikkhus alike; the second five, against luxurious living, were binding only on the bhikkhus.

² See above, p. 44.

ignorance. And to me thus delivered came the knowledge of my Deliverance in the conviction, "Rebirth is no more, I have lived the highest life, my task is done, and now there is no more of this state of things."¹ In the 112th Sutta this long discourse leads up to the statement that this is the manner of knowledge and vision whereby the bias of "I" and "mine" has been extirpated in respect both of this mind-informed body and of all external phenomena. In the 27th Sutta the conclusion of all this is that it "is known as the tathāgata's footprint, as the tathāgata's track, as the tathāgata's slash."² The trail is fired by Gotama himself, so that his disciples may pass along it.

I have dwelt upon this Sutta at some length because like many other discourses to be found in the Nikāyas, it identifies the bhikkhu, who almost always is one who has destroyed the āsavas, with an arahan. But I have reproduced it in such detail mainly because it brings forward some of the steps preliminary to the winning of the goal, and because it advocates two important measures to be observed in the search for perfection: abstinence from grasping, and the necessity for emptying the self of its bias towards the acquisition of possessions. The arahan should be aloof from external phenomena, detached from them, and should not regard them as subsisting in any relation to himself, but as they are in themselves.

At intervals throughout the Majjhima the topic of

¹ M. I. 22; III. 36; A. II. 211; Vin. III. 5; cf. M. I. 184.

² He slashes with the tusk of knowledge. MA. II. 217.

the āsavas and their destruction, together with many other aspects of the arahan, is presented.

The subject of the arahan is also a matter of great importance in both the Anguttara and in the Saṅguttara, although the descriptions given in both of these Nikāyas are perhaps on the whole more stereotyped than those of the Dīgha and the Majjhima. There is, however, in the Saṅguttara an explanation of *arahā* which states extremely clearly the identity of the arahan with the man who is freed from grasping. It describes the arahan in whom the āsavas are destroyed, who has lived the life, done the task, laid down the burden, won his own welfare,¹ worn out the fetters of rebirth, and is released by perfect insight, as one who is released without grasping² (or without fuel *upādāna*). For he has "seen as they really are both the arising and ending of, the satisfaction in, the misery of, and the escape from the five grasping-groups." These are based on body-grasping, on feeling-grasping, on perception-grasping, on the activities-grasping, and on consciousness-grasping.³

There is also in the Saṅguttara a long verse⁴ speaking of the states achieved, the victories won by the man or woman who is an arahan, perfected, with nothing more

¹ *Anupattasaddhā*.

² S. III. 161. The two meanings of *upādāna* as (1) fuel, (2) grasping, make it very hard to translate. It is either the fuel of existence or the grasping after (wrong) states. Either translation could be used in the remainder of this paragraph. Both meanings are late, revealing an aversion from life.

³ Cf. above, p. 125, and below, Formula C. p. 134.

⁴ S III. 83 f.

to do. This verse clearly rings like a later composition whose material has been carefully handled and arranged to the best advantage. I give it because it brings together many aspects of the arahān, and makes a useful summary :

“ Ah, happy saints, the Arahants ! in them no craving's seen.
The 'I' conceit is rooted up : delusion's net is burst.
Lust-free they have attained ; translucent is the heart of them.
These god-like beings, drug-immune,¹ unspotted in the world,
Knowing the fivefold mass, they roam the seven domains of good.²
Worthy of praise and worthy they—sons of the Wake true-born,
The wearers of the seven-fold gem,³ i' the threefold training trained.⁴

These mighty heroes follow on, exempt from fear and dread :
Lords of the ten-fold potency,⁵ great sages tranquillised :
Best beings they in all the world ; in them no craving's seen.
They've won the knowledge of adepts. This compound is their last.

That essence⁶ of the holy life that they have made their own.
Unshaken by the triple modes, set free from birth to come,
The plane of self-control they've won, victorious in the world.
Upwards or crossways or below—no lure is found in them.
They sound aloud their lion's roar, 'Supreme are they that wake.' ”

¹ *Anāsava*.

² *Cmy. saddhā, bhiṭṭappan, saccaṇ, āradhāviriya, sati, paññā*.

³ *Cmy. satta-bojjhaṅgā*, the seven factors belonging to enlightenment.

⁴ The three *sikkhā*: *ādbi-sīla, -citta, -paññā*, the higher morality, mind, and wisdom.

⁵ *Dasa-balāni*. In the Commentaries *Dasabala* is a favourite epithet of Gotama.

⁶ *Cmy. sāra = arabattaphala*.

In the *Saṅguyutta* there is a record of a conversation held between Gotama and King Pasenadi of Kosala.¹ They are sitting together when some adherents of other sects go by : seven matted hair ascetics, seven Nigaṇṭhas (Jains), seven naked ascetics, seven of the single vestment class (*ekasāṭaka*), and seven Wanderers. When they have passed, Pasenadi asks Gotama whether any of them are arahāns or are on the Way to Arahanship. Gotama replies that it is hard for Pasenadi who is a layman holding worldly possessions, dwelling among the encumbrances of children, accustomed to Benares sandalwood, decked in garlands and perfumed oils, and using gold and silver, to know whether any of these people are arahāns, and whether any have won to the Way to Arahanship. But he does not suggest that Pasenadi should question them along the lines proposed in the 112th *Majjhima Sutta*. The responsibility of determining whether a man is an arahān is here laid upon the inquirer and not upon the person who is being questioned. For Gotama is reported to say that it is only after a long interval, good heed and insight being applied, that living a life in common with a person we learn his moral character ; conversing with him we learn whether he is pure-minded ; in time of trouble we learn to know his fortitude ; by intercourse

¹ S. I. 77 ff. = Ud. 65. This passage recurs at A. III. 391, where Gotama, as recorded, tells a householder that it is hard for him, who is a layman, to know who are arahāns, and who are on the way to Arahanship. See also A. IV. 281 for this stock phrase.

with him we learn to know his wisdom. In this document Gotama, because he is talking with a layman, does not go into the technicalities of what makes a man an arahan. He gives instead a broad outline of mental states, the presence of which is essential in the quest for arahanship. And throughout Pali literature it is clear that if a man has not morality (*sīla*), has not purity of mind (*soceyya*), has not fortitude (*thāma*), and has not wisdom (*paññā*) he is far from the goal of the good life.

In the Anguttara is recorded a long conversation between Gotama and Visākhā,¹ the great lay-benefactress of the Order, and an ardent devotee. It bears the stamp of a real conversation, although possibly it has been much edited. Gotama says that, for as long as they live, arahans abandon the slaying of creatures, the taking of things which are not given, impurity of life, falsehood, the indulgence in fermented and distilled liquor; they subsist on one meal a day; refrain from going to exhibitions of nautch-dancing and singing; and they abandon the use of high, wide couches. These are the *sīlas* which every bhikkhu and bhikkhunī should attempt to observe, but which, as the Vinaya reveals, are often broken. To these *sīlas* observed by the arahans, there is added by Gotama, as recorded, a brief account of the heavenly bliss which various types of devas have won. I think that this account is included in the conversation so as to supply Visākhā with a goal: on *uposatha* days² she, as the type in Gotama's day not

¹ A. I. 211.

² Feast-days, transl. by Woodward as "sabbath."

of the arahan, but of the good man or woman, should think of what the devas have won, and resolve to do the same.

In the Dīgha it is said that the bhikkhu who is an arahan cannot become (*abhabba*) one to perpetrate nine things:¹ he cannot become one to break the first four *sīlas*; to lay up treasure for indulgence in worldly pleasure as he used to do in the life of the house; he cannot become one to take wrong courses through desire, ill-will, delusion, or through fear.²

As time went on and the concept of arahan became systematised, four formulæ came into vogue. They are constantly used throughout the Dīgha, Majjhima, Anguttara, and Saṃyutta Nikāyas to describe the man who had attained to arahanship; or sometimes the man himself is recorded to have uttered one or other of these formulæ at the moment of his attainment.

I give these formulæ, both because, on account of their frequent occurrence, they are interesting, and because they indicate the stereotyped view of the arahan-concept.

A. "Destroyed is rebirth, lived is the good life, done is what had to be done, and now there is no more of this state of things."

¹ D. III. 133 = A. IV. 370; cf. D. III. 235, where only the first five *abhabbatthāna* are mentioned.

² These four *agati-gamanāni* are given at D. III. 228; cf. A. I. 72; A. II. 18; A. IV. 272. *Agati* at A. II. 18, is transl. by Woodward, G.S. II. 18, as "no-bourn." He says (*ibid.* n. 4) "*agati*, not leading to the *gati* or bourn: sometimes taken as Nibbāna. . . . Here def. by Comy. (as at VM. II. 683) as wrong action done under the influence of desire, hate, or delusion."



B. "Alone, withdrawn, zealous, ardent, with a self that has striven."

C. "The arahān, in whom the āsavas are destroyed, who has greatly lived, who has done what ought to be done, who has shed his burden, and has won his aim (*attha*), whose bonds to becoming are now no more, is, having rightly come to know, set free."

D. "There arose in me the knowledge: unshakable for me is release of mind, this is my last birth, there is now no further becoming for me."¹

These formulæ do not occur so often in the Khud-daka-Nikāya as in the four great Nikāyas, since much of this is in verse. But even in their absence, the subject of arahanship is well to the front. Thus the Therātherī-gāthā are nothing but a collection of accounts of one or more aspects of arahanship whose attainment the poets claim to have won for themselves; and the *Dhammapada* is a monument, culminating in the Brāhmaṇavagga, to arahanship.

The Dhammapada has a verse which is obviously describing an arahān although the word itself is not mentioned.² It says that those whose mind is well-cultivated in the factors belonging to enlightenment, who without clinging to anything rejoice in freedom from the stuff of life, whose āsavas are destroyed, and who are full of light, are perfectly delivered, even in this world. The Commentary explains³ this to mean

¹ In S. Index volume, these formulæ are numbered, as above, for first time.

² Dh. 89.

³ DhA. II. 163.

that those who have given up cleaving to everything, who are freed from the fourfold Grasping,¹ are full of delight. "Full of light" means that they are resplendent with the splendour of the knowledge of the Way to Arahanship, established, having made clear the destruction of the *khandhas*.² Such beings are in this world, in this very world of the *khandhas*, entirely freed; which means that they are established in arahanship. They have destroyed the *kilesas* and the *khandhas*, together with all the stuff of life; and with these extinguished they are called completely waned (*parinibbata*).

This Dhammapada verse is followed by the Vagga called the Arahantavagga; and although in this there is no mention of the arahān as such, the descriptions are easily recognised to be arahān-descriptions. This Vagga is interesting since the views which it gives on the arahān are simpler than those in many of the Suttas in the four Collections of longer Discourses. This may therefore be some indication of the greater antiquity of this portion of the Dhammapada. For these less complex descriptions suggest a date of composition which belongs to a time prior to the many exalted elements, very hard of attainment, which were apparently gradually infused into the arahān-concept. This Vagga speaks more of what the arahān is rid of—grief, bonds, feverishness, the āsavas—than of any positive

¹ i.e. *kām*-, *diṭṭh*-, *sīlabbat*-, *attavādūpādāna*, or the graspings arising from sensuous desires, false speculation, belief in rites, and the soul-theory.

² Constituent elements of sensory existence.

attainments. It certainly brings to notice his piety, his steadfastness, and the purity of his thought, speech, and action; but these conditions would naturally grow as the evil things waned.

In this Vagga two other interesting points arise. In the first place, the good man who is being described is called a *gataddhin*,¹ which Mrs Rhys Davids translates as "Wayfarer,"² and the Pali Text Society's Dictionary³ and Max Müller⁴ as "one who has completed or finished the journey." Mrs Rhys Davids sees in *gata* a present (not past) participle, parallel to *paṭipanna*, walking. Max Müller and Rhys Davids did not see this parallel. So *sugata*, used for disciples too, means going. The rendering which takes *gata* as a past participle has commentarial support⁵—"a wanderer in the jungle, so long as he cannot get to where he wants, is called a wayfarer (*addhika*), but in this leaf (of the MS.) he is called one who has done the journey (*gataddhin*)."⁶ Whichever translation we adopt, the word brings before the mind the notion of going, of becoming, of growing during the journey; and it does this whether we look upon the journey, the Way, as being never-ending or as being accomplished. Thus the word *gataddhin* looks like an example of a word left in the arahān concept, since it suggests a process which either is to be or has been finished, and which is in consequence rather different from the many aspects of arahān which concentrate on finality. For although in these, victory after a struggle

¹ Dh. 90.² *Minor Anthologies*.³ Under *gata*.⁴ Dh. S.B.E. X.⁵ DhA. II. 168.

is always implied, since the whole arahān-concept would fall to the ground if it were not built upon becoming, upon growing, the final triumph as the result of prolonged effort is seldom so well expressed as it is by this metaphor of the man going upon a journey.

The second point to which I wish to call attention in the Arahantavagga is the refrain which recurs twice,¹ with a slight difference:

"As bourn of birds in air so hard it is
to trace whither those men are bound."

And again, but not in this Vagga:²

"He of whose bourn nor devas know, nor they
expert in deva-music, nor the men
of earth, quenched as to āsava, ar'han:
that man I call a brahman, man of worth."

In the Majjhima also it is said,³ "there is no discovering the course (*vaṭṭa*) of arahans." And nowhere in Pali literature is this elucidated: we are left in ignorance as to the ultimate destiny of arahans. They are no longer liable to be reborn, for by them death and birth have been overpassed. The silence shrouding this question is attributable to two causes: arahanship was regarded as its own reward, the goal itself; and speculative questions were not welcomed by Gotama.

A Majjhima Sutta states the view that in Gotama's teaching arahanship was the one and only goal (*niṭṭhā*).⁴

¹ Dh. 92, 93.² Dh. 420 = Sn. 644.³ M. I. 141.⁴ M. Sta. XI.

The occasion is an imagined talk that some bhikkhus might hold with Wanderers belonging to other sects. Gotama suggests that the bhikkhus might ask them whether the goal was one or many.¹ If they answer aright they will say that the goal is one and not many; and further, they will say that it is the goal of the man who has cut off passion, hate, illusion, of the man without cravings and of the man without attachments. We thus know that the goal is arahanship, since among the primary requisites of the candidate for arahanship is the eradication of these wrong mental conditions. Commenting on this passage, Buddhaghosa says² that the goal of the brahmins is Brahmaloṇa, of the ascetics who practise self-mortification (*tapas*) the Ābhassara (heaven), of the Wanderers the Subhakiṇṇa (heaven), of the Ājīvikas the heaven of the infinity of mind; that they all also call the goal arahanship; but that in this (Buddhist) teaching arahanship is the goal.

In two Nikāya passages, questions as to the goal of arahanship—called in both nibbāna—are cut short, in the one instance by the therī Dhammadinnā,³ and in the other by Gotama.⁴ They both tell their interlocutors that in asking what is beyond nibbāna they push their questions too far; and they insist that the aim of living this holy life is to plunge into nibbāna. It has nibbāna for its goal, nibbāna for its consummation.

There are two passages in the Saṃyutta which both suggest that it is not to the point to ask about the future

¹ M. I. 64.

³ M. I. 304.

² MA. II. 9 f.

⁴ S. V. 218.

existence of a tathāgata. In one,¹ Mahākassapa is represented as declaring to Sāriputta that the tathāgata has not revealed (*avyākata*) whether he exists (*hoti*, is), exists not, both exists and exists not, neither exists nor exists not, after death, because such a revelation “does not pertain to our good, and it belongs not to the first principles of the Brahma-life, it does not conduce to repulsion,² to falling away, to making to cease, to quiet, to super-knowledge, to enlightenment, to nibbāna.” King Pasenadi is reputed to have asked the learned bhikkhunī Khemā about the existence or non-existence after death of a tathāgata.³ She answered that such questions do not apply (*na upeti*). The tathāgata, she said, as recorded, is set free from reckoning by body, feeling, consciousness. “He is deep, boundless, unfathomable, just like the mighty ocean.”

Since arahanship was a goal in itself, it was unnecessary to speculate about the future state of an arahan. The theories of the destiny of the soul put forward by the leaders of other sects were contradictory, possibly mistaken, and certainly beyond the reach of human knowledge. Moreover, Gotama's main interest, at all events in speaking to his followers, was centered in the here and now as much as in the hereafter; and I suggest that this answer should be sufficient to allay the criticism sometimes levelled against Buddhism—

¹ S. II. 222.

² From here to end of quotation is a favourite stock-phrase in the Saṃyutta; also at M. I. 431.

³ S. IV. 374.

that it is a nihilistic doctrine. Gotama never said or hinted that the arahān's destiny was annihilation, any more than he said that it was anything else. Yet his silence on this point cannot be taken as a proof or indication that he himself did not know. His own standpoint was more positive than that which is found in the Kena Upaniṣad :¹

"There the eye goes not ;
Speech goes not, nor the mind.
We know not, we understand not
How one would teach It."

For in the Saṅguyutta² he is recorded to have said that just as the *siṅsapā* leaves in the grove are far more numerous than those he has in his hand, so the truths which he has not made known are far more numerous than those which he has, for "very few are the things which I have revealed." For he does not consider that what he has not revealed would be to the profit of the Order, nor would it constitute the rudiments of the good life or conduce to nibbāna.³ But what he has revealed without distinction of exoteric and esoteric, without the closed fist of a teacher, is dhamma.⁴ Yet, in spite of this and the great implications of dhamma, there are still some people who accuse Gotama of annihilationist findings because, like the teachers of other sects, they want to be assured of some future, and crave for more definite dogmas than Gotama was willing to hold out.

¹ Kena, I. 3.

³ *Ibid.* and cf. M. I. 431.

² S. V. 437.

⁴ D. II. 100.

The whole arahān theory came to be based on the belief in the perfectibility of man here and now, *ditthe va dhamme* ; but from this it does not necessarily follow that the arahān is annihilated at his bodily death. He may, in this existence, be bearing his last body—this can hardly be demonstrated. But unless the mind or character be identified with the body, or held to depend for their existence upon the existence of the body, the breaking up of the body does not necessarily imply the cessation of the man (*puruṣa*). There is no justification for supposing that Gotama taught annihilation, because he refused to reveal the destiny of arahāns. What we do know is, that the early teaching emphasised the present opportunity—the present moment, *khaṇa*, as it was called, since there was no word for opportunity. And the present moment was to be used, and was not to be allowed to slip by, *khaṇo mā upaccagā*, or suffering in hell (*niraya*)¹ would result. And the reverse would hold good. The exact nature of the fruition of using the present moment to the fullest advantage was not, however, made known. Living the best life would bring its own reward—a view in which there is nothing peculiarly Sakyan.

From what has been said it will be seen that Monastic Buddhism is less a philosophical or religious system than a code for conduct and self-training and self-development, whose aim is perfection here and now. It is therefore to be expected that the aspirants for arahānship seldom, if ever, turned their

¹ Sn. 333 = Dh. 315.

minds to a contemplation of God or Brahma, the All, the One without a second. The composers of the Upaniṣads express a certain awe at the supposed majesty of this concept; but anything comparable is totally lacking in Buddhist records. For Buddhism is not a religion in the sense that the religions of the Greeks and the Romans, Hinduism, Judaism, Christianity, or Islam can be called by this name. Therefore in Pali works all sense of the holy as the "numinous," to use Dr Otto's term,¹ to express that which is the overplus of "completely good" in the concept "holy," is lacking. "The Holy" is, I believe, equally absent in the Upaniṣads; hence its absence in the Piṭakas is no distinctive feature of Sakya.² There is in Pali no term corresponding to the Hebrew *qādōsh*,³ the Greek *ἅγιος*, the Latin *sanctus*, or, more accurately, *sacer*. This is simply because a Good

¹ Otto, *The Idea of the Holy*, London, 1928, p. 5 f.

² Cf. *The Birth of Indian Psychology*, p. 50, by Mrs Rhys Davids, 1935.

³ *Qādōsh* (= *ἅγιος*, *sanctus* in the O.T.) is used (1) of God, Isa. vi. 3, and is a familiar title for him. (2) Of God as separate from man, Hos. xi. 9. (3) Of objects, e.g. garments, assemblies, places, altars, and their offerings; cf. Kvu., 271 ff. where it is shown that garments are not freed from the āsavas because they belong to an arahant. (4) Of persons: priests, Lev. xxi. 7, 8; and of Nazarites, Num. vi. 5, 8. In both these, holy is in the sense of being "separated." (5) Of "saints," in Ps. xxxiv. 9, in sense of those who "fear" God. The ordinary meaning of *qādōsh* is a consecrated person, and not a holy individual. The chief idea is separation with Tabu, e.g. books which are "holy" are said to "defile the hands," and so become canonical books.

or a Holy that eludes human apprehension was not so immediate for Gotama's purpose as the good which could be attained by human endeavour. If a man developed his powers of virtue and cultivated his knowledge of virtue as it could be lived in this world, if he strove after wisdom, his salvation would inevitably follow. But his salvation did not depend upon his conjuring up feelings of awe and reverence for a scheme of things hypothetically on the side of right. There is no "feeling of dependence" in Buddhism, no "creature-consciousness," as Otto calls it—"the emotion of a creature, abased and overwhelmed by its own nothingness in contrast with that which is supreme above all creatures."¹ On the contrary, there is the very definite belief that a person can become perfect—at least as perfect as is compatible with human nature—through his or her own efforts. A Sutta-Nipāta verse² tersely sums up this standpoint. It is supposed to have been uttered by Gotama.

"No doubting heart do I
essay to free. Learning
the best dhamma, thou
wilt cross the flood (*ogha*) that's here."

This is borne out by the Thera-therī-gāthā. In these verses ascribed to men and women who claim to have attained arahanship, there is in their confessions of *aññā* (literally *ad-sciens*, acknowledging) no praise or sanctification of an external deity or force or principle; no gratitude to a benevolent supra-mundane helper;

¹ Otto, *loc. cit.* p. 10.

² Sn. 1064.

no wonder or awe at the saving grace¹ or love of a divine being. No, the verses of the Theras and Therīs describe something overcome, something won, and it may differ from case to case, by their own struggles, by their own will, by the virtuous conduct of their own life. At the most they only acknowledge Gotama as their guide—not because he was, to them, divine, but because he was a teacher, human like themselves, a shower of the Way (*maggakḥāyin*), in whom they had faith:

“Past-master he in sooth to guide,
Into the way of blest security.”²

And again:

“All glory to the Exalted One,
Our splendid Lord, the Sākiyas’ son!
For he the topmost height hath won,
And dhamma as supreme hath shown.”³

An intensive study of the Thera-therī-gāthā yields a comprehensive survey of the various states an arahān had won or had suppressed when he confesses *aññā*. For most of these verses testify to a triumph achieved, the struggle over, the desired end finally and completely gained. Only a very small minority have as their burden “the quest not yet won.”⁴ And such a study shows conclusively the absence of all idea of external superhuman guidance, made potent either by prayer or

¹ Whether a verse in the Kaṭha Upaniṣad contains a reference to a doctrine of Grace (II. 20, and cf. II. 23) is a moot question owing to “an important difference of reading.” See J. N. Rawson, *The Kaṭha Upaniṣad*, Oxford, 1934, pp. 107 f., 112 f.

² Thag. 69.

³ Thag. 94.

⁴ *Pss. Breth.* XXXII. and p. 37, n. 1.

magic. In 550 B.C., superhuman guidance was held to be within: “Live as they who have the self for a lamp, the self for a refuge, dhamma for a lamp, dhamma for a refuge, with none other.”¹ There was thus no question of prayer or sacrifice to a power outside oneself. Dhamma was for Early Buddhism the supreme guide, the tribunal by which each action was to be judged, the absolute to which all actions, all motives are relative. But at the same time it was “the moral law within the breast”² of each human being, as inalienably his heritage as Self. In the Bṛhadāranyaka Upaniṣad it had been said³ that “This shining immortal Person who is in this *dharma* exists, with reference to oneself, as virtuousness—he is just this Soul, this Immortal, this Brahma, this All.” Thus the cosmic and the personal are brought into relation with one another. This identification of Self (*attā*) and dhamma is strikingly made in the Anguttara:⁴

“The self (in thee⁵), man, knows what is true or false.
Surely the noble Witness, sir, the Self,
You do misjudge, in that when sin is there
You do conceal the Self within the self. . . .

Thus he who has the Self
As master, let him walk with heed, for whom
The world is master—shrewdly walk, for whom
Dhamma is master (as a) muser (let him walk).
Who lives as Dhamma bids him never fails.”

¹ D. II. 100. Also for remarks on the above translation, see Mrs Rhys Davids, *Buddhism*, 2nd edn., Home University Library, p. 73 f.

² Kant.

³ Bṛhad. 2. 5. 11.

⁴ A. I. 149.

⁵ Translator’s note, G.S. I. 132 n. 4, “as Dhamma, ‘conscience.’ Cf. *Buddh. Psych.* 28.”

Dhamma for Gotāma was as absolutely real as was Brahma for the Upaniṣads. His whole teaching was a teaching on Dhamma. This was revealed by him amid much that was held back. It was an aspect of the All which not only the few, but the many, could understand and evince in their own lives. Only the few might "know" the All, but the many might enter on the Way, if they walked in accordance with dhamma. Hence under Buddhism it was held that perfection could be gained not so much by "knowing" the All-real, as by making concrete in every mode of life a righteousness which is akin to the universal and eternal righteousness of dhamma. Actions, it is said, are our possessions and heritage, our origin (*yonī*), our kindred, and our refuge. It is actions which divide people into high and low.¹ It is recorded that Gotama said, according to our actions, so are our destinies in future becomings.² Because man has conscience (the word was lacking in Pali), because he knows the difference between right and wrong, he knows that there is a standard of morality not only without himself but also within himself. Gotama's refusal to be taken as the fount of authority after he should have gained *parinibbāna* is witness to his belief that there is an order which transcends the personal, and one which each of his disciples should aspire towards, lit by the light of Self, of Dhamma within him. Those who will live thus will become the highest in the undying

¹ M. III. 203.² M. III. 203 ff.

(*tamatagge bhavissanti*¹); only they must be desirous of training.²

Thus I think that in Buddhism the dualism of the perfectibility of man under temporal conditions, on the one hand, and, on the other, the perfection of the All, is transcended. The perfectibility of man was expressed in Monastic Buddhism in the belief in the human perfection of which a man was potentially capable, and he was called an arahān when that perfection had been attained and recognised. The perfection of the All, a belief inherited from the Upaniṣads, was expressed by a number of terms in Sakya. These include: *agga*, the highest; *amatagga*, the highest in the undying; *seṭṭha*, the best; *parama*, the highest, the most excellent; *pāra*, beyond; *anuttara*, the supreme; *uttama*, the utmost; *amata*, the undying. These are all terms which express the realisation that there is something beyond, something inexpressibly higher and greater than anything which is present to the senses.

Most of the Theras and Therīs of the Theragāthā and the Therīgāthā claim to have won to arahanship by subduing doubts, fears, dreads, including the dread of death; by quenching passion, vain conceits, and the longing for this and other lives; by casting out craving and ignorance; by crossing the flood; by training themselves in wisdom, virtue, and mindfulness, by destroying the āsavas; by discerning the transiency of things; and by attaining to peace, safety, happiness,

¹ See Mrs Rhys Davids, *Buddhism*, Home University Library, revised edn., London, 1934, p. 101.² D. II. 101.

bliss, rapture, the thrée-fold wisdom, to nibbāna, to the undying (*amata*), to the goal (*attha*).

Several of the Theras and one Therī, Dantikā,¹ speak of retiring to the forest or jungle, or sitting at the root of a tree for the day-sojourn, removed from the haunts of men, in order to train themselves for the great achievement. The value of solitude for contemplation was fully recognised. Some of them, too, speak of being cool, serene, and calmed. But in none of their verses is a mystical element apparent. The brahmins versed in the three Vedas claim to have been in companionship with Brahmā :² the medieval saints of India, Jñānadeva, Turkārāma, and others,³ and the medieval Western saints claim to have felt at one with their God. In Buddhism this was replaced by the harmony which the individual felt with himself the moment his moral or intellectual unrest was quieted. Such harmony with oneself may be imputed, although it is not called by this name in the Piṭakas. This subjective self-sufficiency of the arahān, burning the "sacred fire of insight"⁴ into things as they really are, making no demand for union with an external personal reality, is admirably expressed in a verse in the Saṅgyutta :⁵

"I lay no wood, brahmin, for fires on altars.
Only within burneth the fire I kindle.
Ever my fire burns ; ever tense and ardent,
I, arahat, work out the life that's holy."

¹ Thig. ver. 50.

² Tevijja Sutta. D. XIII.

³ See R. D. Ranade, *Indian Mysticism*, being vol. vii. of *History of Indian Philosophy*, Poona, 1933.

⁴ SA. I. 236.

⁵ S. I. 169.

The practice of the four *Brahmavihāras*, the Brahma-abodes or Brahma-abidings as they are usually translated, the abidings with Brahma or with the mind developed, perhaps also took the place in Early Buddhism of a more truly mystical element. Mrs Rhys Davids finds that these brahmavihāras are "not adduced as essentially his (Gotama's) teachings,"¹ but as an "annexed gospel" taken over from some now unknown, but probably brahmin teacher, who had joined the Sakyaputtas. The four practices were thus probably brought into Buddhism from outside and probably at an early date, and probably, as their name suggests, from brahminical sources. They nevertheless came to be important, and are mentioned twenty-six times in all in the four great Nikāyas.² This shows that even if the brahmavihāras were not indigenous to it, Buddhism did not turn its back on the aspect of companionship which they imply. But a change was made. The aim of companionship with Brahmā came to be a dwelling or abiding (*vihāra*) in development (*brahma*)³ by means of amity, compassion, gladness, and poise. For the person who undertakes the four brahmavihāras turns his thoughts outward until they suffuse the whole world with thoughts

¹ Mrs Rhys Davids, *Sakya*, p. 228. For a detailed discussion of the brahmavihāras, see *ibid.* p. 216 ff.

² *Ibid.* p. 222.

³ "The very name 'Brahman' (neut. from root *bṛh*, 'to grow') given to the Eternal Essence, is expression of this *growth*, this *expansion*, this universal *development* and *diffusion*." Monier Williams, *Hinduism*. S.P.C.K., 17th thousand, London, 1919, p. 86.

of this nature. It is recorded that Gotama said to Vāseṭṭha: "If one lets one's mind pervade the whole world with thoughts of amity, compassion, gladness, and poise—this is the way to companionship with Brahmā."¹

But from the point of view of the arahān-to-be, the development to which this kind of abiding was thought to lead was not enough. For the practice of the four brahmavihāras was traditionally held to entail rebirth in the Brahmāloka,² with the necessity of being reborn yet again, and not to entail arahanship³ which was indeed identical with nibbāna and the undying (*amata*). Thus the man who chose to practise the brahmavihāras did so, knowing that he would thereby be precluded from achieving arahanship here and now, in this very birth. This is perhaps the reason why the brahmavihāras never appear in the core of the teaching, and are also omitted in the record of Gotama's last tour. Here, of all times, he would have spoken of the things which seemed to him vital for the endurance of Dhamma. To the brahmins soaked in the Upaniṣad doctrine, companionship with Brahma, the All, the One without a second, was vital for their salvation. Such companionship with Brahma, such *being* Brahma, may refer only to men and women when freed from the body. Yet all the time each one, so he was taught, *was* Brahma.

It is possible that Sakya retained the essence of the Upaniṣadic doctrine: that Brahma is the whole of

¹ D. I. 251; cf. M. II. 195; Sn. 507.

² Vism. 199 f.

³ Dial. I. 317 n.

reality; but that it emphasised in the term Brahma the aspect of development. As a man becomes more developed, so is he able to suffuse more and more of the world by his will-power.¹ He becomes Brahma-like as he becomes more developed; and according to the way made possible by practising the four brahmavihāras a man develops himself in so far as he lives willing that the world and its inhabitants shall be filled and suffused with his own surcharged amity, compassion, gladness, and poise. These four modes of thought constitute, for the man who uses them and who gives himself up to them, either, if he be not perfect in them, the abidings that he is practising, his whole ambition and his whole purpose being mastery in them; or, if he be perfect in them, they are abidings which he has developed and mastered for himself. Whether he were imperfect or adept in the brahmavihāras, it was only possible to suffuse all quarters if he had the power of mental development and the will for it. This development was the *brahma*, the *seṭṭha*, the best (as the Commentaries often paraphrase *brahma*), of which a man was capable. But, besides the brahmavihāras, other more potent and efficacious ways of development were known, among them the *satipatṭhānas* and the *bojjhaṅgas* (factors of enlightenment). Therefore emphasis was laid on these. The exclusion of the brahmavihāras in the last tour is explained, if we admit that the brahmavihāra allusions were annexed and only

¹ There was no word for will—*pharati* (suffuse) does duty for it.

entered into the Sayings long after, when the teaching had been incorporated in the oral tradition. The *bodhipakkhiyadhammas* were not annexed, and so became drafted earlier.¹

The other Nikāya "books," as they now are, do not deal with the subject of arahanship so continuously; but one has only to turn over the pages in any portion of the Nikāya literature to realise the extent to which this forms a dominant interest. The quantities of references to it, either in its entirety, or in one or more of its many aspects, some of which came to be synonymous with it, and the terms in which it is without exception described, exhibit a concept of supreme and vital importance. When we recognise the synonyms, when we know the states co-existent with arahanship, when we know the discipline and development of certain factors on which it depends for its realisation, we may well say that, judged from documentary evidence, the attainment of arahanship was the highest ideal held before the followers of Gotama. And it was not a bare, empty concept, impossible of realisation. It was attainable here and now, a living reality for those who could renounce the shams and illusions which had blinded them and fascinated them, and who in consequence could become perfected and complete. For in spite of the simple beginnings of the import of the term arahan, this is the meaning with which it is endowed in the Nikāyas.

That arahan was certainly a term of highest esteem

¹ See above, Chapter I.

is indubitable. The number of times throughout the Nikāya literature that Gotama is represented as calling himself an arahan, and the number of times that others refer to him as such, would alone be sufficient to establish this. Further, it was thought to be an advantage to see and hear an arahan, such as Gotama or one of his chief disciples. "Good it is to see arahans such as this,"¹ is a phrase often repeated. This is but one aspect of the thought common to all civilised communities: that some advantage may be gained from communication with persons at a high stage of intellectual or moral development. It was sometimes differently expressed: "Delightful is that spot where arahans make their dwelling,"² whether it be in forest, village, valley, or on a hill.

In the Sutta-Nipāta there is an excellent summary of the Nikāya views of the attributes of an arahan,³ although it is by no means exhaustive. It is here said that the arahan has his thoughts and mind in full control; he does not take what is not given to him, nor does he harm living creatures (two of the five major *sīlas*); he is zealous; he does not neglect his musing; he does not utter falsehoods, nor is his speech harsh or calumnious; he is unstained by sensuous delights, his heart unmarred; he has overcome illusion; he has vision into things as they really are; he has wisdom (*vijjā*); he walks in purity; the cankers are

¹ Vin. I. 35; III. 1; D. I. 88, 111, 150; M. I. 285; II. 83 (Kaccāna); Sn. p. 103.

² Dh. 98 = Sn. 233 = Thag. 991.

³ Sn. 153-167.

destroyed (*āsava kkhīṇā*); he will be born no more; he is lean, self-denying, temperate; a *muni* (seer) musing in the forests.

ABHIDHAMMA-PIṬAKA

In the seven books of the Abhidhamma references to the arahan are less frequent than they are in the Nikāya literature. For the third Piṭaka differs from this in that it does not contain dialogues setting forth the training or different aspects of the teaching, with frequent insistence on the desirability of becoming perfect. The Abhidhamma is a systematisation and classification of doctrinal points, and was drawn up with a view to expounding difficult parts of the teaching which we should call psychological and logical. Much of this teaching was accepted by the compilers of Abhidhamma without criticism, the theme to be investigated being recognised, by the time that the Abhidhamma was composed, as an integral part of the doctrine. And the doctrine was no longer in a state of growth, but was by now formulated. Unluckily for the historian the Abhidhamma proves to be but a scanty source for later developments of the arahan-concept. For when the Abhidhamma deals with this concept it neither aggrandises it nor minimises it, but upholds the view of the two earlier Piṭakas: that the arahan is mentally and spiritually the greatest and purest of human beings, with the training finished, the āsavas destroyed, nibbāna won. The Kathāvatthu is interesting since it enlarges on the topic of the murder and abuse of an

arahān, thus bringing him before us as physically not more immune from harm than are more ordinary human beings. There are some bodily happenings with which not even the finest spiritual mastery can contend.

I propose to deal here with only four of the Abhidhamma works: the Dhammasaṅgaṇi, Vibhaṅga, Puggalapaññatti, and the Kathāvatthu.

The Dhammasaṅgaṇi is a psychological-ethical treatise, a large portion of which is devoted to discriminating between states which are good and those which are bad. In Book III. the concept of *apariyāpanna*, the Unincluded, which as far as I know does not occur in either of the two older Piṭakas, is introduced. It is a lofty notion connoting all that is exempt from the threefold cycle of existence: the worlds of sense, of form, and of formlessness, which are the Included. Mrs Rhys Davids in her introduction to *Buddhist Psychological Ethics*¹ remarks upon the dry and formal style of the Dhammasaṅgaṇi, but proceeds to say that "no rhetoric could more effectively describe the separatedness and uncompromising otherness of that higher quest than the one word *a-pariyāpanna*—Unincluded."

The Unincluded first appears in connection with the Ways to Arahanship and with nibbāna. In this portion of the Dhammasaṅgaṇi, nibbāna is not called such, but is called *asaṅkhatā dhātu*, the unconditioned element. There is a passage in the Vibhaṅga,² one of

¹ *Buddhist Psychological Ethics*, 2nd edn. 1923, p. xcvi.

² Vbh. 72.

the books of the Abhidhamma, where *asaṅkhatadhammā* is defined in the same way as both *nibbāna* and *arahatta* in a Saṅgīta passage.¹ These three terms are also cited in one passage in the Vibhaṅga Commentary.² The definition of these terms is, "destruction of passion, of ill-will, of confusion."

The Ways that are Unincluded (*apariyāpannā maggā*) and the fruits of the Ways and the unconditioned element are said to be states that are neither grasped at, nor favourable to grasping.³ Again it is said that the four Ways that are unincluded and the three lowest fruits of the life of a recluse are states appertaining to training (*sekha*), whereas the topmost fruit—arahanship—does not appertain to training,⁴ since the adept (*asekha*), the arahā, has perfected his discipline. Moreover, the Ways and the fruits of the Ways and the unconditioned element which are the Unincluded are said to be infinite⁵ (*appamāṇa*, or without measure, Asl. 45), to be excellent,⁶ unable to have āsavas,⁷ and disconnected with them,⁸ to make for the undoing of rebirth.⁹

But often when the Unincluded is mentioned it is not represented as being in opposition to the worlds of sense, of form, and of formlessness, but as operating

¹ S. IV. 251 f.

² VbhA. 51 f.

³ Dhs. 992, 1287; *upādāna* can also mean "fuel," cf. above, p. 129.

⁴ Dhs. 1016, 1017.

⁵ Dhs. 1021.

⁶ Dhs. 1027, *pañña-lokuttara*, Asl. 45.

⁷ Dhs. 1104.

⁸ Dhs. 1121.

⁹ Dhs. 1014. Naturally the unconditioned element does not operate here.

with them. The inference is that the arahā is not essentially different from those who had as yet not achieved the Utmost, but different from them only because of the richer and fuller content of his qualities.

In the Vibhaṅga¹ arahans are identified with the *visuddhidevas*, or devas by purification. The Commentary explains² this to mean "devas by purification of all the corruptions (*kilesā*), worthy of the veneration (*pūjārahā*) of all the devas." The Majjhima Commentary says that the *visuddhidevas* are arahans devoid of āsavas.³ These *visuddhidevas* form dogmatically the highest class of devas. Other classes of devas are "conventional devas" (*sammutideva*), such as kings and princes; and devas by rebirth (*uppatideva*). This distinction is current only in the later canonical works.⁴ In the Vimānavatthu Commentary the *visuddhidevas* (or arahans) are associated with a term, *devātideva*, the deva of devas,⁵ which in post-canonical works appears as an epithet of Gotama. This Commentary says: "He seeing all the teaching of the *devātideva* means: because he is a deva by purification he is said to be of the nature of the supreme deva or of the devas by purification."⁶

Thus the Vibhaṅga adds but little to our knowledge of the arahā. Nor does the Puggalapaññatti do more than repeat the well-known notions. In this work the word arahā is only mentioned a few times. In the grouping of "Human Types by One" "the arahā

¹ Vbh. 422.

² VbhA. 518.

³ MA. I. 33.

⁴ Vbh. 422, and cf. Khu. 123; VvA. 18; Nd. II. 307.

⁵ VvA. 18.

⁶ On term *deva*, see above, p. 50 f.

walking in arahanship" is the last type to be given, although through the forty-nine preceding types synonyms for the arahān occasionally occur. Thus there is the type of one not liable to fall away, of one unrestrained through fear,¹ of the elect, of the adept, of one who has the threefold lore, of the possessor of the six super-knowledges. The definition of the Arahān is as follows: "A person working for putting away attachment to form and the formless, to pride, haughtiness, and ignorance without any residuum, is one working for the fruition stage of arahanship. The person whose attachment to form and the formless, to pride, haughtiness, and ignorance has been entirely put away is said to be an arahān."² These views are a mere repetition of Nikāya conceptions.

But with the Kathāvatthu, over and above a harking back to older works, a different element in the arahān concept is stressed. This different element very definitely shows the arahān not as living alone and aloof removed from the haunts of men, but as living and moving as a social being among ordinary mortals, and as subject to the same forms of human suffering as they undergo from time to time. For it is said that when he dies his body may provide food for the scavenger birds of India; he may be poisoned, burnt, or stabbed; he may be put into captivity by ropes and chains; he may be interned in a village, town, city, or province; he may be imprisoned. If he gives his robe, food, lodging, or medicine to a householder, these objects which were

¹ Cf. Pug. 13.

² Pug. 18.

free from the āsavas may become possessed of the āsavas. This was the point which was controverted. The Vibhajjavādin tries to convince the controversialist that some things, such as the Four Ways, the Four Fruits, nibbāna and the thirty-seven factors serviceable to enlightenment, all of which belong to the arahān, are certainly devoid of the āsavas, whereas his mere material possessions are not. The Vibhajjavādin's argument is based on the difference, unperceived by the controversialist, between what is essential and what is external; and he tries to make the controversialist see that he is mistaken in thinking that the spiritual qualities which belong to the arahān are subject to the same laws as are the material objects which he happens to possess.¹

The aspect of the arahān as a member of a social order, behaving as non-arahāns might behave, is again expressed in a chapter in the Kathāvatthu where the Vibhajjavādin asks: "May not an arahān make gifts—clothing, almsfood, lodgings, medicaments for the sick, food, drink? May he not salute shrines, hang garlands on them and perfumes and unguents? May he not make consummate oblations before them?"²

Nikāya influence is easily recognised in most of the other parts of the Kathāvatthu which mention the arahān. It is argued that he has knowledge;³ that he does not doubt;⁴ that he is not excelled by others.⁵ But in the discussion as to whether an arahān can fall

¹ Kvu. 271 ff.

⁴ Kvu. 180 ff.

² Kvu. 542 f.

⁵ Kvu. 187 ff.

³ Kvu. 173 ff.

away from arahanship,¹ among much that is old, a new point emerges. It is concerned with the intermittent attainment of *jhāna* (musing), a notion which never attained the slightest importance in the later literature. Indeed it is here shown to be no more than the last defence of the controversialist. He has admitted, in response to the subtle pressure of the theravādin, that the arahān has put away the corruptions; ² has won to excellence in the cultivation of the thirty-seven things serviceable to enlightenment; has cut off the three roots of evil—passion, ill-will, and confusion; has cast away many states and has achieved many other states. The controversialist, having assented to all this, then modifies his statement, and in doing so draws a distinction between an arahān who now and then in *jhāna* reaches emancipation, and the arahān who is at any and all seasons emancipated. But the Vibhajjavādin declares that the former class of arahāns has such qualities as they have agreed make falling away impossible, and that therefore the matter of occasional or of constant emancipation does not affect the argument. The controversialist is of course a figure set up to be stoned, and when a quotation from the Anguttara ³ is put into his mouth, it is clearly intended that he should nullify his own argument. For in this Anguttara passage it is said, not that it is an arahān, but that it is a bhikkhu

¹ Kvu. 69 ff.

² *Kilesa*. Kvu. 8; calls them lust, ill-will, illusion, false pride, torpor, excitement, inward scruples, and fear of blame.

³ A. III. 173.

who is intermittently emancipated. The Vibhajjavādin, however, does not draw attention to this distinction. He waits for the controversialist to finish the quotation, which is to the effect that a bhikkhu is intermittently emancipated because there are five things which conduce to his falling away; and he then declares that an arahān delights in none of these disturbing things, and hence cannot fall away.

These, then, are some of the "points" considered by the Kathāvatthu—these and others; and at intervals the four Ways to arahanship are discussed together with the fruits of the Ways.

Another point of interest in the Abhidhamma literature is the occasional mention of twenty-two Faculties (*indriyāṇi*), or Controlling Faculties as they are sometimes translated, presumably in accordance with the Visuddhimagga exegesis.¹ The interest to us in the increase of the Faculties to as many as twenty-two lies largely in the fact that the last three together form a group, which is bound together by the common factor of *aññā* (perfect knowledge). A differing aspect of *aññā* is expressed by each member of this group. None of the remaining nineteen Faculties is connected with this concept. Now, since according to the Commentaries on the Thera-therī-gāthā, *aññā* was often expressed the moment a disciple claimed to have won arahanship, we should expect the three Faculties which share *aññā* to be in some connection with arahanship. And we shall find that this is the case.

¹ Vism. 491.

These three Faculties are :

- (1) *anaññātaññassāmīti* *indriya*, "I shall come to know the unknown" or "I shall learn the unlearnt" ¹ faculty.
- (2) *aññindriya*, the faculty of perfect knowledge.
- (3) *aññātāvindriya*, the faculty of him who knows, or who has learnt, or come to know.

The first of these is a gem of true religion, implying confidence of being on the right way for going further ; acknowledging that there is something more to know beyond the world of sense, attainable for him who has faith, desire, and will. Together they indicate a progress of an intellectual order, consisting of three stages in *aññā*. This mounts from what is as yet unknown, although held to be knowable, to subsequent knowledge of it by a knower. The only places in the Suttas where, as I believe, this list-term is anticipated is once, in the Sutta-Nipāta and twice in the Anguttara. There is first the Sutta-Nipāta *pada* ² which runs : *aññātaṃ etaṃ vacanaṃ Asitassa yathātatthaṃ*, what had been learnt by Asita has come true. Then there is an Anguttara passage ³ which says *anaññāte aññātamānī*, he bethinks himself of what he has not learnt in the unlearnt ; and thirdly, another Anguttara term, *aññātukāma*, ⁴ desirous of knowledge or learning.

¹ See Mrs Rhys Davids, *A Manual of Buddhism*, 1932, p. 131.

² Sn. 699.

³ A. III. 175, translated at G.S. III. 132 "not given to thinking of his knowledge of the unknown."

⁴ A. III. 192.

This group of *indriyas* is, as far as I know, referred to three times and three times only in the Nikāya literature. Once in the Sangīti-Suttanta of the Dīgha-Nikāya, among the triads ; ¹ once in the Saṃyutta-Nikāya ; ² and once in the Itivuttaka ³ of the Khuddakanikāya. In the Sangīti-Suttanta these three *indriyas*, which appear in complete isolation from all the other *indriyas*, are in no way explained. They are simply stated to be the three *indriyas*. The Saṃyutta includes them in the *Indriya-Saṃyutta* of the Great Book, under the heading *Ñāya*, the Method. It is disappointing to find that, although adjacent headings tabulate the results of cultivating the five *indriyas* of faith and the rest, and the six *indriyas* of eye and the rest, the *indriyas* of the three stages in *aññā* are merely given, and no account of the results of cultivating them is appended. ⁴

Of the Nikāya allusions the Itivuttaka alone seems to give, in an accompanying verse, some indication of what it has in mind in referring to these three *indriyas*. For (in rough paraphrase) the verse says that "he who goes by the right way of a learner has knowledge (*ñāṇa*) of destructions ; he has *aññā*. He has the knowledge of freedom by *aññā*, his freedom is unshakable because he has destroyed the fetter of becoming. Whoso is endowed with the *indriyas* bears his last body, having

¹ D. III. 219.

² S. V. 204.

³ It. § 62.

⁴ This applies also to the three *indriyas*, also given here (S. V. 204) under the heading *Jīvita*, namely, *ittāndriya*, *puris-indriya*, and *jīvitindriya*.

routed Māra and his train." As is well known, "bearing the last body" is considered to be one of the characteristics of the arahān.

So much for the Nikāya literature. These last three of the twenty-two indriyas were more prominent in the Abhidhamma. Of the seven books which constitute this Piṭaka, the Dhammasaṅgaṇi and to a less extent the Vibhaṅga tell us most about the conception then current of the indriyas of *aññā*. These three indriyas conclude the list of the twenty-two indriyas in the Puggalapaññatti,¹ in the Yamaka,² and in the Vibhaṅga.³

As regards post-canonical literature, the Visuddhimagga and the Nettipakaraṇa each has something to say on the subject; as have the Commentaries on some of the Nikāya passages referred to above. Again, the list of the twenty-two indriyas is given in the Abhidhammattha-saṅgaha, a work which, since it belongs to the eleventh century A.C., is certainly later than the commentarial literature.⁴

The Dhammasaṅgaṇi and the Vibhaṅga give an identical definition of each of the three *aññā*-indriyas. They are as follows:

(1) *anaññātāññassāmītiindriya*:⁵ "The insight which makes for the realisation of those truths which are unrealised, uncomprehended, unattained to, undiscerned, unknown—the insight which is understanding, search, research, searching in Dhamma, discernment,

discrimination, differentiation, erudition, proficiency, subtlety, criticism, reflection, analysis, breadth, sagacity, leading, insight, intelligence, incitement, insight as Faculty and as Power, as a sword, as a height, as light, as glory, as splendour, as a precious stone; the absence of dullness, searching Dhamma, right views, that searching Dhamma which is a Factor of Enlightenment, a Way-component, contained in the Way—this is the insight which there then is."

This definition is the same as that given in the Dhammasaṅgaṇi for *paññā*, insight.¹ The connection of *paññā* with growth, spiritual growth, is significant here. *Paññā* was not an intellectual state of mind, although in this long description it came to be confounded with it. It involved growth of what we call character.

This faculty of "I shall come to know the unknown" is called a state which is good in the Section on the First Way in the Chapter headed *lokuttaram cittaṃ* in the Dhammasaṅgaṇi.²

(2) *aññīndriya*:³ "The insight which makes for the realisation of those truths which have been realised, comprehended, attained to, discerned, and known—the insight which is understanding, search, research, searching in Dhamma, discernment, discrimination, differentiation, erudition, proficiency, subtlety, criticism, reflection, analysis, breadth, sagacity, leading, insight, intelligence, incitement, insight as Faculty and as Power, as a sword, as a height, as light, as glory, as splendour,

¹ Pug. 2. ² Yam. II. 61. ³ Vbh. 122, 124, 401.

⁴ Transl. *Compendium of Philosophy*; see Intr. to this work.

⁵ Dhs. 296 = Vbh. 124.

¹ Dhs. 16.

² Dhs. 277.

³ Dhs. 364 = Vbh. 124.

as a precious stone; the absence of dullness, searching Dhamma, right views, that searching Dhamma which is a Factor of Enlightenment, a Way-component, contained in the Way—this is the insight which there then is.”

This faculty of perfect knowledge occurs as a state that is good in the Sections on the Second, Third, and Fourth Ways in the Dhammasaṅgaṇi.¹ The definition is appended to the Section on the Fourth Way. It is also included among the states which are indeterminate (*dhamma avyākata*²) in the Section called the Result (*vipāka*) of the First Way.

(3) *aññātāvindriya*:³ “The perfected knowledge, the science, the understanding of the doctrine of those whose knowledge is made perfect, their search, research, searching in Dhamma, discernment, discrimination, differentiation, erudition, proficiency, subtlety, criticism, reflection, analysis, breadth, sagacity, leading, insight, intelligence, incitement, insight as Faculty and as Power, as a sword, as a height, as light, as glory, as splendour, as a precious stone; the absence of dullness, searching Dhamma, right views, that searching Dhamma which is a Factor of Enlightenment, a Way-component, contained in the Way—this is the insight which there then is.”

This faculty of him who knows occurs as a state which is indeterminate in the Section on *lokuttaravipāka*, the “remaining Three Ways” in the Dhammasaṅgaṇi.

¹ Dhs. 362 = 364.

² Dhs. 505 ff.

³ Dhs. 555 = Vbh. 124.

Four Commentaries: the Atthasālinī and the Commentaries on the Dīgha, the Saṃyutta, and the Itivuttaka are in substantial agreement with one another in their interpretations of these three faculties. Differing from this exposition is that given by the Visuddhimagga and the Commentary on the Vibhaṅga, which will therefore be considered separately.

I will now attempt to indicate what the four Commentaries which concur with one another say of the three indriyas of *aññā*.

(1) Of *anaññātāññassāmīdriya*, the faculty of I shall come to know the unknown, Buddhaghosa says, “I shall know the path of deathlessness, the four-true-thing as yet unknown in this round of *samsāra*, whose beginning and end are alike unthinkable, and in practising thus a new faculty arises.”¹ Dhammapāla says, in the Commentary on the Itivuttaka,² “This is so because of insight into the Way of stream-attainment”—a phrase which recurs in much the same wording in the Sumaṅgalavilāsinī³ and in the Commentary on the Saṃyutta.⁴ But both of these last Commentaries take the hitherto “unknown” as Dhamma. Buddhaghosa further says⁵ that he who penetrates the four truths while he is yet in the First Way comes to know them. As one, he continues, “may go off his beat and come to a strange vihāra, receiving a garland there, raiment and food, and realises that this is a new experience for him, so are these truths not known by him before,

¹ Asl. 216.

² ItA. I. 282 (Siam. edn.).

³ DA. III. 1002.

⁴ SA. II. 351 (Siam. edn.).

⁵ Asl. 218.

called by him known, when he has full experience of them." Light has dawned and the ardent disciple is set fair to conquer the knowledge of higher matters. The interesting thing is that the unknown is called by Buddhaghosa both the fourfold-true-thing (*catusacca-dhammā*) and dhamma. Were the two to him identical? And was the fourfold-true-thing the Four Truths of Ill? By the time that Buddhaghosa flourished the teaching of the Founder had, it must be admitted, degenerated into a pessimistic doctrine. The world, so it had come to be held, was full of evil and pain, from which the wise man would attempt to escape by cutting through the round of *samsāra*. He could do this, it was thought, if he came to know ill, as it really is, the arising and cessation of ill and the way leading to its cessation. But I do not believe that when the three indriyas of *aññā* were placed among the Threes in the Sangīti-Sutta (which is usually considered to be old), the unknown which one could come to know was limited to the four truths of ill. The unknown would then have meant something more than this; each man would have been engaged upon a different quest according to his spiritual development; and the quest would not have been stultified by a formula of knowledge. It is more likely that the unknown was intended to represent the Four Ways of arahanship¹ or the path to the Undying, as Buddhaghosa also says it means, although he implies that the attainment of this depends upon insight into the Four Truths.

¹ Cf. below, Chapter VI.

Knowledge of the undying is claimed to have been won by some arahans. Further back in time still, the desire for it is expressed in an Upaniṣadic mantra,¹ although here the undying is not called the unknown:

"From the unreal lead me to the Real.
From darkness lead me to the Light.
From death lead me to the Undying."

(2) In commenting on *aññindriya*, Buddhaghosa says in the Atthasālinī² that the indriya of not knowing is when one has not passed the limitations of what is known by means of the first Way; but *aññindriya* is called the indriya of knowing (*jānaka-indriya*) when by this Way the fourfold-true-thing is known. In the Commentary on the Itivuttaka, "the limitations of what is seen (*diṭṭhamariyāda*)" is substituted for those of what is known; and the "full knowledge of ill and so on" is substituted for the "fourfold-true-thing." This supports the hypothesis, which I have so far taken for granted, that for Buddhaghosa the fourfold-truth meant the four truths of ill. It is curious that the Itivuttaka Commentary, in a passage devoted to a discussion of knowledge, has "what is seen" for "what is known," but it is probably intended to refer rather to what is seen by insight than to what is seen by the bodily eye. In the Itivuttaka Commentary this indriya is also said to be that of the *ariyapuggala*; and it is said that going from the fruition of stream-attainment one has knowledge in six occasions, or things established (*thāna*). The Commentaries on the Dīgha and Saṃyutta

¹ Brhad. I. 3, 28.

² P. 239.

also insert this last clause about *chāsu thānesu*, but offer no explanation of it. The *cha thānāni* probably do not refer to the six *abhiññās*, because these were pre-eminently the six super-knowings attained only by the arahān. It is more likely that these *cha thānāni* are intended to refer to the *cha vijjābhāgiye dhamme*, "the six conditions which are constituents of knowledge," referred to in the Saṃyutta.¹ For here Gotama is recorded to have said to the layman, Dīghāvu, that being established in the four limbs of stream-attainment² he should further make to become these six conditions of knowledge, which are then enumerated. The Commentaries thus concur in the view that these things are to follow stream-attainment.

(3) In commenting on *aññātāvindriya*, Buddhaghosa, in the Atthasālinī,³ still harps on the fourfold-true-thing. In the explanation of the fruit of the fourfold Way this faculty is defined as the "faculty of bringing knowledge to completion among the four true things of him who knows." He not only knows the four truths as he did by *aññindriya*, but he knows them thoroughly and has mastered them inwardly (*sampayuttadhammāṇaṃ thitāṇaṃ dhammāṇaṃ abbhantare*). The Commentary on the Itivuttaka also speaks of the four truths, while the Commentaries on the Dīgha and the Saṃyutta call this indriya the indriya arising among states (*dhammesu*), or possibly, among Dhammas, thus distinguishing the true from false Dhammas. This latter interpretation would only be permissible on the

¹ S.V. 345. ² See below, Chapter VI. p. 233 f. ³ Asl. 291.

assumption that, in the discussion which both of these Commentaries put forward on *anaññātāññassāmītindriya*, *dhamma*¹ means Dhamma, the "Doctrine," or absolute righteousness. For this allusion to *dhamma* in the explanation of the first and third indriyas connected with *aññā* looks like something more than a coincidence. Both of these latter two Commentaries call *aññātāvindriya* the indriya of the fruit of arahanship; while the Itivuttaka Commentary says that it arises in him who has destroyed the āsavas.

The Itivuttaka Commentary has this last phrase in common with the Visuddhimagga where, in the chapter headed *Indriya-sacca-niddeso* of "Exposition of the (controlling) Faculties and Truths," there is a detailed account of the three faculties connected with *aññā*.² This lays stress on the term *inda*, translated by Pe Maung Tin³ in three ways in the different contexts in which it occurs. This Exposition includes a serial ordering. It is the most fully stated and complete account of these faculties which has survived. The Vibhaṅga Commentary also adopts the use of *inda*,⁴ but it comments on the whole subject in much less detail than does the Visuddhimagga. I quote in full from the relevant passages of this latter work:

"Of the last three terms, the first is called the faculty of 'I shall come to know the unknown' because it has the sense of controlling faculty, and it arises in

¹ See above, p. 167.

² Vism. 491 ff.

³ *Path of Purity*, III. 580 ff., which should be consulted for notes on this passage.

⁴ VbhA. 125.

one who practises to the end that 'I shall come to know the path of deathlessness or the law of the Four Truths, not known previously.' The second is called 'the Perfected-Knowledge-Faculty' because it keeps on knowing (the Four Truths)¹ and it has the sense of controlling faculty. The third is called 'the One who has come to know faculty' because it has the sense of controlling faculty, and it arises in one who has destroyed the āsavas and who has come to know the Four Truths, wherein he has accomplished the function of knowledge.

"What, then, is this sense of controlling faculty? It means the indication of control (*inda*), what is taught by the Lord (*inda*), what is seen by the Lord, what is brought about by action (*inda*), what is used by the Lord (*inda*). All these meanings are proper, each in its place. For the Blessed One, the fully-enlightened One is *inda* because he is the supreme overlord; and moral and immoral acts are *inda* because no one can be overlord among actions. Therefore here the controlling faculties which are produced by action indicate moral and immoral action, and are brought about by such action. They are the controlling faculties in the sense of indicating action (*inda*) and of being brought about by action (*inda*). And all of them have been explained and fully understood as they really are by the Blessed One. Thus they are the controlling faculties in the sense of having been taught and seen by the Lord (*inda*). And some of them have been used by the

¹ So Pe Maung Tin.

Blessed One, the Lord of sages, for the needs of life, some as means of developing. Thus they are controlling faculties in the sense of having been used by the Lord (*inda*). They are also controlling faculties in the sense of sovereignty, which is called the dominant influence. . . . The faculty of believing 'I shall come to know the unknown' is next mentioned in order (after the preceding faculties) to show that the attainment is not useless since that faculty is first manifested in one's self owing to the attainment. And owing to the fruit that the last-named faculty yields, the 'faculty of perfected knowledge' should be developed immediately after it; hence the 'faculty of perfected knowledge' comes next in order. Then the faculty of one who has come to know, the faculty which gives supreme comfort, is taught last so that we may understand that its attainment comes of the developing of the last-named faculty, and that when it has been attained, there is nothing further for us to do. Such is the serial order of the faculties."

The climax, "there is nothing further for us to do (*uttarikaraṇiya*)"¹ is reminiscent of a clause in one of the formulæ of arahanship: *katam karaṇiyam*, done is what had to be done; and thus its appearance here, even if any other tendency to establish a connection between the three indriyas and arahanship were absent, would strongly suggest that he who has attained the "faculty of him who knows" is an arahan.

¹ Cf. A. V. 157, 164; S. II. 99; III. 168; M. I. 271 ff., where the phrase appears as a refrain of Śākyan teaching.

Buddhaghosa's insistence on the connection between the three indriyas of *aññā* and the four truths of ill is very striking. In Buddhaghosa's estimation, perfected knowledge evidently stood for knowledge of ill, and he whose knowledge is perfected stood for him who knows ill thoroughly. By his day the most vital knowledge an arahān need possess was clearly confined to this knowledge of the four truths. Equally clearly does it emerge that he whose knowledge of these four truths is perfect is an arahān. With the growing dread of ill the scope of the arahān's powers was diminished, until it was only thought necessary for him to know this: ill was the most salient, the most important, fact in life, and could only be made to cease if life itself were made to cease.

But the belief, hitherto fostered by the arahān-theory, that man has great powers and great potentialities, could not thrive in such a narrowed field. Man wanted to go on believing in himself, or at all events in his race. Hence the arahān-theory, degenerate on account of the connection with ill which had been forced upon it, became outworn, and the belief that the highest and best life was not to be found by deliverance from ill, but by action, found expression at the expense of the arahān-theory. For the nascent theory of the *bodhisattva* was a protest against those attempts of the arahān to secure himself from repeated subjection to ill.

But in Buddhaghosa's writings on these three indriyas which exhibit stages in *aññā*, in perfected

knowledge, it is evident that these, by their intimate association with the four truths of ill, are instruments to be used in the desired attainment of the undying. The knowledge of the four truths is held to result in this state, and the various stages in this knowledge correspond to the graduated stages in *aññā*.

In the last chapter of the Vibhaṅga a curious classification of the twenty-two indriyas is made. In the first place, all of them are said to be those of the realm (*dhātu*) of *kāma*.¹ This *kāmadhātu* here means the earth. Then, fourteen of them, including the three indriyas connected with *aññā*, are said to be those of the realm of *rūpa*.² *Rūpadhātu* here means Brahmāloka, where sight, the thing seen, was held to be of great power and brilliance. And finally, twelve of them, also including the three stages in *aññā*, are said to be the twelve indriyas beyond these two (*apariyāpanna*).³ Although *apariyāpanna*, as the Unincluded, came to mean all that is exempt from the threefold cycle of existence—sense, physical existence, and formlessness—it here means that which in earlier Buddhism would have been called *tatuttariy*, beyond that; namely, all the other deva-realms. These three faculties of *aññā* are presumably of use in the realm of earth and the Brahmā-world, so as to help the disciple to a recognition of these spheres as they really are, thus fitting him to pass on to the knowledge of higher things, to other-worldly knowledge.

¹ Vbh. 404.² Vbh. 405.³ Vbh. 408.

The Commentary on the Puggalapaññatti does not make this distinction between these three realms. According to it, in the realm of *kāma* are ten indriyas, presumably the first ten; nine are mixed; and three, therefore presumably the last three (which are those of *aññā*-stages), are other-worldly (*lokuttara*¹). The Commentary on the Saṃyutta, without going into these classifications, says that these three indriyas are the other-worldly indriyas.²

In the Nettipakaraṇa the three stages in *aññā* are referred to now and again.³ In one passage it is said⁴ that by concentration on the indriya of "I shall come to know the unknown" the three lowest fetters are destroyed; and by concentration on the indriya of *aññā* the next seven fetters are destroyed. This passage goes on to say, "He knows thus: destroyed is birth for me, this is knowledge of destruction; there is no more of what I had been—this is knowledge of no more coming to existence (*anupāde nāṇa*). Now he who knows has two knowledges: 'the indriya of I shall come to know the unknown,' and 'the indriya of knowledge.' These are destroyed in attaining the highest fruit, arahanship." There is here thus given a definite connection between aspects of *aññā* and arahanship. Concentration on the first stage in *aññā* is instrumental in destroying the first three fetters. This means that the bhikkhu in whom they are destroyed is a stream-winner, and is on the first of the Ways of

Arahanship.¹ The destruction of the first five fetters is, in the Pīṭakas, equivalent to entering the third Way, the Way of no-return. Thus, in this Nettipakaraṇa passage, although the first Way of Arahanship is implied by the faculty of "I shall come to know the unknown," on account of its association with the destruction of the first three fetters, the next two Ways do not appear to be implied, for no parts of the usual formulæ descriptive of them are given. But the attainment of the "faculty of him who knows" is made tantamount to the attainment of arahanship, the fruit of the fourth Way. For, eventually, according to the Nettipakaraṇa, the first two stages in *aññā* are destroyed by him who has attained the highest fruit. This therefore appears to correspond to the Kathāvatthu statement that as one stage on the Way to Arahanship is gained, those below are left behind.²

¹ See below, Chapter VI.

² Kvu. 274 ff., and see below, Chapter VI.

¹ PugA. 176.

² SA. II. 351 (Siam. edn.).

³ Netti. 15, 54, 60.

⁴ Netti. 15.

CHAPTER V

THE ARAHAN IN POST-CANONICAL AND
MAHĀYĀNIST WORKS

ON the whole it may be said that the Pali post-canonical literature does nothing much either to add to or to alter the canonical views of the arahān. To this statement the Milindapañha is a great exception. I shall come to it a little later. Nor must it be forgotten that several of the Commentaries share a stereotyped description of the arahān. This appears to be based on Buddhaghosa's long exegesis in the Visuddhimagga.¹ For in the Commentaries this is repeated either at length or with different abbreviations, by both Buddhaghosa and his colleague Dhammapāla.²

There is nothing very novel in this exposition, but it is stated in a new way, various derivations (of doubtful validity) having been brought together. The arahān is defined as he who has won to four states, with all of which the word arahān is, according to Buddhaghosa, etymologically connected. The Lord is taken as the

¹ Vism. 198 ff. For relative dates of the Vism. and some of the Cmys., see Pe Maung Tin, intr. to *The Path of Purity*.

² VinA. I. I. 112 ff.; DA. I. 146 and AA. II. 286, which both refer to the Vism. exposition; MA. I. 52; UdA. 84; VvA. 105; PvA. 7; DhA. IV. 228 calls a brahman an arahān solely on account of his distance from the *kilesas*; cf. Asl. 349.

arahān in the Visuddhimagga; but it is clearly intended that this description of him is equally applicable to all arahāns. He is said to be an arahān for these reasons: because of the distance (*ārakā*, that is from the *kilesas*, corruptions); because of the destruction ($\sqrt{\text{han}}$) of the foes (*ari*, that is the *kilesas*) and of the spokes (*ara*, that is of the cycle of rebirth); because of his worthiness (*arabatta*) to receive the necessities of life and so on; and because of absence of secret (*a-raha*) wrongdoing.

In the Visuddhimagga itself this theme is elaborated. The arahān is said to be far from all the *kilesas*, stands at a really great distance, having brought the *kilesas*, together with their innate tendencies, to destruction by means of the Way. Thus is he an arahān because of distance. The Sutta-Nipāta Commentary says also, and this is its only contribution to the question of arahanship, that "I call him an arahān who is far from the *kilesas*."¹ And he kills those foes, the *kilesas*, by means of the Way. Thus also he is an arahān. And then there is that "wheel of *saṃsāra* (*saṃsāracakka* ²), whose nave is made of ignorance and craving for rebirth, whose spokes are the storing up of merit, whose rim is old age and death, which is pierced by the axle made of the *āsavas*, the cause (of ignorance and so on), and yoked to the chariot of the three existences, and which has been rolling from time immemorial. Standing on the legs of energy, on the ground of morality, at the circle of the *bodhi*-tree, and holding with

¹ SnA. 470.

² Vism. 198.

the hand of faith the axe of knowledge which brings about the waning of karma, he has destroyed all the spokes of this wheel. From this destroying the spokes also is he arahān." There follows a long diatribe against the ignorance which is the cause that karma-conditions lead to craving and hence to rebirth. But Gotama or the arahān, by the knowledge of the law of cause and effect, knowing these states as they really are and being disgusted with them and detached from them and freed from them, has broken and demolished the spokes of this wheel of rebirth. Again he is an arahān by the destruction of the spokes. Thirdly, from worthiness to receive the best offerings, he is an arahān. Several more or less legendary events, purporting to show the honour paid to the Tathāgata, are adduced as sufficient to establish this point. In reality they evince but little historical sense. Lastly, the man who is an arahān does not behave like those fools who do wrong in secret places for fear of evil repute. Thus from absence of secret wrong-doing he is an arahān.

It is at once apparent that in deriving the term arahān from these various etymological sources, the identification of the arahān with the man who has destroyed the āsavas is no longer present. Destruction of the āsavas is not the hall-mark of the arahān in this important Visuddhimagga passage. For some reason destruction of the *kilesas*, which is no more etymologically connected with the term arahān than is destruction of the āsavas, came to stand for a sign of arahanship.

This may have been because Buddhaghosa, in this undoubtedly ingenious passage, wished to stress one āsava—that of the desire for lives, worlds—and in order to give it the required value, thought it best not to bring forward the other āsavas. On the other hand, he may have thought this aspect of the arahān too well known to stand in need of recapitulation or further elucidation.

Certainly this aspect was not lost sight of. For it appears that in some Chinese Buddhist writings the arahāns are called by this name on account of "their entire exhaustion of leaking," which is a translation of the Chinese translation of the Sanskrit *āsrāvākshaya*, Pali *āsavakkhaya*. These works further say, thus according with the Visuddhimagga,¹ that because of this exhaustion of leaking, arahāns deserve (*ying*) to receive offerings (*yung*) from all devas and men.²

Apart from the Visuddhimagga, the other non-commentarial post-canonical literature has on the whole, with the further exception of the Milindapañha, only a few references to the arahān;³ and such as these are, they are repetitions of canonical ideas, and show neither a development of the concept nor a lessening of it. A few references will be sufficient to show the tone of this branch of the literature.

¹ Cf. Vism. 678.

² M. W. de Visser, *The Arhats in China and Japan*, Berlin, 1923.

³ But cf. above, p. 171 ff., 176 f. for Vism. and Netti. references to arahanship as identified with the faculty of him who knows, *aññātāvindriya*.

In the Mahābodhivaṇṣa arahanship is associated with other-worldly matters. It is said that a man by means of arahān-knowledge dwells experiencing the most noble happiness of other-worldly fruits.¹ The Netṭi-pakarāṇa maintains the distinction between the arahān and the learner. The former is called "purified," and the latter he who is "being purified."² This is the old division between the final achievement and the process. It further draws a line between freedom of heart or mind and freedom of insight. *Cetovimutti*, freedom of heart, because of the waning of passion, is both the fruit of the learner and the fruit of non-return; but *paññāvimutti*, freedom of insight, because of the waning of ignorance, is both the fruit of the adept and the highest fruit, arahanship.³

I do not think that the inconsiderable development of the arahān-concept in the commentarial literature need be attributed to a diminished interest in the subject. It is unlikely that the two great exponents of primitive Buddhism could have failed to realise the importance of this cardinal notion. It is more likely that the topic had received such thorough treatment in the canonical works that there was very little left for the commentators to add. With the non-commentarial works it was different; for here there is evidence that the centre of interest had shifted. After the death of the Founder the Jātaka stories were collected, and narrative accounts of the spread of Buddhism to Ceylon took the

¹ Mhbv. 49, *lokuttaraphalasukha*.

² Netṭi. 20.

³ *Ibid.* 82.

place of doctrinal or explanatory works. Hence all the teaching, which formerly had been centered very largely in the arahān, fell into the background. The Jātaka is concerned simply with showing what Gotama had been like in his multitudinous previous rebirths; and these stories reveal a remarkable prelude to his final achievement of Buddhahood and arahanship. The Chronicles carry the history of Buddhism a step later in time, telling of its arrival in Ceylon, but without discussing its doctrines. The Milindapañha alone retained the old tradition; and at the same time laid certain different emphases on it.

In the Milindapañha two lines of thought concerning the arahān are evident. This work was probably composed sometime about the first century B.C.,¹ and it is most interesting to find reproduced in it Nikāya views of the exalted status of the arahān, and at the same time the view, present in the Nikāyas but unstressed, of the arahān as a social being. This, as I suggested when speaking of this aspect of the arahān as put forward in the Kathāvatthu, is not so much a new element in the concept, as an element on which the later works lay an emphasis which differs from that found in works belonging to an earlier date.

I shall now briefly recapitulate the characteristic Pīṭaka survivals: the Milindapañha speaks of arahāns existing at the time when it was composed,² gives certain stereotyped descriptions,³ mentions that the

¹ Mrs Rhys Davids, *The Milinda Questions*, London, 1930, p. 5.

² Miln. 6.

³ Miln. 32 f., 104.

arahān has passed beyond all fear¹—including that of death and punishment, and is never heedless. It speaks of the arahāns outshining all the other bhikkhus, overwhelming them in glory and splendour, because they are emancipated in heart.² Arahanship is called the jewel of emancipation.

The aspect of the arahān as moving among ordinary men, which although implied in the Nikāyas is nowhere made of supreme importance, is clearly brought out in the *Milindapañha*. Further, he is portrayed as not being altogether impeccable.³ This is a new feature, not to be found in the Piṭakas. But more indicative of the impending change which was soon to destroy the whole arahān concept is the wonderful description, peculiar to the *Milindapañha*, of nibbāna as a City. In this City arahāns are depicted as living and as leading a communal existence.

The *Milindapañha* gives the processes by which a man becomes purified and cleansed so that he can enter into nibbāna, the incomparable City, his mind being freed in arahanship. As the expounder proceeds to enlarge on the City to Milinda, it becomes apparent that it contains not arahāns living alone, aloof, secluded, but arahāns living in close contact with one another as members of the same community. This shows, I think, that their glory was on the wane. No longer is the lion among men admired for his powers of enduring solitude and of profiting by it, but his mode of livelihood is brought down to the level of that of

ordinary bhikkhus and even of householders. For not only are arahāns represented as living in that City, but there are present also those who are still at the stage of working towards arahanship. And although the expounder may have been more or less consciously favourable to the view that the majority of its inhabitants were arahāns—"like a forest full of bamboos, full of reeds, that City of Righteousness has ever been crowded and frequented by such Arahāns as these"¹—yet the very fact that learners also were regarded as dwellers in that City, shows that the barriers between the learner and the adept were tottering. This has been already foreshadowed in the *Dhammasaṅgani*. The arahān theory was, in fact, falling into disrepute. A gulf had been made between the arahān who loves a solitary state, but who is accessible to the populace at certain times of day, and the arahān who is pictured as a city-dweller. He certainly lives in the most glorious City imaginable; but this does not alter the fact that he is now regarded as a man who has stepped out of his lonely grandeur into the full light of publicity. And he was destined never more to win back his earlier solitude.

Distinct from this fascinating account of the Utopian City of Righteousness are those passages in the *Milindapañha*, where the arahān is represented as living in the world of men, having dealings with them, constantly meeting them. He is also admitted to be prone, however slightly, to human failings. In the

¹ Miln. 145, 207 ff.² Miln. 338.³ Miln. 266.¹ Miln. 342.

Piṭakas and in the Kathāvatthu the arahān is depicted as faultless and as incapable of transgression. But the notion of the arahān as an erring human being is beginning to creep into the Milindapañha. For, although he is said never to be heedless, he can nevertheless, through inadvertence and because his knowledge is limited, be guilty of an offence against the rules of the Order. Such offences are actions which it is not wrong for a layman to do, but which are unsuitable for those who have entered on the homeless way. Other offences an arahān cannot commit since he is not heedless, and these are transgressions against the ordinary moral law, binding upon bhikkhus and laymen alike. This is another original contribution of the Milindapañha to the arahān theory. It shows us the arahān living among the laity, begging almsfood at their houses, taking meals at their houses, having intercourse¹ with the other sex, and not living the life of a recluse either alone in the jungle, meditating; or in some retreat far from the haunts of men. We cannot draw this conclusion so readily from that passage in the Kathāvatthu, which speaks of the bodily harms which may beset the arahāns. For this passage does not go so far as to represent them in daily contact with the laity; and it might, therefore, be argued that the accidents which befell them occurred when they were withdrawn from the society of the world: it is possible to argue they might have eaten poisonous fruits and berries in the jungle, or that they might not have been sufficiently

¹ *Saṅcariṭṭa*, Miln. 266.

far from the beat of the thieves and dacoits with whom India was at that date apparently infested.

But if, at the time of the Milindapañha, arahāns mixed with the laity, may it not be supposed that they gave to the householders the best of gifts—the gift of dhamma? This cannot be proved. Indeed, the argument is on the other side. In the Nikāyas various arahāns are spoken of as discoursing with the laity, expounding dhamma to them. But also in the Nikāyas, as in the Milindapañha, the arahān is represented as having no more to do. And this is the aspect that was accentuated by those critics of the arahān who followed close on the heels of the Milindapañha. They apparently reasoned that his solitariness unfitted him for holding longer the high estate conferred on him in the Nikāyas. And it is argued, although hardly conceded to them, by those wishing to condemn the arahān-concept, that if he did teach the laity this was only incidental, and not at all essential to his main business in life, which was to win his own perfection. For once nibbāna, arahanship, perfection was attained, so it is argued, there was no compulsion on him to teach others, or to show them more of the means necessary for their realisation of the fruits of arahanship than they could discover for themselves by watching him. These are the shallows in which the arahān theory foundered.

But one protest must be entered in defence of Hinayānist Buddhism—a name adopted later to differentiate the earlier, although not necessarily primitive,

Buddhism which favoured the arahān, from the later Mahāyānist Buddhism which favoured the bodhisattva. I admit that in the Kathāvatthu and in the Milindapañha passages, in which the arahān appears as a social being, a foreshadowing of the bodhisattva concept may be detected. This is the more plausible if we remember that these passages were written long after the Founder had died; and at a time when, in the light of our later knowledge, a change regarding the highest spiritual estate to which mortal man could attain was on the way. Yet I submit, the Kathāvatthu and the Milindapañha passages in question are not only looking forward to the future, but also back to the past. They are presenting, and presenting vividly, one aspect of the arahān's mode of livelihood, which had been laid down for him morally, although there was no compulsion attached to it. He practised this assiduously during the beginnings of Buddhism and in the region where it originally flourished. This aspect of the arahān as a social being is in constant danger of oblivion, since for some reason writers on Buddhism have been apt to belittle the part played by arahāns in associating with their fellow men and women. But in the earlier literature was not Kassapa remarked upon as some one unusual, simply because he was a forest-man? And did not even he descend daily from his "mountain-lodge for" alms?¹ From the internal evidence of both the Vinaya and the Nikāyas, it is clear that the great disciples such as Sāriputta and Moggallāna and

¹ Thag. CCLXI.

others who were arahāns, not to mention Gotama himself, were in close and constant contact with the populace, receiving alms from them, encouraging them, discoursing with them, and helping them to a solution of many and various problems of both a spiritual and a mundane nature. An arahān was not bound to take on these responsibilities, but if we follow the texts, it is patent that many of them did. He was bound, according to the Vinaya and the Nikāyas, to seek periods of seclusion and withdrawal for meditation; and therefore these were stressed more than the times he would give to teaching the people and mixing with them. Hence it has come about that some exponents of Buddhism regard the seclusion of the arahān not as an occasional, but as a continuous happening. They think of him as being always apart, contemplating, seeking his own welfare.

And here we must interpret history by our knowledge of later events. We know that the arahān concept failed. It was supplanted by the concept of the compassionate being, the bodhisattva, who, himself enlightened, chose to return to earth to succour erring mankind in this world of wrong and suffering. It is possible that the times the arahāns spent in meditation came to be, during the lapse of perhaps three centuries, more frequent than the times they spent in helping other less spiritually advanced people. The solitary state of the arahān came to be, for reasons at which we can now only guess, more striking than his gregarious state. Not only was he, in the Nikāyas, exhorted

to contemplate alone in the jungle, sometimes so full of terrors that the bhikkhunis were not allowed to resort to it unaccompanied; not only did he exhibit a praiseworthy absence of fear if he meditated alone in the charnel-field and other fearsome places; but apparently such practices came to occupy more and more of his time. This may have been because, after the death of the Teacher, the example of his charity, benevolence, and willingness to help all and sundry faded and was forgotten. It may have been because the arahān concept synchronised with some peculiar psychological upheaval in India, when men were prepared to stand upon their own feet, with Self as the lamp, unafraid of falling; but when this wave in the history of religious ideas had rolled by, man was discovered cowering, unaware of his own strength, groping for a support, hoping that it would be found outside himself. I think myself that Gotama was so rare a force that he may well have been the inspiration behind the unique mentality which found expression in the arahān concept.

Whatever the reason for the failure of this concept, the results are evident enough. The arahān has been accused of the selfishness of being intent upon his own welfare, and of not giving sufficient attention to the less enlightened. These could not tolerate the absence of religious instruction, for, as I suggested, a psychological change intervened, and people began to believe that without guidance they could not find a way to happiness. It was not enough for them that some

arahāns, mortal beings like themselves, should live near them, yet aloof and not of them, caring nothing about the spiritual welfare of the masses. What these men saw and knew the populace longed to see and know; but to that knowledge and vision they must be helped. It seems that the seeds of altruism, planted with foresight by Gotama at the beginning of his ministry, although smothered during the passage of time, sprouted anew, and bore another fruit. For it turned out to be fruit of a different variety. He had said, "Go forth and teach for the good of the many-folk," and many of his contemporaries who were arahāns had followed this precept. But his successors apparently omitted to give dhamma. The people became bewildered and discontented, and it can only be supposed that from those original seeds of altruism, and from the people's persistent, although probably unspoken, demands for a helper or helpers, the bodhisattva concept arose and entirely supplanted the arahān concept.

To sum up what has just been said: I think it probable that the bodhisattva concept is the outcome of two lines of development. First, there is the original and positive element of the altruism of the arahān in foregoing his meditations in order to give counsel and instruction to other members of the Order and to the laity; and secondly, there is the increasing amount of solitude sought by the later arahāns, which was possibly due to the loss of the inspiring presence and example of the Master. Added to these reasons

another factor must be taken into account: and that is the "Northern" or non-Indian region to which Buddhism spread.

Naturally those lands—Ceylon, Burma, and Siam—which have kept the canonical tradition practically unbroken throughout the ages, clung to and still cling to the arahān as the embodiment of the highest state to which man can rise. But as Buddhism spread eastwards to China and Japan, arriving in China perhaps in 218 B.C.,¹ and came under different skies and among a more practical and less reflective people, the notion of the contemplative arahān overcoming ignorance by knowledge and insight, could not survive. Indian intellectualism gave way to Chinese philanthropy, and for the arahān intent upon the true good was substituted the bodhisattva intent upon the general good. For this is the outstanding feature of the bodhisattva in Sanskrit Buddhist and in Chinese Buddhist writings.

It is in the so-called Northern or Mahāyāna development of Buddhism that the bodhisattva concept found its surest stronghold: the doctrine of the bodhisattva was destined to have a great vogue in Buddhist China and Japan. As Buddhism spread eastwards the arahān became no more than a very minor concept; and bodhisattva, Pali *bodhisatta*, which had been the epithet used to denote Gotama in his myriad rebirths before he attained enlightenment, was the name applied, under the Mahāyānist teaching, to all the compassionate beings, themselves enlightened, who instead of musing

¹ Anesaki in E.R.E.

alone like the arahāns, return of their own will to help struggling mankind by their teaching.

Gotama is no longer regarded as the greatest of the Arahāns, but as one bodhisattva among many. The name, at all events, was at hand to be made much of in this new teaching. For it is possible that the compassion extended by Gotama to suffering beings, as told in some of the Jātaka stories, was instrumental in causing compassion to be one of the chief functions of the bodhisattva. For "compassion" (*karuṇā*), although etymologically unconnected with *bodhisattva*, was in fact one of the major characteristics of the Mahāyānist bodhisattva. Har Dayal, in his book on *The Bodhisattva Doctrine*,¹ has collected a great many renderings which have been put forward from time to time, in order to get as near as possible to the meaning of *sattva* in the compound *bodhisattva*. But in none of these renderings is the compassionate element present. *Bodhi* means enlightenment, but opinions differ as to the meaning of *sattva*. Har Dayal is inclined to follow the St Petersburg Dictionary² in believing that *sattva* means "Wesen, Charakter," and *bodhisattva*, according to Boehtlingk and Roth, "dessen Wesen Erkenntniss ist; der im Besitz des Wesens der Bodhi Seiende." As Har Dayal says, "The safest way is always to go back to the Pali without attaching much importance to the later lexicographers and philosophers." And this is apparently what the St Petersburg Dictionary has done.

¹ London, 1932, p. 4 ff.

² *Sanskrit Dictionary*, Boehtlingk and Roth, St Petersburg.

For in the Pali texts the *bodhisatta* seems to mean a *bodhi*-being. But because he has *bodhi* he is not an ordinary person. Indeed, to quote Har Dayal again, *satta* is "almost certainly related to the Vedic *satvan*, which means a strong or valiant man, hero, warrior." Here perhaps is a faint indication of the characteristic altruism of the *bodhisattva*. He is an enlightened being, a warrior; but, it is to be understood, a warrior fighting for others, able to do so because he is himself enlightened.

To him the world was a field full of the ignorant many-folk to whom he could turn over (*parivarta*) his spiritual merits (*punya*). For the many-folk were capable of benefiting by these, since all beings are one in the *Dharmakāya*. The only difference is that the *bodhi* of the *Dharmakāya* is manifest in the Buddhas and *bodhisattvas*, and unmanifest in the ignorant many-folk.¹ Yet in every individual there is a faculty called *prajñā* by the Mahāyānists. This is the principle which makes enlightenment possible in us as well as in the Buddhas.²

The idea of "turning over merit" is absent from the *arahan*-concept, which was therefore regarded by the Mahāyānists as cold and hard and selfish. Further, *arabhatta* was relegated to the same category as the fruits of stream-attainment, of Once-returning, and of

¹ D. T. Suzuki, *Outlines of Mahāyāna Buddhism*, London, 1907, p. 290 f.

² D. T. Suzuki, *Essays in Zen Buddhism*, First Series, London, 1927, p. 52.

Non-returning: all are said to be "due to mental perturbation."¹ For, according to the Mahāyānists, the Hīnayānists have a false conception of *nirvāṇa*. They have not realised that it is "the mind of all holy ones. . . . They distinguish it from birth-and-death (*samsāra*), and seek for it for fear of being caught up in the net of transmigration. They cherish dualism, and so long as they do so, there is no *Nirvāṇa* for them."² *Nirvāṇa* is not immutable so long as it is thought of as in relation to *samsāra*, and perturbing conditions can enter.

N. Dutt further explains this by saying³ that Mahāyāna "states that there is one and only one *Nirvāṇa*, not two or three, and that one is and can be attained only by a thorough comprehension of the sameness of all things. The conception of *Samatā* (sameness) has been developed in the *Sūtralāṅkāra*. . . . The *Lankāvatāra* explains *samatā* (sameness) by saying that it is the sameness of the world (*samsāra*) and its cessation (*nirvāṇa*), i.e. *samsāra* bears to *nirvāṇa* the same relation as waves bear to the water."

And again N. Dutt says:⁴ "The contention of the Mahāyānists is that the only reality is *Nirvāṇa* or

¹ *Lankāvatāra Sūtra*, transl. D. T. Suzuki, London, 1932, p. 58.

² D. T. Suzuki, *Studies in the Lankāvatāra Sūtra*, London, 1930, p. 128 f.

³ N. Dutt, *Aspects of Mahāyāna Buddhism and its Relation to Hīnayāna*, London, 1930, p. 138.

⁴ *Ibid.* pp. 203, 204.

Dharmadhātu, everything else being a delusion of the mind. The moment an individual realises that he is the Reality, that Samsāra is identical with Nirvāṇa, he becomes perfect, *i.e.* a Buddha. . . . When a being attains a state of mind in which he cannot distinguish himself from any other thing of the world or from the Absolute, he is said to attain Nirvāṇa, in the Mahāyānist sense."

Thus, according to the Mahāyānist way of thinking, since arahanship was not the supreme achievement within the power of man, the attainment of (Hīnayānic) nirvāṇa did not belong to the highest stage of development. Its place was taken by perfect enlightenment, Buddhahood. This now became the goal. Hīnayāna had not said that this could not be won by disciples, but there is no record of anyone having attained the goal except the recognised Buddhas who arose, according to traditional views in widely separated aeons. It certainly was not the goal thought to be within the reach of every man. But with the changed outlook brought in by Mahāyāna Buddhism, Buddhahood is made the possible ultimate fate of every individual. This had been anticipated in the Divyāvadāna,¹ where it is said that some people aspired to *śrāvakabodhi*, the enlightenment of disciples, some to *pratyekabodhi*, the enlightenment of private or independent Buddhas, and some to *samyaksambodhi*, supreme enlightenment.

In the Saddharma Puṇḍarīka the five hundred Arhats confess to the Lord, so it is recorded, that they were

¹ Divyā, pp. 226, 271.

mistaken and wrong in being content with the sort of inferior knowledge which led them to believe that by winning nirvāṇa they were finally delivered. They should, they continue, have acquired perfect enlightenment instead, the knowledge of the Buddhas.¹ For the nirvāṇa-knowledge is limited. But in the sixth, eighth, and ninth chapters of the Saddharma Puṇḍarīka it is recorded that Gotama predicts that two thousand five hundred former arahans will, in the future, attain the supreme state of a Buddha all-enlightened, "that is, will attain nirvāṇa properly so-called";² and that many of the chief disciples, Kassapa, Moggallāna, Mahā-Kaccāyana, Subhūti, Ānanda, Rāhula, will in a far distant æon reappear as Tathāgatas and Buddhas. These disciples, *śrāvakas* as they are called in Mahāyānist terminology, should now proceed with their spiritual development. The Buddha-state is within reach of them all. Nirvāṇa is to be outrun and left behind.

Now under Hīnayāna Buddhism the arahān is thought to attain nirvāṇa on this earth. The ultimate attainment was thought to be *parinibbāna*, as is stated in a Nidāna passage:³ "What now if I, having attained the highest enlightenment, having embarked in the ship of Dhamma, and having brought the many-folk across the ocean of *samsāra*, should afterwards attain *parinibbāna*? This is fitting for me." Thus the attainment of nibbāna appears to be but a step on the Way;

¹ Sa. Puṇ. ch. VIII., trans. Burnouf, *Le Lotus de la bonne Loi*, I. 128.

² N. Dutt, *loc. cit.* p. 140; cf. p. 195.

³ Jā. I. 14.

and since it is not the same as the *nirvāṇa* of the Mahāyānists,¹ "but a lower and not a perfect state,"² they taught that arahans who had previously attained to this state can leave it. In Hīnayāna Buddhism, on the other hand, the further destiny of arahans after attaining *nibbāna* is not revealed, and *parinibbāna* as consummation is a term used mostly in connection with Gotama.

In differentiating between the two kinds of *nirvāṇa* (their own and that of the Hīnayānists), the Mahāyānists certainly give a chance, whether intentionally or not, to the arahans of old once more to take up the burden, and as compassionate enlightened beings to succour floundering mankind. A bodhisattva wishes to help all beings to attain *nirvāṇa*. *Maitrī*, friendliness, and *santāraka*, saviour or liberator, are two words which, as Har Dayal points out,³ are terms applied to the bodhisattva, but do not occur in the Mahāyānist descriptions of the arhat. They thus belong peculiarly to descriptions of the bodhisattva. The idea of them was, however, present in Pali literature. *Maitrī* is the *mettā* of the *brahma-vihāras*. These inculcated friendliness or amity, which was always a respected virtue, even if it never appeared among the characteristic features of the arahan. The idea of the liberator is also to be found, especially in a verse in the *Sutta-Nipāta*. Gotama is said to be "crossed over" (the

flood), and to have helped mankind (*imaṃ pajam*) to cross over too.¹

But the Mahāyānist teaching holds that it is impossible for a bodhisattva to succour mankind if he himself enters *nirvāṇa*. He is in fact an enlightened being who refuses to enter *nirvāṇa*. He helps others to attain it but does not do so himself. Har Dayal finds this position "rather illogical."² I do not agree. The lord teaches the former great arahans to quit *nirvāṇa* in order to strive for *bodhi*. So much we are told, especially in the *Saddharma Puṇḍarīka*. Will not these arahans, as future *bodhisattvas*, appeal to those, then in the *nirvāṇa* state, to leave it for the greater development demanded for the attainment of *bodhi*? The old order has to give way to the new, especially in a religion which was by no means moribund. The arahans are told that their spiritual cultivation is not finished; they should strive to become bodhisattvas, then Buddhas. In this way, Buddhas in the Mahāyānist system eventually came to be thought of as infinite in number, and are said to be "like the sands on the banks of the Ganges."³ They also came to be regarded as immortal.

These Mahāyānist compilations, often picturesque and fanciful in spite of their philosophical architectonic, show to my mind the extent to which the memory of Gotama, the Founder, as a man among men had become dimmed. A large and complex metaphysical

¹ Sn. 545; see below, p. 261. Cf. Pts. I. 126.

² Har Dayal, *The Bodhisattva Doctrine*, p. 17.

³ Har Dayal, *loc. cit.* p. 25.

¹ Cf. N. Dutt, *Aspects of Mahāyāna Buddhism and its Relation to Hīnayāna*, London, 1930, p. 130.

² *Ibid.* p. 198. ³ Har Dayal, *The Bodhisattva Doctrine*, p. 16.

doctrine gradually grew up round the Buddha-nature, such as must have been far from the thoughts of Gotama. A final attempt was successfully made to unite all the countless Buddhas into one cosmic whole. The *Dharmakāya* of the Buddha is said to be the same as absolute reality, *tathatā* (suchness), one and indivisible. N. Dutt says that the Mahāyānist "do not know of anything other than *tathatā*."¹ In this reality all Buddhas are spiritually united.

In the meantime the arahān-concept had faded from view. Gotama was no longer regarded as an arahān, exemplifying with the other arahāns the worthiness of this state. Nor was he regarded as the one and only Buddha of this æon. His charity, benevolence, and unselfishness in helping people, in mixing with them so that they might have the benefit of his counsel and teaching even although he sometimes longed to go to some solitary retreat, seem to have been forgotten by the Mahāyānists. They remembered instead, so it appears, only his countless acts of kindness when, according to the Pali tradition, he was at the *bodhisatta* stage of his career. For this is the title which won, and this is the title under which he became deified and worshipped in Mahāyānist countries. This is the figure, the deified Gotama, to whom offerings of adoration and prayers of supplication are made. It was perhaps inevitable. The instinct to worship is strong in the human race. And Gotama, because of the

¹ N. Dutt, *Aspects of Mahāyāna Buddhism and its Relation to Hīnayāna*, London, 1930, p. 131.

beauty and generosity of his life and character, enhanced if possible, certainly not diminished by the passing of time, became the splendid—I had almost said the obvious—object of veneration. An irresistible psychological need was filled, and the East has continued to pour a full measure of *bhakti*, devotion, before the innumerable images of him who was a man.

The Pali post-canonical works had perhaps contributed their share to the deification of the Founder. For in them, too, are found expressions magnifying the man into a god. It seems as though, after his *parinibbāna* the instinct to worship which his presence had kept in check, could be no longer restrained. While he was here on earth he commanded the admiration and devotion of his disciples. But this was admiration and devotion directed solely towards a person. It was only after his *parinibbāna* that all this veneration was transmuted into worship and prayer. And terms expressive of this change were invented.

How long it took for this different attitude towards Gotama to become established and to be crystallised into words is now a matter of guess-work. All we know is that in the *Jātaka*, in the *Milindapañha*, in the *Niddesa* (an old Commentary), and in some of the other Commentaries¹ the term *devātideva*, the deva above devas, occurs several times. It is of interest that in the *Vibhaṅga* analysis of *devas*² the term does not occur. I think that it would have been used if then current. But because it does not occur in this

¹ e.g. DhA. I. 147; VvA. 18.

² Vbh. 422.

work it might be argued that the Vibhaṅga contains passages which date from an earlier time than similar passages in the Jātaka, Milindapañha, and some of the Commentaries.

In the Niddesa¹ it is said that "the lord (*bhagavā*) is the deva, the chief deva (*atideva*), the deva above devas (*devātideva*) of the conventional devas, of those who are born devas, of the devas by purification; he is the lion of lions, the hero (*nāga*) of heroes, the teacher of crowds, the seer (*muni*) of seers."

There is also a verse of praise, repeated at least three times in the post-canonical literature.² This runs:

"With these my bones to that supreme of beings (*aggapuggala*),
Deva above devas (*devātideva*), tamer of men to be tamed,
All-seeing, marked with a hundred merit-marks,
With my life's breath I go to the Buddha as refuge."

The second line occurs also in the Vimānavatthu,³ although here the Buddha Kassapa is being extolled.

In the latter part of the Milindapañha the term *devātideva* occurs several times as an epithet of Gotama. He is called by this title usually in conjunction with the epithet *bhagavā*; ⁴ only once, unless the text or transliterator is at fault, is *devātideva* unaccompanied by any other designation.⁵ The Milindapañha, in quoting verses and passages ascribed to theas, Subhūti, Vaṅṅisa, Sāriputta, Mahākassapa, and others, or to

¹ Nd. II. 307.

² Jā. IV. 158 = Miln. 111 = DhA. I. 147.

³ Vv. 64. 27.

⁴ Miln. 241, 368, 378, 384-387, 391, 393, 399, 402 f., 405, 408 f., 411, 414 f., 417.

⁵ *Ibid.* 258.

lay-followers, never describes these as *devātideva*. The word is used for Gotama alone.

I am not suggesting that the appearance of the term *devātideva* in the Milindapañha and other late Pali works influenced the Mahāyānist philosophers and writers in their subsequent deification of the Founder. It is likely that the idea of Gotama as a god, and as a "Beloved God," to use J. M. Robertson's phrase,¹ came more and more to be in the air as his life on earth became more distant and more legendary; and in proportion as his life on earth receded into the past, so the urge to worship required some outlet in the present. But the creation of a god, and here is an indubitable example of a man-made god, does little to destroy the egoism of his devotees. For, it may be presumed, many Mahāyānists who were not yet bodhisattvas prayed to this deified Gotama, or to different personified aspects of him, and to other bodhisattvas, often with the object of gaining some private wish or desire.

If the charge of selfishness levelled against the Hīnayānist system had been made on the grounds of the selfishness of votaries of the religion, as much could be said against the followers of Mahāyāna. But I think that the charge is not meant to cover all Hīnayāna, but only the arahans.² In the Karuṇākathā of the Kathāvatthu³ the question is raised as to whether

¹ J. M. Robertson, *Pagan Christs*, London, 1903, p. 2.

² See N. Dutt, *op. cit.* pp. 139, 140; and p. 140, n. 1, for reference.

³ Kvu. 561 f.

the Bhagavan is without compassion. He is the archetype of lesser arahans. The controversialist appears to agree that the Lord had amity, joy, and poise, three of the brahmavihāras; that he was compassionate, kindly to the world, full of sympathy for the world, and went about doing good for the world. Yet, in spite of this admission, he still argues that because he is passionless he lacks the first of the four brahmavihāras—*karuṇā*, compassion.

Such a controverted point shows that the idea of the hardness and selfishness of the arahan was creeping into the thought of the day, in spite of other and conflicting evidence which indicates that arahans had not always been self-seeking in practice; they had, moreover, been considered to constitute "a great field of merit for the world," since the giving of gifts to them had brought much advantage to the giver. But the practice was forgotten and obliterated by the theory, for this persisted while the kindly actions done by man to man suffered at the hands of time. Hence the outstanding difference in the two systems came to be between the arahan making no sacrifice in delaying his own consummation and the bodhisattva making this sacrifice in order that, before he attains nirvāṇa for himself, he may help others towards the goal of Buddhahood. With the formulating of this difference, the arahan concept was shown to be selfish in theory, whereas the bodhisattva concept, by which it was rivalled, appeared as a theory based on altruism.

CHAPTER VI

THE FOUR WAYS AND THE FOUR FRUITS

UNDER Monastic Buddhism, arahanship was the goal of every zealous bhikkhu and bhikkhunī. According to the thought of the time, those who attained the end desired were able to do so because the whole trend of their minds and characters had been set in this direction for more or fewer becoming (or lives) according to their different destinies. But there were many disciples who were not able to attain arahanship in this life, and whose destiny it might not necessarily be ever to achieve it. Thus, in spite of the fact that it is usually Devadatta, the schismatic, to whom the word incurable, *atekiccha*, is applied,¹ a passage in the Anguttara shows that it is also applicable to others: to matricides, parricides, murderers of arahans, those who draw a tathāgata's blood, and those who, like Devadatta, embroil the Order.² These are said to be doomed to (an everlasting) suffering in purgatory, incurable. They therefore may never hope to become arahans. But such criminals formed the minority. And although of the majority most might never gain consummation in this life-span, yet some proportion

¹ Vin. II. 202, V. 124; M. I. 393; A. III. 402; IV. 160.

² A. III. 146.

was reckoned to be on an upward way, sufficiently advanced to merit a designation conveying spiritual attainment. These who have progressed well are not ranked merely as non-arahans, but are brought under one of three headings which, with the arahans as the fourth heading, are together classified into a fourfold group. Of this the arahan is naturally the highest member. This group consists of those people who were on what is known as the "Four Ways," and within the Buddhist interpretation of the Indian belief in a chain of rebirths (*saṃsāra*) this group has some importance.

When each of the four ways (*magga*) had been fully mastered it was said to yield a fruit (*phala*). The fruit of one way was not immediate attainment to the next way, but was the gaining of definite subsequent states (fully stated in the texts).¹ These states had to wear out before entrance to the next way, if this was destined, could take place. Strictly speaking, the last Way, and the last way only, was the Way to arahanship.

The person who is on the first Way (*sotāpattimagga*), the Way of stream-attainment, is called *sotāpanna*, a stream-winner, a stream-attainer, or a stream-entrant. He who is on the second Way (*sakadāgāminimagga*), the Way of once-returning, is called *sakadāgāmin*, a once-returner. He who is on the third Way (*anāgāminimagga*), the Way of no-return, is called *anāgāmin*, a non-returner. He who is on the fourth and highest Way (*arahatta-*

¹ See below, p. 213 ff.

magga), the Way of arahanship is, when he has reaped the fruit of this Way, an arahan. A clear distinction is made between these two conditions in various canonical passages: ¹ in the Vinaya Sāriputta is represented as thinking that Assaji must be an arahan or possessed of the Way to arahanship; and in the Saṃyutta it is asked, "Which of these people are on the Way to arahanship, and which are arahans?" For those who are on the Way have something more to accomplish; they have still to win the fruit of this Way, which is also the goal of the good life and the highest and sweetest fruit in the life of a recluse. But when this has been achieved, then the task is done, for the arahan has nothing further to do.

At some time, we do not know exactly when, the Way became divided into this group of the four Ways. These represent stages of the Way, and have nothing to do with the other classification of the Way into eight component parts. But because the Way was, or came to be, the Way to arahanship, these four Ways are in a sense also Ways to arahanship. For, although arahanship—*nibbāna*—is near only for him who is on the fourth Way, all the cleansing from wrong states which pertain to the lower Ways are preliminaries which are necessary to the achievement of the goal. But the four Ways are nowhere called the Ways to Arahanship in the Pali Canon. Moreover there exist, so far as I know, only a few Vibhaṅga passages ² and

¹ Vin. I. 39; S. I. 78 = A. III. 391.

² Vbh.; 322 ff.; 335.

some commentarial passages¹ where the generic term "the four Ways" is used. Ordinarily each one is referred to specifically. It is most suggestive to find that in the Sangīti Suttanta, although the four limbs of stream-attainment, the four limbs of the stream-attainer, and the four fruits of the life of a recluse (which are identical with the fruits of the four Ways) are named,² the four Ways themselves are not catalogued. They are indeed doubly absent. In the first place, there is no heading called the "four Ways." In the second place, under the heading, "the fruits of samaṇaship," the fruits are not said to be those of the Ways—the Way of stream-attainment, and so on—but are merely said to be those of stream-attainment, and so on, the word *magga* not appearing. The absence of *magga* is more noteworthy since the *fruits* of the Ways are collected together here.

This omission of the four Ways from among the Fours of the Sangīti is as remarkable as the omission, from among its Eights, of the Way (or Path) as eight-fold. Just as there is a cataloguing of the four fruits of samaṇaship, so there is a cataloguing of the eight "fitnesses" or "rightnesses" (*sammattā*) and the eight "wrongnesses" (*micchattā*).³ That is all. Neither is the Way mentioned under the Eights in the Anguttara.

This suggests that at the time when the Sangīti

¹ e.g. DhA. IV. 30; MA. I. 54; II. 405; AA. II. 366; VinA. I. 139, 225.

² D. III. 227; see below, p. 233 ff. for the "limbs."

³ D. III. 254 f.

Suttanta was written down, the Four Ways had not been emphasised as a group; and that neither the subdivision of the Way into stages, each of which was called *magga*, or into eight component parts (*aṅga*) was as yet very important. Mrs Rhys Davids, in her *Manual of Buddhism*,¹ has collected a considerable amount of evidence, for none of which she claims crucial value, though together it contributes to support her suggestion that the eight "fitnesses" were at some time added to the Way. She considers that these eight factors (*aṅga*) were "a substitute for an earlier description," which may have been *bhavamagga*, the Way for Becoming; but that with the depreciation of *bhava* these *aṅga* may have been tacked on to the Way instead.

In the formulæ of the Ways the objectionable word *bhava* does not occur explicitly. But it was implicit in each stage of the Way.² Man was to become worthier, more cleansed and purified during the opportunities afforded by countless life-spans. This was the ancient meaning of these Ways. But since *bhava* came to be connected with recurring experience of ill, and hence to be dreaded, the teaching on the Ways came to be a valuable tool—not for holding out the hope of a number of rebirths, but for holding out the hope of limiting the number of rebirths in this world to a few more (seven at most), to one more or to not one

¹ *Manual of Buddhism*, London, 1932, ch. vi.

² There was no word for "stages." Each stage was called *magga*.

more. The Way, in a word, was no longer for becoming, but for shrinking. This is hardly a view that could have been propounded by any great teacher.

Yet it is possible that as time went on the Ways came to be more emphasised than the fruits. The Dhammasaṅgaṇi, for example, has sections on each of the four Ways,¹ but not on the fruits. These are not, however, wholly absent from this work. They appear twice, linked on each occasion with the Ways that are Unincluded and the unconditioned element, now as states which are neither grasped at nor favourable to grasping,² and now as states without āsavas.³ But because it was not thought fitting to devote any section of the treatise to the fruits, it looks as though, by the time the Dhammasaṅgaṇi was written down, the fruits had lost the importance they had held at the time of the Sangīti Suttanta.

There is a memorable passage in the Dīgha⁴ which speaks of the Way, here called *paṭipadā* as it was in the First Utterance,⁵ and nibbāna flowing into one another as do the waters of the Ganges and the Jumna. I think that it is possible that the notion of the four fruits preceded that of the four Ways; that there were perhaps originally only three fruits corresponding to the various aspects of renewed becomings, which were thought of as going on after life here had ceased; that the fruit of arahanship was a later accretion added

when the finite concept, that of man perfected with nothing more to do, ousted the concept of an infinite becoming; and that the division of the Way into four parts was also a later device made to balance the four fruits. Yet Way, not fruit, belongs to the First Utterance.

The term "stream-winning" especially appears to belong to an earlier date than do the other terms in this group. It represents a facet of a notion which was of the essence of Sakya, for it suggests an eternal flux built upon changelessness, a perpetual flowing along to join the greater, as rivers flow to join the ocean. But it was just this ocean of *saṃsāra* which came to be regarded with such dread that *soṭāpatti* was dethroned from its sovereignty over becoming, and was relegated to the lowest and the first place in the fourfold Way. Originally *saṃsāra*, and the becoming which it implies, had not been regarded with fear and horror, but as a thing full of promise, giving the hope of infinite opportunities for progress. It was later, when *saṃsāra* came to be an object inspiring dismay, a process to be stopped at all costs, at the cost of life renewed and renewable, that the conception of the four Ways will probably have been crystallised into formulæ.

These formulæ were wanted in order to hold out to as many as possible besides those who were arahans, the consolation of the cessation of lives. The monks were the people's teachers, and in teaching them so-called Dhamma they had their own axe to grind. But

¹ Dhs. 277-364.

² Dhs. 992.

³ Dhs. 1101 = 1104.

⁴ D. II. 223.

⁵ Vin. I. 10.

they were generous: They did not want to exclude all those many who were stream-winners, the fewer who were once-returners, and the fewer still who were non-returners from blessings comparable to the greatest blessing of the arahān which, as they saw it, was *nirodha*, making to cease. Before those who were less than the arahāns, lesser blessings were dangled. It was in order that the majority should be able to look forward to ultimate enlightenment and, more especially, to returning here but once or not at all, in either case waning utterly, that the conception of the four Ways was put forward.

By collecting these descriptions of the Ways; by arranging them side by side as occurs in the texts in either an ascending order or a descending order, arahānship as the culminating point of the good life was emphasised. By this means, too, a high light is thrown on the cleansing, purifying process an aspirant must undertake if he is to win the highest and much-coveted fruit. For this cathartic process, which is embedded in the arrangement of the Four Ways, indicates that arahānship cannot be contemplated before all the states, which are to be got rid of by progressing along the lower Ways, are truly eliminated as these Ways are mastered. These states mostly represent grave moral faults and obstructions. There is no exhortation to those on these Four Ways to create anything of positive value. The positive values automatically arise on the ashes of the burnt-out states, and are their fruits. But the higher the fruit in

the monk's eyes, the more negative it was in itself, since it then meant a greater reduction of future life.

Before going on to a discussion of other points concerning the Ways and the Fruits, it will be as well to set out various passages which show how the characteristics and destinies of those on the Four Ways were formulated. All of them clearly present an increasing range of elimination of wrong states, from which it may be deduced that an increasing range of moral and spiritual development from stream-winning to arahānship was intended. I give first the formula which perhaps occurs the most frequently.

"A bhikkhu,¹ by the complete destruction of the three fetters² is³ a stream-winner, one who cannot be reborn in any state of woe, assured, bound for enlightenment.⁴ A bhikkhu by the complete destruction of the three fetters and by reducing to a minimum passion, hatred, and delusion, is a once-returner, who by returning once to this world shall make an end of ill. A bhikkhu, by the complete destruction of the

¹ D. I. 156; D. III. 107, 132; A. I. 231 ff.; M. I. 34; cf. D. II. 91 = 252; A. II. 89, 238; IV. 12; M. III. 80.

² Delusions of the self, doubt, trust in the efficacy of works and ceremonies. D. III. 216, and Dhs. 1002, where definitions are given.

³ *Hoti*; D. III. 107 reads *bhavissati*, either "he will become" or (since *hoti* is a defective verb and has to borrow from *bhavati*) "he will be."

⁴ D. III. 132 adds, "This is the first fruit, the first advantage." And so for the second, third, and fourth fruits respectively, after each sentence.

five fetters which pertain to this world,¹ is one who takes birth spontaneously² in the Pure Abode,³ there to wane utterly, thence never to return.⁴ A bhikkhu by the destruction of the āsavas comes here and now to realise for himself that emancipation of heart and mind which is arahanship, and continues to abide therein."

It will be observed that there is here no indication of what the destiny or bourn of an arahant might be. It is said that it is for the attainment of these states that bhikkhus lead the good life.⁵

A bhikkhu or bhikkhunī may hear, so it is stated in the Nalakaṇṇa Sutta,⁶ that a certain bhikkhu or bhikkhunī has died and has been established in one of the Four Ways. These are described in the words of this formula, which is however given in reverse order; and the bhikkhunī or bhikkhu who is on the topmost Way is said, not to have extirpated the āsavas, but to be established in *aññā*, perfect knowledge. It is there recorded that Gotama said that the life of the dead bhikkhu or bhikkhunī has been exemplary; but that he does not make known their various destinies so as to adver-

¹ The first three with sensuality and ill-will added.

² *Opapātika*, lit. accidental. See *Dial.* I. 201 n. 3 and *Dial.* III. 103, n. 2. Translated by Mrs Rhys Davids, *Indian Religion and Survival*, p. 64, as "just 'happening,' not of parents."

³ PugA. 198, *Suddhāvāsalo*; D. III. 237 gives five "pure abodes," *Suddhāvāsa*.

⁴ Cf. Bṛhad. 6. 2. 15. "In these Brahma-worlds they dwell for long extents. Of these there is no return."

⁵ D. I. 156 f.

⁶ M. I. 465 ff.

tise his own power, but so that those surviving may call to mind the noble characteristics of those who have passed on, and concentrate their whole hearts upon such a state (*tathattāya*).

In the Anguttara,¹ in the Book of Fours, there are said to be four classes of recluse (*samaṇa*),² each class representing a person who is on one of the Four Ways, each of which is described in the terms of the formula just quoted. In another passage those on the Four Ways are called by names which appear to us fanciful, until we remember that the lotus is a symbol of great purity and glory. In this passage³ the stream-winner is said to be an unshaken recluse, the once-returner is called a blue-lotus recluse, the non-returner a white-lotus recluse (*paduma*), and he who has destroyed the āsavas is called a recluse exquisite among recluses.

The description of the stream-attainer as one who "cannot be reborn in any state of woe, who is assured, bound for enlightenment," is expanded into fuller accounts in other passages. Thus in the Dīgha, Anguttara, and Saṃyutta it is said,⁴ "I am he for whom purgatory (*niraya*) is perished, I am he for whom the

¹ A. I. 238, quoted at MA. II. 4.

² Mentioned at M. I. 63; D. II. 151. The Cmy. on each of these passages (MA. II. 4; DA. 589) identifies the first *samaṇa* as *sotāpanna*, the second as *sakadāgāmin*, the third as *anāgāmin*, and the fourth as *araban* (MA. II. 4) or *arabatta-samaṇa* (DA. 589).

³ A. II. 88 ff. = Pug. 63. The Ang. Sutta prior to this one gives the four recluses differently. For tabulation of the differences, see G.S. II. 96, n. 1.

⁴ D. III. 227 = A. III. 211 = A. V. 152 = S. II. 68.

womb of animals¹ is perished, I am he for whom the *peta*-realm² is perished, I am he for whom is perished the waste, the bad bourn, the downfall.³ Stream-winner am I, not to be reborn in any state of woe, assured, bound for enlightenment."

In another passage in the *Anguttara*⁴ this process of spiritual development is made to depend on training in those rules which are said to combine together to make the threefold training: the higher morality, the higher thought, and the higher insight. This passage gives fuller information than that already cited as to the implications of stream-attainment and non-returning. It is said that a clansman desirous of his own welfare trains himself in these rules. The passage is as follows:

"Such a one (the clansman), by destroying the three fetters is destined to seven more births at most; seven times more at most he fares and wanders up and down among devas and men and then makes an end of ill. Or, such a one again, by destroying the three fetters,

¹ On this, see Mrs Rhys Davids, *Indian Religion and Survival*, London, 1934, pp. 17, 45, 50.

² On this, see *ibid.* pp. 35, 50, 59. On p. 35, Mrs Rhys Davids says: "Peta-world—a word which, meaning literally 'gone before,' is held to be a corruption of the older term *pitṛ*-, or fathers'-world."

³ Mrs Rhys Davids, *Indian Religion and Survival*, p. 49, n. 1. Mrs Rhys Davids points out that "the Maha-Nidāna variant is rare: *Apāyam duggatim vinipātam saṃsāram (nātivattati)*. *Dīgha-N.* II. 55." It also occurs at S. II. 92; IV. 158; Pts. I. 127. At e.g. D. I. 83; III. 111; A. III. 385; S. II. 232; IV. 313, we get the formula: *a° d° v° nirayam*.

⁴ A. I. 233; cf., Pug. 15 ff.

is reborn in a good family.¹ He fares and wanders up and down in two or three families and then makes an end of ill. Or, such a one again, by destroying three fetters, is a 'one-seeder,'² he takes just one rebirth as a man and then makes an end of ill.

"That bhikkhu, by destroying the three fetters and weakening those of passion, hatred, and confusion, is a once-returner. He comes back to this world only once and makes an end of ill.

"Again a bhikkhu . . . by destroying the five fetters that pertain to this world, is one who goes upstream (*uddhāyaso*), he goes to the pure Abodes (*akaniṭṭhagāmi*).³ Or by destroying these five fetters, he attains release without much trouble . . . with some little trouble . . . he attains release by reduction of his time.⁴ Or by destroying these five fetters, he attains release midway.⁵

"Again . . . such a one, by destroying the āsavas, in this very life, himself knowing it thoroughly, realises

¹ Cf. S. V. 69, 205.

² *Eka-bījī*; cf. *Pts. of Contr.* 169.

³ Cmy. calls them "*aviha*, and so on," AA. II. 350; D. II. 52; Pug. 17 mention the five Pure Abodes by name.

⁴ *Upahaccaparinibbāyi*. Cmy. "he attains arahanship after 500 Kalpas"; cf. PugA. 199.

⁵ *Antarā-parinibbāyi*, he is a non-returner and finishes his course in the Brahma worlds (so ed.: G.S. I. 213, n. 8). See MA. I. 164; but DA. III. 1029 says that he who attains release midway is he who, not having reached the middle of this life-span attains arahanship, the utter waning out of the Kilesas midway; cf. AA. II. 350. At S. V. 201 these five kinds of anāgāmins are mentioned in reverse order.

the heart's release, the release by insight, and attaining it abides therein."

In another Anguttara passage¹ the person who has not got rid of the five fetters nor those giving rise to rebirth,² nor those giving rise to becoming,³ is called a once-returner. He that has got rid of the first set but not of the others is said to go upstream, to the Pure Abodes (or to the Elder Devas).³ He is in fact a non-returner. He who has got rid of the first two sets of fetters but not of the third, is said to be one who passes finally away in mid-term.⁴ He also, therefore, is a non-returner, although in neither case is he called so. The arahān is said to be he who has got rid of all the three sets of fetters.

In the Anguttara,⁵ in the Book of Fours, besides the four classes of recluse (*samaṇa*) who are paralleled with those on the four Ways, four persons are said to be found existing in the world. These are given as the non-returner, here called he who stands fast (*thitatta*), and the arahān who is here called "the brahmin (who) crossed over, going beyond, stands on

¹ A. II. 133 f.

² *Uppatti* . . . *bhava*-. This shows that "rebirth" and "becoming" contain two different notions, a person being an arahān only when he has got rid of the fetters giving rise to becoming. It means that when he has become developed as much as possible there is nothing more to do: he has made an end. Rebirth does not imply this.

³ Cmy., "No youngsters there"; this also said at DA. II. 480 = VbhA. 521.

⁴ G.S. II. 137. Ed. adds "of deva-life."

⁵ A. II. 5 f.; quoted at Netti. 157.

dry land,"¹ while the other two persons in this group of four are the one who goes with the stream (*anusotaṇ*) and the one who goes against the stream (*paṭisotaṇ*).²

Differences between those who are on the four Ways are also judged according to the degree in which the faculties have been cultivated. The five faculties here are those of faith, energy, mindfulness, concentration, and insight. It is said that by the completion and fulfilment of these five faculties (*indriyāni*) a person is an arahān. By having them in less and lesser and still lesser degrees he is a non-returner, a once-returner, and a stream-attainer respectively. If he has them in still less degree he is a follower in dhamma (*dhammānusāriṇ*); and if he has them in less degree still he is one who walks by faith (*saddhānusāriṇ*).³ He who completes this task succeeds completely, while he who completes it in part only succeeds in part (*padesaṇ*).⁴ This is explained in the Saṅyutta Commentary to mean that he who fulfils the Way of Arahanship obtains the fruits of arahanship. Others obtain fruits according to the Ways which they fulfil.⁵

Again, "pondering with method" is said to be a possible means of rising not only from stream-attainment but from being merely a virtuous bhikkhu, to arahanship.⁶ Pondering with method means concen-

¹ See below, p. 300 for discussion of this phrase.

² Cf. *uddhaṇsoto* above: "upstream."

³ S. V. 200. For discussion of these two terms, see K.S. V. 176.

⁴ A. I. 232, 234; S. V. 201.

⁵ K.S. V. 177, n. 1.

⁶ S. III. 168 ff.

trating upon the five grasping groups (or groups of fuel for existence): body, feelings, perception, activities, and consciousness; as being, among other things full of desire¹ and pain, impermanent, empty, and not of the self. At each stage, from that of a virtuous bhikkhu to that of an arahān, these groups should be pondered upon. But the arahān ends the series, for by him there is nothing further to be done.

Thus there is a continuity between the Ways. They merge into one another, so that having fared along one and shed the wrong states pertaining to it, a disciple may pass on to another. This occurrence may be spread over more than one rebirth. It is recorded that this happened in the case of the lay-disciple, Dīghāvu.² He was called a stream-winner in this life, and after he had died, Gotama is said to have declared that Dīghāvu would not return from that world (*tasmā lokā*) where he had been reborn. On the other hand, we hear of disciples who became stream-winners in this life, and who shortly afterwards became arahāns —also in this life. On dying they would die as arahāns, and presumably meet the destiny due to them. Thus it is said of Sañjaya, the brahmin,³ that, having found faith in the Master, he reached the first Way, later entered the Order and uttered *aññā*. The Commentaries on the Theragāthā and the Therīgāthā also record

¹ *Sallata*, lit. a dart, an arrow = *kāma*, S. II. 230; A. IV. 289.

² S. V. 344 ff.

³ *Pss. Breth.*, p. 52. Possibly not the same as the former teacher of the two Chief Disciples, see above, p. 80.

five other cases of men and five of women who appear to have passed straight from the fruit of stream-attainment to arahanship.¹ But I do not think that, at the time when these Commentaries were written down, it was held that passing along the second and third Ways was not equally essential to the winning of the goal as was entry to the first Way. For unless these were passed through and the wrong states pertaining to them purged away, full purification would not be entailed. The Theragāthā Commentary, indeed, mentions the case of the boy Dabba. It says that he, being one in whom "past causes and an aspiration were taking effect, realised the four Ways in succession in the very act of having his hair cut off."² The boy, Sīvali, too, is said in this Commentary³ to have gained the fruition of the first Way as the first lock of his hair was cut off, and the second, third, and fourth Ways as the second, third, and fourth locks fell respectively.

Such rapidity of realisation of the final stage is suggestive of preparation in previous rebirths, a person achieving the utmost in this becoming because his or her destiny was fully ripe, as it is called, for it.

Hence because these Theras and Theris are said to have won arahanship and not to have stopped on one of the lower ways, it may reasonably be said of them

¹ *Pss. Breth.*, pp. 133, 141, 183, 222, 234; *Pss. Sisters*, pp. 56, 72, 107 f., 125, 142.

² *Ibid.* p. 10.

³ *Ibid.* p. 61. It does not appear on whose authority these bold affirmations were made.

that already they had been on the way to it. This is only true if we mean nothing more than that they had been bound for arahanship, that it was their destiny to fulfil stage after stage of the Way until they got to the end. But actually, while still on one of the lower Ways, they would not have been on what is technically the Way to arahanship, the *arahattamagga*, the highest member of the group of the Four Ways.

Although it may be true that some of the Theras and Therīs to whom the Thera-therī-gāthā are ascribed rose from stream-attainment to arahanship in this rebirth, itself, it does not follow that all people could progress so far or so quickly. The majority were not so gifted, or had not put forth so much effort in previous existences as had the Theras and Therīs. And in drawing up the scheme of the Four Ways it was the less highly developed and cultivated that early Monastic Buddhism had in mind. If these might not attain arahanship in this rebirth, they might at least gain one of the lower fruits. An Anguttara passage well brings out these alternative achievements. It says¹ that if a bhikkhu is zealous, ardent, with a self that has striven even for one night, he may win to the state of non-returning, of once-returning or at least to stream-attainment. It evidently was not expected that he would win to all of these conditions.

As Buddhism developed on monastic lines, and as there grew a repugnance to the view that life upon this earth was but an opportunity, as one of many

¹ A. V. 86.

lives, for so becoming as ultimately to achieve perfection, the doctrine of *nirodha* came into favour. *Nirodha* means stopping, making to cease; the stopping of the self and therefore of experience of ill. The view that arahanship could be attained here and now in physical conditions is the logical outcome of the dread of renewed becomings. Arahanship here and now is the offspring of Monastic Buddhism. Now since the Ways imply *bhava*, becoming, I suggest that the scheme of the four Ways point to a time *earlier* than the formulated teachings on arahanship. For in these teachings consummation, the winning of perfection, was tied down to the here and now, to the present rebirth; but the original motive of the four Ways was that fulfilment might be realised in some future rebirth at an indefinitely long or short distance of time.

Looked at in this light, the four Ways as a group leading to consummation in some non-physical state through non-return to this state of things, is perfectly comprehensible. But it is to my mind very difficult to reconcile the Way of no-return, as a stage on the Way to arahanship, to this same arahanship when once it had become closely united with the here and now. For if, after a person has left this earth, he is not to return to it, if he is to pass utterly away in the realm where he has been reborn after the breaking up of his body here, how can he become an arahā as that is ordinarily understood by the texts with their insistence on *diṭṭhe va dhamme*? How can he, not returning, win to a perfected state in the flesh, under temporal

conditions on this earth and in this life? The Way of no-return in fact appears as a cutting short of the development implied by the four-Way-group, which hence presents a curious anomaly. For the gulf between the non-returner and the arahān is physically unbridgeable, and therefore the inclusion of the third Way is out of place, if it is thought that the attainment of arahānship here and now is the ideal of those on the Way of non-return.

Yet theoretically it must still have been held to be possible for a non-returner to reap the fruits of arahānship. Or was it that the arahānship thus thought of did not fulfil the here and now condition? It is true that in the Piṭakas there is nothing approaching a decisive record of a man or woman who was declared to be, in this life, first a non-returner and then, also in this life, an arahān. But it is also true that the Commentaries on the Theragāthā and on the Therīgāthā record of some of these unusual people, of one Thera¹ and four Therīs,² that having been established in the fruition of no-return, they not long afterwards attained arahānship, and in this life. Again in the Commentary on the Therīgāthā a case is given which can only be called rare. It is said³ that Upaka, who was an Ājīvika, entered the Order, was soon established in the Way of no-return, left this earth and was reborn in the Aviha-realm.⁴ Then it is said that "at the moment of that rebirth he attained arahānship." He may have done

¹ *Pss. Breth.*, p. 230 f.

² *Pss. Sisters*, pp. 10, 20, 86, 148.

³ *ThigA.* 222.

⁴ Or one of the Brahmā-worlds.

so, but if he did it was far from being the here and now type of arahānship on which the Piṭakas lay such great stress.

I think that this difficulty has never been fully faced. A Sutta-Nipāta passage has survived,¹ a further examination of which shows that non-return and arahānship here imply a close relationship to one another. This passage has been much repeated in the Suttas.² It says that "for a bhikkhu³ who is zealous, ardent, with a self that has striven, you may expect one of two fruits: either *aññā*⁴ here and now, or if his stuff of existence be not wholly spent, the condition of a non-returner (*anāgāmitā*)."⁵ In all cases of this pair to which the Suttas refer, the bhikkhu strives to know or to cultivate or to abolish certain states. In the Majjhima it is even said that one or other of these results may accrue to the disciple who has faith and who has penetrated the teaching of the Master.⁵ The result in these cases is not made to depend upon the disciple's success in his attempts, but upon whether or no he has any stuff for existence remaining.

At first sight it looks as if the presence of a remainder of the stuff of existence (*sa-upādisesa*) or the absence of it (*anupādisesa*), were meant to denote alternative consummations. But this is not so. Either

¹ Sn. p. 140 ff.

² D. II. 314; M. I. 63, 481; A. III. 81, 143; V. 108; S. V. 129, 181, 236, 285, 314; It. p. 39 ff.

³ A. III. 81, 143 say that either of these states is obtainable by a bhikkhu or by a bhikkhunī.

⁴ *aññā ti arabattay*, D.A. III. 805.

⁵ M. I. 481.

the bhikkhu has *aññā*, which would mean that he has no substrate remaining, or he has not quite achieved *aññā* (here). For the two states, those of being with or without a substrate remaining, are closely connected. The Dhammapada Commentary distinguishes two forms of *parinibbāna*, utter waning out.¹ It says that *parinibbāna* means that there is a substrate remaining after the attainment of arahanship by the destruction of the *kilesas*; and that there is no substrate remaining after the destruction of the *khandhas* through stopping the last thought. "Whoever has attained these two wanings out is *khīṇāsava*."

The Itivuttaka² and the Sutta-Nipāta Commentary³ identify these two conditions (*sa-upādisesa* and *anupādisesa*) with the sphere of nibbāna (*nibbāna-dhātu*). Nothing spatial is meant by this. For in the Saṃyutta *nibbāna-dhātu* is defined as *rāgakkhaya dosakkhaya mohakkhaya āsavānan khaya*.⁴ In this passage also *amata*, the undying, is defined by the first three of these phrases, while *arahatta* and *nibbāna* are so defined in another Saṃyutta passage.⁵ In the Visuddhimagga also, both the state of having some substrate and the state of having none are equally called *nibbāna*.⁶

These considerations show—not, the irreconcilability of *anupādisesa* (called *aññā* in the Sutta-Nipāta passage) and *sa-upādisesa*, but the existence of a close connection between them. We know nothing definite

¹ DhA. II. 163.

³ SnA. I. 350.

⁵ S. IV. 252, 253.

² It. p. 38.

⁴ S. V. 8.

⁶ Vism. 509.

of the width of the gulf which was at any time held to exist between the arahān and the *anāgāmin*. But, in the light of the considerations just put forward, it looks as if at one time it must have been considered to be very slight. Then, later, as I have suggested, lives, rebirths were whittled down to this rebirth. Hence from this it followed that arahanship, as this came to be regarded, must be won in this rebirth or not at all. Hence the logical sequence of thought would have been to eliminate the Way of no-return from the group of the four Ways, since logically the third Way suggests an alternative achievement to arahanship so long as insistence is laid on gaining this in the present rebirth. This was not done. But something very like it appears to have been attempted in an Anguttara passage.¹ It is said of all those on the three lower Ways that when they have done their time (here) (*kālaṃ karoti*), freed from *niraya*, from rebirth in an animal's womb, from rebirth in the *peta*-realm, in the waste, the bad bourn, the downfall, they are with a substrate for existence remaining. The arahān is not mentioned in this passage; neither is *anupādisesa*, except for a scornful reference to the followers of other sects who are said to 'know neither those who are *sa-upādisesa* as such, nor those who are *anupādisesa* as such. Does this joint exclusion of the terms arahān and *anupādisesa* intend to imply that this state is the monopoly of the arahān? One passage in the Nettipakaraṇa appears to support this view.² It says that no occasion exists on which a

¹ A. IV. 378.

² Netti. 92.

sāvaka who is *sa-upādisesa* will attain the nibbāna-state (*nibbāna-dhātu*) which has no substrate remaining. On the other hand, a second Nettipakaraṇa passage states¹ that "whatever is in a condition of non-desire, this (*ayaṃ*) is nibbāna-sphere (but) with a substrate remaining; this (*ayaṃ*), at the breaking up of the body, is the nibbāna-sphere with no substrate remaining." And in a passage in the Saṃyutta it is said² that a bhikkhu who is a non-returner can, by paying thorough attention to the fivefold group of "fuel for existence" (*upādāna*), realise the fruit of arahanship.

On the whole, then, most of the evidence goes to show that no-return and arahanship remained closely connected. Yet in the Majjhima these results again occur as apparently alternative. It is said³ that the attempt to get rid of the five fetters which pertain to this world—their elimination being considered necessary for non-return—may end either in the extirpation of the āsavas, which is virtually the same as arahanship; or (because there is a passion for dhamma and a delight in it), in the destruction of the five fetters and a state of non-return. Thus the effort to attain non-return may overreach itself and end in arahanship; or it may accomplish exactly that which it set out to do. But the disciple who has put forth the effort is not said to have won both states. So far he has gained the one or the other. There is no actual indication that having won to non-return he is assured of arahanship. But if non-return and arahanship were in reality

¹ Netti. 38.² S. III. 168.³ M. I. 436.

as intimately allied as some of the texts suggest, then the ultimate winning of arahanship is implicit in this passage.

There is not so much perplexity about the state of a *sakadāgāmin* as there is about the *anāgāmin* after he has deceased from this body. It is clearly said that the once-returner is to return once to this earth; and the Majjhima Commentary and the Puggala-paññatti Commentary declare that he is to spend the intervening time in the deva-world. The Majjhima Commentary says¹ that the once-returner, "having here (*idha*) made to become (*bhāvetvā*) the Way of once-returning, wanes utterly here (*idh' eva parinibbātī*), but he is not held (*gahita*) here; or making to become the Way here, he is reborn among devas and wanes utterly there; or making the Way to become in the deva-world he wanes utterly there; or making the Way to become in the deva-world and being reborn in the world of men, he wanes utterly here. Again he who makes to become the Way here is reborn in the deva-world; having finished his life-span there and being reborn again here, he wanes utterly; he is said to be held here."

This passage is perhaps put with greater clarity in the Commentary on the Puggalapaññatti.² It says, "Coming back to this world means: among five once-returners four are excluded (*vajjetvā*), one is held (*gahita*). Some, attaining the fruit of once-returning, wane utterly here; some attaining (it) here, wane utterly in the deva-world; some attaining (it) in the deva-world,

¹ MA. I. 163.² PugA. 197 f.

wane utterly there; some attaining (it) in the deva-world, coming to be again here, wane utterly. But these four are not held here. Again he who attaining (it) here and dwelling for his life-term in the deva-world, coming to be again here, wanes utterly. This one is said to be held here." This makes it clear that the Way of once-returning is to be gained here; then there is to be an intervening life-span in the deva-world, and finally a return to this world, here utterly to wane.

But, turning to the *Sumaṅgala-vilāsinī*,¹ we find there a passage stating that "if a man, attaining the fruit of once-return among men, and being reborn among devas, realises arahanship (there), that is good. But if he is not able to do this, inevitably returning to the world of men, he realises it (here), for if attaining the fruit of once-return among devas, and being reborn among men, he realises arahanship (here), that is good. If he is unable to do this, going to the deva-world, he realises it (there)." The point here is, that however often he passes from the deva-world to the world of men and back again, it is assumed that the once-returner, instead of waning, will eventually realise arahanship. The only question is, will he do so here, or in the deva-world? Presumably it does not matter. And this is because to the Indian mind there is no great gulf between this and the next becoming.

An important point in the *Papañcasūdanī* passage is connected with the meaning which it intends to

¹ DA. 544.

ascribe to the term *magga*, way. It is open to question, I think, whether the way here means the Way of once-returning, as it is explicitly called the first time it is mentioned; and whether it is called simply *magga* in subsequent allusions to it for the sake of brevity (which, however, is not as a rule a virtue of the Commentator); or whether the One sole Way is intended. Either interpretation would be possible. Once-returning might be as easily entailed by cultivation of the Way itself as by cultivation of the Way of once-returning. For the latter was a part or stage of the former. It is said that whoever is blessed with the ariyan eightfold Way is a stream-winner.¹ And the once-returner although at a higher stage of the Way than was the stream-winner was not on a different Way, for there was not a second one by which a disciple could progress. This mention of the (one) Way may have been due to a lingering memory of the earlier teaching which became "left in" in the Commentary. At all events nothing can now fortunately alter the fact that in this Commentary the Way is called by its simplest designation, *magga*.

And I think that there are good grounds for the hypothesis that by *magga* the *Papañcasūdanī* means the Way, and nothing less. The Way was for making to become, and later meant going to *nibbāna*; and these were the aims of those on the fourfold Way. In addition, various Commentaries, including that on the *Majjhima*,² call *sota*, stream, a name for the Way

¹ S. V. 347.

² MA. I. 162; VinA. I. 196.

(*maggass' etan adbhivacanay*). Certainly this effect is spoiled by the immediate quoting of a passage from the Saṅgutta,¹ where the stream is called the Noble Eightfold Way. But in the Dīgha and Saṅgutta Commentaries *sotāpanna* is also defined as *magga-sotaṃ āpanna*, having attained the stream of the Way.² The Commentary on the Anguttara³ explains *sotāpanna* as "having attained the fruit by means of the way known as the stream" (*sotasamkhabhātena maggena*). In the Puggalapaññatti Commentary *sota* is defined as *ariya-magga*.⁴ But this again is only another name for the Way.

In a passage in the Anguttara⁵ Gotama tells Ānanda, so it is said, that only the tathāgata could know the reasons for attainment to once-returning. The laywoman Migasālā is recorded to have told Ānanda that her father had led a virtuous life, so that when he died Gotama declared that he would return but once to this world. But her uncle had not led a virtuous life, yet when he died Gotama said the same of him. She wants to know why there is no difference in the results of leading a virtuous life and one that was not virtuous. The Founder is reputed to have said that neither a female, with just a woman's wit, nor a male man could have knowledge of the destiny of others.

Descriptions of those who are in the four Ways of stream-winning, once-returning, non-returning, and

¹ S. V. 347. ² DA. I. 313 = SA. II. 73; cf. MA. I. 162.

³ AA. II. 349. ⁴ PugA. 195. ⁵ A. III. 347 ff. = A. V. 137 ff.

arahanship are descriptions of those who are progressing on the Way shown by Gotama to all his disciples and followers. Declarations of the knowledge pertaining to these four Ways are manifestations of the extent to which the training has been variously fulfilled, or of the different states to which it will conduce while it is being fulfilled to a greater or lesser degree.

So far we have found that the greater or lesser amount of destruction of certain conditions, such as the fetters, and the greater or lesser degree of completion of others, such as the faculties, constitute a means of differentiating those on the four Ways.

Another, and possibly late, means of discrimination is also recognised. According to this,¹ a man is an arahān who has absolute faith in the Buddha, in dhamma, and in the Saṅgha, and who is joyous and swift in insight. He is fully released from "the waste, the bad bourn, and the downfall." One who has these loyalties and who is joyous and swift in insight, but who has not won deliverance is a non-returner, the five fetters are destroyed, and he is released from the states of woe. But he who, though possessed of these loyalties, is not joyous and swift in insight and has not won release is a once-returner if he has destroyed the three fetters and has also reduced passion, hatred, and confusion. He is a stream-winner if he has absolute faith in the Buddha, dhamma, and the Saṅgha, and has destroyed the three fetters but is not joyous nor swift in insight, and has not won release.

¹ S. V. 375 ff.

Both of these last wayfarers are also said to be released from the waste, the bad bourn, the downfall.

Gotama is said to have expressed these views after a discussion he had with some Sākyans on the case of Sarakāni, the Sākya. A number of these clansmen of his declared scornfully that anyone might be a stream-winner nowadays, since Sarakāni had been declared by Gotama to be one. Yet he had failed in the training and had taken to drink. Gotama had explained to Mahānāma, that Sarakāni had been a disciple who for a long time had taken refuge in the Buddha, dhamma, and the Saṅgha. Moreover, if a man has nothing but the faculties, if he has nothing but faith in the tathāgatha, and affection for him, he does not, so it is said, go to purgatory or the downfall.¹ Then Gotama pointed to the four great sāl-trees standing near,² and declared that if they could know what was well-spoken and what was ill-spoken, he would proclaim them to be stream-winners, assured and bound for enlightenment. Much more then is Sarakāni one, since by the time of his death he had fulfilled the three-fold training (the higher morality, the higher thought, and the higher insight).

It is curious to find that in this passage the four endowments: faith in the Buddha, dhamma, and Saṅgha, and joyousness and swiftness in insight are ascribed to those on all the four Ways. For in other passages, possibly earlier than this one,³ the first three

¹ Cf. M. I.

² Cmy.

³ D. II. 93; III. 227 = S. II. 69 f.; cf. A. III. 211; S. V. 362.

of these endowments with the possession of virtues dear to the Ariyans (instead of joyousness and swiftness of insight) are called the four possessions (*aṅga*, lit. limbs) of the stream-winner only, and not of those on all the four Ways.

This appears to me to lend weight to the hypothesis, already put forward, that the Way of stream-attainment belongs to original Sākya, while the others were added at some later time. I would suggest, tentatively, that the four limbs were first allocated to those on the stream, which was then of great importance. If it was not another name for the Way, at all events it was indicative of the Becoming which was of the original Sākya teaching and peculiar to it. But when this Way of Stream-winning had three others joined to it, all of which were thought to be superior to it, then the endowments characteristic of those on the Way of Stream-winning had necessarily to be shared by those on all the three subsequent Ways. For their nature was such that it was impossible that those on the subsequent Ways should be debarred from possessing them.

The presence of the inconsistency of calling them, now the endowments of those on all the four Ways, and now of the stream-winners only is doubtless to be attributed to the fact that the texts were written down at different times, and that the "repeaters" remembered different parts of them which they repeated to the editors.

These endowments of the stream-winner are also

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called the four very purposive abodes of ease here amid things seen (*ābhicetasika diṭṭhadhammasukhavibhāra*),¹ and are designated "Mirror of dhamma."²

In distinction to the four limbs of the stream-winner are the four limbs (*aṅga*) of stream-attainment (*sotāpattiyaṅgā*). In a Saṃyutta passage, which is taken by the Commentaries as the authority for the definitions of "stream" and "stream-attainment" which they use, it is said³ that these four *aṅgā* consist of association with a true man (*sappurisa* ⁴), of hearing true dhamma,⁵ of thorough attention, of conforming to dhamma. These are no doubt based on the thirteenth group of Fours in the Saṅgīti-Suttanta.⁶ It is also said that if they are cultivated and made much of they conduce to the realisation of the fruit of stream-winning.⁷

It is recorded that Gotama said to Anāthapiṇḍika,⁸ that the ariyan disciple who has mastered the fivefold guilty dread (abstinence from breaking the five *sīlas*) and who has the four possessions of the stream-winner, may declare the Self by the self (*attanā va attānā*),⁹ by means of uttering the longer formula of the stream-

¹ A. III. 211 ff. ² D. II. 93. ³ S. V. 347 = 404.

⁴ See G.S. I. p. ix. for a discussion on the prefix *sa-*; DA. III. 1020 calls *sappurisa* "Buddha and so on."

⁵ DA. III. 1020 *saddhamma* = *tepiṭaka-dhamma*.

⁶ D. III. 227. ⁷ S. V. 410.

⁸ S. II. 68 = A. IV. 405 ff. = A. V. 182.

⁹ This phrase also occurs at S. II. 68; A. IV. 405; V. 182. Another *attā* couple also appears in the Ang., e.g. *attā attānan upavadati*, the Self upbraids the self, A. I. 57. Again *attā attānan atimaññesi*, the self conceals the Self, A. I. 149.

winner.¹ It is also recorded that Gotama told a company of bhikkhunis about these four possessions of the stream-winner,² who is here also called the ariyan disciple. Now the ariyan disciple does not necessarily mean a person who is a member of the Order. For the layman Dhammadinna also affirmed that he had the loyalties and the virtues intact.³ He does not particularise them as we read that the Sākyan lady Kālīgodhā did,⁴ just before Gotama had told her, so it is said, that she had won the fruits of stream-attainment, and that that was a gain for her. Dhammadinna is said to have declared that his endowments were untainted by desire or delusion, and were conducive to concentration of mind. Moreover, it is recorded that Gotama instructed Mahānāma, the Sākyan, that the four possessions are to be used as the comforts of assurance by one lay-disciple who is discreet (*sappañña*)⁵ and a stream-winner, to another who is discreet, but needing such assurance because he is ill.⁶

From the import of the instructions given by Gotama to Mahānāma, it is evident that the limbs of stream-winning were not considered to be the monopoly of those who had entered the Order. This is borne out by another passage in the Anguttara.⁷ Here Gotama

¹ Cf. D. II. 93, see above p. 215 for this formula.

² S. V. 360.

³ S. V. 407.

⁴ S. V. 397; cf. S. V. 401. She was the mother of Bhaddiya, a young cousin of Gotama, see *Pss. Breth.*, p. 315 n. and Rhys Davids, *Buddhist India*, p. 19.

⁵ The Smy. explains *sappañña* of the text by *sotāpanna*.

⁶ S. IV. 408 ff.

⁷ A. III. 211.

is reputed to have said to Sāriputta in the presence of the great lay-follower, Anāthapiṇḍika, that any white-frocked¹ house man (*gihī*) who observes the first five *sīlas*—those for the bhikkhus and lay-people alike—and who is possessed of the four abodes of ease, may declare the Self by the self (*attanā va attānaṃ*) by saying the longer formula of stream-attainment.

These *attā* couples of sayings which occur especially in the Anguttara² are redolent of the old Upaniṣadic outlook, and are a priceless indication of the bond which was then held to exist between the Highest Self and the individual self, the lesser being able by its own nature to declare its share in the nature of the All and its union with it. These couples are a fragment of original Sākya, and belong to a time before nibbāna as a waning of the self of man had intervened as a natural corollary of the growth of the *anattā* doctrine.³

Besides the admission that lay-people might be on the way of stream-winning, it is recorded that Gotama said that the most backward bhikkhu (*pacchimaka*) might be, or indeed is, a stream-winner.⁴ Of women he is reputed to have said⁵ that they might become (*bhaddha*) those to realise the fruits of the first three Ways

¹ In contrast to the yellow robes of members of the Orders.

² See above, p. 236, n. 9.

³ I do not think that this conclusion is necessarily invalidated by the occurrence of another *attā* couple at Vin. III. 68, *attanā attānaṃ jīvītā voropenti*, which means "by the self they deprived the self of life," i.e. they committed suicide.

⁴ Vin. III. 10 = D. II. 155 = A. II. 80.

⁵ Vin. II. 254 = A. IV. 276.

and arahanship, if they would go forth from home into homelessness. This last clause seems to be a contradiction of the view that lay-people may be stream-winners. In the Majjhima also it is told¹ how Gotama declared, that on dying some lay-men and lay-women attained to non-return, once-return, and stream-winning. In the Dīgha several of those lay-people who have attained to one or other of these states on passing hence, are mentioned by name. Whatever may have been Gotama's or the early Sākyan idea as to the possibility of the attainment of arahanship—whether in the world as well as in the cloister²—it is highly probable that he would not have tried to discriminate between a lay-man or a lay-woman follower in the matter of stream-attainment. Indeed, there is the record of the Sākyan lady Kāligodhā to substantiate this hypothesis. Thus the making of women's realisation of the fruits of the four ways dependent upon their going into homelessness, bears signs of later editing, the editor thinking more perhaps of arahanship than of stream-attainment. Gotama is recorded to have admitted the possibility of such attainment by women³

¹ M. I. 465 ff.

² It is noteworthy that at M. I. 465 the lay followers who have died are not mentioned as having become arahans in the next rebirth.

³ Before the female Order had been formed, that is, before a distinction between female lay-followers (*upāsikā*) and bhikkhunīs was possible, Gotama is recorded to have called women in this Vinaya passage (Vin. II. 254) by the more generic term *mātugāma*, women-kind. Directly he tells Ananda that women can be ordained they are called bhikkhunīs.

before he had acceded to their request for a female Order. But the qualifying clause, "if they go into homelessness," is inconsistent with the other evidence which has survived for the winning of the stream by women who are leading a household life.

There is a very interesting passage in the Anguttara¹ which states that various classes of devas who possess perfect faith (*aveccapāsāda*) in the Buddha, dhamma, and Saṅgha, and who have the virtues dear to the Ariyans, are stream-winners. The occasion for this statement is provided by a visit from Moggallāna, famed for his psychic gifts, to one of the Brahmā-worlds. There he found the bhikkhu Tissa, who had just left the earth and passed to this world, and Moggallāna asked him, "To how many devas is there this knowledge: we have attained the stream, we are no more for the abyss, assured, bound for enlightenment?" Tissa tells him that the Four Firmament Devas have this knowledge; also the Devas of the Thirty, Yāma devas, the devas of Tusita (the Happy devas), the devas who delight in creating, and the devas who have power over the creations of others. It is noteworthy that the devas of Brahmā's company, whom Moggallāna was visiting, are not included among the devas who are stream-entrants. For the devas in Brahmā's world were, so it was thought, non-returners.² The devas "beyond that

¹ A. III. 331.

² See DA. I. 313; MA. I. 164; and below, p. 247 ff.

(*tatuttariy*)"¹ are not mentioned either. This term, *tatuttariy*, as "beyond" the Brahmā-world looks like an attempt to express the Highest, the final consummation. The sober reverence it suggests is noteworthy. And the absence of any characterisation of *tat-uttariy* points to an early date. The later way was to coin an *arūpabhava* which was nothing more than a mental fiction.

From what has been said already, it will have emerged that both bhikkhunīs and women leading a household life may become once-returners and non-returners. In the Vinaya² women are said to be capable of gaining these states; they are endowed with this potentiality. But it is not made clear whether women can realise these Ways in this existence or whether they come to them in some future, perhaps the next, rebirth. In all the canonical records which I have come across of women who are once-returners and non-returners, they are said to be such only after they have left the earth. The only exceptions to this are found in a Commentary—that on the Therīgāthā.³ The same is not true of men. For there are at least three passages, all in the Saṅyutta, where a man is called an *anāgāmin* while he is still

¹ *Tatuttariy* = *tato paraṃ*, Cm. on A. I. 211. For this fuller list of devas, see A. I. 211; A. III. 287. M. II. 194 goes as far as the devas of Brahmā's company, but omits those "beyond that." M. I. 289 gives this list as far as the devas of Brahmā's company and then, omitting the devas *tatuttariy*, gives a list of eighteen other classes of devas.

² Vin. II. 254.

³ *Pss. Sisters*, pp. 10, 20, 86, 148.

alive. Sirivaḍḍha¹ and Mānadinṇa² were each told by Gotama, so it is recorded, that they had declared the fruits of non-returning, since even though in great pain they had contemplated according to the four presences of mindfulness (*satipaṭṭhāna*).³ Of Unṇābha, a brahmin, it is said⁴ that if he were to make an end (of life) now, there is no fetter bound by which he would come back to this world (*imaṃ lokam*), on account of the great faith which he manifests in the tāthāgata.

There is an interesting Anguttara passage⁵ which tells how an independent Brahmā⁶ called Tudu came up to some bhikkhus who had been maligning Sāriputta and Moggallāna, and stood in the air and rebuked them. The bhikkhus were astonished and said, "Were you not called *anāgāmin* by the Lord? And now you have come back here. Look rather to your own guilt." This retort cannot be taken to show that it was wrong for *anāgāmis* to return for a temporary visit to this world. For the word of the bhikkhus whom Tudu

¹ S. V. 177. K.S. V. 157, n. 2, is wrong in adducing four instances where, in the Canon, a man is called an *anāgāmin*. For at S. V. 346 (the fourth case to which this note refers) Dīghāvu is declared to be a stream-winner while he is alive, but it is not until after he has died that he is called an *anāgāmin*.

² S. V. 178.

³ This term is not given here.

⁴ S. V. 219.

⁵ A. V. 171.

⁶ *Pacceka*brahmā, independent or private brahmā. I have only been able to find one other mention of this species. At. S. I. 146 two *pacceka*brahmās are alluded to, Subrahmā and Suddhavāsa. Both have one or two forms of *iddhi*, including that of passing at will from world to world, e.g. from this world to the Brahmā-world, and back.

encountered can carry no weight, since they were being troublesome and were in no position to make a rational criticism of others. This passage can only be taken to show that a member of the species of *pacceka*-*brahmā* is recorded to have been an *anāgāmin*, but we do not know whether he was called this before or after he had died.

The view, that on passing from this world a person's destiny or bourn (*gati*) may be according to whether he has attained the fruits of one of these Ways, is brought out in a conversation which, as recorded in the Vinaya,¹ was held between Gotama and Visākhā. While she is asking him to confer on her the boon of making gifts to the Order, she says to Gotama, as recorded, "Such and such a bhikkhu has done his time (here). What is his bourn, what his future state? To which the Lord will answer: it is in the fruit of stream-attainment, it is in the fruit of once-returning, it is in the fruit of non-return, it is in the fruit of arahanship." In the Mahāparinibbāna-suttanta there is a record of a questioning of Gotama by Ānanda at Nāḍika about the bourn of actual people who have left the earth. The answer is in terms of the four Ways.² Gotama is here reputed to say something of the destinies of those on the first three Ways; but to say of Sālha who has destroyed the āsavas, merely that he has attained to arahanship. This would support the assumption that the destiny of the arahan is not revealed.³

¹ Vin. I. 293.

² D. II. 91 f.

³ See above, p. 137 ff.

But there is a puzzling passage in the Lohicca Suttanta in the Dīgha.¹ Gotama is here made to say that if any samāṇa or brāhmaṇa were to put obstacles² in the way of those clansmen who have won distinction in Dhamma and the discipline, as for example the fruit of stream-attainment, the fruit of once-returning, the fruit of non-returning, or even arahanship, he would be putting obstacles in the way of those who are making embryos, fit for devas (*dibbā gabbhā*), ripe for rebirth in becomings fit for devas (*dibbānaṃ bhavānaṃ*).³ This curious little passage appears to mean that attainment to any of the four Ways might lead to a rebirth among the devas. Or does it actually mean this? Had it meant literally this, would not it have said *devesu*, among the devas? Is the use of *dibba* meant to imply that one might be merely deva-like, without necessarily joining their company? I do not think so. I think that before *arahatta* came to be identified with nibbāna, and before that came to mean waning of the self, and not merely of *rāga*, *dosa*, and *moha*, the arahān was regarded as having some bourn beyond, when this life was over; and that before *nirodha*, stopping, came to be held as of prime importance, the arahān was allowed

¹ D. I. 229.

² Buddhism holds that it is objectionable to put obstacles in people's way. Cf. Vin. IV. 383; S. I. 34; Jā. No. 115.

³ *Dibba* = deva-ish; we have no word by which to translate it. "Heavenly embryos . . . heavenly states" as at *Dial.* I. 393 will not do. The opposite of *dibba* is *mānūsika*, human, but the deva-world was not what we mean by heaven, inhabited by gods and angels.

to fit in with the essentially Indian belief in the running on and faring on of beings. This was *saysāra*, whose "beginning and end are alike unthinkable." Who more worthy for the bliss of the deva-realms than the arahān? Who more worthy for a myriad opportunities for fulfilment of self? He was as certainly fit for this as he was for cessation.

The passing of the returner and the non-returner to companionship with the devas is clearly brought out in an Anguttara passage.¹ It is asked, "What is the reason, what the cause why certain beings deceasing from the body (*kāya*)² are either returners who come back to this state of things, *itthattaṇ*,³ or non-returners who do not come back to this state of things?" In both cases it is said, in answer to these questions, that such-and-such a person here and now attains the realm where there is neither-perception-nor-non-perception. Since he enjoys it and does not fall away from it, when he leaves this earth he passes to the companionship of devas who have attained to the realm of neither-perception-nor-non-perception. The returner and the non-

¹ A. II. 159 f.

² Ed. of G.S. II. at p. 166 translates *kāya* as "group," taking it to refer to the devas (just mentioned) "who have attained the realm where there is neither-perception-nor-non-perception." I think that *kāya cuti* would mean "deceased from the body." Beings have to de cease from their body here, thence to join the devas before they return again for one more rebirth to earth. In rendering *kāya* as "group" the translator is not pushing the cycle to its limit, but is emphasising an intermediary stage.

³ G.S. I. 59, ed. remarks "*itthattaṇ* = *ittha-bhāvaṇ* (not 'thusness' but 'this world')."

returner may both do this. The difference in their states is made to depend upon whether they have or have not destroyed the fetters which pertain to this world.

The returner is here called, not the once-returner, but merely *āgāmin*, returner. In another Anguttara¹ passage he is called a person who is fettered inwardly (*ajjhattasaññojana*), whereas the non-returner is called the person who is fettered outwardly. In this passage both are said to lead a virtuous life here, restrained by the restraint of the *pāṭimokkha* rules, proficient in right conduct, trained in the rules of morality. The returner, on deceasing from this body, is reborn in a certain company of devas (those presumably who have attained the realm of neither-perception-nor-non-perception) and deceasing thence he comes back to this state of things. Of the person who is fettered outwardly exactly the same is said; but of him it is further said that having attained to a certain calm freedom of mind he dwells therein.² He is one who does not return. It is also said of him that he is one who is walking by the waning, the passionlessness, the making to cease of sense-pleasures, the making to cease of lives, worlds (*bhavānaṃ*); he is one who is walking by the destruction of desire (*tanhā*), of greed (*lobha*).

Another Anguttara passage³ gives a more definite

¹ A. I. 63 f.

² This differentiating mark is omitted by an oversight at G.S. I. 59. It makes all the difference between a returner and a non-returner.

³ A. IV. 60 ff.

statement as to the particular devas into whose companionship the returner and the non-returner may respectively pass: the returner being reborn among the retinue of the Four Royal Devas, and the non-returner among the devas in the retinue of Brahmā. The difference between attaining these two states is here made to depend on the difference in the mode of making a gift. If it be made with a regard for it, an affection for it, the giver saying "afterwards (*pecca*) I will enjoy this (gift)," he passes to the company of the devas of the retinue of the Four Kings;¹ and having spent his kamma, his psychic potency (*iddhi*), his fame (*yasa*), and his sovereignty (*ādhipateyya*),² he is a returner coming back to this state of things. But if the gift be made humbly, with no expectation of enjoyment of it hereafter, after he has left the earth the giver passes to the companionship of the devas belonging to the retinue of Brahmā. He is a non-returner, returning not to this state of things.

Thus we have, throwing some light on the question of the bourn and destiny of the non-returner, three canonical passages: all from the Anguttara Nikāya. One of them states that the non-returner, deceasing from this earth-life, is reborn among the devas who have attained to the realm of neither-perception-nor-non-perception. The second of these passages states more vaguely that the non-returner is reborn in a certain company of devas, the name being unspecified;

¹ Inhabiting the lowest of the six deva-worlds.

² Three forms are given at A. I. 147.

and the third that he is reborn among the devas of Brahmā's retinue. These passages therefore agree in the opinion that the *anāgāmin* will be reborn among devas. This is interesting. It is a definite view, plainly stated. Devas and deva-worlds are not merely tacitly assumed. They are spoken of openly as consisting, partly at any rate, of those who are non-returners to this world. It is clear that Monastic Buddhism, for all its turning from a faith in the worlds, from a belief in rebirths as precious opportunities for further becomings, does not deny the existence of other worlds, of more rebirths. This is a curious feature of both Sutta and Commentary. The deva-realms were useful as a stage to which to relegate those who were returning here as stream-entrants and once-returners, while the advantage of regarding them as spheres to which to banish non-returners left the arahān in unique possession of the faculty of making an end here, in this rebirth.

The violent opposition of Sutta and Commentary to further worlds and rebirths as opportunities is thrown into relief by their dogmatic assurance that these further worlds and rebirths are the destiny only of those on the three lower ways. The arahān alone is held to consummate here and now, thus escaping the karma, the deeds done, the action wrought in even one more rebirth. The criterion of a man's perfection is that it can be said of him that he will be reborn no more. He has made an end of becoming, or of ill, *dukkha* (which under Monastic Buddhism came to be regarded as the same as becoming), during his earth-

life. No such thing can be said of the non-returner. If he makes an end of becoming, it is not here. He has to go on once more at least and attain the company of devas. Naturally a destiny different from that of the arahān was assigned to him who was not on the fourth, last, and highest Way.

Now nothing is revealed of the destiny of the arahān. In this respect it differs from the destiny ascribed to the non-returner. Not only do the Anguttara passages already quoted speak of the latter as passing to the companionship of certain devas, but the Piṭaka formulæ on the *anāgāmin*, frequently met with, tell us something more. In them are to be found some phrases which although left vague, and I think deliberately and legitimately so, nevertheless evince the opinion that the non-returner wanes out utterly. Are we to infer that this takes place in the deva-realms in which he has been reborn? For an answer to this question we must consult the Commentaries. But first we will see what are the phrases of the Piṭaka formulæ connected with the destiny of the non-returner after he has deceased from this body.

By these terms he is said (1) to wane out utterly there (*tattha parinibbāyi*), not being liable to return from that world (*anāvattidhammo tasmā lokā*); (2) to be one who goes upstream to the Elder Devas (*uddhāgsoto akaniṭṭhagāmi*); (3) to wane out utterly midway (*antarā-parinibbāyi*). Thus twice in the formulæ does *parinibbāyi*, he wanes out utterly, occur. What, then, about the curious phrase, "going upstream to the Elder Devas"?

Does this mean that the non-returner wanes out at some unspecified time after he has joined the Elder Devas? I do not think that this is either intended or imputed by the formulæ. I do not think that they are attempting to make utter waning out consistent with or interdependent upon going upstream to the Elder Devas. For in Nikāya and Commentary five kinds of non-returners are recognised.¹ Thus, there is he who (1) goes upstream to the Elder Devas, (2) wanes without much trouble, (3) wanes with some little trouble, (4) wanes by reduction of his time, (5) wanes midway.

A further Anguttara passage,² putting these five *anāgāmins* in reverse order, leaves us in no doubt that these five kinds of *anāgāmin* are recognised, named, and graded according to their achievement and penetration. Thus the destiny of him who wanes midway (*antarā-parinibbāyī*) is apparently the hardest to achieve, for this type of non-returner is ranked next in order to the arahān. At the lowest end of this Anguttara scale of non-returners is he who goes upstream to the Elder Devas. This is, as it were, the minimum to be achieved in order to be classed with the non-returners. For "if he attain not that, if he penetrate not so far as that (*anabhisambhavan appaṭivijjhan*)," then at most he could but be a once-returner; for in this scale of values the once-returner is given the position immediately below the person going upstream to the Elder Devas.

¹ e.g. A. I. 233; PugA. 200 multiplies them to forty-eight.

² A. I. 234.

It is interesting in this passage that, of the five types of non-returners only one, the lowest, is not specifically said to wane utterly. Naturally they all share the common feature of not coming back again to this state of things, as well as that of having destroyed the five fetters of the lower sort. Otherwise these five non-returners are not sharply differentiated. Yet to each kind rather a different destiny is ascribed, with the result that when Piṭaka and Commentary are not engaged in discussing the five kinds of *anāgāmins*, there is a certain amount of variation in what they held to be the *anāgāmin's* destiny. Hence it is justifiable for the Anguttara to put forward two or three different deva-realms as the bourn of the *anāgāmin*; for the Piṭaka formulæ to speak of his waning out as well as of his joining the Elder Devas; and for the Commentaries to unite the two conceptions in the view that he wanes out in the Brahmā-worlds.

This combining of two Piṭaka assumptions is, I think, peculiar to the Commentaries. If we take these terms of the Piṭaka formulæ one by one and investigate the interpretations put upon them in the Commentaries, we will find that this source yields evidence for the utter waning out of non-returners as non-returners in a Brahmā-world; and that, further, commentarial sources put forward the view that non-returners may attain to arahanship, the goal supreme.

The Sumaṅgalavilāsini¹ maintains a certain reserve in defining *tattha parinibbāyī*. It says that it means:

¹ DA. I. 313.

“he is bound for utter waning in that becoming beyond (*upari-bhava*).” This is vague. So also is the Manorathapūraṇī. It says¹ that *tattha parinibbāyi* means: “not having descended below, he is bound for utter waning beyond.” But with the Papañcasūdanī we come upon that union of Piṭaka notions to which reference has been made. For this Commentary takes *tattha parinibbāyi* to mean that “he wanes out utterly there in a (or, the) Brahmā-world.”²

In the phrase, “not being liable to return from that world,” which is tacked on to the phrase, “he wanes out utterly,” the Commentaries on the Dīgha and the Majjhima both paraphrase “that world” as “that Brahmā-world.” For they say of *anāvattidhammo tasmā lokā* that it means: “on account of his reinstatement (*paṭisandhi*) he is not liable to return again from that Brahmā-world.” The Commentary on the Anguttara again does not commit itself so far. It says: “he is bound for non-return on account of his pure bourn (*yonigati*).”

The Commentary on the Puggalapaññatti, like the Commentary on the Majjhima, states that the non-returner wanes out in a Brahmā-world. Not that the Puggalapaññatti Commentary actually calls the spheres in which it assumes that waning out takes place by the name of Brahmā-worlds. It calls them worlds of the Pure Abodes,³ expounding *tattha parinibbāyi* as “waning out there in the worlds of the Pure Abodes (*suddhāvāsalo*ka).” These number five: Aviha, Atappa,

¹ AA. II. 349.² MA. I. 164.³ PugA. 198.

Sudassa, Sudassī, Akaniṭṭha.¹ This last realm is that of the Elder Devas, the realm which is included in the Piṭaka formulæ: “going upstream to the Elder Devas.” Now, we see, according to the Puggalapaññatti Commentary, that the result of joining the company of the Elder Devas is to wane out there. Further, we learn something of the nature of these Pure Abodes from other Commentaries, those on the Saṃyutta and the Anguttara speaking of Aviha as a Brahmā-world,² while in the Papañcasūdanī Akaniṭṭha is mentioned as a *brahmaloka*.³ Thus because, according to the Commentary on the Puggalapaññatti, *anāgāmins* are said to wane out utterly in a *suddhāvāsa*, and because other Commentaries declare these to be Brahmā-worlds, *anāgāmins* may be said to wane out utterly in a Brahmā-world. The Commentary on the Vibhaṅga also holds this view. It says⁴ that the Akaniṭṭha realm is one of the three best deva-worlds (that of neither-perception-nor-non-perception being also one); and that the *anāgāmins* who have arisen there do not go either higher or lower: they wane out utterly there.

Other passages in the Commentaries, while likewise putting forward the view that the non-returner wanes out in the Akaniṭṭha realm, the fifth of the Pure Abodes, also incorporate another notion. Such passages imply that not only may the non-returner pass consecutively

¹ D. III. 237.² SA. I. 91, *avihādi brahmaloka*; and AA. II. 378, *avihaṇ gato ti avihabrahmaloke nibbatto* 'smi. See G.S. I. 258, n. 1.³ MA. II. 245.⁴ VbhA. 522.

through these five Abodes, but that during his passage he is all the time striving for arahanship. A specified length of life-span is allotted for a person's course through each Abode.¹ According to the Commentary on the Puggalapaññatti,² if a person cannot attain arahanship in either the Aviha, Atappa, Sudassa, or Sudassī realms, although he has been purifying himself in each of these four, he is called *uddhaysoto akanittbagāmi*, one going upstream to the Elder Devas, whose sphere is the fifth of the Pure Abodes. In this Commentary such a person is said to wane out utterly in this, the fifth Pure Abode.³ It is thus imputed that he might attain arahanship in any of the previous Pure Abodes; but that if he cannot do so in one of the first four, he certainly will in the fifth.

Two passages in the Majjhima Commentary may be well compared with this passage in the Puggalapaññatti Commentary. It will be noticed that while in this latter Commentary consummation is held to be attained through purification, in the former it is said to be attained through an increase in insight. For one of these Papañcasūdanī passages declares⁴ that "he, having increased insight, having attained the fruit of non-return, arises in the five *suddhāvāsa*. Having meditated upon form, and having caused proficiency to arise in meditation upon formlessness, he arises in the four *arūpa*-(spheres). Having meditated upon form and formlessness, and making insight grow, he attains

¹ VbhA. 521; Kvu. 208; PugA. 199.

³ DA. III. 1030.

² PugA. 199.

⁴ MA. II. 333.

arahanship." The other Papañcasūdanī passage reads: ¹ "Having made insight into a Brahmā-world to grow, and having realised the fruit of non-returning, he arises in the five Pure Abodes. Having made to become the higher Way (*upari-magga*), he achieves destruction of the āsavas." The Commentary on the Dīgha also speaks of *anāgāmi-khīṇāsava*.² Hence, we have virtually arrived at the evolution of the non-returner into the arahan. This to my mind is a far cry from the Anguttara's assurances that the non-returner joins the company of certain devas. But the Dīgha Commentary appears to be very definite on this point. For it defines *antarā-parinibbāyi* (he wanes out midway) as: "among non-returns, not having passed the middle of a life-span, he attained arahanship, the utter waning of the kilesas at midway."³

Thus, according to the views expressed in certain parts of the Commentaries, it was held that the state of non-returning did not necessarily carry with it waning out as a non-returner, but it entailed the passing on from that state to arahanship. This, according to some Commentaries, was attained in one of the Pure Abodes which, according to other commentarial passages, were Brahmā-worlds.

All that can be said in conclusion is that the Commentaries, in naming and tabulating these other spheres, portray a most curious dogmatic assurance of knowing things to be such and not otherwise. Whether these spheres were purely imaginary or not, we shall,

¹ MA. on Sta. 120, at end.

² DA. III. 1029.

³ *Ibid.*

I think, never know. Nevertheless, the Commentator, in suggesting that arahanship may be gained by the non-returner, although in the nature of things not here and now, has not succeeded in cutting himself completely adrift from Early Buddhism's basic notion of Becoming, which he usually treats with cold disdain. In spite of having striven hard in many and various passages to detract from becoming, to condemn it as being nothing but lamentation and ill, the Commentator is unable to eliminate entirely other lives and other worlds from the scheme of things. And such other worlds cannot be condemned as altogether worthless and full of woe: they are not necessarily spheres where those on the three lower Ways store up demerit and ill and bad karma. On the contrary, by the Commentator's own showing, they are essential to these who are not arahans, providing them with the scope and opportunity for their further development, for their possible achievement of arahanship, after the cessation of this earth-life.

CHAPTER VII

OGHATINNA: FLOOD-CROSSED: AN ASPECT OF
THE ARAHAN

IT is not possible in a work of this nature to enter into a discussion of all the terms which, in Pali Buddhism, were used either as synonyms of the arahan, or as emphasising one or more of his aspects. From out of this mass of many and various terms I have chosen two: *oghatinna*, crossed over the flood, and *pāraṅgata*, going or gone beyond, for some investigation. These terms form respectively the subject-matter of this chapter and of the one following.

I have selected these two for several reasons. In the first place, they are closely connected one with the other. Secondly, the notion of *oghatinna* became allied with, even in all probability identified with, the notion of *āsava-khīṇa*, or as it was later *khīṇāsava*, the destruction of the āsavas, which itself is another leading synonym of the arahan (and a term whose history has yet to be written). Thirdly, I have chosen these two concepts because, in the history of each, we can see something of that mode of thought which was at work, changing the Sakyan phase of Early Buddhism into the Monastic phase of Early Buddhism. I have called attention to these shifting values in Chapter I.

This chapter attempts to give some elucidation of the interesting but difficult phrase *oghatinṇa*, "crossed over the flood," or "flood-crossed." This phrase is almost always used metaphorically in Pali literature, and as an epithet of the arahān. In the few cases where the verb *tarati* is used literally it means crossing a river¹ or the ocean (*samudda*).² The origin of the compound term *oghatinṇa* is a matter for speculation. For in no part of the Canon is any indication given of how it arose; and, with one or two exceptions, the majority of the canonical passage where this compound occurs give no hint of what the term *ogha* connotes. We learn nothing much more from such passages than that the flood is to be crossed and that this is difficult. It hence appears that *ogha* is something dangerous, and that the crossing of it, when accomplished, is praiseworthy and beneficial.

In inventing the term *oghatinṇa*, and in incorporating it in their Way to arahanship, it is not likely that the earliest Śākyans, who were Indians, had the sea in mind. For the word for sea, *samudda*, was there and was used. The same may also be true of the later Buddhists of Ceylon. For in spite of the fact that Ceylon is an island, the great monasteries were inland; hence the sea would have played but little part in the life and thoughts of the monks. It is therefore more reasonable to suppose that the allegorical use of *ogha* was drawn from the idea of some mighty river, such

¹ Vin. I. 191 (Aciravati); Vin. II. 65, A. II. 200 (*nadi*).

² Jā. III. 189.

as the Ganges. The rivers of India, besides becoming swollen and rapid as a direct result of the rains, are also fed by the nullahs of hilly districts. These fill swiftly and deeply after the monsoons have burst, and their waters descend towards the rivers with such incredible speed, that people who were a moment before crossing a dry river bed are often overwhelmed by the flood. India was then a land of wide unbridged rivers, and of countless nullahs in full spate during the rains. *Oghatinṇa*, a highly significant metaphor for waters, might have been suggested by either of these natural phenomena, to which there is nothing comparable in Ceylon. Certainly Ceylon has its floods. But its great monasteries of Anurādhapura and Polonnaruwa were situated in the plains at the north end of the island, where no waters ever rushed down a nullah, and they were sufficiently far away from the Mahāwelīgāṅgā to be beyond the reach of its floods. Hence the conclusion is warranted that the term came from India. It follows that it may be of great antiquity, and belongs to the early Buddhist teaching.

In the earlier Pali works *tinṇa*, "crossed over" (past participle of *tarati*) and other parts of *tarati* are sometimes used alone,¹ giving no indication of what it was that has been crossed over. Different parts of this verb are also frequently combined with some noun which represents that which is or ought to be crossed over. This is consistently the case in later Pali works.

¹ Sn. 359, 515, 545, 638; D. III. 54; It. 123.

And the idea of introducing a state "crossed over" as complementary to the "crossing" had also been present to the compilers of the Kāṭha Upaniṣad. For in one passage in this Upaniṣad is found the notion that "having crossed over both hunger and thirst . . . one rejoices in heaven."¹ This same Upaniṣad also speaks with approbation of crossing over birth and death.²

In Pali literature, that which is or ought to be crossed over is sometimes sorrow and lamentation (*tiṇṇasokapariddava*),³ sometimes doubt (*tiṇṇakatham-katha*)⁴ and sometimes cleaving (*visattikā*).⁵ But most usually it is *ogha-mahogha*, the flood, the great flood, a word which is often in the singular in the earlier works.⁶ In cases where *ogha* appears as the first term in the compound *oghatinṇa*,⁷ it is not possible to determine whether it should be translated as "the flood" or as "floods." Later *ogha* is spoken of as the four floods or as the fourfold flood. This will be discussed presently.

Tiṇṇa is defined as *atikkanta*,⁸ which in its primary sense means: having gone beyond, passed over,

¹ Kāṭha, I. 12.

² Kāṭha, I. 17.

³ DhP. 195; Sn. 1052.

⁴ Sn. 17, 86, 367.

⁵ Sn. 857; A. IV. 434.

⁶ e.g. Sn. 4, 173-4, 183-4, 771, 945, 1052, 1059, 1064, 1069-70; DhP. 25; S. I. 1, 53, 193, 208, 214; S. V. 168, 186; Thag. 7, 88, 681, 880, 894; Thig. 10; A. II. 200 ff., It. § 107; and cf. Vv. 64 (28), 82 (7).

⁷ Sn. 178, 1082-3, 1145; S. I. 3, 142; Thag. 572.

⁸ DhA. III. 252; Nd. I. 115.

crossed; and in its secondary sense: having overcome, conquered. This is important, since it introduces the notion, however covertly, of active endeavour and victory after a struggle. Synonyms for it are also given as *otinna*¹ (descended), *nittinna*² (got out of, crossed, overcome), *atikkanta*, *samatikkanta* (crossed over, transcended, escaped from), *vitivatta* (having passed or overcome, gone through, spent).³ Another and a longer list of synonyms begins with these, and proceeds to others: gone beyond, attained beyond, gone to and attained the summit, the end, the climax, perfection (in this world), protection, salvation, a refuge, fearlessness, cessation from becoming, the undying, nibbāna.⁴ *Tiṇṇa* is also defined as having done the journey, having traversed the span of life, as being perfected, as having kept the good life, and as being established in the highest teaching.⁵ Hence it appears as a word of tremendous import laden with the essence of the Buddhist doctrine. Gotama himself, the great arahan, with the epithet "crossed over" (*tiṇṇo*), is said to preach the doctrine of crossing over;⁶ and again with the same epithet, he is said to have saved mankind or to have helped them over.⁷ The compilers of the Itivuttaka may have had these passages in

¹ Or *utinna*, *uttinna*.

² Nd. I. 159, Nd. II. 284, both read *nitinna*.

³ *Ibid.* II. 284.

⁴ *Ibid.* I. 159. For some of these terms, cf. *Ibid.* II. 436, where they are given as synonyms for *pāraṇ*, the other shore.

⁵ *Ibid.* II. 284.

⁶ D. III. 55.

⁷ Sn. 545 (*tiṇṇo tāres' imay pajay*); cf. M. I. 386.

mind when they declared, that one who has crossed over is the best of those who can help others to cross over.¹ In the striking "litany" in the *Paṭisambhidāmagga* the helper is not called "crossed over," but since he is a Buddha, this is doubtless implied. For it is said, "The whole universe is plunged into a great flood: for it there is no other saviour from the flood but me. When the Lord Buddhas see this there arises a great pity for living beings."²

Among the many characteristics of the *samaṇa* who has crossed over are absence of any wish to hurt anybody, an untroubled state, a complete lack of self-conceit or arrogance (*ussada*),³ and compassion.⁴ A Commentary shows⁵ that one who has no arrogance anywhere in the worlds is an arahān who has destroyed the āsavas. *Ussada* is said to comprise seven bad qualities, namely *rāga* (passion), *dosa* (ill-will), *moha* (confusion), *māna* (pride), *diṭṭhi* (false views) *kilesa* (corruptions), *kamma* (work),⁶ all of which must be annihilated before a man can win the goal. For it is said that he attains to renunciation by the destruction of passion, ill-will, and confusion, and by the very condition of the absence of these.⁷ In this way also he attains to the love of solitude, to kindness of heart, to the absence of craving, of thirst and of ignorance. Thus he has completed all his work, the āsavas are

¹ It. p. 123.

³ Nd. I. 72; cf. SnA. 467, *taṇhāussadābhāvena anussadan*.

⁴ Sn. 515.

⁶ *Ibid.* *kamma* is defined at Vism. 94.

² Pts. I. 129.

⁵ Nd. I. 72.

⁷ Vin. I. 183.

rooted out,¹ and he has made an end of birth and death,² for he has broken down the fetter of the craving for becoming.³ Having crossed over, there is nothing left for him to do, no increase to be added to that which had been done.⁴ "Crossed over" is even in a Commentary defined as having acquired omniscience.⁵

So far very little hint has been given of what the flood represents. The truth is that the texts themselves are remarkably silent on this point, and the explanations are left to the Commentaries. But in one textual passage the realm of death, the culmination of birth and old age, is called the flood that is hard to cross.⁶ This is explained in the Commentary⁷ to mean the great flood of *saṃsāra* (the round of lives, worlds).⁸ Those who are twisted round and round in *saṃsāra* are also twisted round and round in birth and death, for they are pursued by birth.⁹ But for him who has crossed over the whole round of *saṃsāra*, there is no more becoming again. To say that the flood is the realm of death is virtually equivalent to saying that it is birth and old age. Yet when these are spoken of as being crossed over,¹⁰ they are not designated as the flood. Indeed, when Mettagū is represented as asking the Lord how steadfast men (*dhīra*) can cross the flood,

¹ Vin. I.; S. I. 48.

² S. I. 48.

³ Vin. I. 183.

⁴ *Ibid.*; Vin. III. 158; S. I. 48.

⁵ SnA. 35.

⁶ Thig. 10.

⁷ ThigA. 13.

⁸ Cf. Cmy. on Thag. 1131, at *Pss. Breth.*, p. 378 n. 6. *Ogha* here in the plural; cf. *Pss. Breth.*, verse 681; Asl. 49; DhA. I. 255; VvA. 284.

⁹ Nd. II. 282, 284.

¹⁰ Sn. 1045, 1048, 1060.

and also birth and old age, these appear to be supplementary to one another rather than identical.¹

A psychological aspect of the flood emerges when it is called the flood of *kāma* (sense-desires).² Those who are carried away by this flood, not understanding sense-desire, are destined when they die to go from becoming to becoming on the wheel of rebirth. But those who understand sense-desire, go beyond the world, with no reason to fear, having destroyed the āsavas.³ The flood of desire is itself identified with the realm of *saṃsāra*.⁴ This is possibly justified by a verse in the Sutta-Nipāta where Gotama is referred to as he who cuts off desire, who is free from commotion, who forsakes pleasure, who has crossed the flood, who is delivered, and who has left *saṃsāra* behind,⁵ and is *kappāṭṭa* (has overcome time), and therefore an arahān.⁶ For these epithets may all have the same significance.

Further insistence that the flood consists of psychological states appears in the elucidation of an old riddle which runs, "he who has crossed the flood should cut

¹ Sn. 1052.

² A. III. 69; Nd. II. 284.

³ A. III. 69. The four āsavas are *kāma* (sensuous desire), *bhava* (becoming), *diṭṭhi* (false views), and *avijjā* (ignorance). Probably the three āsavas: *kāma*, *bhava*, and *avijjā* are older than that of *diṭṭhi*.

⁴ Nd. II. 284.

⁵ Sn. 1101. *kappañjaham*, lit. one who has left time behind, cut off *saṃsāra*, i.e. an arahān. But at DA. I. 103 and SnA. 366, there are said to be *dve kappā*: *taṇhā-kappo ca diṭṭhi-kappo ca*.

⁶ Sn. 373.

Five, leave Five, further cultivate Five; then transcending the Five ties (*saṅgā*) he wins the name of *oghaṭṭina*." This riddle is explained in the Dhammapada Commentary¹ and in the Theragāthā Commentary. The five that should be cut are the first Five Fetters of the lower sort,² which should be cut by means of the first three Ways. The Five which should be left are the second Five Fetters:³ they should be abandoned and cut by means of the Way to Arahanship. The Five that should be developed are the Five Faculties of faith and the rest, which should be cultivated when the second Five Fetters have been abandoned. The Five Ties to be overcome are passion, hatred, confusion, pride, and wrong views.⁴ He who has overcome these, being thus a destroyer of the Five Ties, is called a bhikkhu who has crossed the flood. Thus in the interpretation of the riddle, the flood stands for fifteen states of mind: the Five Fetters which impede a man on his entrance to the Ariyan Way, the five which impede him in his progress towards the end of the Way, and the Five Ties. Two Commentaries speak of the flood as the flood of the corruptions (*kilesa*).⁵

There are two interesting differences between the older and the later works in their treatment of the

¹ DhA. IV. 109.

² Usually given as: delusion of the self, doubt, the taint of rites and ceremonial observances, the lust of sense, ill-will.

³ Usually given as: lust of form, lust of the formless, pride, excitement, ignorance.

⁴ The same as the first five *ussadā*.

⁵ DhA. I. 255; SA. I. 187; cf. SñA. 18.

flood. In the first place, the earlier works speak almost entirely of *ogha* in the singular, while the later works speak of four floods, or of the fourfold flood. In one canonical passage, however, a five-fold flood is mentioned.¹ The Commentator² says that this may either be the five-doored flood of the *kilesas* (*i.e.* arising because of the five senses); or the five lower and the five higher fetters. But this canonical passage is unique. The usual view, otherwise almost uniformly stated, is that there are four floods.³ In the second place, in the earlier works it is rare to find the flood described, while in the later works the four floods are usually specified, namely, as the flood of *kāma* (sensual desires),⁴ of *bhava* (becoming),⁵ of *diṭṭhi* (false views),⁶ and of *avijjā* (ignorance).⁷ These are the same as the four āsavas, by the destruction of which a man or woman wins nibbāna and is assured of the final bliss of arahanship.

The achievement of such a blissful state (nibbāna) is one of the highest ideals set forth by Monastic Buddhism. Those who have realised this ideal, whose

¹ S. I. 126.

² SA. I. 187.

³ D. III. 230, 276; S. IV. 175, 257; S. V. 59, 136, 191, 241-2, 251, 253, 292, 309; DhA. IV. 109; SnA. 234; SnA. 214, 275, 362 (where they are not specified); Nd. I. 57, 159; Nd. II. 178; Cmy. on S. I. 1, where ignorance is called "ignorance-begotten desires"; VvA. 284.

⁴ SA. I. 17, *kāmogha* = *kāmaguṇesu chandarāga*.

⁵ *Ibid.* = *rūpārūpabhavesu chandarāga*.

⁶ *Ibid.* the sixty-two heretical views.

⁷ *Ibid.* "of the four truths."

training in self-mastery is completed, are called arahans. Progress towards the goal of arahanship may be slow or it may be rapid. Those who have achieved it are described as possessing various characteristics, usually differing in individual cases. Throughout Pali literature one characteristic appears to be of supreme importance, the hall-mark *par excellence* of the arahan: that of having extirpated the āsavas which destroy and consume. Originally the appellation "crossed over" did not possess great significance. It usually appeared in groups with other epithets, their cumulative presence giving to the man or woman so described the right of the title of arahan. In later Buddhist documents, in the Commentaries, one epithet alone and apart from all others, *khīṇāsava*, having destroyed the āsavas, itself a late term and not of the original Sākya, was regarded as sufficient to identify a man or a woman as an arahan. To say that a man had destroyed the āsavas was, in these works, equivalent to saying that he was an arahan. And here, too, a definite meaning was ascribed to "crossed over": this was exactly similar to that of having extirpated the āsavas. For the states which were said to be "crossed over" were identified with the āsavas which were destroyed. Hence it would appear that, although *oghatinṇa* never came to share the incontestable distinction of *khīṇāsava*, it did become, at least in the minds of the commentators, equivalent to it, connoting identical victories, and possessed of the same liberating qualities.

This is plainly brought out in one passage, where

"having subdued the flood" is defined as having crossed the fourfold flood of desire, becoming, false views, ignorance. Having overcome this, the man is called gone beyond,¹ gone to nibbāna, a winner of nibbāna.² Grounds for such a development are to be found in the earlier works. Gotama himself is referred to as the perfectly enlightened One who has crossed the flood and is freed from the āsavas.³ Again he is called the Tathāgata who is well-composed, who has crossed the flood, who knows dhamma by means of the highest vision, who is freed from the āsavas, and who bears his last body.⁴ Nanda deems that those who can be called crossed over the flood are those who have understood craving, who are freed from the āsavas, who have left what has been seen, thought, and heard in this world, and all good works and ceremonial observances, and who have indeed made renunciation of various kinds.⁵ Steadfast men are said to call him a *muni* who knows the world by highest vision, and who, after crossing the flood and the ocean, breaks his bonds, is independent, and freed from the āsavas.⁶

This close relationship between *oghatinna* and the destruction of the āsavas was to some extent taken up by the Commentaries, perhaps as a forerunner of the final identification of the two notions; and in various passages they simply exist side by side with one another. For example, in one passage "crossed over" is defined

¹ SnA. 35.² Nd. I. 160.³ Sn. 178, 1145.⁴ Sn. 471.⁵ Sn. 1082, 1083.⁶ Sn. 219.

to mean: gone to a place that formerly one longed for. One does not go to this place merely as a stream-attainer (*sotāpanna*); but one goes to the other shore. This means that one has attained to arahanship, with all the āsavas destroyed, transcending all things, to the deepest peace, to nibbāna.¹ In addition, the idea of four seems to have been present in a comparatively early work. For in the Dialogues,² not only are the four floods (in the plural) called the floods of sense-desires, of becoming, of false views, and of ignorance; but they are also called the four things to be rejected or eliminated. It is possible that these passages may have done something towards establishing a precedent for calling the four floods by the same names as the four āsavas.

Various methods of crossing the flood are given. Many of them are connected with the Way, the Way to arahanship and nibbāna. Thus the flood that is difficult to cross completely is crossed by means of this one sole Way,³ by cultivation of the Way,⁴ by the Ariyan Eightfold Way,⁵ by cultivating the Ariyan Eightfold Way,⁶ so as to lead to the comprehension, realisation, wearing down of the floods; by means of the ship of the Noble Way.⁷ It is also said that it can be crossed

¹ SnA. 35; cf. SnA. 362, where *pāragatam* = *nibbānappattam*; cf. SnA. 258; and see below, p. 305.² D. III. 231, 276.³ S. V. 168; *ekāyano maggo* = Cmy. *ekamaggo* = MA. I. 229; cf. K.S. V. 119, n. 2.⁴ SnA. 275.⁵ S. IV. 257.⁶ S. V. 59; cf. *ibid.* for *yoga*.⁷ ThigA. 13.

by learning the best dhamma;¹ by discerning the inherent nothingness of things, by being thoughtful, and by the reflection that there is nothing.² It may also be crossed by bhikkhus who take as a basis and establish themselves in the third *jhāna*,³ after having progressed stage by stage on the paths that lead to permanence, to the realm of naught, to neither-perception-nor-non-perception, to traversing the flood and right up to noble deliverance.⁴ It may also be crossed by faith,⁵ and by the heaped-up accumulation of good.⁶ Full understanding should enable a man to cross the flood of perceptions.⁷ Well might Vaṅgīsa say:

"Yea, thou hast shown a Way by many methods
For crossing o'er the torrent safe to land."⁸

It is also said that bhikkhus by mutual reliance lead the good life for the sake of crossing the flood.⁹ Also, that the wise man by rousing himself, by zeal, by restraint of his faculties and by self-mastery can make for himself an island which no flood can wash away.¹⁰ For by such means the wise man, endowed with the wisdom of the essence of dhamma is able to make an island, difficult to obtain, which is the refuge of creatures in the deep ocean (*sāgara*) of *saṃsāra* and the fruit of arahanship. The flood can also be withstood by a

dyke,¹ which is therefore like an arahān whom the flood is unable to destroy.² But a bhikkhu with a distraught, unsteady mind who associates with vicious friends, sinks down into the flood and drowns beneath its waves.³

Hemavata, asking the Lord "who crosses the flood and who does not sink into the deep,"⁴ is said to ask the first question at the stage of a probationer (*sekha*) and the second at the stage of an adept (*asekha*).⁵ The Commentary explains⁶ that the bhikkhu who is freed from the āsavas does not sink down into the depths of rebirth (*aṇṇava*), as *aṇṇava* is here defined.⁷

Candama also asks Gotama how we may pass the flood and not drown in the deep (*aṇṇava*).⁸ To which Gotama is reputed to have replied in the following verses:

"He that in virtuous habit ever walks,
Has wisdom, and is ever well-composed,
Who stirs up effort, and the self makes firm,
'Tis he does cross the flood, so hard to cross.

Whoso delights not in the things of sense,
Who has o'ercome the fetter (strong) of form,
Delight in rebirth having, too, destroyed,
'Tis he that never in the depths does sink."

At another passage where the flood and the deep are both called in question,⁹ it is said that the flood is crossed by faith and the deep by zeal. Such uses of the ocean (*sāgara*) and the deep (*aṇṇava*) seem to suggest

¹ Sn. 4; Thag. 7.

² DhA. I. 255.

³ Thag. 681.

⁴ Sn. 173.

⁵ SnA. 214.

⁶ SnA. 215.

⁷ SnA. 214.

⁸ S. I. 53.

⁹ Sn. 183; S. I. 214; Miln. 36.

¹ Sn. 1064.

² Sn. 1070.

³ MA. on II. 265.

⁴ M. II. 265; cf. M. I. 41 ff.

⁵ Sn. 183-5; S. I. 214; Miln. 36. For some remarks on the comparatively low place assigned to faith in the Buddhist view, see *Questions of King Milinda*, vol. i. 56, n. 1, S.B.E. XXXV.

⁶ ThigA. 13.

⁷ Nd. I. 57.

⁸ S. I. 193; Thag. 1243.

⁹ It. § 107.

¹⁰ DhP. 25.

that a distinction between these and the flood was deliberately made.

The power of virtue as an agency in crossing the flood is again mentioned when Sālha the Licchavi is reputed to have said to Gotama that there are *samaṇas* and *brāhmaṇas* who define the traversing of the flood in two ways: by reason of the purity of morals, and by reason of the detestation of asceticism. Gotama says that he calls purity of morals a certain limb of *samaṇahood*. Those *samaṇas* and *brāhmaṇas* who learn loathsome asceticism, who see excellence in it and who adhere to it are unable to cross the flood. Further, those whose conduct of body, speech, and thought, and whose way of living are impure, are not fitted by knowledge and insight for the highest peace.¹ But those recluses and brahmins who do not learn loathsome asceticism and who have no dealings with it are able to cross the flood. And so are those whose conduct is pure in body, thought, speech, and livelihood.² A *muni* like this who abides, having thrown aside all bodily evil and so on,³ and who does not covet sensual pleasure, and who has crossed the flood is envied by creatures who are still tied to sensual pleasures,⁴ or who are still enslaved by desire.⁵ And those who adhere to the desire for realities (*vatthu-kāma*)⁶

¹ A. II. 200.

² A. II. 201.

³ SnA. 537.

⁴ Sn. 823.

⁵ Nd. I. 282.

⁶ Usually combined with *kilesa-kāma*, or desire as property of a stained character. Cf. Nd. I. 1 where the members of each class are fully given. Asl. 62; Nd. I. 159, 246; Nd. II. 202; DhA. II. 162; III. 240. Cf. SnA. 112 for *vatthu-kāma* alone.

are envied, as they say that one who is free from debt is envied by debtors. For having crossed the four floods, they have carried out the teaching to the climax of arahanship.¹ As the Niddesa says, "the arahān has crossed over the flood of sensuous pleasure, the flood of becoming, the flood of false views, and the flood of ignorance."²

Another way to cross the flood³ is to know ourselves, or the individual, and whence arise passion, hate, greed, repulsion, love, and terror. They who know this (*naṃ*) passion, and so on, and whence it and these other states arise, repress it and these other states. These are all the outcome of our individuality,⁴ of what we are here and now as users of body and of mind. Hence if individuality is destroyed, these states, the roots of ill, are annihilated. There are several dangerous things that drag us backward to the hither shore.⁵ They constitute the five fetters of the lower sort: the lust of sense, ill-will, the delusion of the self, the taint of rites and ceremonial observances, and doubt.⁶ The first three of these fetters are important. A few remarks on the flood of sensuous desire have already been made, and much might be said about doubt. The taint of rites and ceremonial performances was probably included as a safeguard against brahminical practices. A great deal might be written about the delusion of the self, but in passing

¹ SnA. 537.

² Nd. I. 115.

³ S. I. 207.

⁴ *attasambhūtā* = SnA. 304, *attabhāvato jātā*.

⁵ S. I. 208.

⁶ Cf. Thig., vv. 165, 166.

only one reference will be given. It conveys the necessity for not cleaving to the self, but of being emptied of it. It declares that he who has crossed over the four floods, who has left the hither shore with its person-pack or complex, and has reached the safety and security of nibbāna, the further shore, is said to be "crossed over, gone beyond, the brahmin who stands on dry land."¹ Brahmin is one of the names for an arahān.² He is the best of the four types of men to be met with in the world. For he has destroyed the āsavas, is free from them, delivered in mind and insight, and has here and now achieved excellence, is endowed with it and abides in it.³ The samāṇa who has destroyed the āsavas, and who is therefore an arahān, is called, in words ascribed to Gotama, *paramaṇ, paramaṇ*, most excellent. This is defined in a Commentary as nibbāna, the topmost and best of all things.⁴ Thus, having crossed the flood, comes to be identified with having waned utterly.⁵

Anuruddha⁶ crossed over the flood by delighting in Gotama's teaching, and by leaving behind him his parents and all his relatives as well as the joys of sense. His case clearly shows that only those who have gone out into homelessness, and who have renounced everything, are capable of crossing over the flood. This surely is in opposition to several of the methods already

¹ This description is also given at A. II. 5; S. IV. 157.

² S. IV. 175; cf. S. I. 47, D. I. 167 ff., A. II. 5.

³ A. II. 5.

⁴ SnA. 163.

⁵ *parinibbāna*, Vv. 82 (7).

⁶ Thig. 894.

referred to, some of which are culled from the most ancient documents, and which do not necessitate the taking of such fundamental measures. For these documents had been composed before monkdom claimed the monopoly of the Way to freedom. Anuruddha's reasons for wishing to enter the Order provide an enlightening satire on the uses of monastic life. He entered from no high motives, from no burning desire to cross the flood. He asked his mother to give him her permission to leave the world, simply because his brother, Mahānāma, had detailed to him some of the drudgery and hard work incidental to the household life, which had such an effect that Anuruddha was inspired with a determination to escape from it all.¹


Gotama is reported to have given an enigmatic reply to a deva who asked him how he crossed the flood: "Unstayed and unstriving did I cross the flood"²—that is to say, he crossed, but rightly stayed and with right effort.

A commentarial passage gives an illuminating account of the crossing of the fourfold flood.³ It explains that this is done by means of successively acquiring certain necessary mental states. By obtaining mastery over these states, a man may eventually cross all the four floods. The full import of the passage is contained in the notion that the crossing of each flood, one after another, corresponds to the winning of each of the four Ways to Arahanship, one

¹ Vin. II. 181.

² S. I. 1.

³ SnA. 234 = SA. I. 330 f.



after another. This is, I believe, the only occasion on which the four floods are placed in a scale of values, a clue to the comparative importance of each one being given by means of its correlation with one of the Ways.

This exposition of the four floods differs from all others in that here the sequence runs: *diṭṭhi*, *bhava*, *kāma*, *avijjā*, instead of the more usual *kāma*, *bhava*, *diṭṭhi*, *avijjā*. It is possible that the Commentary is guided by the view that *diṭṭhi* is the most important for the monk, as it saves or damns the man. But it is more likely that the commentator fitted a flood to the agent—faith, zeal, effort, knowledge—as given in each line of the verse. A short table shows the method of Commentary in elucidating the verse.¹

THE VERSE SAYS	IN THE COMMENTARY
By faith the flood is crossed	— the attainment of the First Way is by crossing the flood of <i>diṭṭhi</i> .
By zeal the deep is crossed	— the attainment of the Second Way is by crossing the flood of <i>bhava</i> .
By effort ill is overcome	— the attainment of the Third Way is by crossing the flood of <i>kāma</i> .
By knowledge one is purified	— the attainment of the Fourth Way is by crossing the flood of <i>avijjā</i> .

Giving the passage in full, the Commentary declares in accordance with the verse that a man crosses the flood by faith. But he who is without faith cannot spring forward across the flood; and he who is negligent with regard to the five bonds of sensual pleasures does not cross the deep of *saṃsāra*. It is because the flood is crossed by faith that the faculty of

¹ Sn. 183 = S. I. 214.

faith is called the “proximate cause” of the Way of stream-entry; and for this reason crossing the flood of wrong views is called the Way of stream-entry and also stream-entry. Further, if the stream-entrant after cultivating good states is endowed with zeal, he is established in the second Way, that of a once-returner to this world. For having crossed the flood of becoming by means of the Way of stream-entry he crosses the deep of *saṃsāra*. Therefore the crossing of the flood of becoming is called the Way of once-return, or simply once-returning. Anyone on this Way by putting forth effort, achieves the third Way, and overcoming the flood of sensuous pleasures overcomes ill; and crossing this flood is known as a non-returner. If this person by ridding himself of the mud of sensuous desire, by purification and by knowledge achieves the fourth Way, he has destroyed the constituent of ignorance by means of the third Way. For this reason crossing the flood of ignorance is known as the Way to arahanship, or as arahanship. Thus one established in the fruit of stream-attainment may rise to the goal and climax of arahanship.

The flood which is to be crossed is spoken of with horror by a few bhikkhus who were arahans. Devasabha said:

“Transcended is the miry bog of lusts.
Past doom infernal am I safely come
Past flood and fetter dire to liberty,
And shed is every form of self-conceit.”¹

¹ Thag. 89.

Jambuka, detailing austerities¹ he had practised before he had taken refuge in Gotama, speaks of himself when performing these woe-bringing and ruinous actions as being swept along by the great flood.² Aṅgulimāla, too, as bandit, was swept along by the great flood until he found refuge in Gotama.³ Upasīva⁴ thought that he could not cross the great flood alone. In this particular case Gotama is made to give pure monk-advice and not helpful human advice. He is said to suggest, not that Upasīva should find refuge in him, but that he should discern the inherent nothingness of things.⁵ This discrepancy may perhaps be accounted for by the greater age of the Sutta-Nipāta, composed at a time when the core of self-mastery was considered to be self-reliance: a far more austere doctrine than any which permits dependence on another, be he man or god. But for the old Sākya teaching the highest goal to be sought was latent in the self: was indeed man's highest self. Kappa,⁶ when describing the horrors and impurities to which flesh is heir, speaks of the body as sinking down into the great flood. In such a case the man would be in danger of being drowned, for it is said that the very meaning of the floods is that they overwhelm and suffocate the creatures that have fallen into them.⁷ Certainly not all of these arahans shared Ajjuna's remarkable experience of actually coming to know the truths as he was being

¹ Cf. D. I. 166, 167.² Thag. 285.³ Thag. 880.⁴ Sn. 1069.⁵ Sn. 1070.⁶ Thag. 572.⁷ *Comp. Phil.*, p. 171, n. 1.

borne along in the great flood.¹ There would be nothing inherently impossible in this, although the flood in another passage is spoken of as being crossed by means of the fourfold Way.² That is to say, only after one has mastered the cathartic process of the fourfold Way, is one considered to have crossed over the flood.

It may be open to question whether the Commentaries have or have not read more into the conception of *oghatinna* than was originally intended. For little enough do we know of what the older works meant by this term. The Commentaries have at least the characteristic merit of interpreting it, if not in all passages, then in the majority, to mean mental states as well as the whole round of becomings. They mean that the mental states of sensuous desires, false views, ignorance, all of which bind men to the cycle of becoming, are to be crossed over and entirely rooted out. This work can be completed here and now. Hence nibbāna can be won even in this life. But more is needed for its achievement than the mere cessation from becoming. This indeed is given as one of the four floods, and as we have seen, the flood is more than once defined as *samsāra*. It would, however, be misleading to believe that the victory over the flood of becoming could alone insure arahanship: or that it would be possible unless the psychological states that cause the continuance of becoming were also eradicated. For the cessation of wrong psychological states leads to the cessation of becoming. We of to-day who

¹ Thag. 88.² SnA. 214.

either do not believe in the chain of rebirth or who, if we do, are not so much afraid of it as were the world-weary monk-editors of the texts (since we regard it as a field for progress and development towards something better than we are now, rather than as an unbearable burden), should acknowledge our debt to the Commentaries. But not so much for their emphasis on the escape from future becomings, as for the stress that they lay upon the necessity to abandon wrong states of mind—states that lead to excitement and cravings, to doubts, and to misconceptions of the conduct of life and thought.

Nor should it be forgotten that the Commentaries give something positive to the notion of *oghatinna*. Like all the steps in the renunciation necessary to the pursuit of perfection, crossing the flood is a process which begins by getting rid of certain undesirable qualities; but this can only be accomplished by the activity of other and desirable qualities. Even if these are not mentioned explicitly, without the tacit assumption of their presence, all talk of “getting rid of” is vain and empty. In Pali literature the word for *will* had not yet been found, although the idea of willing rightly and energetically was prevalent. Implicit in the notion of crossing over the flood is the idea of crossing it by means of the choosing will. The choice of the man or woman who wills is based on right knowledge; and this is based on the desire to know aright and its fulfilment. Such desire and realisation are possible only after the mind has been thoroughly

cleansed of the cloying, hampering desire for pleasure and sensations. Thus it is that the will, in common with all those determinations towards asceticism, rightly understood, may be directed so as to choose, in preference to the lower way, the development of the higher, which is the Way of arahanship.

CHAPTER VIII

PĀRA : BEYOND

WITH the concepts of *tiṇṇa*, crossed over, and *oghatinṇa*, flood-crossed, and others of a similar nature are connected as natural corollaries, the notions of both *pāra*, beyond, and *pāraṅgata*, which has hitherto usually been translated "gone beyond." But if with Mrs Rhys Davids we take *gata*¹ as a present and not a past participle, *pāraṅgata* will become "going beyond." This translation is in accord with the teaching on Becoming which was one of Śākya's contributions not only to the thought of Gotama's day, but to the religious thought of all time. *Pāraṅgata*, going beyond, is but one aspect of the larger concept of *bhava*, becoming, a notion surely not absent from the Early Upaniṣads, in spite of their stress on Being (\sqrt{as}). For the process of becoming includes going beyond what is, and again and again beyond.

Beyond was not originally, I think, intended to denote any definite place, which could be set in opposition to *this* place, and where, once one had arrived, one could stay with no more journeying ahead. But this is what it came to mean to Monastic Buddhism.

¹ See above, p. 136, and cf. *Sugata*, the well-going-one = well-farer, not the Wellgone. Cf. *paṭipanna*, one who is faring.

Monastic Buddhism craved a wholesale making to cease, corresponding to that static conception of the All which is one of the outstanding characteristics of the Upaniṣadic teachings. The other world, the world beyond this world (*idhhaloka*), was *lokuttara* or *paraloka*; and *pāra* is nowhere, so far as I know, used as a synonym for either of these. It was perhaps intended by original Śākya to imply the possibility of an infinite going, an infinite improvement, enrichment, and development of the self, the macrocosm ever expanding in depth and height for the microcosm as this grew in stature and vision.

This potentiality in man to become as That Highest was most probably regarded by quite early Buddhism (which subscribed to the belief in rebirths, more commonly known to the West as transmigration) as requiring a process of very long duration for its fulfilment, man not coming to be as That without an unlimited practice in self-training. This theory is supported by those parts of the texts, considered to be on other counts early, where *pāra* is dissociated from all notions implying finality, rest, consummate achievement, and is given instead a boundless scope. Such passages neither provide a synonym for *pāra*, nor do they give any explicit notion of what, if anything, "beyond" represents. They thus do not suggest that it stands for anything which could be termed finished. To my mind this is highly significant, as showing that in primitive Śākya the cardinal idea of *pāra* was that of development. I do not think that the Founder

wished to limit this notion. But his followers did this for him by insisting on nibbāna and *arabatta* as states conterminous with man as perfected, in which, since man was perfected, no further development was possible. Thus, if Gotama believed in the possibility of an infinite development of the character of man, there was originally no identification of *pāra* with a static condition. It was left for his later followers, for the Commentators, to tie down the idea of *pāra*, as they had tied down the idea of *arabatta*, to nibbāna, the state where all effort ceases. This meant that, for them, *pāra* became some fixed state, and that the original idea of process, dynamic and unending, of a man continually going beyond what he is at present, was confined within a state whose chief characteristic was finality. Going beyond, therefore, as an ideal automatically renewed in a man's self-development, is a concept differing widely from that into which the Commentaries crowded all the various facets of *nirodha*, stopping.

For this boundlessness inherent in the early Sākyan notion of *pāra* later ceased to appeal to the Buddhist world, and in particular to monkdom. Moreover, with Becoming's fall from favour, *pāra*, also shrivelled. Perfection was gradually thought to be attainable here and now, rather than to be garnered in a succession of rebirths. For the idea of a renewal of rebirths also came to be regarded with dread. With this collapse of everything implied by Becoming there was a waning of the Sākyan departure from static Being; and those

who came after Gotama fell in with¹ the brahminical view of *pāra*, as this is expressed in various passages in the Upaniṣads. It is most striking to find that in all these passages *pāra* is united with some object, with something gone beyond. It never stands alone, untrammelled. Thus :

- (1) Cause me to cross over to the other shore of sorrow.²
- (2) Shows the further shore of darkness.³
- (3) By it one will go to the further shore of darkness.⁴
- (4) Success to you in crossing to the further shore beyond darkness.⁵
- (5) The safe shore of fearlessness.⁶
- (6) For those who seek to cross over to the fearless further shore.⁷
- (7) Having crossed beyond the limited.⁸
- (8) Having crossed over with the raft of the syllable *Om* to the other side of the space in the heart.⁹
- (9) You lead us across to the shore beyond ignorance.¹⁰

¹ According as we see these Upaniṣads in which *pāra* occurs as earlier than the rise of Buddhism, it might be said that in this limiting of *pāra* a reversion to their outlook or expressions had been made. If we think of them as contemporaneous with Buddhism, some idea in the air might have been responsible for the limiting in both "systems."

² Chān. 7. 1. 3. For the translations of these quotations I am indebted to R. E. Hume's *Thirteen Principal Upaniṣads*.

³ Chān. 7. 26. 2.

⁴ Maitri, 6. 30.

⁵ Muṇḍ. 2. 2. 6.

⁶ Kaṭha, 2. 11.

⁷ Ibid. 3. 2.

⁸ Maitri, 6. 21.

⁹ Ibid. 6. 28.

¹⁰ Prasna, 6. 8.

In all these passages *pāra* stands either explicitly or implicitly in relation to something else. It is an attribute of changelessness—a notion which was in direct opposition to the Buddhist view that everything, including man, is in a state of continual flux.

Mrs Rhys Davids, in a note on her introduction to *Gradual Sayings*, III. says¹ that “early monastic Buddhism saw, in *attha*, perfected manhood already to be won here on earth.” As this view gained ground, *pāra* became limited, because in accordance with this view *pāra* came to be thought of as the goal won after something had been crossed over. It came to be identified with *nibhāna* and *arahatta*, states so perfected that for him who has attained to them no further change is conceivable. The perfected man stopped at these states: he had done what was to be done after the traverse had been safely accomplished. Mrs Rhys Davids goes on to say in this introduction, that “original Buddhism saw in it (*i.e.* in *attha*) something *uttariṇ*, ‘beyond,’ not realisable on earth.” Thus *uttariṇ* appears to be of the nature of an alternative expression to the original Sākyan significance of *pāraṇ*. I think it may be found, however, that *uttariṇ* retained boundlessness as its major characteristic, and escaped from identification with the goal itself as, with the closing-in of life to attainments realisable here and now, happened in the case of *pāra*.

Two instances of the occurrence of *uttariṇ* may be called to mind. Both appear in the Anguttara: one

¹ G.S. III. ix. n. 3.

in the Book of Fives,¹ the other in the Books of Sixes.² The one says, “Consider the bhikkhu who masters Dhamma . . . but knows not through insight the goal beyond (*uttariṇ* *c’* *assa paññāya atthaṇ na ppajānāti*).” This leaves the goal (*attha*), though known through insight, remote, unattained; and there is no explanatory clause calling it the destruction of the āsavas, or anything denoting finality which, in Monastic Buddhism, appears to have taken the place of *attha* as the goal. The second Anguttara passage says of a bhikkhu who, “endowed with six things shall in no long time win to greatness and growth in conditions (*dhammesu*),” “that as his sixth endowment he *uttariṇ* *ca patāreti*.” Mr E. M. Hare translates this³ as “drives across to the beyond,” and speaks of it as “a striking and unique (?) phrase.” To my mind this translation, in taking *uttariṇ* as a noun,⁴ runs the risk of suggesting “the beyond” as a definite place or a definite state—instead of, as was intended by primitive Sākya, a field which stretches out infinitely. I find Nyānatiloka’s translation, “strebt immer höher”⁵ more exact both in letter and in spirit as regards *uttariṇ*; although *patāreti*, which is a causative verb, cannot be exactly translated by *strebt* or *strebt immer*. Besides, the Pali has other and much more widely accepted terms for *streben*. But the notion of striving ever higher fits in better with

¹ A. III. 88; for *tat-uttariṇ*, cf. above, pp. 39, 241.

² A. III. 432.

³ G.S. III. 303.

⁴ In the P.T.S. Dict. it is given as an adverb only.

⁵ *Reden des Buddha*, IV. 144.

the five preceding endowments than does the more dramatic "driving across to the beyond." This translation is analagous to that in Majjhima,¹ where the cowherd is said to drive his flocks across the river to the further shore, *pārimaṇ-tīraṇ patāresi uttaran-tīraṇ*. I think that a possible translation of *uttariṇ patāreti* would be "he makes himself drive farther across," which would mean that the more he is developed, the more he carries through, the final achievement being left quite indeterminate. This rendering has incidentally the merit of consideration for the variant reading for *patāreti*, namely, *pakaroti*, to effect, to perform, to make, to do.

To return to *pāraṅgata*. As "going beyond" it opens up a vista of a process which is not necessarily limited; but which implies that as often as the goal is approached it as constantly recedes. For the more a man develops his character the more he realises that perfection contains within itself all the eternal verities, all fulness and richness, all integration and harmony; and, for all that one may know intellectually that these are among the characteristics of perfection, perfection itself is inapprehensible except by a being made perfect. He who could be called a goer beyond (*pāragū*) or going beyond (*pāraṅgata*) was undoubtedly on the right way and was undoubtedly more advanced spiritually than one of whom these terms could not be predicated. Yet I do not believe that original Sākya had any idea, conscious or otherwise, of tying down the notion of

¹ M. I. 225.

pāraṅgata, to the achieved, finite condition where no desire for change would exist. It only meant, in calling a person *pāraṅgata*, that he was more developed than one who had not yet begun the journey, or that he was one who was in process of working out his own self-development, leaving each stage behind as it became for him not-beyond (*a-pāra*).

But as time passed and the worth of the notion of *bhava* became depreciated into meaning lives full of ill, the notion of the infinite development implied in the term *pāraṅgata* also waned until it was made identifiable with some definite concept. No longer was man the goer beyond, or going beyond; but some states, the āsavas, death, sorrow, in being crossed over came to be recognised as that beyond which he went. It is interesting to notice in passing that the early history of the term brahman is exactly the reverse of the Buddhist history of the term *pāraṅgata*. Brahman meant prayer before it meant the man who prays. *Pāraṅgata* was in Sākya originally (the man) going beyond; then the state of having gone beyond something. Yet I think that this interpretation is largely the result of a false view of *gata*, due to two causes. In the first place, translators have usually rendered it "gone," seeing in *gata* a past participle. And in the second place, they have done this because *pāra* and *pāraṅgata* often appear in the Pali texts in close connection with *tiṇṇa*, past participle of *tarati*. It is therefore rather natural to translate the sequence *tiṇṇapāraṅgata* by "crossed over, gone beyond," as though the mere fact of crossing gets one

somewhere where one was not before. Of course it does, but not necessarily to the end of the Way, to some final state of bliss or rest where all effort may cease. Failure to recognise that having crossed over there is still going beyond to be done, which *gata* taken as a present participle suggests, has been responsible for a certain amount of confusion, in which the fineness of the belief "crossed over, going beyond," going beyond indefinitely as a result of the preliminary crossing over, has been lost sight of.

The men who came after Gotama, "repeaters" and commentators, have fallen into this error (on account of their depreciation of *bhava*), as much as have latter-day Western exponents of Buddhism who have confused monastic Buddhism with original Sākya. The remainder of this chapter will be devoted to an investigation first of *pāra* as a free concept; and then of the various ways in which it and *pāraṅgata* were nailed down hard and fast to some definite achievement, to some static conclusion, which debarred all subsequent travel on the "upward-mounting Way."

Para (adjective, adverb) means (1) beyond, that is, "higher" in space; (2) further in time; (3) (adjective, neuter noun) another, others. In the first sense it may be used for the world which is beyond (*paraloka*) this world (*idhaloka*), and in this way was used in the Upaniṣads. The other two meanings of *para* are well known and need not be discussed here.

With *para* is connected *pāra*. This can be used (1) as a preposition with the ablative, meaning across,

beyond. When used in this way it usually bears a literal and not a metaphorical sense, such as *pāra-Gaṅgāya*, across, beyond the Ganges.¹ (2) As a neuter noun, meaning the other side, the beyond. In all the verses of the Urugasutta of the Sutta-Nipāta the somewhat puzzling phrase *jahāti orapāraṇ* recurs.² *Orapāraṇ* might be translated as the below and the above, the lower and the higher worlds, this world and the world beyond, or as this and the further shore. Or I suppose the phrase might be rendered as "he abandons what is beyond (*pāra*) this world (*ora*)," he abandons the beyond of this world. This would mean taking *orapāra* as analogous to *maccedhēyapāra*, beyond the realm of death (Sn. 1146), and as a bahuvrīhi and not as a dvandha compound. I think that Lord Chalmers' translation of *jahāti orapāraṇ* by "he sheds beliefs in this or after-worlds"³ is unnecessarily far-fetched, and not so much in accordance with the spirit of early Buddhism as the rendering which I have suggested. This suggestion would mean that it is not sufficient merely to attain to the beyond of this world; it is not the end of what man is potentially capable of attaining. For he can leave the beyond of this lower world to proceed ever further in development. This is better brought out in Fausböll's translation:⁴ "the bhikkhu leaves this and the further shore," for this rendering

¹ S. I. 207 = 214; SnA. 228.

² Sn. 1 ff.

³ Sn. H.O.S. vol. 37, 1932.

⁴ S.B.E. X. He evidently bases his translation on the Cmy, SnA. 13, which says that *pāra* is the name of *tīra*, bank or shore.

implies that he has set out on a journey whose end is not necessarily in sight.

Allied with *pāra* is *pāragū*. This means (1) a goer beyond, or to the beyond, a yon-farer; one who has crossed, transcended, passed; (2) gone to the end of, reached perfection in, well versed in. In this latter sense it is often used in the compound *vedapāragū* of one who is an authority on the Vedas,¹ perfect in his knowledge in them, well versed in them. *Mantapāragū*² is a similar compound, which the Commentary paraphrases as *vedapāragū*.³ *Pāragū* has also been taken in the sense that the all-enlightened one is versed in every mental outlook or state, or in all things (*sabbadhammapāragū*),⁴ which the Niddesa explains as gone to the end (*anta*) of.⁵

The importance of *pāra*, as a name for development, can be gauged to some extent from its occurrence three times in the Brāhmaṇavagga of the Dhammapada as one of the attributes of the brahman, or the developed man. The second verse of the Brāhmaṇavagga⁶ states the opinion that "when in two things the brahman has gone beyond (or, is going beyond), then for him, the knower, every bond is done away." According to the Commentary these two things are calm and insight.⁷ The verse which follows this one is puzzling.

¹ Sn. 1019; D. I. 88; DhA. III. 361; M. II. 133, 141, 147, 16, ff., 210; A. III. 223.

² Sn. 997.

³ SnA. 583.

⁴ Sn. 992, 1105.

⁵ Nd. II. 435.

⁶ DhP. 384.

⁷ DhA. IV. 140; cf. S. IV. 360, where calm and insight are said to be the Way leading to the un compounded, *asaṅkhaṭa*. This is elsewhere identified with nibbāna, see above, p. 155.

It says,¹ "For whom beyond and not beyond are not, or both beyond and not beyond, that man I call a brahmin." This verse may be taking *pāra* in two senses. It may mean that the brahmin is the man who is constantly trying to develop himself. From the moment when the beyond becomes for him the not beyond, he will not be satisfied, and will not stop his efforts here. The beyond may also have been intended in its (later) sense of other worlds; and that he who does not dwell on the thought of this world and other worlds, nor worries about the hereafter, as did some of the sixty-two heretical sects, is the true brahman.

A third verse in the Brāhmaṇavagga says "he who has crossed over, going beyond, a muser (*jhāyī*), him I call a brahmin."²

This notion of development is well exemplified by two verses in the Sutta-Nipāta:³ "To each several question as by the Buddha taught, he who were thus to practise would go from the not-Beyond (*apārato*) to the Beyond (*pāraṇ*). From the not-Beyond to the Beyond he would go making to become the uttermost Way. The Way is for going beyond. Therefore it is called the Beyond-Way." In the Saṃyutta, Gotama is recorded to have said to some bhikkhus, "I will teach you the Beyond and the Way (*magga*) leading to it."⁴ And again, also in the Saṃyutta, the Way, though here

¹ DhP. 385.

² Sn. 1129, 1130. For this translation I follow Mrs Rhys Davids, *Sākyā*, London, p. 254.

³ S. IV. 369.

eightfold, is said to be the means which, if cultivated and made much of, will lead from the not-beyond to the beyond.¹

Thus it is clear that in early Buddhist times *pāra* denoted something desirable and difficult of attainment. It is therefore not surprising to find it given as a concomitant for intellectual and moral states at a high degree of development. Wealth, it is said, never slays a man whose quest is beyond (*pāragavesin*), but him of low sagacity; ² and delusions never satisfy those who seek the beyond.³ The *muni* who has no wants is called going beyond.⁴ Of Sakyamuni, the Lord, it is said that *katakkica*,⁵ perfected, he is gone beyond.⁶ For here, I think, in this comparatively late passage, the past participle is justified, the immediately preceding phrase, *katakkica*, demanding it. Sāriputta is called the highest in virtue, in insight and in calm (*upāsama*); and it is stated that a bhikkhu who is going beyond may rank with him.⁷ Telakāni asks, "Who in the

¹ S. IV. 24; cf. S. V. 81, 180, where the seven factors of enlightenment and the four *satipatṭhānas* are respectively said to do this. Woodward at these passages translates *apārāpāraṅga-manāya* as "conduce to a state in which no hither and no further shore exist," reading *a-pāra-apāra*. I prefer to read *a-pārā* (abl.) *-pāraṇ* (acc.) as at Thag. 763. He is possibly influenced by Dh. 385.

² Dh. 355. ³ M. II. 64 = Thag. 771 = 773. ⁴ Sn. 210.

⁵ *katakkica*, having performed his obligations, perfected, especially of an arahant. Cf. S. I. 147, 178; Dh. 386.

⁶ Vv. 53 (1).

⁷ S. I. 34 = 55 = II. 277 = M. III. 262 = Thag. 1182; SA. I. 89, *upasamena ti kilesaupasamena*.

world is going beyond"; ¹ or, this might possibly be rendered, "Who in this world has gone beyond," since most of the Psalms are considered to be late compositions. In the Dhammapada it is said that only a few people are going beyond (*pāragāmin*).² It would not have been denied that, out of India's dense population, only a few people could have been rightfully designated going beyond, since only comparatively few were presumably recognised to be striving hard to become better and to develop themselves according to dhamma.

I suggested at the beginning of Chapter VII that the notion of crossing the flood, one of the achievements which was held to contribute to the perfection of a man, and a thing difficult to do, might have been based on the analogy of the dangerous business of crossing a river in full spate. And I think that likewise the notion of *pāra* became in time based on the same analogy. Once this analogy had commended itself to the minds of Gotama's disciples, or of those who came after him, the fate of the meaning of *pāra* was sealed. It would henceforth have to be not a beyond ever eluding the grasp, ever prolonging the crossing; but a beyond which (like the farther banks of the Indian rivers) could possibly only be gained by hard work, but which nevertheless was known to be full of the promise of safety, once the landing was effected. *Pāra* apparently came early to lose its meaning of development and nothing more, or nothing more definite.

¹ Thag. 748.

² Dh. 85 = S. V. 24 = A. V. 252 = 252 f. Cf. S. IV. 157.

It came instead to mean, unless otherwise stated, across the flood, arrived at the other shore; and hence, metaphorically, the other shore itself.

The term *pāra Gaṅgāya* has already been referred to; and there are other passages where *pāra*, *pārima*, and *orima* are used with reference to the further and hither shores (*tīra*) of a river. Thus in the Majjhima¹ those bhikkhus who are arahans, who have cut off the stream of Māra and are going beyond in safety are likened to the bulls, sires, and leaders of a herd of cattle who, under the guidance of a competent herdsman, have been brought across (*patāreti*) the Ganges and have gone safely to the farther bank. Again in a passage in the Dīgha,² Gotama is represented as taking as a simile a man who has business on the other side of the river Aciravatī. Wishing to cross from the hither to the farther bank, he calls upon the further shore to approach the hither shore. Gotama says, as recorded, that he is like those brahmins who by invoking the gods but omitting the practices which make a man a brahman, suppose that after death they will be reborn in the companionship of Brahmā. He goes on to say that those brahmins who are chained with the five bonds of the senses could no more achieve companionship with Brahmā after their death, than could a man with business the other side of the Aciravatī cross from the hither to the farther bank with his arms tied tightly behind his back. Nor is it possible, Gotama continued, as is recorded, that those brahmins should

¹ M. I. 255 f.

² D. I. 244 ff.

be reborn in the companionship of Brahmā, since they are veiled and obstructed by the five hindrances (*nīvaraṇāni*), any more than it is possible for the man with business the other side to get over to the farther bank of the Aciravatī if he goes to sleep on this side and covers himself up. A consideration of passages such as these makes it clear that *pāra* came to be thought of allegorically as the farther bank of a river, the bank beyond the stream, beyond the flood.

Thus, as in the case of *tiṇṇa* we find that *pāra* has a metaphorical meaning in addition to its primary significance. Further we shall expect to find that when it is used metaphorically, it occurs not merely alone, but in connection with the metaphorical meanings of the flood (*ogha*) and other conditions which have been crossed over (*tiṇṇa*). So long as *pāraṅgata* or *pāragū* is the corollary of *oghatinṇa*, crossing over and getting beyond the flood, it is often accompanied by similes of rafts and ships, and by descriptions of denizens of the sea or rivers. In the Sutta-Nipāta¹ there is an exhortation to discard desires for pleasure, and then having dispelled them to cross the flood. When a man has, as it were, baled out the ship, he is called *pāragū*. Or if a man is travelling on a well-made raft, it will carry him beyond, and then there will be no more need for the raft.² The therā Telakāni combines certain similar notions in one of his verses.³ He declares that seeing

¹ Sn. 771.

² Sn. 21; M. J. 134 f.; cf. Maitri Upaniṣad 6. 28 for raft. See above p. 285.

³ Thag. 766.

the Way and the ship in which to embark, having no more false views about the self (*attāna*), he sees the ford to the supreme (*titthaṃ uttamam*) or "the supreme ford." The simile of the sea is found in a verse of the Saṅgutta: ¹ "whoso has crossed this monster-teeming sea with its dreaded waves, so hard to cross, he is called learned in the Vedas, one who has fulfilled the good life, goer to the world's end (*lokantagū*), going beyond."

This passage proceeds to say of each of the six sense-organs in turn, that each is the ocean.² It is stated that whoever conquers the impulses arising from the data peculiar to each of the six senses "has crossed over the ocean (*samudda*) with its waves and whirlpools, its sharks and demons. . . . The brahmin has crossed over (*tiṇṇo*) and going beyond (*pāraṅgata*) stands on dry land (*thale tiṭṭhati*)."

Another Saṅgutta passage³ is enlightening since it not only culminates in an equivalent for gone beyond, but it also puts forward allegorical meanings for several relevant concepts here collected together. I quote this passage in full:

"The great broad water"—that is the name for the fourfold flood of desire, becoming, false views, and ignorance.

¹ S. IV. 157.

² S. IV. 157. See Cm. and Ud. V. 5 and Cm. which says that "the eye is likened to the ocean because it can never be filled, never satisfied, however much is poured into it."

³ S. IV. 175.

"The hither shore," beset with fears and dangers—that is a name for the person-pack.¹

"The further shore" (*pārimaṇ tīraṇ*), secure and safe from fears²—that is the name for nibbāna.

"The raft"—that is the name for the Ariyan Eightfold Way, to wit: right view and the rest.

"Striving with hands and feet"—that is a name for energy and effort.

"Crossed over, gone beyond, the brahmin stands on dry land—that is a name for the arahant."

This passage is also interesting as showing that here *pāraṅgata* must mean gone beyond, for it is included in the group whose members are together equated with the final static condition of the man who was known as arahant.

These notions are supported by others which are similar, and which are found widely scattered in the texts. The flood and its identification with the four āsavas has already been discussed. The person-pack is according to Monastic Buddhism, an encumbrance to be got rid of, as the hither shore is a thing to be left behind. With the person-pack go all sorts of wants and desires and attachments and all manner of wrong ways of regarding the self. Another passage in the Saṅgutta³ calls the hither shore the inner sixfold sense-sphere, or the organs of sensation. It calls the

¹ *Sakkāya*. Above transln. invented by F. L. Woodward. Cf. K.S. III. 86, n. 3.

² Cf. Kaṭha Upaniṣad, 2. 11 ; 3. 2, and see above, p. 285.

³ S. IV. 180.

further shore the outer sixfold sphere of the data of sensations; and says that being caught in a whirlpool is a name for the pleasures of the senses. All of these interpretations are included in the notion of the person-pack. In the Anguttara¹ the hither shore (*orima tīra*) is said to be constituted by the opposite members of the Eightfold Way, while the farther shore (*pārima tīra*) is constituted by those members themselves. As we have seen, in the Saṅguttara passage which has been quoted at length, not the farther shore, but the raft, is there identified with the Eightfold Way. Striving, energy, and effort are well-known Buddhist *desiderata*, and call for no comment here.

"Crossed over, gone beyond, the brahmin stands on dry land" (*tiṇṇo pāraṅgato thale tiṭṭhati brahmano*) is a kind of formula appearing in some other passages, but in none of these, as far as I know, is this brahmin identified with the arahān. But since such identification is certainly implied in an Anguttara passage² and in two Puggalapaññatti passages which contain this formula,³ it is clear that the statement was not regarded as idle sentiment; it was a view, moreover, whose influence persisted into the Abhidhamma-piṭaka. For in the Puggalapaññatti (as in the Anguttara), in answer to the question, who is *tiṇṇo pāraṅgato thale tiṭṭhati brahmano*, it is said that it is he who has destroyed the āsavas, whose mind is emancipated from them, who is freed by knowledge, who here and now has attained

¹ A. V. 232 f. ² A. II. 5.

³ Pug. 62, 72, see also S. IV. 157.

to profound knowledge and dwells at peace. This is obviously a description of an arahān. In the Nettipakaraṇa such a brahmin is called *asekha*,¹ an adept, which is a term for an arahān. Dry land (*thala*) I think is evidently a term which, with flood and beyond, must have been borrowed from experience of natural phenomena. Thus in this Anguttara passage the brahmin who is on dry land is one of a group of four persons, one of whom is said to be going with the stream, and one against the stream. The dry land was a safe place, an island in a river, or a little bit of raised ground perhaps, which could not be submerged either by the floods of a river that had burst its banks, or by the inundation of low-lying fields for the cultivation of paddy. If a man had, metaphorically, reached such a place he was in no danger of being drowned in the swirling waters.²

The notions contained in the Saṅguttara passage thus bear comparison with notions set forth in other parts of the texts, but with one exception. It is noteworthy that no other textual passage identifies the further shore with nibbāna; but that the commentaries define the farther shore in this way more often than in any other, showing the extent to which beyond, the further shore, became identified with notions of work completed, the task done, the struggle over, connoted by the secondary Buddhist meaning of *nibbāna*.³

¹ Nett. 158.

² Cf. Dh. 25.

³ At first it had merely been a cathartic process of the waning of *rāga*, *dosa*, *moha*. See above, p. 106.

Before discussing the views that the Commentators held of the farther shore, the beyond, it will be as well to take a short glance at those texts which refer *pāra* to some object other than the flood, to something which has been gone beyond, which has been transcended. We have seen something of the terms which Gotama or his followers thought suitable to describe the hither and the further shores and beyond, and something of the concepts with which they identified these important notions, or by which they defined them. We shall now attempt to portray what were the views of Gotama or his followers regarding that which was to be gone beyond, that which a man had left behind when he was termed going beyond or gone beyond.

Some light is thrown by the Dhammapada when it apostrophises a person: "Yon-farer of becoming" (*bhavassa pāragū*);¹ and the Saṅyutta² uses the same words with reference to one who rightly knows, knowing the stainless, sorrowless path. An identical passage appears in the Anguttara.³ Again, the Anguttara says that "beings will honour the yon-farer of becoming."⁴ All these four references occur in verses. It seems to me that in these four passages *bhavassa pāragū* might, from the contexts, be translated as "being well-versed in becoming," on analogy with *vedapāragū*, well-versed in the Vedas. It would then mean that he fully under-

¹ Dh. 348. On *bhavassa pāragū* as "yon-farer of becoming," i.e. understander of becoming, and not as "beyond becoming he has gone," see Mrs Rhys Davids, G.S. IV. intr. p. viii f.

² S. IV. 210.

³ A. IV. 157.

⁴ A. II. 3.

stands that the teaching is a teaching on becoming, and that he is prepared to follow it. A "yon-farer" may also mean one who understands ill, as it does in a Saṅyutta passage¹ which calls a *muni* "one who is a yon-farer of ill" (*dukkhassa pāragū*). The Commentary does nothing more than paraphrase this sentence as *dukkhapāragatāy*, one who has gone beyond or who is going beyond ill, and the *muni* as the Buddha-muni.² Another Saṅyutta passage which is followed by an Itivuttaka passage,³ exhorts the monks to become (*bhavatha*), yon-farers (*pāragā*) of birth and death. These two notions (of understanding ill, and of birth and death) are practically combined in a verse in the Sutta-Nipāta, ascribed to the herdsman Dhaniya.⁴ He says, "My wife and I . . . yon-farers of birth and death, end-makers of ill, will become." An Anguttara passage⁵ speaks of him who is a yon-farer of the fear of birth and death, right exertion freeing him from the realm of Māra.

Besides these, there are in the texts several references to *pāray* in connection with crossing the realm of death. For example, it is said that if a man lives in seclusion in the forest, ardent and zealous, he may cross the realm of death to the beyond,⁶ but that those brahmins who are ascetics would not win to the beyond. Piṅgiya is exhorted to show trust like that possessed by Vakkali and others in order to go beyond the realm

¹ S. I. 195 = Nd. II. 136.

² S. IV. 71 = It. p. 41.

³ A. II. 15.

⁴ SA. I. 284.

⁵ Sn. 32.

⁶ S. I. 4 = 29.

of death.¹ It is further said that the people as they go beyond ask for a realm where no death is (*amaccu-dhēyya*).² The texts also say and repeat that those who follow dhamma, crossing the realm of death so very hard to cross, shall come to the beyond (*pāra*).³ An Itivuttaka passage takes *pāragū* to mean a yon-farer of old age.⁴ Or crossed over and beyond (*tiṇṇo ca pāraṇ*) may mean emancipation from the realm of sense-desires.⁵

Although, as has already been said, several passages in the texts in mentioning *pāra* refer it to some object, to something which is gone beyond, several leave vague any notion of what it may mean. In these it stands alone, unrelated; such passages hint neither at what the term connotes, nor at what is left behind as a man goes beyond. The Commentators have no such hesitation. They seem rather to consider it their duty to make the meaning explicit. For whenever they comment upon *pāra*, *pāragata*, which they frequently do, they define them in terms which they hold to be their equivalents. An examination of relevant commentarial passages reveals that the terms most often equated with *pāra* and *pāragata* are *nibbāna* and *nibbānagata* or *nibbānaṇ patta*. Nor is it therefore surprising to find the term *amata* (the undying), which is sometimes identified with *nibbāna*, used in definitions of *pāragata*. Although *pāragata* is sometimes described in other

¹ Sn. 1146.² S. I. 123.³ Dh. 86; S. V. 24 = A. V. 232; A. V. 253 ff.⁴ It. p. 33 = 40.⁵ Sn. 1059; A. IV. 210-214.

ways, *nibbāna* and *amata* were the favourite synonyms for this term with the Commentators. *Amata* was the necessary outcome of going beyond the realm of death, the longing for which was earnestly expressed in some of the texts.¹ Some of the Commentaries give elaborate interpretations of *pāra*, *pāragata*, and *pāragū*, but in almost every case where a string of equivalent phrases for it occurs, *nibbāna* is included. This was the word which above all others commended itself to the Commentators as the best and most fitting definition or synonym of *pāragata*. Because of this building up or interweaving of words and phrases which came to be used in the Commentaries in order to make the meaning of *pāragata* explicit and understandable, it will not always be possible in the following exposition to keep the different commentarial concepts in separate and clear-cut categories. For the terms chosen in the different explanations are often variously combined, hardly any two passages, I think, being exactly the same.

Perhaps the most frequent interpretation of *pāragata* is the equally terse *nibbānagata*,² gone to *nibbāna*, often appearing free of any other explanatory clauses. It seems as though, if the Commentator wished to be brief, here was the core of the matter. The cognate term *pāramī*, perfection, is once defined as gone to the goal (*niṭṭhā*),³ other passages call the goal arahanship.

¹ cf. above, pp. 263, 304.² SnA. 35, 359; SA. I. 27, 81, 89, 237; SA. III. 382; Cmy. on S. IV. 157; DhA. II. 160; cf. ItA. 172.³ SnA. 584; on *niṭṭhā* = *arabatta*, see above, p. 137.

In the Niddesa the undying (*amata*) occurs several times with nibbāna as the definition of *pāragata*.¹ Here also two passages² develop to considerable length, bringing in some different interpretations. As they continue, they say that *pāraṇ* is cessation of all the stuff of life, abandonment of all the elements of existence, destruction of craving, passionlessness, stopping, waning (*nibbāna*). One of these Niddesa passages³ proceeds still further, laying great stress on *pāragū*. It states that he who may go beyond, who may meet the beyond, who may attain (*phuseyya*) the beyond, who may realise the beyond is called *pāragū*, a yon-farer. All who are desirous of going beyond, all who go beyond and all who have gone (*gata*) beyond are alike called *pāragū*. An explanation of the meaning of *pāragū* follows; and an identical passage is to be found in the Dhammapada Commentary.⁴ This Niddesa passage and the Dhammapada Commentary both say that he is a yon-farer of profound knowledge, of comprehension, rejection, development, fulfilment, and attainment. The Dhammapada Commentary omits attainment and repeats *pāragū*, possibly meaning that he who is a yon-farer (or understander) of these other states is indeed a yon-farer. The Niddesa enlarges this passage still more, and says that it means that he who is a yon-farer is a yon-farer of profound knowledge of all states of mind, a yon-farer of the comprehension of all ills, a yon-farer of the rejection of all the *kilesas*, a yon-farer of the

¹ Nd. I. 20, 114; Nd. II. 62 = 436.

² *Ibid.* I. 20, 114.

³ *Ibid.* I. 20.

⁴ DhA. IV. 63.

development of the ariyan fourfold Way, a yon-farer of the fulfilment of stopping, and a yon-farer of the attainment of all attainments. It proceeds to say that he has won mastery and excellence (*pāramipatta*) in the worthy morality, in the worthy concentration, in the worthy wisdom, in the worthy deliverance. The Niddesa continues through a very long list of states in describing him who is *pāragū*. These numerous states, piled one on top of another, form an imposing edifice. They include, besides having gone to the end, to nibbāna, to the undying, to the eternal (*accuta*), also such states as the Way which has been made to become (*bhāvitamagga*, and, shortly afterwards, *maggo bhāvito*), purification through the four brahmavihāras, establishment in the climax of becoming (*bhāva-pariyante phito*). Finally, this Niddesa passage says that he who is *pāragū* is the bearer of his last body, he is an arahant.

Another passage which culminates in the attainment of arahantship occurs in the Sutta-Nipāta Commentary¹ on a verse in which the simile of a ship appears.² The Commentary says that a man having baled out the weight of water from his ship, with a light ship and with little trouble may become a yon-farer (*pāragū bhaveyya*), may go beyond. It is as though having baled out the weight of the water of the *kilesas* from the ship of his existence (*attabbāvanāvā*), he may become one who, because of his now light existence (*attabbāva*), is a yon-farer. He may become, going beyond all states of mind (*sabbadhamma*) to nibbāna,

¹ SnA. 513; cf. Nd. I. 20.

² Sn. 771.

and he may go to the attainment of arahanship. Thus much had the terms *pāragata* and *pāragū* come to imply.

In discussing the phrase "the brahmin stands on dry land" the Commentaries strike their familiar note, and add nothing to their conception of *pāragata*. It will be remembered that the Saṃyutta¹ calls "standing on the dry land" a name for arahanship. In the Commentaries on the Sutta-Nipāta² and the Puggalapaññatti³ it is said that the brahmin stands on the dry land of nibbāna. As we have seen, some commentarial passages identify the attainment of nibbāna with having gone beyond. Therefore the brahmin who stands on the dry land of nibbāna is virtually one who has gone beyond. The Puggalapaññatti Commentary also says that the brahmin stands here having gone beyond the farther or other bank and having crossed the flood of all the *kilesas*. Another passage in the Puggalapaññatti Commentary⁴ says that he stands on the dry land of arahanship and on the dry land of attainment, and that having gone beyond means that he has gone beyond to nibbāna. The Commentary on the Dīgha⁵ explains *thale* (on dry land) to mean being established on the dry land of the way to heaven (*saggamaggathale*).

¹ S. IV. 175.

² SnA. 568.

³ PugA. 252. Here the text, Pug. 72, reads *phale* for *thale*, as also at Pug. 62. In both cases the Comy. reads *thale*. At DA. II. 398, commenting on *thale* in a different context, two of the MSS. collated read *phale* for *thale*.

⁴ PugA. 245.

⁵ DA. II. 398.

Other passages say that having gone beyond means having attained arahanship (*pāragato ti arahattay patto*);¹ and that we shall go beyond by the way of arahanship.²

As in the texts, several passages in the Commentaries indicate an undesirable thing or state which has been abandoned or transcended when a person is said to have gone beyond. Thus this may mean beyond the round of birth,³ beyond the realms (*bhūtāni*) of the sea of *samsāra*⁴ (the chain of rebirths), beyond *samsāra* to nibbāna,⁵ for the beyond of birth and death is nibbāna.⁶ One arrives here having cut off the stream of craving by means of the Way of arahanship, like a great bull who cutting through the stream arrives at the other bank of the Ganges.⁷ To go to the beyond of birth and death is further said to mean to go to nibbāna, the teaching being fulfilled for the sake of its climax, arahanship.⁸ Sometimes, as in the texts, beyond is taken by the Commentaries to mean beyond the realm of death (*macculheyyapāraṇ*),⁹ birth although implied by death not being mentioned. Beyond is also said to mean not to become again.¹⁰ *Pāra* is called the further bank (*pāratīra*) of the person-pack, gone to nibbāna, "attained" by the knowledge of self-dependence.¹¹ Beyond all attachments (*sabbanivesanāna*) is called gone to nibbāna.¹² *Pāragata* is also said to mean that the *muni* has transcended the clinging attachment to everything,

¹ SnA. 35.

² *Ibid.* 43-44.

³ Comy. on S. IV. 369.

⁴ SnA. 13.

⁵ MA. II. 267.

⁶ SnA. 43.

⁷ MA. II. 267.

⁸ SnA. 607.

⁹ Nd. II. 487.

¹⁰ *Ibid.* I. 114.

¹¹ VvA. 231.

¹² SnA. 258.

and that this is called gone to nibbāna.¹ Gone beyond is also taken to mean the destruction of all the āsavas, the transcending of all states of mind, gone to the highest peace (*paramakbema*), gone to nibbāna.²

Occasionally the not-beyond is discussed, but this is infrequent. A Niddesa passage³ calls the not-beyond (*apāra*) the *kilesas* (corruptions), the *khandhas* (component parts), and the *abhisankhāras* (or stuff of existence). Some notion of the unworthy nature of the not-beyond may also be gathered from a passage in the Sutta-Nipāta Commentary⁴ which defines *ora* and *pāra* in various and opposing terms. Nibbāna is not mentioned here. *Ora* is said to be one's own existence (*sakattabhāva*), the sixfold inner sphere of the senses,⁵ the world of men, the realm of pleasures of the senses, the existence of Form (or matter, *rūpa*) and sensual pleasure, existence (*attabhāva*). Against these notions stands *pāra*. It is described as the existence of others (*parattabhāva*), the sixfold external data for experience,⁶ the world of devas, the realm of formlessness and form; the existence of formlessness, and the material for a happy existence.

So little then did *pāraṅgata* come to mean for Monastic Buddhism. It was no longer the free, wide-flung concept of Sākya, the dynamic ever moving onwards, ever "going beyond," as unbounded and unfettered as were man's potentialities and powers

¹ SnA. 258.² *Ibid.* 35.³ Nd. II. 62.⁴ SnA. 13.⁵ Also at S. IV. 180.⁶ *Ibid.*

throughout his opportunities, his lives, his births. On the contrary, directed by monkish dreads, by the overwhelming dominance and terror of ill, the stream (*sota*) of rebirths was turned round upon itself as a wheel (*cakka*) of rebirths. And with this consequent difference: whereas the stream flows on and on to join the ocean, and is the symbol of constant progression towards an invisible horizon, the wheel goes round until it has fetched a full circle. According to Monastic Buddhism *saysāra* is not a stream, a line, but a wheel, a circle. And further, Monastic Buddhism holds that the circle can be completed in this rebirth: "this is my last rebirth, for me there is no more of this state of things." Hence man's supreme destiny, the utmost which he could ever achieve for himself, was shrivelled and confined to that which he could achieve here and now in this, the last of his opportunities. This is what Monastic Buddhism came to hold. It is the result of its attack on the way, the path, the means of Becoming.

But the monkish exhortations—to monks—to cut short in this life itself the stream of rebirths was not Buddhism's last word on the subject of the ultimate culmination of man's energy, will, knowledge, and insight, or of his "willingness to learn." The *bodhisattva* theory arose at some time after the emergence of Monastic Buddhism, and reasserted the goal. This goal was not thought of in terms of nibbāna, but was regarded as something for which a long course of lives subsequent to this present one was necessary.

Pāra, beyond, in being identified with *nibbāna*, as was the *arahatta* which the monk-editors apparently held to be attainable here and now, had lost to an amazing degree its early Sākyan promise of a consummation far beyond any that man can as yet imagine, bound and restricted as he is by physical and material limitations. Monastic Buddhism saw man's ultimate spiritual destiny in close relation to his present circumstances. Sākyā saw it in a way not to be defined and harnessed in words. All we can say is, that for Sākya, the arahān as man perfected was not *nibbānagata*, gone to *nibbāna*: his bourn, his destiny, his *gati* (or going) was as unrevealed as is the course of birds in the air. The arahān for Sākya was one who had overcome doubts and who was freed from fear, and who therefore had the steadfastness and courage to pursue a goal whose attainment lay beyond many lives, beyond many worlds.

EPILOGUE

I HAVE sometimes been asked whether those who claimed to be arahans were ever persecuted. The answer is very definitely in the negative. They were not persecuted in the sense that they were physically tormented either by the laity or by the ordinary bhikkhus. That was not India's way. Down the centuries Hindus have remained true to the doctrine of *ahiṃsā*, non-injury, non-violence—a doctrine which dates from before the Buddhist epoch, and which has in Mahatma Gandhi a great champion to-day.

On the whole the laity were impressed by the arahans' spirituality and other-worldliness. If they could not emulate the arahans' complete self-mastery they could at least admire it. Nevertheless the Orders of Bhikkhus and Bhikkhunīs, but not the arahans specially, came in for some criticism from the laity. Frequent allusions to the lay-people's grumblings and complaints are to be found in the Vinaya. Their objections, however, were usually voiced with the object of preventing the bhikkhus and bhikkhunīs from doing anything not suitable in a *samaṇa*. For in reality the laity, if we are to accept the monastic "recorders'" estimate, were proud of the Orders and regarded them as a "great field for merit in the world,"

and hence they wanted to preserve a sharp division between their own world and functions on the one side and the world and functions of members of the Orders on the other.

There are, I think, no records of jealousy shown by those bhikkhus who were not yet arahans for the arahans' perfected achievements. Naturally all bhikkhus would have had great respect for a state which it was their own ambition to realise. They were occasionally in despair over the slowness of their progress, in a few cases even attempting suicide. But it does not appear either that they resented the swifter realisation of those who became arahans, or that they imputed any unfair advantages to them.

Brahmans sometimes mocked at the "shavelings" as they derisively called Gotama's followers. They may have been afraid of this new teaching, of its popularity, of the way in which its converts were drawn from brahman ranks. They may have deprecated the position and respect accorded to women, from whom Śākya withheld no sacred or secret knowledge. They probably resented the break-away from one of their old traditions: that they could lead the homeless life only as the fourth and last stage of their life on earth. Now they saw young men, and young women too, in many cases going out from home to homelessness long before the scheduled time, long before they could have performed the worldly work and duties expected of them. The brahman may also have been jealous of the abundant alms given to Gotama's followers by the

laity. Rohini's father, a brahman, expostulated with her for giving alms to (Śākyan) recluses (*samaṇa*):¹

"Not fain to work are they, the lazy crew.
They make their living off what others give.
Cadging are they, and greedy of tit-bits—
I ask, why are recluses dear to you?"

However, neither the laity nor the brahman created any real crises during the forty and more years of Gotama's ministry. Conciliation, expressed in the making of rules, stilled the criticism of the former; argument and debate the scorn of the latter. The only attempted schisms came from within, from Gotama's cousin, the attractive and psychic Devadatta. But the sincerity of purpose, which characterised Gotama and his faithful followers, enabled them to ride securely through these danger-zones. It was this very sincerity of purpose, based upon a strong will-power, which quashed antagonism, prevented destruction, and attracted adherents in a land which has ever eagerly assimilated new adventures in religion.

In Gotama's day it was still the tradition to admire outstanding mental and spiritual achievements, and to believe that these were of higher value, or more potent worth, than either the making of money or deeds of physical bravery. For knowledge and virtue and their resultant acts would ensure a good becoming (rebirth). This was not a new view, but it was one which persisted.

¹ Thig. 273.

"According as one acts, according as one conducts himself, so does he become (*yathā-karma . . . tathā bhavati*). The doer of good becomes good. The doer of evil becomes evil. One becomes virtuous by virtuous action, bad by bad action."¹ So the Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad.

Virtue and knowledge at the high power to which they rose in an arahān were doubly worthy of great regard: they were the signs that the mind and spirit had struggled with evil and with wrong desire in previous existences; and they were the signs that having so struggled, triumphing here and now "the mortal becomes immortal" (*attha mṛtyo 'mṛto bhavati*),² as it is expressed in the Upaniṣads. The Pali expressions for this: "I am bearing my last body," "Now there is no more coming to be for me," are less magnificent and less telling perhaps. Yet they likewise are pronouncements that consummation is at hand, and that this needs but the breaking up of the body to be completed. In every other respect the arahān is fully prepared. He has done all that was to be done. Here and now he has become perfected.

This unprecedented assurance of a perfection realisable in these "very seen conditions," and the vogue that this way of thinking enjoyed, suggest that the arahān-theory was needed, in order to fill a blank. Men—or monks—were no longer content to think of the goal, or aim or object (*attha*), as *samparāyika*, belonging to other worlds; otherwise why the weight

¹ Bṛhad. 4. 4. 5.

² *Ibid.* 4. 4. 7 = Kaṭha 6. 14.

attached to the goal as attainable *diṭṭhe va dhamme*, here and now? And why its triumph?

With this transference of *attha* from *samparāyika* to *diṭṭhe va dhamme*, went a limiting of the notion of perfection, though the monks apparently did not notice this. Further, a whole array of other concepts—*attha* itself, *bhava*, *attā*, *nibbāna*, *dhamma*, *magga*, sustained a shrinking and a lessening, which have gone down to history as Buddhism. The new meanings and changed values imposed on the earlier connotation of these concepts, left no room for the self of man: man purging himself of wrong states; man with self as refuge and lamp; man with conscience as refuge and lamp; man a traveller on the Way, becoming ever more as, making the Way to become, he approached nearer to the goal.

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