# THE TREATISE ON THE GREAT VIRTUE OF WISDOM OF NĀGĀRJUNA

(MAHĀPRAJÑĀPĀRAMITĀŚĀSTRA)

# **ÉTIENNE LAMOTTE**

## VOL. III

## **CHAPTERS XXXI-XLII**

Composed by the Bodhisattva Nāgārjuna and translated by the Tripiṭakadharmācārya Kumārajiva

INTRODUCTION	871
I. THE TREATISE ON THE GREAT VIRTUE OF WISDOM	871
II. THE AUTHOR AND HIS SOURCES	873
1. THE GEOGRAPHICAL AND HISTORICAL MILIEU	874
2. THE SARVĀSTIVĀDIN BY TRAINING	878
A. Sarvāstivādin Sūtrapiṭaka.	878
C. Sarvāstivādin Kṣudrakapiṭaka	
D. Sarvāstivādin Abhidharmapiṭaka.	881
E. Postcanonical Literature.	
F. Heretical Literature	886
3. THE MAHĀYĀNIST BY CONVICTION	886
A. The Mahāyāna.	886
B. The Mahāyānasūtras.	891
C. The Madhyamaka	895
III. THE CHINESE TRANSLATION OF THE TRAITÉ	900
1. KUMĀRAJIVA'S TRANSLATION	900
2. NĀGĀRJUNA SEEN FROM TCH'AND-NGAN	905
IV. SUBJECT AND SOURCES OF VOLUME III	909
SUPPLEMENT TO BIBLIOGRAPHY	914
CHAPTER XXXI: THE THIRTY-SEVEN AUXILIARIES TO ENLIGHTENMENT	924
PRELIMINARY NOTE (p. 1119F)	924
I. LISTS OF AUXILIARIES	924
II. CANONICAL DEFINITIONS OF THE 37 AUXILIARIES	926
1. The 4 smṛtyupasthānas	926
2. The 4 samyakpradhānas	927
3. The 4 ṛddhipādas.	927
4. The 5 indriyas	928
5. The five balas	930
6. The 7 saṃbodhyaṅgas	930
8. The 8 mārgaṅgas	931
III. THE AUXILIARIES IN THE ABHIDHARMA	933
IV THE AUXILIAIRIES IN THE MAHĀYĀNA	934
1. The Madhyamaka viewpoint	934
2. The Vijñānavādin viewpoint	937
First Part THE AUXILIARIES BELONG TO THE GREATER VEHICLE AS WELL	938
Second part THE AUXILIARIES ACCORDING TO THE ABHIDHARMA (p. 1143F)	942
I. NUMBER OF AUXILIARIES	942
II. THE ELEMENTS CONSTITUTING THE THIRTY-SEVEN AUXILIARIES	944
III. THE SEVEN CLASSES OF AUXILIARIES	
IV. ORDER OF THE THIRTY-SEVEN AUXILIARIES	945
V. DETAILED STUDY OF THE AUXILIARIES	
The Four Foundations of Mindfulness	
A. Foundations and mistakes	
B. Foundation of mindfulness on the body	
C. Mindfulness of feeling (p. 1158F)	
D. Mindfulness of mind	956

E. Mindfulness of Dharmas	960
F. Mindfulness itself, by connection with or as object	
G. Inner, outer and mixed mindfulness	
2. The Four Right Efforts	
3. The Four Bases of Magical Power.	
4. The Five Faculties	
5. The Five Strenghts	
6. The Seven Members of Enlightenment	
7. The Eight Members of the Path	
8. Distribution of the Auxiliaries in the Stages	
Third Section THE AUXILIARIES ACCORDING TO THE MAHĀYĀNA	
I. THE FOUR FOUNDATIONS OF MINDFULNESS	975
1. Mindfulness of body	
2. Mindfulness of feeling	
3. Mindfulness of mind.	978
4. Mindfulness of dharmas	980
II. – III. THE FOUR RIGHT EFFORTS AND THE FOUR BASES OF MAGICAL POWER	981
IV. THE FIVE FACULTIES	981
V. THE FIVE POWERS	986
VI. THE SEVEN FACTORS OF ENLIGHTENMENT	986
VII. THE EIGHT MEMBERS OF THE PATH	988
CHAPTER XXXII: THE THREE CONCENTRATIONS AND THE FOUR TRANCES	992
First Section THE EIGHT CLASSES OF SUPPLEMENTARY DHARMAS (p. 1209F)	992
PRELIMINARY NOTE	
Second Section THE THREE MEDITATIVE STABILIZATIONS (p. 1213F)	
PRELIMINARY NOTE	
I. THE THREE MEDITATIVE STABILIZATIONS ACCORDING TO THE ABHIDHARMA .	
1. Definitions of the Three Meditative Stabilizations	
2. Nature of the Three Concentrations	
3. Aspects of the Three Concentrations	
4. Distribution of the Three Concentrations in the Levels.	
II. THE THREE CONCENTRATIONS ACCORDING TO THE MAHĀYĀNA	
1. Profound Meaning of the Three Concentrations	
2. Sameness of the Three Concentrations	
3. Single Object of the Three Concentrations	
Third section THE FOUR TRANCES (p. 1233F)	
I. THE FOUR TRANCES ACCORDING TO THE ABHIDHARMA	1011
CHAPTER XXXIII: THE FOUR IMMEASURABLES AND THE FOUR FORMLESS	1010
ABSORPTIONS (p. 1239F)	
First Section THE FOUR IMMEASURABLES	
PRELIMINARY NOTE	
I. DEFINITION OF THE IMMEASURABLES (p. 1242F)	
II. ASPECTS OF THE IMMEASURABLES	
1. Loving-kindness, compassion and joy	
2. The three kinds of loving-kindness	
3. The subjective nature of loving-kindness	
4. Object and merit of equanimity	. 1U31

5. Differences between loving-kindness and joy	1031
6. Reasons for practicing equanimity	
7. Limit to the salvific action of the immeasurables	
8. Is the idea of salvation is purely conventional?	
9. Differences between 'happiness' and 'compassion'	
III. FRUITS OF THE IMMEASURABLES	
Second Section THE FOUR FORMLESS ABSORPTIONS (p. 1274F)	
I. THE FORMLESS ABSORPTIONS ACCORDING TO THE ABHIDHARMA	
1. Defiled absorptions, acquired by birth, acquired by effort.	
2. Process of access to the absorptions	
3. Transcending ideas	
4. Moral qualities of the absorptions	
II. THE FORMLESS ABSORPTIONS ACCORDING TO THE MAHĀYĀNA	
CHAPTER XXXIV: LIBERATIONS, MASTERIES, TOTALITIES, SUCCESSIVE	10.7
ABSORPTIONS (p. 1281F)	1051
First Section LIBERATIONS, MASTERIES AND TOTALITIES	
PRELIMINARY NOTE	
I. CANONICAL DEFINITIONS OF THE THREE LISTS	
II. KAŞINA IN PĀLI SCHOLASTICISM	
III. VIMOKṢA, ABHIBHU AND KŖTSNA ACCORDING TO THE ABHIDHARMA	
1. The Eight Liberations (p. 1291F)	
A. General definition	
B. The first two vimokṣas	
C. The third vimokṣa	
D. Vimokṣas four to seven	
E. The eighth vimokṣa	
2. The Eight Masteries	
A. General definition	
B. The first abhibhu	
C. The second abhibhu	
D. The third and fourth abhibhus	
E. The four last abhibhus	
3. The Ten Totalities	
4. Objects and Distribution of the Vimokşas, Abhibhus and Kştsnas	
Second Section THE NINE SUCCESSIVE ABSORPTIONS (p. 1308F)	
PRELIMINARY NOTE	
CHAPTER XXXV: THE NINE HORRIBLE NOTIONS (p. 1311F)	
PRELIMINARY NOTE	
I. AŚUBHĀ IN THE CANONICAL TEXTS	
II. THE TEN ASUBHASAÑÑĀ IN THE PĀLI ABHIDHAMMA	
III. THE NINE AŚUBHASAMJÑĀS IN THE SANSKRIT ABHIDHARMA	
First Section THE NINE NOTIONS ACCORDING TO THE ABHIDHARMA	
I. THE POSITION OF THE NINE NOTIONS	
II. HOW TO MEDITATE ON THE NINE NOTIONS	
1. Reflection on death	
2. Vyādmātakasaṃjñā	
3. Vidhūtakasaminā	

4. Vilohitakasaṃjñā	1077
5. Vinīlakasamjñā	
6. Vipūyakasaṃjñā	
7. Vikhāditakasaṃjñā	
8. Vikṣiptakasaṃjñā	
9. Asthisaṃjñā	
10. Vidagdhakasaṃjñā	
III. CONNECTION BETWEEN THE NINE AND THE TEN NOTIONS	
IV. RESULTS OF THE NINE NOTIONS	1082
1. Rejection of the seven types of lust	
2. Diminishing of hatred and delusion	
3. Realization of great benefits	
V. NATURE, OBJECT AND DISTRIBUTION OF THE NINE NOTIONS	
VI. THE PLACE OF THE NINE NOTIONS IN THE DHARMAS OF THE PATH	1085
Second Section THE NINE NOTIONS ACCORDING TO THE MAHĀYANA (p. 132)	7F) 1086
CHAPTER XXXVI: THE EIGHT RECOLLECTIONS (p. 1329F)	1088
PRELIMINARY NOTE	
I. LISTS OF RECOLLECTIONS	1088
II. CANONICAL DEFINITIONS OF THE SIX ANUSMRTI	1089
1. Buddhānusmṛti	1089
2. Dharmānusmṛti	1089
3. Saṃghānusmṛti	1090
4. Śīlānusmṛti	1090
5. Tyāgānusmṛti	1091
6. Devatānusmṛti	1091
First Section POSITION AND RESULTS OF THE RECOLLECTIONS (p. 1335F)	
I. POSITION OF THE RECOLLECTIONS IN THE PRAJÑĀPĀRAMITĀ	
II. ALL THE RECOLLECTIONS DRIVE AWAY FEAR	
Second Section THE EIGHT RECOLLECTIONS ACCORDING TO THE ABHIDHAI	\ <b>1</b>
I. RECOLLECTION OF THE BUDDHA	
1. The ten names	
2. The miracles of his birth	
3. Physical marks and superhuman power	
4. The five pure aggregates (anāsravaskandha)	
II. RECOLLECTION OF THE DHARMA	
1. Dharma skillfully presented	
2. Dharma, obtaining its retribution in the present lifetime	
3. Dharma without torment of burning	
4. The Dharma is independent of time.	
5. Dharma leading to the good place	
6. Dharma of unhindered penetration	
7. Other qualities of the Buddhist Dharma	
III. RECOLLECTION OF THE COMMUNITY	
1. Community endowed with the five pure skandhas	
2. Community worthy of offerings, etc.	
3. Community, the best field of merit	1133

4. Community consisting of four pairs and eight classes of individuals	1136
5. Other qualities of the Community	
THE DĀNAPATI WHO EXCLUDED THE ŚRĀMAŅERAS FROM HIS INVITATION	
IV. RECOLLECTION OF THE MORALITIES	
1. The various kinds of morality	1151
2. Qualities of the Moralities to be recollected	
3. The position of morality among the Path members	1153
4. Impure morality	1155
V. RECOLLECTION OF ABANDONMENT	1156
1. Material generosity	1156
2. Generosity of the Dharma	1159
3. Abandonment of the afflicting emotions	1161
VI. RECOLLECTION OF THE DEITIES	1161
1. Recollection of the gods-by-birth	1161
2. Recollection of gods of native purity	1163
VII. RECOLLECTION OF BREATHING	1163
VIII. RECOLLECTION OF DEATH	1163
IX. LOGICAL ORDER OF THE EIGHT RECOLLECTIONS	1167
Third Section THE RECOLLECTIONS ACCORDING TO THE MAHĀYĀNA	1170
CHAPTER XXXVII: THE TEN CONCEPTS	1172
PRELIMINARY NOTE (p. 1431F)	1172
I. THE CONCEPT OF IMPERMANENCE	1174
II. THE CONCEPT OF SUFFERING	1178
III. THE CONCEPT OF NON-SELF	
IV. LINKS BETWEEN IMPERMANENCE, SUFFERING AND NON-SELF	
V. THE CONCEPT OF REVULSION TOWARD FOOD	
VI. LOGICAL ORDER OF THE TEN CONCEPTS	1194
VII. THE CONCEPT OF DISSATISFACTION TOWARD THE ENTIRE WORLD	
1. Evils and wickedness of beings	
2. Wretchedness of lands	1196
VIII. THE CONCEPTS OF DEATH AND IMPURITY	
IX. THE CONCEPTS OF RENUNCIATION, DETACHMENT AND CESSATION	1198
CHAPTER XXXVIII: THE ELEVEN KNOWLEDGES, THE THREE MEDITATIVE	
STABILIZATIONS AND THE THREE FACULTIES (p. 1465F)	
First Section THE ELEVEN KNOWLEDGES	
PRELIMINARY NOTE	
I. THE TEN KNOWLEDGES IN THE SŪTRAPITAKA	
II. THE TEN KNOWLEDGES IN THE SANSKRIT ABHIDHARMA	
III THE ELEVEN KNOWLEDGES IN THE MAHĀYĀNA	
1. Lists of Eleven Knowledges in the Prajñāpāramitās in Sanskrit	
2. Lists of the eleven knowledges in the Chinese Prajñāpāramitās	
A. Definition of the eleven knowledges in the Prajñāpāramitās	
B. The Ten Knowledges According to the Abidharam	
C. The Eleven Knowledges According to the Mahāyāna	
Second section THE THREE MEDITATIVE STABILIZATIONS	
I. THE THREE CONCENTRATIONS ACCORDING TO THE ABHIDHARMA	
1 The three kinds of concentration	1219

2. Vitarka and Vicāra	1219
3. Dharmas with vitarka, etc.	
4. Levels with vitarka, etc.	
II. THE THREE CONCENTRATIONS ACCORDING TO THE MAHĀYĀNA	
Third section THE THREE FACULTIES OF UNDERSTANDING	
PRELIMINARY NOTE	
I. THE THREE FACULTIES OF UNDERSTANDING	
II. THE TWENTY-TWO FACULTIES (INDRIYA)	
1. The Three Faculties of Understanding According to the Abhidharma	
A. Definition	
B. Excellence of the three faculties of understanding	
C. Levels, objects, associates and causality of the three faculties	
2. The Three Faculties of Understanding According to the Mahāyāna	1229
A. In the Darśanamārga	
B. In the bhāvanāmārga	
C. In the Aśaikṣamārga	
CHAPTER XXXIX: THE TEN POWERS OF THE BUDDHA ACCORDING TO THE	
ABHIDHARMA	1232
PRELIMINARY NOTE	1232
I. THE DAŚABALASŪTRA	1232
II. LISTS OF JÑĀNABALAS	1234
First Section GENERAL QUESTIONS	1235
I. ATTRIBUTES OF THE ŚRĀVAKA AND ATTRIBUTES OF THE BUDDHA	1235
II. ATTRIBUTES TO BE FULFILLED AND ATTRIBUTES TO BE COGNIZED	1238
III. DEFINITION OF THE TEN POWERS ACCORDING TO THE DAŚABALASŪTRA	1239
IV. WHY TEACH THE TEN POWERS?	1240
V. WHY ARE THERE ONLY TEN POWERS?	1243
VI. WHY THE FIRST POWER INCLUDES THE OTHER NINE	1244
Second Section THE TEN POWERS IN PARTICULAR	1245
I. THE POWER OF THE POSSIBLE AND THE IMPOSSIBLE	1245
II. THE KNOWLEDGE OF THE RETRIBUTION OF ACTIONS	1248
III. THE KNOWLEDGE OF THE DHYĀNAS, ETC	1259
IV. THE KNOWLEDGE OF THE DEGREE OF THE MORAL FACULTIES	
V. THE KNOWLEDGE OF THE ASPIRATIONS OF BEINGS	1264
VI. THE KNOWLEDGE OF ACQUIRED DISPOSITIONS	1268
VII. THE KNOWLEDGE OF THE WAY LEADING TO THE VARIOUS DESTINIES	
VIII. THE KNOWLEDGE OF FORMER ABODES	1272
IX. THE KNOWLEDGE OF DEATH AND REBIRTH	
X. THE POWER OF THE DESTRUCTION OF THE IMPURITIES	
Third Section APPENDICES TO THE TEN POWERS.	1280
I. THE BEST OF THE TEN POWERS	1280
II. WHY THE BUDDHA THINKS HIGHLY OF HIS TEN POWERS	
III. THERE IS NO BOASTFULNESS IN THE BUDDHA	1281
CHAPTER XL: THE FOUR FEARLESSNESSES AND THE FOUR UNOBSTRUCTED	
KNOWLEDGES (p. 1567F)	1283
First Section THE FOUR FEARLESSNESSES OF THE BUDDHA ACCORDING TO THE	4.5.5
ABHIDHARMA	
PRELIMINARY NOTE	1283

I. THE VAIŚĀRADYASŪTRA	1283
II. THE VAIŚĀRADYAS IN THE ABHIDHARMA AND THE ŚĀSTRAS	
Definition of the Four Fearlessnesses in the Vaiśāradyasūtra	1285
2. Why the Buddha Mentioned His Four Fearlessnesses	
3. Similarities and Differences Between Powers and Fearlessnesses	
4. How Do We Know That The Buddha is Fearless?	
5. Why Distinguish Between the Powers and the Fearlessnesses?	
6. Literal Commentary on the Vaiśāradyasūtra	
A. "I am fully and completely enlightened"	
B. "I have destroyed all the impurities"	
C. "I have stated the dharmas that constitute an obstacle"	
D. "The noble path indicated by me can lead to exit from the world"	
E. "I hold the place of Holy Teacher"	
F. "In the assemblies I utter the lion's roar"	
G. "I turn the Wheel of Brahmā"	
7. Nature and Order of the Fearlessnesses	
Second Section THE TEN POWERS AND THE FOUR FEARLESSNESSES ACCORDING	
MAHĀYĀNA	1313
PRELIMINARY NOTE	1313
I. THE EMPTINESS OF NONEXISTENCE	1317
II. THE TEN POWERS OF THE BODHISATTVA	1320
III. THE FOUR FEARLESSNESSES OF THE BODHISATTVA	1321
Third Section THE FOUR UNHINDERED KNOWLEDGES (p. 1614F)	
PRELIMINARY NOTE	
I. THE PRATISAMVIDS ACCORDING TO THE ABHIDHARMA	
1. Arthapratisamvid	
2. Dharmapratisaṃvid	
3. Niruktipratisaṃvid	
4. Pratibhānapratisaṃvid	
5. Levels, knowledges and types of pratisamvid	
II. THE PRATISAMVIDS ACCORDING TO THE MAHĀYĀNA	
1. Arthapratisamvid	
2. Dharmapratisaṃvid	
3. Niruktipratisaṃvid	
4. Pratibhānapratisaṃvid	
CHAPTER XLI: THE EIGHTEEN SPECIAL ATTRIBUTES OF THE BUDDHA	
PRELIMINARY NOTE	
I. THE EIGHTEEN ĀVEŅIKADHARMAS OF THE BUDDHAS	
II. THE EIGHTEEN ĀVEŅIKADHARMAS OF THE BODHISATTVAS	
First Section MAHĀYĀNIST LIST OF THE EIGHTEEN SPECIAL ATTRIBUTES OF TH	
BUDDHA	
I. TEXT OF THE LIST ACCORDING TO THE PRAJÑĀPĀRAMITĀ	
II. DETAILED COMMENTARY ON THE LIST	
1-2. The Buddha has no bodily or vocal defect	
3. The Buddha has no lapse of mindfulness	
4. The Buddha has no notion of variety	
5. The Buddha has no non-concentrated mind	1341

6. The Buddha has no unconsidered equanimity	1344
7. The Buddha has no loss of zeal	
8. The Buddha has no loss of exertion	1351
9. The Buddha has no loss of mindfulness	1354
10. The Buddha has no loss of wisdom	1355
11. The Buddha has no loss of deliverance	
12. The Buddha has no loss of the wisdom and the vision of deliverance	1356
13-15. Every physical, vocal or mental action of the Buddha accompanies knowledge	1358
Digression on a case brought against the Buddha	
1. The Accusation	1362
2. The Defense	1362
A. Meeting With The Heretics	
B. Display of His Breast	
C. Display of His Tongue and His Cryptorchidia	
D. Insults to the Disciples	1366
E. Insults to Devadatta	
F. Use of a Stone Bowl	
G. Silence on the Fourteen Difficult Questions	
H. Simultaneous Teaching of the Self and the Non-self	
I. Simultaneous Teaching of Existence and Non-existence	
16-18. The Buddha penetrates the past, the future and the present	
A. Sarvāstivādin-Sautrāntika Debate on Time	
B. The Non-existence of Time According to the Mahāyāna	1387
Second Section REFUTATION OF THE SARVĀSTIVĀDIN THEORIES ON THE SPECIAL	
ATTRIBUTES OF THE BUDDHA	
I. REFUTATION OF THE FIRST SARVĀSTIVĀDIN LIST	1389
II. REFUTATION OF THE SECOND SARVĀSTIVĀDIN LIST	1390
Third Section CLASSIFICATION AND DISTRIBUTION OF THE EIGHTEEN SPECIAL	
ATTRIBUTES OF THE BUDDHA RECORDED IN THE MAHĀYĀNIST LIST	
CHAPTER XLII THE GREAT LOVING-KINDNESS AND THE GREAT COMPASSION (	
BUDDHAS	
PRELIMINARY NOTEI. GREAT LOVING-KINDNESS AND GREAT COMPASSION ACCORDING TO THE	1394
ŚRĀVAKAYĀNA	1394
II. GREAT LOVING-KINDNESS AND GREAT COMPASSION ACCORDING TO THE	1374
MAHĀYĀNA	1396
1. Great loving-kindness and great compassion	
Degrees of loving-kindness and compassion	1398
3. Epithet 'great' reserved for loving-kindness and compassion	
4. Epithet 'great' refused for the wisdom of the Buddhas	
5. Loving-kindness and compassion are pure among the Buddhas	

## INTRODUCTION

Volume II of the *Treatise on the Great Virtue of Wisdom* appeared in 1949 and more than twenty years separate it from Volume III which I [Lamotte] have the honor of presenting today. During this time Buddhist studies have made considerable progress in many directions and have brought new light to the *Traité*. An entire book would be needed to describe them in detail, which would delay further the publishing of the present volume. These introductory pages will be limited to providing some detailed information on the *Traité* itself, its author, the sources from which it draws its inspiration, the Chinese translation of which it is the object and, finally, the contents of Volume III. The Supplement to the Bibliography that will follow it will inform the reader more fully.

## I. THE TREATISE ON THE GREAT VIRTUE OF WISDOM

The *Traité* is a voluminous commentary on a lengthy version of the *Prajñāpāramitāsūtra*. The short version that first appeared consisted of 8000 ślokas or units of 32 syllables and was entitled *Aṣṭasāhasrikā Prajñāpāramitā*. The original Sanskrit text was published by R. Mitra in 1888 and by U. Wogihara in 1932-35; it was translated into Chinese six times (T 220, nos. 4-5, 224, 225, 226, 227, 228) and once into Tibetan (Tib. Trip 734).

The long versions entitled *Mahāprajňāpāramitāsūtra* were three or possibly four in number:

- 1. The *Aṣṭādaśasāhasrikā* in 18,000 *ślokas* partially edited by E. Conze in 1962, translated once into Chinese (T 220, no. 3) and once into Tibetan (Tib. Trip. 732).
- 2. The *Pañcaviṃśatisāhasrikā* in 25,000 *ślokas*, the history of which is more complicated:
- a. T 222: Koung-tsang-king, by Dharmarakşa in 286 A.D.
- b. Fang-kouang-pan-jo-king, by Mokşala in 291.
- c. Mo-ho-pan-jo-po-lo-mi-king, by Kumārajīva in 403-404.
- d. T 220, no, 2: Ta-pan-jo-po-lo-mi-king, by Hiuan-tsang in 660-663.
- e. Tib. Trip. 731: Śes-rab-kyi pha-rol-tu phyin-pa stoń-phrag-ñi-śu-lna-pa, by unknown translators.

A modified version serving as commentary to the *Abhisamayālaṃkāra* of Maitreya also exists in Sanskrit and Tibetan.

a. Āryapañcaviṃśatisāhasrika bhagavatī prajñāpāramitā, abhisamayālaṃkārānusāreṇa saṃśodhitā, partially edited by N. Dutt in 1934.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> In this introduction, except for indicated exceptions, the numbers in parentheses in the text refer to the pages of the French translation when they are in simple numbers, to the pages and columns of the Chinese edition of T 1509 when the numbers are followed by the letters a, b or c.

b. Tib. Trip. 5188: Śes-rab-kyi pha-tol-tu phyin-pa ston-phrag ñi-śu-lna-pa, translated by Śi-ba bzan-po and Tshul-khrims rgyal-ba.

3. The Śatasāhasrikā in 100,000 ślokas was partially edited in 1902 by P. C. Ghosa, translated once into Chinese (T 220, no. 1) and once into Tibetan (Tib. Trip. 730).

This list far from exhausts the enormous production of *Prajñāpāramitās*: there are still many other shorter texts of which the author of the *Traité* was unaware. E. Conze has recorded them for us in his work *The Prajñāpāramitā Literature*, 1960.

The *Traité* was a commentary in Sanskrit on the *Mahāprajñāpāramitāsūtra*, in the present case the original version of the *Pañcaviṃśatisāhasrikā*, a copy of which was in Kumārajīva's possession and which he translated at the same time as the *Traité* in 403-404: this is the Taisho 223. The translator had no knowledge of the modified version, the only one that has come down to us.

On the other hand, the Indo-Tibetan tradition is silent about the *Traité*, the only evidence of which is the abridged Chinese translation made by Kumārajīva under the name *Ta-tche-tou louen* (T 1509).

The East as well as the West has become accustomed to restoring this title in Sanskrit as *Mahāprajñāpāramitāśāstra*, "Treatise on the Great Perfection of Wisdom".

But, as P. Demiéville has commented,<sup>2</sup> various titles are found both in the editions as well as in the fragments of manuscript found at Touen-houang and especially *Mo-ho-po-lo-mi-to-king-che-louen*: "The latter (also denoted in the *K'ai-yuan-lou*, T 2145, K. 4, p. 513*a*4) is the one that appears at the head of the preface by Seng-jouei (at the beginning of T 1509), with an abridged variant also given by the *Tch'ou-san-tsang-ki-tsi* (T 2145, k. 10, p. 74*c*11). This title is probably the older one and could correspond to the Sanskrit *Mahā-prajñāpāramitā-upadeśa-[śāstra*]: the word *upadeśa* is, furthermore, given in transcription in the Chinese biographies of Nāgāruna which must emanate from Kumārajīva: in one of these biographies we read that 'Nāgārjuna made an *upadeśa* in ten thousand *gāthās*<sup>3</sup> to explain the Mahāyāna in a developed manner' (*Long-chou-p'ou-sa-tchouan*, T 2047, p. 184*c*18; *Fou-fa-tsang-yin-yuan-tchouan*, T 2058, k. 5, p. 318*b*16)."<sup>4</sup>

But the characters *che-louen* do not necessarily render the Sanskrit *upadeśa* and do not appear among the Chinese expressions most often used to translate *upadeśa*, namely, *louen-yi*, *fa-yi*, *chouo-yi*, *fa-chouo*, *yi-couo*, *ta-kiao*.<sup>5</sup>

Be that as it may, Demiéville was right and, in the title in question, *che-louen* is the equivalent of *upadeśa*.

Actually, *upadeśa* is also the name of the twelfth and last member of the 'twelve-membered' word of the Buddha (*dvādaśangabuddhavacana*) which is frequently mentioned in the Sanskrit texts of the two

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> Le Traité de la Grande Vertu de Sagesse de Nāgārjuna, JA, 1950, p. 375, n. 1

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup> Read: 'ten myriads of gāthās.'

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4</sup> Mochizuki, *Cyclopedia*, p. 227b; A. Hirakawa, *A Study of the Vinaya-Pitaka*, Tokyo, 1960, p. 348-352.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>5</sup> The Chinese characters are given rather than the numbers as in previous vols. I and II.

Vehicles; Kumārajīva uses only two ways of rendering this member: he either transcribes it as *yeou-po-t'i-chö*, or else he translates it as *louen-yi*.

And yet at kiuan 20, p. 208*b*16, which the reader will find below at p. 1237F, the *Traité* designates itself under the title of *Pan-jo-po-lo-mi-louen-yi*: *pan-jo-lo-mi* is the transcription of *prajñā-pāramitā*, and *louen-yi* is the translation of *upadeśa*.

Therefore the original Indian title was *Prajñāpāramitopadeśa* 'Detailed Analysis of the Perfection of Wisdom', or also *Mahā-prajñā-pāramitā-sūtra-upadeśa*, 'Detailed Analysis of the Great Sūtra on the Perfection of Wisdom', in the present case, the *Pañca-viṃśati-sāhasrikā*.

The works of scholastic Buddhism often have the title of *Upadeśa*: thus Vasubandhu composed *upadeśas* on the *Saddharmapuṇḍarīka* (T 1519, 1520), the *Sukhāvatīvyūha* (T 1524), the *Ratnacūḍa* (T 1526), the *Dharmacakrapravartana* (T 1533), etc.

At kiuan 33, p. 308a, the *Traité* will explain what it means by *upadeśa*: "Louen-yi (*upadeśa*) means to reply to questions (*praśnavyākaraṇa*), to explain why and then to explain broadly the meanings (*artha*). When the Buddha preached the four truths (*satya*), he was asked what they are, and the reply was that they are the four noble truths (*āryasatya*). He was asked what are these truths, and the reply was that they are the four noble truths on suffering (*duḥkha*), its origin (*samudaya*), its cessation (*nirodha*) and the path (*pratipad*): that is what the louen-yi (*upadeśa*) is. He was asked what is the noble truth of suffering (*duḥkhāryasatya*), and the reply was that it is the eight kinds of suffering, suffering of birth (*jātiduḥkha*), etc. He was asked what is the suffering of birth, and the reply was that beings, in every place of birth (*jātisthāna*), undergo suffering. Giving such answers to questions and broadly explaining the meanings is what is called yeou-po-t'i-chö (*upadeśa*).

#### II. THE AUTHOR AND HIS SOURCES

An almost twenty century-old legend has been woven around the author of the *Traité* and even to skim through it, it is evident that there will be further enrichment of it. Without pretending to 'render unto Caesar', for the time being, we are not prevented from disregarding it momentarily so as to study the author on the basis of his work alone. Indian writers in general and Buddhist scholars in particular are not in the habit of pushing themselves forward and, if a literary genre has been neglected in India, it is indeed that of autobiography. We cannot blame the philosophers who profess the anātman for concealing their own individuality in their works. Such reservation is easy when the work is not greater than five hundred stanzas, as was the case for the *Madhyamakaśāstra*, the *Dvādaśamukhaśāstra*, the *Catuḥśatakaśāstra* or the Śatakaśāstra. When, like the *Traité*, it reaches more than three million words in a thousand scrolls, it is more difficult for the author to maintain his incognito.

#### 1. THE GEOGRAPHICAL AND HISTORICAL MILIEU

According to the indications furnished by the author, he seems to have been active at the beginning of the 4<sup>th</sup> century of our era in north-western India. This region, which for a long time was the only gate half- way open to the exterior, already had had a long history. After having undergone the Achemenid yoke for two and a half centuries (559-326 B.C.) and the Macedonian occupation for twenty years (326-306 B.C.), it had rejoined the mother country on terms of the convention concluded between Seleucos the First Nicator and Candragupta. Having moved within the circles of the Mauryan Indian empire from about 306 to 189, it was conquered by the Greco-Macedonians of Bactria who founded two kingdoms in it: the western Greek kingdom consisting of Bactria, Sogdia, Arie, Sÿistan and Arachosia; the eastern Greek empire extending over Kapiśa, Gandhāra and the Punjab. Devoured by internal quarrels, the Greeks eliminated themselves, and their last representative disappeared from the scene of history about 30 A.D. Previously, peoples of Iranian language had already infiltrated into India and, for a century and a half (ca. 90 B.C. – 50 A.D.) the north-west suffered invasions by Scytho-Parthians, the Sakas of Mauès (90-53 B. C.) and the Pahlavas of Gondopharesia (19-45 A.D.). Finally, about 50 A.D., Indo-Scythia passed into the hands of nomadic populations of poorly defined origin, called Ta Yue-tche, Yue-tche and Tou-houo-lo by the Chinese, Tokharoi and Thagouroi by the Greeks, Tochari and Togarii by the Romans, Tukhāra, Tusāra and Turuska by the Indians, Tho-Kar and Thod-Kar by the Tibetans, Tokhrī by the Ouigours, Ttaugara or Ttaudägara by the Khotanese. Starting out from Kan-sou in 174 B.C., they had seized hold of Bactria about 130 B.C., and had divided it up into five dynasties. One of their descendants, Kujula Kadphises, an officer of the Kouei-chouang region, dominated his fellows and laid the foundations of an immense empire which, at the time of its greatest extent, included Chinese Turkestan with Kashgar, Yarkhand and Khotan, eastern Iran with Sogdia, Bactria and Séistan, all of north-western India with Kashmir, the Indus basin and the middle Ganges area, possibly as far as Benares.

For two and a half centuries, the Kuṣāna empire played the role of crossroads of Asia, all the lines of communication of which it controlled.

The first dynasty represented by Kujula Kadphises and Vima Kadphises (ca. 50-80 A. D.) was succeeded by a second dynasty represented by the illustrious names of Kaniṣka, Vāṣiska, Kaniṣka II, Huviṣka and Vāsudeva. The date of Kaniṣka's accession is still debated: 78, 128 or 144 A.D.<sup>6</sup> On his inscriptions, he inaugurated a new era lasting at least 98 years. The Kuṣāna empire became decadent with the accession to the Persian throne of the Sassanides (227-651): about 226, its founder, Ardahīr-i-Bābegān invaded Kapiśa, Gandhāra and the eastern Punjab.

Reigning over populations of very different race, language and religion, the Kuṣānas were wise enough to respect them all. Their coins bore inscrptions in Indian, Iranian and even Greek; on the reverse side, they

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>6</sup> Cf. Papers on the Date of Kanişka, ed. by A. L. Basham, 1968.

showed Iranian deities, Sun, Moon, Wind, Fire, Mithra, Anaītis; some Indian, Śiva, Mahāsena, Skandha, Budha (sic!) and also Serapis, Horus, Heracles, Selene, Helios and even Roma.

Kanişka favored Buddhism by building near Puruşapura, his capital, a stūpa 700 feet high at the village of Kharjurikā, which, for many centuries, was admired by the Chinese pilgrims. Excavations at this site by D. B. Spooner and H. Hargreaves have unearthed an inscribed reliquary surmounted by three figures representing the Buddha between Brahmā and Indra; the body of the reliquary is engraved with various figures of orantes, particularly Kanişka flanked by two deities, the Sun and the Moon, the Miiro and Mao of the coins. It appears from many inscriptions in Kharoṣṭhī and Brāhmī that the great emperor promoted the building of stūpas and vihāras. His successors followed his example, and the founding and endowment of a magnificent monastery at Jamālpur Mound near Mathurā is attributed to Huvişka.<sup>7</sup>

A legend, which seems to be a replica of that of Aśoka, formed around Kaniṣka. It connects him with the minister Māṭhara, the physician Caraka and important religious individuals such as Saṃgharakṣa, Aśvaghoṣa, Jeyata, Pārśva, Vasumitra and Pūrṇa. The legend has it that he convened a great council at Kaśmir to revise the Buddhist scriptures and to compose explanatory treatises on the Three Baskets.

The author of the *Traité* definitely lived at the time of the Great Kuṣāṇas since he makes frequent allusions to the Greater and Lesser Yue-tche or Tukhāras (p. 547F, 555F, 672F, 1584F). But curiously enough, he never mentions their personal names and limits himself to referring to them by the official title of *devaputra*, frequent on the inscriptions and coins (p. 475F, 1421F, 396c, 321a, etc.). Such reticence is perhaps a mark of respect, but more likely answers to the fundamental antipathy the Indians always experienced in regard to sovereigns of foreign origin. It explains the total silence maintained by the indigenous chronicles on Alexander's incursion into India, major event though it was. Despite their generous donations, the great Kuṣāṇas remained outsiders to the native population. The author of the *Traité* does not conceal his scorn for the borderlands (*pratyantajanapada*) which he considers to be places of lowly birth, and he adds to them not only the foreign kingdoms such as Tukhāra, Sogdia, Persia and the eastern Mediterranean, but also some regions of India occupied by primitive peoples such as the Śavaras, people of Dravidian languages such as the Andhras and even some slightly aryanized capitals such as Ujjayinī (p.174F, 1584-1586). In his eyes, the Buddhist Madhyadeśa was limited to the lands of Aryan tongue and, whatever their religious sympathies, he is not far from rejecting as barbaric foreigners all those who spoke Chinese, Scythian, Greek, Dravidian, Tibetan, Kāśgarian, Tokharian or Bactrian (p. 1586).

At the end of the Kuṣāṇa epoch, the religious situation was very complex. The inscriptions, the coins and the literary texts attest to the active presence, in the north-west, of Brahmanism and Hinduism, of Jainism and Buddhism, as well as the persistence of the primitive cult of the Nāgas. The holy Dharma particularly flourished and, starting from the reign of Aśoka (272-236), the region became, after Magadha, the second Holy Land of Buddhism. The great emperor flooded it with his edicts on the Dharma, published in Indian Prakrit, in Aramaic and in Greek. After this psychological preparation, the missionary Madhyāntika, sent

-

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>7</sup> H. Lüders, *Mathurā Inscriptions*, 1961, p. 57 seq.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>8</sup> Inscriptions at Shāhbāzgarhi (Peshāwār district) and at Mānsehra (Hazāra district) in chancellery Prākrit and Kharoṣṭhī script; Aramaic inscription at Pūl-i-Darunteh in Lampaka; bilingual Greco-Aramaic at Qandahār (JA,

by Moggaliputtatissa, settled down there with five hundred arhats; he introduced the cultivation of saffron and substituted the reign of the holy Dharma for the cult of the nāgas. The district was soon covered with monasteries (*vihāra*, *saṃghārāma*) to shelter the monastics and with commemorative monuments (*stūpa*) to perpetuate the memory of Śākyamuni. The stūpas of the old style – described by Hiuan-tsang as 'Aśoka's stūpa' – were especially numerous. Consisting of a raised hemispherical dome on a terrace surrounded by a balustrade, they marked the places where Śākyamuni, during his previous existences as Bodhisattva, had distinguished himself by his generosity, morality, patience and exertion. Thus, although the last lifetime of the Buddha had taken place in the region of the middle Ganges, the north-western India was the main theatre of his jātakas.

Later, at the time, more precisely, of the Kuṣāṇas, the stupa evolved in form: placed on a raised drum, it became more slender and gained in height. What is more, it was covered with sculptures representing the human form of the Buddha in various episodes of his last existence, a major innovation probably inspired by Hellenistic sculptors who may have developed unhindered in the large sculpture schools of Gandhāra and Mathurā.

At the same time, the legend of the Buddha, breaking with historical plausibility, devised a long journey of Śākyamuni across the north-west of India where he may have left traces of his passage. Accompanied sometimes byĀnanda, sometimes by the yakṣa Vajrapāni, the Teacher, starting from Mathurā, made this tour in twenty-five stages, taming the nāgas, converting the kings, predicting important events and leaving his shadow in the village of Pālitakūṭa, near Tchahār-Bāgh (p. 547-554F)

In the meantime, the Buddhist community had passed through many vicissitudes: "When the Buddha was in this world, the Dharma met with no opposition. After the Buddha died, when the Dharma was recited for the first time, it was still as it was when the Buddha was alive. One hundred years later, king Aśoka called together a great quinquennial (pañcavarṣa) assembly and the great Dharma teachers debated. As a result of their differences, there were distinct sects (nikāya) each having a name and each developing subsequently" (p. 106-108F). Following a schism provoked by Mahādeva, the Saṃgha split into two big parts, that of the Sthaviras "Old Ones", partisans of a more strict orthodoxy, and that of the Mahāsāṃghikas "Majorities", of laxer and democratic tendencies. These two sections in turn became subdivided into various sects which tradition has fixed as eighteen in number. They expanded over all of India and geographical separation further increased their differences.

In the Kuṣāṇa epoch, two sects, the Mahāsāṃghika and the Sarvāstivādin, contended with one another over the north-west. The former, represented at Mathurā and Kapiśa, used a hybrid language, a mixture of the Prakrit jargon and correct Sanskrit. The latter, derived from the Sthavira branch, resolutely opted for the

1958, p. 1-48); Greek inscription, also at Qandahār (JA, 1964, p. 137-157). – For the Bactrian inscriptions which themselves are not of Buddhist inspiration, see E. Benveniste, *Inscriptions de Bactriane*, JA, 1961, p. 13-152; W. B. Henning, *The Bactrian Inscriptions*, BSOAS, XXIII, 1960, p. 47-55; D. Schlumberger, *Aī Khanouem, une ville hellénistique en Afghanistan*, CRAI, 1965; L. Robert, *De Delphe à l'Oxus, Inscriptions grecques nouvelles de la* 

*Bactriane*, CRAI, 1968, p. 416-457. Some new discoveries have just been announced to the Académie des Inscriptions by A. Dupont-Sommer.

876

use of Sanskrit as the religious language, They were by far the more powerful, and inscriptions in Karoṣṭhī and Brāhmī indicate their presence at Mathurā, Kalwan, Shāh-jī-Dherī, Zeda, Kurram (either in Afghanistan, Punjab and Sindh) with off-shoots as far away as Śrāvastī and Sārnāth.

The two sects, which were opposed especially in matters of buddhology, evolved somewhat over time, but the second in particular still represented the old Buddhism as Śākyamuni had taught it to his śrāvakas. Nevertheless, around the beginning of our era, they were infiltrated by adepts of a new form of Buddhism animated by a more daring ideal, inspired by more radical philosophical ideas and professing theories, hitherto unknown, on the nature of Buddha and future Buddhas. This movement, suggestive rather than revolutionary, took the name of Mahāyāna 'Greater Vehicle (of salvation)' and qualified as Hīnayāna, 'Lesser Vehicle', the old doctrines and practices. It did not constitute a new sect and its name never appears in the inscriptions, but it developed within the very bosom of the monastic communities.

Some monks, regarding the teachings transmitted for five hundred years as the holy Dharma (*saddharma*), refused to come to terms with the Mahāyāna, rejected its scriptures as false and charged the new movement with being the Counterfeit Dharma (*pratirūpakadharma*): disciples they were, disciples they meant to remain. But beside these reactionary śrāvakas, there were progressive monks who took the Mahāyāna sūtras into consideration, held them or pretended to take them as the Word of the Buddha and adopted their ideas. Nevertheless, they did not leave their monastery and continued to co-habit with the 'Old Ones' who did not share their views. Thus, in the 7<sup>th</sup> century, Hiuan-tsang distinguished three types of monasteries: the monasteries within the jurisdiction of the Hināyāna sects (Sthavira, Mahāsāmghika, Sarvāstivādin, Saṃmatīya), the Mahāyāna monasteries, and finally the monasteries where practitioners of both Vehicles lived together.

In regard to his epoch and the sources that he uses, it seems that the author of the *Traité* was a Sarvāstivādin, perhaps belatedly converted to the Mahāyāna. His high esteem for the monastic life (p. 839-846F), his disdainful silence toward the Mahāsāṃghikas whom he mentions only once in his work suggests that he wore the yellow robe of the bhikṣu in some Sarvāstivādin monastery of north-western India, one of these monasteries built on the plains or on the hills, the ruins of which still exist at Shāh-jī-ḍherī, Ṣhāh-ḍherī, Shahr-ī-Bahlol, Sanghao, Takht-ī-Bahai, Hamal-Gaṛhī, Karkai, etc. Fa-hien, who visited them at the beginning of the 5<sup>th</sup> century, tells us that they were occupied almost exclusively by Sarvāstivādins.

Under the direction of learned teachers, the author devoted himself to the study of the sacred texts, memorized the Tripiṭaka and specialized in the Sarvāstivādin Abhidharma. He manifests such a deep understanding of it that we may think he in turn taught it. Later, the reading of the Mahāyānasūtras must have made an impression on him, and study of the early Mādhyamikans (Nāgārjuna, Āryadeva, Rāhulabhadra) convinced him of the cogency of the new ideas. He went over to the Mahāyayāna without, however, giving up his scholastic habits. In the form of a commentary on the *Pañcaviṃśatisāhasrikā*, he composed a voluminous exegetical treatise which is like a Mahāyāna reply to the Sarvāstivādin Abhidharma. The author appears both as a Sarvāstivādin by training and a Mahāyānist by conviction, and it is under these two aspects that he should be studied.

### 2. THE SARVĀSTIVĀDIN BY TRAINING

The study program imposed on the north-western bhikṣus involved a formidable body of canonical and paracanonical texts. In contrast with most of the sects which had only three Baskets, the Sarvāstivādin Tripiṭaka, contrary to its name, had four: 1. the *Vinayapiṭaka*, the basket of discipline, 2. the *Sūtrapiṭaka*, the basket of dogmatic texts incorporating four "traditions" (āgama), 3. the *Abhidharmapiṭaka*, the scholastic basket, 4. the *Kṣudrapiṭaka*, the basket of minor texts. 9 This is mentioned on p. 692-693F of the *Traité* and p. 412a of the Chinese translation.

#### A. Sarvāstivādin Sūtrapitaka.

It comprised four  $\bar{a}gamas$  listed in the following order: 1) *Ekottarāgama* or *Ekottarika*, 2) *Madhyamāgama*, 3)  $D\bar{u}rgh\bar{a}gama$ , 4)  $Samyukt\bar{a}gama$ . The text of the  $\bar{a}gamas$  was translated into Chinese at the beginning of the 5<sup>th</sup> century (T 125, 26, 1, 99) and the sands of central Asia have yielded important fragments of their original Sanskrit: on the basis of these fragments, the patient work of E. Waldschmidt and his school have resulted in the reconstruction of numerous sūtras.

The *Traité* sometimes refers to these *āgamas* and occasionally cites the *Ekottara* (p. 103F, 1268F), the *Madhyama* (p. 4F, 103F, 307b, 456b), the *Dīrgha* (p. 103F, 300F, 544F) and the *Samyukta* (p. 103F, 447F, 542F, 614F, 288a, 295b, 298a, 307a, 444a). As general rule, however, it prefers to refer to the sūtras incorporated in these *āgamas*. These sūtras being familiar to all learned Buddhists, very often it omits mentioning their titles.

Comparative study of the texts shows that the author of the *Traité* used the *Madhyamāgama* and the *Saṃyuktāgama* of which Taisho 26 and 99 are the translations. In regard to the *Ekottarāgama* and the *Dīrghāgama*, he used originals slightly different from Taisho 125 and 1.<sup>11</sup>

According to the immutable laws of religious exegesis, the author presents no event that is not based on a dogmatic source. On each page he refers explicitly or implicitly to a sūtra or a topic mentioned by several sūtras at the same time. This will become evident in the notes annexed to the French translation.

The sūtras being the very words of the Buddha, the author never rejects them. If they apparently contradict themselves, he makes efforts to assure their authenticity, then to interpret them according to the nature of things (*dharmatā*) by establishing a clear distinction between the scriptures of provisional meaning and those of definitive meaning (p.536-539F, 1621F n.). He shows himself thus to be a specialist trained in the school of rigorous intellectual discipline and respectful of the traditional game of exegesis.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>9</sup> The Vijñānavādins inherited this canon: cf. HBI, p. 167.

<sup>10</sup> The same order was adopted by other schools; cf. HBI, p. 170.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>11</sup> In *Essays Offered to G. H. Luce*, 1966, p. 49-58, A. Bareau has decisively established the Dharmaguptaka origin of the *Dīrghāgama* translated into Chinese by Buddhayaśas and Tchou Fo-nien (T 1).

The never-ending recourse to old canonical sūtras has the psychological effect of immersing the author in the past and making him relive in spirit the memorable events that occurred in Kosala, Magadha and the middle Ganges region at the time of the Buddha and his great disciples. He manifests an extensive and precise knowledge of the geography of the ancient epoch (p. 163-197F).

#### B. Sarvāstivādin Vinayapitaka

The *Traité* is rather confused on the history of the Vinaya (p. 104F, 756c) but may be complemented thanks to information given by the Kaśmirian tradition and collected in the 5<sup>th</sup> and 6<sup>th</sup> centuries by Kumārajīva, Seng-yeou and Houei-kiao. <sup>12</sup>

At the council of Rājagṛha presided over by Kāśyapa at the death of the Buddha, Upāli recited the Vinayapiṭaka. As there were 80 repetitions of reciting this Vinaya, this last one will be called the 'Vinaya of 80 recitations'. The first five patriarchs, Kāśyapa, Ānanda, Madhyāntika, Śāṇavāsa and Upagupta, conserved it carefully. As Upagupta, a contemporary of and advisor to Aśoka, had established residency at Mathurā, the old Vinaya which he retained was designated under the name 'Vinaya of the land of Mathurā in 80 sections'. The text contained Avadānas and Jātakas.

But at that time, people, being of weak faculties, were unable to memorize so voluminous a code. The different Buddhist schools therefore published an abridgment of it and this is how the five Vinayas saw the light of day: *Pāli Vin.*, *Mahīśāsaka Vin.* (T 1431), *Mahāsāṃgika Vin.* (T 1425), *Dharmaguptaka Vin.* (T 1428) and *Sarvāstivādin Vin.* (T 1435).

The Sarvāstivādin Vin. was compiled by Upagupta who reduced it to 10 sections by eliminating the stories of the Avadānas and Jātakas. It was entitled: 'Vinaya in ten recitations' (*Daśadhyāya*): sections 1 to 3 commented on the 250 rules of the bhikṣu; sections 4 to 6 dealt with the seven and the eight dharmas, in other words, the Skandhakas; section 7 explained the rules of the bhikṣuṇ̄s; sections 8 to 10 were reserved for appendices: *Ekottara, Upāliparipṛcchā, Kṣudrakavarga and Kuśaladharma*. Some original fragments have come down to us and have been published by J. Filliozat and H. Kung<sup>13</sup> and by V. Rosen. <sup>14</sup> Introduced into Kaśmir, this Vinaya was also designated by the name 'Vinaya of Kaśmir'. Kumārajīva translated it at Tch'ang-ngan in 404-405 under the name Che-song-liu (T 1435) and subsequently, after 409, Vimalākṣa completed it and enriched it with a preface.

Later, according to the *Traité* (p. 756c), there was a *vibhāṣā* in 80 chapters that commented on it. This *vibhāṣā* should not be confused with the primitive Vinaya which itself also consisted of 80 sections. Although the sources lack precision in this regard, this *vibhāṣā*, also composed in Kaśmir, is undoubtedly identical with the *Mūlasarvāstivādin Vinaya*, 15 definitely subsequent to the advent of the great Kuṣāṇas

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>12</sup> HBI, p. 191-192.

<sup>13</sup> Fragments du Vinaya des Sarvāstivādin, JA, 1938, p. 21-64.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>14</sup> Der Vinayavibhanga zum Bhiksuprātimoksa der Sarvāstivādins, 1959.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>15</sup> HBI, p. 187-188.

since it contains a prophecy relating to Kaniṣka. <sup>16</sup> The Indian original has come down to us almost complete: various Sanskrit texts, such as the *Divyāvadāna* and the *Avadānaśataka* reproduce long passages of it; an apparently complete copy, written on birch-bark, was discovered at Gilgit in Kaśmir in 1931 and published by N. Dutt. <sup>17</sup> Between the discovery and the editing, several sheets were misplaced, notably the major part of the *Saṃghabhedavastu* containing a detailed biography of Buddha Śākyamuni. G. Tucci recovered it in Afghanistan and it has appeared in the *Serie Orientale Roma*. The Mūlasarvāstivādin Vinaya also exists in Tibetan translation (Tib. Trip. 1030-1037) and in Chinese translation (T 1442-1451), but the latter, made by Yi-tsing between 700 and 712, is not quite complete.

The Traité has drawn up the table of contents of the Sarvāstivādin Vinaya (p. 104F) and borrows from it some important definitions, such as that of the Buddhadharma (p. 81F), as well as various stories telling the circumstances that led the Teacher to formulate certain disciplinary regulations along with the exceptions they involve: the interdiction of eating impure food (p. 118-121F), of using bowls other than iron or baked clay pātra (p. 1674F), the authorization of accepting and wearing rich robes offered by lay people (p. 1678F), etc. But it is inspired much more frequently by the Mūlasarvāstivādin Vinaya from which it borrows most of the Avadanas and Jatakas with which it ornaments its explanation. After the fashion of this vinaya, it explains most of the events in the life of the Buddha and his great disciples during their last lifetime. It would be impossible to list here the borrowings taken more or less directly from the Mūlasarvāstivādin Vinaya: merely as example, the most characteristic are listed here: conversion of the old Subhadra (p. 205-209F, 1650F), Suddhodana reassured by a god about the health of his son (p. 228-230F), the legend of Dharmaruci (p. 410-414F), Buddha's journey to Sala (p. 457-463), slander about the gardener Gandaka (p. 497-499), the nine or ten torments inflicted on the Buddha in the course of his last lifetime (p.507-511), the niracle of the multiplication of five buddhas (p. 531-535F, 1352-1353F), journeys of the Buddha in southern India, in north-western India and in Kaśmir (p. 546-548F), the story of Śāriputra and Maudgalyāyana (p. 621-633F), the fable of the snake, the frog and the rat (p. 753F), the crimes of Devadatta (p. 868-878F, 1671-1674F), the story of Yasodharā and the explanation of her prolonged pregnancy (p. 1001-1112), the relationship between king Bimbasāra and the courtesan Āmrapāli (p. 990-992F), etc.

The author has an interesting comment on the value of the Vinaya (p. 648b): like the sūtras, the code of monastic discipline is the word of the Buddha but concerns only the things of this world for the welfare of the Samgha; it imposes precepts  $(\dot{s}\bar{\imath}la)$  but does not explain the nature of things  $(dharmat\bar{a})$ .

## C. Sarvāstivādin Kṣudrakapiṭaka.

The Kṣudrakapiṭaka, also called Kṣudrakāgama or simply Kṣudraka by the Traité (p. 341F), formed a separate basket for the Sarvāstivādins, corresponding roughly to the Pāli Khuddakanukāya. It consists of

<sup>16</sup> Mūlasarv. Vin, in Gilgit Manuscripts, III, part 1, p. 2; T 1448, k. 9, p. 41b28.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>17</sup> Gilgit Manuscripts, III, 1942-50.

old minor texts, usually versified, put into the mouth of the Buddha or one of his great disciples. Their number is not fixed, but the more or less complete lists that have come down to us<sup>18</sup> mention the following texts, all of which the *Traité* has used:

- 1) Dharmapada (p. 29F, 1423F, 1513F, 278b, 316a, 464a).
- 2) *Udāna* (p. 325F, 1220F, 1513F).
- 3) Pārāyaṇa (p. 220F, 237F, 295c).
- 4) Satyadrsta.
- 5) Śailagāthā.
- 6) *Sthaviragāthā* and *Anavataptagāthā* (p. 287F, 1363-1364F, 1386F, 1388F, 1426-1437F, 1439F, 1543F, 1546F).
- 7) Arthavargīyāṇi sūtrāṇi (p. 39F, 65F, 1089F).

The more recent editions of these minor texts are mentioned in the Supplement to the Bibliography annexed to the present Introduction.

## D. Sarvāstivādin Abhidharmapitaka.

This basket is the masterpiece of the Sarvāstivādin school; it shows but vague similarities with the Ceylonese Theravādin *Abhidhammapiṭaka*. It includes seven original works which tradition attributes, not to the Buddha himself, but to a series of disciples extending from the first to the sixth century after the Pariniryāna. The Chinese and Tibetan sources <sup>19</sup> do not fully agree on the names of the supposed authors.

- 1) The *Samgītiparyāya*, composed by Śāriputra (T 1536) or by Maudgalyāyana, is a commentary on a sūtra of the Dīrghāgama, the Samgītiparyāya, of which important fragments have been published.<sup>20</sup>
- 2) The *Dharmaskandha* by Mahāmaudgalyāyana (T 1537) or by Śāriputra is a collection of sūtras preached at Jetavana in Śrāvastī and briefly commentated by canonical quotations.
- 3) The *Prajñaptiśāstra* by Mahāmaudgalyāyana (T 1538; Tib. Trip. 5587) shows some resemblance to the cosmological sūtra of the *Dūrghāgama* (T 1, no. 30) and the *Li-che-a-p'i-t'an-louen* (T 1644) which itself also shows all the characteristics of a sūtra.
- 4) The *Vijñānakāya* by Devakṣema (T 1539) or by Devaśarman was composed at Viśoka near Śrāvastī in the century following the Parinirvāṇa.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>18</sup> HBI, p. 177-178.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>19</sup> HBI, p. 203.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>20</sup> Kusum Mittal and V. Stache-Rosen, *Dogmatische begriffsreihen im älteren Buddhismus*, 1968.

- 5) The *Dhātukāya* is attributed to Vasumitra by the Chinese (T1540), to Pūrṇa by the Tibetans: both authors are considered to be contemporaries of Kanişka.
- 6) The *Prakaraṇapāda* (T 1541, 1542) is given by the *Traité* (p. 111-112F) as a collective work: the first four chapters are said to be the work of Vasumitra and the last four, among them the chapter on the Thousand Aporias, the work of the Kaśmirian arhats.
- 7) The  $J\tilde{n}\tilde{a}naprasth\tilde{a}na^{21}$  is the latest in date and by far the most important of the Sarvāstivādin Abhidharma. It is the body ( $\tilde{s}\tilde{a}rira$ ) whereas the six preceding ones are the feet ( $p\tilde{a}da$ ): this is why the Basket in question, although it consists of seven books, is entitled  $\tilde{s}atp\tilde{a}d\tilde{a}bhidharma$  'Abhidharma of Six Feet'

Its author was Kātyāyanīputra, or simply Kātyāyana, who lived in the 3<sup>rd</sup> century after the parinirvāṇa according to Seng-tchao and Hiuan-tsang, in the 3<sup>rd</sup> or 5<sup>th</sup> according to Paramārtha. The Mahāvibhāṣā has it that he composed his work 'in the East', but Hiuan-tsang locates him at Tāmasavana near Cīnabhukti in Kaśmir on the right bank of the Bias. According to Paramārtha, he went to Kaśmir with five hundred arhats and five hundred bodhisattvas to compile the Abhidharma of his school, and the result of this compilation was the *Aṣṭaskandha*, also called *Jñānaprasthāna*. As the work represents the Sarvāstivāda in its pure state, it is not likely that bodhisattvas, as adepts of the Mahāyāna, collaborated in it. Moreover, it may be noted that the traditions about the council of Kaniṣka do not have Kātyāyana appearing in them.

The *Jñānaprasthāna* was in Sanskrit: Vasubandhu's *Kośabhāṣya* and Yaśomitra's *Kośavyāakhyā* cite lengthy extracts from it, and fragments of it have been found at Kapiśa and central Asia: those from Bāmiyān have been published by S. Lévi,<sup>22</sup> and those from Koutcha by B. Pauly<sup>23</sup>: these last were identified by P. Demiéville.<sup>24</sup>

The work has been the object of two Chinese translations: 1. the *Abhidharmāṣṭaskandhaśāstra* (T 1543) translated in 383 at Tch'ang-ngan by Saṃghadeva and Tchou Fo-nien with a preface by Tao-ngan; 2. the *Abhidharmajñānaprasthānaśāstra* (T 1544) translated by Hiuan-tsang at Tch'ang-ngan in 657 to 660.

In the course of time, many commentaries have been made on the  $J\tilde{n}\bar{a}naprasth\bar{a}na$ . According to Taongan, three arhats, Che-t'o p'an-ni, Ta-si and Pi-lo-ni, each dedicated a  $vibh\bar{a}s\bar{a}$  to it; only the first is known to us. Later, five hundred great arhats in turn commented on it. Actually we have three  $vibh\bar{a}s\bar{a}s$  on the  $J\tilde{n}\bar{a}naprasth\bar{a}na$ :

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>21</sup> HBI, p. 203-207.

<sup>22</sup> Note sur des manuscrits sanscrits provenant de Bāmiyān et de Gilgit, JA, 1932, p. 1-13.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>23</sup> Fragments sanskrits de Haute Asie, JA, 1960, p. 509-519.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>24</sup> Un fragment sanskrit de l'Abhidharma des Sarvāstivādin, JA, 1961, p. 461-475.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>25</sup> *Tch'ou-san-tsang-ki-tsi*, T 2145, k. 10, p. 73b.

- 1) *Vibhāṣāśāstra* by Che-t'o-p'an-ni (T1547) or by Kātyāyanaputra himself (?), translated at Tch'ang-ngan in 383 by Saṃghabhadra, Dharmanandin and Buddharakṣa, and perhaps revised at Lo-yang by Saṃghadeva.<sup>26</sup>
- 2) *Abhidharmavibhāṣāśāstra*, by five hundred arhats (T 1546), translated at Leang-cheou from 437 to 439 by Buddhavarman on the basis of an Indian mnauscript found by Tao-t'ai west of the Mountain of Onions (Pamir). It consisted of a hundred *kiuan*, but in 439, as a result of the invasion of the region by the barabarian T'o-pa T'ao, about forty of them were lost and only sixty remain.<sup>27</sup>
- 3) *Abhidharmamahāvibhāṣāśāstra* by five hundred arhats (T 1545) translated by Hiuan-tsang at Tch'angngan in 656-659.

But these facts tell us nothing about the date of the original Sanskrit texts. We know only that the *Mahāvibhāṣā* is later than Kaniṣka since it tells the well-known story of the eunuch and the bulls (T 1545, k. 114, p. 593*a*), placing it as 'once in Gandhara, under Kaniṣka'.

Although the *Traité* contends with the *Sarvāstivādin Abhidharma*, its author reveals himself as an outstanding specialist in this Abhidharma and I [Lamotte] personally think that before his conversion to the Mahāyāna, he professed the Vibhāṣā in some monastery in Kaśmira-Gandhāra. As may be observed in reading the present volume, the explanation of the abhidharmic doctrines take up ten times as much space as their refutation, and the author is careful to say that his explanation is only a summary that could be further extended (p. 1186F, 1225F, 1232F, 1236F, 1273F, 1279F, 1309F, 1362F, 1483F, 1486F, 1492F).

Among the texts and authors that he mentions, the following may be noted:

- 1) The Ṣaṭpādābhidharma (p. 106F, 111F, 536a, 752b), the *Abhidharmasūtra* (p. 576c, 586b), the *Abhidharmapitaka* (p. 105F, 693F), the *Abhidharmavibhanga* (P. 1236F, 1702F, 1703F).
- 2) The Prakaranapāda (p. 11F) and its chapter on the Thousand Aporias (p. 1101F, 1171F, 1181F).
- 3) Kātyāyanīputra or simply Kātyāyana (p. 109F, 614F, 1383F, 1697F), his disciples (p. 245F, 285F, 330*a*), his work called *Jñānaprathānāṣṭaskandha* (p. 109F), *Kātyāyana-* or *Kātyānanīputrābhidharma* (p. 424F, 786F, 787F).
- 4) The *Vibhāṣā* (p. 110F, 377F), the *Abhidharmavibhāṣā* (p. 292F, 343*a*, 579*c*), the *Kātyānīputrābhidharmavibhāṣā* (p. 273*a*) and the Vibhāṣā scholars called Abhidharmavibhāṣopadeśācārya (p. 341*c*). According to some citations (p. 272F, 377F, 728F, 993F), it seems that the author of the *Traité* made use of a complete version of the *Great Vibhāṣā* by five hundred Kaśmirian arhats. For the same reason, he was probably aware of the Abhidharmāmṛitarasa by Ghoṣaka (T 1553) and the Abhidharmasāra by Dharmaśrī (T 1550, by Upaśānta (T 1551) and perhaps also by Dharmatrāta (T 1552).<sup>28</sup> At times he was inspired by some *Dhyānasūtras* such as the *Tch'an-yao-king* (T6090, etc. (p. 1025F, 1322-1323F,

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>26</sup> Cf. R. Shih, *Biographie des moines éminents*, 1968, p. 53, n. 196.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>27</sup> Idem, *ibid.*, p. 120.

\_

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>28</sup> According to the Chinese sources, Dharmaśrī lived in the 3<sup>rd</sup> century A.D., and Dharmatrata at the beginning of the 4<sup>th</sup>: cf. Lin Li-kouang, *L'Aide-Mémoire de la Bonne Loi*, p. 51, 351.

1422F, 1547F, 264c, 705b), but the question of borrowings is obscure and would require an in-depth inquiry.

The *Traité* does not mention the Dāṛṣṭāntika-Sautrāntikas often evoked in the *Mahāvibhāṣā*, but it was certainly familiar with the controversy on time which set them in opposition to the Sarvāstivādins (p. 1691-1694F) and takes its position, understood provisionally, on the side of the opinion of the latter.

In brief, the information that it provides is so vast that it can hardly be situated before the beginning of the 4<sup>th</sup> century A.D.

#### E. Postcanonical Literature.

The author would have been neither Indian nor a scholar if he had not been impassioned by the folklore of his region, the prose and verse biographies of the Buddha Śākyamuni, the tales of previous existences and the innumerable legends current in his time, legends that the Chinese Tripiṭaka grouped into the Section of previous facts (*pen-yuan*) from which É. Chavannes judiciously chose for his fine work *Contes et apologues du Tripiṭaka chinois*. In contrast to Vasubandhu, Saṃgharakṣa, Asaṅga, boring because of their technicality, the author excels in mingling the playful and the serious, without retreating at times in the face of the more spicy stories.

It goes without saying that these legends are without a country of origin. But it is quite natural that the author would have leaned preferentially on the folklore of his own region.

Among the Jātakas that he preferred are the tales where the future Buddha "sacrificed his body, his flesh, his head, his eyes, his marrow and his skull to his enemy" (p. 143F, 691F, 716F, 750F, 945F, 983F, 1654F, 1712F, 502c, 606b, 624c). These stories concern events situated by the 'Golden Legend' in north-west India and commemorated by the building of great stūpas which the Chinese pilgrims such as Fa-hien in about 630 did not fail to visit.

At Nagarahāra (Jelāl-ābād), Śākyamuni received the prediction of the Buddha Dīpamkara after having offered him seven blue lotuses and having spread his hair under his feet (p. 248F, 284F, 983F). – At Puṣkarāvatī (Shāh-Dheti), Śibi made the gift of his eyes to a beggar. – At Varṣapura (Shāhbāzgaṛhī), Sudinna or Viśvantara gave to an insatiable brahmin his white elephant, his kingdom, his chariot, his wife and his children (p. 713-714F, 304c). – At Mingora-Butkara), the bhikṣu Kṣḥāntivādin gave himself up without complaint to the blows of king Kali (p. 264F, 889-990F, 1670F). – At Mahāvana (Sounigrām), the dethroned king Sarvada, wishing to give alms although he had no money, gave himself up to a beggar who then delivered him to the usurper and so obtained a great reward (p. 714-715F). – At Masūrasaṃghārāma (Goumbatai, near Tousak in the Bouner), the brahmacārin Dharmarakta or Dharmatrata, in order to obtain a Buddhist verse, agreed to write it down using his skin as paper, one of his bones as pen and his blood as ink (p. 975-976F). – At Girārai, on the boundary between Peshāwār and Bouner, king Śibi, at the cost of pounds of his own flesh, rescued a pigeon chased by a falcon (p. 255-260F, 1713F, 304c, 314c). – In the Upper Indus, the Bodhisattva gave his body to a starving tigress about to devour her cubs (p. 143F, 723F,

979F). - At Kāpiśī (Bāmiyān), the Bodhisattva let himself be flayed by hunters and devoured by insects in order to remain faithful to his vows (p. 853-855F).

The least that can be said is that the geography of the north-west plays a large part in the *Traité*. It places among the populated and wealthy cities of its time the city of Puṣkarāvati (Prāng, Chārsadda and Rājar), the former Peukelaotis of the Greeks identified by them with Artemis, the tutelary goddess of the city, but which, at the time, belonged to the Ta Yue-tche (p. 172F, 672F). It mentions the miraculous healing of a leper by the bodhisattva Samantabhadra at Haḍḍa (near Jelāl-ābād) at the monastery of Buddhoṣṇīṣa. It was familiar with the large Himalayan lakes of Anavatapta (p. 206F, 450F, 466F, 290*b*, 481*a*) and Mandākinī (p. 466F), and for it, the great rivers of India are not only the Ganges, the Yamunā, the Sasabhū, the Aciravatī and the Mahī listed in the canonical sources (p. 266*a*), but also, and in particular, the northern rivers - the Ganges, Sindhu (Indus), Vakṣu (Oxus) and Sītā (Tarim) which flow out of Lake Anavatapta by the Mouths of the elephant, ox, horse and lion respectively (p. 385F, 450F, 290*b*, 348*b*, 611*c*).

As will be seen from the notes (incomplete, alas) appended to the French translation, the author of the *Traité* has taken the stories and apologues with which his explanation is sprinkled from an enormous mass of documents. Among the postcanonical sources that he preferred, the following texts may be mentioned: the *Aśokasūtra* and the *Aśokāvadāna* from which he borrowed the *avadāna* of the gift of earth (p. 723F, 277a, 301b), the story of Vītaśoka (p.1263-1264F) and probably also the macabre adventure of the man whose limbs were replaced by those of a corpse and who ended up doubting whether he still belonged to the world of the living (p. 738-740F); the *Avadānaśataka* from which was taken the deed of the future Śākyamuni who praised the Buddha Puṣya with a single stanza for seven days and seven nights (p. 253-255F, 297F), , the incident of the blind bhikṣu for whom the Buddha threaded a needle (p. 5690570F), 1645-1646) and the jātaka of the deer that sacrificed itself (p. 1651-1652).

Some texts used by the *Traité* are of an era in which the Buddhist legend about Kanişka was already stereotyped and were translated into Chinese at a late date. This was the case particularly for the *Tsa-paotsang-king* (T203), which dedicated four stories to Kanişka and was translated only in 472 under the Pei Wei by Ki-kia-ye and T'an-yao. From it the *Traité* borrows the story of the Kaśmirian arhat K'i-ye-to (Jeyata?) who lived 700 years after the Buddha and who, invited by Kanişka, categorically refused to get dressed (p. 879F).

The *Kalpanāmaṇditikā* by Kumāralāta, considered by the Chinese to be the teacher of Harivarman, also dedicates two stories to emperor Kaniṣka. It was translated, or rather adapted, only in the 5<sup>th</sup> century by Kumārajīva who named it *Sūtrālaṃkāraśāstra* and attributed it to Aśvaghoṣa (T 201). The *Traité*, without ever designating it by name, borrows from it a good dozen stories as though they were autonomous *avadānas*: the artist from Puṣkarāvatī (p. 672-674F); the outcaste Nītha converted by the Buddha (p. 1634F, 310*a*); the monastic quarrels at Kauśambī (p. 896-898F); king Aśoka and the monk who exhaled a sweet perfume (p. 695-698F); the Buddha disowns Śāriputra (p. 1526F); the Buddha and the cowherds (p. 146-153F); the Śibijātaka (p. 255-260F); Jyotiṣka and Śrīgupta (p. 184F, 1634F); Gautamī's nirvāṇa (p. 587F); the white six-tusked elephant (p. 716-718F); the bodhisattva deer-king (p. 972-975); the bodhisattva king

who gave himself up to his enemy (p. 714F); the Dharma teacher who condemned the brahmanical institutions (p. 489-492F).<sup>29</sup>

By their number and their pecision often pushed to the point of being literal, these borrowings prove irrefutably that the author of the *Traité* is post-Kanişka and, consequently, he cannot be dated in the first or second centuries of our era as has been generally done.

#### F. Heretical Literature.

The *Traité* – and this is new proof of its Indian origin – is familiar with the religions and the philosophical systems which at that time swarmed all over the north-west of India. For its author, whoever is not a 'son of the Śākyas' is a heretic (*tīrthika*) and, in its general meaning, he includes all wandering monks (*parivrājaka*) of poorly defined jurisdiction, Jains (Nirgrantha and Śvetāmbara), brahmins and Hindus, all given to practices condemned by the Buddha (p. 43F, 1409F, 1571F). He is familiar with their 'ninety-six systems' (p. 432F, 1426F, 261a, 325c, 349b, 412b, 581b) and their 'eighteen sacred books' (p. 48F, 92F, 637F, 639F, 1589F). He has read the Vedic literature with its four Vedas and its six Vedaṅgas without, however, neglecting the profane sciences (p. 1623-1624F). He enters into debate at times with those who profess the six brahmanic darśanas, those of the Sāṃkhya (p. 546c) and the Vaiśeṣika (p. 728F, 923F, 1449F). He knows the Hindu iconography and mythology with its great gods like Viṣṇu-Nārāyaṇa, Maheśvara-Śiva, Kumāra, Mahābrahmā the creator, etc., but recognizing in all of them a certain power, he denies any omniscience to them (p. 137-142F, 466F, 562F, 863F). However, he goes so far as to use a Śivaite cosmogony as an argument (p. 835-837F).

It is hard to see how a Chinese or even a Serindian would have been able to be so well-informed about Indian things.

## 3. THE MAHĀYĀNIST BY CONVICTION

Monk and Abhidharma specialist, the author of the *Traité* ended up by being converted to the Mahāyāna movement that had already been introduced into the north-west at least three centuries previously.

## A. The Mahāyāna.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>29</sup> Since this is a borrowing by the *Traité* from the *Kalpanāmaṇḍikā*, the hypothesis suggested on p. 490F, n. 1, is completely unfounded.

In contrast to the Vehicle of the śrāvakas in its religious ideal, its philosophical positions and its buddhology, the Mahāyāna consitutes, in fact, a new Path of liberation.

The Bodhisattva Ideal. – The śrāvaka aspired to the state of arhat, personal salvation involving the suppression, the eradication of the passions and some form of awakening (bodhi) or wisdom (prajñā) concernd with the three general characteristics ( $s\bar{a}m\bar{a}nyalakṣaṇa$ ) of things: impermanence, suffering and selflessness. The saint's death is followed by nirvāṇa, the cessation of painful transmigration, the passing from the domain of contingency to that of the unconditioned (asaṃskṛta) Absolute. In order to attain this ultimate goal, the śrāvaka in the yellow robe of the monastic must travel the path to nirvāṇa, the three essential elements of which are morality (śīla), concentration (samādhi) and wisdom (prajñā).

This ideal of sainthood clearly defined by the Buddha and his disciples could be pursued, in a strict sense and despite its demands, by monks retreating into solitude or within the confines of monasteries; it was beyond the reach of the lay person living in the world and prey to all the cares of the times. Accustomed to supporting their fellows and, moreover, to furnishing the Community with food, clothing and shelter, the lay people practiced the active virtues resulting from their estate rather than the passive virtues of which the monastics were an example. In literature as in art, there arose the infatuation of the upāsakas and the upāsikās for the Jātakas or stories of previous existences in the course of which the future Buddha Śākyamuni multiplied his actions of generosity, morality, patience, exertion and wisdom, thus giving the measure of his altruistic virtues. It was, therefore, him rather than the stiff and solitary monk that the lay people took as model with the secret hope that by following his example they too would arrive at the state of Buddhahood.

The Mahāyāna came to consecrate these profound aspirations by inviting not only the monastic but also the 'sons and daughters of noble family' to engage in the career of the bodhisattvas, i.e., the future Buddhas.

But the prerogative of the Buddhas is not just sainthood (*arhattva*) but also the possession of supreme perfect awakening (*anuttarāsamyaksaṃbodhi*), omniscience (*sarvajñāna*), the awareness of things in all their aspects (*sarvākārajñatā*) put to the service of all beings.

For the adept who takes up the career of the bodhisattva, there are two crucial moments: i) the production of the mind of bodhi ( $bodhicittotp\bar{a}da$ ) by which the bodhisattva promises by solemn vows ( $pranidh\bar{a}na$ ) to conquer supreme awakening in order to devote himself to the welfare and happiness of all beings; ii) the attainment of the said awakening ( $sambodhipratil\bar{a}bdha$ ) which transforms him into a Buddha.

A long interval stretches out between these two moments, for the bodhisattva delays his entry into complete nirvāṇa indefinitely in order to practice his salvific activity as long as possible. He actually knows that, once entered into nirvāṇa, he will no longer be able to do anything for anyone. And so, in three, seven or thirty-three incalculable periods (asamkhyeyakalpa), he traverses the ten stages ( $bh\bar{u}mi$ ) of his career, accumulating the meritorious actions and practicing the six or ten perfections ( $p\bar{a}ramit\bar{a}$ ), namely, generosity ( $d\bar{a}na$ ), morality ( $s\bar{i}la$ ), patience ( $ks\bar{a}nti$ ), exertion ( $v\bar{v}rya$ ), meditation ( $dhy\bar{a}na$ ), wisdom ( $prajn\bar{a}$ ), skillful means ( $up\bar{a}yakausalya$ ), vows ( $pranidh\bar{a}na$ ) for sambodhi and the welfare of beings, power (bala) and knowledge ( $jn\bar{a}na$ ).

Infinite Multiplication of Buddhas and Bodhisattvas. — While recognizing in the Buddha a series of prerogatives and powers, the śrāvakas kept him on the human plane for a long time. They held him to be the possessor of the sciences and practices, the teacher of gods and humans; they were not aware that once he entered into nirvāṇa, he was invisible to gods and men, leaving them his Dharma as sole inheritance. According to them, the appearance of a Buddha was an exceptional event, as rare as the blossoming of the fig tree, and humanity remains without guide and without counsellor for long periods.

A god 'dead since nirvāṇa', as H. Kern defined it, could be enough for the monastics in the strict sense, but could not satisfy the aspirations of people who urgently required a supreme being, a pantheon of saints, a mythology and a cult. The popularization of the holy Dharma and its penetration into the masses had the result of transforming the wise preceptor of gods and men into a 'God higher than the gods' (*devātideva*) and to surround him with a crowd of *dii minores et maiores* as powerful disciples.

The Hināyāna sects had already upheld this process of sublimation, the Sarvāstivādins by filling the legend of Śākyamuni with marvels, the Mahāsāṃgikas by setting aside his historical career into the domain of fiction. And as the need for efficacious protectors became more urgent, the śrāvakas imagined a compassionate messiah at the side of the transcendent Buddha, the future Buddha Maitreya, and some arhats, immortalized by the needs of the cause, ever ready to fly to the aid of the faithful.

These are but exceptions, and the Mahāyāna did not hesitate in multiplying the Buddhas and bodhisattvas infinitely. Breaking the narrow limits of the ancient cosmology, they imagined an infinite number of universes in the bosom of the cosmos, each ruled over by a Buddha assisted by one or more great bodhisattvas. The Buddha is already in possession of supreme awakening, whereas the great bodhisattvas, those of the tenth *bhūmi*, are merely 'close to awakening'. Apart from this difference, both Buddha and bodhisattva, inspired by the same loving-kindness, convert beings in the universes belonging to them and often appear simultaneously in multiple forms in different universes.

Śākyamuni, whose historical existence cannot be brought into doubt, will henceforth be seen to have aligned with him and comparable to him peers and emulators in number as many as the sands of the Ganges. He will remain the best known but not the only one. Other Buddhas will be seen to arise, such as Amitabha or Amitāyus reigning in the west over Sukhāvati, Akşobhya in the east governing his universe Abhirati, Bhaiṣajyaguru, also in the east, exercising his activity as healer. The most famous bodhisattvas were Maitreya waiting in Tuṣita heaven for the time to succeed Śākyamuni; Avalokiteṣvara residing on Mount Potalaka before manifesting in China as the female deity Kouan-yin; Manjuśrī, the bodhisattva of knowledge who, in various forms, appeared in India, Khotan, Nepal, finally to reside at Wou-t'ai-chan.

Most of these Buddhas and bodhisattvas have no ties with history and are only names; some, however, arise from anonymity to become personages of choice for the Mahāyānists, and the interest devoted to them was so lively that they leap out of legend quivering with life.

In the scholarly mind, they are, above all, symbols of universal wisdom and compassion. The Buddhas are identical in their essential body (*dharmakāya*), identified with the truth discovered and preached by them. They are enthroned in the paradises, surrounded by gods and saints whom they delight with their enjoyment bodies (*saṃbhogakāya*). They send down below representatives of themselves, emanated bodies

(nirmāṇakāya) preaching the Dharma and converting beings. This salvific work is that of the truth that leads to the end of suffering, to detachment, to peace.

The twofold non-existence of beings and things. – Faithful to the teachings of Śākyamuni, the śrāvakas had proclaimed the non-existence of the individual (pudgalanairātmya); the Mahāyānists, by a later step, further professed the non-existence of things (dharmanairātmya).

Belief in the self (*satkāyadṛṣṭi*) is the most pernicious of errors because it plants as a root in the mind all kinds of desire, the cessation of which is the condition *sine qua non* of liberation. Śrāvaka and Mahāyānist agree in condemning the belief in a self (ātmagrāha) and the belief in mine (ātmīyagrāha): whatever the names they use to designate them, the soul, the living being, the person, the individual, the agent, does not exist; men, saints, bodhisattvas and Buddhas are only names corresponding to nothing substantial.

But if the śrāvakas were the first to deny the self, they did recognize some sort of reality in things. The great schools of the Sarvāstvādins and the Sautrāntikas prepared long or short lists of conditioned things (samskṛtadharma), i.e., resulting from causes (pratītyasamutpanna) – material entities, minds and mental events, formations dissociated from mind and matter – having only momentary or infinitesimal duration, but nevertheless possessing a self-nature (svabhāva) and specific characteristics (lakṣaṇa): short-lived and transitory, but nevertheless realities.

For the Mahāyānists, on the other hand, dharmas, as arising from causes, do not exist in themselves; they are empty of self nature (*svabhāvaśūnya*) and empty of specific characteristics (*lakṣaṇaśūnya*).

Three corollaries follow from this emptiness:

- *i*) Dharmas are unborn and are not destroyed, for empty things arising from empty things are unborn, Being unborn, they are never destroyed.
- *ii*) Dharmas, being without production or destruction, are peaceful or 'nirvāṇic' from the beginning, nirvāṇa being none other than peace.
- iii) Dharmas, being without exception peaceful and nirvanic, are all equal and involve no duality.

This is why the Mahāyāna adept, the bodhisattva, does not grasp them and, as the *Pañcaviṃśatisāhasrikā* says (p. 146F), if he does not grasp them, it is due to their absolute purity, namely, non-production, non-manifestation, non-activity, non-existence (*anupalambha*).

It follows that the four truths preached at Benares by Śākyamuni need a new interpretation. The Buddha said: "All phenomena of existence are suffering", but these phenomena do not exist. He said: "The origin of suffering is desire", but suffering is unborn. He said: "There is a cessation of suffering, nirvāṇa", but as suffering in unborn, nirvāṇa is acquired by rights, and saṃsāra, painful transmigration, coincides with it. Finally he said: "The eightfold Path leads to the cessation of suffering", but as suffering is not to be destroyed, the path to its cessation has already been traversed. 30

-

These ideas will be masterfully set forth, p. 1381-1382F.

Face with the emptiness of beings and things, the attitude of the sage is to do nothing, to say nothing, to think nothing: that is the secret of peace.

Emptiness. – Some western interpreters have wanted to see in emptiness ( $ś\bar{u}nyat\bar{a}$ ) an absolute negation, but when the Mahāyānists say that beings and things are empty, they attribute no nature to them. They refuse to hypostatize an emptiness that is nothing other than what is (akimcid), a 'simple non-existence' ( $abh\bar{a}vam\bar{a}tra$ ). It is not by virtue of an emptiness that beings and things are empty; they are empty because they are not. The very notion of emptiness is only a provisional expedient: it is a raft that one abandons after having crossed over the river, a medicine that one rejects after being cured. This is why the Mahāyānists are not nihilists: nihilists deny what they see; Mahāyānists, not seeing anything, affirm nothing and deny nothing. 31

Truth of appearance and absolute truth. – An objection naturally arises in the mind: on the one hand, the Mahāyāna nourishes the high ideal of goodness and multiplies the Buddhas and bodhisattvaswho are its protagonists; on the other hand, it affirms the non-existence of beings and the emptiness of dharmas. Of the two things, either the Buddhas and bodhisattvas convert beings or else nobody converts anybody.

The Mahāyānists themselves posed this objection and found an answer to it in the theory of the twofold truth: the conventional or provisional truth (saṃvṛtisatya) and the absolute truth (paramārthasatya). Without living a daily life according to the customary norms, one does not grasp the true nature of things (dharmatā); but this is what must be understood in order to reach the goal. It is indispensable at the start to bow to conventions because they are the means of reaching nirvāṇa in the same way that someone who wants to empty out water first needs to get a vessel.

At the beginning of his career, the still partially awakened bodhisattva who sees beings and perceives things, must practice normally the virtues of his level: practicing generosity, observing discipline, maintaining patience, concentrating the mind, and awakening wisdom. That is the mundane and provisional way of practicing the virtues.

But when his mind has opened to the absolute truth, when he has penetrated the twofold emptiness of beings and things, he raises the same virtues to the rank of perfections ( $p\bar{a}ramit\bar{a}$ ). Conforming to the nature of things, he gives by making no further distinction between donor, recipient and the thing given; he observes discipline by identifying sin with merit; he is patient in considering suffering as non-existent; he is energetic by making no physical effort; he concentrates his mind by identifying concentration with distraction; he is wise by abstaining from opposing error and truth. In a word, the goal of the bodhisattva's career is the stopping of all speech and all practice ( $sarvav\bar{a}dacaryoccheda$ ) and, as this non-activity corresponds to reality, it assures the welfare of beings more effectively than a feverish activity inspired by false prejudice.

By accepting from the point of view of the truth of appearance that which he rejects from the point of view of the absolute truth and vice versa, the Mahāyānist stays equidistant between affirmation and negation,

-

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>31</sup> See above, p. 925F, 1078-1095F; also below, p. 1225-1229F.

between the view of existence and that of non-existence: he is established in the Middle Way (*madhyamā pratipad*), sheltered from all criticism.

## B. The Mahāyānasūtras.

The new ideas found their expression in the *Mahāyānasūtras*, also called *Vaipulyasūtras*, 'Texts of Lengthy Development', which spread in India about the time of our era, five centuries after the Parinirvāṇa.

The *Traité* gives some second-hand information on the genesis of this literature:

- 1. Having appeared in the east, immediately after his awakening the Buddha Śākyamuni preached publicly to the śrāvakas the famous Sermon at Benares dealing with the four Noble Truths. A little later, at Rājagṛha on Gṛdhrakuṭaparvata, he taught the *Prajñāpmaramitā*, soon followed by other Mahāyānasūtras, to a chosen assembly of bodhisattvas and eminent śrāvakas such as Ānanda, Śāriputra and Subhūti, This last revelation remained unknown to the ordinary public and the śrāvakas had no knowledge of it, but the gods who heard it from the heavens uttered cries of joy and affirmed having been present at the second turning of the Wheel of Dharma (*dvitīyam dharmacakrapravartanam*) (p. 517a).
- 2. After the Buddha's death, Mahākaśyapa gathered a great council at Rājagṛha, and a thousand arhats compiled the texts of the Hīnayāna Tripiṭaka (p. 90-106F). Also, but in another place, on Mount Vimalasvabhāva as it will be told later, the great bodhisattvas Mañjuśrī and Maitreya, taking Ānanda with them, compiled the Mahāyāna. But Ānanda, knowing deeply the aspirations and behavior of beings, did not preach the Mahāyāna to the śrāvakas who were incapable of understanding (p. 938-941F; 756b).
- 3. Conforming to a prediction, after the Buddha's Parinirvāṇa, the Prajñāpārāmitā, the first in the list of Mahāyānasūtras, came from the east to the south, from the south to the west, without, it would seem, meeting much success (p. 25F, 541*b*).
- 4. Finally, in the five hundred years after the Parinirvāṇa, it reached the north (*uttarapatha*) where there were many believers (p. 25F):

"This Prajñāpāramitā, in the north, will do the Buddha's work. Here is the reason: when the Buddha was in this world, he was able to cut the doubts of the Saṃgha: the Buddhadharma prospered and there was no fear that it might disappear. But five hundred years after the Buddha's Parinirvāṇa, the holy Dharma gradually, and from then on the work of the Buddha has been menaced. Then beings of keen faculties (tīkṣnendriya) will study and meditate [the Prajñāpāramitā]; they will make offerings of flowers and perfumes to it. Beings of weak faculties (mṛdvindriya) will transcribe it and also offer flowers and perfumes. These two types of beings finally will find salvation... This profound Prajñāpāramitā will spread afar in the northern region. Indeed, among all the regions of Jambudvīpa, the north is the vastest. Furthermore, the Snow Mountains (Himālaya) are there and since it is cold, its plants can destroy the passions [of desire (rāga), hatred (dveṣa) and ignorance (moha). As a result of

the grains that are eaten, these three poisons have no great virulence. For this reason, people are gentle, their faith is steady and their faculties are powerful. Because of all that, in the north those who practice the Prajñāpāramitā are numerous." (p. 26F, 531b)

And the *Traité* is kind enough to comment on a passage in the *Prajñāpāramitasūtras* that tells the circumstances in which the bodhisattva Sadāprarudita found a manuscript of the Prajñā written on gold leaf with molten beryl and sealed with seven seals at Gandhāra in the city of Gandhavatī (in Chinese *Tchong-hiang-ti* or *Miao-hiang-ti*) (p. 744a).

By adopting these legends among so many others, by considering these predictions as long realized, the author reveals once more his connections with the north-west and his relatively late date. It goes without saying that his Sarvāstivādin colleagues rejected all these Mahāyānasūtras as apocryphal and refused to consider them. Hence certain comments of the author, not free of bitterness: "You do not believe in the Mahāyāna, you reject the proof and you claim that only the śrāvaka system has value" (p. 1698F); "This is a big mistake, for the Mahāyānasūtras are the true Buddhadharma, uttered from the very mouth of the Buddha. You must not reject them. Besides, you take your origin from the Mahāyāna" (p. 293F); or also: "It is true that your Kātyāyanīputra expresses himself in that way and that is indeed why he is called the son of Kātyāyanī; if he were really a Śākyaputrīya, he would not say that" (p. 1697F).

In commenting on the *Pañcaviṃśatisāhasrikā*, the *Traité* does not draw its explanations solely from the Prajñā literature, but calls upon all the Mahāyānasūtras known at that time, the production of which extended over almost three centuries. It cites them abundantly but most often does not mention their titles. For this reason, I [Lamotte] have not been able to make a complete list of them. Since the Indian originals were never dated, I [Lamotte] have adopted a chronological order here based, for want of anything better, on the dates of the first Chinese translations of them.

- 1. Prajñāpāramitāsūtra, cited Pan-jo-po-lo-mi-king: see references in Taisho Index no. 13, p. 146-147.
- a. *Aṣṭasāhasrikā*, T 224, tr. Tche Tch'an in 179 (cf. T225 to 228; Tib. 734). Cited *Tao-hing-king = Sarvākārajñatācaryā*, (title of chap. 1 of the translation by Tche Tch'an), p. 529*b*; *Siao-p'in = Kṣudrakaparivarta*, p. 620*a*.
- b. *Pañcavimśatisāhasrikā*, T222, transl. Dharmarakṣa and Gītamitra in 286 (cf. T 221, 223; Tib. 731). Cited *Kouang-tsan* = *Raśmipramokṣa* (title of chap. 1), p. 529*b*, 620*a*.
- c. *Pañcaviṃśatisāhasrikā*, T 221, transl. Mokṣala and Tchou Chou-lan in 291. Cited Fang-kouang = Raśmipramokṣa (title of chap. 1), p. 314*a*, 529*b*, 620*a*.
- **2**. *Pratyutpannabuddhasaṃmukhāvasthitasamādhisūtra*, T 418, transl. Tche Tch'an in 179 (cf. T 416, 417, 419; Tib. 801). Cited *Pan-tcheou-king = Pratyutpannasūtra*, p. 306*a*; mentioned without title, p. 245F, 425F, 430F, 526F, 1023F, 276*a*, 314*a*, 320*a*, 335*b*, 416*a*.

- 3. Śūraṃgamasamādhidūtra, transl. Tche Tch'an in 186, lost (cf. T 642; Tibet. 800). Cited *Cheouleng-yen-san-mei-king*, p. 602F, 349a; *Mo-ho-yen Cheou leng-yen-king*, p. 1647F, *Cheou-leng-yen-king*, p. 273b, 303b, 312a, 586b; mentioned without title, p. 1611F.
- 4. *Drumakimnararājaparipṛcchā*, T 624, transl. Tche Tch'an (cf. T 625;Tib.824). Mentioned without title, p. 609F, 615F, 654F, 1046F).
- **5**. *Ajātaśatrukaukṛtyavinodana*, T 629, transl. anonymously between 265-316 (cf. T 626 to 628; Tib. 882). <sup>32</sup> Cited *Fang-po-king*, p. 340*c*.
- **6**. Ṣaṭpāramitāsūtra, T 778, transl. Yen Fo-t'iao between 181 and 188. Cited *Lieou-po-lo-mi-king*, p. 308a, 394b.
- 7. *Vimalakīrtinirdeśasūtra*, transl. Yen Fo-t'iao in 188, lost (cf. T 474 to 476; Tib. 843). Cited *P'i-mo-lo-kie-king*, p. 515F, 902F, 1044F, 267*c*, 278*b*, 284*a*, 657*b*, 709*a*, 727*a*, 744*b*; *Pou-eul-jou-fa-men* = *Advayapraveśadharmaparyāya* (title of ch. 8), p. 903F, 1635F.
- **8**. *Amitābhavyūha* or *Greater Sukhāvatīvyūha*, T 362, transl. Tche K'ien between 222-229 (cf. T 360, 361, 363, 364; Tib. 760, no. 5) Cited *A-mi-t'o-fo-king*, p. 556F; *A-mi-t'o-king*, p. 708c; mentioned without title, p. 300F, 465F, 601F, 276a, 309a, 311c, 343a, 712a.
- 9. Nandopanandanāgarājadamanasūtra, T 597, transl. Tche K'ien between 222 and 229 (cf. Tib. 755). Cited *Hiang-nana-t'o-p'o nan-t'o-long-wang-hiong-wen-king*, p. 189F mentioned without title, p. 1359F.
- **10**. *Tathāgatajñānamudrā-[samādhi]*, T 632, transl. Tche-K'ien between 222-229 (cf. T 633, 634; Tibe. 799). Cited *Tche-yin-king = Jñānamudrāsūtra*, p. 744*b*.
- **11**. *Tathāgataguhyasūtra* or *Tathāgatācuntyaguhyanirdeśa*, T 312, transl. Dharmarakṣa in 280 (cf. T 310, no. 3; Tib. 760, no. 3). Cited *Mi-tsi-kin-king* = *Guhyakasūtra*, p. 19F, 1638F, 284a, 466b, 684a; *Mi-tsi-kin-kang-king* = *Guhyakavajrapāṇisūtra*, p. 560F. Mentioned without title, p. 1587F.
- 12. Viśeṣacintibrahmaparipṛcchā, T 585, transl. Dharmarakṣa in 286 (cf. T 586, 587; Tibe. 827).Cited Tch'e-sin-king = Viśeṣacintisūtra, p. 1714F, 275a, 297c, 534a, 604a, 631a; Wang-ming (or Mingwang)-p'ou-sa-king = Jālinīpṛabhabodhisattvasūtra, p. 1268F, 1417F, 267a.
- **13**. *Saddharmapuṇḍarīka*, T 263, tr. Dharmarakṣa in 286 (cf. T 262; 264; Tib. 781). Cited *Fa-houa* or *Fa houa-king*, p. 417-418F, 555F, 578F, 280*a*, 299*b*, 300*b*, 303*b*, 339*a*, 394*b*, 420*b*, 466*b*, 619*b*, 648*c*, 713*b*, 714*a*, 754*b*, 756*b*; mentioned without title, p. 294F-295F.
- **14**. *Saṃvṛtiparamārthasatyanirdeśa*, T 460, transl. Dharmarakṣa in 289 (cf. T 1489, 1490; Tib. 846). Cited *Tsing-king = Praśantasūtra*, p. 1562F.
- **15**. *Tathāgatamahākaruṇānirdeśa*, T 398, tr. Dharmarakṣa in 291 (cf. T 397, no. 1-2). Cited *Ta-pei-king*, p. 756*b*.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>32</sup> There is an older translation by Tche Tch'an (T 626), but judging from the title it adopts, the *Traité* is referring to the anonymous translation (T 629).

- **16**. *Daśabhūmikasūtra*, T 285, transl. Dharmarakṣa in 297; T 286, transl. Kumārajīva between 402 and 409 or 413 (cf. T 278, no. 22; 279, no. 26; 287; Tib. 761). Cited *Tsien-pei-king* (title abridged from the transl. by Dharmarakṣa), p. 272a; *Che-ti-king* (title from the transl. by Kumārajīva), p. 411a, 712c; *Fa-yun-king* = *Dharmameghasūtra* (name from the 10<sup>th</sup> bhūmi of the *Daśabhūmika*), p. 308a, 76b.
- 17. Bhadrakalpikasūtra, T 425, transl. Dharmarakṣa in 300 (cf. Tib. 762). Cited Hien-kie-king, p. 271a, 395a; Hien-kie-san-mei = Bhadrakalpasamādhi, p. 498a.
- . Maitreyaparipṛcchā, T 349, tr. Dharmarakṣa in 303 (cf. T 310, no, 42). Cited *Mi-lö-wen-king*, p. 394*h*.
- . *Akṣayamati[nirdeśa]sūtra*, T 403, transl. Dharmarakṣain 308 (cf. T 397, no. 12; Tib. 842). Cited *Wou-tsin-yi-p'ou-sa-wen* = *Akṣayamaibodhisattvapariprcchā*, p. 1245F, 1272F; *Wou-tsin-yi-king* = *Akṣayamatisūtra*, p. 1716F; *A-tch'a-mo-king* = *Akṣatamatisūtra* (title of transl., by Dharmarakṣa), p. 442a.
- . *Anavataptanāgarāpariprcchā*, T 635, transl. Dharmarakṣa in 308; Tib. 823). Mentioned without title, p. 294F, 450F, 344a, 384b.
- 21. Buddhasamgīti, T 810, transl. Dharmaraksa (cf. Tib. 894). Cited Tchou-fo-yao-tsi-king, p. 566F.
- . Śrīmatībhrāhmaṇīparipṛcchā, T 567, transl. Dharmarakṣa (cf. T 568;Tib. 837). Cited *Tö-niu-king* = Śrīmatīsūtra, p. 61-363F, 697a.
- . *Upāyakauśalyaparipṛccha*, T 345, transl. Dhrmarakṣa (cf. T 310, no, 38, 346, Tib. 927). Cited *Fang-pien-king* = *Upāyasūtra*, p, 756b.
- . *Gaṇḍavyūha*, T 294, transl. Cheng kien, between 388-408 (cf. T 278, no. 34; 279, no. 39; 293, 295; Tib. 751, no. 64). Cited *Pou-k'o-sseu-yi-king = Acintyasūtra*, p. 311F, 317a, 419a.
- . *Kuśalamūlasaṃparigrahasūtra*, T 657, transl. Kumārajīva btween 402 and 409 or 413 (cf. Tib. 769). Cited *Houa-cheou-king* (title of transl. by Kumārajīva), p. 571F, 308*a*, 394*b*, 756*b*.
- . *Sarvadharmāpravṛttinirdeśa*, T 650, transl. Kumārajīva between 402 and 409 or 413 (cf. T 651, 652; Tib. 847). *Cited Tchou-fa-wou-hing-king* (title of transl.. by Kumārajīva), p. 1635F.
- **27**. *Vikurvaṇarājaparipṛcchā*, T 420, transl. Kumārajīva between 402 and 409 or 413 (cf. T 421; Tib. 834). Mentioned without reference, p. 1611F.
- . *Mahāmeghasūtra*, T 87, transl. Dharmakṣema between 424 and 421 (cf. Tib. 898). Cited *Ta-yun-king*, p. 308*a*, 394*b*, 756*b*.
- **29**. *Ratnaketu[dhāraṇī]sūtra*, <sup>33</sup> T 397, no. 9, transl. Dharmakṣema between 414 and 421 (cf. Tib. 402; Tibe, 806). Cited *Pao-ting-king = Ratnaketusūtra*, p. 266c.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>33</sup> See fragments of the Indian original in R. Hoernle, *Manuscript Remains*, p. 100-103; N. Dutt, *Gilgit Manuscripts*, IV, p. 1-138.

- **30**. *Ratnameghasūtra*, T 658, transl. Mandrasena in 503 (cf. T 659, 660, 489; Tib. 897). Cited *Pao-yun-king*, p.756b; mentioned without reference, p. 1613F. Perhaps the same as *Yun-king* = *Meghasūtra*, cited p. 308*a*, 394*b*.
- **31**. *Amitāyurbuddhānusmṛtisūtra*, T 365, transl. Kālayaśas between 424 and 432 or 442. Msntioned without references, p. 1361F.
- **32**. *Mañjusryavadāna*: not identified. Cited *Wen-chou-che-li-pen-yuan*, p. 398F.
- **33**. *Asurarājaparipṛcchāsūtra*: not identified. Cited *A-siu-lo-wang-wen-king*, p. 746b.

From this list, incomplete as it is, it may be seen that the author of the *Traité* used the Mahāyānasūtras originally appearing in India over three centuries which had been translated into Chinese between 179 and 503A.D. At that time, these sūtras seem to have been independent publications and were not yet incorporated into vast collections like those of the *Prajñā*, the *Avataṃsaka*, the *Ratnakūṭa* or the *Mahāsaṃnipāta*.

## C. The Madhyamaka.

Presenting themselves as the word of the Buddha, the Mahāyānasūtras do not have to justify their teachings: they proceed with categorical statements (more negative than affirmative) and only by way of exception do they sketch out any proof. From the philosophical point of view, they insist on the twofold emptiness of beings and of things and try to inculcate in their readers the 'conviction that dharmas do not arise' (anutpattikadharmakṣānti) with all its consequences. From the religious point of view, they turn the spotlight on certain Buddhas, certain bodhisattvas: Akṣobhya is the preference of the *Praiyāpāramitās*, Samantabhadra of the *Pratyutpannasamādhis*, Amitabhā of the *Sukhāvatīvyūhas*, Vajrapāṇi of the *Tathāgataguhyas*, etc.

At one time the need was felt to condense the teachings of the Mahāyānasūtras. This was the work of the first Mādhyamika 'philosophers of the Middle' and partisans of emptiness (śūnyavāda), Nāgārjuna, Āryadeva and Rāhulabhadra. In technical perfect Sanskrit in the manner of Aśvaghoṣa, they wrote opuscules as memorial verses (kārikā).

The goal of Nāgārjuna and his disciple Āryadeva is to reduce to the absurd (*prasanga*) the realist and pluralist views of the philosophical systems current at their time, notably Sarvāstivādin Buddhism, brahmanical Sāmkhya and Vaiśeṣika. They show that the facts or basic categories of the old Buddhism escape any preaching: existence, non-existence, existence and non-existence, neither existence nor non-existence, and that affirmation or negation of any proposition whatsoever necessarily involves the negation or affirmation of its opposite. Avoiding the extreme views, refusing to make any categorical statement on a defined subject, following a "Middle Path", these authors escape from all criticism. More a mystic than

philosopher, Rāhulabhadra dedicated to Prajñāpāramitā a hymn that was greatly appreciated by the Indians. All the information that could be desired on the life of Nāgārjuna, his works, his supposed relationship with Kaniṣka and the Śātavāhanas may be found in Venkata Ramanan's work, *Nāgārjuna's Philosophy as presented in the Mahā-Prajñāpāramitā-Śāstra*, 1966. Here I [Lamotte] will limit myself to documenting a passage from the *Si-yu-tche* 'Description of the Western Lands' by *Tao-che Tao-ngan* (312-385) reproduced in the *Fa-yuan-tchou-lin* by *Tao-che* (T 2122, k. 38, p. 589a). To my knowledge [Lamotte], it is the oldest mention of Nāgārjuna; it has him living five hundred year after the Parinirvāṇa, but contrary to most later sources, it places him, not in Dakṣiṇakosala or Vidarbha, but in northern Kosala (capital Śrāvasti) and in the kingdom of Kāśī (Benares) which, at the time of the Buddha, was governed by king Prasenajit:

The *Si-yue-tche* says: "There is a large stūpa on the sea-shore five hundred *li* east of king Prasenajit's capital. Within this big stūpa there is a small stūpa twelve feet high, adorned with precious ornaments; each night there is a flash of light like great fire. It is said that five hundred years after the Parinirvāṇa of the Buddha, the bodhisattva Nāgārjuna went into the ocean to convert a nāgarāja. The nāgarāja offered this precious stūpa to Nāgārjuna who then made a gift of it to this kingdom. The king then built a large stūpa to enclose the small one. For ages, people in search of a favor come there to prostrate themselves, burn incense and offer flowery parasols. These flowery parasols rise by themselves into the air, spin about and gradually ascend. After each night, they disappear without anyone knowing their whereabouts.

The Si-yu-tche says: "In the kingdom of Vāraṇasī (Benares), the bodhisattva Nāgārjuna built seven hundred stūpas and following that, the stūpas built by worldly people and the saints were innumerable. Just on the banks of the river *Tcha-lien* (for *Ni-lien-tchan-na* = Nairañjana), more than a thousand stūpas were built; every five hundred years (*pañcavarṣa*), a great free assembly is convened."

It was Kumārajīva who who made known the works of the first Madhyamikas in China. Among other texts, he translated, during the 6<sup>th</sup> *hong-che* year (404), the second part of the Śātakaśāstra by Āryadeva with commentary by Vasu (T 1659) and, during the 11<sup>th</sup> *hong-che* year (409), the *Madhyamakaśāstra* by Nāgārjuna with commentary by Pingala (T1564),<sup>35</sup> two works known to and cited by the author of the *Traité*.

1. He took his inspiration mainly from Nāgārjuna's Madhyamakaśāstra from which he reproduces many extracts sometimes by mentioning the title (p. 69F, 1142F, 1609-1620F, 338c), sometimes without naming

Other citations of the *Che Tao-ngan Si-yu-tche*, thought to be identical with the *Che-che Si-yu-ki*, have been collected by L. Petech in an article entitled "*Description des Pays d'Occident*" *de Che Tao-ngan* (Mélanges de Sinologie offerts à P. Demiéville, I, 1966, p. 167-190.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>35</sup> Cf. the preface by T'an-ying, T 2145, k. 11, p. 77b8-9; *K'ai-yuan*, T 2154, k. 4, p. 513*a*6.

it (p. 36F, 45-46F, 72F, 396-397F, 922F, 1204-1207F, 1436F, etc.). <sup>36</sup> He refers twice (p. 36F, 1638F) to the well-known dedicatory *kārikā* where Nāgārjuna summarizes his doctrine in a series of eight 'No's': *Anirodham anutpādam*, etc.

- 2. He knows the 'Centuries' by Āryadeva and refers to it at least once (p. 1370F) by simply mentioning the title of one of its chapters, the *Ātmapratiṣedhaprakaraṇa* (see below, p. 1370-1375F as note).
- 3. He cites almost in its entirety the *Prajñāpāramitāstotra* by Rāhulabhadra whom the Chinese tradition unanimously gives as disciple of Āryadeva, himself the disciple of Nāgārjuna.<sup>37</sup>

From these investigations we may conclude that the author is later than the first Madyhamikas and should not be identified with Nāgārjuna the author of the *Madhyamakaśāstra*. If, as Kumārajīva has it, the real Nāgārjuna was born 880 years after the Buddha's Parinirvāṇa which he fixes at the 15<sup>th</sup> year of king Siang, cyclic *kia-chen* order (637 B.C.), that is, in 243 A.D., the author of the *Traité* who knew the disciples and the grand-disciples of Nāgārjuna could hardly have been active before the beginning of the 4<sup>th</sup> century of our era.

Here, in its main features, is the picture that emerges from his work. A native of the north-west and steeped in his Indian nationality, he became a monastic in some monastery of Kaśmir-Gandhāra of Sarvāstvādin persuasion. He devoted himself passionately to the study of the Tripiṭaka and specialized in the Ṣaṭpādābhidharma and its various Vibhāṣās. He acquired such mastery of them that he was probably in charge of teaching them. Devoured by curiosity, he showed a pronounced taste for reading and soon the golden legend of Buddhism which was flourishing in the north-west no longer held any secrets for him. He did not, however, dissociate himself from the heretics with whom he was in close contact on their almsrounds: he had a sufficient rather than schematic acquaintance with Vedic literature, of the Brahmanic systems, especially the Sāṃkhya and Vaiśeṣika, as well as the Hindu doctrines (Śivaism and Viṣṇuism). He took part in internal debates between the Sarvāstivādin-Vaibhāṣikas and the Dāṛṣṭāntika-Sautrāntikas of Kumāralāta and did not hide his preference for the former.

But already, almost three centuries ago, the Mahāyānist movement had taken root in the north-west where it found favor with sons and daughters of good family. Accustomed to the routine of community life and intellectually tired, most of the Sarvāstivādin monks had but little interest in the new ideas that troubled their mental security and modified their customs. Our author was of a different nature. Becoming progressively more familiar with the Mahāyānasūtras that were published, becoming familiar with the

In his introduction to the *Suvikrāntavikrāmin*, p. LXX, R. Hikata notes several Nāgārjunian stanzas in T 1509 that have escaped me [Lamotte]: p. 61b11-12 = XVIII, 7; p. 64c9-10 = XVII, 20; p. 96c13-14 = XVIII, 7; p. 97b = I, 1 (anirodham anutpāda...); p. 107a13-14 = XV, ii.

For Rāhulabhadra, see below, p. 1373-1375. Contrary to the Chinese tradition of the 6<sup>th</sup> century, Candrakīrti and the Tibetan historians make him the teacher of Nāgārjuna, probably under the influence of the chronicles of Nālandā which, in their lists of siddhas, give the following sequence: Rāhulabhadra (or Rāhula), Nāgārjuna, Āryadeva: cf. Dpag-bsam ljon-bsan (tr. S. Pathak, *Life of Nāgārjuna*, IHQ, XXX, 1954, p. 93); Bu-ston, *History of Buddhism*, tr. E. Obermiller, II, p. 123: J. Naudou, *Les bouddhistes kaśmiriens au Moyen Age*, p. 82.

mode of reasoning of a Nāgārjuna or a Deva, he thought he had discovered the 'true nature of things' and resolutely became a Mahāyānist. Such a turnabout did not provoke any moral or intellectual crisis in him. Convinced of the advantages of the monastic life, not for a moment did he think of leaving (hīnāyāvarte) it to return to lay life. His Buddhist faith was in no way shaken since he remained faithful to the Word of the Buddha 'such as it was in the Sūtra and appeared in the Vinaya' and, although he adhered preferentially to the sūtras of profound meaning, supramundane and associated with emptiness, he was aware of 'not straying from the true nature of things', but on the contrary, of staying even closer to it.

When he compared the fantasy and exaggerations of the texts of lengthy development with the tidy and methodical texts of the Tripiṭaka, his sense of moderation was not offended, but the uneasiness that he felt did not prevent him from discovering in the new literature a fire and heat lacking in the old literature. When this Abhidharma teacher examined the sibylline  $k\bar{a}rik\bar{a}s$  of a Nāgārjuna or a Deva closely, not only could he admire their precision and their terseness but he had to notice, on his own part that, compared with the enormous production of Kātyāyanīputra and the Kaśmir arhats, these opuscules, which did not even reach five hundred verses, were rather lightweight.

This is why he undertook to compose, in the form of a commentary on the Mahāyānāprajñāpāramitāsūtra, an exegetical treatise that would be the Mahāyānist replica of the Sarvāstivādin Abhidharma.

According to a well-ordered plan which, however, never appears in the divisions adopted by successive editions, he transposes the Prajñā into early times by citing old canonical sūtras on every page and by evoking numerous individuals borrowed from Śākyamuni's following. In this way, mixing the old and the new, he reveals, according to the fortunate phrase of Hiuan-tsang, a Sthavira-Mahāyāna. On the questions discussed, he begins by explaining, with complete objectivity, the opinions of the Sarvāstivādin masters; then he moves on to criticize them, frequently but not always, by taking his inspiration from two or three skillfully introduced and clearly explained Nāgārjunian *kārikā*s.

In his work, the explanation of the Abhidharmic theories occupies ten times more space than their refutation for, to his eyes, the Abhidharma in which he had specialized is in no way without pertinence: actually, it comes under conventional truth (saṃvṛtisatya) which makes its presence felt by everyone in daily life and serves as a stepping-stone to reach the truth. But it fades and vanishes in the light of the absolute truth (paramārthasatya), before the 'true nature of dharmas', an expression rendered in Chinese by the four characters Tchou-fa-che-siang. For the sake of being literal, I [Lamotte] have usually restored it as sarvadharmāṇām bhūtalakṣaṇam, but in Kumārajīva's translations, it may have, as its Indian correspondent, dharmalakṣaṇa, tattva, bhūtanaya and, most frequently, dharmatā. The expression is not very frequent in the Chinese version of the Pañcaviṃśatisāhasrikā (T 223, p. 231b, 244a, 257b, 392a, 416c) and appears only once in the Chinese kārikās of the Madhyamakaśāstra (T 1564, p. 24a). In turn, the true nature of things is the pivotal axis of the entire philosophy of the Traité. Evoked as early as the opening stanzas, it is trotted out obsessively throughout the entire work (p. 3, 15, 18, 45, 49, 51, 53 68, 131, 150, 156, 159, 213, 239, 298, 322, 327, 338, 340, 355, 399, 400, 439, 481, 500, 593, 677, 700, 708, 710, 769, 839, 902, 915, 916, 918, 924, 925, 926, 928, 929, 950, 954, 969, 1019, 1045, 1047, 1054,1059, 1060, 1083, 1105, 1106, 1107, 1110. 1112, 1142, 1165, 1190, 1204, 1229, 1231, 1232, 1245, 1253, 1261, 1278,

1240, 1378, 1407,1408, 1427, 1500 1501, 1503, 1519, 1610, 1611, 1612, 1622, 1636, 639, 1654, 1699, 1703F).

This true nature, if one may say so, is undefinable by definition, for, being nothing whatsoever, it transcends any category of mind. It suffices to reproduce here the paraphrase that will be given below on p. 1501F: "The true nature of dharmas is unborn and unceasing, neither defiled nor purified, neither existent nor non-existent, ever peaceful, perfectly pure, like space undefinable, inexpressible; it is the cessation of all the paths of discourse; it surpasses the domain of all minds and mental events; it is like nirvāṇa: this is the Dharma of the Buddhas."

We must be careful not to apostatize it as a negative Absolute, for emptiness is valid only as method of argument and has nothing to do with a metaphysical principle: "The person who produces the view of emptiness I declare to be incurable. I am not surprised that a person is attached to a view of the self as great as Mount Sumeru and I do not blame him. But if a fool is attached to a view of emptiness, be it as small as the sixteenth part of a hair, that I cannot allow."

By means of his constant recourse to *bhūtalakṣaṇa* as criterion of the truth, the author of the *Traité* carves out for himself a place in the philosophy of the Middle.

The Taisho Index no. 13, p. 342-344, has prepared a list of the bodhisattvas mentioned in the *Traité* which contains more than 60 names, of which 22 are directly borrowed from the *nidāna* of the *Pañcaviṃśatisāhasrikā* (p. 428F). The author has a high opinion of the bodhisattvas and dedicates no less than six chapters to them (VIII to XIII) where he dwells at length on their qualities and their prerogatives. But his admiration bears upon the bodhisattva *in abstracto* rather than on any one bodhisattva in particular. He reveals himself to be a philosopher rather than a devotee.

Nāgārjuna's *Madhyamaakaśāstra* aroused lively interest and was commented upon at least eight times: by Nāgārjuna himself (which is doubtful), Buddhapālita, Bhavya, Candrakīrti, Devaśarman, Guṇaśrī, Gunamati and Sthiramati. On the other hand, the *Traité* went unnoticed in India. Candrakīrti himself, the best commentator on the *Madhyamakaśāstra* in the 7<sup>th</sup> century, does not seem to have had any suspicion of its existence or, if he was aware of it, he did not rank it among the main works of Nāgārjuna. In a *Madhyamakaśāstrastuti* the original Sanskrit of which was found by G. Tucci, <sup>38</sup> he notes in stanza 10 only eight Nāgārjunian works:

- 1) Sūtrasamuccaya (T 635; Tib. 5330).<sup>39</sup>
- 2) Parikathā Ratnāvalī = Rāja-parikathā-ratnāvālī (Tib. 5658).
- 3) Saṃstuti = Catuḥstava: Niraupamyastava (Tib. 2011). Lokātītastava (Tib. 2012), Cittavajrastava (Tib. 2013), Paramārthastava (Tib. 2014).
- 4) Śāstragaditāh kārikāh = Madhyamakaśāstra.
- 5) Yuktyākhyā şaştikā = Yuktişaştikā (Tib. 5225).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>38</sup> In Oriens Extremus, IX, 1962, p. 47-56

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>39</sup> On the authenticity of this work, see J. Fililiozat, Śikṣāsamuccaya et Sūtrasamuccaya, JA, 1964, p. 473-478.

- 6) Vidalā = Vaidulyasūtra (Tib. 5226) and Vaidulyaprakaraņa (Tib. 5230).
- 7) Śūnyatāsaptati (Tib. 5227).
- 8) Vigrahasya... vyāvartanī = Vigrahavyāvartanī (Tib. 5228).

The Tibetan historians Bu-ston (I, p. 51F) and Taranātha (p. 302F) will be inspired by this list in their accounts of Nāgārjuna.

On the other hand, rather quickly and, in any case, as early as the  $7^{th}$  century, India retained no memory of the  $Trait\acute{e}^{40}$  and the fact that it was saved from oblivion is due to Kumārajīva.

# III. THE CHINESE TRANSLATION OF THE TRAITÉ

Kumārajīva (344-409 or 413), assisted by his disciples Seng-jouei (352-436) and Seng-tchao (384-414)<sup>41</sup> as well as a group of Chinese scholars, translated at Tch'ang-ngan four works of Madhyamaka inspiration that he wrongly or rightly attributed to the bodhisattva Nāgārjuna:

- 1) *Ta-tche-tou-louen* = *Mahāprajñāpāramitopadeśa* (T 1509) between the summer of 402 and the 1<sup>st</sup> of February 406, with preface by Seng-jouei.
- 2) Che-eul-men-louen = Dvadaśanikāyaśāstra or Dvādaśamukhaśāstra (T 1568) in 408-409, with preface by Seng-jouei.
- 3) Tchong-louen = Madhyamakaśāstra (T 1564) in 409-410, with preface by Seng-jouei.
- 4) Che-tchou-p'i-cha-louen = Daśabhūmikavibhāṣāśāstra (T1521), at an undetermined date. 42

In the prefaces and colophons attached to these translations, there are some indications about the very circumstances of the translation, the date and the life of  $N\bar{a}g\bar{a}rjuna$  as they were imagined at Tch'ang-ngan at the beginning of the  $5^{th}$  century.

# 1. KUMĀRAJIVA'S TRANSLATION

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>40</sup> Hiuan-tsang certainly knew the existence of it, but beyond his stay in India between 629 and 645, he collected no information on this subject.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>41</sup> Biographies of Kumārajīva and Seng-jouei in J. Nobel, *Kumārajīva*, Sitzungsberichte der preuss. Akad. d. Wissens, XX, 1927, p. 206-233. On Kumārajīva, see also Kao Seng Tchouan, transl. R. Shih, p. 60-81; on Seng-jouei, A. Wright, *Seng-jui alias Hui-jui*, Liebenthal Festschrift, Santiniketan, 1957, p. 272-292; on Seng-tchao, W. Liebenthal, *Chao Lun*, Hong Kong, 1968, p. 6-7.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>42</sup> The attribution of this text to Nāgārjuna is discussed among Japanese scholars: cf. A. Hirakawa, *L'auteur du Daśabhūmikavibhāṣāśāstra*, Jour. Indian and Buddhist Studies, V, 1957, p. 176-180; R. Hikata, Introduction to *Suvikrāntavikrāmin*, p. 52, 55, 73, 74.

The translation of the *Traité* went hand in hand with that of the *Mahāprajñāpāramitāsūtra* (T 332) of which the *Traité* is a commentary. The documentation of these two texts has been gathered and critiqued by P. Demiéville<sup>43</sup> with his customary skill, and I [Lamotte] largely take my inspiration from his work.

Information taken from the colophon of the *Ta-tchen-tou-louen* (T 1409,k. 100, p. 756c, or T 2145, k. 10, p. 75b):

The dharmācārya Kumārajīva came to Tch'ang-ngan in the year 3 of the *hong-che* period of the Ts'in, *sin-tch'eou* cylic order, the 20<sup>th</sup> day of the 12<sup>th</sup> moon (February 8, 402). During the summer of the 4<sup>th</sup> year (402), at Si-men-t'ang 'Pavilion of the Western Gate' of the Siao-yao-yuan 'Pleasure Park', he published this *Che-louen* (Upadeśa, T 509) for the emperor [Yao] Hing. The tranlation was finished on the 27<sup>th</sup> day of the 12<sup>th</sup> moon of the 7<sup>th</sup> year (February 1, 406).<sup>44</sup> During this period he also published:

- 1. the King-pen 'Sūtra Text', 45
- 2. the Tch'an-king 'Dhyāna Sūtra', 46
- 3. the *Kiai-liu* 'Vinaya', <sup>47</sup>
- 4. the *Po-louen* 'Treatise in a century', 48
- 5. the *Tch'an-fa-yao-kiai* 'Summary explanation of the method of Dhyāna', <sup>49</sup>consisting of almpst 500,000 *yen* 'words or syllables'.

<sup>43</sup> Account in Journal Asiatique, 1950, p. 375-395.

<sup>44</sup> Compare the *Tch'ou* (T 2145, k. 2, p. 11a16): The *Ta-tche-louen* in 100 *kiuan* was translated at Suan-yao-yuan; it is sometimes divided into 70 kiuan. – *Li-tai* (T 2034, k. 8, p. 78c18: The Ta-tche-tou-louen in 100 kiuan is the work of the bodhisattva Nāgārjuna. It was translated during the 5<sup>th</sup> moon of the 6<sup>th</sup> year of the *hong-che* period (May 23 or June 23, 404) at Siao-yao-yuan. Seng-jouei did the brush-calligraphy and added the preface. See the *Eul-ts'in-lou* [catalog compiled between 309 and 415 by Seng-jouei and lost a long time ago]. Kumārajīva says that an integral translation [of the *Upadeśa*] should have consisted of 1000 scrolls, but he abridged it because of the weakness of mind of the Ts'in. – The *K'ai-yuan* (T 2154, k. 4, p. 513a4) adopts the date proposed by the colophon.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>45</sup> This is the *Mahāprajñāpāramitāsūtra* (T 223) of which the *Upadeśa* (T 1509) is the exegesis. But in his doctoral thesis. M. Saigura does not see things in this light: "Das *Ching pĪn* ist ein erfundenes Werk, fūr dessen Existenz wir keinerlei Belege haben, und das aus folgendem Grund nie existiert haben kann." Upon which he launches into mathematical calculations!

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>46</sup> T 614: *Tso-tch'an san-mei-king* "Sūtra on the practice of Dhyāna and Samādhi", a compilation drawn by Kumārajīva mainly from works of the Indian patriarchs of the Kaśmir school, work begun on Februry 14, 402 and revised in 407 (cf. P. Demiéville, *La Yogācārabhūmi de Saṃgharakṣa*, BEFEO, XLIV, 1954, p. 355-356).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>47</sup> T 1435: *Che-song-liu* or *Sarvāstivādavinava*, partially translated in 404.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>48</sup> T 1569: *Po-louen* or Śatakaśāstra by Āryadeva, with commentary by Vasu, translated in 404-405.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>49</sup> T 616: *Tch'an fa-yao-kiai*, work composed and not published by Kumārajīva, partially inspired by the *Traité* (cf. P. Demiéville, *La Yogācārabhūmi...*, p. 354).

With the Che-louen (Upadeśa), this makes up 1,500,000 yen.

The first *p'in* 'chapter' of the *[Che]-louen* (Upadeśa) takes up 34 *kiuan* 'scrolls' [in the Chinese translation] and comments on only a single chapter [of the Sūtra, T 223] entirely.

Also, beginning with the second p'in 'chapter', the dharmācārya [Kumārajīva] abridged the integral text of the [Che]-louen, giving only what is essential, just what is necessary to explain the meaning of the text [of the Sūtra] from then on giving up the completion of the commentary in its full development. Thus he ended up with  $100 \, kiuan$  'scrolls' [of translation]. A complete translation would have been ten times as long. 50

Information taken from the preface by Seng-jouei to the *Ta-tche-tou-louen* (T 1509, p. 57, or T 2145, k. 10, p. 74c-75b).

Ma-ming (Aśvaghoṣa) was born at the end of the Authentic Dharma (*saddharma*), and Long-chou (Nāgārjuna) at the end of the Counterfeit Dharma (*pratirūpakadharma*)....<sup>51</sup> At the end of the Authentic Dharma it was easy to propagate [the doctrine]; thus Aśvaghoṣa worked directly with the inheritance that had been passed down to him and had only to dust it off. But the end of the Counterfeit Dharma was beset with many troubles; thus Nāgārjuna associated with lay people and taught them to understand things by the gradual path. Moreover, he went to the palace of the Nāgas to borrow the clarity to illuminate wisdom in the quest for the mystery. He dedicated himself to the study of the profound secret in order to exhaust the wonders of the subtle words. Then, taking the text of the *Prajñā[pāramitāsūtra]* as a basis, he composed this *Upasdeśa...* 

He explains the true nature (*dharmatā*) so that people misled by wrong views are no longer led astray and are corrected. In this *Upadeśa*, he begins by explaining the views [of the Ābhidharmikas?] and mentions the differences in order to exhaust their beauty, but finally he recommends detachment (*anabhiniveśa*) from all these views as the proper solution. Where the explanation is incomplete, he engages in a discussion to illuminate it; if the discussion does not succeed, he opts for the Middle [Path] (*madhyamā pratipad*) as the definitive solution...

There is the dharmācārya Kumārajīva who, from an early age, acquired a reputation for insight and wisdom and who now, at a ripe age, enjoys extraordinary renown... He always depended on this Upadeśa.

On the 20<sup>th</sup> day of the 12<sup>th</sup> moon of the 3<sup>rd</sup> year of the *hon-che* period (Februray 8, 402), he came from Kou-tsang to Tch'ang-ngan. The Ts'in emperor [Yao Hing] for a long time humbly nourished the hope

-

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>50</sup> P. Demiéville, Journal Asiatique, 1950, p. 388.

<sup>51</sup> The Dharma of the Buddha went through two or three phases, each lasting 500 years: the Authentic Holy Dharma (*saddharma* proper), the Counterfeit Dharma (*pratirūpakadharma*), the final Dharma (*paścimadharma*): cf. HBI, p. 211 seq.

of seeing him and was overjoyed to meet him. In the course of their conversations, they lingered until the end of the day and, by trying to pierce the mystery, they forgot the year's fatigue...

The emperor gathered the śramaṇas in the capital who were specialists in doctrinal works and ordered scholars learned in criticism of the texts, noblemen, and ministers to assemble in the Siao-yao-yuan pavilion on the shore of the Wei... He personally examined the mysterious document and adjusted the [Chinese] words to the Sanskrit text... When the text of the [Prajñāpmaramitā]sūtra (T 223) was established, he went on to the translation of this Upadeśa (T 1509).<sup>52</sup>

The abridged version of the *Upadeśa* (in its original Sanskrit text) had 100,000 gāthās each of 32 characters (i.e., 100,000 units of 32 syllables), or a total of 3,200,000 'words' (Sanskrit syllables; for the Chinese, the notions of words and syllables overlap). Taking into account the contrast between Sanskrit and Chinese, the one being complicated and the other concise, he condensed it by two-thirds and thus obtained these 100 *kiuan* of the Chinese translation. In the 300,000 words of the *Ta-tche-[you-louen]* (condensed thus into about 300,000 Sanskrit syllables), the sublime meaning of the mysterious paragraphs appeared in full clarity. The complete Sanskrit text is as detailed as that of the first chapter (*parivarta*); the master of the Dharma abridged it by cutting it because the Chinese love conciseness. If he had translaled the entire text, that would have come to at least 1000 *kiuan*.53

From this somewhat confused information, some conclusions may be drawn:

- 1) The translation of the *Upadeśa* began at Tch'an-ngan between May 25 and June 23 of the year 404 and was completed February 1, 406.
- 2) It went along with the translation of the *Mahāprajñāpāramitāsūtra* (T 223) of which it is the commentary. But here the evidence differs somewhat.
- a. According to the preface by Seng-jouei in T 223, published in the *Tch'ou* (T 2145, k. 8, p. 53b), the translation of the Sūtra began on the 23<sup>rd</sup> day of the 4<sup>th</sup> moon of the 5<sup>th</sup> hong-che year (May 29, 403) and finished on the 5<sup>th</sup> day of the 12<sup>th</sup> moon of the same year (January 13, 404); after which, the Chinese texts was again revised up to the 23<sup>rd</sup> day of the 4<sup>th</sup> moon of the following year (May 18, 404).
- b. According to the Tch'ou (T 2145, k. 2, p. 10c16) and the K'ai-yuan (T 2154, k. 4, p. 512b4), the translation of the Sūtra began on the  $23^{rd}$  day of the  $4^{th}$  moon of the  $5^{th}$  hong-che year (May 29, 403) and finished on the  $23^{rd}$  day of the  $4^{th}$  moon of the  $6^{th}$  year (May 18, 404).

<sup>52</sup> However, in his preface to the *Mahāprajñāpāramitāsūtra* (Tch'ou, T 2145, k. 8, p. 53*b*13), Seng-jouei states that the text of the *sūtra* had not been (definitely) fixed until the (translation) of the *Upadeśa* was finished (cf. P. Demiéville, *l. c.*, p. 383, n. 3).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>53</sup> The translation of this paragraph is borrowed from P. Demiéville, *l. c.*, p. 387-388.

3. The *Ta-tche-tou-louen* (T 1509) is just an incomplete translation of the Indian *Upadeśa*. The latter, which was divided into chapters (*parivarta*, *p'in*),<sup>54</sup> consisted of 100,000 gāthās or 3,200,000 Sanskrit syllables. A complete translation would have involved 1000 scrolls (*kiuan*) and 3,200,000 words (*yen*).

However, Kumārajīva actually translated only nine-tenths and his translation has only 100 scrolls and about 320,000 Chinese characters. This is how he did it:

- a. He completely translated the first parivarta of the Indian Upadeśa.
- b. He abridged two-thirds of the text of the other parivartas.

The subdivisions of the *Ta-tche-tou-louen* into chapters (*p'in*) as well as into scrolls (*kiuan*) varied considerably in the course of successive editions. In some of the Touen-houang manuscripts they are completly missing.<sup>55</sup>

In the actual Taisho edition, the *Mahāprajñāpāramitāsūtra* (T 223) consists of 90 chapters in 27 scrolls; the *Ta-tche-tou-louen* (T 1509) also has 90 chapters, but is divided into 100 scrolls. We may also note that in these two texts the titles of the chapters do not always coincide.

Scrolls 1 to 34 of the *Ta-tche-tou-louen* (p. 57*c*-314*b*) are the complete translation of the first chapter of the Indian *Upadeśa*; scrolls 36 to 100 of the same *Ta-tche-tou-louen* (p. 314b-756c) are the abridged translation of the rest of the Upadeśa.

4. Commissioned and supervised by Yao Hing, executed by the Serindian Kumārajīva, critiqued by more than 500 scholars, written down by brush and prefaced by Seng-jouei, the Chinese translation of the *Upadeśa* was so completely Sinicized that it succeeds in pulling the wool over one's eyes and makes one doubt its Indian origins. What we have said about its author shows that it is an illusion. The *Upadeśa* is the work of an Indian, but its translators gave it a Chinese flavor and that was the reason for its success.

Many comments and arguments exchanged orally during the course of a work prolonged over two years have passed into the translation either in the form of notes (written at the time in a single column in very tiny characters)<sup>56</sup> or as pure and simple interpolations.

Quite rightly, R. Hikata has distinguished in the *Ta-tche-tou-louen* passages that are clearly or probably by Kumārajīva and those that should be or conveniently are attributed to 'Nāgārjuna'.<sup>57</sup>

Everyone agrees in attributing to Kumārajīva or to his collaborators explanations of Sanskrit terms with phonetic transcriptions and translations into 'the language of the Ts'in', such as *samyaksambuddha* (p. 128F0, *sugata* (p. 131F), *lokavid* (p. 132), *puruṣadamyasārathi* (p. 133), *śāstā devamanuṣyāṇām* (p. 135F), *buddha* (p. 137F), *saṃgha* (p. 202F), *dhāraṇī* (p. 317F), Bhadrapāla and Ratnākara (p. 428), Gaṇḍaka (p. 497), Vipaśyin, Śikhin and Viśvabhu (p. 535F), Kauṣṭhīka (p. 637F), *pāramit*ā (p. 701F), Sudinna (p. 713-714), Aśoka (p. 723F), *śīla* (p. 770F), *kṣānti* (p. 865F), *vīrya* (p. 927F), Arbuda and Norarbuda (p. 963F)

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>54</sup> Unfortunately their number is not given precisely.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>55</sup> Cf. P. Demiéville, *l. c.*, p. 391.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>56</sup> P. Pelliot, BEFEO, VIII, p. 509-510.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>57</sup> R. Hikata, Introduction to the edition of the *Suvikrāntavikrāmin*, p. LIII seq.

mahāprajñāpāramitā (p. 1066F), vimokṣa (P. 1291F), samādhi (p. 1487F), ārṣa sthāna (p. 1593F), saṃskāra (p. 696b), etc.

Also seeming to be interpolations, some comments on the customs and usages of the T'ien-tchou, capable of being of interest to the Chinese but completely useless to an Indian reader: In India there are two words to designate time,  $k\bar{a}la$  and samaya (p. 76F); it is a custom in India to call anything that is fine, heavenly (divya) (p. 523F); in India it is usually said that some one who has done what had to be done 'has crossed over to the other shore' (p. 702F): in India it is the custom to grasp someone's feet as a sign of respect (p. 847F); the Buddha inhabited the Indian Kingdoms, and in these kingdoms there are always many brāhmins (p. 1267F); Iśana and Varuṇa are at Indra's left and right respectively (p. 1338F); according to the rule of the Indian language, the combining of several syllables forms a word and the combining of several words forms a phrase (p. 380b-c); the Greater Vehicle in the Indian language is called Mahāyāna (p. 394c); the Buddha manifested only 32 lakṣaṇas and 80 anuvyañjanas in order to conform to Indian taste (p. 684b). etc.

But it would be dangerous to see interpolations everywhere: several passages of the *Ta-tche-tou-louen* may not correspond to the picture that one has, on the basis of late documents, <sup>58</sup> of a Nāgārjuna 'who was a Brāhmin from the south of India, contemporary with Kaniṣka and a friend of a Śatavāhana', but which may be passages quite natural coming from an author who lived and worked at the beginning of the 4<sup>th</sup> century in north-western India.

#### 2. NĀGĀRJUNA SEEN FROM TCH'AND-NGAN

If, as I [Lamotte] think, the author of the *Upadeśa* is different from the author of the *Madhyamakaśāstra*, the problem of the date of Nāgārjuna loses some of its interest. However, we cannot pass over the information provided by the Tch'ang-ngan school of the 5<sup>th</sup> century in silence.

As we have seen above, Kumārajīva considered Nāgārjuna to be the author of the *Upadeśa*, of the *Dvādaśanikāya*, the *Madhyamakaśāstra* and the *Daśabhūmikavibhāṣā* of which he provided the translation.

-

For a long time, the West has had at its disposal, as information about Nāgārjuna, only incomplete and late documents: a short summary of the *Long-chou-p'ou-sa-tchouan* (T 2047) in V. Vassilief, *Le bouddhisme, ses dogmes, son histoire et sa litérature*, 1865, p. 212-213, *Tāranātha's Geshichte des Buddhismsa* translated by A. Schiefner, 1869, and the *Si-yu-ki* (T 2087) by S. Beal (1884) and Th. Watters (1904-05). The paucity of documentation explains the tendency of the moderns to exaggerate the importance of some old comments without any geographical and chronological significance. Thus, concerning Kumāralabdha (= Kumāralāta), the founder of the Sautrāntika school, we read in the *Si-yu-ki* (T 2087, k. 12, p. 942a16-18): "At that time, there was Aśvaghoṣa in the east, Deva in the south, Nāgārjuna in the west and Kumāralabdha in the north; they are called the four suns illuminating the world." And since legend attaches Aśvaghoṣa to Kaniṣka, it has been deduced that the four 'suns' appeared simultaneously in the 1<sup>st</sup> or the 2<sup>nd</sup> centuries of our era according to the date that is assigned to Kaniṣka. This is to give too much importance to a comment that is only a stylistic symbol.

But we know that Kumārajīva, who 'forgot small details'<sup>59</sup>, did not look very carefully: perhaps he carelessly attributed Kumāralata's *Kalpanāmaṇḍitikā* to Aśvaghoṣa.

According to customary usage, he dated Nāgārjuna in post-Nirvāṇa years. In China until the beginning of the 6<sup>th</sup> century, the birth of Śākyamuni was placed at the 8<sup>th</sup> day of the 4<sup>th</sup> moon of the 10<sup>th</sup> year of King Tchouang (687B. C.).<sup>60</sup> But Kumārajīva brought a correction to this computation.

In a note dated 568 A. D. in the *Eul-kiao-louen* by Tao-ngan<sup>61</sup> cited by Tao-siuan (596-667) in his *Kouang-hong-ming-tei* (T 2103, k. 8, p. 142a18-20), we read:

According to the chronology of the dharmācārya Che (Kumārajīva) and the *Che-tchou-ming* (inscribed pillar in the Wou-hin region) in agreement with the *Springs and Autumns* (Chronicles of the Lou principality), the Tathāgata was born on the 5<sup>th</sup> (correction: the 4<sup>th</sup>) year of king Houan of the Tcheu, *yi-tch'eou* cyclic order (716 B.C.). He went forth in the 23<sup>rd</sup> (correction: 22<sup>nd</sup>) year of king Houan, *kouei-wei* cyclic order (698 B.C.). He attained enlightnment in the 10<sup>th</sup> year of king Tchouang, *kin-wou* cyclic order (687 B. C.). He entered into nirvāṇa in the 15<sup>th</sup> year of king Siang, *kia-chen* cyclic order (637 B. C.): this was 1295 years ago (586 B.C.).

The dating of the Parinirvāna in 637 B.C. allows the use of the information provided by Ki-tsang (549-623) on Aśvaghoṣa, Nāgārjuna, Āryadeva and Harivarman in his commentary on the Śatakaśāstra (T 1827), the *Madhyamakaśāstra* (T 1824) and the *Three Treatises* (T 1852):

T 1827, k. 1, p. 233a8-14: The teacher [Seng]-jouei, in the preface to the Satyasiddhiśāstra [by Harivrman] which he wrote after the death of his teacher Che [Kumārajīva], cites some words of the latter: "After the Buddha's death in the year 350, Ma-ming (Aśvaghoṣa) was born; in 530 Long-chou (Nāgārjuna) was born." He also said: "Aśvaghoṣa illustrated the end of the Authentic Law (*saddharma*); Nāgārjuna *appeared at the* beginning of the Counterfeit Law (*pratirūpakadharma*)"... [Seng]-tchao and {Seng]-jouei say that T'i-p'o (Āryadeva) was born in the 800<sup>th</sup> year or later.<sup>62</sup>

T 1824, k. 1, p. 18*b*23-25: At what time in the Counterfeit Law (*pratirūpakadharma*) was Nāgārjuna born? The master [Seng]-jouei, in his preface to the *Satyasiddhiśāstra*, cites some words of his teacher Lo-che (Kumārajīva) who says: "Aśvaghoṣa was born in the year 350, and Nāgārjuna was born in the year 530."

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>59</sup> *Kao-seng-tchouan*. T 2059, k. 2, p. 330*c*11.

<sup>60</sup> Cf. E. Zürcher, Buddhist Conquest of China, p. 271-272.

<sup>61</sup> This is not the well-known Tao-ngan of the 4<sup>th</sup> century.

<sup>62</sup> Information confirmed by Seng-tchao's preface to the Śatakaśāstra by Āryadeva (T 1569, p. 167c12; *Tch'ou*, T 2145, k. 11, p. 77b12).

T 1852, p. 3c10-14: Once the dharmācārya Lo-che [Kumāramjīva], after having translated the *Satyasiddhiśāstra*, <sup>63</sup> asked Seng-jouei to comment on it. After the death of master Kumārajīva, Seng-jouei wrote down his last teachings and composed the preface to the śāstra; he said: "The *Satyasiddhiśāstra* was composed by Harivarman, the most famous of Kumāralāta's disciples, a scholar of the Hīnayāna from the land of Ki-pin (Kaśmir) in the 800<sup>th</sup> year after the Buddha's Parinirvāṇa."

As the preface to the *Satyasiddhiśāstra* has disappeared, it is difficult to verify the sayings of Ki-tsang. But it is wrong that Seng-jouei placed Aśvaghoṣa at the *end* of the Authentic Law and Nāgārjuna at the *beginning* of the Counterfeit Law. In his preface to the *Ta-tche-tou-louen* (T 1509, p. 57a12-13), he says, to the contrary, that Aśvaghoṣa was born at the *end* of the Authentic Law and Nāgārjuna at the *end* of the Counterfeit Law, and several lines lower down, (p. 57b13) he refers to the authority of an *Indian Chronicle* in terms of which Aśvaghoṣa and Nāgārjuna appeared at the end of the Authentic Law and at the end of the Counterfeit Law respectively. The two periods each cover 500 years, so it would follow that the two individuals were separated by about 500 years.

That being so, there is only one way to interpret Kumārajīva's phrase which puts Aśvaghoṣa at 350 years and Nāgārjuna at 530 years after the Parinirvāṇa. We must understand that Aśvaghoṣa was born at 350 post-nirvāṇa (which gives 637-350 = 287 B.C.) and Nāgārjuna 530 years after Aśvaghoṣa (which gives 637- (350+530) = 243 A.D.).

If we accept these numbers, the Tch'ang-ngan school of the 5<sup>th</sup> century placed the great masters at the following dates:

637 B.C.: Parinirvāņa of the Buddha

287 B.C.: Birth of Aśvaghosa

243 A.D.: Birth of Nāgārjuna who was followed by Āryadeva

253 A.D.: Publication of the *Satyasiddhilsāstra* by Harivarman, the disciple of Kumāralata.

This information probably came from Kaśmir where Kumārajīva had been educated and with which he remained in contact. It may be compared with a passage from the *Rājatasangiņī* (I, v. 168 and 173) by the Kaśmirian historian Kalhaṇa (12<sup>th</sup> century) in whose words a bodhisattva of the first *bhūmi*, the glorious Nāgārjuna, lived at Ṣaḍarhadvana (Hārvan) in the reigns of the last great Kuṣāṇas, Huṣka (Huviṣka?) and his successors.

Nevertheless, no historian will accept that an interval of almost 500 years separated Aśvaghoṣa from Nāgārjuna. In a note incorporated by Seng-tchao in his *Commentary on the Vimalakīrti* (T 1775, k. 8, p. 399b), Kumārajīva himself places Pārśva and Aśvaghoṣa in the 600 years post-nirvāṇa.

-

According to the *Li-tai* (T 2034, k. 8, p. 78c22), Kumārajīva trnaslated the *Satyasiddhiśāstra* in the 8<sup>th</sup> year of the *hong-che* period (406-407); according to the *K'ai-yuan* (T 2145, k. 4, p. 513a18), the translation began on the 8<sup>th</sup> day of the 9<sup>th</sup> moon of the 13<sup>th</sup> *hong-che* year (October 11, 411) and was finished on the 15<sup>th</sup> day of the 9<sup>th</sup> moon of the 14<sup>th</sup> year (Novenmber 4, 412).

One cannot escape the impression that all these dates are derived from theoretical views on the successive stages of the holy Dharma and that, as an absolute chronology, their value is rather weak.

It is doubtful that at the beginning of the 5<sup>th</sup> century, the Tch'ang-ngan school would have known Nāgārjuna's *Suhṛllekha* "Friendly Letter", <sup>64</sup> of which three Chinese and one Tibetan trnaslation exist:

- 1) T 1672: *Long-chou-p'ou-sa wei Tch'an-to-kia-wang chouo-fa-yao-kie* "Summary of the Dharma in verse by the bodhisattva Nāgārjuna on behalf of king Jantaka", translated in 431 at Nankin by Gunavarman.
- 2) T 1673: *K'iuan-fa tchou-wang yao-kie* "Summary in verse to encourage kings", translated in 434 at Nankin by Samghavarman, disciple and successor to Guṇavarman.
- 3) T 1674: Long-chou-p'ou-sa k'iuan-kaiai-wang song "Stanzas of encouragement to the king by the bodhisattva Nāgārjuna", translated in 691 by Yi-tsing during his trip to India. In his Account sent from the southern seas (T 2125, k. 4, p. 227c13-15) Yi-tsing specifies that this letter was dedicated by Nāgārjuna to his former dānapati called Che-yin-tö-kia (Jantaka), king of southern India, called So-to-p'o-han-na (Śatavāhana).
- 4) Tib. 5409 and 5682: *Bśes-paḥi phrin-yig* "Friendly Letter", addressed this time to king Bde-byed (Udayana), a contemporary of the Buddha!

The first translation, which makes the king, Jantaka, the recipient of the letter, is suspect in several regards. It is first mentioned in the *Nei-tien-lou* catalogue T 2149, k. 8, p. 312b25) compiled only in 664, and it is hard to see why Samghavarman would have retranslated a text published by his teacher three years previously.

The second translation, which does not specify the name of the recipient, gives more guarantee of authenticity: it is mentioned in the *Tch'ou-san-tsang-ki-tsi* (T 2145, k. 2, p. 12b23; k. 14, p. 104c25) already published in 515 and mentioned by Houei-kiao in his *Kao-seng-tchouan* (T 2059, k. 3, p. 342c3), which was not the case for the first.

Later, a biography of the bodhisattva Nāgārjuna entitled *Long-chou-p'ou-sa-tchouan* (T 2047) and publishedunder Kumārajīva's name was circulated. It has been translated into English by M. Walleser.<sup>65</sup> It probably collected some information previously furnished by Kumāramjīva,<sup>66</sup> but he was not the author.

Firstly, the first catalogue to mention it was the *Li-tai-san-pao-ki* (*T 2034*, k. 8, p. 79a7) compiled at Tch'ang-ngan in 597 by Fei Tchang-fang and, contrary to his custom, this editor was unable to refer to any earlier catalogue.

65 Life of Nāgārjuna from Tibetan and Chinese Sources, Asia Major, Hirth Anniversry Volume, 1923, p. 445-448.

<sup>64</sup> For detail, see S. Lévi, *Kaniska et Śātavāhana*, JA, 1936, p. 107-110.

A note by Kumārajīva incorporated by Seng-tchao in his *Commentary on Vimalakīrti* (T 1775, k. 2, p. 339*a*) tells of an episode between Nāgārjuna and a heretic. Nāgārjuna had said to the latter that the devas and asuras were at war. The heretic asked for proof. Immediately broken spears and swords, bodies and heads of asuras fell from the sky. The heretic was convinced and gave in. The episode in question is taken from the *Long-chou-p'ou-sa-tchouen* (T 2047, p. 185*a*, 186*a*) and from there passed into the *Fou-fa-tsang-yin-yuan-tchouan* (T 2058, k. 5. p. 318*a-b*).

Secondly, this biography, which correctly mentioned the *Upadeśa* in 100,000 *gāthās* (T 1509) and the *Madhyamakaśāstra* in 599 *gāthās*, also attributes to Nāgārjuna three works unknown as yet and which will not be considered further: a śāstra on the marvelous Bodhi of the Buddhas in 5,000 *gāthās*, a śāstra on the skillful means of great compassion in 5,000 *gāthās* and a śāstra on the absence of fear of which the Madhyamakaśāstra would be an extract.<sup>67</sup>

Finally and above all, this biography presents its hero as a high-flying adventurer and complacently describes his stormy youth, his exciting voyages, his daring attempts at reform, his sensational discoveries in the Nāga palace, his quarrels with the prince, his magic contests with the Brāhmins and finally, his mysterious death. The picture thus sketched gives a good idea of what the upper middle ages thought of a siddha, but corresponds poorly to the image that we ourselves have of this penetrating and rigorous logician who was the author of the *Madhyamakaśāstra*, this wise encyclopedist who was the author of the *Upadeśa*.<sup>68</sup>

#### IV. SUBJECT AND SOURCES OF VOLUME III

Volume II of the present work, which appeared in 1949 treated the six virtues – generosity, morality, patience, exertion, meditation and wisdom – which the bodhisattva must practice in order to reach supreme complete enlightenment and, at the same time, to assure the welfare and happiness of all beings.

The canonical and postcanonical texts of early Buddhism had already mentioned these virtues and, for a long time, the deeds of future Buddhas appeared in the bas-reliefs. But in the view of the Prajñāpāramitā, these virtues are raised to the level of perfections (pāramitā) insofar as the bodhisattva 'keeps them and does not keep them' (asthānayogena tiṣthati) in the sense that he practices them with the deep conviction (kṣāti) that beings do not exist and that things are unborn. From the perspective of their true nature (bhūtalakṣaṇa, dharmatā), all contingent phenomena are reduced to being identical (samatā) in a fundamental non-existence. The result is that the bodhisattva will be completely generous if he eliminates the notions of donor, recipient and gift given, perfectly moral if he mixes merit and wrong-doing, perfectly wise if, rejecting both true and false, he professes no system whatsoever.

In the present Volume III, the author dedicates no less tham twelve chapters (XXXI – XLII) to commenting on a few pages of the Prajñāpāramitāsūtra (*Pañcaviṃśatisāhasrikā*, p. 19-21); *Śatasāhasrikā*, p. 56-66). This part, the most technical and without a doubt the most interesting part of the *Traité*, has as its subject the practices forming the Path of Nirvāṇa and the attributes of the Buddhas.

One could ask if the Upadeśa, like the  $Mah\bar{a}vibh\bar{a}s\bar{a}$  which it opposes, was not another collective work. This is a question to which I [Lamotte] am unable to respond.

<sup>67</sup> Cf. T 2047, p. 184*c*18-21; 186*b*9-12. The same list appears in T 2058, k. 5, p. 318*b*16-19. – This "Śāstra on the absence of fear" has been compared with the *Mūlamadhyamakavṛtti-akutobhayā* attributed to Nāgārjuna and appearing in the Tib, Trip, no. 5229, but the the comparison is forced

Such a subject is somewaht unexpected. The bodhisattva delays his entry into nirvāṇa indefinitely and remains in saṃsāra with the sole purpose of dedicating himself as long as possible to the welfare and happiness of beings. Why then should he be interested in practices that are aimed precisely at hastening nirvāṇa? The answer is simple. The bodhisattva must know these practices so as to teach them eventually to beings destined to be converted by the old Vehicle – that of the śrāvakas, a fact that does not prevent them, at the appropriate time, from being redirected towards the Greater Vehicle. This is why the bodhisattva 'completely fulfills' (*paripūrayati*) the practices of the path in order to be able to teach them or review them with awareness of their cause, but he does not realize (*na sākśātkaroti*) them personally, for he would, by that very fact, betray his ideal of future Buddha and he would rejoin the ranks of the arhats who are more preoccupied with their sainthood than with the salvation of others.

As for the attributes of the Buddha, they are still beyond the reach of the bodhisattva. But although he has not 'fulfilled them completely', he is 'anxious to understand them' (*parijñmatukāma*). This is why it is necessary to speak of them. The division into chapters as presented in the Taisho edition leaves much to be desired and so it is useful to prsent a summary of Volume III here.

FIRST PART: The dharmas of the Path arranged in order of importance:

- I. The thirty-seven bodhipākṣikadharmas divided into seven classes (chap. XXXI):
  - 1. Four *smṛtyupasthānas*.
  - 2. Four samyakpradhānas.
  - 3. Four rddhipādas.
  - 4. Five indriyas.
  - 5. Five balas.
  - 6. Seven sambodhyangas.
  - 7. Eight mārgāngas.
- II. The eight complementary classes of dharmas of the Path (chap. XXXII-XXXIV):
  - 1. Three samādhis.
  - 2. Four dhyānas.
  - 3. Four apramāņas.
  - 4. Four ārūpyasamāpattis.
  - 5. Eight vimokṣas.
  - 6. Eight abhibhvāyatanas.
  - 7. Ten kṛtsnāyatanas.
  - 8. Nine anupūrvasamāpattis.

- III. Six other classes of dharmas of the Path (chap. XXXV- XXXVIII):
  - 1. Nine aşubhasamjñās.
  - 2. Eight anusmṛtis.
  - 3. Ten samjñās.
  - 4. Eleven jñānas.
  - 5. Three samādhis.
  - 6. Three indriyas.

SECOND PART: The attributes of the Buddhas (chap. XXXIX-XLII):

- 1. The eight balas according to the Abhidharma (chap. XXXIX).
- 2. The four vaiśāradyas according to the Abhidharma (chap. XL).
- 3. The ten balas and the four vaiśāradyas according to the Mahāyāna (chap. XL).
- 4. The four pratisamvids according to the Abhidharma and according to the Māhayāna (chap. XL).
- 5. The eighteen *āveṇikadharmas* according to the Mahāyān list (chap. XLI).
- 6. The eighteen āveņikadharmas according to the Sarvāstivādin lists (chap. XLI)
- 7. Mahāmaitrī and mahākaruṇā (chap. XLII).

For each of these subjects, the *Traité* first explains the theories of early Buddhism according to the interpretation of the Abhidhrma and the Sarvāstivādin-VaibhāṣikaVibhāṣā; then it presents the contrasting view of the *Prajñāpāramitāsūtra* and the other *Mahāyānasūtras*, taking its inspiration most frequently from refutation of arguments condensed in the *Madhyamakaśāstra*.

A clear distinction is made in the account between the Abhidharmic theories and the Mahāyānist criticism. The subtitles, added here to the Frenxh translation, carefully mark the separation. It often happens, as a matter of fact, that the contemporary exegesis quoting one or another passage taken from the *Traité*, without placing it in context, attributes theories to the author which he presents only to oppose them.

By means of these frequent allusions to the early Tripitaka, the author plunges us into the elating atmosphere of the 6<sup>th</sup> century B. C. In the course of Volume III, we will see 'humans and non-human beings' whom Śākyamuni met at random in his preaching tours march past helter-skelter: Ājñātakauṇḍinya (p. 1426F, 1576F), Ambaṭṭha (p. 1576F), Ānanda (p. 1352F, 1547F, 1589F, 1631F, 1649F, 1676F), Anavataptanāgarāja (p. 1343F), Aṅgulimāla (p. 1542F, 1579F), Aniruddha (p. 1405F, 1558F, 1630F), Apalāla (p. 1578F), Asita (p. 1344F), Āṭavaka (p. 1578F), Bakkula (p. 1386F, 1530F), Bhāradvāja (p. 1401F), Bimbisāra (p. 1577F), Brahmadatta (p. 1577F), Brahmā devarāja (p. 1343F, 1583F), Brahmāyus (p. 1577F), Caṇḍa Pradyota (p. 1577F), Cāṭurmahārājakāyikadeva (p. 1679F), Cūḍapanthaka (p. 1543F), Devadatta (p. 1545F, 1662F, 1671F seq.), Dīrgha the yakṣa (p. 1405F), Dīrghanakha (p. 1576F, !688F),

Elapatra (p. 1579F), Gavāmpati (p. 1659F), ĪŚāna (p. 1338F), Jambuka (p. 1363F), the Jaţilas (p. 1576F), Jīvaka (p. 1677F), Kimbila (P. 1405F), Kṣānti (p. 1670F), Kūṭasanta (p. 1577F), Lavaṇabhadrika (p. 1439F), Madhuvāsiṣṭha (p. 1659F), Mahāgautamī (p. 1403F), Mahākāṣyapa (p. 1355F, 1399F, 1547F, 1577F), Mahākāṭyāyana (p. 1531F), Makhādeva (p. 1583F), Māndhāṭr (p. 1583F), Māra (p. 1582F), Maudgalyāyana (p. 1355F, 1426F, 1530F, 1543F, 1575F, 1576F, 1631F, 1632F), Meghika (p. 1675F), Nāgasamāla (p. 1675F), Nandika (p. 1405F), Nandopananda (p. 1359F), Nītha

(p. 1634F), Pilindavatsa (p. 1439F), Pilotika (p. 1576F), Piṇḍola Bhāradvāja (p. 1631F), Prasenajit (p. 1577F), Pukkusāti (p. 1531F, 1577F), Pūrṇa (p. 1631F), Puṣkarasārin (p. 1577F), Rādha (p. 1675F), Rāhula (1546F), Revata Khadiravaniya (p. 1547F), Sāgara nāgarāja (p. 1343F), Sāgara the king (p. 1583F), Śaivala (p. 1546F), Śakra devendra (p. 1343F, 1583F), the 100,000 Śākyas (p. 1577F), Śāriputra (p. 1355F, 1426F, 1439F, 1543F, 1547F, 1575F, 1576F, 1631F, 1632F, 1694F, 1713F), Satyaka Nirgranthīputra (p. 1355F, 1576F, 1662F, 1665F), Saundaranada (p. 1545F, 1641F), Śibi (p. 1713F), Śreṇikavatsagotra (p. 1356F), Śrīgupta (p. 1634F), Śrīvṛddhi (p. 1526F), Śroṇa Koṭiviṃśa (p. 1387F), Subadhra (p. 1650F, 1652F), Sudarśana (p. 1583F), Śuddhodana (p. 1344F), Sumana (p. 1426F), Sunakṣatra (p. 1545F, 1675F), Sundarī (p. 1572F), Udayana (p. 1577F), Upāli (p. 1547F), Urubilva the nāga (p. 1359F),Uruvilvākāśyapa (p. 1355F, 1576F), Vakkali (p. 1546F), Varuṇa (p. 1338F), Vemacitrin (p. 1583F), Virūḍhaka (p. 1529), Viśvakarman (p. 1578F), Yaśas (p. 1545F). —The only bodhisattvas mentioned in the present volume are Sadāprarudita (p. 1353F, Avalokiteśvara, Mañjuśrī and Maitreya (p. 1694F).

More than the two previous volumes, Volume III is loaded with canonical quotations of which here is a provisional list:

- 1. Hināyāna sūtras cited with their titles. Bahudhātuka (p. 1524F, 1525F), Devatāparipṛcchā (p. 1633F), Dhyāna (p. 1268F, 1547F), Dīrghanakhabrahmcāri
- (p. 1688F), *Ekottara* (p. 1268F), *Karmavibhanga* (p. 1534F), *Kātyāyanāvavāda* erroneously cited as *Kāśyapaparipṛcchā* (p. 1684F), *Romaharṣaṇiya* (p. 1554F), *Sarvāsrava* (p. 1590F), *Sundarī-sūtra* (p. 1572F).
- 2. Hīnayāna sūtras mentioned without title. Ādumā (p. 1350F, n. 1), Āmrāṇi (p. 1397F, n. 2), Anātman (p. 1448F, n. 1), Anityatā (p. 1438F, n. 1), Āryadharmamudrā (p. 1368F, n. 1), Āśiviṣopama (p. 1419F, n. 1; 1422F, n. 4), Āsvāda (p. 1328F, n. 3), Bhūtam idam (p. 1630F, n. 2), Cātuma (p. 1575F, , n. 1; 1532F, n. 2), Caturmahāpadeśa (p. 1621F, n. 2), Catuṣpratisaraṇa (p. 1621F, n. 1), Cīvara (p. 1399F, n. 1), Cūḍasatyaka (p. 1665F, n. 4), Cūdavedalla (p. 1184, n. 1), Dahara (p. 1397, n. 1), Dakṣiṇāvibhaṅga (1403F, n. 2), Dakṣiṇīya (p. 1392F, n. 1), Daśabala (p. 1515-1517F), Devatānusmṛti (p. 1420F, n. 1), Dharmacakrapravartana (p. 1458, n. 1), Dhvajāgra (p. 1335, n. 1), Etad agram (p. 1630, F, n. 2), Gārava (p. 1425F, n. 2), Gośṛṅga (p. 1405F, n. 1), Haliddavassana (p. 1270F, n. 1), Kolopama (p. 1397F, n. 1), Laṭukikopama (p. 1488F, n. 3), Maitrā (p. 1247F, n. 3), Maraṇasmṛti (p. 1424F, n. 1), Markaṭa (p. 1165F, n. 1), Na tāvakam (p. 1145F, n. 1), Nanda (p. 1641F, n. 2), Rahogataka (p. 1159F, n. 1; 1446F, n. 1); Rūpasaṃgraha (p. 1277F, n. 1), Śaikṣa (p. 1640F, n. 3), Śalyatvena (p. 144F, n. 2), Śramaṇasatya (p. 1663F, n. 2), Subhadra (p. 1550F, n. 2), Susīma (p. 1483F, n. 2), Udaya- and Sundarika (p. 1400F, n. 2), Upāsakaśīla (p. 1559F, n. 1), Vaiśaradya (p. 1570F seq.), Vyādhisūtra (p. 1515F, n. 1).

3. Mahāyānasūtras cited with their titles: <sup>69</sup> - Akṣayamatinirdeśa cited Akṣayamatibodhisattvaparipṛcchā (p. 1245F), Akṣayamatiparipṛcchā (p. 1272F) or Akṣayamatisūtra (p. 1716F), Saddharmapunḍarīka (p. 1646F), Saṃvṛtiparamārthasatyamirdeśa cited Praśantasūtra (p. 1562F), Sarvadharmāpravṛttinirdeśa (p. 1535F), Śūraṃgamasamādhi cited Mahāyāna-Śuraṃgamasūtra (1647F), Tathāgatācintyasuhyanirdeśa cited Guhyakasūtra (p. 1538F) or Guhyayakavajrapāṇisūtra (p. 1681F), Vimalakīrtinirdeśa cited Advayapraveśadharmaparyāya (p. 1645-1636F, n. 1). Viśeṣacintibrahmaparipṛcchā cited Jālinībodhisattvasūtra (p. 1268F, 1417F0 or Viśeṣacintisūtra (p. 1714F).

4. Mahāyānasūtras mentioned without titles. — Akṣayamtinirdeśa (p. 1250, n. 1), Amitayurbuddhānusmṛti (p. 1361, n. 2), Pratyutpannabuddhasaṃmukhāvasthiti-samādhi (p. 1361, n. 2), Ratnamegha (p. 1513F, n. 1), Śūraṃgamasamādhi (p. 1611, n. 2), Tathāgatācintyaguhyanirdeśa (p. 1587F, n. 1), Vikurvaṇarājapariprcchā (p. 1613, n. 1).

The references to the Madhyamakaśāstra by Nāgārjuna and to the Catuḥáataka by Āryadeva have been noted above, p. XXXIXF-XLF.

\*\*\* \*\*\* \*\*\*

I [Lamotte] am pleased to be able to express my gratitude to my colleagues and friends who have shown interest in this work. With the kindness of a bodhisattva, P. Demiéville has given me tireless assistance. W. Simon and J. Brough have furnished precious information. My young colleague, R. Shih, has proposed judicious corrections. H. Durt, J. Kato and M. Van Velthem have shared in correcting the proofs.

At the intervention of J. Willems, the very distinguished President of the University Foundation and the National Council for Scientific Research, the Franqui Foundation has granted a generous subsidy for this publication and thus relieved the burden of the Oriental Insitute of Louvain and its President, Count J. Ryckmans.

To these worthy individuals, to all these *kalvānamitras*, I express my highest thanks.

I would also like to thank particularly E. Peeters, director of the Orientalist Press, who has tried hard to met my wishes and speed the publication of this Volume.

Étienne Lamotte Louvain, May 17, 1970

<sup>-</sup>

 $<sup>^{69}</sup>$  As they are too numerous, the explicit and implicit references to the  $Mah\bar{a}praj\tilde{n}\bar{a}p\bar{a}ramit\bar{a}s\bar{u}tras$  are not given here.

### SUPPLEMENT TO BIBLIOGRAPHY

Ed. = edition; rec. -= reconstruction of Sanskrit; tr. == translation.

Abhidharmadipa: ed. P. 8. JAINI (Tibetan Sanskrit Works Series, IV), Patna, 1959.

Abhidharmamrta: rec. Sh. Bh. SASTRI (Visvabharati Studies, 17), Santiniketan, 1953.

Abhidharmasamuccaya: ed. V. V. GOKHALE, Journ. of the Bombay Branch R.A.S., XXIII, 1947, p. 13-38; ed. and rec. P. PRADHAN (Visvabharati Studies, 12), Santiniketan, 1950.

Abhisamayalamkara; ed. Th. STCHEBBATSKY et E. OBERMILLEB (Bibl. Buddh., 23), Leningrad, 1929; tr. E. CONZE (Serie Orientale Roma, VI), Rome, 1954.

Abhisamayalamkaravrtti, ed. C. PENSA (Serie Orientale Roma, XXXVII), Rome, 1967.

Ajitasenavyakarana: ed. N. DUTT (Gilgit Man., I), Srinagar, 1939.

Aksarasataka: tr. V. GOKHALE (Mat. z. Kunde des Buddh., 14), Heidelberg, 1930.

Alambanapariksa: ed. tib. and tr. S. YAMAGUCHI, JA, 1929, p. 1-65. ALSDORF L., *Die Arya-Strophen des Pali-Kanons*, Abh. d. Geistes- und Sozialwiss. Klasse, 1967, p. 247-331.

Anavataptagatha and Sthaviragatha: ed. H. BECHERT (Sanskrittexte aus den Turfan-funden, 6), Berlin, 1961; tr. M. HOFINGER, *Le Congres du lac Anavatapta* (Bibl. du Museon, 34), Louvain, 1954.

Arthapadasutra: ed. and tr. P. V. BAPAT (Visvabharati Studies, 13), Santiniketan, 1931.

Astadasasahasrika [Prajnaparamita]: ed. E. CONZE (Serie Orientale Roma, XXVI), Rome, 1962.

Astasahasrika [Prajnaparamita]: ed. V. WOGIHARA incorporated in the Abhisamaya-lamkaraloka, Tokyo, 1932-35; tr. E. CONZE (Bibliotheca Indica, 284), Calcutta, 1958.

Avadanakalpalata: ed. P. L. VAIDYA (Buddh. Sanskrit Texts, 22-23), Darbhanga, 1959.

Bahyarthasiddhikarika: tr. N. A. SASTRI, Gangtok, 1968.

BAILEY H. W. (Sir), Khotanese Texts, 5 vol., Cambridge, 1946-1963.

BANERJEE A. C., Sarvastivada Literature, Calcutta, 1957.

BAREAU A., Les sectes bouddhiques du Petit Vehicule (Publ. by 1'Ecole Française d'Extreme-Orient, XXXVIII), Saigon, 1955.

BAREAU A., *Recherches sur la biographie du Buddha* (Publ. by 1'Ecole Française d'Extreme-Orient, LIII), Paris, 1963.

BAREAU A., Les religions de I'lnde, III. Bouddhisme ancien, Paris, 1966.

BECHERT H., Buddhismus, *Staat und Gesellschaft in den Landern des Theravada-Buddhismus*, 2 vol., Wiesbaden and Francfort-sur-le-Main, 1965-67.

BENVENISTE E., Les donnees iraniennes, in Une bilingue greco-arameenne d'Asoka, JA, 1958, p. 1-48.

BERVAL R. DE, Presence du Bouddhisme, in France-Asie, XVI, 1959.

Bhadracaripramdhana: ed. K. WATANABE, Leipzig, 1912.

Bhaisajyaguru Sutra: ed. N. DUTT (Gilgit Man., I), Srinagar, 1939.

Bhavanakrama I: ed. G. TUCCI, Minor Buddhist Texts II (Serie Orientale Roma, IX, 2), Rome, 1958.

Bhavanakrama III: tr. C. PENSA, *Il terzo Bhavanakrama di Kamalasila*, Riv. degli Studi Oriental;, XXXIX, 1964, p. 211-242.

Bhavasamkranti [Sutra and Sastra]: 6d. N. A. SASTRI, Adyar Library, 1938.

BLOCH J., Les Inscriptions d'Asoka (Collection Emile Senart), Paris, 1950.

Bodhicittotpada: rec. BHADANTA SANTI BHIKSU, Visvabharati Annals, II 1949 p 206-243.

BROSSE Th., *Etudes instrumentales des techniques du Yoga* (Publ. do l'Ecole Française d'Extreme-Orient, LII), Paris, 1963.

Buddhabaladhana-[pratiharyavikurvananirdesa]: ed. N. DUTT (Gilgit Man., IV), Calcutta, 1959.

Buddhistische Stotras: ed. D. SCHLINGLOFF (Sanskrittexte aus den Turfanfunden, I) Berlin, 1955.

Catuhstavasamasartha: ed. G. TUCCI, *Minor Buddhist Texts*, I (Serie Orientalo Roma IX, 1), Rome, 1956.

Catusparisat Sutra: ed. E. WALDSCHMIDT (Abh.. d. Deuts. Akad. zu Berlin) Berlin 1952-62.

Ceylon Encyclopaedia - Encyclopaedia of Buddhism ed. by G. P. MALALASEKERA, 7 fasc. parus, Colombo, 1961 and following.

Chandoviciti: ed. D. SCIHLINGLOFF (Sanskrit texte aus den Turfanfunden 5) Berlin 1958.

Chao Lun: tr. W. LIEBENTHAL, 2nd ed., Hong Kong, 1968.

Cittavisuddhiprakarana: ed. P. Bh. PATEL (Visvabharati Studies, 8), Santiniketan 1949.

CONZE E., Materials for a Dictionary of the Prajnaparamita Literature, Tokyo, 1967.

CONZE E., The Prajnaparamita Literature (Indo-Iranian Monographs, VI), La Haye, 1960.

COOMARASWAMY A. K., *La sculpture de Bharhut* (Ann. du Musee Guimet; Bibl. d'Art, VI) Paris, 1956.

Dasottarasutra: ed. KUSUM MITTAL (Sanskrittexte aus den Turfanfunden, 4), Berlin 1957.

DEMIEVILLE P., A propos du Concile de Vaisali, T'oung Pao, XL, p. 239-296.

DEMIEVILLE P., Historique du systeme Vijnaptimatra, in Materiaux pour L'etude du systeme Vijnaptimatra by S. Levi, Paris, 1932, p. 15-42.

DEMIEVILLE P., L'origine des sectes bouddhiques d'apres Paramartha, MCB, I, 1931-32.

DEMIEVILLE, P., La penetration du bouddhisme dans la tradition philosophique chinoise, Cahiers

d'histoire mondiale. III, 1956, p. 19-38.

DEMIEVILLE, P., *Le bouddhisme et la guerre* (Bibl. de l'Institut des Hautes Etudes Chinoises, XI), Paris, 1957, p. 347-385.

DEMIEVILLE P., *Le chapitre de la Bodhisattvabhumi sur la Perfection de Dhyana*, Rocznik Orientalistyczny, XXI, 1957, p. 109-128.

DEMIEVILLE P., Le Candle de Lhasa (Bibl. de 1'Inst. des Hautes Etudes Chinoises 7) Paris, 1952.

DEMIEVILLE P., Le miroir spirituel, Sinologica, I, 1947, p. 112-137.

DEMIEVILLB P., Les versions chinoises du Milindapanha, BEFEO, XXIV, 1924, p. 1-258.

DEMIEVILLE P., *Notes additionnelles sur les editions imprimees du Canon bouddhique*, in Oeuvres posthumes de P. Pelliot, IV, 1952, Paris, p. 121-138.

DEMIEVILLE P., *Sur l'authenticite du Ta-tch'e.ng-k'i-sin-louen*, Bull. de la Maison Franco-Japonaise, II, 1929, p. 1-79.

Dharmadharmatavibhanga : ed. J, NOZAWA, dana Studies in Indohgy and Buddhology in hon. of Prof. Susumu Yamaguchi, Kyoto, 1955.

Dharmasamuccaya: ed. LIN LI-KOUANG, 2 vol., Paris, 1946-69.

Dharmottarapradipa: ed. D. MALVANIA (Tibetan Sanskrit Works Series, 2), Patna, 1952.

Dvadasamukha Sastra: rec. N. A. SASTRI, Visvabharati Annals, VI, 1954, p. 165-231.

EDGERTON, Dictionary = F. EDGEBTON, Buddhist Hybrid Sanskrit Dictionary, New Haven, 1953.

Ekadasamukha: ed. N. DUTT (Gilgit Man., I), Srinagar, 1939.

ELIADE M., Le Yoga, immortalite et liberte, Paris, 1957.

ELIADE M., Techniques du Yoga, Paris, 1948.

FACENNA D., A Guide to the Excavations in Swat (Pakistan) 1956-62, Boma, 1964.

FACENNA D., Reports on the Campaigns 1956-58 in Swat (Pakistan); Sculptures from the Sacred Area of Butkara 1 (Publ. of the Centre Studi e Scavi archeologici in Asia, IsMeo, I; II, 2; II, 3). Boma, 1962-64.

FILLIOZAT J., *Al-Biruni et l'alchimie indienne*, in *Al-Biruni Commemoration Volume*, Calcutta, s.d., p. 101-105.

FILLIOZAT J., Inde, nation et traditions, Paris, 1961.

FILLIOZAT J., Les echanges de l'Inde et de l'Empire romain aux premiers siecles de l'ere chretienne, Revue historique, CCI, 1949, p. 1-29.

FILLIOZAT J., Siksasamuccaya and Sutrasamuccaya, JA, 1964, p. 473-478.

FILLIOZAT J., The Graeco- Aramaic Inscription of Asoka near Kandahar, Epigraphia Indica, XXXIV,

1961-62, p. 1-8.

FILLIOZAT J., *The Psychological Discoveries of Buddhism*, Un. of Ceylon Review, XIII, 1955, p. 69-82.

FOUCHER A., La vie du Bouddha d'apres les textes et les monuments de l'Inde, Paris, 1949.

FOUCHER A., Les vies anterieures du Bouddha, Paris, 1955.

FRAUWALLNER E., Abhidharma Studien, WZKSO, VII, 1963, p. 20-36; VIII, 1964, p. 59-99.

FRAUTWALLNER E., Die Philosophie des Buddhismus, Berlin, 1956.

FRAUWALLNER E., Geschichte der indischen Philosophie, 2 vol., Salzburg, 1953-56.

FRAUWALLNER E., Landmarks in the History of Indian Logic, WZKSO, V, 1961, p. 125-148.

FRAUWALLNER E., On the date of the buddhist Master of the Law Vasubandhu (Serie Orientale Roma, III), Rome, 1951.

FRAUWALLNER E., *The Earliest Vinaya and the Beginnings of buddhist Literature* (Serie Orientale Roma, VIII), Rome, 1956.

FUJITA K., A Study of early Pure Land Buddhism, Tokyo, 1970.

Gandhari Dharmapada: ed. J. BROUGH (London Oriental Series, 7), Oxford, 1962.

GERNET J., Les aspects economiques du bouddhisme (Publ. de l'Eoole Française d'Extreme-Orient, XXXIX), Saigon, 1956.

Guhyasamaja Tantra: ed. B. BHATTACHARYYA (Gaekwad's Oriental Series, 53), Baroda, 1931.

HBI = LAMOTTE, Histoire (see below).

H.C.I.P. = History and Culture of the Indian People ed. by R. C. MAJUMDAR: I. The Vedic Age, London, 1951; II. The Age of the Imperial Unity, Bombay, 1951; III. The Classical Age, Bombay, 1954; The Age of Imperial Kanauj, Bombay, 1955.

Hastavalaprakarana: ed. F. W. THOMAS et H. UI, *The Hand Treatise, a Work of Aryadeva*, JRAS, 1918, p. 266-310.

HATTORI M., Dignaga, on Perception, being the Pratyaksapariccheda of Dignaga's Pramanasamuccaya (Harvard Oriental Series, 47), Cambridge Mass., 1968.

Hayagrivavidya: ed. N. DUTT (Gilgit Man., I), Srinagar, 1939.

Hetubindu: ed. and tr. E. STEINKELLNEB (Veroff. d. Kommision fur Sprachen und Kulturen Sudund Ostasiens, 4 et 5), Vienne, 1967.

Hetutattvopadesa: ed. G. Tuoci, Minor Buddhist Texts, I (Serie Orientale Roma, IX, 1), Rome, 1956.

HIRAKAWA A., *The Rise of Mahayana Buddhism*, Memoirs of the Research Department of the Toyo Bunko, XXII, 1963, p. 57-106.

Inde Classique, by L. RENOU et J. FILLIOZAT : Tome I (Bibl. Scientifique), Paris, 1947; Tome II (Bibl. Ec.. Franc.. Extreme-Orient), Paris, 1953.

INGHOLT H. and LYONS I., Gandharan Art in Pakistan (Pantheon Books), New York, 1957R

Jnanaprasthanasastra: rec. SH. BHIKSU SASTBI, Santiniketan, 1955.

Kao Seng Tchouan: tr. R. SHIH, *Biographie des Moines Eminents* (Bibliotheque du Museon, 54), Louvain, 1968.

Karatalaratna: rec. N. A. SASTRI (Visvabharati Studies, 9), Santiniketan, 1949.

Karikasaptati = Trisatikayah Prajiiaparamitayah Karikasaptatih, ed. G. Tuoci,

Minor Buddhist Texts, I (Serie Orientale Rome, IX, 1), Rome, 1956.

Karmavacana: ed. H. HARTEL (Sanskrittexte aus den Turfanfunden, 3), Berlin, 1956.

Karunapundarika: ed. I. YAMADA, 2 vol., London, 1968.

Kasyapaparivarta : ed. A. v. STAEL-HOLSTEIN, Commercial Press, 1926; tr. F. WELLER (Abh. d. Sachs. Ak. d. Wisa. zu Leipzig, 57), Berlin, 1965.

Kathinavastu! ed. et tr. KUN CHANG (Indo-Iranian Monographs, I), La Haye, 1957.

Kosa = Abhidharmakoaa, tr. L. DE LA VALLEE POUSSIN, 6 vol., Paris, 1923-31.

Kosabhasya == Abhidharmakosabhasya of Vasubandhu, ed. P. PBADHAN (Tibetan Sanskrit Works Series, VIII), Patna, 1967.

Kosakarika = Abhidharmakosakarika, ed. V. V. GOKHALE, Journ. Bombay Branch R.A.S., N.S. XXII, 1946, p. 73-102.

Kosavyakhya = Sphutartha, Abhidharmakosavyakhya, ed. U. WOGIHARA, Tokyo 1932-36.

LAMOTTE, *Histoire* = E. LAMOTTE, *Histoire du bouddhisme indien, des origines a l'ere Saka* (Bibliotheque du Museon, 43), Louvain, 1958.

LAW B. C., Historical Geography of Ancient India, Paris, 1954.

LIN LI-KOUANG, L'aide-Memoire de la Vraie Loi, Paris, 1949.

LUDERS H., Bharhut Inscriptions (Corpus Inscriptionum Indicarum, Vol. II, Part II), Ootacamund, 1963.

LUDERS H., Mathura Inscriptions (Abh. d. Ak. d. Wissensch. in Gottingen), Gottineen 1961.

Madh. Karika and Madh. vrtti = Mulamadhyamakakarikas of Nagarjuna with the Prasannapada, comm. of Candrakirti, ed. L. DE LA VALLEE POUSSIN (Bibl. Buddhica, 4), St.-Petersbourg, 1913. — Tr. J. W. DE JONG, *Cinq chapitres de la Prasannapada*, Leiden, 1949. — Tr. J. MAY, Candrakirti *Prasannapada Mulamadhyamakavrtti*, twelve chapiters tra. From the Sanscrit (Collection Jean Przyluski, II), Paris, 1959.

Madhyantavibhaga: ed. S. YAMAGUCHI, 2 vol., Nagoya, 1934.

Madhyantavibhagabhasya; ed. G. M. NAGAO, Tokyo, 1964.

Mahaparinirvana Sanskrit = Mahaparinirvanasutra, ed, E. WALDSCHMIDT (Abh. d. Deuts. Akad. zu Berlin), Berlin, 1960-51.

Mahaaamghika Pratimoksutra; ed. W. PACHOW, Allahabad, 1956.

Mahavadana Sanskrit = Mahavadanasutra, ed. E. WALDSCHMIDT (Abh. d. Deuts. Akad. zu Berlin), Berlin, 1953-56.

Mahavastu : ed. E. SENART, 3 vol., Paris, 1882-87; tr. J. J. JONES, 3 vol. (Sacred Books of the Buddhists, 16, 18, 19), London, 1949-56.

Mahayanavimsika: ed. G. TUCCI, Minor Buddhist Texts, I (Serie Orientale Roma, IX, 1), Rome, 1956.

Maitreyavyakarana! ed. S. LEVI, *Maitreya le Consolateur* (Etudes d'Orientalisme a la memoire de R. Linossier, II), Paris, 1932, p. 355-402; ed. N. DUTT (Gilgit Man., IV), Calcutta, 1959.

Majjhima: tr. I. B. HORNER, *The Middle Length Sayings*, 3 vol. (PTS Translation Series, 29-31), London, 1954-59.

MARSHALL J. and FOUCHER A., È, 3 vol., Calcutta, 1939.

MAY J., Candrakirti: see above under. Madh. karika.

MAY J., Kant et le Madhyamaka, Indo-iranian Journal, III, 1959, p. 102-111.

MAY J., La philosophie bouddhique de la vacuite, Studia Philosophica, XVIII, 1958, p. 123-137.

MAY J., Recherches sur un systeme de philosophic bouddhique, Bull. annuel de la Fondation suisse. III, 1954.

Melanges d'Indianisme a la memoire de L. Renou (Publications de 1'Institut de Civilisation Indienne, 28), Paris, 1968.

Melanges de Sinologie offerts a M. Paul Demieville (Bibl. de l'Institut des Hautes Etudes Chinoises, XX), Paris, 1966.

Milindapanha: tr. I. B. HORNER, *Milinda's Questions*, 2 vol. (Sacred Books of the Buddhists, 22 and 23), London, 1963-64.

MOCHIZUKI, *Cydopedia* = Bukkyo daijiten, 2nd ed., 10 vol., Tokyo, 1957-63.

MURTI T. R. V., The Central Philosophy of Buddhism, London, 1955.

NAGAO G. M., Index to the Mahayana Sutralamkara, 2 parts, Tokyo, 1961.

Nairatmyapariprecha: ed. S. LEVI, JA, 1928, p. 209-211.

NAKAMURA H., A critical Survey of Mahayana and Esoteric Buddhism chiefly based upon Japanese Studies, Acta Asiatica, VI, 1964, p. 57-88; VII, p. 36-94.

NAKAMURA H., Ways of thinking of Eastern Peoples, 2nd ed., Honolulu, 1964.

NARAIN A. K., The Indo-Greeks, Oxford, 1957.

NAUDOU J., Les bouddhistes kasmiriens au Moyen Age (Ann. du Musee Guimet, LXVIII), Paris, 1968.

Navasloki : ed. G. TUCCI, Minor Buddhist Texts, I (Serie Orientale Roma, XI, 1), Rome, 1956.

Nettippakarana: tr. NANAMOLI, The Guide (PTS Translation Series, 33), London, 1963.

Nidanasamyukta: 6d. C. TRIPATHI (Sanskrittexte aus den Turfanfunden, 8), Berlin, 1962.

Niraupamyastava: ed. G. TUCCI, JRAS, 1932, p. 312-321.

Nyayabindu: ed. Th. STCHERBATSKY (Bibl. Buddhica, 7), Petrograd, 1918.

Nyayapravesa: ed. A. B. DHRUVA, 2 vol. (Gaekwad's Oriental Series, 38, 39), Baroda, 1927-30.

OKC = A comparative analytical Catalogue of the Kanjur Division of the Tibetan Tripitaka, Kyoto, 1930-32.

PACHOW W., A comparative Study of the Pratimoksa, Santiniketan, 1955.

Pali Concordance = *Pali Tipitakam Concordance*, ed. V. L. WOODWARD, E. M. HARE, K. R. NORMANN, A. K. WARDER et N. R. WARDER, 17 parts; in the course of publication since 1952, London.

Pancavastuka Sastra; rec. N. A. SASTRI, Visvabharati Annals, X, 1960.

Pancavimsati [satasahasrika Prajnaparamita]: ed. N. DUTT (Calcutta Oriental Series, 28), London, 1934. — Tr. E. CONZE, *The Large Sutra on Perfect Wisdom*, Part I, London, 1961; Parts II and III, Madison, 1964.

Paramarthastava: ed. G. Tucci, JRAS, 1932, p. 322-325.

PERCY BBOWN, Indian Architecture (Buddhist and Hindu Periods), 3rd ed., Bombay, 1956.

PETECH L., *La« Description des Pays d'Occident» de Che Tao-ngan*, dans Melanges Paul Demieville, I, Paris, 1966.

PETECH L., Northern India according to the Shui-Ching-Chu (Serie Orientale Koma, II), Rome, 1950.

Prajnaparamitapindartha: ed. and tr. G. TUCCI, JRAS, 1947, p. 53-75.

Prajnaparamitahrdaya: ed. and tr. E. CONZE, *Thirty Years of Buddhist Studies*, London, 1967, p. 148-167.

Pramanavarttika: ed. B. GNOLI (Serie Orientale Roma, XXIII), Rome, 1960.

Pratityasamutpadasastra: ed. V. GOKHALE, Bonn, 1930.

PURI B. N., India under the Kushanas, Bombay, 1965.

RAHULA W., History of Buddhism in Ceylon, Colombo, 1956.

RAHULA W., L'enseignement du Bouddha, Paris, 1961.

RAMANAN- K. V., Nagarjuna's Philosophy as presented in the Maha-Prajnaparamita-Sastra, Tokyo,

1966.

Rastrapala [pariprecha]: tr. J. ENSINK, The Question of Rastrapala, Zwolle, 1952.

Ratnagotra [vibhaga] : ed. E. H. JOHNSTON (Bihar Research Society), Patna, 1950; tr. J. TAKASAKI (Serie Orientale Roma, XXXIII), Rome, 1966.

Ratnagunasamcaya: ed. E. OBEBMILLEB with corr..by E. COMZE (Indo-Iranian Reprints, V), La Haye, 1960; tr. E. CONZE, *The Accumulation of precious Qualities* (Indo-Asian Studies, Part 1), New Delhi, 1962.

Ratnaketudharani: ed. N. DUTT (Gilgit Man., IV), Calcutta, 1959.

Ratnavali: ed. G. TUCCI, JRAS, 1934, p. 307-325.

ROERICH G. N., The Blue Annals, 2 vol. (Asiatic Soc. Monograph Series, VII), Calcutta, 1949-53.

ROWLAND B., The Art and Architecture of India, 2nd ed. (Penguin Books), Baltimore, 1956.

RUEGG D.S., *La theorie du Tathagatagarbha et du Gotra* (Publ. de 1'Ecole Française d'Extreme-Orient, LXX), Paris, 1969.

Sadhanamala: ed. B. BHATTACHARYYA, 2 vol. (Gaekwad's Oriental Series, 26 et 41), Baroda, 1925-28.

Salistamba Sutra: ed. N. A. SASTRI, Adyar Library, 1950.

Samadhiraja Sutra: ed. N. DUTT, 3 parts (Gilgit Man., II), Srinagar, 1941-54.

Sammitiyanikaya [Sastra]: tr. K. VENKATARAMANAN, Visvabharati Annals, V, Santiniketan, 1953.

Sangitisutra and Sangitiparyaya; ed. and tr. KUSUM MITTAL et V. STACHE-ROSEN, Dogmatische Begriffsreihen im alteren Buddhismus, 2 vol. (Deutsche Akademie fur Orientforschung, 65, 1-2), Berlin, 1968.

Saptasatika [Prajnaparamita] ; ed. G. TUCCI, Memorie d. R. Accademia dei Lincei XVII, 1923, p. 115-139.

Sarvatathagatadhisthana! ed. N. DUTT (Gilgit Man., I), Srinagar, 1939.

Satapancasatka: ed. et tr. D. R. SHACLETON BAILEY, Cambridge, 1951.

Satasastra: tr. G. TUCCI, Pre-Dinnaga Buddhist Texts (Gaekwad's Oriental Series, 49), Baroda, 1929.

SCHLINGLOFF D., Die Religion des Buddhismus, 2 vol. (Sammlung Goschen, 174 et 770), Berlin, 1962-63.

STERN Ph. et BENISTI M., Evolution du style, indien d' Amaravati (Publ. du Musee Guimet; Recherches, VII), Paris, 1961.

Subhasitaratnakosa : cd. D. D. KOSAMBI and V. V. GOKHALE (Harvard Oriental Series, 42), Harvard, 1957.

*Suramgamasamadhi*: tr. E. LAMOTTB, *La Concentration de la Marche heroique* (Melanges chinois et bouddhiques, XIII), Bruxelles, 1965.

Suvikrantavikrami-[Pariprecha Prajnaparamitasfitra] : ed. R. HIKATA, Fukuoka, 1958.

SUZUKI D. T., On Indian Mahayana Buddhism, New York, 1968.

Svabhavatrayapravesasiddhi: ed. et tr. L. DE LA VALLEE POUSSIN, MCB, II, 1932-33, p. 147-161.

Taisho Index, Tokyo: 1. *Agon-bu*, (1940); 2. *Honnen-bu* (1967); 3. *Hannya-bu*, (1964); 5. *Kegon-bu* (1963); 6. *Hojaku-bu* (1966); 10. *Mikkyo-bu* I; 13. *Syakkyoron-bu* and *Chugan-bu* (1965); 14. *Bidon-bu* I (1968); 16. *Bidon-bu* 111 (1962); 17. *Mokuroku-bu*, (1942); 18. *Ronju-bu* (1966).

TARN W. W., The Greeks in Bactria. and India, 2nd ed., Cambridge, 1951.

Tib. Trip. = The Tibetan Tripitaka (Peking edition) compiled and edited by D. T.

SUZUKI and S. YAMAGUCHI, 168 vol., Tokyo, 1955-61.

TUCCI G., Il trono di diamante, Bari, 1967.

TUCCI, G., Le grande vie di communicazione Europa-Asia, Torino, 1958.

TUCCI G. et GULLINI G., *Preliminary Reports and Studies on the Italian Excavations in Swat (Pakistan)*, East and West, IX, 1958, p. 279-348.

TUCCI G., Simla della filosofia indiana, Bari, 1957.

Udanavarga: ed. F. BEBNHARD, Band I (Sanskrittexte aus den Turfanfunden, X), Gottingen, 1965; Band II, Indices... (Abh. d. Ak. Wissensoh. in Gottingen, 54), Gottingen, 1968.

Udrayana: ed. tib. and tr. J. NOBEL, *Udrayana, Konig von Roruka*, 2 vol., Wiesbaden, 1955.

UI H., Index to the Bodhisattvabhumi, Tokyo, 1961.

Upayahrdaya: rec. G. TUCCI, *Pre-Dinndga Buddhist Texts* (Gaekwad's Oriental Series, 49), Baroda, 1929.

Vajracchedika; ed. et tr. E. CONZE (Serie Orientale Roma, XIII), Rome, 1957.

VAN LOHUIZEN-DE LEEUW J. E., The Scythian Period, Leiden, 1949.

Varnarhavarna Stotra: ed. et tr. D. R. SHACLETON BAILEY, BSOAS, XIII, 1960, p. 671-701, 810, 947-1003.

Vigrahavyavartani : ed. E. H. JOHNSTON et A. KUNST, MCB, IX, 1949-51, p. 09-152; tr. S. YAMAGUCHI, *Pour ecarter les vaines discussions*, JA, 1929, p. 1-86.

Vimalakirtinirdesa [Sutra] : tr. E. LAMOTTE, *L'Enseigmement de Vimalakirti* (Biblio-theque du Museon, 51), Louvain, 1962.

Vimuttimagga: tr. N. R. M. EHARA, etc., Colombo, 1961.

Vin. des Mulasarv. = Mulasarvastivada-Vinayavastu, ed. N. DUTT, 4 parts (Gilgit Man., Ill), Srinagar,

1942-50.

Vin. des Sarvastivadin = *Der Vinayavibhanga zum Bhiksu-pratimoksa der Sarvasltvadins*, ed. V. ROSEN (Sanskrittexte aus den Turfanfunden, 2), Berlin, 1959.

Vinaya pali: tr. I. B. HORNER, *The Book of the Discipline*, 5 vol. (Sacred Books of the Buddhists, 10, 11, 13, 14, 20), London, 1938-52.

Visuddhimagga: ed. H. C. WABBBN et Dh. KOSAMBI (Harvard Oriental Series, 41), Cambridge Mass., 1950; tr. NANAMOLI, The Path a/Purification, Colombo, 1956.

WALDSCHMIDT E., Sanskrithandschriften aus den Turfanfunden, 2 Teile (Verzeichnis der Orientalischen Handschriften in Deutschland, B. X, 1 et 2), Wiesbaden, 1965-68.

WAYMAN A., Contributions to the. Madhyamika School of Buddhism, JAOS, Vol. 89, 1969, p. 141-152.

WELLER F., Tausend Buddhanamen dea Bhadrakalpa, Leipzig, 1928.

YAMAGUCHI S., *The Concept of Pure Land in Nagarjuna's Doctrine*, The Eastern Buddhist, I, 1966, p. 34-47.

Yogacarabhumi of Asanga. — I. Bahubhumikavastu: 1. Bhumi 1-5, ed. V. BHATTACHARYA, Calcutta, 1957; 2. Bhumi 8-9 et 14, ed. A. WAYMAN, *The Sacittika and Acittika-Bhumi and the Pratyekabuddhabhumi*, Journ. of Indian and Buddhist Studiea, VIII, 1, 1960, p. 375-379; 3. Bhumi 10, analysed in A. WAYMAM, *The Rules of Debate according to Asanga*, JAOS, 78,1958, p. 29-40; 4. Bhumi 13, in A. WAYMAN, *A Report on the Sravakabhiimi and its Author Asanga*, Journ. of the Bihar Research Society, XLII, 1956, p. 1-14; *Analysis of the Sravakabhumi Manuscript*, Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1961. — II. Viniscayasamgrahani, in L. SCHMITHAUSEN, *Der Nirvana-Abschnitt in der Viniscayasamgrahani der Yogacarabhumi* (Osterr. Ak.d. Wissens., 264), Wien, 1969.

Yogacarabhumi de Samgharaksa: tr. P. DEMIEVILLE, BEFEO, XLIV, 1954, p. 339-436.

Yogalehrbuch = D. SCHLINGLOFF, Ein buddhistisches Yogalehrbuch (Sanskrittexte aus den Turfanfunden, 7), Berlin, 1964.

ZURCHER E., The Buddhist Conquest of China, 2 vol., Leiden, 1959.

# CHAPTER XXXI: THE THIRTY-SEVEN AUXILIARIES TO ENLIGHTENMENT

# PRELIMINARY NOTE (p. 1119F)

#### I. LISTS OF AUXILIARIES

The title of the fourth noble truth preached by the Buddha in his sermon at Benares is the path of cessation of suffering (duḥkhanirodhagāminī pratipad). It deals with the noble eight-membered Path (ārya aṣṭāngamārga), the culmination of a method of liberation involving an infinite number of more or less efficacious spiritual practices. The most important – among which are included the eight Path members – are designated by the name 'Auxiliaries to Enlightenment', bodhipakkhika or bodhipakkhiya in Pāli, bodhipākṣika, bodhipakṣika, bodhipakṣik

Definition of the Vibhāṣā (T 1545, k. 96, p. 496b18-21): "Why are they called *bodhipākṣika*? The two knowledges of the saint, the knowledge of the cessation of the impurities (āsravaṣayajñāna) and the knowledge that they will not arise again (anutpādajñāna) are given the name of Bodhi because they consist of the complete understanding of the four Truths. If a dharma is favorable to this complete understanding, it is given the name of *bodhipākṣika*."

Definition of the Kośa, (VI, p. 282-284): "Kṣayajñāna and anutpādajñāna are Bodhi which, due to the difference of the saints who attain it, is threefold: śrāvakabodhi, pratyekabodhi, anuttarā samyaksaṃbodhi. Indeed, ignorance is completely abandoned (aśeṣāvidyāprahāṇāt) by these two jñānas: by means of the first, one knows truly that the task has been accomplished; by means of the second, one knows that the task will no longer have to be accomplished. Inasmuch as they are favorable to this Bodhi, thirty-seven dharmas are its auxiliaries (tadanulomyataḥ saptatriṃśat tu tatpakṣāḥ)... All these auxiliaries to Bodhi are also a group of pure (anāṣrava) or impure (sāṣrava) qualities of hearing (śruta), reflecting (cintā) and meditating (bhāvanā), arising from practice (prāyogika)."

But the classical list of the thirty-seven auxiliaries to enlightenment (*saptatriṃśad bodhipākṣikādharmāḥ*) was slow in being formulated:

- 1. In the Nikāyas and the Āgamas the term *bodhipākṣika dharma* is rather rare and still poorly defined. The Aṅguttara, III, p. 70, 300 (cf. Vibhaṅga, p. 244) includes among them: the guarding of the senses (*indriyeṣu guttadvāratā*, sobriety (*bhojane mattaññutā*) and heedfulness (*jāgariy' ānuyoga*). For the Saṃyutta, V, p. 227, 239, the *bodhipākṣika* are the five spiritual faculties (*indriya*); for the Vibhaṅga, p. 249, they are the seven members of enlightenment (*sambojjhaaṅga*).
- 2. In the Canon there is frequently a list of 37 dharmas divided into seven classes: 1) the four foundations of mindfulness (*smṛṭyupasthana*), 2) the four right efforts (*samyakpradhāna*), 3) the four bases of magical powers (*ṛddhipāda*), 4) the five spiritual faculties (*indriya*), 5) the five strengths (*bala*), 6) the seven members of enlightenment (*saṃbodhyanga* or *bodhyanga*), 7) the seven members of the path (*māṛgānga*).

Except for the Ekottarāgama, the Nikāyas and the Āgamas do not enumerate these dharmas which are 37 in total, and do not describe them as *bodhipākṣika*.

See, for example, Dīgha, II, p. 120 (cf. Sanskrit Mahāparinirvāṇa, ed. Waldschmidt, p. 196, 224); Dīgha III, p. 102, 127; Majjhima, II, p. 238-239; III, p. 296; Aṅguttara, IV, p. 125, 203; Udāna, p. 56. It is the same for the Pāli Vinaya, II, p. 240; III, p. 93; IV, p. 26, etc. – Madhyamāgama, T 26, k. 8, p. 476c20-21; k. 9, p. 479a18-19; k. 52, p. 753c6-7; Saṃyuktāgama, T 99k. 2, p. 14a7-8; k. 3, p. 19c5-6; k, 13, p. 87c3-4; k. 24, p. 176c14-15; k. 26, p. 188b26-27.

The Ekottarika, a late text crammed with Mahāyānist interpolations, is the only Āgama to enumerate these dharmas and describe them as *bodhipākṣika*: cf. T 125, k. 3, p. 561b20-22; k. 7, p. 579c26; k. 13, p. 612a19-20; k. 18, p. 635b25-26; k. 26, p. 696c9; k. 40, p. 765c15.

- 3. Sometimes the seven classes are incorporated into a list of more than 37 dharmas, e.g., Majjhima, II, p. 11-12; Anguttara, I, p. 39-49; and also for the Greater Vehicle, Pañcaviṃśati, p. 203-308; Śatasāhasrikā, p. 1427-1439.
- 4. Paracanonical or postcanonical texts, whether Pāli or Sanskrit, the sūtras and śāstras of the Greater Vehicle list the seven classes in question, number their components and give them a name, 'the 37 bodhipākṣika dharmas', that will remain classical.

For the Pāli sources, see Nettippakaraṇa, p. 197, 261; Milinda, p. 30; Visuddhimagga, ed. Warren, p. 582-583; commentaries by Buddhaghosa on the Saṃyutta, I, p. 104; II, p. 139; III, p. 136; and on the Aṅguttara, I, p. 85; II, p. 11; III, p. 56; IV, p. 111; Compendium of Philosophy, p. 179.

For the Sanskrit-Chinese sources, see an infinity of texts on the two Vehicles: Divyāvadāna, p. 350, 616; Avadānaśataka, I, p. 340; Vibhāṣā, T 1545, k. 96, p. 495c27-28; Kośa, VI, p. 281; Abhidharmadīpa, p. 57 seq.; Lalitavistara, p. 9; Pañcaviṃśati, T 223, k. 18, p. 350b9; Kāśyapaparivarta, p. 75; Saddharmapuṇd., p. 458; Vimalakīrti, p. 117, 139, 144, 201-202, 216, 378; Sūtrālaṃkāra, p. 140-146; Madhyantavibhāga, p. 89-94; Yogācārabhūmi, T 1579, k. 28, p. 439c-440a (for the śrāvakas): Bodh. bhūmi, p. 259 (for the bodhisattvas); Dharmasaṃgraha, ch. 43; Arthaviniścaya, p. 569-575; Mahāvyut., no. 952-1004.

- 5. As well as the classical list of 37 *bodhipakṣikas* which is by far the most widespread, there are also aberrant lists:
- a. The Nettippakaraṇa, which notes (p. 31, 261) the list of 37, mentions (p. 112, 237) a list of 43 bodhipakkhiyas beginning with six saññā: anicca, duhkha, anatta, pahāna, virāga and nirodhasaññā.
- b. In his commentary on the Anguttara (I, p. 85) Buddhaghosa mentions as heretical (*adhamma*) a list of 38 bodhipakkhiyas, consisting of 3 sati, 3 padhāna, 3 iddipāda, 6 indriya, 6 bala, 8 bojjhanga and 9 magganga.
- c. According to the Vibhāṣā (T 545, k. 86, p. 499a14-15), the Vibhajyavādins have a list of 41 bodhipākṣikas, by adding the four āryavaṃśas 'Ārya stock' being content with clothing, food and seat, and taking delight in cessation and the Path to the 37 traditional ones.

d. According to Bhavya (M. Walleser, *Die Sekten des alten Buddhismus*, 1927, p. 90: A. Bareau, *Trois Traités*, JA 1956, p. 186) place the four *apramāṇas*, also called *brahmavihāras*, loving-kindness, etc., among the *bodhyaṅgas*.

[In Kośa, VI, p. 281, note, de La Vallée Poussin comments that the Anguttara, I, p. 53, recognizes only six *bodhyangas*, memory being omitted. This is wrong, for memory (*satisambojjanga*) is mentioned in the first line on p. 53.]

#### II. CANONICAL DEFINITIONS OF THE 37 AUXILIARIES

#### 1. The 4 smṛtyupasthānas

Pāli formula in Dīgha, II, p. 290; Majjhima, I,p. 55-56; Saṃyutta, V, p. 141, 167, 185; Vibhaṅga, p. 193. *Ekāyano ayaṃ bhikkhave maggo ....vuneyya loke abhijjhādomanassaṃ...* – Sanskrit formula in Pañcaviṃśati, p. 204; Śatasāhasrikā, p. 1427; Daśabhūmika, p. 38. *Sa ... kāye kāyānupaśyi* (var. *kāyānudarśī) ... vinīyā loke 'bhidhyādaurmanasye*.

Transl. – O monks, there is only one way for the purification of beings, for going beyond sorrow and lamentation, for the disappearance of suffering and sadness, for the conquest of the right Path, for the realization of nirvāna: this is the four foundations of mindfulness. What are these four?

- 1. The monk dwells considering the body in the body, energetic, aware, mindful of controlling greed and sorrow in the world.
- 2. He dwells considering feeling in the feelings, energetic, aware, mindful of controlling greed and sorrow in the world.
- 3. He dwells considering the mind in the mind, energetic, aware, mindful of controlling greed and sorrow in the world.
- 4. He dwells considering dharmas in the dharmas, energetic, aware, mindful of controlling greed and sorrow in the world.

Pāli formula: Dīgha, II, p. 216, 292-306; Majjhima, I, p. 56-57, 59; Anguttara, III, p. 450; Saṃyutta, V, p. 143, 294, 296; Vibhaṅga, p. 193, 195, 197. *Iti ajjhattam vā kāye kāyānupassī ... dhammesu dhamānupassī viharati.* – Sanskrit formula: Pañcaviṃśati, p. 204 seq; Śatasāhasrikā, p. 1427 seq.; Daśabhūmika, p. 38. *Evam adhyātmaṃ kmye kāyānupaśyi* (var. *anudarśi*) ... bahirdhā dharmeṣu dharmānupaśyī viharati.

Transl. -1. Thus he dwells considering the body in the body internally (i.e., in his own body), considering the body externally (i.e., in the body of another) or considering the body (both) internally and externally.

- 2. He dwells considering feelings in the feelings internally, considering feeling in the feelings externally or considering feelings internally and externally.
- 3. He dwells considering the mind in the mind internally, considering the mind in the mind externally or considering the mind in the mind internally and externally.
- 4. He dwells considering dharmas in the dharmas internally, considering dharmas in the dharmas externally or considering dharmas in the dharmas internally and externally.

## 2. The 4 samyakpradhānas

In the Pāli sources, *sammappadhāna* 'right efforts'; in the Sanskrit sources, *samyakprahāṇa* 'right cessations', translated into Tibetan as *yan dag par spon ba*, but glossed as *samyakpradhāna* in the Kośavyākhyā, p. 601, l. 29. The Chinese translations give a choice between *tcheng cheng* or *tcheng k'in* on the one hand, and *tcheng touan* on the other hand.

Pāli formula in Dīgha, III, p. 221; Majjhima, II, p. 11; Saṃyutta, IV,p. 364-365; V, p. 244; Anguttara, II, p. 15; IV, p. 462; Paṭisambhidā, II, p. 15, 17. *Cattāro sammappadhānā: 1. Idha bhikkhu anupannānaṃ pāpakānaṃ ... ārabhati cittaṃ paggaṇhāti padahati.* – Sanskrit formula in Pañcaviṃśati, p. 307; Śatasāhasrikā, p. 1435-36; Daśabhūmika, p. 38; Mahāvyut., no. 958-965. *Catvāri samyakprahāṇāni: 1. Anutpannānāṃ pāpakānām akuśalānāṃ ... pragrhṇāti samyak pradadhāti* (var. *praṇidadhāti*).

#### Transl. – The four right efforts:

- 1. Here the monk gives rise to zeal, exerts himself, activates his energy, stimulates his mind and strives so that evil bad dharmas not yet arisen do not arise.
- 2. He gives rise to zeal, exerts himself, activates his energy, stimulates his mind and strives so that evil bad dharmas already arisen are destroyed.
- 3. He gives rise to zeal, exerts himself, activates his energy, stimulates his mind and strives so that good dharmas not yet arisen arise.
- 4. He gives rise to zeal, exerts himself, activates his energy, stimulates his mind and strives so that good dharmas already arisen are maintained, preserved, developed increased, cultivated and completed.

#### 3. The 4 rddhipādas.

Pāli formula: Dīgha, II, p. 213; III, p. 77, 221; Majjhima, I, p. 103; Saṃyutta, IV, p. 365; V, p. 254, 263-264; 278; Anguttara, I, p. 30, 297; II, p. 256; III, p. 82; IV, p. 464; Vibhaṅga, p. 216; Paṭisambhidā, I, p. 111, 113; II, p. 205. *Cattāro iddhipādā: 1. Idha bhikkhu ... iddhipādaṃ bhāvati.* — Sanskrit formula:

Pañcaviṃśati, p. 207-208; Śatasāhasrikā, p. 1436; Daśabhūmika, p. 38-39; Mahāvyut., no. 967-975. Catvāra ṛddhipādāḥ: 1. Chandasamādhiprahāṇasaṃskārasamanvāgatam ... vyavasargapariṇatam.

Transl. – The four bases of magical power:

- 1. Here the monk cultivates with active effort the basis of magical power that is provided with zealous concentration, a basis that rests on separation, that rests on detachment, that rests on cessation and results in rejection.
- 2. He cultivates with active effort the basis of magical power that is provided with energetic concentration, a basis that rests, etc.
- 3. He cultivates with active effort the basis of magical power that is provided with the concentration of mind, a basis that rests, etc.
- 4. He cultivates with active effort the magical power that rests on concentration of examination, a basis that rests, etc.

[The formula vivekaniśritam, etc., that does not appear here in the Pāli wording, however, does occur.

Definition of the four *samādhis* constituting the bases of magical power. – Pāli wording: Saṃyutta, V, p. 268; Vibhaṅga, p. 216. 1. *Chandaṃ ce bhikkhu nissāya* (var. *adhipatiṃ karitvā*) ... *vuccati vīmaṃsāsamādhi* – Sanskrit wording: Kośavyākhyā, p. 601-602. *1. Chandaṃ cāpi bhikṣur adhipatiṃ* ... 'sya bhavati mīmāṃsāsamādhiḥ.

Transl. – Concentration, the application of the mind to a single object which the monk acquires by resting on (while giving predominance) to zeal, to energy, to the mind, or to examination, concentration of the mind or concentration of examination.

#### 4. The 5 indrivas

The five spiritual faculties, not to be confused with the five organs also called *indriyas*, are frequently mentioned in the canonical texts but rarely defined *in extenso*, and the definitions given are rarely identical. There is no classical definition as there is for the other auxiliaries.

*Vibhangasutta* of the Samyutta, V, p. 196-197, to be compared to the Tsa a han, T 99, no, 647, k. 26, p. 182b-c:

Pañcimāni bhikkhave indriyāni. katamāni ...idam vuccati bhikkhave paññindriyam.

Transl. – Now, O monks, the five faculties. What are these five? The faculty of faith, the faculty of exertion, the faculty of attention, the faculty of concentration, and the faculty of wisdom.

1. What is the faculty of faith? Here the noble disciple has faith; he believes in the enlightenment of the Tathāgata and says: The Blessed One is holy, completely and fully enlightened, endowed with the

sciences and methods, well-come, knower of the world, peerless, leader of men to be tamed, teacher of gods and men, the Buddha and Blessed One. This is called the faculty of faith.

- 2. What is the faculty of exertion? Here the noble disciple dwells actively energetic in destroying the bad dharmas and producing the good dharmas; he is firm, of proven courage, and does not reject the burden of the good dharmas. This is called the faculty of exertion.
- 3. What is the faculty of attention? Here the noble disciple is attentive, endowed with vigilance and supreme discrimination, unceasingly recalling and remembering what was done and what was said a long time ago. This is called the faculty of attention.
- 4. What is the faculty of concentration? Here the noble disciple, making renunciation the object of his mind, acquires concentration, acquires the application of mind to a single object. This is called concentration.
- 5. What is the faculty of wisdom? Here the noble disciple is provided with wisdom: He is endowed with wisdom to determine the rising and falling of things, wisdom that is noble, penetrating, leading to complete cessation of suffering.

Daṭṭhabbaṃ sutta of the Saṃyutta, V, p. 196 (cited in Nettippakaraṇa, p. 19), corresponding to Tsa a han, T 99, no, 646, k. 26, p. 182b:

1. Kattha ca bhikkhave saddhindriyam ... ettha paññindriyam daṭṭhabbam.

Transl. -1. Where, O monks, is the faculty of faith to be found? In the four members of entry into the stream. That is where the faculty of faith is found.

- 2. Where is the faculty of exertion to be found? In the four right efforts. That is where ...
- 3. Where is the faculty of attention to be found? In the four foundations of mindfulness. That is where ...
- 4. Where is the faculty of concentration to be found? In the four trances. That is where ...
- 5. Where is the faculty of wisdom to be found? In the four noble truths. That is where ...

This outline is developed in the *Vibhangasutta*, no, 2, of the Saṃyutta, V, p. 197-198, where the *viriyindirya* is defined in exactly the same terms as the four *sammāpadhāna*.

I [Lamotte] have searched in vain in the Sanskrit sources for a text corresponding to the Pāli sources cited here. The Mahāvyutpatti, no. 977-981, mentions the five *indriyas* but does not give a definition; the Arthaviniścaya, p. 571-572, gives a definition borrowed, it seems, from the Akṣayamatisūtra cited in the Śikṣāsamuccaya, p. 316-317, but its wording has nothing in common with the old canonical sources.

#### 5. The five balas

Pāli formula: Aṅguttara, III, p. 10; Majjhima, II, p. 12; Saṃyutta, IV, p. 366. *Pañc' imāni bhikkhave ... samādhibalaṃ paññābalaṃ...* - Sanskrit formula: Pañcaviṃśati, p. 208; Śatasāhasrikā, p. 1437; Daśabhūmika, p. 39. *Sa śraddhābalaṃ ... samādhibalam*, etc., *prajñābalam*, etc.

Except for the *samādhibala*, the Anguttara, III, p. 10-11, uses exactly the same terms to define the five *balas* as the Samyutta, V, p. 196-197, cited above, uses to define the five *indriyas*. The same formulas appear also in the definition of the seven balas presented by the Anguttara, IV, p. 3-4.

Actually, it has always been recognized that there is just a difference in intensity between *bala* and *indriya*. Cf. Saṃyutta, V, p. 220: Evaṃ eva kho bhikkhave yaṃ saddhinriyaṃ taṃ saddhābalaṃ, yaṃ saddhābalaṃ taṃ saddhindriyaṃ. pe. yaṃ paññindriyaṃ taṃ paññābalaṃ, yaṃ paññābalaṃ taṃ paññindriyaṃ: "Similarly, O monks, the faculty of faith is the power of faith, and the power of faith is the faculty of faith. And so on up to: the faulty of wisdom is the power of wisdom, and the power of wisdom is the faculty of wisdom."

This identity is confirmed by the Vibhāṣā, T 1545, k. 141, p. 726b13-20; Kośa, VI, p. 286.

#### 6. The 7 sambodhyangas

Pāli wording: Majjhima, I, p. 11; II, p. 12; III, p. 275, etc. *1. Idha bhiukkhu satisambojjhangam ...bhāveti*, etc.— Sanskrit wording in Pañcaviṃśati, p. 208; Śatasāhasrikā, p. 1438; Daśabhūmika, p. 39; Mahāvyut. no. 989-995. 1. Sa *smṛtysaṃbodhyangaṃ ...Upekṣāsaṃbodhyangam bhāvayati*, etc.

Transl. – Here the monk cultivates the members of enlightenment called:

1, attention, 2, discernment of dharmas, 3. exertion, 4. joy, 5. relaxation., 6. concentration, 7. equanimity: members that rest on detachment, that rest on cessation and result in rejection.

In the Pāli sources, a stock phrase defines these seven *sambodhyangas*: cf. Majjhima, III, p. 86-87; Saṃyutta, V, p. 67-69, 331-332, 337-339; Vibhanga, p. 227:

1. Yasmim samaye, bhikkhave, bhikkhuno ... bhāvanāparipūrim gacchati.

- Transl. -1. O monks, when an unfailing attention has arisen in the monk, then the member-of-enlightenment called attention has begun in the monk, then the monk develops the member-of-enlightenment called attention, then the member-of-enlightenment called attention reaches its full development in the monk.
- 2. When the monk thus dwelling attentively examines, inquires and investigates this thing by means of wisdom, then the member-of-enlightenment called discernment of dharmas is launched in him.

- 3. When exertion without laziness arises in this monk who is examining, inquiring and investigating this thing by means of wisdom, then the member-of-enlightenment called exertion is launched in him.
- 4. When spiritual joy is produced in this energetic monk, then the member-of-enlightenment called joy is launched in him.
- 5. When the body and also the mind relaxes in this monk with joyful spirit, then the member-of-enlightenment called relaxation is launched in him.
- 6. When the mind is concentrated in this monk of relaxed and happy body, then the member-of-enlightenment called concentration is launched in him.
- 7. When this monk considers his mind thus concentrated with equanimity, then the member-of enlightenment called equanimity is launched in him, then the monk develops the member-of-enlightenment called equanimity, then the member-of-enlightenment called equanimity reaches its full development in the monk.

#### 8. The 8 mārgangas

Pāli wording: Vinaya, I, p. 10; Dīgha, I, p. 157; II, p. 251, 311; Majjhima, I, p. 15, 49, 299; II, p. 82-83; III, p. 231; Saṃyutta, II, p. 42-44, 57, 59; III, p. 159;IV, p. 133, 233; V, 8, 347-348, 421, 425; Anguttara, I, p. 177, 217; III, p. 4121; Paṭisambhidā, I, p. 40, II, p. 86; Vibhaṅga, p. 104, 235, 236: *Ariyo aṭṭhaṅgiko ... sammāsati sammāsamādhi.* — Saskrit wording: Catuṣpariṣad, p. 142; Mahāvastu, III, p. 331; Lalitavistara, p. 417; Pañcaviṃśati, p. 208: *Āryāṣṭāṅgo mārgas ... samyaksmṛtiḥ samyaksamādhih.* 

Transl. – The noble eightfold Path, namely, right view, right concept, right speech, right action, right livelihood, right effort, right mindfulness, right concentration.

Pāli wording: Saṃyutta, IV, p. 367-368: 1. *Idha bhikkhu sammādiṭṭhiṃ ... vossaggapariṇāmiṃ*. – Sanskrit wording: Śatasāhasrikā, p. 1438-1439; Daśabhūmika, p. 39: 1. *Saṃyagdṛṣṛṭiṃ ... vyavasargapariṇatam*.

Transl. – Here the monk cultivates right view, right concept, right speech, right action, right livelihood, right effort, right mindfulness, right concentration, which rest on separation, which rest on detachment, which rest on cessation and lead to rejection.

A stock phrase defines the eight *mārgāṅgas*; it occurs frequently in the Pāli Nikāyas, e.g., Dīgha, II, p. 311-313; Majjhima, III, p. 252-252; Saṃyutta, V, p. 8-10; Vibhaṅga, p. 235-236. The Sanskrit Āgamas do not reproduce it exactly: cf. Tchong a han, T 26, k. 7, p. 469a15-b 29:

Ayam eva ariyo aṭṭhaṅgiko maggo, ... catutthajjhānaṃ upasampajja viharati ...

Transl. – Here is the eightfold noble Path: 1. right view; 2. right resolve; 3. right speech; 4. right action; 5. right livelihood; 7. right mindfulness; 8. right concentration.

- 1. What is right view? It is the knowledge of suffering, the knowledge of the origin of suffering, the knowledge of the cessation of suffering, the knowledge of the path leading to the cessation of suffering.
- 2. What is right concept? The concept of renunciation, the concept of non-maliciousness, the concept of non-violence.
- 3. What is right speech? Abstaining from falsehood, abstaining from gossip, abstaining from abusive speech, abstaining from unnecessary speech.
- 4. What is right action? Abstaining from killing, abstaining from theft, abstaining from illicit sexual activity.
- 5. What is right livelihood? Here the noble disciple, excluding the evil way of life, earns his livelihood by way of right living.
- 6. What is right effort? Here the monk gives rise to a wish, exerts himself, activates his energy, stimulates his mind and strives so that the evil bad dharmas not yet arisen do not arise. He gives rise to a wish... and strives so that the evil bad dharmas already arisen are destroyed. He gives rise to a wish... and strives so that the good dharmas not yet arisen arise. He gives rise to a wish... and strives so that the good dharmas already arisen are maintained, preserved, developed, increased, cultivated and completed.
- 7. What is right mindfulness? Here the monk dwells considering the body in the body, energetic, aware and mindful of controlling greed and sadness in the world. Similarly he dwells considering feeling in the feelings, mind in the mind and dharmas in the dharmas...
- 8. What is right concentration? Here the monk, having eliminated desires, having eliminated bad dharmas, enters into the first trance, provided with examination, provided with judgment, resulting from detachment, which is joy and happiness. By the suppression of examination and judgment, he enters into the second trance, inner peace, one-pointedness of mind, without examination and judgment, arisen from concentration, which is joy and bliss. By renouncing joy, he dwells equanimous, reflective, aware; he experiences bliss in his body; he enters into the third trance where the saints say that he is 'equanimous, reflective, dwelling in bliss'. By cessation of bliss and by cessation of suffering, by the previous suppression of joy and sadness, he enters into the fourth trance, free of suffering and bliss, purified in renunciation and reflection.

We may note that the definitions of *samyagvyāyāma* (no. 6) and *samyaksmṛti* (no. 7) given here are the same, respectively, as the definitions given above of the four *samyakpradhānas* and the four *smṛtyupasthānas*.

For an original definition of the eight mārgāngas, see Arthaviniścaya, p. 573-575.

#### III. THE AUXILIARIES IN THE ABHIDHARMA

Of the eighteen treatises contained in the Pāli Vihanga, the eighth, ninth, tenth and eleventh are dedicated to the five classes of *bodhipākṣhikas* respectively: the *smṛṭyupasthānas* (p. 193-207), the *samyakpradhānas* (p. 208-215), *the ṛddhipādas* (p. 216-226), the *sambodhyangas* (p. 227-234) and the *mārgāngas* (p. 235-243). Each treatise is made up of three parts: 1) the *suttantabhājaniya* or literal explanations of the canonical sources; 2) the *abhidhammabhājaniya* or scholastic explanations of the same sources; 3) the *pañhāpucchaka* or summary by means of questions and answers.

The *bodhipākṣikas* are often discussed in the Visuddhhimagga as well by Buddhaghosa who summarizes his views at the beginning of chapter XXII (ed. Warren, p. 582-585, tr. Ñānamoli, p. 792-796).

But in the second part of the present chapter, the *Traité* takes its inspiration solely from the Sarvāstivādin-Vaibhāṣika sources and enunciates theories already described in the Ṣaṭpādābhidharma (T 1553-1554), the Vibhāṣā (T 1545), the Amṛtasāra (T 1550-1552), the Abhidharmāmṛtarasa (T 1553), all texts dealing copiously with the *bodhipākṣikas*. It seems that the *Traité* preferably consulted the Prakaraṇapāda of Vasumitra (T 1541-42) which it cites twice under the heading of chapter VII, namely 'the Thousand Difficulties'.

The Sarvāstivādin Abhidharma shows considerable progress in elaborating the doctrine of the auxiliaries in regard to the number of elements (*dravya*) entering into the constitution of the *bodhipākṣikas*, their successive appearance in the course of practice of the Path and their distribution in the levels (*bhūmi*) of birth or absorption.

- 1. Elements making up the bodhipākṣikas. The Abhidharma authors rightly noted that although the canonical lists enumerate 37 bodhipākṣikas, many of them are fundamentally the same. Thus, when the lists speak of samyakprahāna, vūryendriya, vūryabala, vūryasaṃbodhyaṅga and samyagvyāyāma, basically it is a matter of one and the same thing, exertion. This is why these authors were led to reducing the 37 bodhipākṣikas to a certain number of constitutive elements, i.e., faith, exertion, mindfulness, etc. The Vibhāṣā (T 1545, k. 96, p. 496a-b) hesitates between ten, eleven or twelve constitutive elements; the Abhidharmāmṛtarasa (T 1553, k. 2, p. 977c11-12; Reconstruction by Bhikṣu Sastri, p. 116) settles for ten; the Kośa (VI, p. 283-284) has ten and the Abhidharmadīpa (p. 358) has eleven. Here the Traité also has ten.
- 2. Successive appearance of the bodhipākṣikas. But if several auxiliaries are intrinsically the same, should we not accuse the canonical lists of having introduced fictional distinctions? No, for a given practice may have been practiced more or less efficaciously at different stages. This is why exertion, as it progresses, successively takes the name of samyakprahāna, vīrendriya, vīryabala, vīryasaṃbodhyanga and finally samyagvyāyāma.

Since then, the authors of the Abhidharma were brought to determining the successive appearance of the seven classes of *bodhipāksikas* in the course of the various stages of the path:

- 1) The first class, that of the *smṛtyupasthānas*, appears at the beginning stage (*adikāramika*).
- 2) 5) The four following classes appear during the preparatory Path  $(prayogam\bar{a}rga)$  or the practice of the four roots of good  $(ku\acute{s}alam\bar{u}la)$  'leading to penetration'  $(nirvedhabh\bar{a}g\bar{v}ya)$ : 1) The four  $samyakpragh\bar{a}nas$ , in the Heat (usmagata); 2) the four  $rddhip\bar{a}das$  in the Summits  $(m\bar{u}rdhan)$ ; 3) the five indrivas in the Patiences  $(ks\bar{a}nti)$ ; 4) the five balas in the Supreme worldly dharmas  $(laukik\bar{a}gradharma)$ .
- 6) The sixth class, that of the seven *sambodhyangas*, develops in the Path of meditation (*bhāvanmārga*).
- 7) The seventh and last class, that of the eight *mārgāngas*, appears in the Path of seeing (*darśanamārga*).

Here, the *Traité* will not mention this classification although it appears in the Vibhāṣā (T 1545, k. 96, p. 496c22-497a2), the Kośa (VI, p. 287-288), the Abhidharmadīpa (p. 362), etc.

3. *Distribution of the bodhipākṣikas in the levels.* – On the other hand, the *Traité* borrows textually from the Vibhḥaṣā the paragraph on the distribution of the *bodhipākṣikas* in the levels (*bhūmi*). This distribution is also accepted by the Abhidharmāmṛta (T 1553, k. 2, p. 977c21-26; Reconstruction of Sastri, p. 117), the Kośa, VI, p. 291-292, and the Abhidharmadīpa, p. 365.

In this entire section, the *Traité* shows its complete understanding of the Sarvāstivādin Abhidharma.

# IV THE AUXILIAIRIES IN THE MAHĀYĀNA

# 1. The Madhyamaka viewpoint

*Preliminary question.* – From the beginning of this chapter, the *Traité* is confronted with an objection of principle. The auxiliaries of Bodhi that lead directly to nirvāṇa are of interest primarily to the śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas whose aspirations concern nirvāṇa. But can we say that they also concern bodhisattvas who delay their nirvāṇa indefinitely in order to dedicate themselves to the welfare and happiness of beings?

The answer of the *Traité* is categorical: the *bodhisapākṣikas* concern the bodhisattvas as well as the śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas and consequently are relevant to the three Vehicles.

Some arguments drawn from scripture and reasoning support this thesis:

1. In the Great Prajñās (Pañcaviṃśati, p. 194-223; Śatasāhasrikā, p. 1405-1473), there is a long chapter dedicated to the constitutive elements of the Mahāyāna. These are the six *pāramitās*, the twenty śūnyatās, the one hundred and twelve *samādhis*, the twenty-one practices, the forty-three *dhāraṇīmukhas* and the ten *bhūmis*. The seven classes of *bodhipāksikas* are placed at the head of the twenty-one practices

(Pañcaviṃśati, p. 203-308; Śatasāhasrikā, p. 1427-1439). This is proof that the *bodhipākṣikas* are an essential part of the Greater Vehicle and must be practiced in some way by the bodhisattvas.

Other Mahāyānasūtras may be called upon as witness. Thus the Avatamsaka (T 278, k. 38, p. 640a27-28; T 279, k. 54, p. 286c24-25) makes the seventh of the ten gardens frequented by the bodhisattvas to be the six pāramitās, the three saṃgrahavastus and the thirty-seven bodhipākṣikas. In its section on the Daśabhūmika (p. 38-39, 42, 57), the same Avataṃsaka comments that the bodhisattva practices (bhāvayati) the bodhipākṣikas as early as the fourth bhūmi, purifies them by the view of sameness (samatā) in the fifth and fulfills them completely (paripūrayati) in the seventh.

Similarly,the Bodh. bhūmi (p.342) section of the Yogācārabhūmi, describes the Arcismatī, the fourth bodhisattva level, as the level 'associated with the auxiliaries' (bodhipākṣhyapratisaṃyukta).

2. We also know from reasoning that the *bodhipākṣikas* are a part of the bodhisattva path, the intent of which is to save beings and lead them to nirvāṇa. But there is no nirvāṇa without bodhi, and bodhi can be attained only by practice of the Path (*mārgabhāvana*) with all the auxiliaries of bodhi (*bodhipākṣika dharma*). It is thus necessary that the bodhisattva fulfill them completely (*paripūr*) himself in order that he can teach them to others. But although he fully completes them (*paripūrayati*), he does not realize (*na sākṣātkaroti*) them immediately for, if he did that, he would enter into nirvāṇa immediately. He means, however, in his great compassion imitating the Buddhas, to stay in saṃsāra for a long time in order to ripen (*paripācana*) the greatest possible number of beings. Established in the perfection of wisdom (*prajñāpāramitā*), he knows that saṃsāra is identical with nirvāṇa, but that does not prevent him in any way from perfecting beings by the practice of the Path. This is why 'his wisdom is accompanied by skillful means, and his skillful means is accompanied by wisdom' (*upāyasahitā prajñā, prajñāsahita upāyaḥ*).

The *Traité* will develop considerations of this type in the first section of this chapter. But although the bodhisattva shares the thirty-seven auxiliaries with the śrāvaka and the pratyekabuddha, he practices them in quite a different spirit. This is what the *Traité* will set out to show in the third section of the chapter.

View and aim of the bodhisattva in the practice of the auxiliaries. – Two passages of the Great Prajñās are involved here:

- 1. Pañcaviṃśati, p. 146-147; Śatasāhasrikā, p. 841-842. The bodhisattva clings (nopalabhate) to no dharma in general nor to any class of bodhipākṣika in particular because of their absolute purity (atyantaviśuddhitām upādāya). This purity is a non-arising (anutppāda), a non-manifestation (aprādurbhāva), an absence of clinging (anupalambha), a non-activity (anabhisaṃskāra). Things do not exist (na saṃvidyante) as worldly fools would like to believe (yathā bālapṛthagjanā abhiniviṣtāh); things exist by not existing (yathā na saṃvidyante tathā saṃvidyante). Consequently, because they exist only out of ignorance, they are called (the result) of ignorance (evam asaṃvidyamānās tenocyate 'vidyeti).
- 2. Śatasāhasrikā, p. 56-57. Dharmas in general and the seven categories of *bodhipākṣikas* in particular must be completely fulfilled (*paripūrayitavya*) by the bodhisattva who abides in the perfection of wisdom

by a method of non-abiding (*bodhisattvena prajñāpāramitāyāṃ sthitvāsthānayogena*) basing himself on the impossibility of their being apprehended (*anupalabdhitām upādāya*).

The *Traité* has defined the method of non-abiding (*asthānayoga*) above (p. 656F): it consists of not grasping any characteristic (*nimitta*) in things. The translation of *anupalabdhi* and *anupalabdhitā*, rendered in Tibetan by *mi dmigs pa* and in Chinese by *wou so tö*, is very tricky. In his Materials for a Dictionary, p. 35, Prof. E. Conze proposes different translations such as no(n)-apprehension, impossibility of apprehending, that cannot be got at, etc., and he cannot be blamed for sticking to the purely literal meaning. However, I [Lamotte] think that the understanding of the term is much vaster than may be given to it by understanding the etymology. A dharma is *anupalabhda*, non-apprehended, not only because it is not grasped by any faculty whatsoever, but also as a result of its basic non-existence which puts it beyond the range of any clinging. For my part, the ultimate meaning of *anupalabdhi* and *anupalambha* is pure and simple non-existence. We may cautiously say, with J. May (*Candrakīrti*, p. 167) that the *anupaladhasvabhāva* dharma is that which is not perceived as existing in itself.

The two passages of the Prajñās that have just been presented permit the attitude of the bodhisattva towards the thirty-seven *bodhipākṣikas* to be defined:

1. For the śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas, the ātman, the individual, does not exist in itself, but things (*dharma*) exist as they are produced by causes. For the bodhisattva, on the other hand, there is neither ātman nor dharma, and it is from the twofold perspective of pudgala- and dharmanairātmya that he 'completely fulfills' (*paripūrayati*) the auxiliaries of bodhi 'by being based on their non-existence' (*anupalabdhitām upādāya*).

The *Traité* as well will dedicate the third section of the present chapter to showing that the *bodhipākṣikas* operate within emptiness. The body, feelings, mind and dharmas, the objects of the four *smṛtyupasthānas*, are not only without self (*anātman*) and without 'mine' (*anātmīya*), but also non-existent (*asat*). The four *samyakpradhānas* and the four *ṛddhipādas* are empty (śūnya) and without basis (*apṛatiṣṭhāna*). The five *indriyas* and the five *balas* are applied to empty (śūnya) dharmas, without characteristics (ānimitta) and are of no interest (*apṛanihita*). The seven *saṃbodhyangas* illuminate the True nature (*bhūtalakṣaṇa*) of things, namely, pure and simple non-existence. Finally, the eight *mārgāngas* lead to total absence of mind, speech and action.

2. The śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas who aspire to bodhi and nirvāṇa 'realize' (sākśātkurvanti) the bodhipākṣikas regarded as leading to it. On the other hand, the bodhisattva, wishing to remain in saṃsāra in order to work for the benefit and happiness of all beings, keeps from realizing the dharmas that would have the effect of making this task impossible and in which he does not believe. If he does 'completely fulfill' them (paripūrayati), it is not for himself but for a purely altruistic end, to teach them to beings destined to be converted by way of the Vehicle of the śrāvakas. For the bodhisattva, the bodhipākṣikas are merely skillful means (upāya) to be used according to the circumstances.

By this twofold attitude of theoretical refusal and practical acceptance, the bodhisattva remains faithful to his plan, namely,  $praj\tilde{n}\tilde{a}$  accompanied by  $up\tilde{a}ya$  and vice versa.

# 2. The Vijñānavādin viewpoint

In contrast to the Prajñāpāramitā and the Madhyamaka of which the *Traité* is here the spokesman, the Vijñānavādin school is of the opinion that the True nature of dharmas is not pure and simple non-existence but a True manner of being (*bhūtatathatā*) and that the practice of the *bodhipākṣikas* allows its attainment.

To illustrate this point of view, a passage from the Bodh. bhūmi, p. 259, is cited:

Bodhisattva upāyaparigṛhītena jñānena ... iyam asya pāramārthikī kāyānupaśyanā.

Transl. – By means of wisdom incorporating skillful means, the bodhisattva understands fully the thirty-seven auxiliaries but does not realize them; and he understands them fully from the point of view of both Vehicles, namely, the point of view of the śrāvaka Vehicle and the point of view of the Greater Vehicle.

From the point of view of the śrāvaka Vehicle, he understands precisely those that have been explained completely in (the chapter) on the śrāvaka level to which reference will be made (T 1579, k. 21-34, p. 395c-477c; cf. A. Wayman, *A report on the Śrāvaka-Bhūmi and its Author Asanga*, J. Bihar research Soc., XLII, 2-4, P{arts 3-4, 1956, p. 1-14).

But how does the bodhisattva understand exactly the thirty-seven auxiliaries of enlightenment from the point of view of the Greater Vehicle? Here the bodhisattva abides considering the body in the body, but he does not conceive the body as being body [which is the viewpoint of the śrāvakas], nor as not existing in any way whatsoever [which is the viewpoint of the Mādhyamikas]; but he understands exactly the manner of existence of the inexpressible nature of the body [which is the viewpoint of the Vijñānavādins]. That is the bodhisattva's consideration of the body in the absolute sense.

\*\*\* \*\*\* \*\*\*

[**k. 19, p. 197b**] (p. 1137F)

Sūtra (cf. Pañcaviṃśati, p. 19, l. 12-15; Śatasāhasrikā, p. 56, l. 9-57, l. 10). –The bodhisattva-mahāsattva who abides in the perfection of wisdom by the method of non-abiding should, without producing them, complete perfect [the following} (*Prajñāpāramitāyaṃ sthitvā bodhisattvena mahāsattvenāsthānayogenānutpādanataḥ paripūrayaitvyāḥ*):

- 1. the four foundations of mindfulness (catvāri smṛtyupasthānāni),
- 2. the four right efforts (catvāri samyakpradhānani),
- 3. the four bases of magical power (catvāra rddhipādāh),
- 4. the five faculties (pañcendriyāṇi),

- 5. the five strengths (pañca balāni),
- 6. the seven members of enlightenment (sapta bodhyaṅgāni),
- 7. the eight members of the Path (aṣṭāṅgamārga).

Śāstra. –

# First Part THE AUXILIARIES BELONG TO THE GREATER VEHICLE AS WELL

Question. – The thirty-seven auxiliaries ( $p\bar{a}k\bar{s}ika$ ) are the path ( $m\bar{a}rga$ ) of the śrāvaka and pratyekabuddha; the six perfections ( $p\bar{a}ramit\bar{a}$ ) are the path of the bodhisattva-mahāsattva. Then why speak of things concerning only the śrāvaka when dealing with the bodhisattva?

Answer. - 1. The bodhisattva-mahāsattva must practice the paths of all the good dharmas. Thus the Buddha said to Subhūti: "The bodhisattva-mahāsattva who practices the Prajñāpāramitā should practice the paths of all the good dharmas, from the level of sharp wisdom (śuṣka- or śuklavipāśyanābhūmi) up to the level of the Buddhas (buddhabhūmi). He must practice (śikṣitavyam) the first nine levels but not realize them (sakṣātkartavyam); as for the level of the Buddhas, he must practice and realize it."<sup>70</sup>

70 Free quotation of the Prajñāpāramita in the Daśabhūmiparivarta (cf. Pañcaviṃśati, p. 225; Śata., p. 1473: Yad bodhisattvo mahāsattva upāyakauśalyena sarvāsu pāramitāsu caran saptatriṃśad bodhipākṣeṣu dharmeṣu śikṣito 'pramāṇadhyānārūpyasamāpattiṣu caran daśatathāgatabalapratisaṃvitsv aṣṭādaśāvenikeṣu buddhadharmeṣu caran śuklapaśyanābhūmiṃ gotrabhūmim darśanabhūmiṃ tanubhūmiṃ vītarāgabhūmiṃ kṛtāvibhūmiṃ śrāvakabhūiṃ pratyekabuddhabhūmiṃ bodhisattvabhūmiṃ bodhisattvo mahāsattvo 'tikramya etā navabhūmīr atikramya buddhabhūmau pratiṣṭhate, iyaṃ bodhisattvasya mahāsattvasya daśamī bhūmiḥ.

Transl. – "When the bodhisattva-mahāsattva, with his skillful means, practices all the perfections, practices the thirty-seven auxiliaries of enlightenment, practices the [four] limitless ones, the trances and the formless absorptions, practices the ten strengths of the Tathāgata, the [four] unhindered knowledges and the eighteen special attributes of the Buddhas, when he goes beyond nine levels, namely, the level of clear seeing, the level of the spiritual lineage, the level of the eighth saint, the level of seeing, the refined (?) level, the level of renunciation, the level of the one who has finished his career, the level of the śrāvaka, the level of the pratyekabuddha and the level of the bodhisattva, when he is established in the level of the Buddha, that is the level of the bodhisattva-mahāsattva."

The ten levels cited here are the levels common ( $s\bar{a}ddh\bar{a}ranabh\bar{u}mi$ ) to both vehicles. On this subject, see Śūramgamasamādhi, p. 248-251, note. The Sarvāstivādin treatises are not unaware of them, as Prof. A. Hirakawa has shown in *The Rise of Mahāyāna Buddhism*, Memoirs of the Research Dept. of the Tokyo Bunko, No. 22, 1963, p. 67-68.

2. Moreover, where is it said that the thirty-seven auxiliaries are the qualities of śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas alone and do not constitute the path of the bodhisattva? In this Prajñāpāramitāsūtra, in the chapter entitled Mahāyāna, the Buddha says that [the thirty-seven auxiliaries], from the four foundations of [197c] mindfulness (*smṛtyupasthāna*) up to the eight members of the noble path (*āṛyāṣtāngamārga*) are contained in the Three Baskets (*tripiṭaka*) of the Greater Vehicle; 71 but he does not say that the thirty-seven auxiliaries are things exclusively (*kevalam*) concerning the Lesser Vehicle.

In his great loving-kindness (*mahāmaitrī*), the Buddha preached the thirty-seven auxiliaries that are the path to nirvāṇa. In accordance with the vows (*praṇidhāna*) of beings, in accordance with karmic causes and conditions (*hetupratyaya*), each finds his own path. The person who seeks (*paryeṣate*) to be a śrāvaka finds the śrāvaka path; the person who has planted the roots of good (*kuśalamūla*) of the pratyekabuddha finds the pratyekabuddha path; the person who seeks the bodhi of the Buddhas finds the Buddha path.

According to his previous vows ( $p\bar{u}rvapranidh\bar{a}na$ ) and the sharpness ( $t\bar{t}k\bar{s}na$ ) or dullness (mrdu) of his faculties (indriya), the person has great compassion ( $mah\bar{a}karun\bar{a}$ ) or does not have great compassion. Similarly, when the naga king ( $r\bar{a}ja$ ) makes rain ( $vr\bar{s}ti$ ) to fall, it rains on the earth everywhere indiscriminately (nirvisesam); the big trees ( $mah\bar{a}vrk\bar{s}a$ ) and the large plants ( $mah\bar{a}trna$ ) receive a lot of rain because of their big roots ( $m\bar{u}la$ ); the small trees ( $alpavrk\bar{s}a$ ) and the small plants (alpatrna) receive but little because of their small roots.

Question. - So be it. Nowhere is it said that the thirty-seven auxiliaries are exclusively the path of the śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas and are not the path of the bodhisattvas, but it can be known by rational induction. The bodhisattva who remains in saṃsāra and the five destinies (*pañcagati*) for a long time does not get nirvāṇa quickly. And yet the thirty-seven auxiliaries are presented only as adjuvants to nirvāṇa, whereas the perfections (*pāramitā*) and the great compassion (*mahākaruṇā*) of the bodhisattvas are not. This is why we know that [the thirty-seven auxiliaries] are not the bodhisattva path.

Answer. – 1. Although the bodhisattva remains in saṃsāra for a long time, he must know the True Path (*bhūtamārga*) and the false paths (*abhūtamārga*), the world (*saṃsāra*) and nirvāṇa. Knowing that, he makes his great vow (*mahāpraṇidhāna*): "Beings are worthy of compassion; I must save them and bring them to unconditioned (*asaṃskṛtapada*) safety." The bodhisattva who practices the perfections (*pāramitā*) is able, by means of this true dharma (*bhūtadharma*), to reach the Bodhi of the Buddhas. But although he practices and understands this dharma, he has not yet fulfilled the six perfections and this is why he does not immediately realize (*na sākṣātkaroti*) this true dharma.

Thus the Buddha said: "It is like [an archer] who, raising his head, shoots his arrows into the air ( $\bar{u}rdhvam$   $k\bar{a}ndam$   $k\bar{s}ipati$ ): the arrows support each other so that they do not fall to earth. In the same way, the bodhisattva, taking the arrow of the Prajñāpāramitā, shoots it into the air at the three gates of deliverance

939

<sup>71</sup> Actually the Prajñāpāramitā, in the chapter on the Mahāyāna, mentions the thirty-seven *bodhipākṣikas*, from the four *smṛityupasthānas* to the *āṣṭāṅgamārgas*, among the Mahāyāna practices (cf. Pañcavimśati, p. 203-208; Śata. P. 1427-1439).

(vimokṣamukha); then, taking the arrow of skillful means ( $up\bar{a}ya$ ), he shoots it at the arrow of Prajñā so that it does not fall on the ground of nirvāṇa."<sup>72</sup>

72 Aşṭasāhasrikā, p. 374 (ed. U. Wogihara, p. 755): Tadyathāpi sāma Subhūte balavān iṣvastrācārya iṣvastraśikṣikṣāyām suśikṣitaḥ supariniṣṭhitaḥ. sa ūrdhvam kāṇḍam kṣiped ūrdhvam kāṇḍam kṣiptvā tadanyaiḥ kāṇḍais tat kāṇḍam bhūman patat pratinivārayed vārayet, tasya paurvakasya kāṇḍasya kāṇḍaparamparayā bhūmau patanam na dadyāt. tāvat tat kāṇḍam bhūmau na patet yāvan nākāṅkṣed aho batedam kāṇḍam bhūmau pated iti. evam eva Subhūte bodisattvo mahāsattvaḥ prajñāpāramitāyām carann upāyakauśalyaparigrhītas tāvat tām paramām bhūtakoṭim na sākṣātkaroti yāvan na tāni kuśalamūlāny anuttarāyām samyaksaṃbodhau paripakvāni suparipakvāni. yadā tāni kuśalamūlāny anuttarāyām samyaksaṃbodhau paripakvāni bhavanti suparipakvāni, tadā tām paramām bhūtakotim sākṣātkaroti.

Transl. – "It is, O Subhūti, as if a powerful master archer, well practiced and well versed in the practice of shooting the bow, shot an arrow into the air and, having shot one arrow into the air prevented, by means of other arrows, this arrow from falling to the ground, by means of a series of arrows, prevented the first arrow from falling to the ground: this first arrow would not fall to the ground as long as the master archer did not consent to its falling to the ground. In the same way, O Subhūti, the bodhisattva-mahāsattva, progressing in the perfection of wisdom and endowed with skillful means, does not realize the supreme summit of the real (i.e., nirvāṇa) as long as these roots of good are not ripe, are not indeed ripened by supreme complete enlightenment. But when these roots of good are ripe, are indeed ripened for supreme complete enlightenment, then he realizes this supreme summit of the real."

The example of the master-archer appears in every version of the Prajñā: Aṣṭasāhasrikā T 224, k. 7, p. 458c16; T 225, k. 4,p. 497c10; T 226, k. 5, p. 531c11; T 227, k. 7, p. 560a16; T 228, k. 18, p. 649c8; Pañcaviṃśati, T 221, k. 14, p. 94c21; T 223, k. 18, p. 350c3; T 220, t. VII, k. 452, p. 281a9; Aṣṭādaśa, T 220, t. VII, k. 517, p. 646c19.

The same example is summed up in the Ratnagunasamcaya, XX, 9-10, p. 74, as follows:

Işvastrasita yathā puruşordha kāṇḍaṃ kṣepitva anya puna kāṇḍaparaṃpareṇa/ patanāya tasya purimasya na deya bhūmiṃ ākāṅkṣamāṇa puruṣasya pataye kāṇḍaṃ//

Evam eva prajñāvarapāramitām caranto prajñā-upāyabalaṛddhivicāramāṇo/tāvan na tāṃ paramaśūnyata prāpuṇotī yāvan na te kuśalamūla bhavanti pūrnāḥ//

Transl. – "It is as if a man practiced in shooting the bow shot an arrow into the air and then, by means of a series of other arrows, did not allow the first arrow to fall: but if the man so wished, the arrow could fall. In the same way, the person who practices wisdom, the best perfection, and who practices wisdom and skillful means, the strengths and magic, would not take this supreme emptiness as long as these roots of good are not fulfilled."

- 2. Furthermore, if, as you have said, the bodhisattva abides for a long time in saṃsāra, he must undergo all the physical and mental sufferings (nānavidha kāyikacaitasikaduḥkha). If he has not attained true knowledge (bhūtajñāna), how could he endure these things? This is why the bodhisattva-mahāsattva seeks the auxiliaries to enlightenment (bodhipākṣika) and true knowledge. From then on he can transform (pariṇamitum) the world (saṃsāra) into the fruits of the path (mārgaphala) and into nirvāṇa by the power of Prajñāpāramitā. Why? The threefold world (traidhātuka) is the result of a complex of causes and conditions (sāmagrīja). That which is born from this complex has no intrinsic nature (svabhāva); having no intrinsic nature, it is empty (śūnya). Empty, it is ungraspable (agrāhya). The ungraspable is nirvāṇa. This is why [the Prajñāpāramitā] says here: "The bodhisattva-mahāsattva who abides in the perfection of wisdom by the method of non-abiding must, without producing them, fulfill the four foundations of mindfulness (smrtvupasthāna)." 73
- 3, Furthermore, in the śrāvaka and praykabuddha system, it is not said [198a] that saṃsāra and nirvāṇa are the same. Why? Because their wisdom (*prajñā*) does not penetrate dharmas deeply. In the bodhisattva system, it is said that saṃsāra and nirvāṇa are identical because their wisdom deeply penetrates dharmas.

Thus the Buddha said to Subhūti: "Form is emptiness and emptiness is form ( $r\bar{u}pam$  eva śūnyatā sūnyataiva  $r\bar{u}pam$ ); feelings ( $vedan\bar{a}$ ), ideas ( $samjn\bar{a}$ ), formations ( $samsk\bar{a}ra$ ) and consciousnesses ( $vijn\bar{a}na$ ) are emptiness, and emptiness is feelings, ideas, formations and consciousnesses. Emptiness is nirvāna and nirvāna is emptiness (śūnyataiva nirvānam, nirvānam eva śūnyatā)."<sup>74</sup>

The Madhyamakaśāstra also says:

Nirvāņa is no different from saṃsāra,

Saṃsāra is no different from nirvāṇa.

The limit of nirvāṇa and the limit of saṃsāra

Are the same limit, for there is no difference. 75

Having fond this True nature (*bhūtalakṣaṇa*), the bodhisattva-mahāsattva is not disgusted with saṃsāra and not pleased with nirvāṇa. The thirty-seven auxiliaries are the ground of true knowledge (*bhūtajñānabhūmi*).

<sup>74</sup> Pañcaviṃśati, p. 38: *Rūpam eva śūnyatā*, *vedanaiva śūnyatā*, *saṃjñaiva śūnyatā*, *saṃskārā eva śūnyatā*, *vijñāṇam eva śūnyatā*; *śūnyataiva rūpaṃ*, *śūnyataiva vedanā*, *śūnyataiva saṃjñā*, *śūnyataiva saṃskārāḥ*, *śūnyataiva vijñānam*.

This is a stock phrase endlessly repeated in the Prajñās: Pañcaviṃśati, T 222, k. 1, p. 221c1, p. 223a14; k. 3, p. 235a11. Other references above, p. 1112F, n. 2.

75 Madh. kārikā, XXV, 19-20; Madh. vṛtti, p. 535; T 1564, k. 4, p. 36a4-11:

Na saṃsmarasya nirvāṇāt kiṃcid asti viśeṣaṃ/
na nirvāṇasya saṃsārāt kiṃcid asti viśeṣaṇaṃ//
nirvāṇasya ca yā koṭiḥ saṃsaraṇasya ca/
na tayor anstaram kimcid susūksmam api vidyate//

<sup>73</sup> Pañcavimśati, p. 1137.

\*\*\* \*\*\* \*\*\*

# Second part THE AUXILIARIES ACCORDING TO THE ABHIDHARMA (p. 1143F)

#### I. NUMBER OF AUXILIARIES

Question. – Since the four foundations of mindfulness ( $smrtyupasth\bar{a}na$ ) suffice to obtain the path  $(m\bar{a}rga)$ , <sup>76</sup> why talk about thirty-seven auxiliaries? Would it be for the sake of abridgment (samksiptena  $deśan\bar{a}$ ) that you speak of the four foundations of mindfulness and for the sake of expansion (vistarena deśana), <sup>77</sup> that you speak of the thirty-seven auxiliaries? Then that is not correct (ayukta) because, if one wants to expand, there would be innumerable ( $apram\bar{a}napaksa$ ) auxiliaries.

Answer. – 1. Although the four foundations of mindfulness are sufficient to attain the path, the four right efforts ( $samyakpradh\bar{a}na$ ) and the other auxiliary dharmas must also be preached. Why? Among beings, minds (citta) are multiple ( $n\bar{a}n\bar{a}vidha$ ) and varied (visama); their fetters (samyojana) and the things that they love and those to which they are unattached also are multiple.

The person who raises the objection is here contesting the need to speak of the thirty-seven auxiliaries in detail, as some of them are enough to lead to nirvāṇa This is mainly the case of the four foundations of mindfulness since the Buddha stated in the Majjhima I, p. 63:

Ehāyano ayam bhikkhave sattānam visuddhiyā sokaparividdavāvam satikkamāya dukkhadomanassānam atthagamāya ñāyassa adhigamāya nibbānassa sacchikiriyāya, yadidam cattāro satipaṭṭhānā ti. — "There is one single way, O monks, leading to the purification of beings, to the transcending of sorrow and lamentation, to the disappearance of suffering and sadness, to the attainment of knowledge and realization of nirvāṇa; this is the four foundations of mindfulness."

But the objection does not hold, for although the *smṛtyupasthānas* and the other auxiliaries to enlightenment constitute paths that are sufficient to the attainment of enlightenment, they are not suitable for all adepts indiscriminately: each must choose the one best suited to his own capacities and aptitude. Hence the need to propose a complete listing of auxiliaries to adepts without, however, excluding an infinity of other practices which will make up the object of chapters XXXII to XXXVIII.

77 The Dharma may be preached in an abbreviated form (*saṃkṣiptena*) or in a long form (*vistareṇa*): cf. Anguttara, I, p. 53; II, p. 189.

<sup>76</sup> The fourth noble Truth concerning the path to the cessation of suffering is so complex that it consists not only of the eightfold path (*aṣṭāṅgamārga*) preached by the Buddha but also the thirty-seven auxiliaries to enlightenment (*bodhipāksika*) and a whole infinity of dharmas.

Although it is a single truth (ekārtha) and is of a single nature (ekalakṣaṇa), the Buddhadharma is classes expressed in distinct explanations (sambhinnadeśana): twelve (dvādaśāngadharmapravacana) and eighty-four thousand dharmas (caturśītisahasradharmaskandha). <sup>78</sup> If it were otherwise, after having preached the four noble Truths (āryasatya) in the course of their first sermon, the Buddhas should stop and should preach nothing more. Because there are beings who detest suffering (duhkha) and love happiness (sukha), the Buddhas preach the four truths: 1) physical and mental dharmas, etc. (kāvikacaitasikādidharma) are all suffering and have no happiness (sukha); 2) the causes and conditions (hetupratyaya) of this suffering are craving  $(trsn\bar{a})$  and the other passions (kleśa); 3) the cessation of this suffering (duhkhanirodha) is called nirvāna; 4) the way to reach nirvāna is the Path (mārga).

There are beings who, as a result of worries (bahucintā), distractions (vikṣiptacitta) and misunderstanding (viparyāsa), cling (abhiniviśante) to the body (kāya), feelings (vedanā), the mind (citta) and things and lead a bad life (mithyācāra). For these people the Buddhas preach the four foundations of mindfulness (smṛtyupasthāna). It is the same for the other [auxiliary] dharmas of the Path: each of them is preached to a certain type of being. It is like a master physician (bhaiṣajyaguru) who cannot cure all sickness with a single drug (bhaṣajya): sicknesses (vyādhi) are dissimilar and the remedy to be applied is not single. In the same way, the Buddha adapts himself to the various types of mental illnesses (cittavyādhi) from which beings suffer and cures them with different remedies.

Sometimes the Buddha saves beings by preaching only one thing. Thus the Buddha said to a bhikṣu: "This is not yours, do not grasp it (*na tāvakaṃ*, *tan* mā *gṛhāṇa*)." – The bhikṣu said: "I know it already, O Bhagavat." – The Bhagavat replied: "What do you know?" – The bhikṣu answered: "Dharmas are not 'mine' (ātmīya); they should not be grasped."<sup>79</sup>

Sometimes the Buddha saves beings by means of two things, concentration  $(sam\bar{a}dhi)$  and wisdom  $(praj\tilde{n}\bar{a})$ . Sometimes, by three things, morality  $(s\bar{\imath}la)$ , concetration and wisdom. Sometimes by four things, the four foundations of mindfulness  $(smrityupasth\bar{a}na)$ .

[198b] Thus, although the four foundations of mindfulness are enough to attain the Path, there are other dharmas that differ in practice  $(\bar{a}c\bar{a}ra)$ , concepts (vikalpa), quantity and point of view. This is why the four right efforts  $(samyakpradh\bar{a}na)$  and the other [auxiliary] dharmas must also be preached.

2. Furthermore, the bodhisattva-mahāsattvas have a power of faith ( $\acute{s}raddh\bar{a}bala$ ) so great that they save all beings, and so the Buddha preaches the thirty-seven auxiliaries to them simultaneously. And although he

,

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>78</sup> Two different classifications of the Buddhist scriptures already mentioned above (p. 27F, 560F). For details see F. Lamotte, *Histoire du bouddhisme indien*, p. 157-163.

<sup>79</sup> Natumhākasutta in Samyutta, III, p. 33-34, and Tsa a han, T 99, no, 269, k. 10, p. 70b, repeated in the Alagaddūpamasutta in Majjhima, I, p. 140-141: Yaṃ bhikkhave na tumhākaṃ taṃ pajahatha, taṃ vo pahīnaṃ dīgharattaṃ hitāya sukhāya bhavissati. Kiñ ca bhikkhave na tumhākaṃ: Rūpaṃ bhikkhave na tumhākaṃ, taṃ pajahatha, taṃ vo pahīnaṃ dīgharattaṃ hitāya sukhāya bhavissati. Vedanā pe. Sañā pe. Saṅkhārā pe, Viññānaṃ pe.

preaches other dharmas favorable to the Path, such as the ten concepts  $(da\acute{s}asamj\~n\~a)^{80}$ , etc., all are included  $(samgrh\=ta)$  in the thirty-seven auxiliaries. These thirty-seven are a collection of all the remedies (sarvabhaisajyasasamsarga) that can cure all the illnesses  $(vy\=adhi)$  of beings. This is why it is not necessary to multiply the auxiliaries to the Path infinitely. Similarly, although the Buddha possesses innumerable powers (bala), we speak only of ten powers, for they are enough to save beings.

# II. THE ELEMENTS CONSTITUTING THE THIRTY-SEVEN AUXILIARIES

These thirty-seven auxiliaries have ten things  $(dravya)^{81}$  as roots  $(m\bar{u}la)$ . What are these ten? 1) Faith  $(\dot{s}raddh\bar{a})$ , 2) morality  $(\dot{s}\bar{t}la)$ , 3) thought (samkalpa), 4) exertion  $(v\bar{v}ya)$ , 5) mindfulness (smrti), 6) concentration  $(sam\bar{a}dhi)$ , 7) wisdom  $(prajn\bar{a})$ , 8) relaxation  $(pra\dot{s}rabdhi)^{82}$ , 9) joy,  $(pr\bar{t}ti)$ , 10) equanimity  $(upeks\bar{a})$ .

- 1) Faith (śraddhā) constitutes: a. the faculty of faith (śraddhendriya); b. the power of faith (śraddhābala).
- 2) Morality (*śila*) constitutes: *a.* right speech (*samyagvac*); *b.* right action (*samyakkarmānta*); *c.* right livelihood (*samyagājīva*).
- 3) Thought (saṃkalpa) constitutes: right thinking (samyaksaṃkalpa).]
- 5) Mindfulness (*smṛti*) constitutes: *a*. the faculty of mindfulness (*smṛtīndriya*); *b*. the power of mindfulness (*smṛtibala*); *c*. the factor-of-enlightenment called mindfulness (*smṛtisambodhyaṅga*); *d*. the [factor-of-the-path] called right mindfulness (*samyaksmṛti*).
- 6) Concentration (samādhi) constitutes: a. the four foundations of magical power (rddhipāda); b. the faculty of concentration (samādhīndriya); c. the power of concentration (samādhibala); d. the factor-of-enlightenment called concentration (samādhisambodhyanga); e. the [factor-of-the-path] called right concentration (samyaksamādhi).

\_

<sup>80</sup> See below, chap. XXXVII.

<sup>81</sup> According to the Vibhāṣā (T 1545, k. 96, p. 496*a-b*), the thirty-seven auxiliaries consist of ten, eleven or twelve constitutive elements: according to the Abhidharmāmṛta (1553, k. 2, p. 977*c*11-12) and Kośa (VI, p. 283-284), ten; according to the Abhidharmadīpa (p. 358), eleven.

This is *cittapraśrabdhi*, 'the dharma by means of which the mind is skillful, light, capable': cf. Kośa. II, p. 157. Kumārajīva renders *praśrabdhi* here by *tch'ou* "to get rid of?"; the translation *k'ing-ngan* 'lightness-peace' adopted by Hiuan-tsang in his version of the Kośa (T 1558, k. 2, p. 7c7; k. 4, p. 19b6; k. 12, p. 67a1-2; k. 25, p. 132b11; k. 28, p. 147a13) seems preferable.

- 7) Wisdom (*prajñā*) constitutes: *a*. the four foundations of mindfulness (*smṛtyupasthāna*); *b*. the faculty of wisdom (*prajñānaliya*); *c*. the power of wisdom (*prajñābala*); *d*. the factor-of-enlightenment called discernment of dharmas (*dharmapravicayasaṃbodhyanga*); *e*. the [factor-of-the-path] called right view (*samyagdṛṣṭi*).
- 8) Relaxation (*praśrabdhi*) constitutes the factor-of-enlightenment called relaxation (*praśrabdhisambodhyanga*).
- 9) Joy (*prīti*) constitutes the factor-of-enlightenment called joy (*prītisaṃbodhyaṅga*).
- 10) Equanimity  $(upek s\bar{a})$  constitutes the factor-of-enlightenment called equanimity  $(upek s\bar{a}sambodhyanga)$ ]. 83

# III. THE SEVEN CLASSES OF AUXILIARIES

- 1. The dharmas where mindfulness (*smṛti*) is focused (*upatiṣṭhati*) on the objects of knowledge (*prajñālambana*) are called 'foundations of mindfulness'(*smṛtyupasthāna*).
- 2. Those that destroy bad dharmas and move in the right path (samyagmārga) are called 'right effort' (samyakpradhāna).
- 3. When the concentrated mind (*pragṛhītacitta*) stops worrying (āśvasiti) about things (ālambana), there is 'foundations of magical power' (*rddhipāda*).
- 4. When a mind of dull knowledge (mṛdujñānacitta) is acquired, there is 'faculties' (indriya).<sup>84</sup>
- 5. When a mind of sharp knowledge (tīkṣṇajñānacitta) is acquired, there is 'powers' (bala).85
- 6. By the practice of the path of meditation (*bhāvanāmārgavyāpāra*), there is '[factors] of enlightenment' (*sambodhyanga*).
- 7. By the practice of the path of seeing (darśanamārgavyāpāra), there is '[factors] of the path' (mārgānga).

# IV. ORDER OF THE THIRTY-SEVEN AUXILIARIES

Question.<sup>86</sup> – First we must speak about the [factors] of the path (*mārgānga*). Why? Because only after having traveled the path are the good dharmas acquired. Thus, a person first travels over a road and later arrives at his destination. Here, by what mistake (*viparyāsa*) do you first speak of the four foundations of mindfulness (*smṛṭyupasthāna*) and only at the end, of the eight factors of the path (*mārgānga*)?

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>83</sup> The text in square brackets is taken from Kośa, VI, p. 284, so as to complete the list.

<sup>84</sup> The punctuation in Taisho is defective, the period should be placed between *ken* and *li*.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>85</sup> Śraddhā, vīrya, smṛti and prajñā are called faculties (*indriya*) when they are weak, called powers or strengths (*bala*) when they are strong; cf. Kośa, VI, p. 286.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>86</sup> For the logical and chronological order of the seven classes of auxiliaries, cf. Kośa, VI, p. 288-290.

Answer. – It is not a mistake  $(vipary\bar{a}sa)$ . The thirty-seven auxiliaries are involved as soon as one wants to enter onto the Path.

- 1. Thus, when the yogin goes to the teacher (ācārya) and hears the teaching on the Path (mārgadharma) from him, first he uses his mindfulness (smṛṭi) to retain (dhāraṇa) this teaching: that moment is called 'foundation of mindfulness' (smṛṭyupasthāna).
- 2. When he has retained and followed this teaching, the yogin who is looking for the fruit (*phalaparyeṣin*) practices with exertion (*vīryeṇa prayuñjate*): this is called 'right effort' (*samyakpradhāna*).
- 3. As a result of this expenditure of energy (*bahuvīrya*), his mind is distracted (*vikṣipta*). He concentrates his mind (*cittaṃ pragṛḥṇāti*) and controls it (*damayati*): this is called 'foundation of magical power' (*rddhipāda*).
- 4. His mind being tamed (*dānta*), he produces the 'five faculties' (*pañcendriya*).
- a. The True nature (bhūtalakṣaṇa) of dharmas is very profound (atigambhīra) and difficult to probe (durvigāhya), but by means of the faculty of faith (śraddhendriya), he believes in it: this is called the 'faculty of faith' (śraddhendriya).
- b. He does not spare his own life (*kāyajīvita*) and seeks enlightenment (*bodhiṃ paryeṣate*) wholeheartedly (*ekacittena*): this is called 'faculty of exertion' (*vīryendriya*).
- c. He constantly thinks about the Bodhi of the Buddhas and does not think about anything else: this is called the 'faculty of mindfulness' (smṛtūndriya).
- d. He always concentrates his mind on Bodhi: this is called the 'faculty of concentration' (samādhīndriya).
- e. He considers (samanupaśyati) the four truths and the True nature (bhūtalakṣhaṇa): this is called the 'faculty of wisdom' (prajñendriya).
- 5. When the five faculties (*pañcendriya*) have been developed (*vṛddha*), [198c] they are able to intercept the afflictions (*kleśa*): this is like the power of a big tree (*mahāvṛkṣa*) that is able to block off water. These five faculties, when they have been developed, are able to gradually penetrate the profound Dharma (*gambhīradharma*):<sup>87</sup> this is called 'power' (*bala*).
- 6. Having obtained the powers (*bala*), the yogin distinguishes the dharmas [of the path of meditation (*bhāvanamārga*)]:

There are three factors (aiga): 1) the [second] factor-of-enlightenment called discernment of dharmas (dharmapravicayasambodhyaiga); 2) the [third] factor-of-enlightenment called exertion (vīryasambodhyaiga); 3) the fourth factor-of-enlightenment called joy (prītisambodhyaiga). If the mind sinks when one is practicing the Path, these three factors (aiga) raise it up again (samutthāpayanti).

[There are three other factors]: 1) the [fifth] factor-of-enlightenment called relaxation (praśrabdhisambodhyanga); 2) the [sixth] factor of enlightenment called concentration

-

<sup>87</sup> Defined above, p. 337-338F.

(samādhisaṃbodhyaṅga); 3) the [seventh] factor-of-enlightenment called equanimity (upekṣaḥasaṃbodhyaṅga). If the mind is distracted (vikṣipyate) when one is practicing the Path, these three factors settle it (pragṛhṇanti) so that it is concentrated.

As for the remaining factor, namely: the [first] factor-of-enlightenment called mindfulness (*smṛtisaṃbodhyaṅga*), it operates in both cases [when the mind sinks and when it is distracted]. It can unite the good dharmas and stop the bad ones; it is like a gate-keeper (*dauvārika*) who allows what is useful (*arthavat*) to enter and sends away what is useless (*anarthaka*).<sup>88</sup>

If the mind sinks, mindfulness (*smṛti*) and the three factors [nos. 2-4] raise it up. If the mind is distracted, mindfulness and the three factors [nos. 5-7] settle it.

Because these seven things work (gāmitvāt), they are called 'factors' (anga).

7. When the yogin has obtained these things and his tranquility (*kṣema*) is complete (*saṃpanna*), he wishes to enter into the unconditioned city of nirvāṇa (*nirvāṇāsaṃskṛtanagara*).<sup>89</sup> This is why he practices the dharmas [of *mārgaṅga*]: that moment is called 'Path' (*mārga*).

# V. DETAILED STUDY OF THE AUXILIARIES

#### 1. The Four Foundations of Mindfulness

# A. Foundations and mistakes

Question. – What are the four foundations of mindfulness (*smrtyupasthāna*)?<sup>90</sup>

Answer. – The foundation of mindfulness on the body ( $k\bar{a}yasmrtyupasth\bar{a}na$ ) and the foundations of mindfulness on feeling ( $vedan\bar{a}$ ), mind (citta) and dharmas are the four foundations of mindfulness. The yogin considers (anupaśyati) these four things in four ways: 1) he considers the impurities of the body ( $k\bar{a}y\bar{a}\acute{s}uci$ ); 2) he considers the painfulness of feelings ( $vedan\bar{a}duhkha$ ); 3) he considers the impermanence of the mind ( $citt\bar{a}nityat\bar{a}$ ); 4) he considers the non-self of dharmas ( $dharmanair\bar{a}tmva$ ).

Although each of the four things has these four characteristics, in the body it is especially the impurities that must be considered; in feelings, the suffering; in the mind, impermanence; and in dharmas, non-self.

947

<sup>88</sup> Canonical comparison: Dīgha, II, p. 83; III, p. 101; Saṃyutta, IV, p. 194; Anguttara, IV, p. 107, 110; V, p. 104: *Seyyattā pi rañño paccantimaṃ nagaraṃ daļhuddāpaṃ daļhapākāratoraṇaṃ ekadvāraṃ, tatr' assa dovāriko panḍito viyatto medhāvī aññātānaṃ ñātānaṃ pavesetā.* – See also the Nāgasenasūtra in BEFEO, XXIV, 1924, p. 113.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>89</sup> The 'City of nirvāṇa' is a canonical expression: cf. Tch'ang a han, T 1, k. 4, p. 30a19 seq.; Tseng yi a han, T 125, k. 16, p. 626a1; k. 23, p. 669b27; k. 25, p. 687b19-20; k. 39, p. 760c24. We will see (p. 1231F) that the three gates of the City of nirvāṇa are the three *vimokṣamukha*.

<sup>90</sup> See references above, p. 1121F.

Why? The worldly person (*prthagjana*), who has not yet entered into the Path, is deluded about these four things and produces four mistakes (*viparyāsa*): 1) the mistake that consists of taking what is impure to be pure (*aśucau śucir iti viparyāsa*); 2) the mistake that consists of taking what is suffering to be happy (*duḥkhe sukham iti viparyāsa*); 3) the mistake that consists of taking what is impermanent to be permanent (*anitye nityam iti viparyāsa*); 4) the mistake that consists of taking what is not a "self" to be a "self" (*anātmany ātmeti viparyāsa*). 91

In order to destroy these four mistakes, the Buddha preached the four foundations of mindfulness: 1) to destroy the mistake about purity ( $\dot{s}ucivipary\bar{a}sa$ ), he preaches the foundation of mindfulness on the body ( $k\bar{a}yasmrtyupasth\bar{a}na$ ); 2) to destroy the mistake on happiness ( $sukhavipary\bar{a}sa$ ), he preaches the foundation of mindfulness on feelings ( $vedan\bar{a}smrtyupasth\bar{a}na$ );

3) to destroy the mistake on permanence (*nityaviparyāsa*), he preaches mindfulness on the mind (*cittasmṛtyupasthāna*); 4) to destroy the mistake on the self (*ātmaviparyāsa*), he preaches the foundation of mindfulness on dharmas (*dharmasmṛtyupasthāna*). It is for this reason that he preached four, no more and no less. 92

# B. Foundation of mindfulness on the body

Question. – How does one obtain these four foundations of mindfulness?

Answer. – The yogin who is established in pure morality (*viśuddhaśīla*) and is practicing exertion (*vīrya*) wholeheartedly (*ekacittena*) considers (*anupaśyati*) the fivefold impurity of the body (*kāyāśuci*). What are these five impurities? 1) The impurity of birthplace (*jātisthānāśuci*); 2) the impurity of seed (*bījaśuci*); 3) the impurity of intrinsic nature (*svabhāvāśuci*); 4) the impurity of intrinsic characteristics (*svalakṣanāśuci*); 5) the impurity of the final outcome (*paryavasānaśuci*).

1. What is the impurity of the place of birth (*jātisthānaśuci*)? Head (*śiras*), feet (*pāda*), belly (*udara*), back (*pṛṣṭha*), thighs (*pārśva*), that which is called a woman's body (*strīkāya*) is a collection of impure things (*aśuddhavastusamāgrī*).

Inwardly ( $adhy\bar{a}tman$ ), it contains a stomach ( $\bar{a}m\bar{a}\acute{s}aya$ ), a belly ( $pakv\bar{a}\acute{s}aya$ ), excrement (vis), urine ( $m\bar{u}tra$ )<sup>93</sup> and [other] impurities ( $a\acute{s}uci$ ). Outwardly ( $bahirdh\bar{a}$ ), there is a wind ( $v\bar{a}ta$ ) conditioned by the afflictions ( $kle\acute{s}a$ ) and actions (karman), a wind that blows on the seed-consciousness ( $vij\bar{n}\bar{a}nab\bar{v}a$ )<sup>94</sup> and

<sup>91</sup> On these mistakes (*viparyāsa*), see Anguttara, II, p. 52; Vibhanga, p. 376; Kośa, V, p. 21; Śiksāsamuccaya, p. 198; *Traité*, p. 925F.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>92</sup> The contrast between *viparyāsa* and *smrtyupasthāna* has already bween noted above, p. 1076F.

<sup>93</sup> See also Mahāvyut., nos. 4026, 4027, 4065, 5063.

The  $vij\tilde{n}\bar{a}na-b\bar{i}ja$  "seed-consciousness), the consciousness which is seed, is obviously the third member of the causal chain, the member conditioned by actions and itself conditioning name and form  $(n\bar{a}mar\bar{u}pa)$ . This is what descends into the mother's womb and is the first seed of the new being. This

vijñāna was the subject of a conversation between the Buddha and Ānanda (Dīgha, II, p. 63: Kośavyākhyā, p. 669; Madh. vṛtti, p. 552).

Transl. – If the  $vij\tilde{n}\bar{a}na$ , O Ānanda, did not descend into the mother's womb, would the  $n\bar{a}mar\bar{u}pa$  (i.e., the entire living individual) coagulate as an embryo? – No, Lord.

If the  $vij\tilde{n}\bar{a}na$  went away after having descended into the mother's womb, would the  $n\bar{a}mar\bar{u}pa$  come into existence? – No, Lord.

If the  $vij\tilde{n}ana$  were to be cut off in the child, boy or girl, would the  $n\bar{a}mar\bar{u}pa$  grow and develop? – No, Lord.

The technical term *vijñānabīja* used here by the *Traité* does not appear, it seems, in the canonical scriptures, but occurs in some Mahāyānasūtras, especially in the Śalistamba, ed. Sastri, p. 13-14 (cited with a few variants in Madh. vṛṭti, p. 566, and Pañjikā, p, 480:

Transl. – "Although this twelve-membered co-dependent production set in action for all of eternity continues to function uninterruptedly like the current of a river, however, four members of this twelve-membered co-dependent production function as cause to ensure its substance. What are these four? They are ignorance, craving, action and consciousness. Here consciousness is cause as seed: action is cause as field; ignorance and craving are causes as defilements. Action and the defilements give rise to the seed-consciousness; action plays the part of field for the seed-consciousness; craving waters the seed-consciousness, ignorance plants the seed-consciousness. If these four conditions do not exist, there is no arising for the seed-consciousness."

But it seems that the Śalistamba may have been directly inspired by the *Bhava-sutta* of Anguttara, I, p. 23-224, where the Buddha explains to Ānanda: "If the action destined to be retributed in kāma-, rūpa- or ārūpyadhātu did not exist, existence (*bhava*) in one of these three realms would not manifest." The Sūtra continues by saying:

Iti kho Ānanda kammam khettam, viññānam bījam, taṇhā sineho avijjānīvaraṇānam sattānam taṇhāsamyojanānam hīnāya... majjhimāya... paṇitāya dhātuyā viññāṇam patiṭṭhitam. "Indeed, O Ānanda, action is the field, consciousness is the seed, and craving is the moisture (of the soil). In beings chained by ignorance, fettered by craving, consciousness manifests in the lower, middle or higher realm."

The *Bhava-sutta* exits in a Chinese version in the Ts'i tch'ou san kouan king (T 150a, no. 42, p. 881c), an anthology of 47 sūtras translated by Ngan Che-kao, the first year of the *yuan-kia* period (151A. D.). Tan-ngan claims that these sūtras are extracts from the Samyuktāgama (cf. Li-tsi, T 2034, k. 4, p. 50b1), but actually, only two sūtras – the *Sattaṭṭhāna* (no, 1) and the *Puggala* (no, 30) – come from the Samyukta, and all the others are borrowed from the Ekottara. The anthology is entitled *Ts'i tch'ou* 'The Seven Subjects', after the title of the first sūtra *Sattaṭṭhāna* (cf. K'ai-yuan, T 2154, k. 1, p. 479c16).

It is quite characteristic that the *Bhava-sutta*, dealing with the *vijñāna-bīja*, should have been one of the first to be translated into Chinese. The seed-consciousness was called upon to play a large role in the Abhidharma (see Kośa, III, p. 25, 26, 124, 26); it is the basis of the Vijñānavādin psychology

introduces it within the two viscera. During eight or nine months, the seed-consciousness dwells in a pit of excrement and urine (*vinmūtragarta*). Thus it is said:

This body is foul and revolting:

It is not from a flower that it is born,

[199a] Neither does it come from Campaka,

And it does not come from a jewel mountain.

This is what is called the impurity of the place of birth.

2. The impurity of the seed  $(b\bar{\imath}ja\acute{s}uci)$ . – By means of the wind  $(v\bar{a}ta)$  of deceptive concepts  $(mr\dot{\imath}a\dot{v}ikalpa)$  and wrong thoughts  $(mithy\bar{a}manasik\bar{a}ra)$ , the father and mother  $(m\bar{a}t\bar{a}pitr)$  blow upon the fire (agni) of sexual desire  $(r\bar{a}ga)$ ; blood (rudhira), marrow (majjan) and fat  $(vas\bar{a})$  escape, get hot and are changed into sperm. The seed-consciousness  $(vij\tilde{n}\bar{a}nab\bar{y}a)$  conditioned by previous actions  $(p\bar{u}rvakarman)$  settles in the blood  $(\acute{s}onita)$  and whitish sperm  $(\acute{s}ukra)$ . That is what is called the seed of the body  $(k\bar{a}yab\bar{y}a)$ . Thus it is said:

The seed of the body is impure,

It is not a precious substance,

It has not come from pure innocence,

It has come only from the urinary pathways.

That is what is called the impurity of the seed.

3. The impurity of intrinsic nature (*svabhāvāśuci*). – From head to toe and on all four sides, the body is a lowly rag. Everything in it is full of impurities. Decorate it with garments, bathe it with perfumed water, nourish it with the best dishes and food of many flavors, at the end of one night all of it will be impure. Seven if that you clothe it in celestial garments (*divyavastra*) and feed it with celestial food (*divyāhāra*), because of the body itself, all of it will become impure. Then what can be said if you give it only human garments and human clothes? Thus it is said:

which made the ālayavijñāna, the consciousness-receptacle 'provided with all the seeds' (*sarvabījaka*) the support of the knowable (*jñeyāśraya*); cf. Mahāyānasaṃgraha, p. 12 seq.

95 Reminder of a canonical topic: Dīgha, I, p. 76, 173, 209; Majjhima, I, p. 144, 500; II, p. 17; Saṃyutta, IV, p. 83, 194, 202; V, p. 370; Aṅguttara, IV, p. 386: *Ayaṃ kāyo rūpī cātummahābhūtiko mātāpettikasambhavo odanakummāsupacayo anico'* 

*ucchādanaparimaddanabhedanaviddhamsanadhammo*: "The material body, composed of the four great elements, coming from the mother and father, fattened with boiled rice and gruel, that always must be oiled and massaged, nevertheless breaks up and is destroyed."

The corresponding Sanskrit wording (Mahāvastu, II, p. 269, 278; Kāśyapaparivarta, § 152, shows asome variations: cf. Vimalakīrti, p. 134 as n.

Formed from earth, water, fire and wind,

It transforms everything into impurities.

Empty the sea to bathe the body,

Still you will be unable to clean it.

That is what is called the impurity of intrinsic nature..

4. The impurity of intrinsic characteristics (svalakṣaṇāśuci). – This body with its nine gates (nanadvāra) is always secreting impurity: the eyes (akṣi) spill out rheum ( $akṣig\bar{u}thaka$ ) and tears (aśru); the ears (karṇa) produce wax ( $karṇag\bar{u}thaka$ ); the nose ( $n\bar{a}s\bar{a}$ ) contains snot ( $siṇgh\bar{a}ṇaka$ ); the mouth (mukha) has saliva ( $l\bar{a}l\bar{a}$ ) and vomit ( $v\bar{a}nt\bar{i}krta$ ); the anus (guda) and the urethra ( $m\bar{u}tram\bar{a}rga$ ) constantly empty out excrement (viṣ) and urine ( $m\bar{u}tra$ ); and the hair-pores ( $romak\bar{u}pa$ ) sweaty impurity. <sup>96</sup> Thus it is said:

All kinds of impure things

Fill the interior of the body.

It flows ceaselessly

Like a filter-sack containing dirt.

That is what is called the impurity of intrinsic characteristics.

96 Cf. the *Vijayasutta* of the Suttanipāta, p. 34, verse 197-198:

Ath' assa navahi sotehi asūci sabbadā/
akkhimhā akkhigūthako, kaṇṇagūthako//
siṃghāṇikā ca nāsāto, mukhena vanat' ekadā/
pittaṃ semhañ ca vamati, kāyamhā sedajallikā//

"Impurity flows from him ever in nine streams: from the eye, rheum; from the ear, wax; from the nose, snot; from the mouth sometimes bile and sometimes phlegm vomit; and from the entire body there flows sweat and filth."

A sermon of the Buddha, cited in Milinda, p. 74, and Visuddhimagga, ed. Warren, p. 161, is expressed thus:

Allacammapaṭicchasnno navadvāro mahāvaso / samantato paggharati asuci pātiganhiyo//

"Covered with damp skin, [the body] with its nine gates, a great suffering, pours out stinking secretions from very part."

The nine gates (*dvāra*), holes (*chidra*) or wounds (*vraṇ*a) of the body are the two eyes, two ears, two nostrils, mouth, anus and urinary canal. They are often mentioned in Buddhist texts: Fo pan ni yuan king, T 5, k. 2, p. 171a16; Tsa pan nie pan king, T 7, k. 1, p. 194c13; Tchong a han, T 26, k. 5, p. 453c5; Anguttara, IV, p. 386; Tseng yi a han, T 125, k. 30, p. 713a28; Ts'i tch'ou san kouan king, T 150, p. 880b5; Sieou hing pen k'i king, T 184, k. 2, p. 466c16; Ta tchouang yen louen king, T 201, k. 12, p. 324b28 (tr. E. Huber, *Sūtrālaṃkāra*, p. 346); Fa kiu king, T 210, k. 2, p. 573c27; Śikṣasamuccaya, p. 82, l. 1 (*navavraṇamukha*).

5. The impurity of the final outcome (*paryavāsanāśuci*). – Thrown on the fire (*agni*), the body becomes ash (*bhasman*); devoured by insects (*kurmi*) it becomes dung (*purīṣa*); placed in the earth, it decays, decomposes, and becomes earth; put into the water, it swells up and decays or it is eaten by water-insects. Of all corpses (*kuṇapa*), that of man is the most impure: his impurities (*aśucidharma*) will be explained at length in reference to the nine concepts (*navasaṃjñā*). <sup>97</sup> Thus it is said:

Examine the body minutely:

It ends up necessarily in death.

Difficult to control. 98

It gives nothing in return,

Ungrateful like a lowly individual.

That is what is called the impurity of the final outcome.

Moreover, from birth (*jāti*) until death, everything that moves close to the body, everywhere that it rests, all is defiled. Just as perfumed clear waters that [199b] flow in a hundred rivers are changed into bitter salt as soon as they reach the great sea (*mahāsamudra*), so whatever the body eats, the most delicate dishes of various flavors, beautiful colors and fine smells, as soon as they penetrate into the sea of the belly (*udarasamudra*), are changed into filth. Thus the body, from birth to death, always contains disgusting impurities.

The yogin wonders if this body, impure as it is, does not have some permanence. Wrong! It is a great suffering ( $mah\bar{a}duhkha$ ). This body is the place of arising ( $upapattisth\bar{a}na$ ) of all the suffering. Just as water (ap) arises from the earth ( $prthiv\bar{i}$ ), wind ( $v\bar{a}yu$ ) from the ether ( $\bar{a}k\bar{a}sa$ ) and fire from wood ( $d\bar{a}ru$ ), so all the inner ( $\bar{a}dhy\bar{a}tmika$ ) and outer ( $b\bar{a}hya$ ) suffering comes from the body. The inner sufferings are old age ( $jar\bar{a}$ ), sickness ( $vy\bar{a}dhi$ ) and death (marana); the outer sufferings are the knife (asi), the stick (danda), cold and heat ( $s\bar{i}tospa$ ), hunger and thirst ( $sutpip\bar{a}s\bar{a}$ ), etc. It is because there is a body that these sufferings exist.

Question. – The body is not suffering alone basically (duḥkhasvabhāva); happiness (sukha) also comes from it. If there were no body, who would experience the five objects of enjoyment (pañcakāmaguṇa) as they like?

Answer. –The suffering which the four noble truths [mention] the saint cognizes truly as suffering, but worldly people (*pṛthagjana*) call it happiness. It is necessary to rely on the noble truth (*āṛyatattva*) and reject error (*moha*) and doubt (*kāṅkṣā*). This body is really suffering because it rests on the 'Great Suffering' (*mahāduḥkha*) [of saṃsāra], and it is only a lesser suffering (*parīttaduḥkha*) that constitutes happiness. Thus, when a man condemned to death undergoes punishment (*daṇḍa*) instead of being

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>97</sup> The nine concepts, objects of meditation on the horrible (*aśubhabhāvanā*), will be studied below in Chap. XXXV.

<sup>98</sup> Like a stubborn horse.

executed, he feels great joy. This punishment is really suffering, but as he escapes from death, the condemned man calls it happiness.

Furthermore, recent suffering (navaduḥkha) is 'happiness' (sukha) [in contrast] to the old suffering (pūrvaduḥkha) which is 'suffering'. Thus, when one sits down (sīdati) one feels happiness, but when this position persists, it gives rise to suffering. At the beginning, walking (cankrama), standing (sthāna) and lying down (śayyā) are happiness, but in the end they too are suffering. Whether one is bending (saiñjite) or one is stretching (prasārite), whether one is bowing the head or raising it, whether one looks straight ahead (ālokite) or to the side (vilokite), whether one is breathing out (praśvasite) or breathing in (āśvasite), 99 suffering always follows the body. From conception (garbhāvakrānti) and birth (jāti) to death (maraṇa), there is not a single moment of happiness.

You enjoyed pleasures ( $r\bar{a}ga$ ) as if they were happiness; when the sickness of lust ( $abrahmacaryavy\bar{a}dhi$ ) increases, you seek women outside, but the more you find, the more your torment increases. It is like when one suffers from scabies ( $kacch\bar{u}$ ), one goes near the fire, one scratches one's hands and roasts them. At that time, one feels a little joy, but in the long run (read kieou) the sickness increases in intensity. This little joy, it too becomes the cause of sickness: it was not a true happiness or the elimination of the sickness. Those who see people with scabies act thus, feeling pity ( $karun\bar{a}$ ) for them. The person who has renounced desire ( $v\bar{u}tar\bar{a}ga$ ) has the same feelings towards the lustful: he has compassion for these angry madmen, burned by the fire of desire ( $k\bar{a}madagdha$ ) who suffer more than they enjoy. For many reasons of this kind, we know that the body has the nature of suffering (duhkhalakṣaṇa) and is the cause of suffering (duhkhalak•uh).

The yogin knows that the body is mererly impure (aśuci), impermanent (anitya) and suffering (duḥkha) but he cannot do otherwise than nourish it. It is like parents who have given birth to a son: however vicious the child, he is born from themselves (ātmaja) and this is why they must feed him and raise him.

The body is, in truth, not the self (ātman). Why? Because it is not independent (svatantra). It is like a man sick with an illness of wind (vāyuvyādhi), unable to raise or lower his head, unable to come or go; or like a man suffering from an obstruction in his throat, unable to speak. This is why we know that [199c] the body is not independent. If a man has something, he uses it as required. This is not the case for the body; as it escapes from all influence, we know that it is not ours.

It is in this way that the yogin meditates on the body, the impure  $(a\acute{s}uci)$ , impermanent (anitya), painful (duhkha), empty  $(\acute{s}\bar{u}nya)$ , selfless  $(an\bar{a}tman)$  body possessing innumerable defects of the same type. The various considerations on the body are called mindfulness of the body  $(k\bar{a}yasmrtyupasth\bar{a}na)$ .

#### C. Mindfulness of feeling (p. 1158F)

-

Expressions borrowed from a canonical stock phrase listing various bodily positions: *abhikkante paţikkante, ālokite vilokite, sammiñjite pasārite*, etc.: cf. Dīgha, I, p. 70; II, p. 95, 292: Majjhima, I, p. 57, 181, 269, 274, 346; III, p. 3, 90, 135; Saṃyutta, IV, p. 211, V, p. 142; Anguttara, II, p. 210. V, p. 206; Pañcaviṃśati, p. 204; Śatasḥahasrika, p. 1428.

In possession of this consideration called  $k\bar{a}yasmrtyupasth\bar{a}na$ , the yogin pursues his reflections and asks himself why beings are attached (abhiniviśante) to this body. It is because of pleasant feeling ( $sukhavedan\bar{a}$ ). How? From the meeting between the six internal organs ( $\bar{a}dhy\bar{a}tmikendriya$ ) and the six outer objects ( $b\bar{a}hyaviṣaya$ ) the six kinds of consciousnesses ( $vij\bar{n}\bar{a}na$ ) arise. From these six consciousnesses arise the three kinds of feelings ( $vedan\bar{a}$ ), unpleasant feeling ( $duhkhavedan\bar{a}$ ), pleasant feeling ( $sukhavedan\bar{a}$ ), neither unpleasant nor pleasant feeling ( $aduhikh\bar{a}sukhavedan\bar{a}$ ). Pleasant feelings are loved by all beings; unpleasant feelings are hated by all beings; as for the neither unpleasant nor pleasant feelings, people neither reject them nor cling to them. Thus it is said:

Evil-doers and monks (pravrajita).

Gods, humans and small worms:

Amongst these beings divided among the five destinies (gati) in the ten directions,

There is not one that does not love happiness and hate suffering. 100

Out of error (moha), mistake (viparyāsa) and ignorance (ajñāna),

They do not know nirvāṇa, the abode of eternal bliss.

Considering pleasant feeling (*sukhavedanā*), the yogin truly knows that it contains no happiness but only suffering. Why? Happiness (*sukha*), i.e., 'true happiness' (*bhūtasukha*) is free of errors (*viparyāsa*). And yet all the pleasant feelings of the world come from mistakes and contain no reality. <sup>101</sup>

Furthermore, while greedily seeking the happiness of pleasant feeling, one will encounter great suffering. Thus it is said:

Those who go to sea encounter heavy winds

The waves rise up as high as the Kālaparvata.

Those who go into the army to fight

In other words, all the phenomena of existence, by reason of their transitory nature, are suffering and, if sometimes they seem to us to be pleasant, sometimes unpleasant and sometimes indifferent, that is purely a mistake.

<sup>100</sup> Cf. Majjhima, I, p. 315, 365; II, p. 260; Saṃyutta, II, p. 99; IV, p. 172, 188; V, p. 170, 353: *Puriso jīvitukāmo amaritukāmo sukhakāmo dukkhapaṭikkūlo*: "Man wants to live, fears death, loves happiness and abhors suffering."

<sup>101</sup> See the *Rahogataka-suttanta* of the Saṃyutta, IV, p. 216 (Tsa a han, T 99, no. 476, k. 17, p. 121c) cited in Kośa, VI, p. 131, and Kośavyākhyā, p. 519:

Transl. – "I have spoken, O monks, of three feelings: pleasant feeling, unpleasant feeling and neither unpleasant nor pleasant feeling. But I have also said that every feeling is suffering (acc. to the comm.., dukkhasmim = dukkha-sannissitam): it is by viewing the impermanence of [all] the formations, the perishable, transitory, unpleasant, destructible and changing nature of [all] the formations that I have declared that all feeling is suffering."

Cross very dangerous paths and perilous gorges.

Noble śresthins must bow down when approaching vile people in order to satisfy their sexual desires.

These many great sufferings

All come from attachment to happiness and to cupidity (*rāgacitta*).

This is why we know that pleasant feeling can give rise to all sorts of suffering.

Furthermore, although the Buddha spoke of the three kinds of suffering, one of them, that of pleasant feeling, merits the name of suffering because in it happiness is rare. It is like a bushel of honey (*madhu*) which, when thrown into a big river, loses its smell and its taste (*rasa*).

Question. – Happiness [such as it is conceived in the world (laukikasukha)], having error (viparyāsa) as cause and condition (hetupratyaya), is suffering (duḥkha). But the concentrations (samādhi) practiced by the saints (āryapudgala) give rise to a pure happiness (anāsravasukha) which itself is real happiness. Why? Because this happiness is not derived from delusion (moha) or mistake (viparyāsa). How then could it be suffering?

Answer. – It is not suffering. Although the Buddha said: "All that is impermanent is suffering" (yad anityaṃ tad duḥkham), 102 it was only in regard to impure dharmas (sāsravadhrma) that he was speaking of suffering. Why? Worldly people (prthagjana) are mentally attached to impure dharmas, and as these impure dharmas are impermanent (anitya) and perishable (vyaya), they give rise [200a] to suffering. But the mind does not become attached (nābhiviśate) to pure dharmas and, although they are impermanent (anitya), they do not produce sadness (daurmanasya), lamentation (parideva), suffering (duḥkha), torment (viheṭhana), etc. That is why they are not called suffering. And besides, the bad contaminants (anuśaya) do not take shelter there. 103

Furthermore, if pure happiness were suffering, the Buddha would not have treated it separately in the truth of the Path (*mārgasatya*), since, [as suffering], it would have been included (*saṃgrhīta*) in the truth of suffering (*duḥkhasatya*). 104

Question. – "There are two kinds of happiness (*sukha*): impure (*sāsrava*) happiness and pure (*anāsrava*) happiness." <sup>105</sup> Impure happiness is lowly, vile, perverse and bad; pure happiness is excellent. Why does one become attached to the lowly vile happiness and not attached to the excellent happiness? One should

<sup>102</sup> Anguttara, V, p, p. 187-188.

<sup>103</sup> Of the 98 *anuśayas*, bad tendencies that cause actions to accumulate, 92 have an impure object; 6 have a pure object, namely, the third and fourth truth, cessation and the Path: cf. Kośa, V, p. 34.

<sup>104</sup> The Buddha spoke of *samādhi*, the second element of the Path of nirvāṇa, when he was dealing with the fourth noble truth. This proves that *samādhi*, which gives rise to the pure happiness of nirvāṇa, is truly happiness and not suffering. If it were suffering, the Buddha would have spoken of it in connection with the first truth which deals precisely with universal suffering.

Anguttara, I, p. 80-81: Dve 'māni bhikkave sukhāni. Katamāni dve? Sāsavañ ca sukham anāsavañ ca sukham ... Etadaggam bhikkhave imesam dvinnam sukhānam yadidam anāsavasukhan ti.

become attached preferentially to the excellent happiness in the same way that one would prefer to be attached to precious objects of gold (heman) or silver (rajata) rather than to straw (trna) or to wood ( $k\bar{a}stha$ ).

Answer.- Pure happiness being excellent, wisdom ( $praj\tilde{n}\tilde{a}$ ) abounds there and, as wisdom is abundant there, it can eliminate attachment ( $abhinive\acute{s}a$ ). In the impure happiness, it is the fetters (samyojana), thirst ( $trsn\bar{a}$ ), etc., that abound, and thirst is the root of attachment ( $abhinive\acute{s}am\bar{u}la$ ). The true wisdom ( $bh\bar{u}tapraj\tilde{n}a$ ) [inherent in pure happiness] is able to eliminate attachment. That is why it is not attached to [the pure happiness].

Furthermore, pure wisdom  $(an\bar{a}sravapraj\tilde{n}\bar{a})$  always considers  $(anupa\acute{s}yati)$  universal impermanence  $(sarv\bar{a}nityat\bar{a})$  and because it considers impermanence it does not produce the fetters (samyojana), thirst  $(tr.\sin\bar{a})$ , etc. It is like a sheep (edaka) that is kept near a tiger  $(vy\bar{a}ghra)$ : even if it has good grass and good water, it does not get fat. 106 In the same way, even though they experience pure happiness  $(an\bar{a}sravasukha)$ , the saints nevertheless contemplate impermanence  $(anityat\bar{a})$  and emptiness  $(\dot{s}\bar{u}nya)$  and that is why they do not produce the 'fat' of desire  $(r\bar{a}gameda)$ .

Furthermore, pure happiness  $(an\bar{a}sravasukha)$  is inseparable from the sixteen noble aspects (sodaśakara) of the three concentrations  $(sam\bar{a}dhi)^{107}$  and is always without the mark of a self (sattvanimitta). If it were endowed with the mark of a self, it would produce minds of attachment (abhiniveśacitta). Thus pure happiness, although excellent, does not give rise to attachment.

For many reasons of this kind, the yogin considers pleasant worldly feeling (*laukikā sukhavedanā*) as suffering.

He considers unpleasant feeling (duḥkhavedanā) as an arrow (śalya); as for the neither unpleasant nor pleasant feeling (adhuḥāsukhavedanā), he considers its impermanent and perishable nature (anityavyayanimitta).

Thus he does not experience desire  $(r\bar{a}ga)$  for pleasant feeling; he does not experience hatred  $(dve\bar{s}a)$  for unpleasant feeling and he does not experience delusion (moha) for neither unpleasant nor pleasant feeling.

That is what is called mindfulness of feeling (vedanāsmṛtyupasthāna).

#### D. Mindfulness of mind

The yogin also says to himself: "It is because of happiness that one becomes attached to the body; but who is experiencing (*vedayati*) this happiness?" Having reflected, he knows that feeling (*vedanā*) comes from the mind (*citta*). It is following mental elation (*cittakṣepa*) and a misunderstanding (*viparyāsa*) that beings experience a given happiness. The yogin must take into account that the mind which is transitory (*anitya*)

See the apologue of the big but not fat sheep, above (p. 908-909F)

<sup>107</sup> The sixteen aspects of the four noble truths perceived in the course of the three *samādhis* of *śūnyatā*, *ānimitta* and *apraṇihita*: see above, p. 641F and later, k. 23, p. 233b6; k. 54, p. 444a15; k. 63, p. 505a17.

has the nature of being born and perishing (*utpādabhangalakṣaṇa*) and lasts for only a moment, is unable to experience happiness. It is by mistake that a person claims to feel happiness. Why? At the very moment when one wishes to experience happiness, the mind has already changed; at the moment when the happiness arises, the mind is another (*anya*) mind. There is no connection between happiness and the mind. How could it be said that the mind experiences happiness?

The past mind (atītacitta), being already destroyed (bhagna), does not experience the happiness; the future mind (anāgatacitta), being not yet born (utpanna), does not experience the happiness; the present mind (pratyutpannacitta), being momentary (ekakṣaṇika) and fleeting (kṣipra), does not have the awareness to experience the happiness.

Question. – We accept that the past mind and the future mind cannot experience happiness. But the present mind, which endures for a moment, must experience happiness. How can you say that it does not?

Answer. – I have just said that, being fleeting, it does not have the awareness to experience happiness. [200b]

Besides, being impermanent in nature (*anityalakṣaṇa*), all dharmas have no span of duration (*sthitikāla*). If mind lasted for a moment, it would also last during the second moment. It would then be eternal in duration and without the nature of disappearing (*vyayalakṣaṇa*). And yet, among the three characteristics of conditioned dharmas (*saṃskṛtadharmalakṣaṇa*), the Buddha also mentioned the characteristic of disappearance (*vyayalakṣaṇa*). <sup>108</sup> If the mind did not have disappearance, it would not show the characteristics of the conditioned.

108 The sūtras of the Āgamas and the Nikāyas set out the three characteristics of conditioned dharmas: production or origin, disappearance, and duration-change.

Sanskrit version (cf. Nidānasaṃyukta, p. 139, cited in Vibhāṣā, T 1545, k. 39, p. 199c22-23; Kośa, II, p. 223; Kośavyākhyā, p. 171; Madh. vṛtti, p. 145): *Trīṇīmāni bhikṣavaḥ saṃskṛtasya saṃskṛtalakṣaṇāṇi. Katamāni trīṇi. Saṃskṛtasya bhikṣava utpādo 'pi prajñāyate, vyayo 'pi prjñāyate, sthityanyathātvam apīti*: "There are, O monks, three characteristics of the conditioned that are themselves conditioned. What are these three? Of the conditioned, the production is object of consciousness; the disappearance is also object of consciousness; likewise the duration-change."

Pāli version (Anguttara, I, p. 152; Saṃyutta, III, p. 37): *Tīṇ' imāni bhikkhave saṅkhatassa saṅkhatalakkhaṇāni. Katamāni tīṇi. Uppādo paññāyati, vayo paññāyati, thitassa* (variant: *thitānaṃ) aññathattaṃ paññāyati*.

The Pāli reading *thitassa* (or *thitānaṃ*) *aññathattaṃ* 'change while it (they) endure(s)' is in contrast with the Sanskrit reading *sthityanyathātvam* attested by the preceding sources and by a fragment from Central Asia published by L. de La Vallée Poussin, *Documents sanscrits de la seconde collection A. Stein*, JRAS, 1913, p. 573.

c. The Chinese versions of the Āgamas render the originals only imperfectly: the Tsa a han, T 99, k. 2, p. 12a29 (corresponding to the Saṃyutta, III, p. 37) mentions only *utpāda* and *vyaya*; the Tseng yi a han, T 125, k. 12, p. 607c15 (corresponding to Anguttara, I, p. 152) has *utpāda*, *anyathātva* and

Furthermore, if dharmas suffered a destruction *a posteriori* (*uttareṇa*), we would know that they possessed it already *a priori* (*pūrveṇa*). Thus, when a person clothes himself in a new garment (*navavastra*), if on the same day that he puts it in, the garment is not yet old, it would not be old on the second day either, and so on for ten years: the garment would always be new and never old. In truth, the garment was already old, and we should know that [this ageing] coexisted with its newness. But since this ageing was subtle, we were not aware of it. It is only in the presence of old things that we notice it. This is why we know that dharmas do not have a time of duration (*sthitikāla*). How then could the mind last long enough to be able to experience happiness? Since it has no duration, it is impossible that it experiences happiness.

This is why we know that there is nothing that can truly experience happiness. [A mind 'experiencing happiness'] is a purely conventional entity (*prajñaptimātra dharma*): we speak of a single entity experiencing happiness as a result of the succession of minds (*cittaprabandha*).

Question. – How do you know that all conditioned dharmas (samskrtadhrma) are impermanent (anitya)?

Answer. – Here I must repeat what I have already said above (p. 37F). These conditioned dharmas, which all depend on causes and conditions (*hetupratyayāpekṣa*), are impermanent. Because not existing earlier, they exist now and because existing now, they will not exist later, they are impermanent.

Furthermore, the nature of impermanence (*anityatālakṣaṇa*)<sup>109</sup> always follows (*anusarati*) conditioned dharmas. Conditioned dharmas have neither increase (*upacaya*) nor decrease (*apacaya*), and finally, all conditioned dharmas are mutually destroyed (*parasparaviheṭhaka*): therefore they are impermanent.

Furthermore, a twofold old age (*dvividhajarā*) always follows (*anusarati*) conditioned dharmas: *i*) primary old age (*mūlajarā*); *ii*) the old age of old age (*jarājarā*). 110 A twofold death (*dvidhamaraṇa*) always

*vyaya*; the Tsa a han, T 99, k. 12, p. 83c16 (corresponding to Nidānasaṃyukta, p. 139) subdivides the *sthityanyathātva* of the original and thus has four characteristics: *utpāda*, *sthiti*, *anyathātva* and *vyaya*.

- d. The Pāli Abhidhamma accepts only three characteristics: *uppāda*, *vaya* and *thitānaṃ* aññathatattam (Kathāvatthu, p. 61; *Compendium*, p. 25, 125).
- e. The Sanskrit Abhidharma of the Sarvāstivādins, while referring to the canonical sources that accept three characteristics, nevertheless puts forth four: birth (*jāti*), old age (*jarā*) duration (*sthiti*) and impermanence (*anityat*ā) according to the Vibhāṣā (T 1545, k. 39, p. 200c10-12) and Kośa, II, p. 222; *jāti, jarā, nāśa* according to the Abhidharmadīpa, p. 104.
- f. For the Sautrāntikas and for Vasubandhu, the four characteristics of the conditioned, being the *viprayuktasaṃskāras*, are not real entities (cf. Kośa, II, p.226-234).
- 109 Fourth samskṛtalakṣaṇa according to the Sarvāstivādin Abhidharma (see preceding note).
- According to the Sarvāstivādin Abhidharma whose theories the *Traité* reproduces here, the four primary characteristics (*mūlalakṣaṇa*) of the conditioned, namely *jāti*, *jarā*, *sthiti* and *anityatā*, have secondary characteristics (*anulakaṣaṇa*) in their turn: birth-of-birth (*jātijāti*), old-age—of old-age (*jarājarā*) duration-of-duration (*sthitisthiti*) and impermanence-of-impermanence (*anityatānityatā*): cf. Kośa, II, p. 224-225). But Nāgārjuna refuted the theory of the anulakṣaṇas in Madh. Kārikā, VII, 3 (Madh. vṛtti, p. 147): *Utpādasthitibhangānām anyat saṃskṛtalakṣaṇam / asti ced anavasthaivaṃ*; *nāsti*

follows them: *i*) death by oneself (ātmanā maraṇam); *ii*) being put to death by another (pareṇa marana). 111 This is why we know that all conditioned dharmas are impermanent.

Among the conditioned dharmas, the impermanence of the mind (*cittānityatā*) is very easy to detect. Thus the Buddha said: "Sometimes worldly people (*pṛthgjana*) recognize the impermanence of the body (*kāyānityatā*) but do not recognize the impermanence of the mind (*cittānityatā*). Some worldly people say that the body is eternal, but the mistake that holds the mind to be eternal is even more fatal. Why? It may be that the body will last for ten years or twenty years, whereas the mind, night and day, disappears each moment (*ekakṣaṇalavamuhūrte*), arising as one thing, perishing as another, without stopping for a single moment. On the point of arising, it is born one thing; on the point of perishing, it dies another thing. 112 The true nature (*bhūtalakṣaṇa*) of such a magical thing (*māyāvastu*) is ungraspable (*anupalabdha*).

cet te na saṃskṛtāḥ //: "If production, duration and destruction have a secondary characteristic, there is infinite regression; if they do not have a secondary conditioned characteristic, they are not conditioned."

111 Dīgha, III, p. 231; Anguttara, II, p. 159: Atth' āvuso attabhāvapaṭilābho yasmiṃ attabhāvapaṭilābhe attasaṃcetanā yeva kamati no parasaṃcetanā. Atth' āvuso attabhāvapaṭilābho yasmiṃ attabhāvapaṭilaābhe yeva kamati no attasaṃcetanā: "There is an occasion in life life [note, p. 1165F] in the course of which it is one's own volition that acts, not the volition of another. There is an occasion in life during the course of which it is the volition of another that acts and not one's own volition."

According to the explanations of Anguttara (l. c.) summarized in Kośavyākhyā, p. 170, in the first case, death is due to one's personal will (ātmanā maraṇam), in the second case, to the will of another (pareṇa maraṇam). Kośa, II, p. 218, cites several examples of these two kinds of death.

112 Beginning of the Markaṭasūtra of the Samyukta (Nidānasaṃyukta, p. 115-120; Tsa a han, T 99, no. 289, k. 12, p. 81c), entitled Assutavato in the Saṃyutta, II, p. 94-95.

Transl. of the Sanskrit. -1. A foolish and unlearned worldly person, O monks, can indeed become disgusted with it, detached from it, and liberated from the body formed of the four great elements.

- 2. Why? We notice, O monks, that this body formed by the four great elements gets bigger, gets smaller, is taken and rejected. [This is why one can become disgusted with it.]
- 3. But in regard to the 'mind', or the 'consciousness', the foolish and unlearned worldly person is incapable of becoming disgusted with it and liberated from it.
- 4. Why? During the long night [of saṃsāra], this [mind] has been cared for, guarded, assimilated, espoused, adopted by the foolish unlearned worldly person, who says to himself: "It belongs to me, it is me, it is my self."

This is why the foolish unlearned worldly person is incapable of becoming disgusted with it, detached from it, liberated from it...

- 5. And moreover, O monks, it would be preferable that the foolish unlearned worldly person considers as his self the body formed by the four great elements rather than the consciousness.
- 6. Why? We notice that the body formed by the four great elements, when it is maintained [in health], lasts for ten, twenty, thirty, forty, fifty, a hundred years, or even a little longer.

For innumerable reasons of this kind, we know that the mind is impermanent. That is what is called mindfulness of mind (*cittasmṛtypasthāna*).

#### E. Mindfulness of Dharmas

The yogin asks himself on whom does the mind depend (*apekṣate*) and who controls the mind. Having considered well, he does not see that the mind has a master. The dharmas resulting from the complex of causes and conditions (*hetupratyayasāmagrī*) are not independent (*svatantra*); not being independent, they have no intrinsic nature (*svabhāva*); not having any intrinsic nature, they have no self (*ātman*). If there is no self, then who controls the mind?

Question. – 1) There must be an  $\bar{a}$ tman. Why? If the mind (citta) controls [200c] the body ( $k\bar{a}ya$ ), there also must be an  $\bar{a}$ tman to control the mind. In the same way that the master of a kingdom ( $r\bar{a}$ stresvara) controls the general ( $sen\bar{a}pati$ ) and the general controls the soldiers (patti), there must be an  $\bar{a}$ tman to control the mind, and there must be a mind to control the body so that it may enjoy the five objects of enjoyment ( $pa\bar{n}$ cak $\bar{a}$ maguna).

2) Moreover, as each person possesses his own mind (ātmacitta), we know that there really is an ātman. If it were only due to a mistake (*viparyāsa*) about the body and the mind that we assume an ātman, why would we not produce the idea of an ātman in regard to another?<sup>113</sup> Thanks to this sign, we know that each one possesses his own ātman.

Answer. – 1) If, the mind controlling the body, there were an  $\bar{a}$ tman to control the mind, there still must be someone to control the  $\bar{a}$ tman. If there were still someone to control the  $\bar{a}$ tman, there would be an infinite regress (anavasth $\bar{a}$ ); as there would be still someone to control the  $\bar{a}$ tman, there would be two  $\bar{a}$ tmans.

If there is no ātman to control the mind, there can only be the mind to control the body. You consider the mind to be dependent on a soul (pudgalāpekṣa), but in the absence of the mind, the soul has no object of consciousness (jñeya) and, having no object of consciousness, how would it control the mind? If the soul had the characteristics of a knowledge (jñānalakṣaṇa), why resort again to the mind? This is why we know that only the mind presents the characteristics of a consciousness (vijñānalakṣaṇa). Therefore it is able to control the body and does not depend on a soul (pudgalam nāpekṣate). It is like fire (agni) which, by its nature, burns things without the intervention of a person (puruṣa).

<sup>7.</sup> On the contrary, what is called 'mind', 'consciousness', over the days and nights, in the course of instants, moments and hours, appears in many different aspects: when it arises, it is [already] another mind that is born, when it disappears, it is another mind that is destroyed.

<sup>8.</sup> It is like a monkey who grasps a branch of a tree and, having let go of it, grasps another. In the same way, what is called 'mind' or 'consciousness', over the course of nights and days, etc., as before up to 'when it is disappears, it is another that is destroyed.'

This objection has already been formulated above, p. 736F.

Objection. – Although fire has the power to burn, it is not useful without a person; although the mind has the characteristic of a consciousness (*vijñānalakṣaṇa*), it is not controlled without the soul (*pudgala*).

Answer. – Dharmas exist insofar as they have their own characteristics (*lakṣaṇa*). Not having any characteristics, the soul does not exist. You consider the inbreath and the outbreath (*ānāpāna*), suffering and happiness (*duḥkhasukha*), etc., as characteristics of the soul; but that is not right (*ayukta*). Why? Because the inbreath and the outbreath, etc., are characteristics of the body, and the fact of feeling suffering, happiness, etc., is characteristic of the mind. Why make the body and the mind into characteristics of the soul?

Moreover, fire (*agni*) burns things by itself without depending on a person (*pudgala*). We say that a man burns something only metaphorically. You have fallen into an untenable position (*nigrahasthāna*). Why? Because the soul (*puruṣa*) is the person (*pudgala*) and you cannot compare the person with the person.

2) Moreover, you said: "Each one possessing his own mind (ātmacitta), we know that there really is an ātman. If it were only due to a mistake (*viparyāsa*) about the body and the mind that an ātman is assumed, why not produce the idea of an ātman in regard to another?"

Without knowing if the  $\bar{a}$ tman exists or does not exist, you are asking why one does not produce the idea of the  $\bar{a}$ tman in regard to another. The distinctions between one's own body ( $\bar{a}$ tmak $\bar{a}$ ya) and another's body ( $parak\bar{a}ya$ ) exist as a function of the  $\bar{a}$ tman. But the  $\bar{a}$ tman is non-existent (nopalabhyate). [The characteristics attributed to it]: having form ( $r\bar{u}pin$ ) or formless ( $ar\bar{u}pin$ ), permanent (nitya) or impermanent (anitya), finite (antavat) or infinite (ananta), moveable (gantr) or motionless (agantr), cognizant ( $jn\bar{a}tr$ ) or ignorant ( $ajn\bar{a}tr$ ), active ( $k\bar{a}raka$ ) or inactive ( $ak\bar{a}raka$ ), autonomous (svatantra) or non-autonomous (asvatantra): all these characteristics of the  $\bar{a}$ tman do not exist (nopalabhyante), as we have said above in the chapter on the  $\bar{a}$ tman.

For many reasons of this kind, the yogin considers that dharmas come from complexes of causes and conditions, that there are no real dharmas endowed with ātman. That is what is called mindfulness of dharmas (dharmasmrtvupasthāna).

#### F. Mindfulness itself, by connection with or as object.

The four foundations of mindfulness (*smṛtyupasthāna*) are of three kinds: *i*) mindfulness in itself (*svabhāvasmṛtyupasthāna*); *ii*) mindfulness by connection (*saṃsargasmṛtyupasthāna*); *iii*) mindfulness as object (*ālambanasmṛtyupasthāna*). 115 [201a]

Smṛṭyupasthāna itself (svabhāva) is fixing of the attention (smṛṭer upasthānam): it is a wisdom (prajñā) by which the attention is fixed (smṛṭir anayopatiṣṭhate) on the body, the feelings, the mind, dharmas. The person who possesses this prajñā becomes an anupaśyin: hence the phrase: kāye kāyānupaśyī smṛṭa upasthitasmṛṭiḥ.

<sup>114</sup> Compare the refutation developed above, p. 737-747F.

<sup>115</sup> See Kośa, VI, p. 159-161; Kośavyākhyā, p. 529-531:

- i) What is mindfulness in itself (svabhāva)? The wisdom (prajñā) that considers the body (kāyam anupaśyan) is mindfulness of the body. The wisdom that considers the feelings (vedanā) is mindfulness of feelings. The wisdom that considers the mind (citta) is mindfulness of mind. The wisdom that considers dharmas is mindfulness of dharmas. This is mindfulness in itself.
- ii) What is mindfulness by connection (samsarga)? When they consider the body at the head of the list, the dharmas of the Path [other than prajñā], coming from causes and conditions (hetupratyaya), impure (sāsrava) or pure (anāsrava), are mindfulness of the body. When they consider feelings, the mind or dharmas as head of the list, the dharmas of the Path [other than prajñā], coming from causes and conditions, impure or pure, are mindfulness of feelings, mind or dharmas [respectively]. This is mindfulness by connection.
- iii) What is mindfulness as object (ālambana)? 116 All dharmas with form (rūpadharma), namely, the ten bases of consciousness (daśāyatana) and a small part of the dharmāyatana 117 are mindfulness of body. The six kinds of feelings, namely, feeling arising from contact with the eye (cakṣuḥsaṃsparśajā vedanā) and the feelings arising from contact with the ear (śrotra), nose (ghrāṇa), tongue (jihvā), body (kāya) and mind (manas) respectively 118 The six kinds of consciousnesses, namely, consciousness of the eye (cakṣurvijñāna) and consciousnesses of the ear, nose, tongue, body and mind 119 are mindfulness of mind. The notion aggregate (saṃjñāskandha), the volition aggregate (saṃkāraskandha) and the three unconditioned (asaṃskṛta) 120 are mindfulness of dharmas. That is mindfulness as object.

Mindfulness in itself (*svabhāva*), having wisdom (*prajñā*) as nature, is formless (*arūpin*), invisible (*anidarśana*), non-resistant (*apratigha*), sometimes impure (*sāsrava*) and sometimes pure (*anāsrava*)...<sup>121</sup>.

These things are fully explained in the *Ts'ien-nan* 'The Thousand Aporias.' 122

When other dharmas, the auxiliaries to the path that are not *prajñā*, are dharmas co-existing with *prajñā*, they are *smṛṭyupasthāna* by connection (*saṃsarga*).

The objects – body, feelings, mind, dharmas – to which the attention is applied are smṛṭyupasthāna as object. In this sense, kāyasmṛṭyupasthāna should be analyzed as kāyaḥ smṛṭyupasthānam 'the body is fixation of the attention' as the attention is fixed on it.

- 116 In other words, on what objects is the attention fixed in the course of the *smṛtyupasthāna*?
- 117 Five ādhyātmikāyatanas or organs: cakṣus, śrotra, ghrāṇa, jihvā and kāya; five bāhyāyatanas or objects: rūpa, śabda, gandha, rasa, spraṣṭavya; and the material part of the dharmāyatana, namely, avipjñapti (cf. Kośa, I, p. 20).
- 118 The six *vedanākāvas* (cf. Samyutta, III, p. 60).
- 119 The six *vijñānakāyas* (cf. Saṃyutta, III, p. 61).
- 120 The six *saṃjñākāyas* (Saṃyutta, III, p. 60), the six *cetanākāyas* (Saṃyutta, ibid.) and the three *asaṃskṛtas ākāśa* and two *nirodhas* accepted by the Sarvāstivādins (Kośa, I, p. 8-9).
- 121 There follows a long list which I [Lamotte] think need not be translated here. It shows many analogies with the Pāli Vibhaṅga, p. 206.

#### G. Inner, outer and mixed mindfulness

[1. In regard to  $k\bar{a}yasmrtyupasth\bar{a}na$ .] – What is the inner body ( $adhy\bar{a}tmak\bar{a}ya$ ); what is the outer body ( $bahirdh\bar{a}k\bar{a}ya$ ) and, since everything is already included (samgrhita) in the inner and outer body, why does the  $s\bar{u}tra^{123}$  speak again about the consideration of both the inner and outer body ( $adhy\bar{a}tmabahirdh\bar{a}k\bar{a}y\bar{a}nupa\acute{s}yan\bar{a}$ )?

Answer. – One's own body (svakāya) is inner; another's body (parakāya) is outer.

One's own body is of two kinds: i) the impurities (aśuci) inside the body; ii) the skin (tvac), the hairs (roman), the nails (nakha), the hairs of the head (keśa), etc., outside.

122 Prakaraṇapāda, T 1541, k. 8-9, p. 667c-672a; T 1542, k. 11-12, p. 739b-743c.

The *Traité* cites the Ts'ien-nan (p'in) 'Chapter of the thousand Aporias' three times: k. 18, p. 195a15-16 (see above, p. 1101F); k. 19, p. 202a5; 203a8. It is the seventh chapter of the [Abhidharma]-Prakaraṇapāda-[śāstra] entitled in the Chinese versions *Ts'ien wen louen p'in* (T 1541, k. 8, p. 663a5) or *Pien ts'ien wen p'in* (T 1542, k. 10, p. 733a17) corresponding to a Sanskrit original like Sahasraparipṛcchā-varga 'Chapter of the Thousand Aporias'.

The Prakaraṇapāda, also called Prakaraṇagrantha or simply Prakaraṇa, is part of the Ṣaṭpādābhidharma of the Sarvāstivādins made up of the Jñānaprasthāna of Kāṭyāyanīputra and six annexed treatises (see above, p. 111F, n. 1).

The Sanskrit sources (Kośavyākhyā, p. 9), Tibetan sources (Bu ston, I, p. 49; Tāranātha, p. 296) and the Chinese sources attribute the Prakaraṇapāda to Vasumitra who composed it at Gandhāra, not far from Puṣkarāvati (Si-yu-ki, T 2087, k. 2, p. 881a15-16). But according to the *Traité* (above, p. 111-112F), only the first four chapters were by Vasumitra, the last four of which are the *Ts'ien-nan p'in* were the work of the Kaśmir arhats.

According to the modern exegetists, the Prakaraṇapāda belonged to the Abhidharma of the late period and shows affinities with the Vibhanga of the Pāli Abhidhamma: cf. Kogen Mizuno, *Abhidharma Literature*, Ceylon Enc., I, p. 70-71; A. C. Banerjeee, *Sarvāstivādin Literature*, 1957, p. 62-64: B. C. Law, *History of Pāli Literature*, I, 1933, p. 340.

The Prakaraṇapāda is often cited by Vasubandhu in his Kośa, by Yaśomitra in his Kośavyākhyā and by Saṃghabhadra in his Nyāyānusāra (cf. Taisho Index, 16, p. 174).

Two Chinese translations of the Prakaraṇapāda have been made:

- a. Tchong che fen a-p'i-t'an louen (T 1541) by the Indian Brahmin Guṇabhadra (394-468) and his disciple Bodhiyaśas (cf. Li tai san pao ki, T 2034, k. 10, p. 91a25; K'ai yuan mou lou, T 2154, K. 5, p. 528b11).
- *b. A-p'i-ta-mo p'in tsou louen* (T 1542) by Hiuan-tsang. The translation was started in the Yun-kouang hall at Yu-houa sseu the 1<sup>st</sup> of the 9<sup>th</sup> month of the 5<sup>th</sup> *hien-k'ing* year (October 10, 660) and finished the 23<sup>rd</sup> day of the 10<sup>th</sup> month of the same year (November 30). Ta-cheng-kouang, etc., wrote it down with the brush (K'ai yuan mou lou, T 2154, k. 8, p. 447a14-15).

<sup>123</sup> The canonical sūtra mentioned above, p. 1122F.

Furthermore, when the yogin considers a corpse (*mṛtaśarīra*), bloated (*vyādhmātaka*) and rotting (*vipūyaka*), he grasps the characteristics (*nimittāny udgṛhṇāti*) and examines his own body, saying: "This body, too, is of the same nature, the same constitution and has not gone beyond this state of affairs" (*sa imam eva kāyam upasaṃharati: ayam api khalu kāya evaṃdharma evaṃbhāvy etad anatīta iti*), <sup>124</sup> then the corpse is the 'outer' body, whereas the yogin's body is the 'inner' body.

If the yogin, possibly seeing a beautiful woman (*abhirūpastrī*), becomes attached to her in his mind and then considers the impurities (*aśuci*) of this female body, it is a matter of an outer body. But if the yogin recognizes that his own body is exactly like it, it is a question of an inner body.

Furthermore, the five organs (indriya), eye (cakşus), etc., are inner body whereas the five objects (viṣaya), color ( $r\bar{u}pa$ ), etc., are outer body.

The four great elements  $(mah\bar{a}bh\bar{u}ta)$  are inner body whereas the matter derived from the four great elements  $(bhautikar\bar{u}pa)$  are outer body.

The place where suffering and happiness are experienced is the inner body; the place where one does not experience suffering and happiness is outer body.

One's own body (*svakāya*) and the organs (*indriya*), eye (*cakṣus*), etc., are inner body; one's wife (*bhāryā*), son (*putra*), wealth (*dhana*), fields (*kṣetra*), house (*gṛha*) and other utilized objects are outer body. How is that? Since material dharmas (*rūpadharma*) are all [objects] of mindfulness of the body (*kāyasmṛtyupasthāna*).

First the yogin examines the inner body (*adhyātmakāya*) to find out if he can find a pure (*śuci*), eternal (*nitya*) and happy (*sukha*) ātman there, but he examines thoroughly and can find no ātman, as has been said above (p. 1167F) in regard to the examination of dharmas.

But if he finds no ātman when he examines the inner [body], perhaps this ātman is outside (*bahirdhā*). Why? Because outer things (*bāhyavastu*) are an object of attachment (*abhiniveśasthāna*) for all beings. 125 But when the yogin examines the outer body, the ātman is not found there either.

Then the yogin makes this reflection: "When I examined inwardly (adhyātmam anupaśyan), I did not find the ātman and [I wondered] if it was not on the outside (bahirdhā), but when I examined [things] on the outside, I did not find it either. I wonder if the ātman is not a delusion (bhrānti). Now I must examine internally and externally simultaneously (yugapat). Examining internal and external are two distinct operations (bhinna); examining [internal and external] at the same time (ekakāle) and simultaneously (sārdham) are conjunct operations!" But although he examines [internal and external] conjointly or separately, the ātman is not found anywhere (nopalabhyate): the examination is therefore ended.

[2. In regard to  $vedan\bar{a}smrtyupasath\bar{a}na$ .] – Question. – In regard to mindfulness of the body  $(k\bar{a}yasmrtyupasth\bar{a}na)$ , it might be a matter of the inner [body] and the outer [body]. But here, all the

<sup>124</sup> Canonical expression: cf. Dīgha, II, p. 297; Majjhima, I, p. 58: *Ayam pi kho kāyo evaṃdhammo evaṃbhāvī etaṃ anatīto ti*.

<sup>125</sup> Therefore capable of being taken for the 'self' or 'mine'

feelings ( $vedan\bar{a}$ ) are included ( $samgrh\bar{u}a$ ) in the external bases of coknsciousness ( $b\bar{a}hy\bar{a}yatana$ ); 126 so how can there be a difference between inner feelings ( $\bar{a}dhy\bar{a}tmikavedan\bar{a}$ ) and outer feelings ( $b\bar{a}hyavedan\bar{a}$ )?

Answer. – The Buddha said: "There are two kinds of feelings: bodily feeling ( $k\bar{a}yik\bar{\iota}\ vedan\bar{a}$ ) and mental feeling ( $caitasik\bar{\iota}\ vedan\bar{a}$ )." Bodily feeling is outer ( $b\bar{a}hya$ ) and mental feeloing is inner ( $\bar{a}dhy\bar{a}tmika$ ).

Furthermore, the feelings associated with the [first] five consciousnesses (pañcavijñānasaṃprayuktavedanā) are outer, and the feelings associated with the mental consciousness (manovijñānasaṃprayuktavedanā) are inner.

The feelings arise in dependence on the twelve bases of consciousness [202b] (*dvādāśāyatana*). The group of the six inner bases (*ādhyātmikāyatana*) produce feelings that are inner; the outer six bases (*bāhyāyatana*) produce feelings that are outer.

Coarse (*audārika*) feeling is outer; subtle (*sūkṣma*) feeling is inner.

There are two kinds of suffering (duḥkha): inner suffering and outer suffering.

a. Inner suffering (ādhyātmika duḥkha) is of two types: physical suffering (kāyika duḥkha) and mental suffering (caitasika duḥkha). 128 Physical suffering is the four hundred and four sicknesses (vyādhi), bodily pains (kāyavyādhi), headaches (śirovyādhi), etc. 129: those are physical suffering. – Mental suffering is grief (daurmanasya), sadness (śoka), hatred (dveṣa), fear (bhaya), jealousy (īrṣyā), doubt (vicikitsā), etc.: those are mental suffering. These two sufferings together are inner suffering.

b. Outer suffering (bāhyaduḥkha) is of two types: i) the king (rājan), the victorious enemy (vijetṛ), the wicked thief (caura), the lion (siṃha), tiger (vyāghra), wolf (vṛka), snake (sarpa) and other nuisances (vihethana); ii) the wind (vāta), rain (vṛṣṭi), cold (śīta), heat (uṣna), thunder (meghagarjita), lightning (vidyut), thunderbolts, etc: these two kinds of suffering are outer suffering.

It is the same for pleasant feeling ( $sukhavedan\bar{a}$ ) and neither unpleasant nor pleasant feeling ( $aduhkh\bar{a}sukhavedan\bar{a}$ ).

Furthermore, the feeling that takes as object (*ālambate*) an inner dharma is an inner feeling; that which takes as object an outer dharma is an outer feeling.

Furthermore, the one hundred and eight feelings  $^{130}$  are inner feelings; the others (śeṣa) are outer feelings.

-

<sup>126</sup> The six organs, eye, etc.

<sup>127</sup> Saṃyutta, IV, p. 231: Katame ca bhikkhave dve vedanā. Kâyikā ca cetasikā ca.

<sup>128</sup> Cf. Majjhima, I, p. 302: Yaṃ kho āvuso kāyikaṃ vā cetasikaṃ vā dukkhaṃ asātaṃ vedayitaṃ ayaṃ dukkhā vedanā.

<sup>129</sup> See above, p. 494-495F, 583-585F.

<sup>130</sup> The canonical sources distinguish two, three, five, six, eighteen, thirty-six, and one hundred and eight kinds of *vedanā*: cf. Samyutta, IV, p. 231-232; Tsa a han, T 99, no. 485, k. 17, p. 123c-124b. Later the *Traité* (k. 36, p. 324b4-8) will return to this subject.

[3. In regard to cittasamrtyupasthāna.] - Question. - The mind is included (samgrhita) in the inner bases of consciousness (ādhyātmikāyatana): how can the sūtra say that [the yogin] "also considers the mind outwardly" (bahirdhā vā citte cittānupaśyī viharati)?

Answer. - Although the mind is included in the inner bases of consciousness, when it takes as object (ālambate) an outer dharma, it is outer mind, and when it takes as object an inner dharma, it is inner mind.

The mental consciousness (manovijñāna) is an inner mind, and the [first] five consciousnesses (pañcavijñāna) are outer minds.

The concentrated mind (samksiptacitta) that penetrates into meditation (dhyānapravista) is an inner mind; the distracted mind (viksiptacitta) is an outer mind.

The mind associated (samprayukta) with the five inner obstacles (ādhvātmikanīvarana)<sup>131</sup> or with the inner seven factors of enlightenment (ādhvātmikabodhvanga) is an inner mind; the mind associated with the five outer obstacles (bāhyanīvarana) or with the seven outer factors of enlightenment (bāhyabodyanga) is an outer mind.

For various reasons of this kind, we distinguish inner mind, outer mind and both inner and outer mind.

[4. In regard to dharmasmrtyupasthāna.] – Mindfulness of dharmas (dharmasmrtyupasthāna) is included (samgrhita) in the outer bases of consciousness (bāhyāyatana): how can [the sūtra] say that [the yogin] "also considers dharmas inwardly" (ādhyātmam vā dharmeşu dharmānupaśyī viharati)?

Answer. – Outside of feeling (vedanām sthāpayitvā), there are other mental dharmas (caitasika dharma). Mental dharmas that have as object (ālambante) an inner dharma are inner dharmas; mental dharmas that have as object an outer dharma, the unconditioned (asamskrta) or the formations dissociated from the mind (cittaviprayuktasaṃskāra)<sup>132</sup> are outer dharmas.

Furthermore, the dharmas that are the object (ālambana) of the mental consciousness (manovijñāna) are inner dharmas, for it has been said by the Buddha: "The mental consciousness arises in dependence on the object (ālambanam āśrityotpadyate manovijñānam)." Here, except for feeling (vedanām sthāpayitvā), the other mental dharmas (caitasika dharma) are inner dharmas, whereas the other formations dissociated from the mind (cittavipravuktasamskāra) and the unconditioned dharmas (asamskrtadharma) are outer dharmas.

# 2. The Four Right Efforts

<sup>131</sup> The five obstacles preventing entry into dhyāna. The Traité has spoken of them above (p. 1012-1020F). In the same way as the factors of enlightenment, these obstacles are inner or outer according to whether one examines them within oneself or in another.

<sup>132</sup> Kośa, II, p. 178 and foll.: cf. the *cittavippayutta* of the Pāli scholasticism: Dhammasanganī, p. 210, 254.

The four right efforts (*samyakpradhāna*) are of two kinds: *i*) right efforts in themselves (*svabhāvasamyakpradhāna*); *ii*) right efforts by connection (*saṃsargasamyakpradhāna*).

Right efforst in itself develops four kinds of exertion  $(v\bar{v}rya)$  in view of the path  $(m\bar{a}rga)$ : it eliminates the two types of bad dharmas  $(aku\acute{s}aladhama)$ , [namely, those that have not yet arisen and those that have already arisen], and it brings together the two types of good dharmas  $(ku\acute{s}aladharma)$ , [namely, those that have not yet arisen and those that have already arisen.]

During the examination (anupaśyanā) characteristic of the four foundations of mindfulness (smṛṭyupasthāna), when [the yogin] feels some laziness (kausīdya), when the five obstacles (pañcanīvaraṇa) and the other passions (kleśa) cloud the mind and he strays away from the five kinds of roots of good, faith, etc. (śraddhādhikuśalamūla), then he makes an effort (vyāyacchate) and develops exertion (vīryam ārabhate) for: 1) eliminating the bad dharmas that have already arisen (utpannānām akuśaladharmāṇām prahāṇāya); 2) preventing the arising of the bad dharmas that have not yet arisen (anutpannānām akuśalānām dharmāṇām anutpādāya); 3) making the good dharmas, faith, etc., that have not yet arisen, arise (anutpannānām śraddhādikuśaladharmāṇām utpādyāya); 4) developing the good dharmas that have already arisen (utpannānām kuśaladharmāṇām bhūyobhāvāya). 133 When these [four] exertions are abundant during the four doundations of mindfulness (smṛṭyupasthāna), they take the name of right efforts (samyakpradhāna). [202c]

Of the seven categories of dharmas [auxiliary to enlightenment (*bodhipakṣika*)], why are these four called *right* efforts and the last eight, [namely, *samyagdṛṣṭi*), etc.] not described as right (*samyak*)?

Answer. – Because these four kinds of exertion  $(v\bar{n}ya)$ , of spritual energy  $(citt\bar{a}bhyus\bar{a}ha)$  or efforts  $(\bar{a}rambha)$  are easily damaged by error  $(bhr\bar{a}nti)$ , they are called right efforts. Because the [eight] factors of the Path, [samyagdrsti, etc.] take pleasure in the Dharma and are are easily damaged by falling into bad doctrines (mithyādharma), they are called right Path.

[The right efforts] in themselves (*svabhāva*) are the four kinds of exertions (*caturvidhavīrya*). [The right efforts] by connection (*saṃsarga*) are the dharmas of the Path resulting from causes and conditions (*hetupratyaya*), [dharmas other than the four right efforts] but having primarily the four kinds of exertion (*caturvidhavīrya*) in question. They are impure (*sāṣrava*) or pure (*anāṣrava*), with form (*rūpin*) or formless (*arūpin*), as has been said above (p. 1170F).

# 3. The Four Bases of Magical Power

When the four right efforts ( $samyakpradh\bar{a}na$ ) are practiced, the mind is slightly distracted ( $vik\bar{s}ipta$ ); this is why the concentrations ( $sam\bar{a}dhi$ ) are used to fix the mind: [concentrations of zeal (chanda), of exertion ( $v\bar{v}rya$ ), of the mind (citta) and of examination ( $m\bar{v}m\bar{a}m\bar{s}a$ ). These concentrations are called bases of magical power ( $rddhip\bar{a}da$ ).

\_

<sup>133</sup> Canonical formula already cited above, p. 1123F.

Thus, when good food (*praṇītāhāra*) is under-salted, it lacks flavor (*rasa*), but when salt (*lavaṇa*) is added, the taste is sufficient and is in accord with what is desired (*yatheṣṭa*). Or again, when a person who has two legs finds a good horse (*aśva*) or a good chariot (*ratha*), he comes to his destination as desired.

Similarly, when the yogin has obtained the true wisdoms that are the four foundations of mindfulness (smṛtyupasthāna) and these right exertions (samyagvīrya) that are the four right efforts (samyakpradhāna), his wisdom (prajñā) is increased (vardhate) by means of these exertions; however, the strength of his concentration (samādhibala) remains weak. But when he obtains the four kinds of concentration (caturvidhasamādhi) and therefore fixes his mind (cittaṃ pragṛḥṇati), the strength of his wisdom (prajñā) and concentration (samādhi) are equal (sama) and his vows (praṇidhāna) are realized. [These four concentrations] are called bases of magical power.

Question. – Concentration (samādhi) already was present in the four foundations of mindfulness and the four right efforts. Why not call them the bases of magical power?

Answer. – These practices do indeed contain [a certain measure] of concentration, but although wisdom  $(praj\tilde{n}\tilde{a})$  and exertion  $(v\tilde{v}rya)$  are strong in them, concentration is weak. That is why the yogin did not realize his wishes  $(pranidh\tilde{a}na)$  as he desired. [In the bases of magical power], there are four kinds of concentrations:

- i) The concentration obtained by giving predominance to zeal (chandam adhipatim krtvā). 134
- ii) The concentration obtained by giving predominance to exertion (vīryaṃ adhipatiṃ kṛtvā).

From these concentrations as causes and conditions there arise [the practices of] the Path, impure ( $s\bar{a}srava$ ) or pure ( $an\bar{a}srava$ ).

- iii) The concentration obtained by giving predominance to the mind (cittam adhipatim kṛtva)
- iv) The concentration obtained by giving predominance to examination (mīmāṃsām adhipatiṃ kṛtva).

From these concentrations as causes and conditions there arise [practices of] the Path, impure or pure.

Together with the five good elements (*kuśalaskandhasaṃsargāt*) these practices are called [bases of] magical power by connection (*saṃsargarddhipāda*).

The four kinds of concentrations under the predominating influense of zeal (*chanda*), etc., are called [bases of] magical power in itself (*svabhāvarddhipāda*). 135

Taken by themselves (*svabhāva*), they are of lower order: they are right views but are impure (*sāsrava*), having only meritorious value (*puṇyabhāgīya*) and bearing fruit only in this world (*upadhivaipkaya*); it is the right view of worldly people who see the truth but stay apart from the path traced by the Buddha.

<sup>134~</sup> Formulas appearing in the Vibhanga, p. 216, and Kośavyākhyā, p. 601-602; see above, p. 1125F.

The four concentrations having zeal, exertion, the mind, examination a predominating respectively are the bases of magical power (see above, p. 382-383F).

For the four right efforts (*samyakpradhāna*) and the four bases of magical power (*rddhipāda*) see what was said in full detail in regard to the *smṛṭyupasthānas* in themselves and as *smṛṭyupasthānas* by connection (p. 1169F).

#### 4. The Five Faculties

Here are the five faculties (pañcendriva): 136

- 1. Believing in the Path (*mārga*) and in the good dharmas adjuvant to the Path (*mārgapākṣika kuśaladharma*) is the faculty of faith (*śraddhendriya*).
- 2. When the yogin practices the Path and the dharmas adjuvant to the Path and exerts himself without stopping, that is the faculty of exertion (*vīryendriya*).
- 3. When he thinks about the Path and the dharmas adjuvant to the Path and does not think of anything else, that is the faculty of memory (*smṛtīndriya*).
- 4. When he meditates attentively (*ekacittena*) and without being distracted (*avikṣepam*), that is the faculty of concentration (*samādhīndriya*).
- 5. When, in view of the Path and the dharmas adjuvant to the Path, he considers (*anupaśyati*) the sixteen aspects of the truths (*ṣoḍaśākāra*), 137 impermanence (*anitya*), etc., that is the faculty of wisdom (*prajñendriya*).

# 5. The Five Strenghts

When the five faculties have increased and are no longer troubled by the affictions (*kleśa*), they take the name of strengths (*bala*). <sup>138</sup> See what has just been said about the five faculties.

On the other hand, together with the five good elements (the *dhammakkhandha* of the Dīgha, III, p. 229, 279, Itivuttaka, p. 107; the *lokottaraskandha* of the Dhrmaguptaka, § 23; the *asamasamāḥ skandhāḥ* of the Mahāvyut., no. 103-108) – namely, *śīla*, *samādhi*, *prajñā*, *vimukti*, *vimuktijñānadarśana* -, these four concentrations 'by connection' (*saṃsarga*) are the right views of the nobles (*ārya*), pure (*anāsrava*), supraworldly (*lokottara*) and linked to the Path (*mārgānga*); this is the view found in the noble mind, purified, joined to the way, following the noble Path. See Majjhima, III, p. 72.

136 For the *Traité*, the five *indriyas* concern the Path and the auxiliaries to enlightenment exclusively. The canonical sources cited above (p. 1125F) are less precise: according to them, faith (*śraddhā*), rather, would have the Buddha as object.

On the order of the indriyas, cf. Kośa, VI, p. 287. See above, p. 641F.

The five faculties and the five strengths come under the aggregate of volition (*saṃskāraskandha*), are always associated (*sadāsaṃprayukta*), are mental events (*caitasikadharma*) accompanying the mind (*cittānuparivartin*); they arise with the mind, endure with the mind and perish with the mind.

When one possesses them, the mind is in right concentration (*samyaksamādhi*); when one does not possess them, the mind falls into wrong concentrations (*mithyāsamadhi*).

### 6. The Seven Members of Enlightenment

On the seven members of enlightenment (*sapta saṃbodhyaṅga*), see the explanations aove (p. 1149F). [203a]

Question. – You previously gave the meaning but you did not speak from the Abhidharma point of view.

Answer. – It is necessary here to repeat what was said above (p. 1170F) in regard to the four foundations of mindfulness (*smṛtyupasthāna*).

The seven members of enlightenment are formless ( $ar\bar{u}pin$ ), invisible (anidarśana), non-resistant (apratigha), pure ( $an\bar{a}srava$ ), conditioned (samskrta), resulting from causes and conditions (hetupratyaya), included in the three times ( $tryadhvasamgrh\bar{t}ta$ ), included in name ( $n\bar{a}masamgrh\bar{t}ta$ ), included in the outer bases of consciousness ( $b\bar{a}hy\bar{a}yatanasamgrh\bar{t}ta$ ) and not to be destroyed by seeing (na darśanena  $prah\bar{a}tavya$ ), things to be cultivated ( $bh\bar{a}van\bar{a}dharma$ ) and non-defiled things (asamsklistadharma), being fruit (phala) and involving a fruit (saphala), being neither feeling (na  $vedan\bar{a}$ ) nor matter derived (bhautika,  $up\bar{a}d\bar{a}ya$   $r\bar{u}pa$ ) from the four great elements, nor cause associated with existence (na bhavanasamprayuktahetu). Two sections of the good (kuśala) contain the seven members of enlightenment and the seven members of enlightenment contain two sections of the good. [The members of enlightenment] are dissociated from bad, indeterminate, impure dharmas and dharmas containing impurity ( $akuśala-avy\bar{a}krta-\bar{a}srava-s\bar{a}sravadharma-viprayukta$ ). Two sections of the anāsrava include the seven members of enlightenment and the seven members of enlightenment include two secions of the anāsrava.

These various things have been discussed fully in the Ts'ien-nan' The Thousand Aporias'. 139

<sup>138</sup> There is only a difference in intensity between the five *indriyas* and the five *balas*: see above, p. 1127F; Vibhāṣā, T 1545, k. 141, p. 726b13-20: Kośa, VI, p. 286.

<sup>139</sup> Prakaranapāda, T 1541, k. 10, p. 679c9 foll.; T 1542, k. 15, p. 753a. – Cf. Vibhanga, p. 232-234.
On the Chapter of the Thousand Aporias, see above, p. 1171F, note 1.

# 7. The Eight Members of the Path

On the eight members of the noble Path (āryāṣṭaṅgamārga), see what has been said above (p. 1150F).

- 1. [The first member], right view (samyakdṛṣṭi), is the wisdom mentioned in regard to the four foundations of mindfulness (smṛṭyupasthāna), the faculty of wisdom (prajñendriya), the strength of wisdom (prajñābala) and the member of enlightenment called discernment of dharmas (dharmapravicayasaṃbodhyaṅga).
- 2. [The second member], right thought (samyaksamkalpa), is, at the time of contemplating the four truths (satyānupaśyanā), associated with a pure mind (anāsravacittasamprayukyta): it is a reflection (tarka), an enquiry (vitarka), an understanding (avabodha), an examination (mīmāmsa).
- 3. [The sixth member], right effort (*samyagvyāyāma*) has already been mentioned in regard to the four right efforts (*samyakpradhāna*), the faculty of exertion (*vīryendriya*), the strength of exertion (*vīryabala*) and the member of enlightenment called exertion (*vīryasambodhyanga*).
- 4. [The seventh member], right attentiveness (*samyaksmṛṭi*), has already been mentioned in regard to the faculty of attentiveness (*smṛṭīndriya*), the strength of attentiveness (*smṛṭibala*) and the member of enlightenment called attentiveness (*smṛṭisambodhyanga*).
- 5. [The eighth member], right concentration (samyaksamādhi) has already been mentioned in regard to the bases of magical power (rddhipāda), the faculty of concentration (samādhīndriya), the strength of concentration (samādhibala) and the member of enlightenment called concentration (samādhisambodhyanga).

Now it is necessary to speak [of the three remaining members]: right speech (samyagvāc), right action (samyakkarmānta) and right livelihood (samyagājīva).

- 6. [The third member or  $samyagv\bar{a}c$ ]. With the exception of the four bad ways of livelihood  $(mithy\bar{a}j\bar{i}va)$ , <sup>140</sup> fixing vocal actions  $(v\bar{a}kkarmapragrahaṇa)$  and, by means of a pure wisdom  $(an\bar{a}sravapraj\bar{n}\bar{a})$ , rejecting and eliminating bad vocal actions  $(v\bar{a}nmithy\bar{a}karman)$ .
- 7. [The fourth member or *samyakkarmānta*.] For right action (*samyakkarmānta*), it is the same [allowing for a few minor variations].
- 8. [The fifth member or  $samyag\bar{a}j\bar{v}a$ .] By means of a pure wisdom  $(an\bar{a}sravapraj\tilde{n}\bar{a})$ , to reject and eliminate the five bad ways of livelihood is right livelihood  $(samyag\bar{a}j\bar{v}a)$ .

Question. – What are the five bad ways of livelihood  $(mithy\bar{a}j\bar{i}va)$ ? <sup>141</sup>Answer. – a. Out of love for profit  $(l\bar{a}halobha)$ , to manifest all kinds of wonders  $(\bar{a}\acute{s}carya)$  by cheating  $(kuh\bar{a}na)$ .

-

<sup>140</sup> These will be discussed in regard to the fifth member or *samyagājīva*.

<sup>141</sup> The five bad ways of livelihood are formulated in sybilline terms which have severely tested the wisdom of translators. Besides, the texts show many variations:

- b. Out of love for profit, to boast about one's own qualities (svaguṇalapanā).
- c. Out of love for profit, to predict good luck (svasti) or bad luck (asvasti) to people.
- d. Out of love for profit, to proclaim loudly (uccais) one's own power ( $prabh\bar{a}va$ ) in order to frighten people and make them respect oneself.

a. Pāli sources. – Majjhima, III, p. 75: *Katamo ca bhikkhave micchā-ājīvo. Kuhanā, lapanā, nemittakatā, nippesikatā, lābhena lābhaṃ nijigiṃsanatā.* – Transl. I. B. Horner, *Middle Length Sayings*, III, p. 118: 'Trickery, cajolery, insinuating, dissembling, rapacity for gain upon gain'. Scholarly notes justify this translation.

Dīgha, I, p. 8, 67; Anguttara, III, p. 111: *Kuhakā ca honti, lapakā ca, nemittikā ca, nippesikā ca, lābhena ca lābham nijigimsitaro iti.* – Transl. L. Renou, *Canon bouddhique pāli,* vol.. I, fasc. 1, 1949, p. 8: 'They become swindlers, boasters, soothsayers, jugglers, seeking to gain profit upon profit.'

The Pāli commentaries pile synonym upon synonym and are not of much help: cf. Vibhanga, p. 352-353 (reproduced in Visuddhimagga, ed. Warren, p. 19); Sumangalavilāsinī, I, p. 91-92: Papañcasūdanī, IV, p. 134; Manorathapūranī, III, p. 273, 412.

b. Sanskrit sources. – Kośavyākhyā, p. 420: 1) kuhanā, 2) lapanā, 3) naimittikatā, 4) naiṣpeṣitā, 5) lābhena lābhaniścikīrṣā.

Bodh. bhūmi, p.168: 1) kuhanā, 2) lapanā, 3) naimittikā, 4) naiṣpeṣikatā, 5) lābhena lābhaṃ niścikīrṣutā.

Abhidharmadīpa, p. 309: 1) kuhanā, 2) lapanā, 3) naimittikatā, 4) naiṣpeṣikatā, 5) lābhena lābhasya niścikīrsatā.

Mahāvyut., no. 2493-97: 1) *kuhanā* = ṅan pa, 2. *lapanā* = kha=gsag, 3. *naiṣpeṣikatva* = thob kyis ḥjal ba, thob ciṅ ḥjal ba, 4) *naimittikatva* = g€og sloṅ, 5) *lābhena lābhaniṣpādanatā* = rñed pas eñed pa sgrub pa. – For the Chinesse translations, see Hiuan-tsang (T 1579, k. 41, p. 518a7), preferable to the translations adopted by the editions of the Mahāvyutpatti.

In the *Lexicalisches* annexed to his edition of the Bodh. bhūmi, p. 21-26, U. Wogihara has succeeded in defining the meaning of these five expressions. Edgerton's *Hybrid Sanskrit Dictionary* (p. 189, 461, 312, 313, 462) is mainly inspired by Wogihara.

The explanations given here by the *Traité* may be found mainly in the Abhidharmadīpa, p. 310: Abhūtaguṇadarśanārtham ūryāpathavikalpakṛe caittaviśeṣaḥ kuhanā. Lābhārtham eva guṇapriyalapanakṛl lapanā. Upakaraṇārthitvanimittadarśanakṛc caittaviśeṣo naimittikatā. Paraguṇavad doṣavacananiṣpeṣaṇakṛd eva caitasiko naiṣpeṣikatā.

Labdhalābhakhyāpanenānyalābhaniścikīrṣaṇatā lābhena lābhasya niścikīrṣatā.

The five bad ways of livelihood are thus special mental evenrs (*caittaviśeṣa*). *Kuhanā*, cheating, resorts to various attitudes to show qualities that one does not have. *Lapanā*, boasting, consists of praising one's own qualities towards one's own interest. *Naimittikatā*, divination, under pretext of rendering service, to interpret favorable or unfavorable signs. *Naiṣpeṣikatā*, extortion, to snatch a favor by means of threats. *Lābhena lābhaniścikīrṣatā*, to try to grab new profit by virtue of a profit previously won.

e. Out of love for profit, to speak of offerings already obtained ( $labdhap\bar{u}j\bar{a}$ ) in order to encourage [other] people [to give in their turn].

These eight right paths (samyagmārga) are arranged into three groups (skandha):

- a. Three of them, [right speech ( $samyagv\bar{a}c$ ), right action ( $samyakkarm\bar{a}nta$ ) and right livelihood ( $samyag\bar{a}j\bar{v}a$ )], make up the class of morality ( $s\bar{\imath}laskandha$ ).
- b. Three others, [right effort (samyagvyāyāma), right mindfulness (samyaksmṛti) and right concentration (samyaksamādhi)], make up the class of concetration (samādhislandha).
- c. Two, finally, [right view (samyagdṛṣṭi) and right thinking (samyaksaṃkalpa)], make up the class of wisdom (prajñāskandha). 142

The class of wisdom and the class of concentration are as above. Now we must talk about the class of morality.

The class of morality (\$\frac{s}{l}askandha\$) has form (\$r\tilde{u}pasvabh\tilde{u}va\$), is invisible (\$anidar\frac{s}{a}na\$), non-resistant (\$apratigha\$), pure (\$an\tilde{a}srava\$), conditioned (\$sam\frac{m}{s}krta\$), non-retribution (\$avip\tilde{a}ka\$), the result of causes and conditions (\$hetupratyayaja\$), included in the three times (\$tryadhvasamgrh\tilde{u}ta\$), included in form (\$r\tilde{u}pasamgrh\tilde{u}ta\$), not included in name (\$na\$ \$n\tilde{a}masamgrh\tilde{u}ta\$), included in the outer bases of consciousness (\$b\tilde{a}hy\tilde{a}yatanasamgrh\tilde{u}ta\$), not to be destroyed by meditation (\$na\$ \$bh\tilde{a}vanay\tilde{a}\$ \$prah\tilde{a}tavya\$) and not to be destroyed by seeing (\$na\$ \$dar\frac{s}{a}mena\$ \$prah\tilde{a}tavya\$), something to be cultivated (\$bh\tilde{a}van\tilde{a}dharma\$) and something non-defiled (\$asamkli\tilde{s}tadharma\$), being fruit (\$phala\$) and involving a fruit (\$saphala\$), not being either feeling (\$na\$ \$vedan\tilde{a}dharma\$) nor derived from the four great elements (\$na\$ \$bhautika\$), not something of subordinate rank (\$na\$ \$sottaradharma\$) nor a cause associated with existence (\$na\$ \$bhavasamprayuktahetu\$).

One section of the good (*kuśala*) includes (*saṃgṛhīta*) three [members of [203b] the] right path and these three [members of the right path] include a section of the good. The members are dissociated from the bad, indeterminate, impure or involving impurity dharmas (*akuśala-avyākṛta-sāṣrava-sāṣravadharma-viprayukta*).

One dharma of the anāsrava includes three [other members of] the right path, and these three members also include one dharma of the anāsrava.

These various explanations are presented in full in the Abhidharma.

p. 125, 291; II, p. 20; III, p. 15-16; V, p. 326; Itivuttaka, p. 51; Nettippakarana, p. 64, 126.

<sup>142</sup> Cūļavedallasutta of the Majjhima, I, p. 301 (Tchong a han, T 26, k. 58, p. 788c9-12), cited in Atthasālinī, p. 305: Na kho Visākha ariyena atthangikena .... dhammā paññākhande sangaītā ti.
For these three elements (skandha) of the eightfold path, see also Dīgha, I, p. 206; Anguttara, I,

# 8. Distribution of the Auxiliaries in the Stages $^{143}$

- 1. The thirty-seven auxiliaries of enlightenment (*bodhipakṣikadharma*) are all present in the stage of the first dhyāna (*prathamadhyāna*).
- 2. In the stage of the *ānāgamya* [preliminaery absorption of the first dhyāna], there are thirty-six auxiliaries, excluding the member of enlightenment called joy (*prītisambodhyanga*).
- 3. In the second dhyāna (*dvvitīyadhyāna*), there are also thirty-six auxiliaries, excluding [the member of the path] called right thinking (*samyaksamkalpamārganga*).
- 4. In the intermediate dhyāna (*dhyānāntara*) [subdivision of the first dhyāna], in the third dhyāna (*tṛtīyadhyāna*) and in the fourth dhyāna (*caturthadhyāna*), there are thirty-five auxiliaries, excluding the member of enlightenment called joy (*prītisambodhyanga*) and excluding the [member of the path called] right thinking (*samyaksamkalpamārgānga*).
- 5. In the [first] three formless absorptions (ārūpyasamāpatti), there are thirty-two auxiliaries, excluding the member of enlightenment called joy (prītisambodhyanga) and [the members of the path (margānga) called] right thinking (samyaksamkalpa), right speech (samyagvāc), right action (samyakkarmānta) and right livelihood (samyagājīva).
- 6. In the summit of existence (*bhavāgra*) [or fourth formless absorption], there are twenty-two auxiliaries, excluding the seven members of enlightenment (*saṃbodhyaṅga*) and the eight members of the noble path (*āryamārgaṅga*).
- 7. In the desire realm ( $k\bar{a}madh\bar{a}tu$ ), there are also twenty-eight auxiliaries [excluding the sambodhyangas and the eight  $m\bar{a}rg\bar{a}ngas$ ].

2) anāgamya or preliminary absorption (sāmantaka) of the first dhyāna

4) dhyānāntara, higher type of the first dhyāna

5-7) second, third and fourth dhyānas

8-11) the four *ārūpyasamāpattis*, formless absorptions, the fourth of which is also listed under the name of *bhavāgra*, summit of existence.

For further details, see above, p. 1027-1034F, and the note on p. 1035F.

In regard to the distribution of the auxiliaries among the eleven stages, the *Traité* adopts the viws here of the Vibhāṣā, T 1545, k. 96, p. 497c4-15, which will be taken up again in the Abhidharmāmṛta, T 1553, k. 2, p. 977c21-26 (reconstr. Sastri, p. 117), Kośa, VI, p. 291-292 and Abhidharmadīpa, p. 365.

These are the eleven stages (*bhūmi*) of birth (*upapatti*) and concentration (*samādhi*) accepted by the Vaibhāṣikas (Kośa, VI, p. 236; VII, p. 71), namely:

<sup>1)</sup> kāmadhātu

<sup>3)</sup> first dhyāna

This information is valid for the system of the śrāvakas.

# Third Section THE AUXILIARIES ACCORDING TO THE MAHĀYĀNA

Question. – What is the meaning (artha) of these thirty-seven auxiliaries as taught in the Mahāyāna?

#### I. THE FOUR FOUNDATIONS OF MINDFULNESS

Answer. – The bodhisattva-mahāsattva practices the four foundations of mindfulness (smṛtyupasthāna).

### 1. Mindfulness of body

He contemplates his inner body as impermanent, suffering, like a sickness, like an ulcer (so 'dhyātmakāyam anityato duḥkhato rogato gaṇḍataḥ samanupaśyati), 144 a mass of rotting flesh (read jou tsiu), filled with impurities (aśuciparipūrṇa), oozing from nine gates (navadvāra) 145 and a veritable walking latrine. In the same way, he contemplates the repulsive nakedness of the body where there is not even one pure place.

This 'pile of bones, equipped with flesh and blood, wrapped with tendons' (asthisamkalikā samāṣalohitā snāyusambandhā), \$\frac{146}{6}\$ this leather bag, that has as causes and conditions (hetupratyaya) the impure actions (sāsravakarman) of earlier lives (pūrvajanman), is provided in this life (ihajanman) with baths (snāpana), flowers (puṣpa) perfumes (gandha), clothes (vastra), food (āhāra), beds and seats (śayasana), remedies and medicines (glānapratyayabhaiṣajya), etc. It is like a two-wheeled cart (dvicakra ratha) which, when drawn by the power of an ox (gobala), can move: the causes and conditions of the two lifetimes produce the 'cart' of the body and, pulled by this 'ox' which is the consciousness (vijñāna), it turns, goes forwards and backwards.

<sup>144</sup> Canonical reminiscence: cf. Majjhima, I, p. 500: *Ayaṃ kāyo rūpī... aniccato dukkhato rogato gaṇḍato sallato aghato ābādhato parato palokato suññato anattato samanupassitabbo*. Same wording in Majjhima, I, p. 435.

<sup>145</sup> See above, p. 1154F, n. 2.

Also a canonical expression: cf. Dīgha, II, p. 296; Majjhima, I, p. 58, 89; Anguttara, III, p. 324. For the Sanskrit correspondents, see Edgerton, Dictionary, p. 85 under *asthi-śakatā*.

This body formed by of the complex of the four great elements ( $caturmah\bar{a}bh\bar{u}tas\bar{a}magr\bar{\imath}$ ) is not real ( $abh\bar{u}ta$ ) and without substance ( $as\bar{a}ra$ ), like a ball of foam (phenapindu). 147

This body is impermanent (anitya) and must perish after a time. The physical characteristics (kāyalakṣaṇa) are not found inside the body, nor outside, nor in between the two (na te 'dhyātmaṃ na bahirdhā nobhayam antarenopalabhyante).

The body itself does not know itself: it is ignorant  $(aj\tilde{n}\bar{a})$ , inactive  $(ak\bar{a}raka)$ , like the tiles (kathalla) and stones  $(\dot{s}il\bar{a})$  of a wall (kudya).

In this body there are no definite physical characteristis ( $k\bar{a}yanimitta$ ). There is no person who makes the body nor anyone who makes him make it. In this body there is no earlier term ( $p\bar{u}rv\bar{a}nta$ ) nor later term ( $apar\bar{a}nta$ ) nor middle term ( $madhy\bar{a}nta$ ).

Eighty thousand types of worms (krmikula), <sup>148</sup> innumerable sicknesses  $(vy\bar{a}dhi)$ , hunger and thirst  $(k\bar{s}utpip\bar{a}s\bar{a})$ , cold and heat  $(s\bar{t}tospa)$  and weaknesses always torment the body.

According to the Visuddhimagga, ed. Warren, p. 193-194, the body is inhabited by eighty families of worms (*kikikula*) located in the skin, hide, flesh, tendons, bones, marrow, and which feed there: "There they are born, live, die and fill their greater and lesser needs: the body is their maternity ward, their hospital, their cemetery, their latrine ditch and even dies under their rage." According to the same text, p. 213, the stomach itself is occupied by thirty-two types of worms, round worms, ribbon worms, thread worms, etc., ever in turmoil: when the body is on a light diet, the worms jump around crying and strike against the heart region; when the body is fed, they rush to seize the mouthfuls of food. — According to the Milindapañha, p. 100, these undesirable and undesired guests come into the body and multiply there by the power of bad actions.

The Mahāyāna texts go so far as to postulate the presence in the body of eighty-four thousand types of worms. The Udayanavatsarājaparipṛcchā, cited in the Śikṣāsamuccaya, p. 81, actually says: Aśitiṃ krimikulasahasrāṇi yāni tiṣṭhanti antare.

The wise person puts up with their presence. According to the Ratnakūṭa (T 310, k. 114, p. 645b4-6), the forest-dwelling monk (*araṇyabhikṣu*), when he is about to eat, has the following thought: "In this body there are at present 80,000 types of worms. When the worms get this food, they will all be safe; now I am going to attract these worms with this food." – According to the Avataṃsaka (T 279, k. 21, p. 112c12-15: cf. T 278, k. 12, p. 476b12-15), at the time of the bodhisattva's meal, he has the following thought: "In my body there are 80,000 types of worms; they live in me; when my body is filled, they too are filled; when my body suffers from hunger, they too suffer from hunger. Now by taking this food and drink (*pāṇabhojana*), I hope that these beings may be replete. Therefore I am myself eating this food so as to make a gift to them; I do not desire the taste of it."

But the great Bodhisattva, the 'irreversible' bodhisattva (*avinivartanīya* or *avaivartika*) does not have to formulate such intentions, for one of his numerous privileges is to be completely free of worms. In the Aṣṭasāhasrikā, p. 326, we read: *Yāni khalu punar anyeṣāṃ sattvānām aśītiḥ kurmikulasahasrāṇi* 

<sup>147</sup> The phenapindūpamam rūpam of Samyutta, III, p. 142; see above, p. 370F.

The bodhisattva-mahāsattva who considers the body in this way knows that there is neither his own body  $(\bar{a}tmak\bar{a}ya)$  nor the body of another  $(parak\bar{a}ya)$ . There is neither master  $(\bar{i}svara)$  nor agent  $(k\bar{a}raka)$  who makes this body. Empty of characteristics  $(lakṣaṇaś\bar{u}nya)$ , the body arises from unreal causes and conditions  $(abh\bar{u}tahetupratyaya)$ : this body that has but nominal existence  $(praj\bar{n}aptisat)$  depends on previous actions  $(p\bar{u}rvakarman)$  as causes and conditions.

The bodhisattva then says to himself: "I must not spare the life of the body. Why? The bodily characteristics do not unite and do not separate, they do not come and they do not go, they are not born and they are not destroyed; they do not rest upon anything."

Pursuing the examination of the body, he says to himself: "Being without '1' (anātman) and without 'mine' (anātmīya), this body is empty (śūnya). Being empty, it does not have any male (puruṣa) or female (strī) characteristics. Being without characteristics (animitta), it is not to be wished for (apranihita)." [203c]

Thinking thus, the bodhisattva enters into the gate of knowledge (jñānamukha) called 'wishlessness' (apraṇihita). He knows that the body is not to be considered in the sense that it arises only from a complex of engendering causes and conditions (hetupratyayasāmagrī). But these causes and conditions that produce the body also come from mistakes (bhrānti) and errors (viparyāsa). In these causes and conditions, the nature of cause and conditiona is also lacking, and the arising of causes and conditions is really a non-arising (anutpāda).

Reflecting thus, the bodhisattva knows that the body, from the beginning, is without the nature of arising (*utpādalakṣaṇa*). He knows that this body, without characteristics (*animitta*), is ungraspable (*agrāhya*). Since it is not born, it is without characteristics and, not having any characteristics, it is not born. Only stupid worldly people (*bālapṛthagjana*) speak about the body.

When the bodhisattva considers the true nature ( $bh\bar{u}talak\bar{s}ana$ ) of the body in this way, he eliminates all desire ( $r\bar{a}ga$ ) and all attachments (sangacitta) and, always fixing his attention on the body, he pursues the examination of the body. That is what is called mindfulness of body ( $k\bar{a}yasmrtyupasth\bar{a}na$ ) for the bodhisattva.

It is the same in regard to the consideration of the outer body ( $bahirdh\bar{a}k\bar{a}ya$ ) and the consideration of the inner and outer body ( $adhv\bar{a}tmabahirdh\bar{a}k\bar{a}ya$ ).

kāye saṃbhavati tāni tasya kāye sarveṇa sarvathā sarvaṃ na saṃbhavanti. tat kasya hetoḥ. tathā hi tasya tāni kuśalamūlāni sarvalokābhyugatāni bhavanti: "Moreover, these eighty thousand types of worms that are in the bodies of other beings are never found in his body. Why? Because for him these roots of good transcend the entire world." This privilege of the avaivartika is mentioned in all the versions of the Prajñā: cf. Pañcaviṃśati, T 223, k. 16, p. 339c27; Mahāprajñāpāramitā, T 220, k. 326, p. 666b4-5; k. 448, p. 261c26-28; k. 514, p. 627b13-14; k. 549, p. 826b10-11; k. 562, p. 901a16. Note also, that according to Taoist ideas, grain takes birth in the bodies of the worms which eat away at vitality. On this subject, see H. Maspero, *Mélanges Posthumes*, I, 1950, p. 98 seq.

# 2. Mindfulness of feeling

How does the bodhisattva consider feelings (vedanā)? He considers inner feeling (adhyātmavedanā). This feeling is of three kinds: unpleasant (duḥkha), pleasant (sukha) neither unpleasant nor pleasant (aduḥkhāsukha). These feelings do not come from anywhere and, once destroyed, do not go anywhere. They arise only from error (bhrānti), mistakes (viparyāsa) and thought-construction (vikalpa). They are fruit of retribution (vipākaphala), depending on causes and conditions (hetupratyaya) constituted by the actions of previous lifetimes (pūrvajankakarman).

In this way, the bodhisattva considers these feelings that are neither in the past (atīta) nor in the future (anāgata) nor in the present (pratyutpanna). He knows that these feelings are empty (śūnya), without 'I' (anātman) or 'mine' (anātmīya), impermanent (anitya) and changing (vipariṇāmadharman). Considering the feelings distributed in the three times (tryadhvan) as empty (śūnya), without characteristics (ānimitta) and unworthy of being considered (apraṇihita), he penetrates into the gates of deliverance (vimokṣamukha). 149

He also considers the arising (*utpāda*) and the cessation (*nirodha*) of feelings. He knows that feelings are not united, are not separated, do not arise and do not cease. Thus he penetrates into the gate of non-production (*anutpādamukha*).

He knows that feelings do not arise, are without characteristics (ānimitta) and, being without characteristics, are not born.

Knowing this, he is not attached to the objects ( $\bar{a}lambana$ ) of the mind. If he experiences an unpleasant feeling (duhkha), pleasant feeling (sukha) or a neither unpleasant nor pleasant feeling ( $aduhkh\bar{a}sukha$ ), his mind does not feel it ( $na\ vedayati$ ), is not attached to it ( $n\bar{a}bhinivi\acute{s}ate$ ), does not rest on it ( $n\bar{a}\acute{s}rayate$ ).

Considering feelings in this way (etena paryāyena) is what is called mindfulness of feelings (vedanāsmṛṭyupasthāna) for the bodhisattva.

It is the same in regard to the consideration of outer feeling ( $bahirdh\bar{a}vedan\bar{a}$ ) and the consideration of both inner and outer feeling ( $adhy\bar{a}tmabahirdh\bar{a}vedan\bar{a}$ ).

#### 3. Mindfulness of mind

What is mindfulness of mind (*cittasmṛtyupasthāna*) for the bodhisattva? The bodhisattva considers the inner mind (*adhyātmacitta*). This inner mind has three characteristics (*lakṣaṇa*): arising (*utpāda*), duration (*sthit*i) and cessation (*bhaṅga*). He has the following thought: "This mind comes from nowhere and once destroyed, does not go anywhere. It arises only from a complex of inner and outer causes and conditions (*adhyātmabahirdhāhetupratyayasāmagrī*)."

<sup>149</sup> The three *samādhis* which will be studied in the following chapter.

This mind has no fixed and real nature, has no real birth, duration or cessation (*utpādasthitibhanga*); it does not occur in past (*atīta*), future (*anāgata*) or present (*pratyutpanna*) existence.

This mind is neither inner nor outer nor between the two (na tad adhyātmaṃ na bahirdhā nobhayam antarenopalabhyate).

This mind is also without intrinsic nature (niḥsvabhāva) and without characteristics (nirmitta) and there is nothing that arises or anything that makes it arise. Outwardly, there are various (nānāvidha) mixed (miśra) causes and conditions (hetupratyaya), namely, the six objects (viṣaya); inwardly, there are erroneous notions (viparītasamjñā). But due to the succession of births and cessations (utpādanirodhaprabandha), the name of mind (citta) is habitually given to all of that.

The true nature of the mind (*cittasya bhūṭalakṣaṇa*) does not exist (*nopalabhyate*) in this mind. In its intrinsic nature (*svabhāvena*), the mind is not born (*notpadyate*) and does not cease (*na nirudhyate*). This mind is always [204a] luminous (*prabhāsrava*) but, because of adventitious passions (*āgantuka kleśa*), we [wrongly] speak of the soiled mind (*upakliṣṭacitta*).

The mind does not recognize itself. Why? Because this mind is empty of characteristics of mind (*cittalakṣaṇaśūnya*). From the beginning to the end, this mind has no real attributes.

This mind is not joined with nor separated from dharmas. It has neither an anterior term  $(p\bar{u}rv\bar{a}nta)$  nor a posterior term  $(apar\bar{a}nta)$  nor a middle term (madhyanta). It has neither color  $(r\bar{u}pa)$ , shape  $(samsth\bar{a}na)$  nor resistance (pratigha). It arises only from mistakes  $(vipary\bar{a}sa)$  and error  $(bhr\bar{a}nti)$ .

This mind is empty  $(\dot{sunya})$ , without 'I'  $(an\bar{a}tman)$ , without 'mine'  $(an\bar{a}tm\bar{i}ya)$ , impermanent (anitya) and unreal (asat). That is a consideration in accordance with the mind.

Knowing that the nature of the mind is unborn is to enter into 'the dharmas that do not arise' (anutpattikadharma). Why? Because this mind is without birth (utpāda), without intrinsic nature (svabhāva) and without characteristics (lakṣaṇa). The wise person (jñānin) can know it. And although the wise person considers the characteristics of birth (utpāda) and cessation (nirodha) of this mind, he will find no true birth, no true cessation. Not finding any defilement (saṃkleśa) or purification (vyāvadan) in it, he discovers this luminosity of the mind (cittasya prabhāsvara), a luminosity by virtue of which the mind is not defiled by the adventitious passions (na khale āgantukair upakleśair upakliṣyate). 150

the aggregates, it is transitory, suffering and impersonal. However, we find, in the Canon, some passages

However, we find, in the Canon, some passages that seem to attribute to the mind a more stable, almost transcendental, value. Actually, in Anguttara, I, p. 10 and in Atthasālinī, p. 140, we read: *Pabhassaraṃ idaṃ bhikkhave cittaṃ tañ ca āgantukehi upakkileseshi upakkiliṭṭaṃ... tañ ca kho āgantukehi upakkilesehi vippamuttaṃ*: "This mind is luminous, but sometimes it is defiled by adventitious passions; sometimes it is free of these adventitious passions."

<sup>150</sup> Concerning the nature of the mind (*citta*), the general tendency of the Canon is clear. Mind (*citta*, *manas*) and consciousness (*vijñāna*) are synonymous. *Vijñāna* constitutes the fifth *skandha* and, like all the aggregates, it is transitory, suffering and impersonal.

This is how the bodhisattva considers the inner mind (ādhyātmacitta), and it is the same in regard to the outer mind (bahirdhācitta) and the both inner and outer mind (adhyātmabahirdhācitta).

#### 4. Mindfulness of dharmas

How does the bodhisattva practice mindfulness of dharmas (dharmasmṛṭyupasthāna)? He considers that all dharmas are neither on the inside nor on the outside nor in between (na te 'dhyātmaṃ na bahirdhā nobhayam antareṇopalabhyante); they they are not in the past (atīta) lifetime, the future (anāgata) lifetime, or the present (pratyurpanna) lifetime. They arise only from the complex of causes and conditions (hetupratyayasāmagrī) and wrong views (mithyādṛṣṛṭi). There is no fixed reality; there is no dharma that is any dharma whatsoever.

In the dharmas there is no characteristic of dharmas and there is no dharma that unites or is separated. All dharmas are non-existent like space  $(\bar{a}k\bar{a}\dot{s}a)$ ; all dharmas are deceptive like a magic show  $(m\bar{a}v\bar{a})^{151}$ . The

Basing themselves on this passage, certain sects of the Lsesser Vehicle say that the mind is originally and naturally luminous (*cittaṃ prabhasvaram*) but that it may be soiled (*kliṣṭa*) by the passions (*kleśa*) or liberated (*vipramukta*) from the passions. The latter are not the original nature of the mind and are described as adventitious (*āgantuka*).

Among the sects advocating this maximalist interpretation, one may cite the Mahāsāṃghika (cf. A. Bareau, *Les Sectes bouddhiques*, p. 67-68, no. 44), the Vibhajyavādin (ibid., p. 175, no. 23; Vibhāṣā, T 1545, k. 27, p. 140b25-26), the practitioners of the Śāriputrābhidharma (ibid., p. 194, no. 6; Śāriputrābhidharma, T 1548, k. 27, p. 697b18) and the Andhaka (Kathāvatthu, p. 238-241).

But the major schools of the Lesser Vehicle resolutely rejected this interpretation. No, the mind is not naturally and originally pure; on the contrary, it is originally defiled by passion and action, and the efforts of the candiate for sainthood consist precisely of eliminating defiled minds (cf. Atthasālinī, p. 140, l. 24-29; Vibhāṣā, T 1545, k. 27, p. 149b-c; Kośa, VI, p. 299; Nyāyānusaraśāstra, T 1562, k. 72, p. 731c).

For the Greater Vehicle in general and the Prajñāpāramitā in particular, the alleged luminous mind of which the Anguttara spoke is in reality a non-mind (*cittam acittam*), the pure and simple non-existence of the mind (*cittābhāvamātra*): that which does not exist cannot be defiled nor purified (cf. Aṣṭasāhasrikā, p. 5-6;Pañcaviṃśati, p. 121, l. 12-122, l. 11; Śatasāhasrikā, p. 495, l. 3-21; āloka, p. 38, l. 24-26; 40, l. 6; Suvikrāntavikrāmin, p. 85, l. 15-86, l. 6).

This is the position which the *Traité* is defending here, reserving itself to return to the subject later (k. 41, p. 363a20 seq).

For further details, see introduction to Vimalakīrti, p. 51-60.

151 These two examples are part of the stock phrases of the ten comparisons explained above, like space, p. 364-368F; like a magic show, p. 358-363F.

purity of nature ( $svabh\bar{a}vavisuddhi$ ) of dharmas <sup>152</sup> has no contact with defilement (samkleśa). Dharmas are not felt (vedita) because feelings ( $vedan\bar{a}$ ) do not exist; dharmas are not cognized ( $j\tilde{n}\bar{a}ta$ ) because the mind (citta) and mental events (caitasikadharma) are deceivers.

Considering things in this way, the bodhisattva sees neither identity (ekatva) nor difference ( $anyatv\bar{a}$ ) among dharmas. He considers that all dharmas are empty ( $s\bar{u}nya$ ) and without self ( $an\bar{a}tman$ ). Thus, he has the following thought:

Coming from causes and conditions (hetupratyaya), all dharmas have no intrinsic nature (svabhāva) and are empty of reality (tattvaśūnya). Being empty of reality, they have no characteristics (animitta). Not having characteristics, they are not to be taken into consideration (apranihita). Not being taken into consideration, one does not see any dharma that is born, that perishes or that lasts. In this wisdom (prajñā), the bodhisattva penetrates into the gateway of 'conviction that dharmas do not arise' (anutpattikadharmakṣānti).

From that time on, even if he notices birth  $(utp\bar{a}da)$  or cessation (nirodha) among dharmas, he enters into the gateway of 'signlessness'  $(\bar{a}nimitta)$ . Why? Because all dharmas are without characteristics. That is what is understood by the wise person  $(j\bar{n}anin)$ .

Considering things in this way, he is not attached to objects of the mind ( $citt\bar{a}lambana$ ) and, while submitting (anugacchan) to the characteristics of dharmas (dharmalakṣaṇa), he does not think about the body ( $k\bar{a}ya$ ) or about feeling ( $vedan\bar{a}$ ) or about the mind (citta) or about dharmas. He knows that these four things are without a basis ( $apratisth\bar{a}na$ ). 153

That is mindfulness of inner dharmas (*adhyātmadharma*). It is the same for mindfulness of outer dharmas (*bahirdhādharma*) and mindfulness of both inner and outer dharmas (*adhyātmabahirdhādharma*).

# II. – III. THE FOUR RIGHT EFFORTS AND THE FOUR BASES OF MAGICAL POWER

The four right efforts ( $samyakpradh\bar{a}na$ ) and also the four bases of magical power ( $rddhip\bar{a}da$ ) should be analyzed in the same way and considered as empty ( $s\bar{u}nya$ ) and without basis ( $apratisth\bar{a}na$ ).

#### IV. THE FIVE FACULTIES

What are the five faculties (*indriya*) as practiced by the bodhisattva? The bodhisattva-mahāsattva considers (*anupaśyati*) and cultivates (*bhāvayati*) the five faculties.

We have just seen that this purity of nature is a pure and simple (*cittabhāvamātra*) non-existence.

For the apratisthāna of all dharmas, see Vimalakīrti, p. 47-51, 269-271, 283.

1. The faculty of faith (*śraddhendriya*). – The bodhisattva believes that all dharmas arise from causes and conditions (*hetupratyaya*), arise from mistakes (*viparyāsa*) and wrong views (*mithyādṛṣṭi*), like a fire-brand brandished in a circle [**204b**] (*alātrackara*), <sup>154</sup> like a dream (*svapna*), like a magic show (*māyā*).

He believes that dharmas are impure (aśuddha), impermanent (anitya), suffering (duḥkha), without self (anātmaka), like a sickness (roga), like an ulcer (gaṇḍa), like a thorn (śalya), subject to deterioration and ruin.

He believes that all dharmas are non-existent (asat), like an empty fist deceiving little children (bālollāpanariktamuṣtivat). 155

He believes that there are no dharmas in the past  $(at\bar{t}ta)$  or in the future  $(an\bar{a}gata)$  or in the present (pratyutpanna), that they come from nowhere and, once destroyed, they go nowhere.

He believes that dharmas are empty  $(\dot{sunya})$ , without characteristics  $(\bar{a}nimitta)$ , not to be considered (apranihita), unborn (anutpanna) and non-destroyed (aniruddha). Despite this wishlessness (read wou-tso) and this signlessness, he believes [in the five pure elements or  $(an\bar{a}sravaskandha)$ ]: i) morality  $(\dot{s}\bar{\imath}la)$ , ii) concentration  $(sam\bar{a}dhi)$ , iii) wisdom  $(praj\tilde{n}\bar{a})$ , iv) deliverance (vimukti), v) knowledge and vision of deliverance  $(vimukti)\bar{j}n\bar{a}adarsana$ .

Because he has acquired this faculty of faith, the bodhisattva is non-regressing (avaivartika). Taking the faculty of faith as the major one, he skillfully becomes established in morality (śīla). When he is established in morality, his mind of faith is unmoving (acala) and firm. He believes with his whole mind (ekacittena). He depends on the retribution of the fruit of action (karmaphalavipāka), rejects wrong views (mithyādṛṣṭi), no longer believes in the words of others (paravacana). He accepts only the Buddha's teachings; he believes in the Community (saṃgha) and he becomes established in the true Path (mārga). He is of right mind (rjucitta), gentle (mṛdu) and patient (kṣamavat). His supernatural powers (abhijñā) are unhindered (apratigha), immobile (acala) and indestructible (akṣaya); he acquires mastery of powers (balavaśitā).

This is called the faculty of faith.

The Ratnakūṭā (T 310, k. 90, p. 519a7-8) explains the comparisom: It is as if one were fooling a little child with an empty fist; one opens one's hand, but there is nothing in the empty fist; then the child weeps and cries.

<sup>154</sup> For the *alātacakra*, see above, p. 372F, n. 1.

<sup>155</sup> This comparison is unknown to the Tripiṭaka I [Lamotte] think, but is frequent in the Mahāyānasūtras: Lalitavistara, p. 176, l. 4; 212, l. 14 (cited in Śikṣāsamuccaya, p. 238, l. 2; Pañjikā, p. 532, l. 10): *bālollāpana riktamuṣṭivat*.

Suvikrāntavikrāmin, p. 92, l. 23: *riktamuṣṭisamā hi sarvadharmā vaśikasvabhāvalakṣaṇatayā*. See also Mahāvyut., no. 2831;Fo pen hing tsi king, T 190, k. 18, p. 737a4; Sūtra of the sermon given by Piṇḍola Bhāradvāja to king Udayana, T 1690, k. 1, p. 786b11; *Traité*, T 1509, k. 20, p. 211a5; l. 43, p. 375a14.

2. The faculty of exertion ( $v\bar{v}yendriya$ ). – Day and night (aharniśam), the bodhisattva always develops exertion ( $v\bar{v}ya$ ). He rejects the five obstacles ( $pa\bar{n}canivar\bar{a}na$ ) and protects the five faculties ( $pa\bar{n}cendriya$ ). He wants to find, understand, practice, read, study and hear the profound teachings ( $gambh\bar{v}radharma$ ) of the sūtras.

When evil bad dharmas (*pāpaka akuśala dharma*) have arisen, he acts so as to destroy them quickly and, if they have not arisen, he acts so as to prevent them from arising. As for the good dharmas (*kuśaladharma*) that have not yet arisen, he acts so that they will arise and, if they have already arisen, he acts so as to develop them. He has no fondness for dharmas that are neither good nor bad (*naivakuśalānākuśaladharma*).

Dedicating equal exertion to good dharmas, he advances directly and straight to the point. He develops right exertion (*samyagvīrya*) and, due to his concentrated mind (*samāhitacitta*), the latter is called the faculty of exertion (*vīryendriya*).

3. The faculty of mindfulness (*smṛtīndriya*). – The bodhisattva is always attentive (*smṛtimat*) and reflective (*saṃprajānat*). Wishing to perfect generosity (*dāna*), morality (*śīla*), meditation (*dhyāna*), wisdom (*prajñā*) and deliverance (*vimukti*), wishing to purify bodily, vocal and mental actions (*kāyavāṅmanaskarman*), he is ever attentive and reflective in his knowledge pertaining to the arising (*utpāda*), disappearance (*vyaya*) and duration-change (*sthityanyathātva*) of dharmas.

He reflects attentively [on the four noble truths] on suffering (duhkha), its origin (samudaya), its cessation (nirodha) and the path  $(m\bar{a}rga)$  to its cessation.

He reflects attentively and analyzes the faculties (*indriya*), strengths (*bala*), the [members] of enlightenment (*saṃbodhyaṅga*) and the absorptions (*samāpatti*), deliverance (*vimukti*), arising (*utpāda*) and cessation (*nirodha*), entering and exit.

He reflects attentively on unborn (*anutpanna*), non-destroyed (*aniruddha*), ineffective (*anabhisaṃskāra*) and inexpressible (*anabhilāpya*) dharmas in order to attain the knowledge of non-production (*anutpādajñāna*) and to realize fully the teachings of the Buddha.

He reflects attentively and prevents the concepts of the śrāvakas from being introduced.

The bodhisattva always reflects and never forgets. Thanks to these very profound (*gambhīra*), pure (*viśuddha*) dharmas acquired by meditation and practice (*bhāvanācāraprāpta*), he attains this sovereign attentiveness (*vibhūtasmṛti*) called the faculty of mindfulness (*smṛtīndriya*).

4. The faculty of concentration (samādhīndriya). – Grasping well the characteristics (lakṣaṇa) of concentration, the bodhisattva is able to produce all kinds of dhyānas and absorptions (samāpatti).

He knows clearly the gates of concentration (samādhimukha); he knows how to enter into concentration (samādhipraveśa), how to remain in concentration (samādhivihāra) and how to come out of concentration (samādhivyutthāna).

He is not attached to concentration (*na samādhim abhiniviśate*), does not savor it (*nāsvate*) and does not emphsaize it (*nāśrayate*). <sup>156</sup> He knows well the object (*ālambana*) of the concentrations and the destruction of this object. <sup>157</sup>

He also knows the objectless concentration (*anālambanasamādhi*). Without conforming to the words of another (*paravacana*), without conforming to any [204c] particular absorption, he practices his mastery (*vaśita*) of it and enters it and comes out of it without obstacle.

That is what is called the faculty of concentration (samādhīndriya).

5. The faculty of wisdom (*prajñendriya*). – In order to exhaust suffering (*duḥkha*), the bodhisattva is endowed with a noble wisdom (*āryaprajñāsaṃpanna*), a wisdom that eliminates the dharmas and realizes nirvāṇa. With this wisdom, the bodhisattva considers the impermanence (*anityatā*) of the threefold world (*traidhātuka*) burning with the fire of the three rottennesses and the three poisons (*viṣayatraya*). 158

When this consideration is finished, the bodhisattva is detached from the threefold world by means of his wisdom and, for him, the threefold world is transformed into the gates of deliverance (*vimokṣamukha*), namely, emptiness (*śūnyatā*), wishlessness (*apraṇihita*) and signlessness (*ānimitta*). He seeks the Buddhadharma attentively as if his hair were on fire (*ādiptaśira-upama*). 159

Nothing can destroy this wisdom of the bodhisattva: it has no support (āśraya) in the threefold world, and his mind constantly avoids the five objects of enjoyment (pañcakāmaguṇa) as he wishes (yatheṣṭam).

By the power of wisdom (*prajñābala*) the bodhisattva accumulates innumerable qualities (*guṇa*) and, without hesitation or difficulty, penetrates directly into the true nature (*bhūtalakṣaṇa*) of dharmas. He has neither grief (*daurmanasya*) in saṃsāra nor joy (*saumansaya*) in nirvāṇa.

The possession of this sovereign wisdom  $(vibh\bar{u}tapraj\tilde{n}\bar{a})$  is what is called the faculty of wisdom  $(praj\tilde{n}endriya)$ .

The Pāli texts resort preferentially to a periphrasis: *Seyyathāpi bhikkhave ādittacelo vā āditasīso vā, tass' eva celassa vā sīsassa vā nibbāpanāya adhimattam chandañ ca vāyāmañ ca ussāhañ ca ussolhiñ ca appaṭivāniñ ca satin ca sampapajaññañ ca kareyya*: cf. Anguttara, II, p. 93; III, p. 307; IV, p. 320; V, p. 98; Saṃyutta, V, p. 440.

<sup>156</sup> In other words, he avoids the concentrations associated with enjoyment (āsvādanasamprayukta) in order to practice only the pure (śuddhaka) concentrations without defilements (anāsrava): see above, p. 1027F.

<sup>157</sup> On the object of the *dhyānas* and *samāpattis*, see p. 1040F and, for further details, Kośa, VIII, p. 176-177.

<sup>158</sup> An implicit reference to the Fire Sermon spoken by the Buddha at Gayaśīrṣa (Vinaya, I, p. 34; Catuṣpariṣad, p. 322): Sarvaṃ bhikṣava ādīptam... Kenādīptam? Rāgāgninā dveṣāgninā mohāgninādīptam..

As for the three (or five?) decays (*chouai*), they have been discussed above, p. 834F.

The expression in the Sanskrit texts is usually *ādīptaśiraścailopama* 'like someone whose head or clothes are on fire': cf. Gaṇḍavyūha, p. 493, l. 2; Śikṣasamuccaya, p. 54, l. 3-4; Mahāvyutpatti, no. 1802.

[Altruism in the practice of the faculties]. 160 – The bodhisattva in possession of the five faculties understands well (prajānāti) the various faculties of beings.

He understands the faculties of beings with desire (*sarāga*) or without desire (*vītarāga*), hateful (*sadveṣa*) or without hatred (*vītadveṣa*), stupid (*samoha*) or without stupidity (*vītamoha*). <sup>161</sup>

He understands the faculties of beings destined to fall into the bad destinies (*durgati*), destined to be reborn among humans (*manuṣya*) or destined to be reborn among the gods (*deva*).

He understands the beings of weak faculties (*mṛdvindriya*) or of sharp faculties (*tīkṣṇendriya*). He understands beings of superior (*agra*), medium (*madhya*) or lower (*avara*) faculties.

He understands the faculties of guilty (sāpattika) or faultless (anāpattika) beings, rebellious or docile.

He understands the faculties of beings who are always reborn in the desire realm ( $k\bar{a}madh\bar{a}tu$ ), in the form realm ( $r\bar{u}padh\bar{a}tu$ ) or in the formless realm ( $\bar{a}r\bar{u}pyadh\bar{a}tu$ ).

He understands the faculties of beings of coarse (sthūla) or fine (sūkṣma) roots of good (kuśaladharma).

He understands the faculties of beings predestined to salvation (*samyaktvaniyata*), predestined to ruin (*mithyātvaniyata*) or without predestination (*aniyata*). 162

He understands the faculties of careless or impetuous people. He understands the faculties of beings bearing the burden  $(bh\bar{a}rasaha)$ . <sup>163</sup>

He understands the faculties of miserly (*matsarin*) or generous (*tyāgavat*) people, respectful people or disrepectful people, people of pure morality (*viśuddhaśīla*) or of impure morality (*aviśuddhaśīla*), angry (*vyāpanna*) or patient (*kṣamin*) people, energetic (*vīryavat*) or lazy (*kusīda*) people, people of distracted

These three *rāśi* are mentioned in Dīgha, III, p. 217; Tseng yi a han, T 125, k. 13, p. 614b24; k. 27, p. 698c; Kathāvatthu, II, p. 611; Dhammasangani, p. 186; Nettippakarana, p. 96; Mahāvastu, III, p. 318; Lalitavistara, p. 5400; Pañcaviṃśati, T 223, k. 23, p. 384a26-27.

According to the Sukhāvativyūha, p. 44, the last two *rāśi* are absent in Amitābha's paradise.

In the later sources, the system of the *rāśi* is mixed with that of the *gotras* 'race, family'; certain eternal or acquired mental dispositions that cause a person to obtain nirvāṇa: on this subject, see *Vimalakīrti*, appendix, p. 425-430.

Whereas the śrāvaka practices the *bodhipakṣikas* in his own interest, the bodhisattva practices them for the benfit of others: this is an essential difference.

<sup>161</sup> Common canonical locutions: cf. Majjhima, I, p. 59.

These are the three categories of beings ( $sattvar\bar{a}\dot{s}i$ ): 1)  $samyaktvaniyatar\bar{a}\dot{s}i$ , those who have entered onto the Path and will quickly reach nirvāṇa; 2)  $mithy\bar{a}niyatar\bar{a}\dot{s}i$ , those who, having committed grave sins, will definitely go to the bad destinies and who, coming out of these bad destinies, will go into the third  $r\bar{a}\dot{s}i$ ; 3)  $aniyatar\bar{a}\dot{s}i$ , those who do not belong to either the first or the second  $r\bar{a}\dot{s}i$  and may enter either the first or the second.

<sup>163</sup> On the 'burden', see above, p. 215-216F.

mind (*vikṣiptacitta*) or of concentrated mind (*samgṛhītacitta*), stupid people (*mūḍhā*) or wise people (*prajñāvat*), fearless (*nirbhāya*) or fearful (*sabhaya*) people, prideful people (*abhimānika*) or people without pride (*nirabhimāna*), people of right conduct (*samyakpratipanna*) or of wrong conduct (*mithyāpratipanna*), controlling their senses (*guptendriya*) or not controlling their senses.

He understands the faculties of people who seek the path of the śrāvakas, that of the pratyekabuddhas, or that of the Buddhas.

In this knowledge of the faculties of beings, the bodhisattva shows his mastery ( $va\acute{s}ita$ ), skillfulness ( $up\bar{a}ya$ ) and power (bala): this is what is called the faculty of wisdom ( $j\tilde{n}\bar{a}nendriya$ ).

#### V. THE FIVE POWERS

When the bodhisattva has progressed in the practice of the five faculties (*indriya*), he is able to destroy the afflictions (*kleśa*), save beings and acquire the [205a] conviction that dharmas do not arise (*anutpattikadharmakṣānti*): this is what is called the five powers or strengths (*bala*).

Moreover, as the god Māra and heretics (*tīrthika*) are unable to destroy them, they are called powers or strengths.

#### VI. THE SEVEN FACTORS OF ENLIGHTENMENT

Here are the seven factors of enlightenment (sambodhyanga):

- 1. The bodhisattva no longer thinks about or reflects on any dharma: this is the factor of enlightenment called attentiveness (*smrtisambodhyanga*).
- 2. Looking among the dharmas for good (*kuśala*), bad (*akuśala*) or neutral dharmas (*avyākṛta*), the bodhisattva finds nothing: this is the factor of enlightenment called discernment of dharmas (*dharmapravicayasaṃbodhyanga*).
- 3. Without entering into the threefold world (*traidhātuka*), the bodhisattva reduces the characteristic traits (*lakṣaṇa*) of all worlds into pieces: this is the factor of enlightenment called exertion (*vūryasaṃbodhyaṅga*).
- 4. In regard to all the formations (*saṃskāra*), the bodhisattva produces no attachment (*abhiniveśa*) or pleasure (*sukha*) and, as all signs of grief (*daurmanasya*) and joy (*prīti*) have been overcome in him, this is the factor of enlightenment called joy (*prītisaṃbodhyanga*).
- 5. In all dharmas, there is nothing but an object of mind (*cittālambana*): this is the factor of enlightenment called relaxation (*praśrabdhisambodhyanga*).

- 6. The bodhisattva knows that all dharmas, which have as their characteristic being always concentrated (sadāsamāhita), are not [sometimes] scattered (vikṣipta) and [sometimes] concentrated (samāhita): this is the factor of enlightenment called concentration (samādhisambodhyanga).
- 7. The bodhisattva is not attached to any dharma (*na dharmam abhiniviśate*), does not rest there (*nāśrayate*) and no longer sees them (*na paśyati*): this mind of equanimity (*upekṣacitta*) is the factor of enlightenment called equanimity (*upekṣāsaṃbodhyaṅga*).

This is how the bodhisattva considers the seven factors of enlightenment as empty (śūnya).

Question. – Why explain these seven factors of enlightenment so briefly (samksepena)?

Answer. – Of these seven factors of enlightenment, [four, namely] attentiveness (*smṛti*), wisdom (*prajñā*), exertion (*vīrya*) and concentration (*samādhi*) have been fully explained above (p. 1149F). Now we must speak of the three others.

1. The bodhisattva who practices the factor of enlightenment called joy (*prītisaṃbodhyaṅga*) considers this joy as unreal (*abhūta*). Why? This joy arises from causes and conditions (*hetupratyayaja*). These are the formations (*saṃskāra*), conditioned dharmas (read: *yeou tso fa*: saṃskṛtadharma), impermanent (*anitya*) dharmas that produce (read *cheng* in place of *k'o*) attachment (*abhiniveśa*). But if the thing that produces attachment is impermanent (*anityalakṣaṇa*), once it has disappeared, it arouses grief (*daurmanasya*). Worldly people (*pṛthagjana*) are attached to it out of error (*viparyāsa*), but if they know that dharmas ar empty of reality (*tattvaśūnya*), they correct themselves at once and say: "I made a mistake (*bhranti*)."

It is like a man in the darkness (andhakāra) tormented by hunger and thirst (kṣutpipāsāpīḍita) who has swallowed impure things; then, by the light of day, he re-examines the things and finally understands his mistake.

Considering things in this way, the bodhisattva puts his joy  $(pr\bar{t}i)$  into real wisdom  $(bh\bar{u}tapraj\tilde{n}\bar{a})$ : this is true joy  $(bh\bar{u}tapr\bar{t}i)$ .

- 2. Having acquired this true joy, first he eliminates unwholesome physical states (*kāyadauṣṭhulya*), then he eliminates unwholesome mental states (*cittadauṣṭhulya*), and finally he eliminates all characteristics of dharmas (*dharmalakṣaṇa*). Thus he acquires well-being that fills the body and the mind and that constitutes the factor of enlightenment called relaxation (*praśrabdhisambodhyanga*).
- 3. Since he has attained joy (*prīti*) and relaxation (*praśrabdhi*), he disregards any form of examination (*anupaśyanā*), namely, examination of impermanence (*anityānupaśyanā*), examination of suffering (*duḥkhānupaśyanā*), examination of emptiness and non-self (*śūnyānāmānupaśyanā*), examination of arising and cessation (*utpādanirodhānupaśyanā*), examination of existence (*sadanupaśyanā*), examination of non-existence (*sadanupaśyanā*), examination of what is neither existence nor non-existence (*naivasannāsadanupaśyanā*). The bodhisattva abandons all futile proliferation (*prapañca*) of this kind completely. Why? Because absence of nature, absence of object, non-activity, absence of futile discursiveness, perpetual pacification are the true nature (*bhūtalakṣaṇa*) of dharmas.

If the bodhisattva did not practice this equanimity ( $upek s\bar{a}$ ), there would still be arguments (rana). Indeed, those who hold the existent (sat) to be true consider the non-existent to be false (moha); those who hold the non-existent (asat) to be true consider the existent (sat) to be false; and those who hold to be true what is neither existent nor non-existent ( $naivasann\bar{a}sat$ ) consider as false that which is both existent and non-existent (sadasat). They like what they believe to be true (satya), they hate what they believe to be false (moha), and this gives rise to grief (daurmanasya) and joy ( $pr\bar{t}ti$ ). Why not disregard all that?

When the bodhisattva has attained this [real] joy (*prīti*), this relaxation (*praśrabdhi*) and this equanimity (*upeksā*), the seven factors of enlightenment are complete (*paripūrna*).

#### VII. THE EIGHT MEMBERS OF THE PATH

As for the eight members of the noble Path (āryamārgānga), [the first] or right view (samyagdṛṣṭi), [the sixth] or right effort (samyagvyāyāma), [the seventh] or right mindfulness (samyaksmṛṭi) and [the eighth] or right concentration (samyaksamādhi) have already been explained above (p. 1181F). Now we must [205b] speak of right thought (samyaksamkalpa).

[Second member]: right thought (samyaksamkalpa). — In the course of right thinking, the bodhisattva who is established in the emptiness (śunya) and non-existence (anupalabdhi) of dharmas examines the characteristics of right thought (samyaksamkalpalakṣaṇa). He knows that all thoughts (saṃkalpa) are false conceptions (mithyāsaṃkalpa), up to and including those concerning nirvāṇa and the Buddha. Why? The cessation of all kinds of conceptions (sarvasaṃkalpaprabhedhanirodha) is called right thought. All types of conceptions come from falsities, errors (bhrānti) and mistakes (viparyāsa): this is why they differ. But the characteristics of the conceptions are all non-existent, and the bodhisattva established in this right thinking (samyaksaṃkalpa) no longer sees what is correct (samyak) and what is wrong (mithyā) and bypasses (atikrāmati) all kinds of thinking (sarvasaṃkalpaprabheda): this is right thinking. For him, all types of conceptions are the same (sama) and, because they are the same, his mind does not become attached to them. This is what is called the right thinking of the bodhisattva.

[*Third member*]: right speech ( $samyagv\bar{a}c$ ). – The bodhisattva knows that all words ( $v\bar{a}c$ ) come from error ( $bhr\bar{a}nti$ ), falsities, mistakes ( $vipary\bar{a}sa$ ), imaginings that seize the characteristics (nimittodgrahaṇavikalpa). Then the bodhisattva reflects in this way: In speech, the characteristics (lakṣana) of speech do not exist and all vocal actions ( $v\bar{a}kkarman$ ) have ceased (niruddha). Understanding the true nature ( $bh\bar{u}talakṣaṇa$ ) of words is right speech ( $samyagv\bar{a}c$ ).

Words come from nowhere and, once they have ceased, they go nowhere. The bodhisattva who is practicing right speech, in everything he says, holds to the true nature (*bhūtalakṣaṇa*). Thus the sūtras say that, established in right speech, the bodhisattva is able to accomplish pure vocal action

(*pariśuddhavākkarman*). Understanding the true nature of all words, the bodhisattva, whatever he may say, does not fall into unwholesome words (*mithyāvāc*). 164

[Fourth member]: right action (samyakkarmānta). – The bodhisattva knows that all actions (karman) are false, erroneous, unreal, having non-activity as nature (anabhisaṃskāralakṣaṇa). Why? Because there is not a single action that possesses definite nature.

Question. – If all actions are empty  $(ś\bar{u}nya)$ , why did the Buddha say that generosity  $(d\bar{a}na)$ , etc., is a good action (kuśalakarman), murder  $(pr\bar{a}n\bar{a}tip\bar{a}ta)$ , etc., a bad action (akuśalakarman), and other things, gestures (ceṣta), are neutral actions  $(avy\bar{a}krtakarman)$ ? <sup>165</sup>

Answer. – If there is not even one single kind of action, why should there be three? How is that? When the time of the movement has already been accomplished (*gamanakāle gate*), there is no motor activity (*gamikriyā*). When the time of the movement has not yet been accomplished (*agate*, i.e., future), there is no motor activity either. When the time of the movement is present (*pratyutpanna*), there is no motor activity either. 166

Question. – In the seat of the movement already accomplished (*gate sthāne*) there can be neither [motor activity] nor can there be any motor activity in the seat of the movement not yet accomplished (*agate sthāne*); but in the seat of present movement (*gamyamāne sthāne*), there must be movement. <sup>167</sup>

Answer. – In the seat of present movement there is no movement. Why? Because the seat of present movement (gamyamāna) does not exist (nopalabhyate) without a motor activity (gamikriyā). If the seat of the present movement could exist without a motor activity then it ought to involve movement; but that is not the case. Without a present seat of movement, there is no motor activity and without motor activity there is no seat of present movement. Since this is a case of co-existent conditions (sahabhūprataya), we

Gataṃ na gamyate tāvad agataṃ naiva gamyate / gatāgatavinirmuktaṃ gamyamānaṃ na gamyate //

Transl. – J. May, p. 52: "Accomplished movement does not involve movement; no more does unaccomplished movement. A present movement independent of the other two is unintelligible."

167 Objection formulated in Madh. kārikām, II, 2 (p.93):

Ceṣṭā yatra gatis tatra gamyamāne ca sā yathaḥ / na gate nāgate cestā ganyamāne gatis tatah //

Transl. J. May, p. 55: "Since there is movement wherever there is gesture and there is gesture in present movement, in contrast to movements [already] accomplished and not [yet] accomplished, there is thus movement in present movement."

See the paragraph dedicated to the eloquence of the bodhisattva in the  $Ś\bar{u}ramgamasam\bar{a}dhi$ , p. 188-189.

Reference to a sūtra often cited, but without any other identification, in the Abhidharma: *Uktaṃ hi sūtre: trīṇi karmāṇi: kuśalam akuśalam avyākṛtaṃ ca*: cf. Kośa, IV, p. 105; Nyāyānusāra, T 1562, k. 43, p. 584c3; Abhidharmadīpa, p. 136.

<sup>166</sup> Almost textual citation from Madh. kārikā, II, 1 (p. 92):

cannot say that that the seat of present movement involves movement (gamyamānaṃ gamyate iti nopadyate).

Furthermore, if the seat of present movement had motor activity ( $gamikriy\bar{a}$ ), there should be a seat of present movement outside of the motor [205c] activity, and there should be a motor activity outside of the seat of present movement. <sup>168</sup>

Question. – If that is so, what would be the error (dosa)? 169

Answer. – There would be two motor activities (gamikriyā) at the same time (samakāla) and, if there were two motor activities, there would be two agents of movement (dvau gantārau). Why? Because movement does not exist without an agent of movement (gantāram hi tiraskrtya gamanam nopapadyate). Without agent (gantṛ), the seat of the present movement (gamyamāna) does not exist and, since there is no seat of the present movement, neither is there any agent of movement (gantṛ). 170 Furthermore, this non-agent itself does not move either (agantā naiva gacchati) and, outside of agent and non-agent, there cannot be a 'third' to move (nāsty anyo gantur agantuś cakaścit tṛṭīyo gaccheta). 171

The answer to the objetion is a paraphrase of Madh, kārikā, II, 3-4 (p. 94-95):

```
Gamyamānasya gamanam katham nāipapatsyate /
gamyamānam vigamanam yadā naivopapadyate //
Gamyamānasya gamanam yasya tasya prasajyate /
ṛte gater gamyamānam hi gamyate //
```

Transl. J. May, p. 55-57: "How will movement be applied [as predicated] to present movement, since a present movement without [inherent] movement is completely irrational? – He for whom present movement possesses movement incurs the necessary consequence of a present movement without [inherent] movement: indeed, present movement involves movement."

169 If the present movement were distinct from the inherent movement.

170 Madh. kārikā, II, 5-7 (p. 95-97):

```
Gamyamānasya gamane prasaktam gamanadvayam /
yena tad gamyamānam ca yac cātra gamanam punaḥ //
Dvau gantārau prasajyete prasakte gamanadvaye /
gantāram hi tiraskṛtya gamanam nopapadyate //
Gantāram cet tiraskṛtya gamanam nopapadyate /
gamane 'sati gantātha kuta eva bhaviṣyati //
```

Transl. J. May, p. 58-60: "If the present movement possesses movement, the existence of two movements will result: one by which it is the present movement, the other contained in this [present movement]. – The necessary consequence of twofold movement involves that of a twofold agent of movement. Indeed, without agent, movement is illogical. – If the movement without agent of movement is illogical, how would the agent exist in turn in the absence of the movement?"

171 Madh. kārikā, II, 8 (p. 97):

Gantā na gacchati tāvad agantā naiva gacchati / anyo gantur agantuś ca kas tṛtīyo gacchati //

Question. – It is right that the non-agent does not move (agantā na gacchatīti yujyate). But why does the agent not move?

Answer. – Without motor activity, the agent does not exist (*gamikriyāṃ tiraskṛtya, gantā nopapdyate*), <sup>172</sup> and without agent, motor does not exist (*gantāraṃ tirask rtya, gamikriyā nopapadyate*).

This emptiness of all action (sarvakarmaśūnyatā) is called right action (samyakkarmānta). The bodhisattvas who penetrate into the equality of all actions (sarvakarmasamatā) do not consider bad action (mithyākarman) as bad and do not consider right action (samyakkarmānta) as good (kuśala). Without activity (anabhisaṃskāra), they do not perform right actions and they do not commit bad actions. That is true wisdom (bhūtaprajñā); that is right action.

Moreover, among the dharmas, none is right (samyak) and none is wrong ( $mithy\bar{a}$ ). The bodhisattvas know actions in accordance with the truth and, knowing in accordance with the truth, they do not undertake anything and do not stop anything. Such wise people always have right actions and never have bad actions. In the bodhisattva this is what is called right action ( $samyakkarm\bar{a}nta$ ).

[Fifth member]: right livelihood (samyagājīva). — All foods (bhojana), all means of subsistence (jīvitapariṣkāra) are right (samyak) and are not bad (mithyā). Established in a knowledge free of futile proliferation (niṣprapañcajñāna), the bodhisattva does not choose right livelihood (samyagājīva) and does not reject wrong livelihood (mithyājīva). He does not depend on either the right law (samyagdharma) or the wrong law (mithyādharma), but he remains always in pure knowledge (viśuddhajñāna). Penetrating thus into right living which is equality (samatā), he does not see life and does not see non-life. To practice this true wisdom (bhūtaprajñā) is what is called right livelihood (samyagājīva) [in the bodhisattva].

The bodhisattva-mahāsattva who conceives the thirty-seven auxiliaries of enlightenment (*saptatriṃśad bodhipakṣikadharma*) in this way surpasses the levels (*bhūmi*) of the śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas, penetrates into the state of bodhisattva (*bodhisattvaniyāma*) and gradually (*krameṇa*) realizes the knowledge of things in all their aspects (*sarvākārajnatā*). <sup>173</sup>

Transl. J. May, p. 60: "The agent of movement does not move; neither does the agent; and what 'third' other than agent and non-agent would be able to move?"

Gantā tāvad gacchatīti katham evopapatsyate / gamanena vinā gantā yadā naivopapadyate //

Transl. – The objection: "The agent itself, at least, moves", is not logical whereas in the absence of movement, the agent is completely illogical."

On the problem of movement closely linked with that of action, there are useful notes and a complete bibliography in J. May, *Candrakīrti*, p. 51-77.

173 Defined fully above, p. 640-642F.

<sup>172</sup> Madh. kārikā, II, 9 (p. 98):

# CHAPTER XXXII: THE THREE CONCENTRATIONS AND THE FOUR TRANCES

# First Section THE EIGHT CLASSES OF SUPPLEMENTARY DHARMAS (p. 1209F)

#### PRELIMINARY NOTE

The thirty-seven auxiliaries (*bodhipākṣikadharma*) are not the only ones imposed on the bodhisattva; an infinite number of other dharmas equally conducive to the Path must also be completely fulfilled (*paripūritavya*) or cultivated (*bhāvitavya*) by him.

Having mentioned the seven classes of *bodhipākṣika*, the Prajñāpāramitāsūtra is now going to point out eight new classes of dharmas conducive to the Path and the *Traité* will study them in detail in the next three chapters.

Chapter XXXII will deal with the first two groups: the three meditative stabilizations (*samādhi*) and the four trances (*dhyāna*).

Chapter XXXIII will deal with the third and fourth group: the four immeasurables (*apramāna*) and the four formless absorptions (*ārūpyasamāpatti*).

Chapter XXXIV will deal with the next four groups: the eight liberations (*vimokṣa*), the eight spheres of mastery (*abhibhvāyatana*), the ten spheres of totality (*kṛtsnāyatana*) and the nine successive absorptions (*anupūrvasamāpatti*).

Except for the three meditative stabilizations (samādhi) which, as gates of liberation (vimokṣamukha), constitute the goal of the Path, the other classes are lower than the seven classes of bodhipākṣika dharmas discussed in the preceding chapter. In general, it may be said that they prepare for and facilitate the practice of the bodhipākṣikas.

From the Abhidharma point of view, the seven classes of *bodhipākṣika*s have an objective value in that they are based on the fourth noble truth, that of the Path, and in that they share its efficacy. On the other hand, except for the three meditative stabilizations, the classes of supplementary dharmas in question in the following are subjective practices having no other purpose than the relaxing of the ascetic's mind and making it capable of traveling on the Path.

[206a] *Sūtra* (cf. Pañcaviṃśati, p. 19, l. 15-18); Śatasāhasrikā, p. 57, l. 10-58, l. 9) - [The bodhisattva-mahāsattva must completely fulfill]: 174

- 1. the meditative stabilization of emptiness (*śūnyatāsamādhi*), the samādhi of signlessness (*ānimittasamādhi*), the samādhi of wishlessness (*apranihitasamādhi*),
- 2. the four trances (catvāri dhyānāni),
- 3. the four immeasurables (catvāry apramāṇāni),
- 4. the four formless absorptions (catasra ārūpyasamāpattayaḥ),
- 5. the eight liberations (aṣṭau vimokṣāḥ),
- 6. the eight spheres of mastery (aṣṭāv abhibhvāyatanāni),
- 7. the nine successive absorptions (navānupūrvasamāpattayāḥ),
- 8. the ten spheres of totality (daśa kṛtsnāyatanāni).

 $\dot{S}\bar{a}stra$ . – Question. – After the thirty-seven auxiliaries ( $pak\bar{s}a$ ), why does [the Prajñāpāramitāsūtra] still speak of these eight classes of dharmas?

#### Answer. -

1. [The samādhis]. – The thirty-seven auxiliaries are the path  $(m\bar{a}rga)$  leading to nirvāṇa. When one follows this path, one reaches the city of nirvāṇa  $(nirv\bar{a}ṇagara)$ . The city of nirvāṇa has three gates  $(dv\bar{a}ra)$ , emptiness  $(s\bar{u}nyat\bar{a})$ , signlessness  $(\bar{a}nimitta)$  and wishlessness (apranihita). Thus, after having spoken about the path [in chapter XXXI], it is necessary to speak of the gates that lead into it.

2. [Dhyānas and ārūpyasamāpattis]. – The four trances (dhyāna), etc., are dharmas helping to open these gates.

Moreover, the thirty-seven auxiliaries are higher and admirable things, but the mind is distracted (vik,sipta) in the desire realm ( $k\bar{a}madh\bar{a}tu$ ); then on what levels ( $bh\bar{u}mi$ ) and on what means ( $up\bar{a}ya$ ) will the yogin depend in order to obtain them? He will depend on the trances ( $dhy\bar{a}na$ ) of the form realm ( $r\bar{u}padh\bar{a}tu$ ) and on the absorptions ( $sam\bar{a}patti$ ) of the formless realm ( $\bar{a}r\bar{u}pyadh\bar{a}tu$ ).

3. [Apramāṇas, vimokṣas, abhibhvāyatanas, navānupūrvasamāpattis and kṛtsnāyatanas]. – In the four immeasurables (apramāṇa), the eight liberations (vimokṣa), the eight spheres of mastery (ahibhvāyatana), the nine successive absorptions (anupūrvavihārasamāpatti) and the ten spheres of totality (kṛtsnāyatana), the yogin is testing his mind to see whether it is flexible (mṛdu), powerful (vibhu) and docile (yatheṣṭa). It

These eight classes of supplementary dharmas must be 'completely fulfilled' (*pūrayitavya*) according to the Śatasāhasrikā, or 'cultivated' (*bhāvitavya*) according to the Pañcaviṃśatti, but they cannot be 'realized' (*sākṣātkartavya*) by the bodhisattva, for then they would contribute to ushering him into nirvāṇa straight away, preventing him therefore from continuing his salvific activity in saṃsāra.

is like the nomad  $(s\bar{a}rthav\bar{a}ha)$  who tests his horse  $(a\dot{s}va)$  to see whether it is supple and docile and who, only after that, goes into battle.

It is the same for the ten spheres of totality: the yogin contemplates (*anupaśyati*) and seizes (*udgrhṇāti*) a blue color (*nīlavarṇa*), big (*apramāṇa*) or small (*parītta*); then he looks at objects wanting them to be all blue, or else all yellow (*pīta*), all red (*lohita*), all white (*avadāta*).

Furthermore, in the eight spheres of mastery (abhibhvāyatana), he rules as sovereign (abhibhu) over objects (ālambana).

In the first and the last liberation (vimok sa), he considers the body as disgusting (asubha), but in the third liberation, on the other hand, he considers it as fine (subha).

In the four immeasurables (*apramāṇa*), by means of loving-kindness (*maitrī*), he sees <sup>175</sup> all beings as happy (*sukhita*); by means of compassion, he sees (*karuṇā*) all beings as suffering (*duḥkhita*); by means of joy (*muditā*), he sees all beings as rejoicing (*mudita*); then, with equanimity (*upekṣā*), setting aside the [preceding] three feelings, he sees beings quite simply without feeling aversion (*pratigha*) or affection (*anunaya*) for them.

[Subjective or objective consideration]. – Furthermore, there are two types of consideration (*pratyavekṣā*): *i*) the subjective consideration (*adhimutipratyavekṣā*); *ii*) the objective consideration (*bhūtapratyavekṣā*).

The objective consideration is the thirty-seven auxiliaries of enlightenment (*bodhipākṣikadharma*). But as this objective consideration is difficult to acquire (*durlabha*), it is necessary to follow it up with the subjective consideration. The mind, in the course of the latter, <sup>176</sup> becomes supple and so it becomes easy to obtain the objective consideration. By using the objective consideration, the three gates of nirvāṇa are successfully opened.

# Second Section THE THREE MEDITATIVE STABILIZATIONS (p. 1213F)

#### PRELIMINARY NOTE

Here the *Traité* returns to a subject already touched upon above, p. 321-323F. It concerns the three meditative stabilizations on emptiness (*śūnyatā*), signlessness (*ānimitta*) and wishlessness (*apraṇihita*).

The canonical sources present them under various names:

Or more correctly, 'wants to see', for it is a matter of purely subjective considerations serving to purify the ascetic's mind, but not exerting any influence on the happiness or misfortune of beings.

176 In the course of the subjective consideration relating to the seven classes of supplementary dharmas.

- 1. The three *samādhis*, or concentrations: Vinaya, III, p. 93; Dīgha, III, p. 219; Saṃyutta, IV, p. 360; Anguttara, I, p. 299; Tch'ang-a-han, T 1, k. 8, p. 50b1-2; k. 9, p. 53a23-24; k. 10, p. 59c5-6; Tseng-yi-a-han, T 125, k. 16, p. 630b4; k. 39, p. 761a5-6.
- 2. The three *vimokṣa*, liberations, or *vimokṣamukhas*, gates of liberation: Paṭisambhidā, II, p. 35; Atthasālinī, p. 223; Visuddhimagga, ed. E. Warren, p.564-565.
- 3. The three *sparśas* or contacts which the ascetic experiences on coming out of the absorption of cessation: Majjhima, I, p. 302.
- 4. For at least two of them, the *cetovimukti* or liberations of mind: Majjhima, I, p. 297; Saṃyutta, IV, p. 296; Tsa-a-han, T 99, k. 21, p. 149c13-14. Their importance cannot be overestimated: they are the dharmas to be cultivated in order to understand and destroy the three poisons of *rāga*, *dveṣa* and *moha* (Anguttara, I, p. 299); they are the path of the *asaṃskṛta* or of nirvāṇa (Saṃyutta, IV, p. 360. 303; Tch'ang-a-han, T 1, k. 10, p. 50c5-6), the gates of nirvāṇa (Saddharmapuṇḍ., p. 136, l. 13).

But satisfactory definitions are rare in the early sources. The clearest are in the Ekottara (Tseng-yi a-han, T 125, k. 16, p. 630b), the original Sanskrit of which is reproduced in the Pañcaviṃśati, p. 208 (cf. T 223, k. 5, p. 254c14-18) and Śatasāhasrikā, p. 1440 (cf. T 220, k. 415, p. 80a18-28): *Katame trayaḥ samaādhayaḥ*. śūnyatānimittāpraṇihitaḥ ... ayam ucyate 'pranihitasamādhiḥ.

Transl. – What are the three concentrations? Those of emptiness, signlessness and wishlessness. What is the concentration of emptiness? It is the position of a mind that considers all dharmas as empty of inherent nature, the gate of liberation "Emptiness".

What is the concentration of signlessness? It is the position of a mind that considers all dharmas as being without characteristics, the gate of liberation "Signlessness".

What is the concentration of wishlessness? It is the position of a mind that considers all dharmas as unworthy of being considered, the gate of liberation "Wishlessness". – Var. – It is the position of a mind that makes no effort (or no longer has any contention) by saying to itself that all dharmas are unworthy of it.

The Pāli Abhidhamma gives only a relatively modest place to the three *samādhis* (cf. Paṭisambhidā, II, p. 35, 48; DhammasaṅgaṇI, p. 70-73; Atthasālinī, p. 223; Nettippakaraṇa, p. 90. 119, 126; Milinda, p. 413; Visuddhimagga, ed. Warren, p. 564-565).

On the other hand, the Abhidharma of the Sarvāstivādin-Vaibhāṣikas gives them a important role. Among the numerous sources, there are Vibhāṣā (T 1545, k. 104, p. 538a-541c), Abhidharmāmṛta (T 1553, k. 2, p. 975c1-9); Reconstruction by bhikṣu Sastri, p. 90), Kośa (VIII, p. 184-192), Abhidharmadīpa (p. 424), etc.

For these sources, the three *samādhis* are really wisdoms, but samādhis so perfect that they occur only in a concentrated mind: this is why they are called *samādhi*.

Actually, they penetrate to the very depths of the four noble truths of which they represent the sixteen aspects  $(\bar{a}k\bar{a}ra)$ : this is why, in the pure  $(an\bar{a}srava)$  state, they constitute the three gates of liberation

(*vimokṣamukha*). According to whether they are mundane (*laukika*), i.e., still attached to the threefold world, or supramundane (*lokottara*), they appear in eleven or nine levels (*bhūmi*).

The entire system is summarized admirably by Ghoşaka in his Abhidharmāmṛta (l.c.):

"The three *samādhis* are *śūnyatā-*, *apraṇihita-* and *ānimittasamādhi*. It is because the mind takes the Anāsrava as object that they are called *samādhi*.

When concentrated, the ascetic sees the five aggregates of attachment (*upādānaskandha*) as empty (śūnya), without 'me' (*anātman*) or 'mine' (*anātmīya*): this is śūnyatāsamādhi.

Having entered into this  $sam\bar{a}dhi$ , he no longer wishes for desire  $(r\bar{a}ga)$ , hate (dveṣa), ignorance (moha) or rebirth (punarbhava): this is  $apranihitasam\bar{a}dhi$ .

There is a  $sam\bar{a}dhi$  the object  $(\bar{a}lambana)$  of which is free of ten characteristics (nimitta). What are these ten? The five objects, substance, etc,  $(r\bar{u}p\bar{a}dipa\bar{n}cavi\bar{s}aya)$ , maleness  $(puru\bar{s}a)$ , femaleness  $(str\bar{t})$ , birth  $(j\bar{a}ti)$ , old age  $(jar\bar{a})$  and impermanence  $(anityat\bar{a})$ . This is  $\bar{a}nimittasam\bar{a}dhi$ .

Śūnyatāsamādhi has two aspects (ākāra), emptiness (śūnya) and non-self (anātman).

Apranihitasamādhi has ten aspects: impermanence (anitya), suffering (duḥkha), and [the eight] aspects [of the truth] of the origin (samudaya) and [of the truth] of the Path (mārga).

Ānimittasamādhi has the four aspects [of the truth] of cessation (nirodha) of suffering."

Having described the Sārvāstivādin system objectively, the *Traité* will explain the Madhyamaka point of view of the three *samādhis*.

They must be interpreted not only from the viewpoint of the non-existence of beings (*pudgalanairtmya*) as do the śrāvakas, but also from the twofold non-existence of beings and of things (*pudgaladharmanairātmya*) as the Mahāyānists interpret them.

By practicing the three  $sam\bar{a}dhis$ , the bodhisattva takes into account that beings and things are empty  $(s\bar{u}nya)$  of inherent nature and of characteristics, that this very emptiness is not a substantial mark (nimitta) and that consequently any aspiration for the world of existence or non-existence is irrational.

The three *samādhis* are identical because they have as their sole object the true nature (*bhūtalakṣaṇa*) which is nothing other than what is. When the śrāvakas speak of the emptiness of things, they hold it to be a real nature; on the other hand, the bodhisattva is forbidden to hypostatize this emptiness and to make a thing out of it.

The true nature of things constitutes the single object of the three *samādhis*, but it is not a reality; it is only a method of purifying the mind which, freed of illusions, notices that there is nothing to hypostatize, nothing to characterize and nothing to hope for. The result is that the world of becoming exists only in our imagination and that, according to the time-honored expression, samsāra is identical with nirvāna.

The *Traité*, as we shall see, in all of this and in the notes, limits itself to condensing the teachings of the old Mahāyānasūtras.

# I. THE THREE MEDITATIVE STABILIZATIONS ACCORDING TO THE ABHIDHARMA

#### 1. Definitions of the Three Meditative Stabilizations

## a. Śūnyatāsamādhi.

Question. – What is the gate of nirvāṇa called emptiness (śūnyatā)?

Answer. – It considers dharmas as empty ( $\dot{sunya}$ ), without 'me' ( $\bar{a}tman$ ) or 'mine' ( $\bar{a}tm\bar{t}ya$ ). Dharmas being the result of a complex of causes and conditions ( $hetupratyayas\bar{a}magryutpanna$ ), there is neither agent ( $k\bar{a}raka$ ) nor patient [206b] (French, sic) (vedaka)<sup>177</sup>. This is what is called the gate of emptiness. For more on this gate of emptiness, see what has been said in the chapters on patience (p. 912-926F) and wisdom (p. 1104-1106F)

#### b. Ānimittasamādhi.

Knowing that there is neither 'me' nor 'mine', why do beings become attached mentally (cittenābhiniviśante) to dharmas? The yogin reflects and says to himself: "Dharmas being the outcome of causes and conditions, there is no real dharma (bhūtadharma); there are only characteristics (nimitta) 178 and beings, seizing these characteristics, become attached to 'me' and 'mine'. Now I must see if these characteristics have a perceptible reality or not." Having examined them and considered them, he determines that they are all non-existent (anupalabdha). Whether it is a matter of the male characteristic (puruṣanimitta) or of the female characteristic (strūnimitta), the characteristics of identity or difference (ekatvānyatanimitta), etc., the reality of these characteristics does not exist (nopalabhyate). Why? Being without me and mine, all dharmas are empty and, being empty, they are neither male nor female. As for the identity and difference, these are names (nāman) valid only in the hypothesis of 'me' and 'mine'. This is why male and female, identity and difference, etc., are really non-existent.

Furthermore, when the four great elements  $(mah\bar{a}bh\bar{u}ta)$  and derived matter  $(up\bar{a}d\bar{a}yar\bar{u}pa)$  limit [the element] space  $(\bar{a}k\bar{a}sa)$ , we say there is a body  $(k\bar{a}ya)$ . Then, within a complex of causes and conditions  $(hetupratyayas\bar{a}magr\bar{i})$  with the inner and outer bases of consciousness  $(\bar{a}dhy\bar{a}tmikab\bar{a}hy\bar{a}yatana)$ , there

<sup>177</sup> Monier Williams: *vedaka* = making known, announcing, proclaiming, restoring to consciousness 178 In this paragraph, the *Traité* is roughly keeping to the classical definitions mentioned above (p. 1213F seq.) which it has reproduced more faithfully on p. 322F. But in regard to the marks (*nimitta*) of which the Ānimitta is free, it adds to the ten traditional marks (*pañcaviṣaya-strī-puruṣa-trisaṃskṛtalakṣaṇāni daśa*) those of identity (*ekatva*) and difference (*anyatva*).

arises the consciousness element (*vijñānadhātu*) and the body, making use of this grouping of elements (*dhātusāmagrī*), performs various activities; it speaks, it sits down, it arises, it goes and it comes. This grouping of six elements, which is empty [of intrinsic nature], is improperly qualified as a man or improperly qualified as a woman. 179

If each of these six elements were male, there would have to be six men, for it is impossible that *one* equals *six* or that *six* equals *one*. But in the earth element (*pṛthividhātu*) [entering into the composition of the body], there is neither male nor female characteristic, and it is the same for the other elements, water, fire, wind, space and consciousness (*vijñānadhātu*). If these characteristics do not exist in each [of the six elements] taken separately, neither do they exist in the grouping of these six elements. Similarly, if six dogs (*kukkura*), taken separately, cannot give birth to a lion (*siṃha*), neither can they do so taken together, for that is not their nature.

Question. – Why would there not be male and female? Although the individuals (puruṣa) are not different, the parts of the body ( $k\bar{a}y\bar{a}vayava$ ) themselves differ and there are sexual distinctions. <sup>180</sup> The body cannot exist independently of the body parts and the body parts themselves cannot exist independently of the body. If we see the foot, which is part of the body, we know that there is a whole (avayavin) called body. The body parts, foot, etc., are different from the body, and it is the body that has the male or female characteristics.

Answer. – The individual has already been refuted above (p. 736F) and I [Kumārajīva] have also refuted the characteristics (*nimitta*) of the body. Now I must repeat myself.

If there were a whole (avayavin) called body ( $k\bar{a}ya$ ), all the parts of the body would exist in each part (avayava) of this body; each of the parts would exist in every part. If the body existed fully in all of the parts, the foot ( $p\bar{a}da$ ) would exist in the head (siras). Why? Because in the head there is an entire body. If

179 The human being consists of six elements  $(dh\bar{a}tu)$  – earth, water, fire, wind, space and consciousness – but, whether they are taken separately or together, they do not constitute any difference in sex.

The analysis of the human being into six elements is of canonical origin: cf. Majjhima, III, p. 239: *Chadhāturo ayaṃ, bhikkhu, puriso to iti kho pan' etaṃ vuttaṃ. Kiñ c'etaṃ paṭicca vuttaṃ? Paṭhavidhātu āpodhātu tejodhātu vāyodhātu ākāsadhātu viññāṇadhātu.* 

For these six elements, see also Anguttara, I, p.176; Vibhaṅga, p. 82-85; Tch'ang a han, T 1, k. 8, p. 52a6-7; Tchong a han, T 26, k. 3, p. 435c21-22; K. 7, p. 468a27-28; k. 21, p. 562c17-19; k. 42, p. 690b27-28; k. 47, p. 723b20-21; k. 49, p. 732c28-29; Tsa a han, T 99, k. 9, p. 60c28-29 (cf. E. Waldschmidt, *Das Upasenasūtra*, Nach. Göttingen, 1957, No. 2, p. 38, ;. 11-12); Tsa a han, T 99, k. 17, p. 119a3; k. 37, p. 269c20-21; k. 43, p. 315b16; Tseng yi a han, Y 125, k. 29, p. 710b14-15; Pitāputrasam, ama, T 320, k. 16, p. 964b21-22, the original Sanskrit of which is cited in Śikṣāsamuccaya, p. 244, and Pañjikā, p. 508. – See also Madh. avatāra, p. 262 (tr. L. de La Vallée Poussin, Muséon, 1911, p. 307-308); Garbhābakrāntisūtra cited in Kośa, I, p. 66.

<sup>180</sup> The problem of the whole and its parts (*avayavin*, *avayava*), which opposes the Buddhists and the Vaiśeṣikas, is treated fully in the Kośa, III, p. 210-214.

each part of the body were in all the parts, there would be no difference between the body and its parts, the whole (avayavin) following the parts (avayava).

Question. – If the parts of the body, the foot, etc., were different from the body, the error (*doṣa*) that you mention would exist. But here the parts of the body, the foot, etc., are not different from the whole, i.e., the body. Therefore there is no error.

Answer. – If the parts of the body were not different from the whole, then the head would be the foot. Why? Because both of them, as body, would not differ. [206c]

Moreover, the parts of the body are many, whereas the whole is just one. It is impossible that a multiplicity should make a unit and that a unit should make a multiplicity.

Besides, although it is true that the fruit (*phala*) does not exist when the cause (*hetu*) does not exist, it is not true that the cause does not exist when the fruit does not exist. If, [as you claim], the parts of the body are not different from the whole, the cause would not exist when the fruit does not exist. Why? Because cause and fruit would be identical.

The body does not exist (nopalabhyate) whether you look for it in identity (ekatva) or in difference (anyatva) and, as the body does not exist, on what basis (sthāna) would the male or female characteristics reside? If the latter exist, they are either bodily or different from the body. But the body does not exist. If they occur in some dharma other than the body, since this other dharma is non-material (arūpa), there would be no difference between male and female. It is simply a matter of a complex of causes and conditions (hetupratyayasāmagrī) in the course of two successive existences and we speak of male and female out of mental error (viparītacitta). Thus it is said:

Lower you head or raise it up,

Bend (samiñite) or stretch (prasārite),

Stand up (*sthite*), go forth (*pratikrānte*) or return (*abhikrānte*),

Look straight ahead (ālokite) or to the side (vilokite),

Speak or babble:

In all of that, there is nothing true.

It is because the wind moves the vijñāna

That these activities take place.

But this vijñāna is of temporary nature (kṣayadharman)

And it exists no longer from one moment to the next moment.

The distinction

Between male and female

Comes from my mind.

It is out of lack of wisdom

That I see them wrongly exist,

Structures of bones tied one to another,

Without skin or flesh,

Impulses in movement,

Like a mannequin!

No reality on the inside

Outwardly called a man.

Like a foreign coin thrown into the water

Or a jungle fire devouring a bamboo forest,

Sounds issue forth out of it

As a result of a complex of causes and conditions.

For other similar characteristics, see above (p. 1095-1106F). This is the gate of signlessness (ānimittadvāra).

c. Apraṇihitasamādhi.

There is wishlessness (*apraṇihita*) when, having knowledge of the non-existence of characteristics, there is no longer any reaction. <sup>181</sup> This is the gate of wishlessness (*apraṇihitadvāra*).

#### 2. Nature of the Three Concentrations

Question. – But it is by means of wisdom that these three things contemplate śūnyatā, ānimitta and apraņihita respectively. If these are wisdoms, why call them concentrations (samādhi)?

Answer. – If these three kinds of wisdoms were not in meditative stabilization, they would be wild wisdoms ( $unmattapraj\tilde{n}\tilde{a}$ ); many people would fall into pernicious doubts ( $mithy\tilde{a}\acute{s}ankh\tilde{a}$ ) and do nothing further. But when these wisdoms are in concentration, they are able to destroy all the defilements ( $kle\acute{s}a$ ) and find the true nature ( $bh\bar{u}tadharma$ ) of dharmas.

1000

<sup>181</sup> Or any effort (abhisamskāra).

Furthermore, they are dharmas of the Path  $(m\bar{a}rga)$ , different from the world and in opposition to the world (lokaviruddha). The saints  $(\bar{a}rya)$  who are in these meditative stabilizations find the true nature and preach it; and this is not the language of a wild mind.

Finally, the other trances (*dhyāna*) and absorptions (*samāpatti* in which these three things do not occur, are not called meditative stabilizations (*samādhi*). Why? Because one can stray away from them, lose them and fall back into samsāra. This is what the Buddha said:

The person who observes pure morality

Is called a monk (bhikşu).

The person who contemplates emptiness (*śūnyat*ā)

Is called an ecstatic (*dhyāyin*).

The mindful (*smṛtimat*), vigorous (ātāpin), energetic (vūryavat) person

Is called the real yogin.

The foremost of all happiness (sukha)

Is cutting desires (tṛṣṇā) and destroying madness.

Rejecting the group of the five aggregates (skandha) and the dharmas of the Path

Is eternal happiness, arriving at nirvāna. 183

It follows from these stanzas that the Buddha calls the concentration the three gates of liberation (vimokṣamukha). [207a]

Question. – Why are they called gates of liberation?

Answer. – When they are practiced, liberation (*vimokṣa*) is attained and one reaches nirvāṇa without residue of conditioning (*nirupadhiśeṣanirvāṇa*); this is why they are called gates of liberation. Nirvāṇa without residue of conditioning is true liberation for in it one finds liberation from physical and mental suffering (*kāyamānasikaduḥkha*). Nirvāṇa with residual conditioning (*sopadhiśeṣanirvāṇa*) is the gate to it

Among the innumerable  $sam\bar{a}dhis$ , those of  $s\bar{u}nyat\bar{a}$ , etc., are the only true ones: this idea has already been developed above, p. 324-325F.

<sup>183</sup> A new translation of two stanzas already cited above, p. 325F. These are two stanzas of the Udānavarga, XXXII, 81 and 82 of the Sanskrit edition (F. Bernhard, p. 458-459), XXXII, 78 and 79 of the Tibetan edition (H. Beckh, p. 142).

<sup>&</sup>quot;The person who possesses the precepts is a bhikṣu; he who is [in the concentration of] emptiness is an ecstatic; he who is in constancy is a yogin; that is the happiness of extinction.

Actually the bhikşu who endures pleasure and displeasure, whose bed and seat are isolated (*prāntśayanāsana*), who is settled in purity who is based in mindfulness (*apramāda*), will uproot the perverse tendency of the desire for existence.

and, although these three concentrations are not nirvāna [proper], they are the cause (*hetu*) of nirvāṇa and that is why they are called nirvāṇa. In the world, it is common usage to designate the cause by the effect and the effect by the cause.

Śūnyatā, ānimitta and apraṇihita are concentrations (samādhi) by nature (svabhāva). The mind and mental events associated with these concentrations (samādhisamprayukta-cittacaittasikadharma), bodily actions (kāyakarman) and vocal actions (vākkarman) that arise following them, the formations dissociated from the mind (cittaviprayuktasaṃskāra) that come forth, form a complex (sāmagrī) called concentration. Thus, when the king (rājan) arrives, with him, of necessity, come the prime minister (mahāmātya) and some soldiers (sainika). 184 Here concentration (samādhi) is like the king, wisdom (prajñā) is like the prime minister, and the other dharmas are like the soldiers. Even if these other dharmas are not mentioned, they must necessarily be present. Why? Concentration does not arise by itself; it is unable to have all the activity by itself. The other dharmas arise along with it, endure with it, perish with it, and collaborate with it in realizing the good (hita).

# 3. Aspects of the Three Concentrations <sup>185</sup>

184 Same comparison above, p. 135F.

completely.

The Vibhāṣā (T 1545, k. 104, p. 538c7-10), the Abhidharmāmṛta (T 1553, k. 2, p. 975c1-9; Reconstruction by bhikṣu Sastri, p. 90); Kośa (VIII, p. 188-190) and the Abhidharmadīpa (p. 424) distribute the aspects understood by the three *samādhis* in the following way:

 $\acute{Sunyatasamadhi}$  perceives emptiness  $(\acute{sunya})$  and non-self  $(an\bar{a}tman)$  as constituting the  $3^{rd}$  and  $4^{th}$  aspects respectively of duhkhasatya.

Ānimittasamādhi perceives the four aspects of nirodhasatya.

Apraṇihitasamādhi perceives impermanence and suffering constituting respectively the  $1^{st}$  and  $2^{nd}$  aspect of duḥkhasatya plus the four aspects of samudayasatya plus the four aspects of mārgasatya: in all, ten aspects.

The *Traité* refers quite often to the theory of the sixteen aspects: cf. k. 11, p. 138a7-10 (above, p. 641F); k. 17, p. 186c28 (above, p. 1036F); k. 19, p. 200a14 and 202c24; k. 23, p. 233b2; k. 29, p. 274a22; k. 54, p. 444a15; k. 63, p. 505a17-18; k. 83, p. 641a16.

A phrase often repeated in the early scriptures (Majjhima, I, p. 435, 500; Angiuttara, II, p. 128; IV, p. 422-424) may be thought of as a rough draft of the theory of the sixteen aspects: *Dhamme aniccato dukkhato rogato gaṇḍato sallato aghato ābādhato parato palokato suññato anattato samanupassati*: "He considers the dharmas as impermanent, suffering, like a sickness, an ulcer, a dart, a misfortune, a torment, a strange object, a decay, empty and without self." In the Pāli Abhidhamma, e.g.,

The three *samādhis* are the gates of liberation because they penetrate the sixteen aspects of the four noble truths. These sixteen aspects have already been considered during the preparatory path (*prayogamārga*) by the practice of the four roots of good 'leading to penetration' (*nirvedhabhāgīya*), heat (*uṣmagata*), etc. (cf. Kośa, VI, p. 163). But the three *samādhis* are alone in penetrating them

- A. The meditative stabilization on emptiness ( $\hat{sunyatas}$  amādhi) has two aspects ( $\hat{a}k\bar{a}ra$ ):
  - 1) Because it considers (samanupaśyati) the five aggregates of attachment (pañca upādānaskandha) as having neither sameness (ekatva) nor difference (anyatva), it is 'empty' (śūnya).
  - 2) Because it considers the 'me' (ātman) and the 'mine' (ātmīya) as non-existent (anupalabdha), it is 'without self' (anātmaka).
- B. The meditative stabilization of signlessness (ānimittasamādhi) has four aspects:
  - 1) Because it considers nirvāṇa as the cessation of all types of suffering (nānāvidhaduḥkhanirodha), it is 'cessation' (nirodha).
  - 2) Because it considers it as the extinctions of the fires of the threefold poison (*triviṣa*) and the other defilements (*kleśa*), it is 'peace' (*śanta*).
  - 3) Because it considers it as the foremost of all dharmas, it is 'excellent' (pranita).
  - 4) Because it considers it as separated from the world (lokavisamyukta), it is 'exit' (nihsarana).
- C. The meditative stabilization of wishlessness (apranihitasamādhi) has two aspects:
  - 1) Because it considers the five aggregates of attachment (pañcopādānaskandha) as coming from causes and conditions (hetupratyayaja), it is 'impermanent' (anitya).
  - 2) Because it considers them as the torments of the body and mind (*kāyikamānasikaviheṭhana*), it is 'suffering' (*duhkha*).

Next, insofar as it considers the causes (*hetu*) of the five skandhas of attachment (*upadānaskandha*), it has four more aspects:

- 3) Because the complex of defilements and impure actions (*kleśasāsravakarmasāmagrī*) produces a fruit of suffering (*duḥkhaphala*), it is 'origin' (*samudaya*).
- 4) Because the six causes (hetu) <sup>186</sup> produce a fruit of suffering (duhkhaphala), it is 'cause' (hetu).
- 5) Because the four conditions (*pratyaya*)<sup>187</sup> produce a fruit of suffering (*duḥkhaphala*), it is 'condition' (*pratyaya*).

in the Paţisambhidā, I, p. 118, there are analyses growing out of the four noble truths. But the specification of the sixteen aspects (Mahāvyut., no. 1189-1205) is an innovation of the Sarvāstivādins.

The definitions proposed by their scholars are rather different and are worthy of detailed study: the Kośa gives no less than three different explanations; the Abhidharmāmṛta (T 1553, k. 1, p. 973a1-9; Reconstruction by bhikṣu Sastri, p. 83), the Abhidharmadīpa (p. 329), the Kośakārikābhāṣya by Saṃghabhadra (T 1563, k. 35, p. 950c27-951a12) have also their individual interpretations.

186 See above, p. 386F, 1038F.

187 See also p. 386F and 1038F.

6) Because a certain number of similar causes and conditions [follow one another] so as to produce this fruit, it is 'stream' (*prabhava*).

Finally, insofar as it considers the aggregates of detachment (anupādānaskandha), it has four more aspects:

- 7) Because the eight members of the noble [path (āryamārgānga) can lead to nirvāṇa, it is 'path' (mārga).
- 8) Because [this path] is free of errors (viparyāsa), it is 'reasonable' or 'practical' (nyāya).
- 9) Because all saintly people (*āryapudgala*) make use of this path, it is 'path'.
- 10) Because the defilements (*kleśa*) that depend on thirst (*tṛṣṇāpatita*) and those that depend on wrong views (*dṛṣṭipatita*)<sup>188</sup> do not obscure this path, it is 'definitive exit' (*nairyāṇika*).

# 4. Distribution of the Three Concentrations in the Levels. 189

The three gates of liberation (*vimokṣamukha*) occur in nine levels (*bhūmi*):

- 1) 4) the four trances ( $dhy\bar{a}na$ ),
- 5) the level of *anāgamya* [the preparatory trance of the first *dhyāna*]
- 6) the *dhyānāntara* [the intermediate trance, subdivision of the first *dhyāna*]
- 7) 9) the [first]three formless  $(\bar{a}r\bar{u}pya)$  absorptions, because the three gates of liberation are essentially pure  $(an\bar{a}sravasvabh\bar{a}va)$ .

Some say that the three gates of liberation (*vimokṣamukha*) are absolutely pure (*atyantam anāsrava*), whereas the three concentrations (*samādhi*) are sometimes impure (*sāsrava*), sometimes pure (*anāsrava*). For those who say this, the concentrations occur in eleven levels:

- 1)- 6) the six *bhumis* [namely, the four *dhyānas*, the *anāgamya* and the *dhyānāntara*].
- 7) 9) the [first] three  $\bar{a}r\bar{u}pva$ .
- 10) the desire realm (*kāmadhātu*).
- 11) the sphere of the summit of existence (*bhāvagra* or 4<sup>th</sup> *ārūpya*).

When the three *samādhis* are impure (*sāsrava*), they are linked (*baddha*) to these eleven levels. When they are pure (*anāsrava*), they are not linked to but are associated with the organ (or dominant faculty) of

<sup>188</sup> Two classes of passions already noted above, p. 424F.

In this section, the *Traité* proposes a distribution identical with that of the Vibhāṣā (T 1545, k. 104, p. 539b1-2) and of the Kośa (VIII, p.187 n.1).

satisfaction (saumanasyendriya), the organ of pleasure (sukhendriya) and the organ of equanimity (upekṣendriya). 190

Beginners  $(\bar{a}dik\bar{a}rmika)$  in the practice of the three concentrations are in [207b] the desire realm  $(k\bar{a}madh\bar{a}tu)$ , the advanced (parinispanna) are in the form realm  $(r\bar{u}padh\bar{a}tu)$  or the formless realm  $(\bar{a}r\bar{u}pyadh\bar{a}tu)$ . See what has been set forth fully in the Abhidharma on all of those, whether they are advanced or non-advanced, practiced or non-practiced.

### II. THE THREE CONCENTRATIONS ACCORDING TO THE MAHĀYĀNA

### 1. Profound Meaning of the Three Concentrations

#### a. Śūnyatāsamādhi.

Furthermore, there are two ways of understanding emptiness according to whether one considers all dharmas as empty of existence (*sattvaśūnya*) or empty of dharmas (*dharmaśūnya*). 191

Emptiness of existence (*sattvaśūnyatā*) is what we have just explained [according to the Abhidharma system]. The emptiness of dharmas (*dharmaśūnya*) is the fact that all dharmas are empty of intrinsic nature (*svalakṣaṇaśūnyatā*), as the Buddha said to Subhūti:

"Form  $(r\bar{u}pa)$  is empty of the nature of form  $(r\bar{u}patv\bar{a})$ , and feelings  $(vedan\bar{a})$ , concepts  $(samj\tilde{n}\bar{a})$ , volitional formations  $(samsk\bar{a}ra)$  and consciousnesses  $(vij\tilde{n}\bar{a}na)$  are empty of the natures of [feeling, concept, volitional formation] and consciousness." 192

Question. – One can think about the emptiness of beings (sattvaśūnyatā) and the non-emptiness of things (dharmāṇām aśūnyatā). It is inconceivable that dharmas are empty of intrinsic nature (svalakṣaṇaśūnya). Why? If dharmas were empty of intrinsic nature, they would be without arising (anutpanna) or cessation (aniruddha). Since there would be neither arising nor cessation, there would be no sin (āpatti) or merit (punya). If there is no sin or merit, why still practice on the Path?

Answer. – It is as a result of the emptiness of dharmas (*dharmaśūnyatā*) that there is sin and merit. Without this emptiness of dharmas, there would be neither sin nor merit. Why? If dharmas really had an intrinsic nature (*svabhāva*), they would be indestructible (*avināśa*), their intrinsic nature and their characteristic (*lakṣaṇa*) not coming from causes and conditions (*hetupratyayaja*). If they do come from causes and conditions, then it is only that they are formations (*samskāra*) [i.e., conditioned dharmas, *samskrtadharma*].

<sup>190</sup> Three organs appearing in the list of 22 indrivas which will be discussed below, p. 1494F.

<sup>191</sup> See the lengthy study dedicated to the two emptinesses above, p. 1078-1095F.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>192</sup> Pañcaviṃśati, p. 128, l. 10-12 (T 123, k. 3, p. 235a11-12; k. 9., p. 288b10; k. 16, p. 337b4; k. 21, p. 372c11-12, 3373c3-4), Śatasāhasrikā, p. 554, l. 6-18: *Rūpaṃ rūpatvena śūnyaṃ*, vedanā yāvād vijñānaṃ vijñānatvena śūnyam.

It is essential that the intrinsic nature of dharmas be conditioned (*saṃskṛta*) in order to be capable of being destroyed.

You will say that the intrinsic nature of dharmas is capable of being created (*kṛta*) and destroyed (*niruddha*) but that is not correct (*ayukta*). [By definition], the intrinsic nature is an unconditioned dharma (*asaṃskṛtadharma*) and exists independently of causes and conditions. Dharmas existing by themselves (*svabhāvena*) are without arising (*anutpāda*) since they exist in themselves before arising. <sup>193</sup> Being without arising (*utpāda*), they are without cessation (*nirodha*). Since arising and cessation do not take place, there is neither sin (*āpatti*) nor merit (*puṇya*). If there is no sin or merit, why still practice on the Path?

If beings had a true intrinsic nature (*bhūtasvabhāva*), they would be incapable of doing evil and incapable of doing good since they would be fixed (*niyata*) in their intrinsic nature. Such people would misunderstand the value of merit and would ruin [the law] of retribution of action (*karmavipāka*).

There is no nature of emptiness (śūnyatālakṣaṇa) in the emptiness of dharmas (śūnyatālakṣaṇa). <sup>194</sup> It is because you assume an emptiness of dharmas and you become attached to it that you raise these objections.

193 Dharmas existing in themselves and by themselves would be unchanging, without arising and without cessation by definition.

All dharmas are empty, but emptiness does not exist: it is valid only as a method of argumentation and not at all as a philosophical principle. Here the *Traité* returns to a view already explained above (p. 925F, 1091F and n.) which nullifies the recent imaginings about the presence in the Madhyamaka of a negative Absolute resting on purely mystical concepts. To the bibliography on this subject, we may add J. May, *Candrakīrti*, Introduction, p. 18-21, and my [Lamotte's] Introduction to *Vimalakīrti*, p. 94-97: "Emptiness is not an entity."

In the present passage, the *Traité* seems to draw inspiration from the Ratnakūṭa in the Kāśyapaparivarta, § 63-65, p. 94-97 (transl. F. Weller, p. 101 and n.) cited in the original Sanskrit with some variants in Madh. vṛtti, p. 248-249; Ratnagotravibhāga, p. 28, l. 11-13; Laṅkāvatāra, p. 146, l. 12-13: *Yan na śūnyatayā dharmān śūnyān karoti; api tu dharmā ... yasya khalu punaḥ śūnyatataiva dṛṣṭis tam aham acikitsyam iti vadāmi*.

Transl. – It is not by means of emptiness that dharmas are made to be empty, but dharmas are by themselves empty. It is not by means of signlessness that dharmas are made to be without characteristics, but dharmas are by themselves without characteristics. It is not by means of wishlessness that dharmas are made to be not taken into consideration, but dharmas by themselves are not to be taken into consideration. That very consideration, O Kāśyapa, is called the Middle Way, the real consideration of dharmas. Indeed, O Kāśyapa, those who, by grasping an emptiness, take refuge in emptiness, I declare them to be completely lost for my teaching. Moreover, O Kāśyapa, a view of the self as high as Sumeru is worth more than a view of emptiness in those who adhere to it wrongly. Why? Emptiness, O Kaśyapa, is the way to escape from all kinds of false views; on the other hand, the person who has this very emptiness as a belief, I declare him to be incurable. Suppose, O Kaśyapa, there is a sick man and a physician gives him medicine, but this medicine, after having eliminated all the guilty humors of this

illness, penetrates into his belly and does not come out. What do you think, O Kāśyapa; will this man be freed of his illness? – Certainly not, O Blessed One; his sickness will become greater if this medicine, having eliminated all the guilty humors, should penetrate into his belly and not come out. – The Blessed One said: In the same way, O Kaśyapa, emptiness is the means of escaping from all the wrong views; on the other hand, the person who holds this very emptiness as a belief, I declare him to be incurable.

The image of wrong view of the self 'high as Sumeru' and the example of the medicine not eliminated are used again in *Vimalakīrti*, p. 291, 339.

In the Wou chang yi king, T 669, k. 1, p. 471b8-10, the Buddha says to Ānanda: "He who produces the view of emptiness (\$\sigma unyata dr\tilde{s}ti\$), I declare him to be incurable (\$acikitsya\$). If a person is attached to a view of the self (\$pudgaladr\tilde{s}ti\$) as high as Sumeru, I am not surprised by that and I do not condemn him. But if a fool (\$abhim\tilde{a}nika\$) is attached to a view of emptiness (\$\sigma unyata dr\tilde{s}ti\$) as minute as the sixtieth part of a single hair, that I cannot allow."

In this regard, a passage from the Bodh. bhūmi, p. 46-47, should be cited, hostile as it is toward the Mādhyamika doctrines: *Idam ca saṃdhyāyoktaṃ Bhagavatā. Varam ihaikatyasya pudgaladṛṣṭir na tv evaikatyasya durgṛhītā .... evaṃbhūtaṃ vastu apavadamānaḥ pranaṣto bhavaty asmād dharmavinayāt.* Transl. – "It is with this intention that the Bhagavat said: 'The view of the self in an absolute individualist is better than emptiness wrongly understood in an absolute nihilist [in this case, a Mādhyamika]. Why? A person who believes in the self is mistaken only on [the nature of] the knowable, but does not deny the [existence] of the knowable. This is why he will not be reborn in the bad destinies; he does not criticize and does not deceive his neighbor, the believer, who is seeking to free himself from suffering, but to establish him [on the other hand] in the Dharma and the Truth; furthermore, he does not slacken in observing the rules. On the contrary, by means of emptiness completely misunderstood, the person is mistaken about the reality of the knowable and even rejects it entirely. This is why he will be reborn in the bad destinies; he destroys his neighbor, the believer, who is seeking to free himself from suffering and, further, he slackens in his observation of the rules. By rejecting reality as it is, he separates himself from our teachings."

By thus attacking the person who misunderstands emptiness, the Bodh. bhūmi manifestly quarrels with the Mādhyamikan whom it wrongly confuses with the nihilist. But the *Traité* has already given the answer (p. 1090-1094F): "The nihilist denies the things that he sees; the Mādhyamika-Śūnyavādin denies nothing because there is nothing and he sees nothing." See also Madh. vṛtti, p. 159-160, with the translation and note of J. May, *Candrakīrti*, p. 122-124. The Bodhisaṃbhāraśāstra (T 1660, k. 6, 539c25-28), the author of which may have been Nāgārjuna and commentator the bhikṣu Iśvara, continues the Mādhyamika position in the following way:

"We resort to emptiness in order to stamp out the great mass of ignorance (mahāvidyāskandha), but the wise man does not act by basing himself on emptiness. If he acts by basing himself on emptiness, it is in order to combat ands refute those who are difficult to convert and who profess the wrong view of the self (satkāyadṛṣṭi), for those who are prey to wrong views (dṛṣṭicarita) can escape from them only by emptiness. But those who are attached to the view of emptiness (śūnyatādṛṣṭyabhiniviṣṭa) are incurable."

The emptiness of dharmas was preached by the Buddha with the feeling of compassion (*karuṇācitta*) in order to cut through the fetters of thirst (*tṛṣṇāṣaṃyojana*) and destroy wrong views (*mithyādṛṣṭi*).

Furthermore, the true nature (*bhūtalakṣaṇa*) of dharmas destroys suffering (*duḥkha*): it is the true domain (*bhūtāvacara*) of holy individuals (*āryapudgala*). If the emptiness of dharmas (*dharmaśūnyatā*) had an intrinsic nature (*svabhāva*), [i.e., existed by itself], how could we say, in speaking of the emptiness of dharmas, that they are substantially empty? But if the emptiness of dharmas is without intrinsic nature, what objection do you have?

When we contemplate the emptiness of dharmas in the light of the twofold emptiness [of beings and of dharmas], the mind is separated from all the dharmas: we know that the world (loka) is false and deceptive like a magic show ( $m\bar{a}y\bar{a}$ ). That is the contemplation on emptiness.

#### b. Signlessness.

When the yogin has understood ( $udgrhn\bar{a}ti$ ) the empty nature ( $s\bar{u}nyalaksana$ ) of dharmas, he produces the fetters of pride, etc. ( $abhim\bar{a}n\bar{a}disamyojana$ ) by that very fact, and he says: "I have understood the true nature of dharmas." It is then that he must practice the gate of signlessness ( $\bar{a}nimittadv\bar{a}ra$ ) in order to destroy his grasping onto the empty nature ( $s\bar{u}nyanimittodgrahana$ ).

#### c. Wishlessness.

When the yogin gives himself up to futile proliferation (*prapañca*) in regard to signlessness (*ānimitta*), when he is about to imagine something as desirable, when he becomes attached (*abhiniviśate*) to

The last word in this matter remains with  $\dot{Santideva}$  whose three well-known stanzas, IX, v. 33-35) cut through the problem:

Śūnyatāvāsanādhānād dhīyate bhāvavāsanā /
kiṃcin nāstīti cābhyāsāt sāpi paścāt prahīyate // 33 //
Yadā na labhyate bhāvo yo nāstīti prakalpyate /
tadā nirāśrayo 'bhāvaḥ kathaṃ tiṣṭhen mateḥ puraḥ // 34 //
Yadā na bhāvo nābhāvo mateḥ saṃtiṣṭhate puraḥ /
tadānyagatyabhāvena nirālambā praśāmyati // 35 //

Transl. by L. de La Vallée Poussin. – When one assumes the idea of emptiness, when one is saturated with it, the idea of existence disappears; and later, by the habit of this mind that 'nothing exists', the idea of emptiness itself is eliminated.

Indeed, when one no longer perceives [as a consequence of the elimination of the idea of existence] an existence that one is able to deny, how then would the non-existence henceforth deprived of support arise to the mind?

And when neither existence nor non-existence present themselves to the mind, then the mind is pacified, no longer having any form [to affirm or deny], which are these two modes of action.

- According to Tāranātha (p. 165), Śāntideva, in the middle of stanza 35, rose up into the air and disappeared, but these words came to the ears of the monks who were able to concentrate until the end of the Bodhicaryāvatāra.

signlessness, then he must say to himself: "I am wrong. Why find characteristics, why grasp characteristics, why give myself up to futile proliferation about empty dharmas without characteristics? [207c] Now is the time to be based in emptiness and signlessness in order to control the body  $(k\bar{a}ya)$ , speech  $(v\bar{a}c)$  and mind (manas). One should not have  $pranidh\bar{a}na$ , 'desire for'. One should consider this nature of wishlessness (apranihitalakṣaṇa) to destroy the three poisons (triviṣa). One should not be producing actions, bodily, vocal or mental. One should not be seeking rebirth in the threefold world (trailokya)." By reflecting in this way, the yogin enters into apranihitavimokṣamukha.

#### 2. Sameness of the Three Concentrations

These three gates of liberation (*vimokṣamukha*) in the Mahāyāna are one and the same thing: it is as a result of the way they are practiced that we speak of three things. 195

Considering the emptiness of dharmas is called  $\dot{sunyata}$ . When there is no place to grasp characteristics in this emptiness, this  $\dot{sunyata}$  changes its name and is called  $\bar{animitta}$ . When there is no place in the presence of this signlessness to experience 'desire for' or rebirth in the threefold world, this  $\bar{animitta}$  changes its name and is called apranihita.

It is like a city with three gates. A single person cannot simultaneously enter by the three gates. If he enters, it is by going through one single gate.

Here the true nature (*bhūtalakṣaṇa*) of dharmas is the City of nirvāṇa (*nirvāṇagara*). This City has three gates, Śūnyatā, Ānimitta and Apraṇihita.

Developing the second point, the text explains that the Immeasurable, the Nothing-at-all, the Emptiness and the Signlessness are alike empty of desire ( $r\bar{a}ga$ ), hatred ( $dve\bar{s}a$ ) and ignorance (moha), the three bad roots ( $aku\acute{s}alam\bar{u}la$ ) that create standards ( $pram\bar{a}nakarana$ ) [Fr., measures, p. 1230F, n.] constitute obstructions (kimcana) and produce signs (nimittakarana). The result is that in their unchangeable (akopya) form, the four mind-liberations are one and the same thing under different names. – For detail see translation and notes of I. B. Horner,  $Middle\ Length\ Sayings$ , p. 358, 260.

However, even in the Lesser Vehicle, there was a suspicion of the identity of three *samādhis* also called *vimokṣamukha* and *cetovimukti*. On this subject, see Saṃyutta, IV, p. 296-297; Tsa a han, T 99, k. 21, p. 149c: *Ya cāyaṃ āvuso appamāṇā cetovimutti yā ca ākiñcañña cetovimutti ... ekaṭṭhā, byañjanam eva nānam*.

Transl. – "In regard to the mind-liberations called Immeasurable, Nothing-at-all, Emptiness and Signlessness respectively, there is, O venerable One, a way of teaching in which these dharmas are at the same time of different meaning and of different words, and there is also a way of teaching according to which these dharmas are of the same meaning and different words."

If a person enters the śūnyatā gate, does not hypostatize this śūnyatā and no longer grasps at characteristics (nimitta), this person penetrates directly [into the City of nirvāṇa] and, with his end attained, has no need of the other gates.

But if he enters the śūnyatā gate, grasps at its characteristic and hypostatizes śūnyatā, the śūnyatā is not a gate for this person: the path of entry is closed to him. And so in order to avoid the characteristic of śūnyatā, he makes use of the ānimitta gate.

If his mind becomes attached to the characteristics of ānimitta and he gives himself up to futile chatter (prapañca), then he stops grasping the characteristics of ānimitta and goes through the apranihita gate.

## 3. Single Object of the Three Concentrations

In the system of the Abhidharma, the emptiness gate of liberation (śūnyatāvimoksamukha) has as its object (ālambate) the truth of suffering (duḥkhasatya) and comprises (samgrhnati) the five skandhas. 196 The signlessness gate of liberation (ānimittavimoksamukha) has as its object a single dharma, the pratisamkhyānirodha [or disjunction from impure dharmas obtained by understanding the truths]. 197 The wishlessness gate of liberation (apranihitavimoksamukha) has as its object three truths [a part of the truth of suffering (duhkhasatya), the truth of the origin of suffering (samudayasatya) and the truth of the cessation of suffering (*nirodhasatya*)]; it comprises five aggregates (*skandha*).

In the Mahāyāna, these three gates of liberation (vimokṣamukha) pertain to the true nature (bhūtalakṣaṇa) of dharmas. By means of these three gates of liberation, the ascetic sees that samsara and nirvana are the same Why? Because nirvāṇa is empty (śūnya), without characteristics (ānimitta), not worthy of being taken into consideration (apranihita), and samsāra likewise.

Question. – If the Sūtra says that nirvāṇa has only one gate, 198 why is it a matter of three gates here?

Answer. – I have already said above that, although the dharma is single, its meaning (artha) is threefold.

Furthermore, beings to be converted (vineya) are of three kinds: those who abound in craving (trṣṇābahula), those who abound in wrong views (drṣṭibahula) and those in whom craving and wrong views are equal.

To those who abound in wrong views, the śūnyatāvimokṣamukha is preached. In this way they will see that all dharmas are impermanent (anitya), suffering (duhkha), the result of causes and conditions

197 For more details, see Kośa, VIII, p. 190.

<sup>196</sup> Whoever enters into samādhi necessarily possesses the four formless aggregates depending on mind and mental events, namely, samjñā, vedanā, samskāra and vijñāna, plus the 'discipline (samvara) of concentration' which is  $r\bar{u}pa$ . Cf. Kośa, VI, p. 107, 170; VIII, p. 128 and n. 4.

<sup>198</sup> The single gate of Immortality (*ekam amatadvāram*) mentioned in the Sūtras: Majjhima, I, p. 353; Anguttara, V, p. 346.

(hetupratyayaja), have no intrinsic nature (svabhāva); not having intrinsic nature, they are empty (śūnya). By means of this emptiness, wrong views (dṛṣṭi) are stopped.

To those who abound in craving, the *apranihitavimokṣamukha* is preached. In this way they will see that all dharmas are impermanent, suffering, the result of causes and conditions. Having seen in this way, they will be mentally detached from thirst and will enter into the Path.

To those in whom craving and wrong views are balanced, the *ānimittavimokṣamukha* is preached. Learning that the characteristics of male and female do not exist, they will cut through craving. Learning that the characteristics of sameness (*ekatva*) and difference (*anyata*) do not exist, they will cut through wrong views

Sometimes the Buddha preaches two gates of liberation at the same time, sometimes he preaches three at the same time. Since the bodhisattvas must [208a] always exert themselves in knowing all the paths, he preaches the three gates to them.

We could say yet other things, but the question of the three gates of liberation is treated here in summary (samkṣepeṇa).

# Third section THE FOUR TRANCES (p. 1233F)

#### I. THE FOUR TRANCES ACCORDING TO THE ABHIDHARMA

The four dhyānas are of two types: *i*) śuddhaka, pure in the mundane order of purity; *ii*) anāsrava, pure in the supramundane order of purity. <sup>199</sup>

What is called *dhyāna śuddhaka*? The five impure but good aggregates (*sāsravakuśala*). 200

What is called *dhyāna anāsrava*? The five pure aggregates (*anāsrava*).<sup>201</sup>

<sup>199</sup> See above, p.1027F and n. 3; 1038F; 1042F and n. 4. Cf. Kośa, VIII, p. 144-146.

Whoever enters into *dhyāna*, i.e., possesses the concentration called *dhyāna*, necessarily possesses, in addition to mind and mental events (four *skandhas*), the discipline (*saṃvara*) of *dhyāna* which is *rūpa*: cf. Kośa, VIII, p. 128 and n. 4.

<sup>201</sup> The five *anāsravaskandha*, also called *dharmaskandha* or *lokottaraskandha*: morality (*śīla*), concentration (*samādhi*), wisdom (*prajñā*), liberation (*vimukti*), wisdom and vision of liberation (*vimuktijñānadarśana*): cf. Dīgha, III, p. 279; Majjhima, I, p. 145, 214, 217; Saṃyutta, I, p. 99-100, 139; V, p. 162; Anguttara, I, p. 162; III, p. 134, 271; V, p. 16; Itivuttaka, p. 107-108; Kośa, VI, p. 297 n.; Kośavyākhyā, p. 607.

The bodily and vocal actions ( $k\bar{a}yavakkarman$ ) contained in the four  $dhy\bar{a}nas$  are material dharmas ( $r\bar{u}pa$ ); the rest are non-material ( $ar\bar{u}pa$ ). All of them are invisible (anidarśana), without resistance (apratigha), sometimes  $s\bar{a}srava$ , sometimes  $an\bar{a}srava$ . Those that are  $s\bar{a}srava$  are the five  $kuśala-s\bar{a}srava$  skandhas; those that are  $an\bar{a}srava$  are the five  $an\bar{a}srava$  skandhas. The  $s\bar{a}srava$  belong to the desire realm ( $k\bar{a}madh\bar{a}tuvacara$ ); the  $an\bar{a}srava$  do not belong to any realm.

The *dhyānas* include bodily actions (*kāyakarman*), vocal actions (*vākkarman*) and formations dissociated from the mind (*cittaviprayuktasaṃskāra*) that are neither mind (*citta*) nor mental events (*caitasika dharma*), nor associated with the mind (*cittasaṃprayukta*).

The *dhyānas* also contain the feeling aggregate (*vedanāskandha*), the discrimination aggregate (*saṃjñāskandha*) and the volition aggregate (*saṃskāraskandha*) associated with it. The mental events (*caitasika dharma*) also are associated with the mind (*cittasamprayukta*).

The *dhyānas* include mind (*citta* and *manas*), and consciousness (*vijñāna*): this is only mind.

In the dhyānas, there are:

- 1) things accompanying the mind (cittānuparivartin) and non-associated with feeling (na vedanāsamprayukta).
- 2) things associated with feeling (vedanāsamprayukta) and not accompanying mind (na cittaparivartin).
- 3) things accompanying mind (cittānuparivartin) and associated with feeling (vedanāsamprayukta).
- 4) things not accompanying mind (na cittānuparivartin) and non-associated with feeling (na vedanāsamprayukta).

There are things accompanying mind and non-associated with feeling. Actually, the four *dhyānas* contain:

- a. bodily actions (kāyakarman) and vocal actions (vākkarman).
- b. formations dissociated from the mind (cittaviprayuktasaṃskāra) but accompanying mind (cittānuparivartin).
- c. feelings ( $vedan\bar{a}$ ).

There are things associated with feeling and not accompanying mind. As a result, the four *dhyānas* contain mind (*citta* and *manas*) and consciousness (*vijñāna*).

There are things accompanying mind and associated with feeling. Actually, the four *dhyānas* contain:

- a. the aggregate of discrimination (samjñāsaṃskāra)
- b. the 'associated' aggregate of volition (samprayukta samskāraskandha)

There are things not accompanying the mind and non-associated with feeling. Actually, with the exception of the formations dissociated from the mind (*cittaviprayuktasaṃskāra*) but accompanying the mind

(cittānuparivartin) – formations contained in the four dhyānas -, these are all the other formations dissociated from the mind (cittaprayuktasaṃskāra) and associated with the discrimination aggregate (saṃjñāskandhasaṃprayukta).

Of the four *dhyānas*, the [last] three are not endowed with investigation (*na vitārkaluparivartin*) and are not associated with analysis (*na vicārasaṃprayukta*).

In the first dhyāna, there are:

- 1) things accompanying investigation (*vitarkānuparivartin*) but non-associated with analysis (*na vicārasamprayukta*)
- 2) things associated with analysis (*vicārasaṃprayukta*) but not accompanying investigation (*na virtarkānuparivartin*)
- 3) things accompanying investigation (vitarkānuparivartin) and associated with analysis (vicārasamprayukta)
- 4) things not accompanying investigation (*na vitarkānuparivartin*) and non-associated with analysis (*na vicārasamprayukta*).

There are things accompanying analysis but non-associated with investigation. Actually, the first dhyāna contains:

- a. bodily actions (kāvakarman) and vocal actions (vākkarman)
- b. formations dissociated from the mind (cittaviprayuktasaṃskāra) and accompanying investigation (vitarkānuparivartin)
- c. analysis (vicāra).

There are things associated with analysis, but not accompanying investigation, namely, investigation (vitarka)

There are things accompanying investigation and associated with analysis, namely, the mind (*citta*) and mental events (*caitasika dharma*) associated with investigation (*vitarka*) and analysis (*vicāra*).

There are things not accompanying investigation and non-associated with analysis. Actually, with the exception of the formations dissociated from the mind (*cittaviprayuktasaṃskāra*) that accompany investigation (*vitarkānuparivartin*), they are all the other formations dissociated from mind.

The four *dhyānas* are all causes and conditions (*hetupratyaya*) and constitute all the causes and conditions.

In the first of the four *dhyānas*, there are:

- 1) things that follow upon an antecedent (samanantara) and constitute an antecedent condition (samanantarapratyaya),
- 2) things that follow upon an antecedent and constitute an antecedent condition,
- 3) things that do not follow upon an antecedent and do not constitute an antecedent condition.

There are things that follow upon an antecedent, but do not constitute [208b] an antecedent condition. This is the mind (*citta*) and mental events (*caitasika dharma*) called 'to arise in a future existence'.

There are things that follow upon an antecedent and constitute an antecedent condition. This is the past (atīta) and present (pratyutpanna) mind.

There are things that do not follow upon an antecedent and that do not constitute an antecedent condition. Actually, with the exception of mind and mental events that will arise in a future existence, these are the other minds and mental events of the future, physical and mental actions dissociated from the mind.

It is the same for the second and third *dhyānas*.

In the fourth *dhyāna*, there are:

- 1) Things that follow an antecedent but that do not constitute an antecedent condition. These are:
- a. The mind and mental events called 'to arise in a future existence'
- b. The absorption of non-discrimination (asamjñisamāpatti), arisen or to arise
- 2) Things that follow upon an antecedent and that constitute an antecedent condition. This is the past and present mind and mental events.
- 3) Things that do not follow upon an antecedent and that do not constitute an antecedent condition. These are:
- a. With the exception of the mind and mental events called 'to arise in a future existence', all the other minds and mental events of the future.
- b. With the exception of the formations dissociated from the mind (*cittaviprayuktasaṃskāra*) and following upon an antecedent, all the other formations dissociated from the mind.
- c. Bodily and vocal actions.

The four *dhyānas* include bodily actions ( $k\bar{a}yakarman$ ), vocal actions ( $v\bar{a}kkarman$ ) and formations dissociated from the mind ( $cittaviprayuktasaṃsk\bar{a}ra$ ); some constitute conditions (pratyaya) and do not have conditions. Others both have conditions and constitute conditions.<sup>202</sup>

These four *dhyānas* are also dominating conditions (*adhipatipratyaya*) and constitute dominating conditions. <sup>203</sup> All this is fully explained in the Abhidharmavibhāga.

This subject is treated in detail above, p. 1038-1040F.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>203</sup> See above, p. 1040F.

# II. THE FOUR TRANCES ACCORDING TO THE MAHĀYĀNA (p. 1237F)

The bodhisattva possesses the skillful means of trance  $(dhy\bar{a}nip\bar{a}ya)$ ,  $^{204}$  the characteristics of trance  $(dhy\bar{a}nanimitta)^{205}$  and the factors of trance  $(dhy\bar{a}n\bar{a}niga)$ . This has all been fully explained already in the context of the  $dhy\bar{a}nap\bar{a}ramit\bar{a}$  (p. 1043-1057F).

Question. – In the present Prajñāpāramitßpadeśa, <sup>207</sup> you speak only of dharmas empty of characteristics (*lakṣaṇaśūnya*); then how is the bodhisattva able to produce trance (*dhyāna*) or absorption (*samāpatti*) on empty dharmas?

Answer. – The bodhisattva knows that the five objects of enjoyment (pañcakāmaguṇa) and the five obstacles (pañcanīvaraṇa) are the result of causes and conditions (hetupratyaya) without intrinsic nature (niḥsvabhāva), empty (śūnya) and non-existent (anupalabdha). Thus it is very easy for him to reject them. But under the influence of errors (viparyāsa), beings are attached to ordinary pleasures and are guilty of abandoning the profound and wonderful happiness of dhyāna.

The bodhisattva experiences great compassion (*mahākaruṇā*) for these beings and practices (*bhāvayti*) trance and concentration:

- 1) Being attached to the object of mind (*cittālambana*), he avoids the five objects of enjoyment (*pañcakāmaguṇa*), rejects the five obstacles (*pañcanivaraṇa*) and enters into the first *dhyāna* which is great joy (*mahāprīti*).
- 2) Suppressing investigation (*vitarka*) and analysis (*vicāra*) and concentrating his mind, he penetrates deeply into inner peace (*adhyātmasaṃprasāda*), obtains a subtle and wonderful joy (*prīti*) and enters into the second *dhyāna*.

First dhyāna: vitarka, vicāra, prīti, sukha, samādhi.

Second dhyāna: adhyātmasamprasāda, prīti, sukha, samādhi.

Third dhyāna: upekṣā, smṛti, saṃprajanya, sukha, samādhi.

Fourth dhyāna: upekṣā, upekṣapariśuddhi, smṛtipariśuddhi, samādhi.

For details, see Vibhāṣā, T 1545, k. 80, p. 412a21-412b3; Kośa, VIII, p. 147;

Abhidharmadīpa, p. 407-409. Cf. Viduddhimagga, ed. Warren, p. 71.

<sup>207</sup> The seven Chinese characters *Pan-jo-po-lo-mo-louen-yi* appearing here remove any doubt about the exact title of the present work, *[Mahā]Prajñāpāramitopadeśa* and not *[Mahā]Prajñāpāramitāśāstra*. See above the Introduction to the present volume.

The bodhisattva uses the *dhyānas* as salvific skillful means  $(up\bar{a}ya)$  to convert beings: this perfection of trance  $(dhy\bar{a}nap\bar{a}ramit\bar{a})$  has been the object of a description in 18 points above (p. 1043-1057F).

These *nimitta*s are 23 in number: see above, p. 1038F.

<sup>206</sup> These *angas* are 28 in number:

- 3) Because this profound joy is distracting to concentrations, the bodhisattva avoids all joy, obtains a complete happiness (*sukha*) and enters into the third *dhyāna*.
- 4) Destroying all suffering and all happiness, rejecting all sadness (*daurmanasya*) and all satisfaction (*saumanasya*) as well as inhalation and exhalation ( $\bar{a}n\bar{a}p\bar{a}na$ ), he adorns himself with a pure and subtle equanimity ( $upeks\bar{a}$ ) and enters into the fourth  $dhy\bar{a}na.208$

This bodhisattva knows well that dharmas are empty ( $\dot{sunya}$ ) and without characteristics (animitta), but as beings themselves do not know it, he resorts to the signs of dhyāna (dhyānanimitta) in order to convert them.

If the emptiness of dharmas (*dharmaśūnyatā*) truly existed in itself, we would not call it emptiness and it would not be necessary to abandon the five objects of enjoyment (*pañcakāmaguṇa*) to obtain *dhyāna* since, existing substantially, this emptiness would involve neither abandoning (*tyāga*) nor acquiring (*lābha*). [208c] But the empty nature of dharmas also being non-existent, you cannot raise the objection [that you have just brought up] by saying: "How can the bodhisattva produce trance on empty dharmas?"

Here the *Traité*, taking a few liberties, reproduces the canonical definitions of the four *dhyānas*, the original formulation of which in Pāli and in Sanskrit has been cited above (p. 1024F, n.). This formula is commented on word by word in Vibhaṅga, p. 256-261, Visuddhimagga, ed. Warren, p. 112-115, 126-137, etc.

It is to this information that the great exegetists of the 4<sup>th</sup> century turned: the five hundred arhats of Kaśmir who compiled the Mahāvibhāṣa (T 1545, k. 85, p. 442a1-8) and, as we will see, the author or authors of the *Traité*.

2) When Devadatta asked the Buddha to retire and to entrust the community to him, the Buddha refused curtly and treated his cousin as a mūḍha 'fool'", śava 'corpse, and kheṭāśika 'eater of spit'. Those who recalled the kiss exchanged between Devadatta and Ajātaśatru could not help but see an allusion to this repugnant action. This is why the translators of the afore-mentioned sources translated khetāśika as follows:

- a. Tan t'o 'eater of spit' (Sarv. Vin., T 1435, k. 36, p. 258b7),
- b. Che t'o tchö, 'eater of spit' (Mūlasarv. Vin., T 1450, k. 13, p. 169b26).
- c. Che jen t'o tchö,' eater of human spit' (Mahāvibhāṣā, T 1545, k. 85, p. 442a6-7).
- d. Seou t'o jen, 'swallower of spit' (Traité, T 1509, k. 26, p. 252c3).

If the Buddha treated Devadatta as a swallower of spit, it is because the latter had taken Ajātaśatru's spit, and the Buddha spoke only the truth.

Now in the Majjhima, I, p. 395, the Buddha said: *Yañ ca kho Tathāgato vMacaṃ jānmati bhūtaṃ... tatra kālaññā Tathāgato hoti tassā vācāya veyyākaraṇāya*: "Every word that the Buddha knows to be true, he waits for the opportunity to utter it", and that whether it is unpleasant or pleasant for others.

In this case, the Buddha was completely right in calling Devadatta *kheṭāśika* and the accusation against the Buddha does not hold. In the words of the 14<sup>th</sup> *āveṇikadharma*, every word of the Buddha is preceded by knowledge and accompanied by knowledge.

Furthermore, the bodhisattva practices *dhyāna* without being attached to grasping characteristics (*animittodgrahṇabhiniveśāt*). And in the same way that a man swallows medicine (*bhaiṣajya*) to eliminate sickness (*vyādhi*) and not because of its taste, so the bodhisattva practices *dhyāna* for the purification of morality (*śīlaviśodhana*) and the perfecting of wisdom (*prajñāsaṃpādana*).

In each  $dhy\bar{a}na$ , the bodhisattva cultivates great loving-kindness ( $mah\bar{a}maitr\bar{t}$ ). In  $dhy\bar{a}na$ , the contemplation of emptiness ( $s\bar{u}nyat\bar{a}samanupasyan\bar{a}$ ) does not take place. Since it is a matter [of overcoming] the five objects of enjoyment ( $pa\bar{n}cak\bar{a}maguna$ ), gross errors and mistakes ( $vipary\bar{a}sa$ ), it is necessary to resort to subtle ( $s\bar{u}ksma$ ) but false (vitatha) subterfuges to destroy them, in the same way that a poison (visa) is required in order to destroy other poisons.

# CHAPTER XXXIII: THE FOUR IMMEASURABLES AND THE FOUR FORMLESS ABSORPTIONS(p. 1239F)

## First Section THE FOUR IMMEASURABLES

#### PRELIMINARY NOTE

The third class of supplementary dharmas recommended by the Prajñāpāramitā for the bodhisattva is made up of the four immeasurables: loving kindness (maitrī or maitrā), compassion (karuṇā), joy (muditā) and equanimity (upekṣā). These are the four limitless ones (apramāṇa), the four liberations of the mind (cetovimukti) or the four abodes of Brahmā (brahmavihāra). This last term is by far the most frequent in the post-canonical Sanskrit texts and in the Mahāyāna sūtras and śāstras.

A stock phrase endlessly repeated in the Tripiṭaka defines the four immeasurables. The Pāli wording shows almost no variation: Dīgha, I, p. 250-251; II, p. 186-187, 242, 250; III, p. 49-50, 78, 223-224; Majjhima, I, p. 38, 27,, 283, 297, 335, 351, 369-370; II, p. 76, 195; III, p. 146; Saṃyutta, IV, p. 196, 322, 351-356; V, p. 115-116; Anguttara, I, p. 183, 192, 196; II, p. 128-130, 184; III, p. 225; IV, p. 390; V, p. 299-301. 344-345. - On the other hand, the Sanskrit wording, imperfectly reproduced in the Prajñāpāramitā editions, has many variants: Sanskrit Mahāparinirvāṇa, p. 350; Mahāvastu, III, p. 213; Pañcaviṃśati, p. 181; Śatasāhasrikā, p. 1444; Daśabhūmika, o. 34; Mahāvyut., no. 1504-1509.

Pāli: So mettāsahagatena cetaasā skam disam pharitvā viharati, thatā duriyam .... Upekhāsahagatena cetasā - pe – pharitvā viharati.

Sanskrit: Sa maitrīsahagatena cettena vipulena mahadgatenādvayenāpramāṇenāvaireṇā-sapatnenāvyāvadhyena ... spharitvopasampadya viharati.

Transl. of the Pāli. - He abides, having encompassed the first region with a mind associated with loving-kindness. In the same say, he abides, having encompassed the second, the third and the fourth region, the zenith, the nadir, the [four] intermediate regions. Having encompassed the entire world everywhere and in every way with a mind associated with loving-kindness, with an extended mind, a grand immense mind free of enmity, free of malice, he abides.

He does the same with a mind associated with compassion, with a mind associated with joy and with a mind associated with equanimity.

In the chapters dedicated to the immeasurables, the Abhidharmas comment at greater or lesser length on this canonical formula. For the Pāli Abhidhamma, see Vibhanga, chap. XIII, p. 272-284; Atthaālinī, p. 192-197; Vidhuddhimagga, ed. Warren, chap. IX, p. 244-270 (transl. Nanamoli, p. 321-353); Vimyyimagga, transl. Ehara, p. 181-197. For the Sanskrit Abhidharma, see Vibhāsā, T 1545, k. 81-83, p. 420b-431b;

Abhidharmāmṛta, T 1553, k. 2, p. 975c9-22 (reconstruction by Sastri, p. 99-100); Kośa, VIII, p. 196-203; Nyāyānusāra, T 1562, k. 79, p. 768c-771a; Abhidharmadīpa, p. 427-429.

Here, contrary to its custom, the *Traité* avoids its usual method of first explaining the Sarvāstivādin theories and then opposing them with the Mahāyāna point of view, perhaps because the two Vehicles are in agreement on an essential point: in the meditation on loving-kindness, etc., nobody receives, nobody is satisfied and, nevertheless, merit arises in the mind of the benevolent one by the very power of his benevolence (Kośa, IV, p. 245). The four immeasurables are purely platonic wishes: it is not enough to wish (*adhimuc*-) that beings be happy, free of suffering or full of joy for this wish to be realized.

There are, however, three differences between the Hinayāna and Mahāyāna conceptions on this subject.

First a difference in intention. The śrāvaka practices the immeasurables in his own interest, to purify his own mind. The bodhisattva has in mind only the interests of others which he realizes indirectly. By practicing the immeasurables, he personally gains merit which he then can apply to the welfare and happiness of all beings.

Next, there are differences in domain or object. The śravaka brings the immeasurables to bear upon the beings of kāmadhātu who alone are able to call forth the feelings of loving-kindness, compassion, joy or equanimity in him. The bodhisattva puts no limits on his feelings and includes in them all beings of the three worlds (kāma-, rūpa- and ārūpyadhātu) distributed in the numberless universes of the ten directions.

Further, the bodhisattva never loses sight of the twofold emptiness of beings and things that forms the very basis of his philosophical outlook. His feelings are brought to bear upon beings, things and even, by a supreme paradox, on nothing whatsoever. Although he has beings in mind, he does not forget that these do not exist; although he has things in mind, he remembers that they come from a complex of causes and conditions and are empty of intrinsic nature and of characteristics; although he has nothing in view, he keeps from hypostatizing this true nature of things which dissolves into a pure and simple non-existence.

To my [Lamotte] knowledge, the distinction between loving-kindness that has beings as object, things as object, or not having any object is a Mahāyanist invention. In the following pages, the *Traité* does not fail to exploit it.

## I. DEFINITION OF THE IMMEASURABLES (p. 1242F)

The four immeasurable feelings ( $apram\bar{a}nacitta$ ) are loving-kindness ( $maitr\bar{i}$ ), compassion ( $karun\bar{a}$ ), joy ( $mudit\bar{a}$ ) and equanimity ( $upek\bar{s}\bar{a}$ ).

*Maitrī* is to think about beings with love and always to seek for the safety (*yogakṣema*) and happy things (*sukhvastu*) in order to bring them good.

 $Karun\bar{a}$  is to think with compassion of beings who are suffering in the five destinies (gati) all sorts of bodily suffering ( $k\bar{a}yikaduhkha$ ) and mental suffering (caitasikaduhkha).

Muditā is to wish that beings obtain joy as a result of happiness (sukha).

 $Upek s\bar{a}$  is to abandon the three previous feelings and think of beings without either aversion (pratigha) or fondness (anunaya).

*Maitrī* is practiced to remove<sup>209</sup> hostility (*vyāpāda*) toward beings.

Karuṇā is practiced to remove harm (vihiṃsā) toward beings.

*Muditā* is practiced to remove dissatisfaction (*arati*) toward beings.

 $Upek \bar{s}a$  is practiced to remove sensual attachment ( $k\bar{a}mar\bar{a}ga$ ) and hostility ( $vy\bar{a}p\bar{a}da$ ) toward others. 210

Question. –The four immeasurables (*apramāṇa*), [the four formless absorptions (*ārūpyasamāppati*), the eight liberations (*vimokṣa*), the eight masteries (*abhibhvāyatana*), the nine successive absorptions (*anupūrvasamāpatti*) and finally the ten spheres of totality (*kṛtsnāyatana*) are already contained in the four trances (*dhyāna*). Why speak of them separately here?

The corresponding Sanskrit phrases are cited in the Abhidharmadīpa, p. 442, l. 3-6: *Maitry āsevitā bhāvitā bahulīkṛtā vyāpādaprahāṇāya saṃvartate, karuṇā vihiṃsāprahāṇāya, aratiprahāṇāya muditā, kāmarāgavyāpādaprahāṇāyopekṣā.* 

See also Kośa, VIII, p. 196; Kośavyākhyā, p. 686, l. 6-8; Lalitavistara, p. 442, l. 3-5; Sūtrālaṃkāra, p. 181, l. 10-11; Bodh, bhūmi, p. 98, l. 18-19, p. 204, l. 24.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>209</sup> It should be noted that, for the Vibhāṣā, T 1545, k. 83, k. 427b10-24, the Kośa, VIII, p. 200-201 and the Kośavyākhyā, p. 687), the passions are merely removed (*dūrīkṛta*) or weakened (*viṣkhambhita*), not abandoned, by the *apramāṇas*.

<sup>210</sup> This is the canonical doctrine: cf. Dīgha, III, p. 248-249 (cited in Visuddhimagga, ed. Warren, p. 264): Nissaraṇaṃ h'etaṃ, āvuso, byāpādassa, yad idaṃ mettā cetovimutti...Nissaraṇam h'etaṃ, āvyuso, vihesāya, yad idaṃ karuṇā cetovimutti... Nissaraṇaṃ h'etaṃ, āvuso, aratiyā, yad idaṃ muditā cetovimutti... Nissaraṇam h'etaṃ, āvuso, rāgassa, yad idaṃ upekkhā cetovimutti...

Answer. – Although all these things are contained in the four  $dhy\bar{a}nas$ , if they are not mentioned separately by name, their particular virtues (guna) would not be known. It is like precious objects in a sack; if you do not open the sack to take them out, nobody can know about them.

- 1) For those who want to obtain great merit  $(mah\bar{a}punya)$ ,  $^{211}$  one should talk about the four immeasurables  $(apram\bar{a}na)$ .
- 2) In order to inspire disgust for visibles ( $r\bar{u}panirveda$ ), like spending time in prison ( $k\bar{a}r\bar{a}grha$ ), one should talk about the four formless absorptions ( $\bar{a}r\bar{u}pyasam\bar{a}patti$ ).
- 3) To those who cannot obtain mastery (*abhibhava*) over objects (*ālambana*) so as to see objects at will (*yathestam*), one should speak about the eight masteries (*abhibhvāatana*).
- 4) To those who take blocked paths (*pratiṣiddhamārga*) and do not succeed in freeing the obstacles, one should speak of the eight liberations (*vimokṣa*).
- 5) To untamed minds (*adāntacitta*) that cannot merge from one trance (*dhyāna*) in order to enter into the others successively, one should speak of the nine successive absorptions (*anupūrvasamāpatti*).
- 6) To those who do not possess complete illumination (*kṛṭṣnāvabhāsa*) on all objects (*ālambana*) in order to liberate them at will, one should speak of the ten totalities (*kṛṭṣnāyatana*).

When one thinks about the beings of the ten directions, wishing them to obtain happiness, a mental event (caitasika dharma) occurs called maitrī. The aggregates associated with this maitrī, feelings (vedanā), concepts (saṃjñā), formations (saṃkāra) and consciousnesses (vijñāna), give rise to bodily actions (kāyakarman), vocal actions (vākkarman) and formations dissociated from the mind (cittaprayuktasaṃskāra): the group of these dharmas (dharmasāmagrī) is called maitrī. Since they are loving-kindness or arise with loving-kindness as dominant (adhipati), these dharmas are given the name of maitrī. In the same way, all [209a] minds (citta) and all mental events (caitasika dharma), although they are all causes and conditions (hetupratyaya) of future actions, are called cetana because, among their activities (krivā). "thinking" (cetana) is the strongest. 212

It is the same for *karunā*, *muditā* and *upeksā*.

2

<sup>211</sup> See above, p. 323-324F, 1040F.

All bodily or vocal actions derived from loving-kindness are called *maitrī* in the same way that bodily or vocal actions derived from 'thinking', i.e., from volition (*cetanā*), are themselves volition. This is why the Buddha said in the Anguttara, III, p. 415: *Cetanāhaṃ bhikkhave kammaṃ vadāmi; cetayitvā kammaṃ karoti kāyena vācāya manasā:* "I say, O monks, that action is volition: it is after having wished that one acts with body, speech and mind."

On this subject, see Tchong a han, T 26, k. 27, p. 600a24; Kathāvatthu, p. 393; Atthasālinī, p. 88; Kośa, IV, p. 1-2; Karmasiddhiprakāraṇa, MCB, IV, p. 152, 207-208; Madh, vṛtti, p. 305-306.

This *maitrī* occurs in the form realm (*rūpadhātu*);<sup>213</sup> it is impure (*sāsrava*) or pure (*anāsrava*), to be destroyed (*prahātavya*) or not to be destroyed (*na prahātavya*). It also occurs in the [four] root trances (*mauladhyāna*) and again in the *dhyānāntara* [variation of the first *dhyāna*].<sup>214</sup> Associated with the three sovereign organs (*indriya*), it excludes the faculty of unpleasantness (*duḥkhendriya*) and the faculty of dissatisfaction (*daurmansayendriya*).<sup>215</sup> This is all explained in detail in the Abhidharma.

When *maitrī* still grasps (*udgrhṇāti*) the nature of the beings [towards whom the loving-kindness is expressed], it is impure (*sāsrava*); when, after having understood the nature of beings, it enters into the true nature (*bhūtalakṣaṇa*) of dharmas, it is pure (*anāsrava*). This is why the *Wou-tsin-yi p'ou- sa-wen* (Aksayamatibodhisattyapariprechā)<sup>216</sup> says:

214 Cf. Vibhāṣā,T 1545, k. 81, p. 421a1-6: "The four *apramāṇas* occur in kāmadhātu. As for the levels (*bhūmi*), *maitrī*, *karuṇā* and *upekṣā* occur in seven levels: *kāmadhātu*, the four *dhyānas*, the *anāgamya* and the *dhyānāntara*. Some say that they occur in ten levels: the four *dhyānas*, four *sāmantakas*, the *dhyānāntara* and *kāmadhātu*. The *āpramāṇa* of *muditā* occurs in three levels: *kāmadhātu*, first and second *dhyānas*. Other teachers say that the first and second *dhyānas* do not have the *apramāṇa* of *karuṇā*. Why? Because the first and second *dhyānas* have a strong feeling of joy."

Cf. Kośabhāṣya, p. 453, l. 12-18: *Prathamadvitīyadhyānayor muditā, saumamasyatvāt. Anyāni trīny apramanāṇi ṣaṭsu bhūmiṣu: anāgamye, dhyānāntare, dhyāneṣu ca, saprayogamaulagrahaṇāt. Kecit punaḥ anāgamyam hitvā pannñcasv etānīcchanti. Daśasv ity apare, kāmadhātum sāmantakāni ca prakṣipya samāhitāsamāhitamaulaprayogagrahaṇāt. — "Muditā is of the first and second dhyāna, for it is satisfaction [and satisfaction is absent in the other dhyānas]. The other three apramāṇas occur in six levels: anāgamya, dhyānāntara and the [four] dhyānas, thus including the root dhyānas with their preparatory stages. However, some teachers, excluding anāgamya, distribute these apramāṇas into five levels. Still others, into ten levels by adding [to the six] the [four] sāmantakas [of the higher dhyānas] and attributing [the apramāṇas] to both the state of non-concentration and that of concentration, to the preparatory states as well as to the main dhyānas."* 

215 Of the twenty-two *indriya*s of which the Sūtra speaks, five are faculties of feeling (*vedanendriya*). *Maitrī* is associated with the feeling of pleasure (*sukhendriya*), the faculty of satisfaction (*saumanasyendriya*), and the feeling of equanimity (*upekṣendriya*). On the other hand, it is without the feeling of displeasure (*suḥkhendriya*) and the feeling of dispatisfaction (*daurmanasyendriya*).

For these five *indriyas*, see Saṃyutta, V, p. 209; Kośa, II, p. 112-15.

The *Akṣayamatibodhisattvaparipṛcchā*, which will be cited again below, p. 1272F and which is mentioned in the Mahāvyut., no. 1400, forms the 45<sup>th</sup> section of the Chinese Ratnakūṭa and the 44<sup>th</sup> section of the Tibetan Ratnakūṭa:

- 1) *Wou-tsin-houei p'ou-sa houei*, T 310, k. 115, p. 648a-650b, translated by Bodhiruci (Dharmaruci) between 693 and 727 AD.
- 2) *Blo-gros-mi-zad-pas* €*us pa*, OKC, no. 760 (44), translated and revised by Śurendrabodhi and Ye-śes-sde.

This is then a *maitrī* in the non-concentrated state, in kāmadhātu.

"There are three kinds of *maitrī*: *i*) that which has beings as object (*sattvālambana*), *ii*) that which has things as object (*dharmālambana*), *iii*) that which has no object (*anālambana*).<sup>217</sup> "

#### II. ASPECTS OF THE IMMEASURABLES

#### 1. Loving-kindness, compassion and joy

Question. – What are the aspects  $(\bar{a}k\bar{a}ra)$  of these four immeasurables  $(apram\bar{a}na)$ ?

Answer. – As the Buddha said everywhere in the sūtras: "With a mind associated with loving-kindness (maitrīsahagatena cittena), free of enmity (avaireṇa), free of hostility (anupanāhena), free of rivalry (asapatnena), free of malice (avyāvadhyena), extended (vipulena), expanded (mahadgatena), immense (apramāṇena) and well cultivated (subhāvitena), the bhikṣu intentionally includes in this mind of loving-kindness (maitrīcittenādhimucya spharati) the beings of universes in the eastern direction (pūrvā diś), then he intentionally includes in this mind of loving-kindness the beings of the universes of the ten directions: those of the south (dakṣiṇā), the west (paścimā), the north (uttarā), of the four intermediate directions (vidiś), of the zenith (upariṣṭāt) and the nadir (adhastāt). And in the same way, he includes them by means

But the passage cited here does not belong to the *Akṣayamatibodhisattvaparipṛcchā*: it comes from the *Akṣayamatinirdeśasūtra* or simply *Akṣayamatisūtra*, of which there are two Chinese translations and one Tibetan translation:

- 1) A-tch'a-mo p'ou-sa king, T 403, translated by Dharmarakşa between 265 and 313.
- 2) Wou-tsin-yi p'ou-sa p'in, translated by Dharmakṣema between 414 and 421 and later incorporated in the Mahāsaṃnipāta where it forms the 12<sup>th</sup> section (T 397, k. 27-30, p. 184-213).
  - 3) Blo-gros-mi-zad-pas bstan-pa, OKC, no. 842, anonymously translated.

This sūtra, under the name Akṣayamatisūtra, is cited in the Śikṣāsamuccaya, p. 11, 21, 33, 34, 117, 119, 158, 167, 183, 190, 212, 233, 236, 271, 278, 285, 287, 316; in the Pañjikā,, p. 81, 86, 118, 173, 522, 527; and the Traité will refer to it later (k. 53, p. 442a2), calling it A-tch'a-mo king. It is also cited under the name Akṣayamatinirdeśasūtra in the Pañjikā, p. 20, and the Mahāvyut., no. 1344.

217 Akṣayamatinideśa, T 403, k. 4, p. 500a13-17; T 397, k. 29, p. 200a15-18. The original Sanskrit is cited in Śikṣāsamucchaya, p. 212: Sā [maitrī] trividhākṣayamatisūtre 'bhihitā: sattvārambaṇā maitrī prathamacittotpādikānāṃ bodhisattvānāṃ; dharmārambaṇā caryāpratipannānāṃ bodhisattvānāṃ; anārambaṇā maitrī anutpattikadharmakṣātipratilabdhānāṃ bodhisattvānām iti. — "In the Akṣayamatisūtra, this loving-kindness is threefold: that which has beings as object belongs to the bodhisattvas who have just produced the mind of bodhi; that which has dharmas as object belongs to bodhisattvas cultivating the practices; that which has no object belongs to the bodhisattva having the conviction that dharmas do not arise."

As we will see later, p. 1251F, this threefold  $maitr\bar{t}$  is mentioned frequently in the Mahāyāna sūtras and śāstras.

of a mind associated with compassion (*karuṇāsahagatena*), associated with joy (*muditāsahagatena*) and associated with equanimity (*upeksāsahagatena* cittena)."218

a. maitrīsahagatena cittena.

"With a mind associated with loving-kindness." –  $Maitr\bar{\iota}$  is a mental event ( $caitasika\ dharma$ ) capable of counteracting the corruptions ( $kas\bar{a}ya$ ) contained in the mind, namely, hatred (dvesa), hostility ( $upan\bar{a}ha$ ), avarice ( $m\bar{a}tsarya$ ), lust ( $r\bar{a}ga$ ), and the other passions (klesa). Thus, when the purifying pearl (mani) is placed in dirty water, it becomes clear.

b. avaireṇānupanāhena cittena.

"With a mind free of enmity and free of hostility." – Let us suppose that, with or without reason, one hates someone. If one wants to insult him, curse him, strike him or rob him, this is enmity (*vaira*), If one waits for the proper moment and, given the chance, one torments him with all one's strength, this is hostility (*upanāha*). Since *maitrī* counteracts both these things, it is said to be free of enmity and hostility.<sup>219</sup>

c. asapatnenābyāvadhyena cittena.

"With a mind free of rivalry and free of malice." – Hostility (*upanāha*) is rivalry (*sapatnatā*). The first offensive movement (*āghāta*) is of hostility (*upanāha*). In time, hostility becomes rivalry (*sapatnatā*). When one inflicts torment (*vyābādha*) by means of physical and vocal actions (*kāyavākkarman*), this is malice (*vyāvadhya*).

Furthermore, the fetter 'hostility' (*pratighasamyojana*) is called enmity (*vaira*). When enmity increases, is prolonged and becomes attached to but not yet fixed (*niyata*) in the mind, it takes the name of hostility (*upanāha*) and also rivalry (*sapatnatā*). When the mind is determined and no longer has any scruples, this is called malice (*vyāvadhya*).<sup>220</sup>

Because the power of *maitrīcitta* rejects, abandons and leaves behind these three things, it is said to be 'free of enmity, free of hostility, free of rivalry and free of malice'. The Buddha praised *maitrīcitta* in regard to this fourfold exemption.<sup>221</sup>

Mātā yathā niyam puttam

Here the *Traité* reproduces, with a few liberties, the canonical stock phrase cited above, p. 1239F, with references. Like the Kośa, VIII, p. 199, and the Visuddhimagga, p. 255, it is careful to state that the *apramāṇas* include not the directions but the beings in these regions. It insists on the voluntary nature of their action, for the ascetic voluntarily (*adhimucaya*) and in contradiction to the actual fact that the ascetic sees beings as happy, unhappy, joyful: see Kośa, IV, p. 245; VIII, p. 198-199.

According to the Visuddhimagga, p. 256, the mind is without enmity (*avera*) inasmuch as it destroys malice and hostility (*bvāpādapaccatthikappahānena*)

<sup>220</sup> On the other hand, for the Visuddhimagga, p. 256, the mind is *abyāpajjha* 'without affliction', because it destroys sadness (*domanassappahānato*). The expression then would mean absence of suffering (*niddukkha*).

Notably in the Mettasutta of the Suttanipāta, p. 26, v. 149-151:

All beings fear suffering and are attached to happiness. Enmity is cause and condition for suffering, and *maitrī* is cause and condition for happiness. Beings who hear it said that this concentration of loving-kindness (*maitrīsamādhi*) can chase away suffering and bring happiness become mindful (*smṛtimat*), brave (ātāpin) and full of energy (vīryavat) to practice this meditative stabilization, and this is why they are 'without enmity, without hostility, without rivalry and without malice.'

d. vipulena, mahadgatenāpramānena cittena.

"With a vast, expanded, immense mind". 222 – This mind is single, but as its magnitude differs, there are three attributive adjectives used.

This mind is vast (*vipula*) when it includes one single region, extended [209b] (*mahadgata*) when it goes far and high, immense (*apramāṇa*) when it includes the nadir (*adhastād diś*) and the other nine regions.

Furthermore, if it is low (avara), maitrī is called vast (vipula); middling (madhya), it is called extended (mahadgata); higher (agra), it is called immense (apramāṇa).

āyusā ekaputtam anurakkhe / evam pi sabbabhūtesu mānasam bhāvaye aparimāṇaṃ //

Mettañ ca sabbalokasmim mānasam bhāvaye aparimāṇaṃ / udhaṃ adho ca tiriyañ ca asambādham averaṃ asapattaṃ //

Tiṭṭhaṃ caraṃ nisinno vā sayāno vā yāvat' assa vigatamiddho / etaṃ satiṃ adhiṭṭheyya, brahmam etam vihāraṃ idha-m-āhu //

Transl. - "As a mother, during her entire life, protects her own son, her only son, so should everyone nourish an immense friendliness for all beings.

Let him nourish an immense friendliness and loving-kindness for the entire world, above, below and across, free of any obstacle, enmity or rivalry.

Standing, walking, sitting or lying down, as long as he is awake, let him be filled with this feeling, for this, they say, is the abode of the Brahmā gods."

222 Cf. Visuddhimagga, p. 256: Vipulenā ti attha ca pharaṇavasena vipulatā daṭṭhabbā. Bhūmivasena pana etaṃ mahaggataṃ. Paguṇavasena ca appamāṇasattārammaṇavasena ca appamāṇam: "By vast here we should understand its amplitude as inclusion. It is also expanded in regard to the levels in which it is applicable [from kāmadhātu up to rūpadhātu included]. It is immense in regard to its competence and to the fact that it has innumerable beings as object."

Furthermore, if it bears upon the beings of the four main directions ( $di\dot{s}$ ),  $maitr\bar{t}$  is called vast (vipula); if it bears upon the beings of the four intermediate directions ( $vidi\dot{s}$ ), it is said to be extended (mahadgata); if it bears upon the beings of the zenith and the nadir, It is said to be immense ( $apram\bar{a}na$ ).

Furthermore, if it destroys<sup>223</sup> the minds of enmity (*vairacitta*), *maitrī* is called vast (*vipula*); if it destroys the minds of rivalry (*sapatnacitta*), it is called extended (*mahadgata*); if it destroys the minds of malice (*vvāvadhyacitta*) it is called immense (*apramāna*).

Furthermore, all the defiled minds (*kliṣṭajñāna*) cultivated by vile individuals giving rise to evil things are called vile (*hīna*). The most vile of them are enmity (*vaira*), rivalry (*sapatnatā*) and malice (*vyāvadhya*). Since *maitrī* destroys these vile minds, it is called vast (*vipula*), extended (*mahadgata*) and immense (*apramāṇa*). Why? Because great causes and conditions are necessary to destroy vile things. The 'vast' mind (*vipulacitta*) that fears sin (*āpatti*), that fears falling into hell, eliminates the bad dharmas from the mind; the 'extended' mind (*mahadgatacitta*) that believes in the retribution of merits (*puṇyavipāka*) eliminates the bad thoughts; the 'immense' mind (*apramāṇacitta*) that wants to attain nirvāṇa eliminates the bad thoughts.

Furthermore, when the yogin observes the purity of the discipline (*śīlaviśuddhi*), this is a 'vast' mind; when he is endowed with trance and absorption (*dhyānasamāpattisaṃpanna*), this is an 'extended' mind; when he is endowed with wisdom (*prajñāsaṃpanna*), this is an 'immense' mind.

When the yogin, by means of this mind of loving-kindness ( $maitr\bar{c}itta$ ), thinks about the noble people ( $\bar{a}ryapudgala$ ) who have found the Path, this is an 'immense' mind because he is using immense means to distinguish these noble people. When he thinks about the noble abodes ( $\bar{a}v\bar{a}sa$ ) of gods and men, this is an 'extended' mind. When he thinks about lower beings ( $h\bar{i}nasattva$ ) and the three unfortunate (durgati) destinies, this is a 'vast' mind.

When he thinks with loving-kindness about a being that is dear to him (*priyasattva*) and he extends this thought [to all dear beings], this is a 'vast' mind. When he thinks with loving-kindness about people who are indifferent to him (*madhyastha puruṣa*), this is an 'extended' mind. When he thinks with loving-kindness about his enemies (*vaira*) and thus his merits (*guṇa*) are many, this is an 'immense' mind.<sup>224</sup>

224 Maitrī should be practiced gradually in this way to include with all beings, friends, neutrals and enemies, in the same loving-kindness. This is called 'breaking the barriers (sīmasambheda). Cf. Visuddhimagga, p. 246: Bhikkhunā... sīmasambhedam katthkāmena... atippiyasahāyake, atippiyasahāyakato majjhatte, majjhattato veripuggate mettā bhāvetabbā. Bhāventena ca ekekasmim kottāse mudum kammaniyam cittam katvā tadanantare tadanantare upasamharitabbam: "The monk who wishes to break the barriers should cultivate loving-kindness toward a very dear friend, then toward a neutral person as though he were very dear, then toward an enemy as though he were neutral. While he is doing this, in each case he should make his mind soft and gentle before going on to the next one."

For the way in which beginners (ādikmarmika) should practice loving-kindness, see also Vibhāṣā, T 1545, k. 82, p. 421c15-22; Kośa, VIII, p. 201-202.

<sup>223</sup> In fact, it does not destroy the passions; it removes them and undermines them.

The mind that bears upon a limited object is called 'vast'; that which bears upon a small object is called 'extended'; that which bears upon immensity is called 'immense'.

This is the meaning of these distinctions.

e. subhāvitena cittena.

By a 'well-cultivated' mind is meant a strong (*dṛḍha*) mind of loving-kindness (*maitrīcitta*). The mind is not yet 'well-cultivated' when one is just beginning to acquire it. In order that it be 'well-cultivated', it is not enough to practice it just toward fond people, or toward good people, or toward those who do good to us, or toward beings of a single direction; following long practice, it is necessary to acquire deep affection for and love equally and without any difference the three types of beings, friends (*priyapudgala*), enemies (*vairipudgala*) and neutrals (*madhyastha*), to look upon beings in the five destinies (*pañcagati*) and the ten directions with the same loving-kindness as one regards one's mother, father, older brother, younger brother, older sister, younger sister, one's son, nephew, one's friend; one should always look for good things to procure their welfare (*hita*) and safety (*yogakṣema*); finally, one should include the beings of the ten directions in this loving-kindness.

# 2. The three kinds of loving-kindness<sup>225</sup>

The *Traité* will return later (k. 40, p. 350b25-28; k. 53, p. 442a2-3) to these three types of loving-kindness and compassion. They are often mentioned in the Mahāyāna sūtras and śāstras, especially in the Aksayamatisūtra cited above, p. 1245F. Here are some other texts where they are mentioned:

Mahāyana Mahāparinirvāṇasūtra (T 374, k. 15, p. 452c; T 375, k. 14, p. 694c): O son of noble family, there are four other brahmanical conducts: maitrī, karuṇā, muditā and upekṣā. – The bodhisattva Kāśyapa said to the Buddha: O Bhagavat, if one practices maitrī well, one destroys malice (vyāpāda), and if one practices karuṇācitta, one also destroys malice. Then why speak of four apramāṇa cittas? By examining the meaning, there should be three. Bhagavat, there are three kinds of maitri. 1) that which has beings as object (sattvālambana); 2) that which has things as object (dharmālambana); 3) that which has no object (anālambana). It is the same for karuņā, muditā and upekṣā. Consequently, the apramāṇas should be three in number and not four. The *maitrī* that has beings as object is concerned with the five skandhas and wishes to bring them happiness: we say that it has beings as object. The one that has things as object is concerned with the things that are necessary to beings and brings them to beings: we say that it has things as object. The one that has no object concerns the Tathagata: we say that it has no object. In general, maitrī concerns poor beings (daridrasattva), but the Tathāgata, the great Teacher, is always free of poverty and enjoys absolute happiness (paramasukha). Thus, although it concerns beings, maitrī does not concern the Buddha. It is the same for the maitrī that concerns objects. O Bhagavat, the maitrī that has all beings as object concerns, for example, a father, mother, wife, son, relative; consequently we say that it has beings as object. The maitrī that has things as object does not see the father, mother, wife, son, relative; it see all the things that result from causes and conditions (pratītyotpanna): we say that it has things as object. The maitrī that has no object is based upon neither

the characteristic of a thing (*dharmanimitta*) nor the characteristic of a being (*sattvanimitta*): we say that it has no object. It is the same for the minds of *karuṇā*, *muditā* and *upekṣā*. Therefore the *apramāṇas* should be three and not four.

Buddhabhūmisūtraśāstra, T 1530, k. 5, p. 314b8-13: There are three kinds of *maitrī*: 1) that which has beings as object (*sattvālambana*); 2) that which has things as object (*dharmālambana*); 3) that which has no object (*anālambana*).

Bodhisattvas at the stage of those who have just produced bodhi mind (*prathamacittotpādikāvasthā*) practice mainly the *maitrī* that has beings as object. This is most frequently impure (*sāsrava*) for its realm (*gocara*) is purely conventional (*saṃvṛtisat*) things.

Bodhisattvas at the stage of those who are cultivating the practices (*caryāpratipannāvasthā*) mainly practice the *maitrī* that has things as object. This one also is impure (*sāsrava*) most frequently, for its realm (*gocara*) is the Mahāyāna teachings.

Bodhisattvas who have acquired the conviction that dharmas do not arise (anutpattikadharmakṣāntipratilabdha) practice maitrī mainly without object. Even though it has an object, the fundamental element (dharmadhātu), it is, like the dharmas of retribution (vipākadharma), eye, etc., without thought-construction (vikalpa), makes no effort (prayoga) and functions spontaneously (svaraseṇa pravartate). This is why it is called 'great maitrī without object' (anālambana), associated with the knowledge of equality (samatājñānasaṃprayukta). Another meaning: as it bears upon the fundamental element (dharmadhātu) only and is always without thought-construction (vikalpa), as it does not bear upon either beings or things, it is called the maitrī without object.

The Sūtrālaṃkāra, p. 121, also mentions these three kinds of *apramāṇa*. Those that have no object, it says, concern suchness (*tathatā*): they are without object insofar as they are without thought-construction (*te hy avukapatvād anālambanāḥ*).

Bodh. bhūmi, p. 241-242 (T 1579, k. 44, p. 535c7-18). Transl. – In short, the bodhisattva develops the four *apramāṇas* in three ways: those having beings as object, those having things as object and those having no object.

The bodhisattva arranges beings into three groups, happy, unhappy and neither unhappy nor happy, but all aspiring to happiness; he conceives towards them loving-kindness accompanied by the great resolve to procure happiness for them. Having included the ten directions in this mind of loving-kindness, he dwells with the aspiration ( $adhimokṣa = adhimuktisamj\~n\~a$ : cf. Kośa, VIII, p. 199) that this is about beings.

Then, no longer having the notion of things, the bodhisattva cultivates this loving-kindness by intentionally considering this metaphor of beings in what are just things. This is the *maitrī* of bodhisattvas having things as object.

Finally, the bodhisattva cultivates this loving-kindness by not even imagining things. This is the bodhisattva's  $maitr\bar{\iota}$  without object.

It is the same for karuṇā, muditā and upekṣā.

- 1) The mind of loving-kindness (*maitrīcitta*) of which we have just spoken is that which has beings as object (*sattvālambana*). It is found mainly among worldly people (*pṛthagjana*) practicing the trances or in adepts on the path of practice (śaikṣa) who have not yet destroyed the impurities (akṣīṇasrava).
- 2) There are those who practice a loving-kindness that has things as object (*dharmālambana*); these are the arhats who have destroyed the impurities [209c] (*kṣ̄māsrava*), the pratyekabuddhas and the Buddhas. Having destroyed the concept of self (*ātmasamjñā*) and eliminated notions of identity and difference (*ekatvānyatvasamjñā*), these holy individuals (*āryapudgala*) consider only the objects of enjoyment (*kāmaguṇa*) continually (*prābandika*) coming from causes and conditions (*hetupratyaya*). When they think about beings with loving-kindness, they think only of the emptiness (*śūnya*) coming continually from causes and conditions together. The 'being' is the five [empty] *skandhas*. When they think with loving-kindness, they are thinking about these five skandhas. But beings themselves ignore this emptiness of things (*dharmaśūnyatā*) and, with their whole heart, always want to find happiness (*sukha*). The holy individuals (*āryapudgala*) of whom we are speaking take pity on them and make them find happiness as they wish, but only from the conventional point of view (*saṃvṛtitas*). This is what is called loving-kindness having things as object (*dharmālambana*).
- 3) As for the loving-kindness that has no object (anālambana), this is the one that only the Buddhas possess. Why? The mind of the Buddhas does not rest on the conditioned (saṃskṛta) or on the unconditioned (asaṃskṛta); it does not rest on the past (atīta), the future (anāgata) or the present (pratyutpanna). The Buddhas know that all objects (ālambana) are not real, are erroneous and deceptive: this is why their mind is without object (anālamabana). Beings do not know the true nature (bhūtalakṣaṇa) of things; they wander through the five destinies (pañcagati), their minds are attached (abhiniviśate) to things, they make distinctions, take [certain things] and reject other things. And so the Buddhas use the wisdom (prajñā) of the true nature of things and make beings obtain it: this is the loving-kindness 'without object'.

It is as if one gave material (vasu) objects to a needy person (daridra), precious things of gold or silver (suvarṇarūpyamayaratnadravya) and [finally] the precious wish-fulfilling gem: it is the same for the

It may be noted that the sources cited here have adapted the theory of the three kinds of *maitrī* to the ultimate point of their philosophy. Thus the Mahāyana Mahāparinirvaṇasūtra which accepts the innateness of buddha-nature in all beings makes the Tathāgata the object of the *maitrī* called 'without object'. For the Buddhabhūmisūtra, the Sūtrālaṃkāra and the Bodh, bhūmi, which come under the idealist school of the Vijñānavādins, the object of the *maitrī* 'without object' is the fundamental element (*dharmadhātu*), suchness (*tathatā*), a mind where subject and object of consciousness are mixed, or rather, a mind where there is neither subject nor object.

The *Traité*, which represents pure Madhyamaka, clearly cannot go along with the conclusions of monist Buddhism or of idealist Buddhism. For the *Traité*, the object of *maitrī* 'without object' is the true nature of things (*dharmāṇāṃ bhūtalakṣaṇam*), i.e., pure and simple non-existence as has been explained.

loving-kindness that has beings as object, the loving-kindness that has things as object and the loving-kindness without object, respectively. 226

This briefly (saṃkṣepeṇa) defines the meaning of the mind of loving-kindness. It is the same for the mind of compassion (karuṇācitta): the ascetic includes with compassion the suffering of beings of the ten directions and reflects as follows: "Beings are in misery; they should not endure all these sufferings." Then "with a mind free of enmity (avaira), free of hostility (anupanāha), free of rivalry (asapatna), free of malice (avyāvadhya)," etc., "he includes the ten directions."

## 3. The subjective nature of loving-kindness

Question. – There are three kinds of beings: *i)* those who experience happiness (*sukhita*), such as the gods and a small portion of humans (*manuṣyāṇāṃ prabheda*); *ii*) those who undergo suffering (*duḥkhita*), such as the beings of the three unfortunate destinies (*durgati*) and a small portion of humans; *iii*) those who experience neither suffering nor happiness (*aduḥkhāsukhita*), such as a small portion of beings in the five destinies. How do those who practice loving-kindness see all beings as experiencing happiness, and those who practice compassion see all beings as undergoing suffering?

Answer. - When the yogin wants to use the infinite feeling of loving-kindness, first he makes the following vow (praṇidhāna): "I wish that beings may experience all kinds of happiness." Having in this way grasped (udgrhya) the character of the happy man (sukhitanimitta), he concentrates his mind (cittaṃ pragrhṇāti) and enters into dhyāna. This nature increases gradually (krameṇa vardhate) and then the yogin sees all beings as experiencing happiness.

Thus, when one is making fire by friction (*mathana*), first the flame takes fire on the soft grass (*mṛdutṛṇa*) and dried cow dung (śuṣkagomaya) and, as the strength of the fire increases, it is able to consume big pieces of moist wood (*sasnehakāṣṭha*).<sup>228</sup> It is the same for the concentration of loving-kindness (*maitrīṣamādhi*): at the beginning, when one make the vows for loving-kindness (*maitrīpramidhāna*), one applies them only to one's friends (*mitra*); but when the mind of loving-kindness has grown, enemies (*amitra*) and relatives (*bandhu*) become mixed up and one sees them all as experiencing happiness: this is

The three kinds of *maitrī* are comparable to the gift of an ordinary object, the gift of a precious object, and the gift of the *cintāmaṇi*, respectively.

We may recall that the practice of the *apramāṇas* is limited to formulating and extending to infinity purely platonic vows: cf. Abhidharmadīpa, p. 428: *Sukhitā vata santu sattvā iti manasi kurvan maitrīm samāpadyate, dhuḥkhitā vata sattvā iti karuṇām, modantāṃ vata sattvā iti muditām, sattvā ity eva manasi kurvann upeksām samāpadyate mādhyasthvāt. See also Kośa, VIII, p. 198.* 

<sup>228</sup> Cf. Majjhima, I, p. 240: *Api nu... puriso allam... kaṭṭhaṃ sasnehaṃ udake nikkhhittaṃ uttarāraṇim ādāya abhimanthento aggiṃ abhinibbatteyya tejo pātukareyyāti.* – "A man who rubs a soaking wet piece of wood with a fire stick, would he be able to produce fire and create heat?"

because the *dhyānas* or *samāpattis* of loving-kindness have grown (*vardhita*) and are becoming complete (*saṃpanna*).

It is the same for the minds of compassion (karuṇā), joy (muditā) and equanimity (upekṣā).

#### 4. Object and merit of equanimity

Question. – In the course of the mind of compassion (*karuṇācitta*), one takes hold of the character of the unhappy man (*duḥkhanimittam udgrhṇāti*); in the course of the mind of joy (*muditā*) one takes hold of the character of the joyful man (*muditānimitta*. What character does one take hold of in the course of the mind of equanimity (*upekṣanimitta*)? [210a]

Answer. – One takes hold of the character of the neither unhappy nor happy man (*aduḥkhāsukhita*). When this mind has increased gradually, the yogin sees the entire world as being neither unhappy nor happy.

Question. – The first three minds – loving-kindness, compassion and joy – are certainly meritorious (punya). But what benefit  $(arthakriy\bar{a})$  can there be in the mind of equanimity bearing on beings who are neither unhappy nor happy?

Answer. – The yogin thinks thus: "When they lose their happiness (*sukha*), beings encounter suffering (*duḥkha*), and in the time of suffering, they are unhappy (*duḥkhita*). Finding a state without either suffering or happiness would be safety for them (*yogakṣema*)." This is how [the mind of equanimity} presents a benefit (*arthakriyā*).<sup>229</sup>

When the yogin practices the minds of loving-kindness (maitrī) and joy, it may happen that a feeling of attachment (abhiṣvaṅgacitta) arises in him; when he practices the mind of compassion (karuṇā), it may happens that a feeling of sadness (daurmansayacitta) arises in him. His mind is distracted (vikṣipta) by this attachment or this sadness. Then he enters into the mind of equanimity (upekṣacitta) and drives away (apanayati) this attachment and this sadness. Since attachment and sadness are eliminated, there is a 'mind of equanimity'.

## 5. Differences between loving-kindness and joy

Question. – We can ascertain the differences (*viśeṣa*) that exist between the mind of compassion (*karuṇācitta*) and the mind of equanimity (*upekṣacitta*). [But the differences are less evident between the other two.] The mind of loving-kindness (*maitrīcitta*) wishes that all beings be happy (*sukhita*) and the mind of joy (*muditācitta*) wishes that all beings be joyful (*muditā*). What difference is there between happiness (*sukha*) and joy (*muditā*)?

An advantage for the person who is practicing it, but not for the person who is the object of it.

Answer. – Happiness is bodily happiness (kāyika sukha); joy is mental happiness (caitasika sukha).

happiness associated with first happiness the the five consciousnesses (pañcavijñānasamprayutasukha);<sup>230</sup> we call joy the happiness associated with the mental consciousness (manovijñānasamprayuktasukha).

We call happiness the happiness that arises in regard to the first five [external] bases of consciousness (pañcāvatana):<sup>231</sup> we call joy the happiness that arises in regard to the base made up of mental objects (dharmāyatana).

First the yogin formulates vows of happiness (sukhapranidhāna) that beings find this happiness and that, after this happiness, they find joy (*muditā*). Thus, when someone has pity on a needy person, first he gives him a precious thing (ratnadravya): that is 'happiness'; next, he invites the poor person to trade it for money so that he can enjoy the five objects of enjoyment (pañcakāmaguṇa): that is 'joy'.

Furthermore, we call happiness the happiness of the desire realm (kāmadhātusukha) which one is wishing for beings; we call joy the happiness of the form realm (rūpadhātusukha) which one is wishing for beings.

Furthermore, we call happiness: i) the happiness associated with the five consciousnesses (pañcavijñānasamprayuktasukha) in the desire realm (kāmadhātu); ii) the happiness associated with the three consciousnesses (trivijñānasamprayuktasukha) in the first dhyāna; iii) all the happiness in the third  $dhy\bar{a}na.^{232}$  – We call joy: i) the happiness associated with the mental consciousness (manovijñānasamprayuktasukha) in the desire realm (kāmadhātu) and the first dhyāna; ii) all the happiness in the second dhyāna.

We call happiness coarse (audārika) happiness; we call joy subtle (sūkṣma) happiness.

'Happiness' refers to the time of the cause (hetukāla); 'joy' refers to the time of the fruit (phalakāla). When one is beginning to find happiness, that is called 'happiness'; when the joyful mind arises within (adhyātman) and the signs of happiness appear outwardly (bahīrdā) by way of singing, dancing and leaping about, that is called 'joy'. Thus when one starts to swallow a medicine (bhaisajya), it is happiness, but when the medicine has penetrated the whole body, that is joy.

Ouestion. – If that is so, why not combine these two minds into one single immeasurable (apramāna)? Why, on the contrary, distinguish two different things?

Answer. – At the start, the yogin's mind is not concentrated (pragrhīta) and as he cannot love beings deeply, that gives him happiness only; but when he has concentrated his mind and loves beings deeply, that gives him joy. This is why he is first happy and, only after that, is he joyful.

Eye, ear, nose, tongue and body consciousnesses.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>231</sup> Color, sound, smell, taste and tangible.

<sup>232</sup> On the nature of sukha in the kāmadhātu and the first three dhyānas, see Kośa, VIII, p. 150-151.

Question. – If that is so, why does [the sūtra] $^{233}$  not mention loving-kindness (*maitrī*) and joy (*muditā*) one after the other [but interposes compassion]?

Answer. – When the mind of loving-kindness is being practiced, one loves beings as one's son and one wishes to bring them happiness. But having emerged from the concentration of loving-kindness, one sees beings undergoing all kinds of suffering. Then, producing a mind of deep love, one has compassion for [210b] beings and makes them obtain deep happiness.<sup>234</sup>

Just as parents who love their son at all times, nevertheless redouble their affection for him when he falls sick, so the bodhisattvas who have entered into minds of compassion (*karuṇācitta*), considering the sufferings of beings, develop a feeling of pity (*anukampācitta*) and grant them profound happiness. This is why the mind of compassion takes an intermediate place [between the mind of loving-kindness and the mind of joy].

#### 6. Reasons for practicing equanimity

Question. – If one loves beings so deeply, why practice the mind of equanimity (upekṣācitta) in addition?

Answer. – The yogin sees things in the following way: he never abandons beings and he thinks only of abandoning the three minds [of loving-kindness, compassion and joy]. Why? First of all, to put an end to other dharmas.<sup>235</sup>

Then, by the mind of loving-kindness (*maitrīcitt*a), he wished that beings be happy, but he did not succeed in making them happy. By the mind of compassion (*karuṇācitta*), he wished that beings could escape from suffering, but he did not succeed in making them free of suffering. When he practiced the mind of joy (*muditācitta*) he did not succeed in causing them to experience great joy either. All of that was mere mental activity (*manakāra*) without any real reality (*bhūtārtha*). And so, wishing to make beings find the real truth, the yogin makes the resolve (*cittam utpādayate*) to become Buddha. He practices the six perfections (*pāramitā*) and perfects within himself the attributes of Buddha so that beings may find true happiness. This is why the yogin abandons the three minds [of loving-kindness, compassion and joy] so as to enter into the mind of equanimity (*upekṣacitta*).<sup>236</sup>

Finally, the minds of loving-kindness, compassion and joy are minds of love so deep that it is hard to abandon beings. [On the other hand], if one enters into the mind of equanimity, it is easy to separate from them.

The canonical expression for the four *apramāṇas* is cited above, p. 1239-40F.

Psychologically, joy (*muditā*) follows after compassion (*karuṇā*); we should note that beings are unhappy before wishing to be joyful.

By practicing equanimity ( $upek s\bar{a}$ ), the yogin removes sensual attachment ( $k\bar{a}mar\bar{a}ga$ ) and hostility ( $vy\bar{a}p\bar{a}da$ ) towards beings: see above, p. 1242F.

This mind of equanimity is indispensable to becoming Buddha.

#### 7. Limit to the salvific action of the immeasurables

Question. – The bodhisattva, who has finally become Buddha after having practiced the six perfections cannot do anything further so that beings may escape from suffering and find happiness. Then why do you limit yourself to saying that the three minds [of loving-kindness, compassion and joy] are mental activity arising in the mind and without any real truth? [Why not say that also of the mind of equanimity]?

Answer. – It is true that the bodhisattva, having become Buddha, cannot do anything to make beings find happiness, but when he is still bodhisattva, he makes the great vows (*mahāpraṇidhānāny utpādayati*); as a result of these great vows, he gains great merit (*mahāpuṇya*) and, as the reward of this great merit, he is able to do great good for worldly people (*pṛthagjana*).

When the śrāvakas practice the four immeasurables (*apramāṇa*), it is to tame themselves (*ātmadamanāya*), for their own welfare (*svahitāya*), and they think about beings in vain.<sup>237</sup> The bodhisattvas, however, practice the mind of loving-kindness so that beings may escape from suffering and find happiness. As a result of this mind of loving-kindness, they themselves gain merit and teach others how to gain merit. Gathering the ripened fruits (*vipākaphala*) of their merit, these bodhisattvas sometimes become noble cakravartin kings, rich in kind deeds; sometimes also they leave home (*pravrajanti*), practice the *dhyanas*, guide beings and teach them how to practice the *dhyānas* to be reborn in pure universes (*śuddhalokadhātu*) and there enjoy the happiness. Finally, when they become Buddha, they enter into nirvāṇa without residue (*nirupadhiśeṣanirvāṇa*) with immeasurable and incalculable beings (*apramāṇāsaṃkhyeyasattva*). Compared to the mind of emptiness (*śūnyatācitta*), their vows (*praṇidhāna*) are much more salutary, and still other things, including their relics (*śarūra*), are very beneficial.

Furthermore, if a single bodhisattva completely saved all beings, the other bodhisattvas would have no one to save. From then on, there would be no more future (anāgate) Buddhas, the lineage of the Buddhas (buddhavamśa) would be interrupted (samucchinna) and other faults of the same kind would ensue. This [210c] is why a single Buddha does not save all beings without exception.

Finally, what is called the nature of beings (*sattvasvabhāva*) is only a product of error (*mohaja*): it is not a real thing (*bhūta*) nor is it determinate (*niyata*). If all the Buddhas of the three times and the ten directions went to look for a being, they would find none. Then how would they save all completely?

## 8. Is the idea of salvation is purely conventional?

237 In the sense that beings will derive no benefit, for the vows formulated by the śrāvakas profit only themselves.

Question. – If [the beings] who are empty [of intrinsic nature] cannot all be saved (*trāta*), a small number of beings will be equally empty. Then how do [the Buddhas] save a small number of them?

Answer. – I have just said that if the Buddhas of the three times and the ten directions went to look for beings, they would find not a single one and, consequently, that there is no one to save. If you object: "Why do they not save them all?", you fall into a questionable position (*nigrahasthāna*), a position from which you cannot extricate yourself. And if you object: "Since the categories of few and many do not apply to beings, how could the Buddhas save a small number of them?", you fall into an even more questionable position.

Furthermore, from the absolute point of view (paramārtha), the true nature (bhūtalakṣaṇa) of things, there are no beings (sattva) and there is no salvation (trāṇa). It is merely conventionally that we affirm the existence of salvation. As for you, you seek the absolute (paramārtha) in the conventional (saṃvṛti), which is inadmissible (nopapadyate). It is as if you were looking for a precious pearl (maṇiratna) in a brick or a stone: never would you find it there.

Furthermore, all the qualities acquired by the Buddhas in the interval of time between their first production of the mind of awakening (*prathamacittotpāda*) until the disappearance of the Holy Dharma (*saddharmavipralopa*), all these qualities are formations (*saṃskāra*), limited (*saparyanta*), measurable (*sapramāṇa*), having a beginning (*ādi*) and an end (*paryavasāna*). This is why the number of beings to be converted (*vaineyasattva*) must also be measurable. It is not possible, with measurable qualities, fruits of retribution [of a given number] of causes and conditions, to completely save beings without number in their totality.

It is like a strong man (balavān puruṣaḥ): no matter how powerful his bow (dhanus) and no matter how far his arrow (iṣu) can fly, it will necessarily finally fall down. Or it is like the great fire (mahāgni) at the end of the kalpa (kalpasaṃvartana) <sup>238</sup> that burns the trisāhasralokadhātu: its brilliance (arcis) is immense, but although it burns for a long time, it is finally extinguished. It is the same for the bodhisattva become Buddha. From his first production of the mind of awakening, he holds the bow of exertion (vūryadhanus) in his hand, wields the arrow of wisdom (prajñeṣu), penetrates deeply into the Buddhadharma and accomplishes the great deeds of the Buddhas (buddhakārya), but he also must end up becoming extinguished. When the bodhisattva has won the knowledge of dharmas in all their aspects (sarvakārajñāna), his body emits rays (raśmi) that light up innumerable universes (apramāṇalokadhātu); each of these rays creates numberless bodies (apramāṇakāya) that save numberless beings (apramāṇasattva) in the ten directions by metamorphosis (nirmīte). After his nirvāṇa, the eighty-four thousand articles of the Dharma that he has taught (caturśūtisahasra dharmaskandha) and his relics (śarīra) convert (paripācayanti) beings. But, like the fire at the end of the kalpa, having shone for a long time, he too must become extinguished.

<sup>238</sup> Cf. Kośa, III, p. 184, 209-210.

Question. – You yourself say that these rays create *innumerable* bodies by metamorphosis that save the *innumerable* beings of the ten directions. Why did you sometimes say that, due to *measurable* causes and conditions, the number of beings to be converted should also be *measurable*?

Answer. - There are two kinds of immeasurable (apramāṇa): 239

- 1) The true immeasurable (*bhūtāpramāṇa*) which cannot be measured by any holy individual (*āryapudgala*). Space (*ākāśa*), nirvāṇa and the true nature of being (*sattvabhāva*) cannot be measured [in any way].
- 2) Measurable things (*prameyadhama*) which only weak people are incapable of measuring; for example, the weight (*gurutva*) of Mount Sumeru, or the number of drops of water (*bindu*) in the great ocean (*mahāsamudra*). The Buddhas and bodhisattvas know these things, but they are unknown to gods and humans.

It is the same for the number of beings to be converted (*vinītasattva*) by [211a] the Buddhas; the Buddhas know it, but as it is not within your range, it is described as immeasurable.

Finally, dharmas, coming from causes and conditions ( $hetupratyayas\bar{a}magr\bar{t}$ ), have no intrinsic nature ( $nihsvabh\bar{a}va$ ). Since their intrinsic nature does not exist, they are eternally empty ( $s\bar{u}nya$ ) and, in this eternal emptiness, the being does not exist ( $sattva\ nopalabhyate$ ). Thus the Buddha said:

When I was seated on the sphere of enlightenment, <sup>240</sup>

My wisdom was non-existent.

Like the empty fist that deceives little children,<sup>241</sup>

I have saved the entire world.

The true nature (bhūtalakṣaṇa) of things

Is the mark of beings (sattvanimitta).

But to seize the mark of beings

Is to stray far from the true Path.

Always thinking about the eternally empty,

The same distinction is made above, p. 152F, 393F, 451F.

The *bodhimaṇḍa*, in its proper sense, the diamond seat (*vajrāsana*) at Gayā where Śākyamuni reached supreme enlightenment; in the figurative sense, the spiritual presence of the Dharma or of the dharmakāya of the Buddhas which is independent of any material localization: cf. Vimalakīrti, p. 199-200, note.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>241</sup> Bālollāpana riktamuştivat: cf. above, p. 1195F and n. 2.

A person does not follow the Path.

He invents imaginary characteristics

For dharmas that are without birth or cessation.

Imaginings, reflections, concepts

Are the net of Māra (mārajāla).

Not moving, not standing still

That is really the seal of the Dharma ( $dharmamudr\bar{a}$ ).

# 9. Differences between 'happiness' and 'compassion'

Question. – If 'happiness' (*sukha*) is subdivided into two parts, the mind of loving-kindness (*maitrīcitta*) and the mind of joy (*muditācitta*), why is not the mind of compassion (*karuṇācitta*) that contemplates suffering (*duhkha*) considered to be of two parts?

Answer. – Happiness (*sukha*), loved by everyone, is important (*guru*); this is why it is divided into two parts, [loving-kindness and joy]. On the other hand, suffering (*duḥkha*), which nobody loves, which nobody commemorates, is not divided into two parts.

Furthermore, when happiness is experienced, the mind is soft (*mṛdu*); but when suffering is endured, the mind is hard (*drdha*).

[The story of Vītaśoka]. – When Wei-t'o-chou (Vītaśoka), the younger brother of King Aśoka, was king of Jambudvīpa for seven days, he was permitted to indulge in the five objects of enjoyment (pañcakāmaguṇa) on a grand scale. At the end of the seven days, king Aśoka asked him: "As king of Jambudvīpa, did you experience happiness (sukha) and joy (muditā)?" Vītaśoka answered: "I saw nothing, heard nothing, noticed nothing. Why? Because each morning, some caṇḍālas rang a bell and shouted: "Of the seven days [that you have been granted], so many have already gone by, and at the end of the seven days , you will die." Hearing this proclamation, although I was king of Jambudvīpa and loaded down with the five objects of enjoyment, my sorrow (daurmanasya) and my suffering (duḥkha) were so great that I heard nothing and saw nothing." 242

The story of Vītaśoka, also called Vigataśoka, Sudatta or Sugātra, is told fully in Aśokavadāna, T 2042, K. 2, p. 106a-107c (transl. Przyluski, *Aśoka*, p. 270-280); Aśokasūtra, T 2043, k. 3, p. 141b-44a;

Divyāvadāna, p. 419-429 (transl. Burnouf, *Introduction*, p. 370-379); Tchou yao king, T 212, k. 6, p. 641a-c (transl. Chavannes, *Contes*, III, p. 297-302); Fen pie kong tö louen, T 1507, k. 3, p. 39c. – Vītaśoka, the younger brother of king Aśoka, had faith in heretical doctrines and jeered at the disciples of

the Buddha whose easy life he begrudged. In order to convert him to the Holy Dharma, Aśoka resorted

From that, we know that the power of suffering is strong whereas that of happiness is weak. When a person who experiences happiness throughout his body is stabbed some place, all his happiness disappears and he feels nothing but the pain of his wound. The power of happiness (*sukhabala*) is so weak that two parts<sup>243</sup> are needed to make it strong; that of suffering (*duḥkhabala*) is so strong that it needs only one part.

#### III. FRUITS OF THE IMMEASURABLES

Question. - What fruits of retribution  $(vip\bar{a}laphala)^{244}$  does the person who is practicing the four immeasurables  $(apram\bar{a}na)$  receive?

to a trick. While the king was bathing, his ministers, in connivance with him, invited Vītaśoka to try on the royal crown which the chances of succession might someday lead him to wear. Vītaśoka was ready for the experiment and, mounting the throne, he donned the crown. Suddenly the king came out of his bathroom and, seeing his brother seated on the throne, pretended to be indignant. He treated him as an usurper and sent him to the caṇḍalas, ordering him to be put to death. However, in order to permit him to repent, he allowed Vītaśoka to reign effectively for seven days after which he would be executed. Thus Vītaśoka enjoyed all the royal prerogatives, but each morning, the caṇḍalas, counting off the days remaining to him, reminded him of his forthcoming death. When the seventh day had passed, Vītaśoka was led into the presence of his brother the king. Aśoka questioned him about his impressions during the days of his reign. Vītaśoka answered: "All the sense pleasures with which I was loaded were spoiled by the perspective of my imminent death. Tormented by the fever of death, I remained sleepless for the entire time." Embracing his brother, Aśoka said to him: "I will not put you to death; I wanted you to have faith in the Buddha's Dharma and explain how his disciples, while abstaining from the arduous practices imposed on the Brahmins, turn away from sense objects, the complete vanity of which they calculate." Convinced by this experience, Vītaśoka became a śramaṇa.

In the Ceylonese tradition, the hero of this story is Tissa-kumāra, brother of Aśoka and his vice-regent (Mahāvamśa, V, v. 151-60); for Hiuan-tsang, it was Mahendra (the Maninda of the Pāli sources), wrongly presented as the king's brother, whereas he was his son (Si-yu-ki, T 2087, k. 8, p. 912a; transl. Watters, II, p. 93-94).

- Namely, happiness (sukha) and joy (muditā).
- In order to understand the discussion that will follow, one should recall the distribution of gods in the three worlds, a distribution discussed among scholars (cf. Kośa, III, p. 2-4, note) but which the *Traité* has already presented above, p. 517F, 519F, 954F:
- 1) Kāmadhātu is the abode of six groups of gods: *i*) Caturmahārājika, *ii*) Trāyastrimśa, *iii*) Yāma, *iv*) Tuṣita, *v*) Brahmaloka, *vi*) Paramirnitavaśavartin.
- 2) Rūpadhātu, also called Brahmaloka, world of the Brahmā gods, with its four *dhyānas*, is the abode of seventeen groups of gods.

First *dhyāna*: i) Brahmakāyika, ii) Brahmapurohita, iii) Mahābrahman.

Second *dhyāna*: i) Parrittābha, ii) Apramāṇābha, iii) Ābhāsvara.

Third *dhyāna*: *i*) Parīttaśubha, *ii*) Apramāṇaśubha, *iii*) Śubhakṛtsna.

Fourth *dhyāna*: *i*) Anabhraka, *ii*) Puṇyaprasava. *iii*) Bṛhatphala, and the five Śuddhāvāsikas, *iv*) Avṛha, *v*) Atapa, *vi*) Sudṛśa, *vii*) Sudarśaṇa, *viii*) Akaniṣṭha.

3) Ārūpyadhātu, formless realm, has no abodes: it is inhabited, one might say, by formless beings belonging to four spheres: *i*) ākāśanantyāyatana, *ii*) vijñānānantyāyatana, *iii*) ākiṃcanyāyatana, *iv*) naivasaṃjñānāsaṃjñāyatana.

In principle, the ascetic who has practiced the *apramāṇas* is reborn in the two higher realms, rūpadhātu and ārūyadhātu, but the exact place is disputed by scholars because the canonical sources give the impression of being contradictory. Here, without any pretense of being complete, is a series of canonical topics that are under discussion:

- 1) Anguttara, IV, p. 150; V, p. 342 (T 125, k. 47, p. 806a26; Vinaya, V, p. 140; Paṭisambhidā, II, p. 130; Milindapañha, p. 198; Visuddhimagga, p. 253, 258-260. If he does not penetrate any higher, the person who practices *maitrī* gains Brahmaloka (*uttarim appaṭivijjhanto brahmalokūpago hoti*). 'If he does not penetrate any higher' means: if he is incapable of attaining the state of arhat (*arahattaṃ adhigantuṃ asakkonto*).
- 2) Dīgha, I, p. 251; Majjhima, II, p. 195 (T 26, k. 6, p. 458b1); Majjhima, II, p. 207, 208. The practice of *maitrī*, of *karuṇā*, of *muditā* or of *upekṣā* is the path leading to rebirth in the company of the Brahmā gods (*Brahmānaṃ sahavyatāya maggo*).
- 3) Anguttara, II, p. 130. The good man who practices *maitrī*, *karuṇā*, *muditā* or *upekṣā*, when his body dissolves after death, is reborn in the company of the Śuddhāvāsa gods (*kāyassa bhedā paraṃ Suddhāvāsānaṃ devānaṃ sahavyataṃ uppajjati*). These gods constitute the five classes of Brahmā gods occupying the summit of the 4<sup>th</sup> dhyāna in rūpadhātu.
- 4) Tseng yi a han (T 125, k. 21, p. 656b1-9); Vibhāṣā (T 1545, k. 82, p. 425c13-23); Nyāyānusāra (T 1562, k. 44, p. 594c3-6); Kośa, IV, p. 250; Kośavyākhyā, p. 438 (Sanskrit original). The person who practices the *apramāṇas* is one of the four individuals 'who gain brahmic merit' (*brāhmaṃ puṇyaṃ prasavanti*).

According to Anguttara, V, p. 76, the holder of brahmic merit 'rejoices in the heavens for a kalpa' (*kappaṃ saggamhi modati*), and according to Kośa (III, p. 174; IV, p. 251), the gods whose lifespan is one kalpa are the Brahmapurohitas forming the second group of gods of the first dhyāna.

Therefore the person who, having loving-kindness, gains a brahmic merit and is reborn among the Brahmapurihitas.

5) Anguttara, II, p. 129. – The person who practices *maitrī* is reborn in the company of the Brahmakāyikas whose lifespan is one kalpa. The person who practices *karuṇā* is reborn among the Ābhāsvara whose lifespan is two kalpas. – The person who practices *muditā* is reborn among the Śubhakṛtsnas whose lifespan is four kalpas. – The person who practices *upekṣā* is reborn among the Bṛhatphalas whose lifespan is five hundred kalpas.

[But the sources do not agree on the lifespan of the various classes of gods: c. W. Kirfel, *Die Kosmographie der Inder*, 1920, p. 194; add Vibhanga, p. 424-425; Kośa, III, p. 173-174].

Answer. – The Buddha said: "He who enters into the concentration of loving-kindness (maitrīsamādhi) receives, at the present, five benefits (anuśaṃsa): i) he is not burned if he enters fire (agni); ii) he does not die if he swallows poison (viṣa); iii) the soldier's sword (śastra) does not wound him; iv) he will not die a violent death (asaṃmūdhaḥ kālaṃ karoti); v) the good gods protect him (devatā rakṣanti). Having been of benefit to innumerable beings (apramāṇasattva), he receives immense merit (apramāṇapuṇya). By virtue of this immeasurable mind of impure order (sāsravāpramāṇacitta) that has beings as object (sattvālambaṇa), he is reborn in a pure place (śuddhasthāna), namely, the form realm (rūpadhātu). 245

6) Saṃyutta, V, p. 119-121; Tsa a han, T 99, k. 27, p. 197c11-13; Vibhāṣā, T 1545, k. 83, p. 430c22-24; Nyāyānusāra, T 1562, k. 79, p. 770b24-26; Visuddhimagga, ed. Warren, p. 269. – The person who practices *maitrī* ends up at best in the Śubhas (according to the Chinese versions, in the Śubhakṛtsnas). – The person who practices *karuṇā* ends up at best in the ākāśanantyāyatanas. – The person who practices *muditā* ends up at best in the vijñānānantyāyatanas. – the person who practices *upekṣā* ends up at best in the ākiṃcanyāyatanas.

The Sarvāstivādin-Vaibhāṣikas have expended a wealth of ingenuity in order to harmonize all these discrepancies. The *Traité* has not ignored them, but, refusing to enter into these subtleties, it concludes that the *apramāṇas*, dealing with all the beings of the ten regions without exception, receive their reward in ārūpyadhātu as well as in the rupadhātu of the Brahmā gods.

Five benefits in the sūtra cited by the Vibhāṣā, T 1545, k. 83, p. 427a6-7; eight benefits according to Anguttara, IV, p. 150; eleven benefits according to Anguttara, V, p. 342; Vinaya, V, p. 140; Paṭisambhidā, II, p. 130; Milinda, p. 198; Visuddhimagga, p. 253.

Anguttara, V, p. 342 (Tseng yi a han, T 125, k. 47, p. 806a17-806b3; Che yi siang sseu nien jou lai, T 861a23-b-7): Mettāya cetovimuttiyā āsevitāya... ekādasānisamsā pātikankhā... Sukham supati, sukham paṭibujjhati, na pāpakam supinam passati, manussāsam piyo hoti, amanussānam piyo hoti, devatā rakkhanti, nāssa aggi vā visam vā sattham vā kamati, tuvaṭam cittam samādhiyati, mukavaṇṇo vippasīdati, asammūļho kālam karoti, uttarim appativijjhanto brahmalokūpago hoti.

Transl. – If the liberation of the mind consisting of loving-kindness is observed and cultivated, eleven benefits are in store: *1*) The benevolent person sleeps happily; *2*) he awakes happy; *3*) he has no bad dreams; *4*) he is dear to humans; *5*) he is dear to non-humans; *6*) the gods protect him; *7*) fire, poison and the knife do not harm him; *8*) his mind becomes concentrated quickly; *9*) his face is serene; *10*) he dies without worry; *11*) if he goes no higher, [after death] he wins the world of the Brahmā gods.

The reservation *uttarim appațijjhanto* 'if he does not penetrate any higher', i.e., 'if he is incapable of attaining the state of arhat' (*arahattam adhigantum asakkonto*) is necessary as it permits one to understand that loving-kindness can, by way of exception, accede to the supreme fruit of the religious life. But judging from the Chinese versions, this reservation does not appear in the Sanskrit āgamas.

The sūtra on the eleven benefits of *maitrī* is fully commented on, with supporting stories, in Visuddhimagga, ed. Warren, p. 258-260. See also Manorathapūraṇi, V, p. 82-84.

Question. – Why did the Buddha say that the reward  $(vip\bar{a}ka)$  for loving-kindness is to be reborn in the Brahmā heavens?<sup>246</sup> [211b]

Answer. – Because the Brahmadevas are venerated by beings, everyone has heard of them and everyone knows them.

The Buddha lived in the Indian kingdoms where there were always many brahmins in whose religion virtuous men were all reborn among the Brahmadevas. When they learn that the devotees of loving-kindness (*maitrācārin*) are reborn among the Brahmadevas, beings have great faith (*śraddhā*) and are ready to practice loving-kindness. This is why the Buddha said that devotees of loving-kindness are reborn among the Brahmadevas.

Furthermore, the gods who have cut through sexual desire  $(r\bar{a}ga)$  are all called Brahmā, and it is said that these Brahmās dwell in the form realm  $(r\bar{u}pad\bar{a}atu)$ . And so the fact of having cut through sexual desire is called brahmacarya 'celibacy' and those who have cut through are called brahmanas.

When the Buddha speaks here of the 'Brahmā heavens', he means not only the four dhyānas [of rūpadhātu, inhabited by the Brahmadevas] but also the four ārūpyasamāpattis [formless absorptions of ārūpyadhātu, inhabited by the formless deities]. Investigation (*vitarka*) and analysis (*vicāra*), [which are eliminated in the dhyānas of ārūpyadhātu], are so difficult to destroy that the Buddha does not speak here about the levels higher than these dhyānas [namely, the four ārūpyasamāpattis]. In the same way, when he spoke about the discipline of speech (*vāksaṃvara*) which is part of the fivefold discipline (*pañcaśīla*) of the upāsaka, the Buddha mentioned only one [abstention], the abstention from lying (*mṛṣāvādavairamaṇa*), but he implied the other three abstentions [regarding slander (*paiśunyavāda*), harmful speech (*pāruṣyavāda*) and idle chatter (*sambhinnapralāpa*)].<sup>248</sup>

Question. - So loving-kindness brings the five benefits (*anuśaṃsa*) in question; but why did the Buddha say nothing about the benefits brought by compassion, joy and equanimity?

Answer. - Refer to the above comparison (*upamāna*): by speaking of one single thing, the Buddha intends the other three. This applies here also. What the Buddha said about loving-kindness is equally true for compassion, joy and equanimity.

Furthermore, loving-kindness is the immeasurable par excellence. Loving-kindness is like the king  $(r\bar{a}jan)$ ; the other three immeasurables that accompany it are like the people (jana). Why? First, the yogin, by the mind of loving-kindness  $(maitr\bar{i}citta)$ , wants beings to find happiness (sukha). Seeing that there are some

Anguttara, III, p. 225: So ime cattāro brahmavihāre bhāvetvā kāyassa bhedā parammaraṇā sugatim brahmalokam upapajjati. — See also Dīgha, I, p. 251; Majjhima, II, p. 195, 207-208, where the practice of the apramānas is given as the path leading to rebirth in the company of the Brahmā gods: ayam pi kho Brahānam sahavyatāva maggo.

This comment which is evidently addressed to Chinese readers is not attributable to the author of the *Traité*, Nāgārjuna or others; it is probably a gloss of the translator Kumārajīva.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>248</sup> In regard to the fivefold morality (*pañcaśīla*), it is enough to say 'lying' and by that to include the other three misdeeds of speech: see above, p. 820F.

who do not find happiness, he produces the mind of compassion (*karuṇācitta*). Wanting beings who are free from painful thoughts to find the joy of the Dharma, he produces the mind of joy (*muditācitta*). Feeling neither aversion (*pratigha*) nor fondness (*anunaya*) nor sorrow (*daurmanasya*) towards these three things, he produces the mind of equanimity (*upekṣācitta*).

Finally, it is loving-kindness that gives happiness (*sukha*) to beings.

Moreover, in the *Tseng yi a han* (Ekottarāgama), the Buddha spoke about the mind of compassion (*karuṇācitta*) 'endowed with the five benefits (*anuśaṃsa*)'.<sup>249</sup>

In many places in the Mahāyānasūtras, he spoke about the benefits it presents. Thus, in the *Wang-ming* p ou-sa king (Jālinīprabhabodhisattvasūtra or Višeṣacintibrahmapariprcchā), $^{250}$  he said: "The bodhisattva practices the thirty-two kinds of compassion (karunā) among beings. The former increase gradually and change into great compassion (mahākarunā). Great compassion is the root of the qualities (gunamūla) of all the Buddhas and bodhisattvas; it is the mother (matr) of Prajñāpāramitā and the grandmother (mahāmatr) of the Buddhas. By means of great compassion, the bodhisattva attains Prajñāpāramitā and, having acquired Prajñāpāramitā, he becomes Buddha." He praises great compassion in every way.

A sūtra in which the brahmarājan Viśeṣacintin, the bodhisattva Jālinīprabha and the bodhisattva Mañjuśrī appear. The *Traité* cites it impartially under the name of *Jālinīprabhabodhisattvasūtra* (k. 20,p. 211b19; k. 22, p. 227b4; k. 28, p. 267a16) or under the name of *Tch'e sin king = Viśeṣacintisūtra* (k. 27, p. 257b2; k. 29, p. 275a18; k. 32, p. 279c9; k. 66, p. 524a24; k. 77, p. 604a23; k. 81, p. 631a18). The Mahāvyutpatti mentions the bodhisattva Jālinīprabha (no. 705) and a Brahmaviśeṣacintiparipṛcchā (no. 1367).

The Viśesabrahmapariprcchā is known to us by three Chinese versions and one Tibetan version:

- 1) *Tch'e-sin fan-t'ien so wen king* (T585) by Dharmarakşa; translated the 10<sup>th</sup> day of the 3<sup>rd</sup> month of the 7<sup>th</sup> T'ai-k'ang year (April 20, 286): cf. K'ai yuan mou lou, T 2154, k. 2, p. 494a26.
- 2) *Sseu-yi fan-t'ien so wen king* (T 586) by Kumārajīva; translated at Tch'ang-ngan, in the garden of Siao-yao, the 1<sup>st</sup> day of the 12<sup>th</sup> month of the 14<sup>th</sup> hong-che year (January 9, 403): cf. Li ti san pao ki, T 2034, k. 8, p. 77c12. Seng-jouei wrote the preface.
- 3) *Cheng-sseu-wei fan-t'ien so wen king* (T587) by Bodhiruci; translated at Lo-yang in the 1<sup>st</sup> *chen-kouei* year (518): cf. Li tai san pao king, T 2034, k. 9, p. 85c20. A *Cheng-sseu-wei king louen* (T 1532), commentary by Vasubandhu (?) on this paripṛcchā was translated by this same Bodhiruci in the 1<sup>st</sup> *p'ou-t'ai* year (531): cf. Li tai san pao ki, T 2034, k. 9, p. 86a15.
- 4) *Tshańs-pa khyad-par-sems-kyis śus-pa* (OKC 827), translated by Śakyaprabha, etc. <sup>251</sup> Viśeṣacintin, T 585, k. 1, p. 9b24-10a16; T 586, k. 2, p. 41c6-42a25; T 587,, k. 2, p. 72b26-73b9. The same passage also appears in two Chinese versions of the Ratnameghasūtra: T 660, k. 5, p. 302a9-302c19; T 489, k. 8, p. 723a8-723c11; and its original Indian is in the Mahāvyutpatti, no. 154-186.

It is not a matter of the thirty-two kinds of *mahākaruṇā* but of the thirty-two reasons impelling the Tathāgata to practice. Here is the first: *Nairātmyāḥ sarve dharmāḥ sattvāś ca nairātmyaṃ nādhimucyante. atas tathāgatasya sattveṣu mahākaruṇotpadyate*: "All dharmas are without self and yet

<sup>249</sup> Unidentified passage.

Also in other places, he praises the mind of joy (*muditācitta*) and the mind of equanimity (*upekṣacitta*), but as loving-kindness and compassion are very important, the Buddha praises their advantages (*anuśaṃsa*) by preference: loving-kindness because of its qualities (*guṇa*) is difficult to get, and compassion realizes great deeds.

Question. – However, in explaining the benefits (anuśaṃsa) of the four immeasurables (apramāṇa) the Buddha said: "The mind of loving-kindness, properly observed, properly developed, ends up at best [in a rebirth] among the Śubhakṛtsna gods (maitrīcittam āsevitaṃ subhāvitaṃ Śubhakṛtsnebhyo devebhyaḥ saṃvartate). – The mind of compassion (karuṇācitta), properly observed, properly developed, leads at best to the sphere [of the infinity] of space (ākāśānantyāyatana). – The mind of joy (muditācitta), properly observed, properly developed, ends up at best in the sphere [of the infinity] of consciousness (vijñānānantyāyatana). – The mind of equanimity (upekṣācitta), properly observed, properly developed, leads at best to the sphere of nothing at all (ākiṃcnayāyatana)."<sup>252</sup>

beings do not believe in non-self; this is why great compassion for beings arises in the Tathāgata"; and so on.

The great compassion of the Tathāgata will be the subject of chapter XLII.

252 An extract from the *Haliddavasanasutta* of Saṃyutta, V, p. 119-121 (Tsa a han, T 99, no. 743, k.

27, p. 197c11-13). – Some bhikṣus were paying a morning visit to the Parivrājaka heretics established at Haliddavasana, a Koliya village. The latter stated that they taught the same 'liberations of mind' (*cetovimutti*), i.e., the same *apramāṇas*, as the Buddha, and asked the bhikṣus how the Buddha's teaching differed from their own. The bhikṣus, unable to answer, came to consult the Buddha, and this is what he told them:

Subhaparamāham, bhikkhave, mettam cetovimuttim vadāmi... Ākāsānañcayatanaparamāham, bhikkhave, karuṇaṃ cetovimuttim vadāmi... Viññāṇāmañcātaranaparamāhām, bhikkhave, cetovimuttim vadāmi... Ākiñcaññāyatanaparamāham, bhikkhave, upekkham cetovimuttim vadāmi. —"I state, O monks, that the liberation of mind which is loving-kindness has the Śibha [in the Chinese versions, the heaven of the Śubhakṛtsnas] as supreme as supreme goal. That which has compassion has the sphere of infinity of space as its supreme goal. That which is joy has the sphere of infinity of consciousness as supreme goal. That which is equanimity has the sphere of nothing at all as supreme goal."

Among the four ultimate goals, only the first, namely the heaven of the Śubhakṛtsnas belongs to the form realm ( $r\bar{u}padh\bar{a}tu$ ), also called the world of the Brahmās (brahmaloka). The other three belong to the formless realm ( $\bar{a}r\bar{u}pyadh\bar{a}tu$ ).

The *Haliddavasanasutta* is the only sūtra where rebirth in the formless realm is promised to those who practice the *apramāṇas*. Everywhere else the Buddha affirmed that adepts of the *apramāṇas* "are reborn in the Brahmaloka", i.e., in the form realm.

These contradictory teachings naturally struck the old exegetists, and both Sanskrit and Pāli scholars have brooded over the *Haliddavasanasutta*. See especially Visuddhimagga, ed. Warren, p. 269; Comm. of Saṃyutta, III, p. 172; Vimuttimagga, tr. Ehara, p. 195; Vibhāṣā, T 1545, k. 83, p. 430c22-24; Nyāyānusāra, T 1562, k. 79, p. 770c3-8.

[The three spheres in question belong to the ārūpyadhātu and not to rūpadhātu which forms the Brahmaloka.] Why then did the Buddha say above [211c] (p. 1267F) that the fruit of retribution of loving-kindness [and the other immeasurables 'is rebirth in the Brahmā heavens'?

Answer. – 1. The teaching of the Buddhas is inconceivable (acintya). He speaks in this way in order to conform to the needs of those to be converted ( $vaineyasattv\bar{a}nuvartan\bar{a}t$ ).

- 2. Furthermore, when one emerges from the concentration of loving-kindness (*maitrīsamādhi*), it is easy to be led to the third dhyāna [the summit of which the Śubhakṛtsna gods occupy]. On emerging fromm the concentration of compassion (*karuṇāsamādhi*), it is easy to enter into the ākāśanāyatana. On emerging from the concentration of joy (*muditāsamādhi*), it is easy to enter the vijñānānantyāyatana. On emerging from of the concentration of equanimity (*upeksāsamādhi*), it is easy to enter into the ākimcanyāyatana.
- 3. Furthermore, by means of the mind of loving-kindness, the yogin wishes that all beings may find happiness (sukha) and, as a reward for this thought, he himself finds happiness. In the threefold world (traidhātuka), the Śubhakṛtsna gods are the happiest. 254 This is why the Buddha says that 'the mind of loving-kindness' leads at best to rebirth among the Subhakṛtsna gods. - By means of the mind of compassion, the yogin sees beings who are old, sick, weak, tormented and suffering. A feeling of pity (anukampaācitta) arises in him and he wonders how he can liberate these beings from suffering (duhkha): actually, if one eliminates the internal suffering (ādhyātmikaduhkha), the external sufferings (bāhyaduhkha) go away and if one eliminates the external suffering, the internal suffering goes away. The yogin then says: Those who have a body (dehin) necessarily encounter suffering; only those who have no body meet up with no suffering. And yet the ākāśa excludes all form  $(r\bar{u}pa)$  and, [by that very fact, escapes from suffering]. This is why the Buddha said that [the mind of compassion] ends up at best in the ākāśānantyāyatana. – By means of the mind of joy, the yogin wants to brings beings the spiritual happiness (vij $\tilde{n}$ anasukha) called 'joy'. In this spiritual happiness, the mind (citta), freed from the body ( $k\bar{a}va$ ), is like a bird (pakṣin) that has escaped from its cage (pañjara). 255 In the ākāśānantyāyatana, the mind, although free of the body, was still attached to space  $(\bar{a}k\bar{a}sa)$ . The vijnanantyayatana is immense (apramana): it is consciousness in all the phenomena, and this consciousness enjoys unlimited sovereignty (aiśvarya). This is why the Buddha said that joy ends up at best in the vijñānānanantāyatana. - By means of the mind of equanimity, the yogin remains neutral (upekşante) to the suffering (duhkha) and the happiness (sukha) of beings and, since he ignores suffering or happiness, he attains true equanimity (bhūtopekṣādharma), namely, the akimcanyayatana. This is why the Buddha said that the mind of equanimity ends up at best in the akimcanyayatana.

These four immeasurables are acquired only by the noble individuals (*āryapudgala*) and not by the worldly people (*pṛthagjana*).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>253</sup> Anguttara, II, p. 80: Buddhānam, bhikkhave, budhavisayo acinteyyo na cintetabho yam cintento ummādassa vigātassa bhāgī assa.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>254</sup> See above, p. 499F, 504F.

<sup>255</sup> Similar considerations have been developed above, p. 1032F.

4. Finally, the Buddha knew that, in future times (anāgate 'dhvani), because they were of weak faculties (mṛdvindriya), his disciples would become attached to dharmas by way of making distinctions (vikalpa) and would wrongly say about the four immeasurables: "The four limitless ones, having beings as their object (ālambana), are exclusively impure (sāsrava), concern the desire realm (kāmadhātu) exclusively and do not exist in the formless realm (ārūpyadhātu)."256

In order to destroy the wrong views (*mithyādrṣṭi*) of these people, the Buddha said that the four immeasurables also concern the ārūpyadhātu. And since the Buddha considers these four immeasurables as concerning all the beings of the ten directions, they must also have the ārūpyadhātu as object.

Thus it is said in the *Wou-tsin-yi p'ou-sa wen* (Akṣayamatiparipṛcchā): "Loving-kindness is of three kinds: *i*) that which has beings as object (*sattvālambana*); *ii*) that which has things as object (*dharmālambana*); *iii*) that which has no object (*anālambana*)." The śāstra explains: "That which has beings as object is impure (*sāsrava*); that which has no object is pure (*anāsrava*); and that which has things as object is sometimes impure and sometimes pure."<sup>257</sup>

All this is a summary of the four immeasurables.

-

Here the *Traité* counters the Sarvāstivādin-Vaibhāṣika theses according to which the *apramāṇas* have beings as object (*apramāṇāḥ sattvālambanāḥ*) and, more precisely, that their domain is the beings of the desire realm (*kāmasattvās tu gocaraḥ*): cf. Kośa, VIII, p. 199; Abhidharmadīpa, p. 429. The Mahāyānasūtras and particularly the Akṣayamatinirdeśa, cited here for the second time, state that they also can have things as object and even no object.

<sup>257</sup> Quotation from the Akṣayamatinirdeśa and not from the Akṣayamatiparipṛcchā: see above, p. 1245F, n. 1.

# **Second Section THE FOUR FORMLESS ABSORPTIONS (p. 1274F)**

#### I. THE FORMLESS ABSORPTIONS ACCORDING TO THE ABHIDHARMA

The four formless absorptions ( $\bar{a}r\bar{u}pyasam\bar{a}patti$ ) are: i) the sphere of infinity of space ( $\bar{a}k\bar{a}s\bar{a}nanty\bar{a}yatana$ ), ii) the sphere of infinity of consciousness ( $vij\bar{n}a\bar{n}anty\bar{a}yatana$ ), iii) the sphere of nothing at all ( $\bar{a}kimcany\bar{a}yatana$ ), iv) the sphere of neither-discrimination-nor-non-discrimination ( $naivasamj\bar{n}a\bar{n}asamj\bar{n}a\bar{n}asamj\bar{n}avatana$ ).

#### 1. Defiled absorptions, acquired by birth, acquired by effort.

These four formless absorptions are each of three kinds: stained (*samala*), acquired by birth (*upapattiprātilambhika*) or acquired by effort (*prāyogika*).<sup>258</sup> [212a]

- 1) The thirty-one bad propensities ( $anu\acute{s}aya$ ) contained in the four  $\bar{a}r\bar{u}pyas^{259}$  and the formations associated with the mind ( $cittasamprayuktasamsk\bar{a}ra$ ) arising within these propensities are stained (samala).
- 2) Acquired by birth (*upapattiprātilambhika*). Those who have practiced the four immaterial absorptions (*ārūpyasamāpatti*) are reborn by virtue of ripening of these actions (*karmavipāka*) in the formless realm (*ārūpyadhātu*) and obtain four clear (*vispaṣṭa*) and morally undefined (*avyākṛta*) skandhas.<sup>260</sup>

Like the *dhyānas*, the *samāpattis* may be *samāpattis* of enjoyment (*āsvādana*) associated with craving (*satṛṣṇa*) or pure *samāpattis* (*śuddhaka*), but of worldly order (*laukika*) and still involving *āsrava*: see above, p. 1027F, and also Kośa, VIII p. 145-146, with notes by de La Vallée Poussin. Moreover, the *samāpattis* may be acquired by birth (*upapattiprātilambhika*) as is the case among beings who, in the form of a 'mental series without body', come to be reborn in the four spheres of the formless realm (*ārūpyadhātu*). Finally, the *samāpattis* may be acquired by effort (*prāyogika*) as is the case for ascetics who momentarily become concentrated on these spheres: cf. Kośa, VIII, p. 134.

There are six *anuśayas*: 1) *rāga*, 2) *pratigha*, 3) *māna*, 4) *avidyā*, 5) *dṛṣṭi*, 6) *vimati*. These six make ten by dividing *dṛṣṭi* into five. These ten *anuśayas* constitute the thirty-six *anuśayas* of kāmadhātu, thirty-one of rūpadhātu, the thirty-one of ārūpyadhātu, in all ninety-eight *anuśayas*: cf. Jñānaprasthāna, T 1544, k. 5, p. 943a, discussed by Kośa, V, p. 9.

Whereas the *dhyānas* are accompanied by the five *skandhas*, the *samāpattis* have only four, because all *rūpa* (*dhyānasaṃvara*, *anāravasaṃvara*) is absent there (*anuparivartakarūpābhāvāt*). This is why the four *samāpattis* as well as the preliminary absorptions (*sāmantaka*) of the three higher *samāpattis* are called *vibhūtarūpasaṃjña* 'having overcome the notion of form'. The *samantaka* of the first *samāpatti*, the ākāśānantyāyatana, is not given this name because the notion of *rūpa* is not completely overcome. It

3) Acquired by effort (prāyogika). — Examining the grossness (audārya) and harmfulness of form (rūpa), the cause of old age (jarā), sickness (vyādhi), death (maraṇa) and all kinds of suffering, the yogin considers it 'as a sickness, as an ulcer, as a poisoned arrow' (rogato gaṇdatah śalyatah samanupaśyati). 261 He tells himself that all of it is deception (vañcana) and falsehood (mṛṣāvāda) that he must avoid. Having reflected in this way, he overcomes all notion of matter, he destroys all notion of resistance, he forgets all notion of multiplicity and penetrates into the absorption of infinity of space (sa sarvaśo rūpasaṃjñānāṃ samatikramāt pratighasaṃjñānām astaṃgamān nānātvasaṃjñānām amanasikārād ākāśānatvāvatanasamāppattim praviśati). 262

# 2. Process of access to the absorptions

Question. – How can these three kinds of notions [of matter, resistance, multiplicity] be destroyed?

Answer. – These three kinds of notions (samjñā), all coming from a complex of causes and conditions (hetupratyayasāmagrī), are without intrinsic nature (niḥsvabhāva) and, since their intrinsic self nature does not exist, they are all deceptions, non-realities, easily destroyed.

Furthermore, [the yogin says to himself], distinctions (*vikalpa*) regarding form are eliminated little by little (*bhāgaśaḥ*) and finally no longer exist. This is why, if they do not exist later, neither do they exist now. Under the influence of error (*viparyāsa*), beings seize the characteristics of identity (*ekatva*) and difference (*anyatva*) in composite matter, and their minds become attached to the nature of matter. As for me, I must not imitate these fools; I must seek the true reality (*bhūtavastu*) in which there is neither identity nor difference.

Furthermore, the yogin reflects thus: 263

- 1) When I rejected and avoided dharmas, I obtained considerable benefits. First I abandoned my wealth, my wife and children; I left home and found the pure discipline (*viśuddhaśīla*); my mind is secure (*yogakṣema*); I have no more fear.
- 2) Putting away desires ( $k\bar{a}ma$ ), evil and wicked dharmas ( $p\bar{a}p\bar{a}$   $aku\acute{s}ala$   $dharma\rlap/h$ ), I obtained the first  $dhy\bar{a}na$ . joy and happiness ( $pr\bar{t}isukha$ ), the result of detachment (vivekaja),
- 3) By suppressing enquiry and analysis (*vitarkavicārāṇāṃ vyutpaśamā*), by inner purification (*adhyātmaṃ saṃprasādāt*), I obtained the second *dhyāna* where there is great joy and happiness (*mahāprītisukha*).

is actually in this *samantaka* that the ascetic overcomes the notion of matter (*rūpasaṃjñām atikrāmati*) and connected notions. See Kośa, VIII, p. 134-135; Abhidharmadīpa, p. 412.

- 261 Cf. Majjhima, I, 436, 500; Anguttara, IV, 422-423: So yad eva tattha hoti... te dhamme aniccato dukkhato rogato gaṇḍato sallato aghato ābādhato parato palokato suññato anattato samanupassati.
- The overcoming of these notions takes place in the preliminary ( $s\bar{a}mantaka$ ) of the first  $\bar{a}r\bar{u}pyasam\bar{a}patti$ .
- Here the *Traité* repeats the old canonical phrases already quoted above, p. 1025, n.

- 4) By renouncing joy (prūter virāgāt), I found myself in the third dhyāna which is by far the happiest.
- 5) Suppressing this happiness (*sukhasya prahāṇāt*), I obtained the fourth *dhyāna*, purified by renunciation and reflection.
- 6) Now I abandon these four *dhyānas*, for it is still necessary to obtain the wonderful absorptions (*samāpatti*).

This is why the yogin 'transcends the notion of matter (*rūpasaṃjñām atikrāmati*), destroys the notion of resistance (*pratighasaṃjñām nirodhayati*) and no longer thinks about the notion of multiplicity (*nānātvasaṃjñāṃ na manasikaroti*)'.

# 3. Transcending ideas

The Buddha spoke of three kinds of form ( $r\bar{u}pa$ ): "1) There is form that is visible and resistant ( $asti \, r\bar{u}pam \, sanidarśanam \, sapratigham$ ); 2) There is invisible resistant form ( $asti \, r\bar{u}pam \, anidarśanam \, sapratigham$ ); 3) There is invisible non-resistant form ( $asti \, r\bar{u}pam \, anidarśanam \, apratigham$ )." 264

When the yogin 'transcends the notion of matter ( $r\bar{u}pasamj\bar{n}\bar{a}$ )', this concerns visible resistant form (sanidarśana-sapratigha); when he 'destroys the notion of resistance ( $pratisamj\bar{n}\bar{a}$ )', this concerns invisible resistant form (anidarśana-sapratigha); when he 'no longer thinks about the notion of multiplicity ( $n\bar{a}n\bar{a}tvasamj\bar{n}\bar{a}$ )' this concerns invisible non-resistant form ( $anidarśan\bar{a}prtigha$ ).

Furthermore, by the destruction of visibles seen by the eye (cak sus), the yogin 'transcends matter'; by the destruction of the ear ( $\acute{s}rotra$ ) and sounds ( $\acute{s}abda$ ), the nose ( $ghr\bar{a}na$ ) and smells (gandha), the tongue ( $jihv\bar{a}$ ) and tastes (rasa), the body ( $k\bar{a}ya$ ) and tangibles (sprastavya), he 'transcends the notion of resistance'. In regard to other forms and many varieties not described as form, we speak of 'the notion of multiplicity'. 265

An obscure and possibly corrupt passage. For the Kośavyākhyā, the  $r\bar{u}pasanidar!sana-sapratigha$  is the  $r\bar{u}pa$  to be cognized by the eye consciousness; the  $r\bar{u}pa$  anidarśana-sapratigha is the eye, etc. and also the nine material bases of consciousness; the  $r\bar{u}pa$  anidarśana-apratigha is the avijñapti.

For the Visuddhimagga, ed. Warren, p. 273-274, the *rūpasamjñās* are the *dhyānas* of subtle form mentioned here under the name of 'notion', and things that are their object (*rūpasaññānan ti saññāsīsena vuttarūpavacarajjhānānañ c'eva tadārammaṇānan ca*). The *pratighasamjñās* are the notions of resistance coming from the contact between the physical bases of consciousness, eye, etc., and their respective objects, color, etc. (*cakkhādīnaṃ vatthūnāṃ rūpādīnaṃ ārammaṇāñ ca paṭighātena samuppannā paṭighasañnnā*). The *nānātvasaṃjñās* are the notions that function with variety as their domain (*nānatte vā gocare pavattā saññā*) or that are varied themselves (*nānattā vā saññā*), The Visuddhimagga is here inspired by the Vibhaṅga, p. 261-262.

<sup>264</sup> *Rūpasaṃgrahasūtra* cited in Kośavyākhyā, p. 352; Pāli correspondent, Dīgha, III, p. 217; Vibhaṅga, p. 13, 72, 89; DhammasaṅgaṇI, p. 125, 146-147, 244-245.

Seeing this, the yogin eliminates the defilements (samkleśa) of the form realm ( $r\bar{u}padh\bar{a}tu$ ) and obtains the  $\bar{a}k\bar{a}ś\bar{a}nantya\hat{A}atana$ . In regard to the causes and methods of obtaining the other three  $\bar{a}r\bar{u}pyas$ , refer to what was said in the chapter on the Dhy $\bar{a}nap\bar{a}ramit\bar{a}$  (p. 1032-1034F).

# 4. Moral qualities of the absorptions

Of the four formless  $(\bar{a}r\bar{u}pya)$  [absorptions], one, namely, the [212b] naivasaṃjñānā-saṃjñāyatana, is always impure  $(s\bar{a}srava)$ . For the other three, one can single out: the ākāśasnantyāyatana is sometimes impure  $(s\bar{a}srava)$  and sometimes pure  $(an\bar{a}srava)$ . If it is impure, this ākāśāyatana contains four impure aggregates  $(s\bar{a}sravaskandha)$ ; if it is pure, it contains four pure aggregates. It is the same for the viiñānānantyāyatana and the ākimcanyāyatana.

All these absorptions are conditioned (samskrta) and good ( $ku\acute{s}ala$ ). If it is impure, the ākāśāyatana involves retribution ( $savip\bar{a}ka$ ) and is morally indeterminate ( $avy\bar{a}krta$ ); if it is pure, it does not involve retribution ( $avip\bar{a}ka$ ). It is the same for the vijñānāyatana and the ākiṃcanyāyatana.

If it is good, the naivasamjñānāsamjñāyatana involves retribution and is morally indeterminate, but [in itself] it does not involve retribution.<sup>267</sup>

# II. THE FORMLESS ABSORPTIONS ACCORDING TO THE MAHĀYĀNA

Question. – What do these four absorptions consist of in the Mahāyāna? [213b]

Answer. – In the Mahāyāna, these four formless absorptions are modes of wisdom (*prajñākāra*) connected with the true nature (*bhūtalakṣaṇa*) of dharmas.

Question. – What is the true nature of dharmas?

Answer. – It is the fact that dharmas are empty of intrinsic nature (svabhāvaśūnya).

Question. – We accept that material dharmas ( $r\bar{u}pidharma$ ) composed of and coming from various causes and conditions are empty; but why would non-material dharmas be empty?

Answer. – If the coarse  $(aud\bar{a}rika)$  substances  $(r\bar{u}pa)$ , seen by the eye and heard by the ear, can be accepted as empty, then why would non-material invisible, non-resistant (apratigha), experiencing neither suffering nor happiness, not be empty?

In this āyatana, also called the bhavāgra 'Summit of existence', awareness is so weak that in it one cannot meditate on the Path: cf. Kośa, VIII, p. 145.

Here the *Traité* continues with a series of technical considerations which I [Lamotte] do not translate. The reader may find a similar set of analyses in the Vibhanga, p. 269-271.

Furthermore, material dharmas that can be analyzed as far as their subtle atoms (*paramāṇu*) are scattered, perish and return to the void. [But the non-material dharmas are still less consistent]: these minds (*citta*) and mental events (*caitasikadharma*) do not exist (*nopalabhyante*) for a month (*māsa*), a fortnight (*parvan*), an hour (*muhūrta*), a minute (*lava*) or even a single second (*kṣaṇa*). <sup>268</sup>

This is the significance of the four formless absorptions and all of this summarizes (saṃkṣepataḥ) the four immeasurables.

\_

<sup>268</sup> Cf. Anguttara, I, p. 10: *Nāhaṃ, bhikkave, aññaṃ ekadhammaṃ pi samanupassāmi yaṃ lahuparivattaṃ yathayidaṃ cittaṃ*: "I do not see, O monks, a single other dharma the transformation of which is as brief as the mind." This may be compared to the river that never stops: "There is no *khaṇa, laya*, or *muhutta* when the river stops" (Anguttara, IV, p. 137).

According to the Atthasālionī, p. 60: *Yāva pan' uppannaṃ rūpaṃ tiṭṭhati tāva soļassa ciitāni uppajjitvā bhijjanti*: "Sixteen moments of mind arise and perish during the time a material dharma lasts."

See L. de La Vallée Poussin, *Notes sur le moment ou kṣaṇa des bouddhistes*, Rocznik Orjentalistyczny, VIII, 1931, p. 1-9; *Notes sur le moment des Vaibhāṣika et des Sautrāntika*, MCP, V, 1936-37, p. 123-158.

# CHAPTER XXXIV: LIBERATIONS, MASTERIES, TOTALITIES, SUCCESSIVE ABSORPTIONS (p. 1281F)

# First Section LIBERATIONS, MASTERIES AND TOTALITIES

#### PRELIMINARY NOTE

The fifteenth, sixteenth and seventeenth classes of supplementary dharmas recommended for bodhisattvas by the Prajñāpāramitā include:

- 1) Eight liberations: Sanskrit aṣṭau vimokṣāḥ; Pāli aṭṭa vimokkhā (& vimokhā); Tibetan rnam par thar ba brgyad; Chinese pa pei chö or pa kiai t'ouo.
- 2) Eight spheres of mastery: Sanskrit aṣṭāv abhibhvāyatana; Pāli attha abhihāyatāni; Tibetan gzil gyis gnon paḥi skye mched brgyad; Chinese pa tch'ou tch'ou (or jou) or pa cheng tch'ou.
- 3) Ten spheres of totality: Sanskrit daśa kṛtsnāyatanāni; Pāli dasa kasiṇāyatanāni; Chinese che yi tsie tch'ou (or jou) or che pien tch'ou (or jou).

These three lists intersect one another and are partially mingled so that it is useful to study them at the same time.

#### I. CANONICAL DEFINITIONS OF THE THREE LISTS

I. THE EIGHT VIMOKṢAS. – Pāli formula in Dīgha, II, p. 70-71; 111-112; III, p. 261-262; Majjhima,II, p. 12-13; Anguttara, IV, p. 306; Vibhaṅga, p. 342. – Sanskrit formula in Daśottarasūtra, p. 92-94; Kośavyākhyā, p. 688; Daśasāhasrikā, p. 98; Śatasāhasrikā, p. 1445; Mahāvyut., no. 1510-1518.

Pāli: Atth vimokhā: 1. rūpī rūpāni passati: ayam ... viharati: ayam atthamo vimukho.

Sanskrit: Aṣṭau vimokṣāḥ: 1. rūpī rūpāṇI paśyaty ayaṃ ... viharaty ayam aṣṭamo vimokṣa iti.

Transl. of the Sanskrit. – The eight liberations:

- 1) Being [in the sphere of subtle form], he sees visibles; this is the first vimokṣa.
- 2) Not having the notion of inner visibles, he sees outer visibles; this is the second vimokşa.
- 3) Producucing the pleasant vimoksa, he abides in this absorption; this is the third vimoksa.

- 4) By means of complete transcendence of notions of form, disappearance of notions of resistance, rejection of notions of multiplicity, he thinks: "Space is infinite" and he penetrates into the sphere of infinity of space and abides there in the manner of the gods attached to this sphere; this is the fourth vimokşa.
- 5) Further, having completely transcended the sphere of infinity of space, he thinks: 'Consciousness is infinite', he penetrates into the sphere of infinity of consciousness and abides there in the manner of the gods attached to this sphere; this is the fifth vimoksa.
- 6) Further, having completely transcended the sphere of infinity of consciousness, he thinks: "Nothing exists", he penetrates into the sphere of nothing at all and abides there in the manner of the gods who are attached to it; this is the sixth vimokşa.
- 7) Further, having completely transcended the sphere of nothing at all, he penetrates into the sphere of neither identification nor non-identification and abides there in the manner of the gods who are attached to it; this is the seventh vimokşa.
- 8) Further, having completely transcended the sphere of neither identification nor non-identification, the cessation of notions and sensations being realized, he penetrates into it and abides there; this is the eighth vimokşa.
- 2. THE EIGHT ABHIBHVĀYATANAS. Pali formula in Digha II, p. 110-111; III p. 260-261; Majjhima, II, p. 13-14; Anguttara, IV, p. 305-306; V, p. 61-62. –

Pāli: Aṭṭha abhibhāyatanāni: 1. ajjhattaṃ rūpasaññī eko bahiddhā ... evaṃsaññī hoti. idaṃ aṭṭhamaṃ abhibhāyatanaṃ.

Sanskrit formula in Daśottarasūtra, p. 95-97; Kośavyākhyā, p. 690-691; Abhidharmadīpa, p. 431-432; Daśasāhasrikā, p. 101-102; Mahāvyut., no. 1520-1527. Sanskrit: *Aṣṭāv abhibhvāyatanāni: 1. adhyatmaṃ rūpasaṃjñā bahirdhā ... ca bhavati. idam aṣṭamam abhibhvāyatanam.* 

Transl. of the Sanskrit. – The eight spheres of mastery:

- 1) Having the notion of inner visibles, he sees narrow outer visibles, beautiful or ugly, and he cognizes these visibles by mastering them, he sees them by mastering them and he is aware of them; this is the first abhibhu.
- 2) Having the notion of inner visibles, he sees outer visibles very extensive (var. very enlarged), beautiful or ugly, and these visibles (etc., as in 1); this is the second abhibhu. outer visibles.
- 3) Not having the notion of inner visibles, he sees outer narrow visibles, and these visibles (etc. as in 1); this is the fourth abhibhu.
- 4) Not having the notion of inner visibles, he sees outer extensive (var. very enlarged) visibles, beautiful or ugly, and these visible (etc. as in 1); this is the fourth abhibhu.

- 5) Not having the notion of inner visibles, he sees outer visibles blue, blue in color, blue in aspect, blue in luster. Just like the flax flower or like fine blue Benares muslin, blue in color, blue in aspect, blue in luster, in the same way, without having the notion of inner visibles, he sees outer visibles blue, blue in color, blue in aspect, blue in luster, and he cognizes them by mastering them, he sees them by mastering them and he is aware of them; this is the fifth abhibhu.
- 6) Not having the notion of inner visibles, he sees outer visibles yellow, yellow in color, yellow in aspect, yellow in luster. Just like the *karnikāra* flower (Pterospermum acerifolium) or like fine yellow Benares muslin, yellow in color, yellow in aspect, yellow in luster, in the same way, without having the notion of inner visibles, he sees outer visibles yellow (etc., as in 5); this is the sixth abhibhu.
- 7) Not having the notion of inner visibles, he sees outer visibles red, red in color, red in aspect, red in luster. Just like the *bandhujīvaka* flower (Pentapetes phoenicea) or fine red Benares muslin, red in color, red in aspect, red in luster, in the same way, without having the notion of inner visibles, he sees outer visibles red, (etc. as in 5); this is the seventh abhibhu.
- 8) Not having the notion of inner visibles, he sees outer visibles white, white in color, white in aspect, white in luster. Just like the planet Venus or fine white Benares muslin, white in color, white in aspect, white in luster, in the same way, not having the notion of inner visibles, he sees outer visibles white (etc. as in 5); this is the eighth abhinhu.
- 3. THE TEN KṛTSNĀYATANAS.- Pāli formula in Dīgha, III, p. 268; Majjhima, II, p. 14-15; Anguttara, V, p. 46, 60: Dasa kasiṇāyatanāni: 1. paṭhavīkasiṇam eko sañjānati ... adho tiriyam advayam appamāṇam. Sanskrit formula in Mahāvyut., no. 1528-1540: Daśa kṛtsnāyatanāni: 1. pṛthivīkṛtsnāyatanam. ... 10. vijñānakṛtsāyatanam.

Transl. of the Sanskrit. – The ten spheres of totality: 1) Totality of earth; 2) totality of water; 3) totality of fire; 4) totality of wind; 5) totality of blue; 6) totality of yellow; 7) totality of red; 8) totality of white; 9) totality of space; 10) totality of consciousness. This totality of earth, water, fire, wind, blue, yellow, red and white, he recognizes them above, below, on the side, without duality and limitless.

The last two kaṣinas are sometimes omitted in the lists of the Paṭisambhidā (I, p. 49, 143-144, 149-150) or replaced by the *āloka*- and the *paricchinn' ākāsa*- in the Visuddhimagga, ed. Warren, p. 89.

The kṛtsnas are not objective observations but 'voluntary seeings': adhimuktimanasikāra (Kośa, II, p. 325). This is well-explained in the Daśasāhasrikā, p. 102: Sarvadhātūn pṛthivīdhātāv adhimucya sarvam api pṛthivīdhātur evaikadhātur bhavati: "When one 'wills' all the elements into the element earth, everything becomes a single element, namely, the 'earth' element. In the same way, when one 'wills' all the elements into the element water, fire, wind, blue, yellow, red, white, space or consciousness." And the Daśasāhasrikā concludes: "We call sphere of totality the fact [that as a result of 'voluntary seeing'] everything becomes a single element: earth, water, etc."

# II. KAŞINA IN PĀLI SCHOLASTICISM

Of the three classes of supplementary dharmas, the ten *kaṣinas* have captured the attention of Pāli scholasticism: cf. Paṭisambhidā, I p. 6, 95; Dhammasaṅgaṇi, p. 42; Nettipakaraṇa, p. 89. 112: and especially Visuddhimagga, ed. Warren, p. 96-144 (transl. Nanamoli, p. 122-184) which describes fully the process of the earth *kasiṇa*. As in the subsequent seven, it is a process of autosuggestion to reach the dhyānas. Here is a brief summary of the stages of the mental operation:

- 1) Creation of the sign (nimitta). If he is specially endowed, the monk chooses as visible sign a ploughed earth surface (kasitaṭṭḥāna) or a threshing area (khalamaṇḍala). Most frequently, on the advice of a teacher, he makes an earthen disc (mattikamaṇḍala) of dark color, without the intrusion of blue, yellow, red or white color that could cause confusion with the other kasiṇas and thus contaminate the earth kasiṇa. Whether or not this disc is transportable, it should be set up on a pedestal in an isolated place and the ascetic sits down at the appropriate distance to see it well.
- 2) Appearance of the sign of learning (uggahanimitta). Having vowed to eliminate sense desires that are so unpleasant (appassādā kāmā), the monk looks calmly at the earth disc without resting on its color (vanna) or its nature (lakkhaṇa) but by fixing his mind on the nominal concept (panṇattidhamma) of 'earth' the different names of which he recites mentally: paṭhavī, mahī, medinī, bhūmi, etc. Sometimes with his eyes open and sometimes with his eyes closed (kālena ummīletvā kālena nimīletvā), the monk contemplates this semi-abstract, semi-concrete image until he sees it as clearly with his eyes shut as with his eyes open. It is at this moment that the sign of learning (uggahanimitta) is produced. The monk then leaves his seat and goes back into the monastery still keeping clearly in his mind this sign of learning and recovering it each time that he loses it.
- 3) Appearance of the counter-sign (paţibhāganimitta). There comes the time when the five obstacles (nīvarana) to the jhāna (see above, p. 1012-1020F) disappear and when the factors (aṅga) of the jhāna (see above, p. 1237F) manifest. In the first case, the ascetic enters into the samadhi of approach (upacārasamādhi); in the second case, he enters into the mental stabilization of absorption (appanāsamādhi). But the entry into samadhi coincides with the appearance of the counter-sign (paṭibhāganimitta):

"The difference between the sign of learning (uggahanimitta) and the counter-sign is the following: In the sign of learning, any defect (dosa) of the kasiṇa (intrusion of foreign colors?) is evident; but the counter-sign, the sign of learning having come to en end, is somehow removed from it and appears purer, a hundred times purer, a thousand times purer than it, like a glass removed from its case, like a well-polished pearly shell, like the disc of the moon coming out from behind a cloud. This counter-sign has neither color (varṇa) nor shape (saṇthana), for if it had any, it would be cognizable by the eye, coarse, susceptible of being grasped and marked by the three characteristics [impermanence, suffering and selflessness?]. But it is not like that. It is just a way of representation, a state of awareness belonging solely to the holder of the stabilization. Starting from the moment when it is produced, the obstacles [to the jhāna] are weakened, but the negative emotions (kilesa) remain and the mind is stabilized in the samadhi of approach

(upacārasamādhi)." In the samādhi of approach (appanāsamadhi) which follows, the factors of the samādhi appear and grow.

- 4) Protection of the counter-sign (paṭighātanimittarakkhaṇa) and attainment of the jhānas. The ascetic should keep the counter-sign as if it were his most precious treasure and, to this end, take great care of his dwelling (āvāsa), his domain (gocāra), his words (bhassa), the people (puggala) he meets, his food (bhojana), the atmosphere (utu) and the postures (iriyāpatha) he takes. Thus, thanks to the earth kasiṇa, he attains the first dhyāna and abides there.
- 5) Extension of the counter-sign (paṭighātanimittavaḍḍhana). In the course of the concentrations of approach and of absorption, the ascetic should gradually extend the counter-sign by noting its progress: one span, two spans and finally the outer limit of the cosmic sphere.
- 6) Acquisition of the spheres of mastery (*abhibhāyatanapaṭilabdha*). This complete mastery over the sign assures the ascetic a complete mastery over things and gives him magical powers. This is how the earth *kasiṇa* allows him to multiply himself when he is one, etc. (cf. above, p. 382F, n. 2).

The other nine *kasiṇas* progress in the same way as the earth *kasiṇa*. Here it is sufficient to determine their respective 'signs' and to specify the type of 'mastery' they will exert upon things.

In the water *kaṣina*, the sign of learning is moving (*calamāna*) and the counter-sign is inert (*nipparipphanda*), like a crystal fan held in the air or like a crystal mirror. It brings the following powers: plunging into the earth and emerging from it, bringing rain-storms, creating rivers and seas, shaking the earth, mountains, palaces, etc.

In the fire *kaṣina*, the sign of learning is like a spark of fire that becomes detached and falls; the countersign is motionless (*niccala*) like a piece of red wool held up in the air. Thanks to this practice, the ascetic can emit smoke and flames, cause a rain of ash, extinguish one fire by means of another, burn whatever he wishes, create lights that allow him to see objects visible to the divine eye and, at the moment of his pariniryāṇa, burn his body by the fire element.

In the wind *kaṣina*, the sign of learning appears in movement (*cala*) like an eddy of hot steam coming out of a pot of rice-gruel; the counter-sign is calm (*sannisinna*) and motionless (*acala*). From this *kaṣina* come the powers of walking with the speed of wind and causing wind storms.

The four color *kaṣinas* use as signs of learning a blue, yellow, red or white flower or cloth. Their countersign appears like a crystal fan. They permit the ascetic to create colored objects and particularly to reach the 5<sup>th</sup> to the 8<sup>th</sup> *abhibhāyatana* (spheres of mastery of colors) as well as the 3<sup>rd</sup> *vimokha*, namely the *subhavimokha* or pleasant liberation.

The kasina of light  $(\bar{a}loka)$  and that of limited space  $(paricchinn\bar{a}k\bar{a}sa)$  have as their respective countersigns a mass of light  $(\bar{a}lokapu\tilde{n}ja)$  and the circle of space  $(\bar{a}k\bar{a}samandala)$ . Thanks to the first, the ascetic is able to create luminous forms, to banish languor and torpor and chase away shadows; by means of the

second he is able to discover whatever is hidden, create empty spaces in the earth and rocks and occupy them, pass though walls at will, etc.

# III. VIMOKṢA, ABHIBHU AND KṛTSNA ACCORDING TO THE ABHIDHARMA

These technical procedures aimed at complete detachment from the things of the threefold world are fully studied by the Abhidharma of the Sarvastivādins and related texts: Jñānaprasthāna, T 1544, k. 18, p. 1013 seq.; Saṃgītiparyāya,T 1536, k. 18-20, p. 443a26- 446a18, 447a25-452c11; Saṃyuktābhidharmasāra, T 1552, k. 7, p. 96b-929a; Abhidharmāmṛta, T 1553, k. 2, p. 976117-b16 (reconstruction by Sastri, p. 103-107); Vibhāṣā, T 1545, k. 84-85, p. 434b15- 442b14; Kośa, VIII, p. 203-218; Nyāyānusāra, T 1562, k. 80, p. 771b-775a; Abhidhamadīpa, p. 429-432; Satyasiddhiśāstra, T 1646, k. 12-13, p. 5339a16-340b16,346b14-c22; Abhidharmasamuccahaya (of the Vijñānavādins), T 1605,, k. 7, p. 680c23-691a22 (reconstructed by Pradhan, p. 95-96).

Here is a summary of the Abhidharma scholasticism.

In general, the vimokṣas are the gateway into the abhibus, which in turn are the gateway into the kṛtsnas. The vimokṣas are 'complete emancipation' (vimokṣamātra) from the object. The abhibhus exert a twofold mastery (abhibhavana) over the object, entailing the view of the object as one wishes it (yatheṣṭam adhimokṣaḥ) and the absence of the negative emotion provoked by the object (kleśānutpatti). The kṛtsnas embrace the object without a gap and in its totality (nirantarakṛtsnaspharaṇa). All are derived from the dhyānas and the samāpattis.

- A. Vimokṣas 1-3, eight abhibhus and kṛtsnas 1-8.
- 1) In nature they are the five skandhas and they have as object the visibles of kāmadhātu.
- 2) Vimokṣas 1-2 and abhibhus 1-4 are contemplations of the horrible ( $a\acute{s}ubhabh\bar{a}vana$ ), i.e., of the decomposing corpse, and are practiced in the  $1^{st}$  and  $2^{nd}$  dhyānas. When practiced in the first, they counteract attachment to color ( $varnar\bar{a}ga$ ) of kāmadhātu; when practiced in the second, they counteract attachment to color of the first dhyāna.
- 3) In vimokṣaṣ 1 and abhibhus 1-2, the ascetic still has the notion of inner visibles, those of his own body; in vimokṣa 2 and abhibhus 3-4, he no longer has them. But in all cases, he contemplates unpleasant outer visibles (*amanojñā*), less numerous (*parītta*) in abhibhus 1 and 3, numerous (*mahodgata* or *paramāna*) in abhibhus 2 and 4.
- 4) Vimokṣa 3, abhibhus 5-8 and kṛtsnas 1-8 are contemplations on the beautiful ( $\acute{s}ubhabh\bar{a}vana$ ) and are practiced exclusively in the 4<sup>th</sup> dhyāna. No longer having the notion of inner visibles, the ascetic contemplates the outer pleasant visibles ( $manoj\tilde{n}\tilde{a}$ ) of kāmadhātu: in vimokṣa 3, the beautiful ( $\acute{s}ubha$ ) in

general, which he actualizes ( $k\bar{a}yena\ s\bar{a}k\hat{O}d\bar{a}tkaroti$ ); in abhibhus 5-8 and kṛtsnas 5-8, the four pure colors (blue, yellow, red and white); in kṛtsnas 1-4, the four great elements (earth, water, fire and wind).

#### B. Vimokṣas 4-7 and kṛtsnas 8-10.

- 1) Being formless, in nature they are the four *skandhas* with the exception of *rūpaskandha* and are practiced in the formless absorptions (*ārūpyasamāpatti*): vimokṣa 4 and kṛtsna 9 and the ākāśānantyāyatana; vimokṣa 5 and kṛtsna 10 in the vijñānānantyāyatana; vimokṣā 6 in the ākiṃcanāyatana; vimokṣa 7 in the naivasamjñānāsamjñāyatana.
- 2) For object they have the suffering of their own level and a higher level (*svabhūmyūrdhvabhūmikaṃ duḥkham*), the cause and cessation of this suffering (*taddhetunirodhau*), the Path relative to the totality of the *anvayajñāna* (*sarvānvayajñānapakṣomārgaḥ*), the *apratisaṃkyānirodha* and the *ākāśa*.

#### C. Eighth vimokṣa.

This is the absorption of cessation of concepts and feelings (*saṃjñāveditanirodhasamāpatti*), [a dharma] which stops the mind and mental events.

The qualities that constitute class A are acquired only by humans; those of classes B and C are acquired by beings of the threefold world. All these qualities may have as support (āśraya) the mental series of a worldly person (prthagjana) or a saint (ārya), except the last one, the nirodhavimokṣa, which can be produced only by the saint.

# 1. The Eight Liberations (p. 1291F)

#### A. General definition

The eight liberations (astau vimokṣāḥ): [k. 21, p. 215a]

- 1) Having [the notion] of inner visibles, he also sees outer visibles, this is the first vimokṣa (*adhyātmaṃ rūpasaṃjñī bahirdhā rūpāṇi paśyaty ayaṃ prathamo vimokṣaḥ*).<sup>269</sup>
- 2) Not having [the notion] of inner visibles, he sees outer visibles, this is the second vimokṣa (adhyātmam arūpasamjñī bahirdhā rūpāṇi paśyaty ayam dvitīyo vimokṣaḥ).
- 3) He physically actualizes the pleasant vimokṣa, this is the third vimokṣa (śubhaṃ vimokṣaṃ kāyena sākṣātkaroty ayaṃ tṛtīyo vimokṣaḥ).

<sup>269</sup> In place of the canonical phrase *rūpī rūpāṇi paśyati*, the *Traité* substitutes this new wording borrowed from the definition of the first abhibhu. Harivarman does the same in his Satyasiddhiśāstra, T 1646, k. 12, p. 339a17.

4-8) – The four formless absorptions (*catasra ārūpyasamāpattayaḥ*) and the absorption of cessation of concept and feeling (*saṃjñāveditanirodhasamāpatti*) are the [last] five vimokṣas.

In all, eight vimokṣas. They 'turn the back' (*pei*) on the five objects of enjoyment (*kāmaguṇa*) and [they 'reject' (*chö*)] or eliminate the mind of attachment (*sangacitta*) towards them; this is why they are called 'turning the mind and rejecting' (*pei-chö*, in Sanskrit vi-mokṣa).<sup>270</sup>

#### B. The first two vimoksas

The yogin has not destroyed inner and outer visibles: he has not suppressed the notion of both [his own] inner and outer visibles ( $r\bar{u}pasamj\bar{n}\bar{a}$ ) and he sees these visibles with a feeling of horror ( $a\acute{s}ubhacitta$ ):<sup>271</sup> this is the first vimoksa.

The yogin has destroyed the inner visibles and suppressed the notion of inner visibles ( $adhy\bar{a}tmam$   $r\bar{u}pasamj\tilde{n}\bar{a}$ ), but he has not destroyed outer visibles nor suppressed the notion of outer visibles ( $bahirdh\bar{a}$   $r\bar{u}pasamj\tilde{n}\bar{a}$ ) and it is with a feeling of horror that he sees outer visibles: this is the second vimokṣa.

These two vimokṣas both contemplate the horrible (aśubha): the first contemplates inner as well as outer visibles; the second does not see inner visibles and sees only outer visibles. Why is that?

Beings (*sattva*) have two kinds of behavior (*pratipad*):<sup>272</sup> sensualism (*tṛṣṇācarita*) and rationalism (*dṛṣṭicarita*). The sensualists (*tṛṣṇābahula*) are attached to happiness (*sukharakta*) and are bound (*baddha*) by outer fetters (*bāhyasaṃyojana*). The rationalists (*dṛṣṭibahula*) are strongly attached to the view of the individual (*satkāyadṛṣṭi*), etc., and are bound by inner fetters (*adhyātmasaṃyojana*). This is why the sensualists [usefully] contemplate the horrors of outer visibles (*bāhyarūpāśubha*), whereas the rationalists [usefully] contemplate the horrors (*aśubha*) and corruption (*vikāra*) of their own body.

Furthermore, at the beginning of the practice, the yogin's mind lacks sharpness ( $as\bar{u}k\bar{s}ma$ ) and at the start it is difficult for him to fix his mind on a single point [viz,, outer visibles]. That is why he disciplines his mind and tames it by gradual practice ( $kram\bar{a}bhy\bar{a}sa$ ) consisting of the [simultaneous] consideration of both outer and inner visibles. Then he can destroy the notion of inner visibles and see only outer visibles

Ouestion. – If the vogin no longer has the notion of inner visbles, why can he see outer visibles?

For the Indian exegesis, see Athasālinī, p. 191-192: Āraṃmane adhimuccanaṭṭhena paccanīkadhammehi vimuccanaṭṭhena vimokkho ti vuttaṃ; Kośavyākhyā, p. 689: sarvasaṃskṛtavaimukhyād vimoṣaḥ, samāpattyāvaraṇavimokṣaṇād vimokṣa iti.

This paragraph is undoubtedly a note by Kumārajīva aimed at justifying the translation of vimokṣa by the Chinese characters *pei-chö*.

Actually, during the first two vimokṣas, the ascetic cultivates the nine notions regarding the decomposing corpse, notions that will be the subject of the next chapter.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>272</sup> For these two kinds of behavior, see Nettippakaraṇa, p. 7, 109; Kośa, IV, p. 174, 208; V, p. 82; Kośavyākyā, p. 427.

Answer. – This is a matter of a subjective method (*adhimuktimārga*)<sup>273</sup> and not an objective method (*bhūtamārga*). The yogin thinks about his future corpse burned by the fire (*vidagdhaka*), devoured by insects (*vikhāditaka*), buried in the ground and completely decomposed. Or, if he considers it at present, he analyzes this body down to the subtle atoms (*paramāṇu*), all non-existent. This is how 'he sees outer visibles, not having the notion of inner visibles'.

Question. – In the [first] two abhibhvāyatanas, the yogin sees inner and outer visibles; in the [last] six abhibhvÂatanas he see only outer outer visibles. In the first vimokṣa, he sees inner and outer visibles; in the second vimokṣa, he sees only outer visibles. Why does he destroy only the concept of inner visibles and not destroy the outer visibles?

Answer. – When the yogin sees with his eyes this body marked with the marks of death (*maraṇanimitta*), he grasps the future characteristics of death; as for the actual body, in it he sees, to a lesser degree, the disappearance (*nirodhalakṣaṇa*) of the outer four great elements (*mahābhūta*). Therefore, since [215b] it is difficult for him to see that they do not exist, the [Sūtra] does not speak of the destruction of the visibles. Besides, at the time when the yogin will have transcended the form realm (*rūpadhātu*)<sup>274</sup>, he will no longer see outer visibles.

#### C. The third vimokşa

"He actualizes the pleasant vimokṣa" (śubham, vimokṣaṃ kāyena sākṣātkaroti). – This is a pleasant meditation in regard to unpleasant things (aśubheṣu śubhabhāvanā), as is said about the eight abhibhāyatanas.

The first eight kṛṭṣṇāyatanas contemplate, in the pure state ( $\dot{s}uddha$ ),:<sup>275</sup> 1) earth ( $prthiv\bar{t}$ ), 2) water (ap), 3) fire (tejas), 4) wind ( $v\bar{a}yu$ ), and also 5) blue ( $n\bar{t}la$ ), 6) yellow ( $p\bar{t}ta$ ), 7) red (lohita), 8) white ( $avad\bar{a}ta$ ).

The [fifth] sees visibles as blue  $(r\bar{u}p\bar{a}ni\ n\bar{\imath}l\bar{a}ni)$  like the blue lotus flower  $(n\bar{\imath}lotpalapuṣpa)$ , like the  $kintsing-chan,^{276}$  like the flax flower (umakapuṣpa) or like fine Benares muslin  $(sampannam\ v\bar{a}\ v\bar{a}r\bar{a}naseyam\ vastram)$ . It is the same for the visions of yellow  $(p\bar{\imath}ta)$ , red (lohita) and white  $(avad\bar{a}ta)$ , each according to its respective color. The entire thing is called 'the pleasant vimokṣa'.

Question. – If all of that is the pleasant vimokṣa, it should not be necessary to speak of the kṛtsnāyatanas [under the pain of repeating oneself].

An *adhimuktimanasikāra* or *adhimuktisamjñāna* or 'voluntary seeing' of the object; see Kośa, VIII, p. 198-199 and notes.

<sup>274</sup> I.e., in the five vimoksas and the two krtsnas called arupya.

This detail is necessary because, in the course of the first eight kṛtsnas, the yogin contemplates the four great elements and the four colors in their most pure form, without the intrusion of foreign elements or colors. This is what the Visuddhimagga calls the 'counter-sign' (*paṭihāganimitta*) of the object: see above, p. 1287F.

This must be a flower or a blue metal. However, there is a mountain in Kiang-Si with this name.

Answer. – The vimokṣas are the initial practice ( $prathamacary\bar{a}$ ); the abhibhvāyatanas are the intermediate practice ( $madhyamacary\bar{a}$ ) and the kṛtsnāyatanas are the long-standing practice.  $^{277}$ 

The meditation of the horrible (aśubhabhāvatana) is of two types: i) unpleasant (aśubha); ii) pleasant (śubha). The [first] two vimokṣas and the [first] four abhibhvāyatanas are of the unpleasant type. One vimokṣa, [i.e., the third], the [last] four abhibhvāyatanas and the [first] eight kṛtsnāyatanas are of the pleasant type.

Question. – When the yogin takes as pleasant (śubha) that which is unpleasant (aśubha), he is making a mistake (viparyāsa).<sup>278</sup> Then why is the meditation that he practices in the course of the pleasant vimokṣa not erroneous?

Answer. – The error is in seeing wrongly as pleasant a woman's beauty which is unpleasant, but the meditation practiced during the pleasant vimokşa is not a mistake due to the extension (*viśālatva*) of all true blue color, [etc].

Moreover, in order to tame the mind (*cittadamanārtham*), the pleasant meditation presupposes a lengthy practice of the meditation on the horrible (*aśubhabhāvana*) and on mental revulsion (*cittanirveda*): this is why practicing the pleasant meditation is not a mistake and there is no desire (*lobha*) in it.<sup>279</sup>

Moreover, the yogin begins by contemplating the horrors of the body and fixes his mind on all the inner and outer horrors in bodily things. Then he feels revulsion (nirveda): [his negative emotions], lust ( $r\bar{a}ga$ ), hatred ( $dve\acute{s}a$ ) and stupidity (moha) decrease; he becomes frightened and understands: "I do not possess these characteristics as a person at all: it is the body that is like that. Then why am I attached to it?"

He concentrates his mind and really meditates so as not to commit mistakes. As soon as his mind becomes disciplined and gentle, he avoids thinking of the horrors of the body, such as skin (*tvac*), flesh (*māṃsa*), blood (*lohita*) and marrow (*asthimajjan*): for him there are only white bones (*śvetāsthika*) and he fixes his mind on the skeleton (*kaṅkāla*). If his mind wanders outward, he concentrates and gathers it back. Concentrating his mind deeply, he sees the diffused light of the white bones (*śvetāsthika*) like a conch-shell (*śaṅkha*),<sup>280</sup> like shells (*kapardaka*), lighting up inner and outer things. This is the gateway of the pleasant vimoksa.

Then, noting the disappearance of the skeleton, the yogin sees only the light of the bones ( $asthiprabh\bar{a}$ ) and grasps the characteristics (nimitta) of outer and inner visibles. For example:

1) diamond (vajra), pearl (mani), precious golden and silver objects (hemarajataratnavastu), 281

278 The third of the four errors consisting of taking what is impure to be pure (aśucau śucir iti viparyāsah).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>277</sup> Cf. Kośa, VIII, p. 215.

The third vimokṣa is the root of good, *alobha*: cf. Kośa, VIII, p. 206; Abhidharmadīpa, p. 430.

<sup>280</sup> Cf. the attikāni satāni sankhavannūpanibhāni about which the canonical sources speak: Dīgha, II, p.

<sup>297;</sup> Majjhima, I, p. 58,59; III, p. 93; Anguttara, III, p. 324.

The contemplation of these precious objects is not mentioned in the traditional list of the kṛtsnas.

- 2) very pure (*supariśuddha*) earth (*pṛthivī*):<sup>282</sup> [first kṛtsna],
- 3) pure water (ap): [second kṛtsna],
- 4) pure fire (tejas) without smoke (dhūma) or kindling (indhana): [third kṛtsna],
- 5) pure wind (vāyu), without dust (rajas): [fourth kṛtsna],
- 6) blue visibles (*rūpāṇi nīlāni*), like the *kin-tsing-chan*: [fifth abhibhu and fifth kṛtsna],
- 7) yellow visibles (rūpāni pītāni), like the ginger flower (campakapuspa): [sixth abhibhu and sixth krtsna],
- 8) red visibles ( $r\bar{u}p\bar{a}ni\ lohit\bar{a}ni$ ), like the flower of the red lotus (padmapuṣpa): [seventh abhibhu and seventh kṛtsna]. 9) white visibles ( $r\bar{u}p\bar{a}ny\ avad\bar{a}t\bar{a}ni$ ), like white snow (hima): [eighth abhibhu and eighth kṛtsna].

Grasping these characteristics (nimittāny udgrhṇan), the yogin fixes his mind on the pleasant meditation (śubhabhāvana) on the pure light (pariśuddhaprabhā) belonging to each of these visibles. Then the yogin experiences joy (prīti) and happiness (sukha) filling his entire body (kāya): this is what is called the pleasant vimokṣa (śubha vimokṣa). Since it has pleasant things as object (ālambana), it is called 'pleasant' vimokṣa. Since the ascetic experiences this [215c] happiness in his whole body, it is said that the yogin 'actualizes it physically' (kāyena sākṣātkaroti). Having obtained this mental happiness (cittasukha), the yogin 'turns his back and rejects' (vi-muc) the five objects of enjoyment (kāmaguṇa) and is henceforth without joy (prīti) or happiness (sukha): 283 this is indeed a vimokṣa.

As the yogin has not yet destroyed the impurities (akṣṇṇāsrava), it happens that, from time to time, passionate thoughts (saṃyojanacitta) arise in him and he becomes attached (anusajate) to pleasant visibles (śubharūpa). Then he vigorously (ātāpin) and energetically (vīryavat) cuts this attachment (tam āsaṅgaṃ samucchinatti). Actually, this pleasant meditation is a result of his mind. And just as a master magician (māyākāra), in the face of objects that he has created magically, knows that they come from him, so the yogin is no longer attached (āsaṅga) and no longer pursues objects (ālambana). Then the vimokṣa 'liberation' changes its name and is called 'sphere of mastery over the object' abhibhvÂatana.

Although the yogin thus masters (*abhibhavati*) the pleasant meditation (*śubhabhāvana*), he is still incapable of extending it (*vistārayitum*). Then he returns to grasp the pleasant characteristics (*śubhanimitta*):

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>282</sup> Cf. the first eight counter-signs (*paṭibhāganimitta*) defined by the Visuddhimagga in the chapters on the kasiṇas (above, p. 1288F)

This is explained by the fact that the third vimokşa and consequently the eight abhibhus and the first eight kṛtsnas are practiced in the fourth dhyāna where there is no longer any happiness or suffering, neither joy nor sadness: see above, p. 1031-1032F.

The expression  $k\bar{a}yena\ s\bar{a}k\bar{s}\bar{a}tkrtv\bar{a}$  is absent in the Pāli canonical sources and is used by the Sanskrit sources only in regard to the fourth and eighth vimokṣa. This is due to their excellence  $(pr\bar{a}dh\bar{a}nya)$  and because they are in the final stages of rūpadhātu and ārūyadhātu respectively: cf. Kośa, VIII, p. 210-211; Kośavyākhyā, p. 690.

a. Using the power of the vimokṣas and the power of the abhibhvāyatanas, he grasps the nature of pleasant earth ( $\acute{s}ubhaprthiv\bar{\imath}$ ) and gradually extends it ( $\acute{k}rameṇa\ vist\bar{a}rayati$ ) to all the empty space ( $\bar{a}k\bar{a}\acute{s}a$ ) of the ten directions. He does the same with water (ap), fire (tejas) and wind ( $v\bar{a}yu$ ). <sup>284</sup>

b. He grasps the nature of blue ( $n\bar{\imath}lanimitta$ ) and gradually extends it to all the space of the ten directions. He does the same with yellow ( $p\bar{\imath}ta$ ), red (lohita) and white ( $avad\bar{a}ta$ ). <sup>285</sup>

Now the abhibhvāyatanas are transformed and become the kṛtsnāyatanas 'spheres of totality of the object'.

These three, [namely the vimokṣas, the abhibhvāyatanas and the kṛtsnāyatanas], are one and the same thing (*ekārtha*), with three name-changes.

Question. – The [first] three vimokṣas, the eight abhibhvātanas and the ten kṛtsnāyatanas are either objective considerations ( $bh\bar{u}tapratyavekṣ\bar{a}$ ) or subjective considerations ( $adhimuktipratyavekṣ\bar{a}$ ).

If they are objective considerations, since the body still contains skin (*tvac*) and flesh (*māṃsa*), how can one see only white bones (*śvetasthika*) in it? Besides, the body is constituted by an assemblage of thirty-six substances (*ṣaṭtriṃļśaddhātusāmagrī*), <sup>286</sup> why distinguish them and consider them separately? The four great elements (*mahābhūta*) [entering into the constitution of the body] each have their own nature (*svalakṣaṇa*); <sup>287</sup> why exclude three of them [water, fire and wind] and consider just the earth element

The Pāli suttas list 31 (Dīgha, II, p. 293; III, p. 104;Majjhima, I, p. 57; III, p. 90; Saṃyutta, IV, p. 111; V, p. 278; Anguttara, III, p. 323; V, p. 109). The Visuddhimagga gives their number as 32 and discusses them at length. Here is the latter list with corresponding terms in Pāli and Sanskrit:

1) Hair of the head (kesa, keśa); 2) hairs (loma, roman). 3) nails (nakha); 4) teeth (dānta); 5) skin (taca, tvac); 6) flesh (maṃsa, māṃsa); 7) tendons (nhāru, snāyu); 8) bone (aṭṭhi, asthi); 9) marrow (aṭṭhimiñja, asthimajjan); 10) kidneys (vakka, vṛkka); 11) heart (hadaya, hṛdaya); 12) liver (yakana, yakṛt); 13) pleura (kilamaka, kloman); 14) spleen (pihaka, plīhan); 15) lungs (papphāsa, pupphusa); 16) intestines (anta, antra); 17) mesentery (antagiṇa, antraguṇa); 18) stomach (usatiya, udara); 19) excrement (karīṣa, karīṣa); 20) brain (matthaluṅga, mastuluṅga); 21) bile (pitta); 22) phlegm (samha, śleṣman); 23) pus (pubba, pūya); 24) blood (lohita); 25) sweat (seda, sveda); 26) fat (meda or medas); 27) tears (assu, aśru); 28) suint (vasā); 29) saliva (khela, kheṭa); 30) snot (siṅghāṇikā, saṅghāṇaka); 31) synovial fluid (lasikā); 32) urine (mutta, mūtra).

<sup>284</sup> In the course of kṛtsnas 1 to 4.

<sup>285</sup> In the course of krtsnas 5 to 8.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>286</sup> In the Sanskrit sources of both the Lesser and the Greater Vehicles, physical substances are 26 in number (cf. Tseng yi a han, T 125, p. 687b9; k. 27, p. 712b7; k. 49, p. 815c5; Kalpanāmaṇḍitikā, T 201, k. 5, p. 285b1; Po yu king, T 209, k. 4, p. 555b15; Tch'ou yao king, k. 212, k. 1, p. 612b17; k. 5, p. 632c22; k. 17, p. 699c7; k. 26, p. 749c16). They are listed, with many faulty readings, in the Sanskrit editions of the Pañcaviṃśati, p. 205, l. 16-19 (T 223, k. 5, p. 253c26-29) and the Śatasāhasrikā, p.1431, l. 9-13 (T 220, k. 53, p. 298b26-28).

The nature of the four great elements is, respectively, solidity (*khakkhatatva*), moistness or fluidity (*dravatya*), warmth (*uṣṇatva*) and movement (*ūraṇatva*).

 $(prthiv\bar{n}mah\bar{a}bh\bar{u}ta)$ ?<sup>288</sup> The four colors are not blue  $(n\bar{\imath}la)$  exclusively; why then practice meditation just on blue  $(n\bar{\imath}labh\bar{a}vana)$ ?<sup>289</sup>

Answer. – [In these considerations] there is an objective consideration ( $bh\bar{u}tapratyavek\bar{s}\bar{a}$ ) as well as a subjective consideration ( $adhimuktipratyavek\bar{s}\bar{a}$ ).

Bodily characteristics (*kāyanimitta*), objectively, are unpleasant (*aśubha*): that is an objective consideration. Among outer things (*bāhyadharma*), there are all kinds of colors of pleasant nature (*śubhalakṣaṇa*): this is also an objective consideration. The pleasant (*śubha*) and the unpleasant (*aśubha*) come within objective considerations.

On the other hand, when one takes the small number of pleasant things and extends it to consider everything as pleasant,<sup>290</sup> when one chooses the single element water and extends it to see everything as water,<sup>291</sup> when one chooses the small amount of blue that exists and extends it to see everything as blue<sup>292</sup> and so on, those are subjective considerations that are not objective.

#### D. Vimokşas four to seven

The four formless vimokṣas  $(\bar{a}r\bar{u}pyavimokṣa)$  are similar to meditations practiced in the four formless absorptions  $(\bar{a}r\bar{u}pyasam\bar{a}patti)$ . The person who wants to acquire these vimokṣas first enters into the formless absorptions: the latter are the gateway into these vimokṣas, for the sphere of the infinity of space  $(\bar{a}k\bar{a}ś\bar{a}nanty\bar{a}yatana)$  'turns the back on and rejects' material objects  $(r\bar{u}py\bar{a}lambana)$ .

Question. – If it is the same for the formless absorptions, how do [the formless vimoksas] differ?

Answer. – The worldly person (*pṛthagjana*) who acquires the formless absorptions is *arūpin* ['without form' or without the concept of form]. But when the saint (*āryapudgala*) with high resolve (*adhyāśaya*) acquires these formless absorptions, [he is *arūpin*] absolutely and without regression: that is why it is called vimokṣa.

It is the same for the other vimokṣas coming within the spheres of infinity of consciousness (vijñānānantyāyatana), nothing at all (ākiṃcanyāyatana) and neither identification nor non-identification (naivasamjñānāsamjñānāsamjñānatana).

#### E. The eighth vimokşa

<sup>288</sup> This is done in the first krtsna.

This is done in the fifth abhibhu and the fifth krtsna.

<sup>290</sup> In the course of the third vimoksa.

<sup>291</sup> In the course of the second kṛtsna.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>292</sup> In the course of the fifth abhibhu and the fifth krtsna.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>293</sup> See above, p. 1274F seq.

Turning the back on and suppressing feelings (*vedita*) and concepts (*samjñā*) as well as all mind (*citta*) and all mental events (*caitasikadharma*) is what is called 'liberation consisting of the cessation of feeling and concept' (*samjñāveditanirodhavimokṣa*).

Question. – Why is the absorption of non-identification (asamjñāsamāpatti) not a vimokṣa? 294

Answer. – Because when beings with wrong view (*mithyādarśin*) who do not discern the defects (*doṣa*) of dharmas enter into the absorption [216a] [of non-identification], they identify it with nirvāṇa and when they emerge from of this absorption, they feel regret (*vipratisāra*) and fall back into their wrong views (*mithyādrṣṭi*). This is why the absorption [of non-identification] is not a vimokṣa.

On the other hand, by the cessation of feeling and concept that suppresses all distraction (*vikṣiptacitta*), the yogin penetrates into a nirvāna-like<sup>295</sup> cessation (*nirodha*). Since he acquires it by attaching to it [just] his body, the Sūtra says that he 'actualizes it physically' (*kāyena sākṣātkaroti*).

#### 2. The Eight Masteries

#### A. General definition

The eight spheres of mastery (aṣṭāv abhibhvāyatanāni):

- 1) Having the notion of inner visibles, he sees outer visibles, few in number, beautiful or ugly, and he cognizes these visibles by mastering them, he sees them by mastering them; this is the first abhibhu (adhyātmam rūpasamjnī habirdhā rūpaṇi paśyati parīttāni suvarṇadurvarṇāni, tāni khalu rūpāṇy abhibhūya jānāty abhibhūya paśyatīdam prathamamam abhibhvāyatanam).
- 2) Having the notion of inner visibles, he sees outer visibles, numerous, beautiful or ugly, and he cognizes these visibles by mastering them, he sees them by mastering them; this is the second abhibhu (adhyātmaṃ rūpasaṃjñī nahirdhā rūpāṇi paśyaty adhimātrāṇi suvarṇadurvarṇāni, tāni khalu rūpāṇy abhinhūya jānāty abhibhūya paśyatīdaṃ dvitīyam abhibhvāyatanam).
- 3-4) It is the same for the third and fourth abhibhvāyatana, with the only difference that, *not* having the notion of inner visibles, he sees outer visibles (*adyātmam arūpasamjñī bahirdhā rūpāni paśyati*).
- 5-6) [In these āyatanas], not having the notion of inner visibles, the yogin sees outer visibles blue, yellow, red or white (adhyātmam arūpasamjñī bahirdhā rūpāṇi paśyati nīlapītalohitāvadātāni).

These are the eight abhibhvāyatanas.

The yogin who has entered into cessation is *drṣṭadharmanirvāṇaprāpta*: in the present lifetime (*drste janmani*) is in the nirvāṇa with residue of conditioning (*sopadhiśesanirvāṇastha*).

The absorption of non-identification is practiced by worldly people (*pṛthagjana*) who identify non-identification with true liberation. The saints (*āṛya*) do not practice it; they reserve their efforts for the absorption of cessation which they consider to be the peaceful absorption: cf. Kośa, II, p. 201-214.

#### B. The first abhibhu

"Having the notion of inner visibles, he sees outer visibles " (adhyātmaṃ rūpasaṃjñī bahirdhā rūpāṇi paśyati): himself unhurt, he sees outer objects (bāhyālambana).

"He sees few of them" (*parīttāni*): being rare, these objects are said to be 'few in number'. The path of seeing not being developed in him, the yogin sees objects few in number for, if he saw a large number of them, he would grasp them with difficulty. In the same way, when deer run about in confusion, one cannot see them from far away.

"He sees the beautiful or ugly" (suvarṇadurvarṇāni). At the start of the practice, the yogin fixes his mind on an object (ālam,bana), the space between the eyebrows, the forehead or the end of the nose. With the notion of unpleasant inner visibles (adhyātmam aśubhasamjñī) and the notion of unpleasant things in his own body, the yogin sees outer visibles which sometimes will be beautiful (suvarṇāni) by virtue of the retribution for good actions (kuśalakarmavipāka), sometimes ugly (durvarṇāni) by virtue of retribution for bad actions (akuśhalakarmavipāka).

Furthermore, when the yogin, following the instructions of his teacher, grasps and sees all kinds of unpleasant things (nānāvidhāny aśubhāni) in outer objects (bāhyālambana), this is a matter of 'ugly visibles' (durvarṇāni rūpāṇI). But sometimes when, by loss of attentiveness (smṛtihāni), the yogin conceives a pleasant notion (śubhasamjñā) and sees pleasant visibles (śubhāni rūpāṇI), this is then a matter of 'beautiful visibles' (suvarṇāni rūpāṇI).

Furthermore, when the yogin by himself fixes his mind on a given place, he sees two kinds of visibles  $(dvividh\bar{a}ni\ r\bar{u}p\bar{a}n\bar{l})$  inherent in the desire realm  $(k\bar{a}madh\bar{a}tu)$ : i) the visibles that give rise to lust  $(r\bar{a}ga)$ , ii) the visibles that give rise to hatred  $(dve\bar{s}a)$ . Those that give rise to lust are pleasant visibles  $(\dot{s}ubh\bar{a}ni\ r\bar{u}p\bar{a}n\bar{l})$  described here as beautiful  $(suvarn\bar{a}ni)$ ; those that give rise to hatred are unpleasant visibles  $(a\dot{s}ubh\bar{a}ni\ r\bar{u}p\bar{a}n\bar{l})$  described here as ugly  $(durvarn\bar{a}li)$ .

The yogin is master (*vaśavartin*) over these objects (*ālambana*):<sup>296</sup> "He cognizes them by mastering them, he sees them by mastering them" (*abhibhūya jānāty abhibhūya paśyati*). Faced with beautiful visibles

Although the vimokṣas liberate from the object, the abhibhus exert a real mastery (aiśvarya) over it. According to the Kośa, VIII, p. 213, this domination (abhibhavana) over the object is twofold: i) yatheṣṭam adhimokṣaḥ: the voluntary seeing of the object as one wants it to be; ii) kleśānutpatti: the absence of negative emotion evoked by the object. Here the Traité particularly stresses this second point: the ascetic in possession of the abhibhus no longer feels any lust (rāga) for pleasant objects or any hatred (dvesa) toward unpleasant objects.

But the abhibhus still allow one to see the object as one wishes it to be. Indeed, "when the mind is absorbed, very pure, very clean, stainless, free of impurities, supple, ready to act, the ascetic can direct his mind (cittam abhinīharati) to the supernatural powers (abhijñā) and especially toward magical power (rddhi)" (Dīgha, I, p. 77). Then he can, at will, transform the great elements and the colors so as to see them as he wishes. See Visuddhimagga, ed. Warren, p. 142-143. Thus, the contemplation on yellow can

 $(abhir\bar{u}pa)$  capable of generating lust  $(r\bar{a}ga)$ , the yogin feels no lust; faced with ugly visibles capable of generating hatred  $(dve\bar{s}a)$ , he feels no hatred. He sees only that visibles coming from the four great elements  $(mah\bar{a}bh\bar{u}ta)$  and from a complex of causes and conditions  $(hetupratyayas\bar{a}magr\bar{i})$  are lacking in substance  $(as\bar{a}ra)$  like a water bubble (budbuda). That is how it is for beautiful and ugly visibles.

In this abhibhvāyatana, the yogin stays on the threshold of the [meditation] on the horrible (aśubhabhāvana). When the fetters of lust, hate, etc. (rāgadveṣādisaṃyojana) occur, he does not follow them: that is the sphere of mastery [of the object] for he masters the mistake that consists of taking as pure that which is impure (aśucau śucir iti viparyāsa) and the other defilements (kleśa).

Question. – While having the notion of inner visibles (*adhyātmaṃ rūpasaṃjñā*), how does the yogin see outer visibles (*bahirdhā rūpāṇi paśyati*)?

Answer. – The eight abhibhvāyatanas can be attained (*prāpti*) by ascetics who have entered deeply into concentration and whose mind is disciplined and softened. Sometimes the yogin sees the horrible (*aśubha*) of his own body and [216b] also sees the horrors of outer visibles.

The contemplation of the horrible (aśubhabhāvana) is of two types: i) that which contemplates all kinds of impurities (nānāvidhāśuci), such as the thirty-six bodily substances (dravya), etc.; ii) that which, disregarding in one's own body as in others' bodies, the skin (tvac), flesh (māmsa) and the five internal organs, 298 contemplates only the white bones (śvetāsthika), like a conch-shell (śankha), like snow (hima). The sight of the thirty-six bodily substances is called 'ugly' (durvarṇa); the sight of the conch or snow is called "beautiful' (suvarṇa).

#### C. The second abhibhu

At the time he is contemplating inner and outer [visibles], the yogin is distracted (*vikṣiptacitta*) and only with difficulty can he enter into dhyāna. Then he excludes notions of his own body (ādhymatmikasamjñā) and considers only outer visibles (bāhyarūpa). As is said in the Abhidharma, the yogin who possesses vimokṣa contemplates and sees the dead body: after death, the latter is picked up and taken to the charnel-ground (śmaśāna) where, burned by fire (*vidagdhaka*) and devoured by insects (*vikhāditaka*), it

have the effect of creating yellow forms (pītakarūpanimmānaṃ), the volition that something be golden (suvaṇṇan ti adhimuccanā), etc. This creative power of 'volitional seeing' (adhimokṣa) is mentioned in the canonical sources, e.g., Saṃyutta, I, p. 116: Ākaṅkhamāno Bhagavā Himavantaṃ pabbatarājaṃ suvaṇṇaṃ tv eva adhimucceyya, suvaṇṇañ ca pabbat' assā tī.

297 See above, p. 359, n.

A typically Chinese expression appearing in the canonical versions, although the Indian originals show no trace of it: cf. Fo pan ni yuan king, T 5, k. 1, p. 163c15; k. 2, [. 171a16; Fo k'ai kiai, T 20, p. 262a3; Hong chouei, T 33, [. 817b3; Ni-li, T 86, p. 908b15; Tseng yi a han, T 125, k. 25, p. 6587b12; k. 51, p. 828c18. The five viscera are the kidneys, the heart, the liver, the lungs and the spleen. The Commentary to the Vihhanga, p. 249, also speaks of the *vakkapañcaka* "the five [constituents of the body] starting with the kidneys."

disintegrates. From then on, the yogin sees only the insects and the fire, but does not see the body: this is why the Sūtra says that "not having the notion of inner visibles, he sees outer visibles" (adhyātmam ārūpasamjñī bahirdhā rūpāṇi paśyati).

In accordance with instructions, the yogin perceives and looks at the body as a skeleton (*kankāla*). When his mind is distracted outwardly, he brings it back and concentrates on the skeleton as object. Why is that? At the beginning of the practice, this person was unable to see subtle objects (*sūkṣmālambana*), and that is why the sūtra said [in regard to the first abhibhu that the yogin sees only] visibles "few in number" (*rūpāṇi parīttāni*). But now, this yogin, whose path of seeing is developing, deepening and broadening, uses this skeleton in order to see Jambudvīpa as skeletons everywhere, and this is why the Sūtra says here that he sees 'numerous visibles' (*rūpāṇy adhimatrāṇi*).

Then he concentrates his mind again and no longer sees a single skeleton; this is why the sūtra says that "he cognizes visibles by mastering them and sees visibles by mastering them" (tāni khalu rūpāṇy abhibhūya jānāty abhibhūya paśyati).

And since, the yogin is able at will (yathestam) to master the concept of man and woman  $(purusastr\bar{\imath}samj\tilde{n}\bar{a})$  and the concept of beauty  $(sucisamj\tilde{n}\bar{a})$  in regard to the five objects of enjoyment  $(k\bar{a}maguna)$ , that is indeed a 'sphere of mastering the object'  $(abhibhv\bar{a}yatana)$ .

Thus a strong man (balavat) mounted on his horse who captures the enemy is able to destroy them is said to 'master' them and, as he is also able to control his horse, he 'masters' it. It is the same for the yogin: in the meditation on the horrible (aśubhabhāvana), he is able to do a lot with just a little, and do a little with a lot: that is an abhibhvāyatana. He is also able to destroy his enemies, the five objects of enjoyment (kāmaguṇa); that also is an abhibhvāyatana. When without destroying inwardly [the notion] of his own body, the yogin sees visibles outwardly, numerous or few in number, beautiful or ugly, that is a matter of the first and second abhibhvāyatanas.

#### D. The third and fourth abhibhus

When, no longer having the notion of visibles concerning his own body, the yogin sees visibles outwardly, numerous or few, beautiful or ugly, that is the third and fourth abhibhu.

#### E. The four last abhibhus

When, having concentrated his mind, the yogin deeply penetrates into the absorptions (samāpatti), suppresses [the concept] of inner body (adhyāymakāya), sees outer objects perfectly pure (bāhyapariśuddhālambana), blue (nīla) and blue in color (nīlavarṇa), yellow (pīta) and yellow in color (pītavarṇa), red (lohita) and red in color (lohitavarṇa), white (avadāta) and white in color (avadātavarṇa), this is a matter of the last four abhibhvāyatanas.

Question. –What is the difference between the last four abhibhvāyatanas and the last four kṛtsnāyatanas of color, blue, etc., that are part of the ten kṛtsnāyatanas?

Answer. – The kṛtsnāyatana of blue grasps absolutely everything as blue; the corresponding abhibhvāyatana sees a large number or a small number of objects only as blue, at will (*yatheṣṭam*), without, however, eliminating foreign thoughts. Seeing and mastering these objects, it is called abhibhvāyatana.

Thus, for example, whereas the noble cakravartin king totally dominates the four continents (*cāturdvīpaka*), the king of Jambudvīpa dominates only a single continent. In the same way, whereas the kṛtsnāyatanas totally dominate all objects, the abhibhvāyatanas see only a small number of visibles and dominate them but are unable to include all objects.

This is a summary (*saṃkṣepeṇa*) explanation of the eight abhibhvāyatanas.

#### 3. The Ten Totalities

[216c] As for the ten kṛṭṣṇāyatanas 'spheres of totality of the object', we have already spoken of them in regard to the vimokṣas and the abhibhvāyatanas. They are called 'spheres of totality' because they embrace their object in its totality (ālambanakṛṭṣṇaspharaṇāt).<sup>299</sup>

Question. – [Of the four formless spheres (ārūpyāyatana], only the first two, ākāśānantyāyatana 'sphere of infinite space' and vijñānānatyāyatana 'sphere of infinite consciousness', are kṛtsnāyatanas. Why are [the other two formless spheres], namely, ākiṃcanāyatana 'sphere of nothing at all' and naivasaṃjñānāsaṃjñāyatana 'sphere of neither identification nor non-identification'] not kṛtsnāyatanas as well?

Answer. – The kṛtsnāyatanas are subjective views (*adhimokṣamanasikāra*) and, of the formless spheres, only two, those of infinity of space and infinity of consciousness, lend themselves of subjective extensions.

"Safety (yogakṣema), happiness (sukha), vastness (viśāla), immensity (apramāṇa) and infinitity (ananta), the sphere of space", said the Buddha. – Throughout all the kṛtsnāyatanas there is a consciousness (vijñāna) capable of quickly bearing upon all things and, faced with these dharmas, one determines the presence of consciousness. This is why the two spheres (āyatana) [of space and consciousness] constitute the kṛtsnāyatana.

On the other hand, in the sphere of nothing at all  $(\bar{a}kimcany\bar{a}yatana)$ , there is no substance  $(dh\bar{a}tu)$  capable of being extended; there is no happiness (sukha) there and, in regard to nothing-at-all, the Buddha said nothing about infinity, immensity.

299 Cf. Kośavyākhyā, p. 692: *Nirantarakṛtsnasspharaṇād iti nirantaraṃ kṛtsnānāṃ pṛthivyādīnaṃ spharaṇād vyāpanāt kṛtsnāyatanānīty ucyante.* – Vibhāṣā, T 1545, k. 85, p. 40b18-23: They are called kṛtsnāyatana for two reasons: *i*) because they are without intervals (*nirantara*) and *ii*) because they are extended (*viśala*). Because deliberate reflection (*adhimokṣamanasikāra*) bears uniquely on blue, etc., without being mixed with another object, they are 'without interval'; because deliberate reflection on all of blue, etc., is of infinite scope (*gocara*), they are 'extended'. The Bhadanta says: Because their object (*ālambana*) is vast and extended, because there are no intervals-gaps, they are called kṛtsnāyatanas.

In the sphere of neither identification nor non-identification (*naivasaṃjñānāsaṃjñāyatana*), the mind is dull (*mṛdu*) and it is hard for it to grasp a concept (*nimittodgrahaṇa*) and extend it to infinity, as is the case for the kṛtsnas].

#### 4. Objects and Distribution of the Vimoksas, Abhibhus and Kstsnas

Every utilization of these three types of dharmas realizes a mastery over the object (ālambanābhibhavana).

1) The kṛtsnāyatanas are impure (*sāsrava*).

The first three vimokṣas, the seventh and eighth vimokṣas are impure. The others are sometimes impure  $(s\bar{a}srava)$ , sometimes pure  $(an\bar{a}srava)$ .<sup>301</sup>

2) The first two vimokṣas and the first four abhibhvāyatanas are contained (saṃgṛhūta) in the first and second dhyānas.

The śubhavimokṣa ( $3^{rd}$  vimokṣa), the last four abhibhvāyatanas and the first eight kṛtsnāyatanas are contained in the fourth dhyāna. $^{302}$ 

Why are there no vimokṣas in the third dhyāna? On this point see Kośa, VIII, p. 209.

<sup>300</sup> A possibility that may be verified during the *vyutkrāntakasamāpatti* or the 'absorption of the leap': see above, p. 1048F, and, for detailed description, see Hobogirin, IV, p. 353-360, article  $Ch\beta j\beta$  by J. May.

We may recall that the absorption of worldly order practiced by ordinary people (*pṛthagjana*) is śuddhaka, i.e., kuśala sāsrava 'good but mixed with impurities'. The absorption of supraworldly order practiced as Path by the saints (ārya) who have seen the Buddhist truths is anāsrava 'free of impurities'. See above, p. 1027F, 1035-36F, and Kośa, VIII, p. 145, n.

Thus the eight vimokôas are distributed over eleven levels: cf. Kośavyākhyā, p. 689: "These vimokṣas occur in the other eleven levels, except for the seven threshold absorptions, viz., 1) the desire realm, 2-3) the *anāgamya* and the *dhyānāntara*. 4-11) the eight levels made up of the [four] dhyānas and the [four] *samāpattis*." – See also Vibhāṣā, T 1545, k. 84, p. 434c-435a: The first two vimokṣas occur in the first two dhyānas, the anāgamya and the dhyānāntara... The third vimokṣa occurs in the fourth dhyāna... The fourth vimokṣa is in the ākāśānantyāyatana... The fifth vimokṣa is in the vijñānānantyāyatana... The sixth vimokṣa is in the naivasamjñānāsamjñāyatana... The Vimokṣa of samjñāveditanirodha also.

3) The first two kṛtsnāyatanas are called ākāśāyatana. The ākāśāyatana contains the vijñānāyatana. The vijñānāyatana contains the first three vimokṣas, the eight abhibhvāyatanas and the [first] eight kṛtsnāyatanas, all of which have as object (ālambana) the visibles of the desire realm (kāmadhāturūpa).

The four next vimokṣas (nos. 4-7) have as object the formless realm ( $\bar{a}r\bar{u}pyadh\bar{a}tu$ ), the marvelous qualities of pure dharmas ( $an\bar{a}srvadharma$ ) and the good ( $ku\acute{s}ala$ : read chan instead of jo) in [the four] fundamental [absorptions] (maulasammapatti), because the fundamental formless absorptions ( $\bar{a}r\bar{u}pyamaulasam\bar{a}patti$ ) do not concern the levels lower than them.

The absorption of the cessation of concepts and feeling (samjñāveditanirodhasamāpatti) constituting the eighth vimokṣa), being neither mind (citta) nor mental event (caitasikadharma), has no object (anālambana).

The seventh vimokṣa, namely, the absorption of neither identification nor non-identification (naivasaṃjñānanāsaṃjñāyatana) alone has as its object the four formless aggregates (ārūpyaskandha) and the pure dharmas (anāsravadharma). 304

# **Second Section THE NINE SUCCESSIVE ABSORPTIONS (p. 1308F)**

#### PRELIMINARY NOTE

Designated by the name *anupūrvavihāra* (Dīgha, III, p. 265; Anguttara, IV, p. 410), *anupūrva-samāpatti* (Divya, p. 95), *anupūrva-vihāra-samāpatti* (Saṃyutta, II, p. 216; Anguttara, IV, p. 410; Pañcaviṃśati, p. 19; Śatasāhasrikā,p. 58, 1445; Vibhaṅga, p. 343; Mahāvyut., no. 1498), *anupūrva-samādhi-samāpatti* (Dharmasaṃgraha, §82), the nine successive absorptions are the four dhyānas of the rūpadhāru, the four *samāpattis* of ther ārūpya, plus the *saṃjñāveditanirodhasamāpatti*.

To define them, the Pāli and Sanskrit texts (df. Dīgha, III, p. 265-266; Anguttara, IV, p. 410-414; Śatsāhasrikā, p. 1445-1446) repeat the words of the old Dhyānasūtra, the text of which has been given above, p. 1024F. Dīgha, III, p. 266, and Anguttara, IV, p. 410-414, explain that these nine absorptions are acquired by nine successive cessations (nirodha) eliminating in turn: 1) bad desires (kāma), 2) investigation and analysis (vitarkavicāra), 3) joy (prīti), 4) inhalation and exhalation (āśvāsapraśvāsa) or indifference and happiness (upekṣāsukha), 5) the concept of substance (rūpasaṃjñā), 6) the notion of infinite space (ākāśānanatāyatana), 7) the concept of infinite consciousness (vijñānānantyāyatana), 8) the concept of nothing at all (ākimcanyāyatana), 9) the concept of neither identification nor non-identification (naivasaṃjñānāsaṃjñāyatana) and finally, all concept (saṃjñā) and sensation (vedanā).

The object of the vimokṣas, etc., is treated in the same manner in Vibhāṣā, T 1545, k. 84, p. 435a16-28; Kośa, VIII, p. 208-209.

<sup>303</sup> This passage is obscure; there is possibly a gap.

The nine successive absorptions (anupūrvasamāpatti):

Emerging from of the first dhyāna, the yogin then [directly] enters into the second dhyāna in such a way that there is no other intervening mind, whether good (*kuśala*) or defiled (*saṃkliṣṭa*). [From the dhyāna into the samāpatti], the yogin continues in this way until the absorption of cessation of concept and feeling (*saṃjñāveditanirodhasamāpatti*).

Question. – But other things can still follow one another [directly]. Why would just the nine absorptions be successive?

Answer. – There are always foreign minds that happen to be interpolated among the other qualities (guna); this is why they are not successive. But here, lofty resolve  $(adhy\bar{a}\dot{s}aya)$  and wisdom  $(prajn\bar{a})$  are sharp  $(t\bar{t}ksna)$ ; the yogin puts his own mind to the test and, coming out of the first dhyāna, he enters directly into the second in such a way that no other mind intervenes. In these very qualities, the mind is supple (mrduka) and easily cuts through desire  $(trsn\bar{a})$ : this is why the minds succeed one another.

Of these successive absorptions, two are impure  $(s\bar{a}srava)$  and the other [217a] seven are sometimes impure and sometimes pure  $(an\bar{a}srava)$ . On the other hand, the dhyānantara 'variation of the first dhyāna' and the anāgamya 'threshold absorption of the first dhyāna' are without stability  $(as\bar{a}ra)$ .  $^{305}$ 

Moreover, [the successive absorptions] are acquired by the āryas only, and their great benefits are not found in the samānantaka 'threshold absorptions': this is why the latter are not 'successive' (anupūrva).

The eight vimokÔas, the eight abhibhvāyatanas, the ten kṛtsnāyatanas and the nine anupūrvasamāpattis have been explained in brief (samāsatas) according to the śrāvaka system.

-

<sup>305</sup> For detail, see Kośa, VIII, p. 178-181.

# CHAPTER XXXV: THE NINE HORRIBLE NOTIONS (p. 1311F)

# PRELIMINARY NOTE

By Navasamjñā, the *Traité* means the nine notions of the horrible (*navāśubhasamjñā*) cultivated by the ascetic in the course of the contemplation of the decomposing corpse.

# I. AŚUBHĀ IN THE CANONICAL TEXTS

The Pāli canon contains three suttas entitled *Asubha*: Samyutta, V, p. 132; Aṅguttara, II, p. 150-152; Itivuttaka, p. 80-81.

Aśubhā or aśubhasamjñā also appears in the canonical lists:

- 1. List of three dharmas: Anguttara, III, p. 446.
- 2. List of four *samjñās*: Anguttara, IV, p. 353, 358; Tchong a han, T 26, k. 10, p. 492b23-25.
- 3. Lists of five *saṃjñā*s: *i*) Anguttara, II, p. 150, 151, 55, 156; III, p. 83, 142-143; *ii*) Anguttara, III, p. 79, 277.
- 4. Lists of seven *saṃjñās*: *i*) Dīgha, II, p. 79; III, p. 253; Anguttara, IV, p. 24,148; *ii*) Anguttara, IV, p. 46, 148; *iii*) Tch'ang a han, T 1, k. 2, p. 11c26-29.
- 3. Lists of nine  $samj\tilde{n}\tilde{a}s$ : i) Dhigha, III, p. 289-290; Anguttara, IV, p. 387, 465; ii) Tch'ang a han, T 1, k. 9, p. 56c22-24.
- 4. Lists of ten *saṃjñā*s: *i*) Dīgha, III, p. 291; Saṃyutta, V, p. 132-133; Anguttara, V, p. 105, 309; *ii*) Anguttara, V, p. 109.
- 5. List of twenty samjñās: Anguttara, I, p. 41-42.

But *aśubha* is a complex entity since it concerns the various stages of decomposition of the corpse. However, the canonical sources mention only a few without enumerating them.

Among the most frequently mentioned stages of decomposition mentioned are the corpse reduced to bones (aṭṭhika), rotten (puluvaka), turning blueish (vinīlika), torn apart (vicchiddaka), bloated (uddhumātaka), and a few others, but the description is not systematic: cf. Anguttara, I, p. 42; II, p. 17; V, p. 310; Tsa a han, & 99, k. 31, p. 221b27-28; Tseng yi a han, Y 125, k. 42, p. 781a19-21; k. 44,p. 789b2-5.

There is an almost complete list in a Sanskrit sūtra cited in the Kośavyākhyā, p. 55, l. 1-2: i) vinīlaka, ii) vipūyaka, iii) vyādhmātka, iv) vipaṭumaka, v) vilohitaka, vi) vikhāditaka, vii) vikṣiptaka, viii) asthi, ix) asthisamkalikā.

# II. THE TEN ASUBHASAÑÑĀ IN THE PĀLI ABHIDHAMMA

The Abhidhamma, its commentaries and related treatises fix the number of  $asubhasa\tilde{n}\tilde{n}\bar{a}s$  at ten and cite them in the following order:

i) Bloated corpse (*uddhumātaka*), *ii*) blueish (*vinīlaka*), *iii*) rotten (*vipubbaka*), *iv*) torn apart (*vicchiddaka*), *v*) devoured (*vikkhhāyitaka*), *vi*) scattered (*vikkhittaka*), *vii*) chopped up and scattered (*hatavikkhittaka*), *viii*) bloody (*lohitaka*), *ix*) infested with worms (*puļuvaka*), *x*) reduced to bone (*aṭṭhika*).

These terms are cited and commented upon in Dhammasangani, p. 55 (tr. Rhys Davids, p. 63 and n. 3); Atthasālinī, p. 197-198 (tr. Tin, p. 264-267); Visuddhimagga, ed. Warren, p. 89, 145-146 (tr. Nanamoli, p. 185-186); Vimuttimagga, tr. Ehara, p. 132-139. The Visuddhimagga, ed. Warren, p. 146-158 (tr. Nanamoli, p. 186-200) deals at great length with the manner of practicing the first *asubhabhāvana*. As in the *kasinas*, the ascetic must apprehend a twofold sign, the sign of learning (*uggahanimitta*) and the counter-sign (*paṭibhāganimitta*). To this end, he goes to a charnel-ground and contemplates with extreme attentiveness the ten stages of decomposing corpses, the bloated corpse, etc. The pertinent *uggahanimitta* appears to him as a unit (*paripuṇṇa*). See two fine articles in *Ceylon Encyclopedia*, II, p. 270-281.

# III. THE NINE AŚUBHASAMJÑĀS IN THE SANSKRIT ABHIDHARMA

The Sanskrit Abhidharma and, following it, the Mahāyāna sūtras and śāstras, list only nine notions of the horrible, but rarely cite them in the same order and not always in full. Descriptions will be found in Vibhāṣā, T 1545, k. 40, p. 205a-210a; Kośa, VI, p. 148-153; VIII, p. 197, 205; Kośavyākhyā, p. 526-537; Nyāyānusāra, Y 1562, k. 59, p. 671a; Abhidharmadīpa, p. 372.

The *Traité*, being a Prajñāpāramitā commentary, cites lists of the nine notions found in this literature. Unfortunately, the Sanskrit editions available to us are rather defective. Edgerton (Dictionary, s.v. *aśubha*) has tried to correct them. Perhaps it is more useful to reproduce here the texts of the editions, simply noting the variants:

Pañcaviṃśati, p. 19, l. 19-20,l. 2; p. 165, l. 7: i) ādhmātaka, ii) vidhūtaka (var. vipaḍumaka,) iii) vipūyaka (var. vipūryaka), iv) vilohitaka, v) vinīlaka, vi) vikhāditaka, vii) vikṣiptaka, viii) vidagdhaka, ix) asthisamjñā.

Śatasāhasrikā, p. 59, l. 2-18: i) dhyātaka, ii) vipadāka, iii) vipūtika, iv) vilohitaka, v) vinīlaka. vi) vikhāditaka, vii) vikṣiptaka, viii) asthi, ix) vidagdhaka-saṃjñā.

Śatasāhasrikā, p. 1258, l. 6-8 (very defective text): i) vyāgatika, ii) niruttamaka, iii) vipūtika, iv) vilohataka, v) vilīnaka, vi) vivādaka, vii) vikṣiptaka, viii) asmi, ix) vidagnaka.

Chinese translation of the Pañcaviṃśati by Kumārajīva (T223, k. 1, p. 219a9-10): i) vyādhumātaka, ii) vidhūtaka, iii) vilohitaka, iv) vipūyaka (or vipūtika), v) vinīlaka, vi) vikhāditaka, vii) vikṣiptaka, viii) asthi. ix) vidagdhaka-saṃjñā.

The Chinese translation of the Mahāprajñāpāramitā by Hiuan-tsang systematically adopts the following list in various places (T220, vol. V, k. 3, p. 12a13-15; vol. VII, k. 402, p. 7b24-26; k. 479, p. 429c17-19): i) vyādhmātaka, ii) vipūyaka, iii) vilohitaka, iv) vinīlaka, v) vikhāditaka. vi) vikṣiptaka, vii) asthi, viii) vidagdhaka, ix) vidhūtaka (?)

Three other lists should also be mentioned:

Bhikṣuṇīkarmavacana, p. 139, l. 13-16: i) vinīlaka, ii) vipūyaka, iii) vipaṭumaka, iv) vyādhmātaka, v) vikhyāditaka, vi) vilohitaka, vii) vikṣiptaka, viii) asthi, ix) śūnyatā-pratyavekṣaṇa-samjñā.

Abhisamayālamkāravṛtti, p. 22, l. 11-13: i) ādhmātaka, ii) vidhūtaka, iii) vipāyaka, iv) vilohitaka, v) vinīlaka, vi) vikhāditaka, vii) vikṣiptaka, viii) asthika, ix) vidagdhaka-samjñā. See C. Penna, Note di lessicografia buddhista, Rivista degli Studi Orientali, XXXIX, 1964, p. 61-53.

Mahāvyut., no. 1156-1164: i) vinīlaka, ii) vidhūtika-(vipūyaka), iii) vipaḍumaka, iv) vyādhmātaka, v) vilohitaka, vi) vikhāditaka, vii) vikṣiptaka, viii) vidagdhaka, ix) asthi-saṃjñā.

Sūtra (cf. Pañcaviṃśatī, p. 19, l. 18-20, l. 2; Śatasāhasrikā, p. 59, l. 2-18). – The [bodhisattva-mahāsattva must cultivate] the nine notions (navasaṃjñā)<sup>306</sup> of the horrible:

- 1) that of the bloated corpse (vyādhmātakasaṃjñā),
  - 2) that of the torn-up corpse (vidhūtakasaṃjñā),
  - 3) that of the bloody corpse (vilohitakasamjñā),
  - 4) that of the rotting corpse ( $vip\bar{u}yakasamj\tilde{n}\bar{a}$ ).
  - 5) that of the corpse turning blueish (*vinīlakasamjñā*),
  - 6) that of the devoured corpse (vikhāditakasamjñā),
  - 7) that of the scattered corpse (vikṣiptakasaṃjñā),
  - 8) that of the corpse reduced to bones (asthisamj $\tilde{n}a$ ),
  - 9) that of the burned corpse (*vidagdhakasamjñā*).

Śāstra. –

306 Here and in the following pages, the variant *kieou siang* will be adopted by preference.

First Section THE NINE NOTIONS ACCORDING TO THE ABHIDHARMA

#### I. THE POSITION OF THE NINE NOTIONS

Question. – It is necessary first to have cultivated these nine notions and be free from desire in order to then attain the dhyānas. Why does [the Prajñāpāramitāsūtra] speak of the nine notions here after having dealt with the dhyānas and the absorptions (samāpatti)?

Answer. – First the Sūtra spoke about the fruit of retribution (*vipākaphala*) which is [the dhyānas and the samāpattis] in order to encourage the yogin's heart. Although the nine notions are horrible (*aśubha*), the person who wants to obtain their fruit of retribution must have practiced them previously.

#### II. HOW TO MEDITATE ON THE NINE NOTIONS

Question. – How does the yogin meditate on these nine things, the bloated corpse (vyādhmātaka), etc?

#### 1. Reflection on death

Answer. – First the yogin observes pure discipline (*śīlaśuddhi*) in order to have no regrets (*kaukṛtya*), and thus he will easily find the meditation subjects (*bhāvanadharma*) to destroy the enemies (*amitra*) that are the negative emotions, lust, etc. (*rāgādikleśa*).

He thinks about a man on the very day of his death: the words of farewell that he speaks, the outbreath  $(ap\bar{a}na)$  which does not return and, immediately afterwards, his death. The family is in turmoil: they weep and invoke the heavens saying: "Just a moment ago he passed away; his breath is no more, his body is cold, he is no longer conscious."

Death is a great calamity; it is impossible to avoid it. It is like the fire at the end of the kalpa (*kalpoddāha*) from which there is no escape. Thus it is said:

When death comes, neither rich nor poor,

Neither benefactors nor criminals,

Neither nobles nor lowly people

Neither old nor young can escape it.

There are no prayers that can save you,

There are no tricks by which you can escape,

There are no stratagems to free you,

There is no way to avoid it.

Death is the place where one leaves one's attachments forever; it is hated by all, but no matter how much one hates it, no one can escape it. The yogin says: "Soon my body will be like this, no different from a piece of wood or stone. Therefore, from now on I must not covet the five objects of enjoyment ( $k\bar{a}maguna$ ) and I must not think of the coming of death like oxen and sheep. Even when these animals see a dead animal, they leap about and squeal without taking anything into account. I, who possess a human body and differentiate between beautiful and ugly, must seek the ambrosia (amrta) of immortality." Thus it is said:

Having the six faculties (sadindriya), the human being is complete,

His knowledge is clear and his vision is keen,

But he does not seek the Dharma of the Path;

It is in vain that he has received body and knowledge.

All animals also are able to free themselves

From the objects of enjoyment (kāmaguṇa)

[217b]But they do not know how to cultivate

The good in view of the Path.

The person who has acquired a human body

But who only devotes himself to licentiousness

And does not know how to develop the good practices,

How is he different from the animals?

The beings in the three unfortunate destinies (durgati)

Are incapable of accomplishing the deeds of the Path.

The person who has obtained a human body

Must look after his own interests.

# 2. Vyādmātakasaminā

The yogin goes to a dead body (*mṛtaśarīra*) and sees this corpse bloated (*vyādhmātaka*) like a leather bag blown up by the wind and quite different from what it was originally. He feels disgust (*nirveda*) and fear of it and says to himself: "My body too will be like that and will not escape this end. In this body a sovereign consciousness governed it, saw, heard, spoke, committed wrong deeds (*āpatti*), won merits (*puṇya*) and used it as it pleased: where has it gone? Now I see only an empty house (*śūnyagrha*). This body had fine features (*lakṣaṇa*): a fine waist, nice shoulders, long eyes, a straight nose, a smooth forehead, arched eyebrows, and all these beautiful things troubled men's hearts; now I see only a swollen thing: where has its beauty gone? The characteristics of man or woman (*puruṣastrīnimitta*), they too, are unrecognizable."

Having made this meditation, the yogin condemns any attachment to lust  $(r\bar{a}g\bar{a}dhyavas\bar{a}na)$ . Indeed, this bloated sack of rotten excrement is detestable; how could it evoke any lust?

#### 3. Vidhūtakasamiñā

With the heat of the wind, the corpse gets bloated and lies on the ground, split open and broken up  $(vidh\bar{u}taka)$ . The five viscera ooze forth excrement (vis), urine  $(m\bar{u}tra)$ , pus  $(p\bar{u}ya)$  and blood (sonita) and a repugnant liquid appears.

The yogin grasps this 'notion of the torn-up corpse' (*vidhūtakasaṃjñā*) and compares his own body to it, saying to himself: "I too, in the same way, contain all these horrible things; how am I any different? I was very foolish to allow myself to be seduced by this fine skin, a simple sack of excrement. Like moths (*adhipātika*) flying into the fire, <sup>307</sup> I coveted bright colors without knowing that they burn the body, At last I have seen this split and torn corpse in which the male and female characteristics (*puruṣastrīnimitta*) have disappeared. Everything that I was attached to is nothing but that."

#### 4. Vilohitakasamiñā

When the corpse is torn up, a 'jumble of flesh and blood' (māmsavilohitaka) spreads out.

# 5. Vinīlakasaminā

307 See also below, k. 37, p. 333b17. This is a canonical comparison: cf. Udāna, p. 72: *Patanti pajjotam iv 'ādhipātā, diṭṭhe sute iti h'eke niviṭṭhā*: "Like moths that fall into the flame of a lamp, some people become attached to what they see and hear."

Sometimes the yogin sees some 'blueish' (*vinīlaka*), yellowish, reddish or even, under the sun's heat, blackish, spots on the corpse of a flogged man. Grasping all these signs, the yogin contemplates them and says to himself: "Then how is the purity and beauty of the red and white colors to which I am attached different from these?"

# 6. Vipūyakasamijnā

The yogin soon sees these blueish, yellowish, reddish and blackish spots which the birds and beasts have not devoured or buried or hidden, putrefy; all kinds of worms develop in it. Seeing all of that, the yogin says to himself: "Once this corpse had lovely colors; the body was smeared with fine makeup, dressed in superb garments and adorned with flowers. Today it is no more than a rotten mass, torn up and 'putrid' (vipūyaka): that is its real constitution; the former adornments were nothing but deceptions."

#### 7. Vikhāditakasaminā

If the corpse has not been burned or buried but abandoned in a deserted place  $(k\bar{a}nt\bar{a}ra)$ , it is 'devoured'  $(vikh\bar{a}ditaka)$  by the birds and beasts. The crows  $(k\bar{a}ka)$  tear out the eyes; the dogs  $(\acute{s}van)$  share its hands and feet amongst themselves; the jackals  $(\acute{s}rg\bar{a}la)$  and wolves (vrka) tear up the belly, and the corpse is completely torn to pieces. 308

#### 8. Viksiptakasamiñā

The pieces lying on the ground are more or less complete. Seeing that, the yogin feels disgust (*nirveda*) and says to himself: "This body, when it was not yet torn to pieces (*vidhūtaka*), was an object of attachment for people; now that it is torn to pieces and 'scattered' (*vikṣiptaka*), it no longer has its original characteristics and only the pieces are seen: the place where the birds and beasts have devoured is appalling."

#### 9. Asthisamiñā

-

<sup>308</sup> Cf. Majima, I, p. 58: Sarīram sīvathikāya chaḍḍitam kākehi vā khajjamānam kulalehi vā khajjamānam gijjhehi vā khajjamānam supāṇehi vā khajjamānam sigālehi vā khajjamānam vividehi vā pāṇakajātehi khajjamānam.

When the birds and animals have gone, when the wind has blown it about and the sun has heated it up, the tendons  $(sn\bar{a}yu)$  become detached and the bones (asthi) are scattered, each in a different place. The yogin says to himself: "Once I saw the bodily elements, the combination  $(s\bar{a}magr\bar{i})$  of which formed a body and I was able to distinguish a man or a woman. Now that the corpse has been scattered in different places, the whole body has disappeared and the body itself no longer exists. It is completely different from what it was originally. Where is that which I once loved?"

The body is now white bones (*śvetāsthika*) scattered in various places. When the birds and beasts have devoured the corpse, there is nothing but bones. When one contemplates this skeleton (*asthisaṃkhalikā*), there is the 'notion of the corpse reduced to bones' (*asthisaṃjñā*).

There are two kinds of skeletons ( $asthisamkkhalik\bar{a}$ ): i) the skeleton in which the tendons and bones are still attached ( $sn\bar{a}yvasthisambandha$ ); ii) the skeleton in which the tendons and bones are separated ( $apagat\bar{a}sthisn\bar{a}yusambandha$ ). The skeleton in which the tendons and bones are still attached already excludes the notions of male or female ( $puru\bar{s}astr\bar{i}$ ), of tall or short ( $d\bar{i}rghahrasva$ ), of fine colors, of slenderness and gentleness ( $s\bar{u}k\bar{s}ma\dot{s}lak\bar{s}ana$ ). That in which the tendons and bones are separated excludes the original notion ( $maulasamj\bar{n}\bar{a}$ ) of human being (sattva).

Furthermore, there are two kinds of bones (asthi): i) beautiful (śubha) bones, and ii) ugly (aśubha) bones. The beautiful bones are those that are always white, free of blood (lohita) and fat (vasā), the color of which is like white snow. The ugly bones are those where the bloody (vilohitaka) and greasy remains have not yet disappeared.

# 10. Vidagdhakasamjñā

The yogin goes to a charnel-ground (śmaśāna) and sees that sometimes piles of grass and wood have been collected and that corpses are being burned. The belly bursts open, the eyes pop out, the skin burns and becomes blackened; it is truly dreadful. In a moment (muhūrta), the corpse becomes ashes (bhasman). The yogin grasps this 'notion of the burned corpse' (vidagdhakasamjñā) and says to himself: "Before he died, he bathed this body in perfumes and gave himself up to the five objects of enjoyment (kāmaguṇa); now it is burned in the fire, it is worse than if he had suffered the soldier's sword (śastra). Immediately after death, this corpse still resembled a man, but as soon as it is burned, its original marks (maulanimitta) have all disappeared. All physical (dehin) beings end up in impermanence (anityatā). I too will be like that."

-

<sup>309</sup> Cf. Dīgha, II, p. 296; Majjhima, I, p. 58, 89; III, p. 92; Saṃyutta, II, p. 255; Anguttara, III, p. 324: Sarīraṃ sīvathikāya chaḍḍitaṃ, aṭṭhikasaṅkhalikaṃ samaṃsalohitaṃ nahārusambandhaṃ, aṭṭhikasaṅkhalikaṃ nimmaṃsaṃ lohitamakkhitaṃnahārusambandhaṃ, aṭṭhikasaṅkhalikaṃ apagatamaṃsalohitaṃ nahārusambandhaṃ, aṭṭhikāni apagatasambadhāni.

These nine notions destroy the negative emotions ( $kle\acute{s}a$ ) and are very powerful in destroying lust ( $r\bar{a}gaprah\bar{a}n\bar{a}ya$ ). It was to destroy lust that [the Buddha] preached the nine notions.<sup>310</sup>

#### III. CONNECTION BETWEEN THE NINE AND THE TEN NOTIONS

Question. – What do the ten notions  $(da\acute{s}asamj\~n\~a)^{311}$  beginning with the notion of impermanence  $(anityasamj\~n\~a)$  destroy?

Answer. – They also serve to destroy the three poisons (triviṣa), lust ( $r\bar{a}ga$ ), etc.

Question. – If that is so, how do these two groups differ?

Answer. – 1) The nine notions prevent those who have not attained the dhyānas and the samāpattis from being enveloped (praticchanna) by lust ( $r\bar{a}ga$ ). The ten notions remove and destroy the three poisons, lust, etc.

- 2) The nine notions are like the enemy who puts [the three negative emotions] in chains. The ten notions are like the enemy who kills them.
- 3) The nine notions are a beginner's practice  $(p\bar{u}rva\dot{s}ik\bar{s}a)$ . The ten notions are a perfected practice  $(sampanna\dot{s}ik\bar{s}a)$ .
- 4) Of the ten notions, [the seventh], that of the horrible (asubhasamjñā), includes (*saṃgṛḥṇāti*) the nine notions [called 'of the horrible'].

Some say that, of the ten notions, [the seventh, the fourth and the fifth], namely, the notion of impurity ( $a\acute{s}ucisamj\~n\~a$ ), the notion of the loathsome nature of food ( $\bar{a}h\bar{a}re\ pratik\=ulasamj\~n\=a$ ) and the notion of displeasure in regard to the world ( $sarvaloke\ 'nabhiratisamj\~n\=a$ ), include the nine notions.

Others say that the ten and the nine notions are equally detachment (*vairāgya*) and, together, nirvāṇa. 312 Why?

The Buddha said in several places (Anguttara, III, p. 446; IV, p. 353, 358) that the horrible should be cultivated in order to destroy lust (asubhā bhāvetabbā rāgassa pahānāya). The fact remains that the horrible does not destroy the negative emotions but merely weakens them (Kośavyākhyā, p. 526: Nāśubhayā kleśaprahāṇaṃ viṣkaṃbhaṇamātraṃ tu bhavati), for, as an act of attention on an imaginary object (adhimuktimanasikāra), it is impure (sāsrava) and only meditations that entail the view of the sixteen aspects of the noble truths cut through the negative emotions. Cf. Kośa, VI, p. 150; Satyasiddhiśāstra, T 1646, k. 16, p. 367b1-2.

<sup>311</sup> These ten notions will be the subject of chapter XXXVII.

In regard to the five or the seven notions, the Buddha said (Anguttara, III, p. 79, 80; IV, p. 46, 48-

<sup>51):</sup> Imā kho bhikkhave saññā bhāvitā bahukīkatā mahaoohalā honti mahānisaṃsā aamatohadhā

- 1. When the first signs of death appear, in the time it takes to say it, one is dead already. The body swells up, putrefies, breaks apart, is scattered and everything changes; this is impermanence, *anityatā*, [the first of the ten notions]. [218a]
- 2. One was attached to this body but when impermanence has destroyed it, it is *duhkha*, suffering, [the second of the ten notions].
- 3. Being impermanence and suffering, it cannot be independent (*svatantra*): thus it is *anātman*, non-self, [the third of the ten notion].
- 4. Being impure (aśuci), impermanent (anitya), suffering (duhkha) and non-self (anātman), it is anabhirata, an object of displeasure, [the fifth of the ten notions]. This is the meditation on the body (kāyabhāvana).
- 5. When food  $(\bar{a}h\bar{a}ra)$  is in the mouth (mukha), the cervical saliva  $(singh\bar{a}naka)$  runs down and, together with the mucus (kheta), becomes flavor (rasa), but swallowing  $(abhyavah\bar{a}ra)$  is no different from vomiting  $(v\bar{a}nt\bar{i}krta)$ , and penetrates the stomach (udara): hence  $\bar{a}h\bar{a}re$   $pratik\bar{u}lasanjin\bar{a}$ , the notion of the repugnant nature of food, [the fourth of the ten notions].
- 6. When the yogin makes use of the nine notions [of the horrible] to meditate on the impermanent (anitya), changing (vipariṇāmadharman) body that perishes from moment to moment (kṣaṇaniruddha), there is maraṇasaṃjñā, the notion of death, [the sixth of the ten notions].
- 7. When the yogin uses the nine notions to become disgusted with the joys of the world (*lokanirvedāya*) and knows that suppression of the negative emotions (*kleśaprahāna*) is salvation (*yogakṣema*) and peace (*kṣānti*), there is *prahāṇasamjñā*, the notion of cutting, [the eighth of the ten notions].
- 8. When the yogin uses the nine notions to oppose the negative emotions (*kleśapratiṣedhāya*), there is *vairāgyasamjñā*, the notion of detachment, [the ninth of the ten notions].
- 9. When, by using the nine notions, the yogin becomes disgusted with the world (*lokanirvinna*) and knows that the destruction of the five aggregates (*pañcaskandhanirodha*) and the fact that they will not re-arise (*apunarbhava*) constitutes abiding (*vihāra*) and salvation (*yogakṣema*), there is *nirodhasaṃjñā*, the notion of suppression, 313 [the tenth of the ten notions].
- 5) Moreover, the nine notions are the cause (*hetu*), while the ten notions are the fruit (*phala*). This is why the [Prajñāpāramitāsūtra] speaks of the nine notions first and then the ten notions.

*amatapariyosānā:* "These notions have great results if they are cultivated and gathered, they present great benefits, they plunge one into immortality, they lead to immortality."

<sup>313</sup> Cf. Saṃyutta, V, p. 133: Nirodhasaññā bhikkhave bhāvitā bahulikatā mahato atthāya saṃvattati, mahato yogakhemāya saṃvattati, mahato samvegāga saṃvattati, mahato phāsuvihārāya saṃvattati: "The notion of destruction, if cultivated and increased, leads to great benefit, to great security, to great discipline, to comfortable abiding."

6) Finally, the nine notions are the outer gate  $(b\bar{a}hyadv\bar{a}ra)$  while the ten notions are the inner gate  $(\bar{a}dhy\bar{a}tmikadv\bar{a}ra)$ . This is why the sūtras speak of the two gates of the immortal  $(amrtadv\bar{a}ra)$ , i.e., that of meditation on the horrible  $(a\acute{s}ubhabh\bar{a}vana)$  and that of attention to the breath  $(\bar{a}n\bar{a}p\bar{a}nasmrti)$ .

#### IV. RESULTS OF THE NINE NOTIONS

# 1. Rejection of the seven types of lust

These nine notions [of the horrible] eliminate the seven types of lust (saptavidha rāga) in people.<sup>315</sup>

1) There are people who are attached to colors (*varṇa*), red (*lohita*), white (*avadāta*), reddish-white (*śvetarakta*), yellow (*pīta*), black (*kṛṣṇa*).

314 Cf. Itivuttaka, p. 80: Asubhānupassī bhikkhave kāyasmim viharatha ... vitakkāsya vighātapakkhikā te na honti. "Remain, O monks, in the contemplation of the horrible in the body and let the attention to the breath be inwardly well established in you... If you remain contemplating the horrible in the body, the perverse tendencies to beauty will be suppressed and if attention to the breath is inwardly well established in you, the perverse troublesome tendencies to think of outer things will no longer exist."

This is why, in the words of the Kośa, VI, p. 148-149 and of the Nyāyānusāra (T 1562, k.59, p. 671a), "Entry into *bhāvanā* occurs by contemplation of the horrible or attention to the breathing" (*tatrāvatāro 'śubhayā cānāpānasmṛtena ca*). Those of passionate nature (*rāgādhika*) enter by way of *aśubha* which is directed outwardly (*bahirmukha*); those who are of rational nature (*vitarkādhika*), by way of *ānāpānasmṛti* which, not being directed outwards, cuts *vitarka*.

Vibhāṣā, T 1545, k. 40, p. 207c10-13: "Although  $a \acute{s}ubhabh\bar{a}van\bar{a}$  concerns only visibles  $(r\bar{u}pa)$ , it counteracts lust  $(r\bar{a}ga)$  in regard to the six sense objects. Thus, those who are prey to lust for visibles  $(r\bar{u}pa)$  eliminate the latter by practicing  $a \acute{s}ubhabh\bar{a}van\bar{a}$ ; those who are prey to lust for sounds  $(\acute{s}abda)$  eliminate the latter by practicing  $a \acute{s}ubhabh\bar{a}van\bar{a}$ , etc."

Kośa, VI, p. 149; Kośavyākhyā, p. 526; Nyāyānusāra, T 1562, k. 59, p. 671a18-20: The nine notions are in opposition to fourfold *rāga*: lust for colors (*varṇa*), shapes (*saṃsthāna*), touch (*sparśa*) and honors (*upacāra*).

Here the *Traité* departs from classic scholasticism: for it, the nine notions are horrors opposed to the seven kinds of *rāga*: lust for colors (*varṇa*), shapes (*saṃsthāna*), postures (*īryāpatha*), fine language (*vāda*), pleasant touch (*sparśa*), of all five at once, and finally of the human appearance. Undoubtedly the *Traité* was inspired by the *Tch'an yao king* 'Summary sūtra on the dhyānas' (T 609), wrongly thought to be an anonymous translation by the Han, where these kinds of lust are mentioned (k. 1, p. 237c19-21).

The same classification of *rāga* is adopted by Kumārajīva in his *Tch'an fa yao kiai* 'Summary explanation of the dhyāna method' (T 616, k. 1, p. 286b16-18), an original work that he composed between 402 and 405, during which time he was busy with his translation of the *Traité*. On this subject, see P. Demiéville, *La Yogācārabhūmi de Sangaraksa*, p. 354.

- 2) There are people who are not attached to colors but who are attached only to shapes (*saṃsthāna*), delicate skin, tapered fingers, expressive eyes, arched eyebrows.
- 3) There are people who are not attached to either colors or shapes, but who are attached only to postures  $(\bar{r}y\bar{a}patha)$ , ways of entering, of stopping, sitting, rising, walking, standing, bowing, raising or lowering the head, raising the eyebrows, winking the eye, approaching, holding an object in the hand.
- 4) There are people who are not attached to colors or shapes or postures, but who are only attached to language, soft sounds, elegant words, speech appropriate to the circumstance, replying to a thought, honoring orders, capable of moving people's hearts.
- 5) There are people who are not attached to colors or shapes or positions or soft sounds, but who are only attached to fine smooth [furs], gentle to the skin, softening the flesh, refreshing the body in the heat and warming it in the cold.
- 6) There are people who are attached to all five things listed above at once.
- 7) There are people who are not attached to these five things but who are only attached to the human appearance, male or female. Even if they were to enjoy the five lusts ( $k\bar{a}ma$ ) mentioned above, when they come to lose the loved person, they refuse to separate from them and they renounce the five objects of enjoyment ( $pa\bar{n}cak\bar{a}maguna$ ) so esteemed by the world so as to follow their loved one in death.

[But the nine notions of the horrible reject these seven kinds of lust]:

- 1. The notion of death  $(maraṇasaṃjñ\bar{a})$  eliminates lust for postures  $(\bar{\nu}y\bar{a}pathar\bar{a}ga)$  and lust for fine language  $(v\bar{a}dar\bar{a}ga)$  in particular.
- 2. The notion of the bloated corpse (*vyādhmātakasaṃjñā*), the notion of the torn-up corpse (*vidhūtakasaṃjñā*) and the notion of the scattered corpse eliminate lust for shapes (*saṃsthānarāga*) in particular.
- 3. The notion of the bloody corpse (*vilohitakasamjñā*), the notion of the blueish corpse (*vinīlakasamjñā*) and the notion of the rotting corpse (*vipūyakasamjñā*) eliminate the lust for colors (*varṇarāga*) in particular.
- 4. The notion of the corpse reduced to bones (asthisamjñā) and the notion of the burned corpse (vidagdhakasamjñā) eliminate the lust for fine and gentle touch (sūkṣmaślakṣṇaspraṣṭavayarāga) in particular.316

Thus the nine notions eliminate these various lusts and also lust for the loved person. But it is the notion of the devoured corpse (*vikhāditakasamjñā*), the notion of the burned corpse (*vidagdhakasamjñā*) and the notion of the corpse reduced to bones (*asthisamjñā*) that preferentially eliminate lust for an individual because it is hard to see how a person can be attached to devoured, scattered or white bony remains (*śvatāsthika*).

\_

<sup>316 &#</sup>x27;Soft' is one of the eleven kinds of touch: cf. Kośa, I, p. 18.

# 2. Diminishing of hatred and delusion

By means of the meditation on the nine notions, the minds of lust [218b]  $(r\bar{a}ga)$  are eliminated, but hatred  $(dve\bar{s}a)$  and delusion (moha) are also decreased. If one is attached to the body, it is because of delusion (moha), an error consisting of taking what is impure to be pure  $(a\acute{s}ucau \acute{s}ucir iti vipary\bar{a}sah)$ . But now, with the help of the nine notions [of the horrible], the interior of the body is analyzed and the [impure] nature of the body is seen. From now on, error (mohacitta) decreases; as error decreases, lust  $(r\bar{a}ga)$  diminishes and, as lust diminishes, hatred  $(dve\bar{s}a)$  also decreases. It is because a person loves their own body that they experience hatred [when the latter is menaced]. But now that the yogin has contemplated the impurities  $(a\acute{s}uci)$  of his own body and is disgusted (nirvinna) by them, he no longer loves his own body and, not loving his own body, he does not have hatred [when the latter is menaced].

#### 3. Realization of great benefits

As the threefold poison (*triviṣa*) [of lust, hate and delusion] decreases, the entire mountain of the ninety-eight perverted tendencies (*anuśaya*) is shaken and the yogin gradually (*kramaśas*) progresses towards Bodhi. Finally, by the diamond-like concentration (*vajropamasamādhi*), <sup>318</sup> he breaks the mountain of the fetters (*saṃyojana*) to pieces.

Although the nine notions are meditations on the horrible (aśubhabhāvanā), one depends on them to realize great benefits (mahānuśaṃsa). Similarly, when a repulsive corpse is floating in the sea, the shipwrecked sailor clings to it to save himself from the waves.

#### V. NATURE, OBJECT AND DISTRIBUTION OF THE NINE NOTIONS

Question. – What is the intrinsic nature ( $svabh\bar{a}va$ ) of these nine notions, what is their object ( $\bar{a}lambana$ ) and where are they contained ( $samgrh\bar{t}ta$ )?

<sup>317</sup> The third of the four errors.

<sup>318</sup> See above, p. 242F and note, 940F, 986F, 1068F.

These questions are dealt with in detail in Vibhāṣā, T 1545, k. 40, p. 206c; Kośa, VI, p. 152; Nyāyānusāra, T 1562, K. 59, p. 672b. Aśubhā has as its nature the absence of desire (alobha). The ascetic can produce it in ten levels: kāmadhātu, dhyānantara, the four dhyānas and their four respective sāmantakas. The object of aśubhā is the visible – color and shape – in the realm of rūpadhātu. Only men produce it. For its aspect (ākāra) it has the horrible and therefore does not show the sixteen aspects of the noble truths, impermanence, etc. As it is the act of attentiveness on an imaginary object (adhimuktimanasikāra), it is impure (sāsrava). Finally, it may be acquired either by detachment

Answer. – As their nature, they have the grasping of characteristics (nimittodgrahana); they are contained in the aggregate of form ( $r\bar{u}paskandha$ ).

They are also contained in a small part of the foundation of mindfulness on the body  $(k\bar{a}yasmrtyupasth\bar{a}na)$ , 320 in the desire realm  $(k\bar{a}madh\bar{a}tu)$  or also in the first, second and fourth dhyāna.

The person who has not yet renounced desire ( $av\bar{t}ar\bar{a}ga$ ) and who has a distracted mind ( $vik\bar{s}iptacitta$ ) belongs to the domain of the desire realm ( $k\bar{a}madh\bar{a}tvavacara$ ); the person who has renounced desire ( $v\bar{t}ar\bar{a}ga$ ) belongs to the domain of the form realm ( $r\bar{u}padh\bar{a}tvavacara$ ).

Eight notions, those of the bloated corpse (*vyādmātaka*), etc., are contained in kāmadhātu and the first and second dhyānas. The notion of pure bone (*asthisaṃjñā*) is contained in kāmadhātu, the first second and fourth dhyānas. As there is a great deal of happiness (*sukha*) in the third dhyāna, this one is exempt from the notion of horror.

#### VI. THE PLACE OF THE NINE NOTIONS IN THE DHARMAS OF THE PATH

These nine notions open the gate of the foundation of mindfulness on the body ( $k\bar{a}yasmrtyupasth\bar{a}na$ ). Mindfulness of the body opens the gate of the other three foundations of mindfulness. The four foundations of mindfulness open the gate of the thirty-seven auxiliaries to enlightenment ( $bodhip\bar{a}k\bar{s}hika\ dharma$ ). The thirty-seven auxiliaries to enlightenment open the gate to the city of nirvāṇa. The suffering of sadness, sorrow, etc. ( $śokadaurmanasy\bar{a}diduhkha$ ) are eliminated and, as the process of interdependency of the five aggregates ( $pa\tilde{n}caskandhapart\bar{t}tyasamutp\bar{a}da$ ) has been destroyed, one enjoys the eternal bliss of nirvāṇa (nirvanantyasukha).

(vairagyā) or by practice (prayoga). The Kośakārikā, VI, II, condenses all this into one line: alobho daśabhūḥ kāmadṛśyālambā nṛjāśubhā.

This is why the meditation on the horrible is found in the sūtras dedicated to the *smrtyupasthānas*, e.g., Majjhima, I, p. 58.

<sup>321</sup> On the city of nirvāṇa, see above, p. 1150F, 1231F.

# Second Section THE NINE NOTIONS ACCORDING TO THE MAHĀYANA (p. 1327F)

Question. –The śrāvaka who meditates [on the nine notions] in this way experiences disgust (*nirveda*) and wants to enter nirvāna quickly. But the bodhisattva has compassion for all beings; he gathers all the attributes of the Buddha, saves all beings and does not seek to enter nirvāṇa quickly. Then, by meditating on these nine notions, why does he not fall into the class of an adept of the first two Vehicles, [i.e., that of the śrāvakas and of the pratyekabuddhas]?

Answer. – The bodhisattva feels compassion for beings. He knows that, because of the three poisons (triviṣa) [passion, aggression and ignorance], beings experience mental and physical suffering (caitasikakāyikaduḥkha) in the present lifetime (iha janmani) and in the future lifetime (paratra). The three poisons are not destroyed by themselves, and there is no other way to destroy them than to contemplate the inner and outer physical characteristics (ādhyātmikabāhyakāyanimitta) to which one is attached [but that are repulsive]. The three poisons are destroyed only after this contemplation. That is why the bodhisattva who wants to destroy the poison of lust (rāgaviṣa) contemplates the nine notions [so as to teach them to beings]. The bodhisattva is like a person who, out of compassion for the ill, gathers all the medicines (bhaiṣajya) to cure them. To beings who love colors (varṇarakta), the bodhisattva preaches the notion of the blueish corpse (vinīlakasaṃjñā) and, according to that to which they are attached, he explains the other notions [of the horrible] of which we have spoken above. This is how the bodhisattva practices the meditation on the horrible (aśubhabhāvanā). [218c]

Furthermore, the bodhisattva who is practicing these nine notions with a mind of great compassion (mahākarunācitta) has the following thought: "Not completely possessing all the attributes of the Buddha, I do not enter into nirvāṇa: this would be using only one gate of the Dharma (ekadharmadvāra); but I should not keep to a single gate, I should use all the gates of the Dharma." This is why the bodhisattva practices the nine notions without any restriction.

When the bodhisattva practices these nine notions, it may happen that thoughts of disgust (nirvedacitta) rise up in him and he may say: "This horrible body is hateful and miserable: I want to enter nirvāṇa." Then the bodhisattva has the following thought: "The Buddhas of the ten directions have said that all dharmas are empty of nature (lakṣaṇaśūnya). But in emptiness, there is no impermanence (anitya): then how (kaḥ punarvādaḥ) could there be impurities (aśuci)? This meditation on the horrible is practiced only to destroy the error consisting of taking [what is impure] to be pure (aśucau iti viparyāsaḥ). These horrors (aśubha) that come from a complex of causes and conditions (hetupratyayasāmagrī) are without any intrinsic nature (niḥsvabhāva) and all end up in emptiness. And so I cannot cling (udgrah-) to these horrors (aśubhadharma) that come from a complex of causes and conditions and are without intrinsic nature to allow me to enter into nirvāṇa."

 $[\bar{A}sv\bar{a}das\bar{u}tra]$  – Moreover, it is said in a sūtra: "If there were no satisfaction  $(\bar{a}sv\bar{a}da)$  derived from the visible  $(r\bar{u}pa)$ , beings would not be attached to the visible; but because there is satisfaction deriving from the visible, beings are attached to the visible. If there were no defects  $(\bar{a}d\bar{u}nava)$  in the visible, beings would not be revolted by the visible; but because there are defects in the visible people are revolted by the visible. If there were no exit (nihsarana) from the visible, beings would not come out of the visible; but because there is an exit from the visible, beings come out of the visible."

Therefore satisfaction  $(\bar{a}sv\bar{a}da)$  is the cause and condition of pure notions  $(\dot{s}ubhasamj\tilde{n}\bar{a})$ . This is why the bodhisattva does not pay attention to the horrible and abstains from entering nirvāṇa prematurely.<sup>323</sup>

This ends the explanations of the nine notions.

\_

<sup>322</sup> Assādasutta, no. 3, in Saṃyutta, p. 29-30. Tsa a han, T 99, no. 13, k. 1, p. 2b15-c10): No cedaṃ bhikkhave rūpassa assādo abhavissa ... rūpassa nissaraṇaṃ, tasmā sattā rūpasmā nissaranti.

323 By considering pleasant visibles and then determining their defects (ādīnava), the bodhisattva accounts for the fact that they are completely empty (śūnya), without nature and, from the point of view of the true nature of things, unworthy of acceptance or rejection. The meditation on the horrible thus leaves him quite cold and in no way encourages him to hasten into nirvāṇa, as is the case for the śrāvaka. Personally, he does not believe in these horrors, but he preaches them to those whom he judges to be too attached to visibles. Briefly, preaching the horrible is one of the skillful means (upāya) used by the bodhisattva to ripen beings.

# CHAPTER XXXVI: THE EIGHT RECOLLECTIONS (p. 1329F)

#### PRELIMINARY NOTE

The tenth class of supplementary dharmas to be fulfilled (*paripūrayitavya*) by the bodhisattva is made up of the eight recollections (*anusmṛti*, in Pāli, *anussati*).

#### I. LISTS OF RECOLLECTIONS

The lists of *anussati* and *anusmṛti* presented by the Pāli Nikāyas and the Sanskrit Āgamas respectively coincide general and here only the first will be mentioned:

- A. THREE ANUSSATI in Dīgha, III, p. 5; Saṃyutta, I, p. 219-220; IV, p.304; Anguttara, I, p. 222:
- 1) Buddha-; 2) Dhamma-; 3) Sangha-anussati.
- B. FOUR SOTAPATTIYANGA, practically identical with the *anussati*, by means of which the noble disciples (*ariyasāvaka*), inspired by perfect faith (*aveccappasādena samannāgata*), give evidence of their respect for the Buddha, the Dhamma, the Sangha and the Discipline (*Sīla*) of the saints. Cf. Dīgha, II, p. 93-94; III, p. 227; Saṃyutta, II, p. 69-70; V, p. 343, 365, 386-387; Anguttara, II, p. 56; III, p. 212-213; IV, p. 416-407; V, p. 183-184.
- C. FIVE ANUSSATI in Anguttara, I, p. 207-211: 1) Buddha-; 2) Dhamma-; 3) Sangha-; 4) Sīla-; 5) Devatā-anussati.
- D. SIX ANUSSATI in Dīgha, III, p. 250, 280; Anguttara, III, p. 284-287, 312-313. 452; V, p. 329-332:
- 1) Buddha-; 2) Dhamma-; 3) Sangha-; 4) Sīla-; 5) Cāga-; 6) Devatā-anussati.
- E. TEN ANUSSATI in Anguttara, I, p. 30, 42: 1) *Buddha-*; 2) *Dhamma-*; 3) *Sangha-*; 4) *Sīla-*; 5) *Cāga-*; 6) *Devatā-*; 7) *Ānāpāna-*; 8) *Maraṇa-*; 9) *Kāyagata-*; 10) *Upasama-anussati*.

The six and the ten *anussati* are mentioned in the Paţisambhidā, I, on p. 28 and 95 respectively. They are commented on at length in Visuddhimagga, ed. Warren, p. 189-243 (transl. Nanamoli, p. 204-320).

The Prajñāpāramitā literature has the following lists:

- A. EIGHT ANUSMRTI in Kumārajīva's translation of the Pañcaviasati (T 223, k. 1, p. 219a10-11):
- 1) Buddha-; 2) Dharma-; 3) Saṃgha-; 4) Śīla-; 5) Tyāga-; 6) Devatā-; 7) Ānāpāna-; 8) Maraṇa-anusmṛti.

- B. EIGHT ANUSMṛTI in N. Dutt's edition of the Pañcaviṃśatī, p. 20, l. 2-5: 1) *Buddha-*; 2) *Saṃgha-*; 3) Śīla-; 4) *Tyāga-*; 5) *Devatā-*; 6) Ānāpāna-; 7) *Udvega-*; 8) *Maraṇa-anusmṛti*.
- C. TEN ANUSM**Ŗ**TI in the translation of the Pañcaviṃśatī by Kumārajīva (T223, k. 5, p. 255a22-23): 1) Buddha-; 2) Dharma-; 3) Saṃgha-; 4) Śīla-; 5) Tyāga-; 6) Devatā-; 7) Kuśala-; 8) Ānāpāna-; 9) Kāya-; 10) Maraṇa-anusmṛti.
- D. TEN ANUSMṛTI in N. Dutt's edition of the Pañcaviṃśatī, p. 210, l. 6-8: 1) *Buddha-*; 2) *Dharma-*; 3) *Saṃgha-*; 4) Śīla-; 5) *Tyāga-*; 6) *Devatā-*; 7) *Urdhvaga-*; 8) *Maraṇa-*; 9) *Kāya-*; 10) Ānāpāna-anusmṛti.
- E. NINE ANUSMRTI in the edition of the Śatasāhasrmikā by P. Ghosa, p. 59,1. 20-60, 1. 15:
- 1) Buddha-; 2) Dharma-; 3) Saṃgha-; 4) Tyāga-; 5) Devatā-; 6) Ānāpla-; 7) Udvega-; 8) Maraṇa-; 9) Kāya-anusmṛti.
- F. TEN ANUSMṛTI in the same edition, p. 1443, l. 5-10: 1) *Buddha-*; 2) *Dharma-*; 3) *Saṃgha-*; 4) Śīla-; 5) *Tyāga-*; 6) *Devatā-*; 7) Ānāpāna-; 8) *Udvega-*; 9) *Maraṇa-*; 10) *Kāya-anusmṛti*.
- G. TEN ANUSMṛTI in the translation of the Mahāprajñāpāramitāsūtra by Hiuan-tsang, T 220, vol. V, k. 3, p. 12a17-18; vol. VII, k. 402, p. 7b27-29: 1) *Buddha-*; 2) *Dharma-*; 3) *Saṃgha-*; 4) Śīla-; 5) *Tyāga-*; 6) *Devatā-*; 7) Ānāpāna-; 8) *Udvega-*; 9) *Maraṇa-*; 10) *Kāyagata-anusmṛti*.

# II. CANONICAL DEFINITIONS OF THE SIX ANUSMRTI

#### 1. Buddhānusmrti

Pāli formula: Anguttara, III, p. 285; V, p. 329: *Idha ariyasāvako Tathāgataṃ anusarati ...* devamanussānaṃ buddho bhagavā ti.

Sanskrit formula: passim. Iti hi sa Bhagavān tathāgato 'rhān ...śāstā devamanuṣyānam buddho bhagavān.

Transl. – First the holy disciple recollects the Tathāgata, saying: Yes, this Blessed One, fully and completely enlightened, endowed with knowledge and practice, well-come, knower of the world, supreme leader of men to be tamed, instructor of gods and men, the awakened one, the blessed one, is worthy of homage.

#### 2. Dharmānusmrti

Pāli formula: Anguttara, III, p. 285; V, p. 329: Puna ca paraṃ ariyadhammaṃ anussarati ... paccattaṃ veditabbo viññūhī ti.

Sanskrit formula: Mahāvastu, III, p. 200, 1.9-11; Mahāvyut., no. 1291-1297: *Svākhyāto Bhagavato dharmaḥ sāṃdṛṣṭiko ... pratyātmavedanīyo vijñaiḥ*.

Transl. – Then the holy disciple recollects the Dharma, saying: The Dharma has been well enunciated by the Blessed One: it receives its retribution in the present lifetime; it is without frenzy; it is independent of time; it leads to the good place; it says "Come and see"; it is cognizable inwardly by the wise.

The present translation departs somewhat from the Pāli commentaries: see Manorathapūraṇī, II, p. 256, 333.

#### 3. Saṃghānusmṛti

Pāli formula: Anguttara, III, p. 186; V, p. 330: Puna ca paraṃ ariyasāvako saṅghaṃ ... anuttaraṃ puññakkhettaṃ lokassā ti.

Sanskrit formula reconstituted by the help of the Mahāvyut., no. 1119, 11220, 1121, 1122, 1772, 1773: Supratipanno Bhagavatah śravakamgah ... 'nuttaram punyakṣetram lokasya.

Transl. – Then the holy disciple recollects the Community, saying: Of good conduct is the Community of the Blessed One's disciples; of logical conduct is the Community of the disciples of the Blessed One; of correct conduct is the Community of disciples of the Blessed One, namely, the four pairs of individuals, the eight classes of individuals. This Community of disciples of the Blessed One is worthy of sacrifice, is worthy of offerings, is worthy of alms, is worthy of being greeted with joined palms: this is the best field of merit for the world.

#### 4. Śīlānusmrti

Pāli formula: Anguttara, III, p. 286; V, p. 330: *Puna ca paraṃ ariyasāvako attano sīlāni ... aparāmaṭṭhāni samādhisamvattanikāni*.

Sanskrit formula reconstituted according to the Sanskrit Mahāparinirvāṇasūṭra, p. 132 and the Mahāvyut., no. 1619, 1621, 1622-27: Śīlāny akhandāny acchidrāny ... vijñapraśastāny agarhitāni vijñaiḥ.

Transl. of the Pāli. – Furthermore, the holy disciple recollects the correct precepts unbroken, without cracks, unstained, without spots, liberating, praised by the wise, free of thoughtless attachment [to his own benefit], leading to meditative stabilization.

Transl. of the Sanskrit. – Precepts without breakage, without cracks, without stains, without spots, liberating, without attachment [to one's own benefit], well achieved, well taken up, praised by the wise, not blamed by the wise.

# 5. Tyāgānusmṛti

Pāli formula: Anguttara, III, p. 287; V, 331: Puna ca param ariyasāvako attano cāgam ... yācayogo dānasamvibhāgarato ti.

Transl. – Furthermore, the holy disciple recollects his own renunciation (i.e., his own generosity), saying: This is a gain for me, this is a great gain for me, for me in the midst of people who are prey to avarice, to living at home, my mind free of the stain of greed, giving freely, my hand extended, happy to give gifts, accessible to requests, happy to distribute gifts.

#### 6. Devatānusmrti

Pāli formula: Anguttara, III, p. 287; V, p. 331-332: *Puna ca paraṃ ariyasāvako devatānussatiṃ bhāveti ...* mayham pi tathārūpā paññā samvijjatī ti.

Transl. - Furthermore, the holy disciple practices the recollection of the deities, saying: There are the Caturmahārājika, Trāyastriṃśa, Yāma, Tuṣita, Nirmānaratin, Paranirmitavaśavartin gods. There are the Brahmakāyika gods and the higher gods. It is because they were endowed with such faith, such discipline, such generosity and such wisdom that these deities, having left this world, have been reborn there [in their paradise], This same faith, this same discipline, this same learning, this same generosity and this same wisdom is in me as well.

*Sūtra* (cf. Pañcaviṃśati, p. 20, l. 2-5; Śatasāhasrikā, p. 59, l. 20-60, l. 15). – [The following should be cultivated (*bhāvitavyā*) by the bodhisattva]:

- 1) recollection of the Buddha (buddhānusmṛti),
- 2) recollection of the Dharma (dharmānusmṛti),
- 3) recollection of the Community (saṃghānusmṛti),
- 4) recollection of discipline (śīlānusmṛti),
- 5) recollection of abandonment (tyāgānusmṛti),
- 6) recollection of the deities (devatānusmṛti),
- 7) recollection of inhalation and exhalation (ānāpānasmṛti),
- 8) recollection of death (maraṇānusmṛti).

Śāstra. -

# First Section POSITION AND RESULTS OF THE RECOLLECTIONS (p. 1335F)

# I. POSITION OF THE RECOLLECTIONS IN THE PRAJÑĀPĀRAMITĀ

Question. – Why do the eight recollections follow the nine notions [of the horrible] [in the Prajñāpāramitāsūtra]?

Answer. – In a forest (araŋya), an empty house (śūnyāgāra), a charnel-ground (śmaśāna), a mountain (giri), a woods (vana) or a desert (kāntāra), the disciples of the Buddha who are meditating properly on the nine notions and who are practicing the meditation on the inner and outer horrors (adhyātmabahirdhāśubhahāvanā) feel disgust for the body and say to themselves: "Why do we carry around this vile and horrible sack of excrement (viṣ) and urine (mūtra)?" They are pained and frightened by it. Also there is wicked Māra (Māra pāpīyat) who plays all kinds of evil tricks on them and who comes to frighten them in hopes of making them regress. This is why the Buddha, [in the Prajñāpāramitāsūtra], continues by explaining the eight recollections.

[*Dhvajāgrasūtra*].<sup>324</sup> – Thus, in a sūtra, the Buddha said to the bhikṣus: When you are meditating in a forest, an empty house, a charnel-ground, a mountain, a woods or a desert, and you experience fear (*bhaya*), trembling (*chambitatva*) or exasperation (*romaharṣa*), then recollect the Buddha, thinking: [219a] Yes, he is the *Tathāgata* 'thus come', *Arhat* 'worthy of homage', *Saṃyaksaṃbuddha* 'completely and fully enlightened', [*Vidyācaraṇasaṃpanna* 'endowed with knowledge and practice', *Sugata* 'well-come', *Lokavid* 'knower of the world', *Anuttarah purusadaṃyasārathih* 'supreme leader of beings to be tamed',

The Sūtra on the "Top of the Standard" is well known. At Śrāvastī in the Jetavana in the garden of Anāthapiṇḍada, the Buddha advised the monks who were afraid of solitude to recollect the Buddha, the Dharma or the Saṃgha, a recollection the nature of which could dispel their fear. For this purpose, he related to them how once the god Śakra advised his devas who were in battle against the Asuras to think of his standard or that of Īśāna or Varuṇa in order to conquer their fears.

The sūtra in question is known in several versions in Sanskrit, Pāli, Chinese and Tibetan. They have been studied by E. Waldschmidt, *Bruchstücke buddh. Sūtras*, p. 43-54:

A. *Dhvajāgrasūtra*, restored on the basis of manuscripts from Central Asia by E. Waldscmidt, *Kleine Brāhmī-Schriftrolle*, Nachrichten der Akad. der Wissenschaften in Göttingen, 1959, no. 1, p. 8-18.

- B. Tch'ouang king, in Tsa a han, T 99, no. 981, k. 35, p. 255a25-b14.
- C. Mdo chen po rgyal mtshan dam pa (Dhvajāgranāmamahāsūtra), OKC no. 959 (Tib.Trip., vol. 38, p.285-5-1 to 285-3-5.
  - D. Dhvajaggasutta, in Samyutta, I, p. 218-220.
  - E. Kao tch'ouang king, in Tseng yi a han, T 125, k. 14, p. 615a6-b6.

The Sūtra of the "Top of the Standard" should be compared and, on occasion, completed by another sūtra the title of which is poorly defined. Coming from the land of the Vṛji, the Buddha stayed at Vaiśālī at the Markaṭahrada, in the Kūṭāgāraśālā. Invited by some embarking merchants who were fearful of the dangers of the journey, he advised them also to recollect the Buddha, the Dharma or the Saṃgha in order to conquer their fears. To this end, he reminded them of the advice once given by Śakra to his devas. This sūtra, a simple variant of the preceding one, is attested by a Chinese version and a Tibetan version:

- F. *P'i chö li kou k'o king* "Sūtra of the Vaiśalī merchants", in Tsa a han, T 99, no. 980, k. 35, p. 254c2-255a24.
- G. *Mdo chen po rgyal mtshan mchog* (Dhvajāgranamamahāsūtra), OKC no. 958 (Tib. Trip., vol. 38, p. 283-2-3 to 284-5-1).

In sources A, B, C, F, G, the advice addressed by the Buddha to his monks precedes the recommendations once given by Śakra to the devas; in sources D and E, it is the reverse.

The version of the Dhvajāgrasūtra given here by the *Traité* is very close to sources A and B, but slightly more developed.

Śāstā devamanusyāṇām 'teacher of gods and men', Buddha 'awakened' and Bhagavat 'blessed'. Your fears will immediately disappear. 325

If you do not recollect the Buddha, you should recollect the Dharma saying: The Dharma of the Buddha is pure (*pariśuddha*), skillfully announced, well said (*svākhyāta*), receiving its retribution in the present lifetime (*sāmdṛṣṭika*), offering itself to be shared (*veditavyo vijñaiḥ*). If you recollect the Dharma thus, your fear will immediately disappear.

If you do not recollect the Dharma, you should recollect the Samgha, saying: The Community of disciples of the Buddha (buddhaśrāvakasaṃgha) cultivates the proper path (rjupratipanna) and acts in accordance with the instructions (sāmīcipratipanna). In this Community, there are arhats and candidates for the fruit of arhat (arhatphalapratipannaka) and so on, down to srotaāpannas and candidates for the fruit of srotaāpanna (srotaāpannaphalapratipannaka): thus four pairs of individuals (catvāri puruṣayugāni) or eight classes of individuals (aṣṭau puruṣapudgalāḥ). This Community of disciples of the Buddha is worthy of offerings (dakṣūṇūya), worthy of being greeted with joined palms (añjalikaraṇīya), venerated (arcanīya), saluted and welcomed: for the world, it is the supreme field of merit (anuttaraṃ puṇyakṣetraṃ lokasya). If you commemorate the Community thus, your fears will immediately disappear.

The Buddha said to the bhikṣus: In the struggle against the asuras, in the midst of a great battle (saṃgāma), Devendra said to his army of devas: When you are struggling against the asuras and you feel afraid, recollect my standard made of seven jewels (mama saptaratnamayo dhvajaḥ samanusmartavyaḥ) and immediately your fear will disappear. If you do not recollect my standard, recollect the precious standard of devaputra Yi-chö-na (Iśāna) [Kumārajīva's note: the devaputra who is on the left of Indra-Śakra]. At once your fear will disappear. If you do not recollect the precious standard of Iśāna, recollect the standard of devaputra P'o-leou-na (Varuṇa) [Kumārajīva's note: the devaputra to the right of Indra]. At once your fear will disappear.

From that we know that [the *Prajñāpāmaitasūtra*] continues its account here by speaking of the eight recollections as the means to drive away fear.

#### II. ALL THE RECOLLECTIONS DRIVE AWAY FEAR

Question. – But the [Dhvajāgra]-sūtra mentions only three recollections, [those of the Buddha, the Dharma and the Saṃgha] as the means to drive away fear. Are the other five recollections also able to drive away fear?

Yama are deities invoked by the Brahmins.

\_

In the Pāli sutta, Śakra advises the devas to look at his own standard and, that lacking, that of the Prajāpati gods, Varuṇa and Īśāna. In sources E, F, G and here in the *Traité*, only his own standard and that of Iśāna and Varuṇa are mentioned. Indra, Soma, Varuṇa, Iśāna, Prajāpti, Brahmā, Mahārddhi and

Answer. – 1-2) If the bhikṣu thinks about his own virtues of abandonment  $(ty\bar{a}ga)$  and discipline  $(s\bar{\imath}la)$ , his fear also disappears. Actually, immoral  $(duhs\bar{\imath}la)$  beings fear falling into hell (niraya) and misers (matsarin) fear being reborn among the hungry ghosts (preta) or among poor people (daridra). The bhikṣu himself remembers that he has pure morality  $(parisuddhas\bar{\imath}la)$  and generosity-abandonment  $(ty\bar{a}ga)$ . If he recollects his pure discipline or his own abandonment, his mind is joyful and he says to himself: "As long as my life  $(\bar{a}yus)$  is not exhausted  $(k\bar{\imath}na)$ , I will still increase my virtues (guna) and, at the end of my life, I will not be afraid of falling into the unfortunate destinies (durgati)." This is why the recollection of discipline  $(s\bar{\imath}l\bar{a}nusmrti)$  and the recollection of renunciation  $(ty\bar{a}g\bar{a}nusmrti)$  can also prevent fear from arising.

- 3) The bhikṣu remembers that the higher heavens (uttamasvarga) are the fruits of retribution ( $vip\bar{a}kaphala$ ) resulting from abandonment ( $ty\bar{a}ga$ ) and discipline ( $s\bar{\imath}la$ ) and that if the deities ( $devat\bar{a}$ ) have taken rebirth there, it is precisely because of these merits (punya). "I too", he says to himself, "possess these merits." This is why the recollection of the deities ( $devat\bar{a}nusmrti$ ) also can prevent fear from arising.
- 4) When the bhikṣu recollects the sixteen ways of breathing  $(\bar{a}n\bar{a}p\bar{a}na)$ , 326, even the subtle discursiveness  $(s\bar{u}kṣmavitarka)$  disappears; then what can be said  $(kah punar v\bar{a}dah)$  of the coarse thoughts  $(aud\bar{a}rikavitarka)$  [such as fear]?
- 5) In the recollection of death (*maraṇānusmṛti*), the bhikṣu says to himself: "The group of the five aggregates (*pañcaskandhakāya*) arises and perishes in a moment and, from its very birth, it is always associated with death. At this moment, why should I fear death particularly?"

The Buddha did not speak about these five recollections [in the Dhvajāgrasūtra]; nevertheless, they too can drive away fear. Why [did the Buddha not speak of them]? When we think about the qualities (*guna*) of [219b] another, [be they those of the Buddha, the Dharma and the Community], it is difficult to drive away fear. On the other hand, when we think of our own qualities, [those of discipline, generosity, etc.], it is easy to drive away fear. This is why the Buddha did not speak of them [in the *Dhvajārasūtra*].

Second Section THE EIGHT RECOLLECTIONS ACCORDING TO THE ABHIDHARMA (p. 1340F)

#### I. RECOLLECTION OF THE BUDDHA

1. The ten names $^{327}$ 

<sup>326</sup> See above, p. 641-642F.

These ten traditional names (*adhivacana*) have been studied above, p. 126-144F. Here the *Traité* adds some new explanations.

Question. - How does one recollect the Buddha?

Answer. -

[1. Tathāgata.] – The yogin thinks of the Buddha one-pointedly (ekacittena): The Buddha has acquired right knowledge (yathābhūtajñāna); he is endowed with great loving-kindness and great compassion (mahāmaitrīmahākaruṇāsamanvāgata). This is why his words (āgada) are infallible (aviparīta): whether they are coarse (audārika) or subtle (sūkṣma), numerous (bahula) or few (alpa), profound (gambhīra) or superficial, there is nothing false in them. Since all his words (āgada) are true (tathā), the Buddha is called TATHĀGATA 'of true speech'.328

Past (atīta), future (anāgata) or present (pratyutpanna), the Buddhas of the ten directions feel great compassion (mahākaruṇā) for beings, practice the six perfections (pāramitā) and discover the [true] nature of dharmas: they have reached (āgata) the anuttarasamyaksambodhi. The present Buddha too has arrived (āgata) there in the same way (tathā): this is why he is called TATHĀGATA 'thus come'.

The body of the Buddhas of the ten directions in the three worlds emits great rays (raśmi) that illumine the ten directions and drive away the shadows (tamas); from their minds there come rays of knowledge that destroy the shadows of ignorance  $(avidy\bar{a})$  in beings; their virtues (guna) and their glory (yaśas) also fill the ten directions: they have gone to nirvāṇa. The present Buddha has also gone (gata) in the same way  $(tath\bar{a})$ : this is why he is called TATHĀGATA 'thus gone'.

- [2. Arhat]. Because he possesses such qualities (guṇ a), the Buddha is entitled (arhati) to the supreme worship ( $p\bar{u}j\bar{a}vi\acute{s}e\ddot{s}a$ ) of all gods and men: this is why he is called ARHAT 'entitled to'.
- [3. Samyaksambuddha]. Some ask why only the Buddha "speaks in accordance with the truth" and "has gone" in the same way [as his predecessors] and is "entitled to" supreme worship. It is that the Buddha has obtained samyak-sam-bodhi 'complete perfect enlightenment': samyak 'perfect' insofar as it accords with the immovable indestructible nature (acalākaṣaslakṣaṇa) of all dharmas; saṃ 'complete' because, instead of concerning merely one or two dharmas, it completely cognizes all dharmas without exception. This is why the Buddha is called SAMYAKSAMBUDDHA 'fully and perfectly enlightened'.
- [4. Vidyācaraṇasaṃpanna]. This samyaksaṃbodhi has not been obtained without cause (ahetu) or without condition (apratyaya). Here it is by depending on the perfection (saṃpad) of knowledge (jñāna) and moral discipline (śīlasaṃvara) that the Buddha has obtained saṃyaksaṃbodhi.

By knowledge  $(j\tilde{n}\bar{a}na)$  we mean the sciences  $(vidy\bar{a})$  that the bodhisattva possesses from the time of the first production of the mind of Bodhi  $(prathamacittotp\bar{a}da)$  until reaching the diamond-like samādhi  $(vajropamasam\bar{a}dhi)$ . Moral discipline  $(s\bar{\imath}lasamvara)$  is the fact that for the bodhisattva, from the first production of the mind of Bodhi until the diamond-like samādhi, his bodily actions  $(k\bar{a}yakarman)$  and his vocal actions  $(v\bar{a}kkarman)$  are pure (visuddha) and accomplished as he wishes (yathestam).

This etymology is valid only in the hypothesis that 'Tathāgata' is an erroneous reading for 'Tathāgada': cf. Sumangala, p. 66: Evam tathavāditāya Tathāgato. Api ca āgadanam āgado vacanan ti attho. Tatho aviparīto āgado assāti da-kārassa ta-kāram katvā Tathāgat ti.

This is why the Buddha is called VIDYĀCARAŅASAMPANNA 'endowed with sciences and practices'.

[5. Sugata]. – Going along with this twofold course [of sciences and practices], the Buddha makes good progress (sugati), like a chariot (ratha) that runs well when it has two wheels (cakra). Since the Buddha also goes in this way to the place (sthāna) where the earlier Buddhas have gone (gata), he is called SUGATA 'well-gone'.

[6. Lokavid]. – If someone tells us that the Buddha, using his own qualities (svaguṇa), does not know certain things, for example, the ātman, etc., we answer: It is because he knows the world (loka), the origin of the world (lokasamudaya), the cessation of the world (lokanirodha) and the path that leads to the cessation of the world (lokanirodhagāminīpratipad)<sup>329</sup> that the Buddha is called LOKAVID 'knower of the world'.

[7. Anuttaraḥ puruṣadamyasārathiḥ]. – Knowing the world, the Buddha tames (damayati) beings, and of all the kinds of teachers (ācārya), he is truly [219c] without superior (anuttara): this is why he is called ANUTTARAḤ PURUṢADAMYASĀRATHIḤ 'supreme leader of those beings to be tamed who are humans'.

[8. Śāstā devamanyuṣyāṇām]. – By means of the three kinds of paths, the Buddha is able to destroy the threefold poison (*triviṣa*) and make beings travel on the paths of the Three Vehicles (*yānatrāya*): this is why he is called ŚĀSTĀ DEVAMANUṢYĀŅĀM 'teacher of gods and men'.

[9. Buddha]. – If someone asks us how the Buddha, who is able to assure his own good (svahita) without limit, is able to assure the good of others (parahita), we answer: Being endowed with omniscience (sarvajñānasamanvāgata), the Buddha cognizes clearly and fully the past (atīta), the future (anāgata) and the present (pratyutpanna), perishable things and imperishable things (kṣarākṣara), moveable things and immoveable things (calācala), the whole world: this is why he is called BUDDHA.

[10. Bhagavat]. – The Buddha who possesses these nine kinds of names (*adhivacana*) has great glory (*mahāyaśas*)<sup>330</sup> filling the ten directions: this is why he is called BHAGAVAT 'the blessed one'.

In the sŪtras, the Buddha himself said that it is necessary to recollect him under these ten names (adhivarana).

#### 2. The miracles of his birth

Furthermore, all the various qualities (guna) are found in full in the Buddha:

Anguttara, II, p. 23: Loko bhikkhave Tathāgatena abhisambuddho ... lokasamudayo ... lokanirodha ... lokanirodhagāminī paṭipadā Tathāgatena abhisambuddhā.

Among the six meanings of the word *bhaga*, the Visuddhimagga, ed. Warren, p. 174, l. 25, also mentions that of glory (*yaśas*).

- *1*) The Buddha is of the lineage of *Mo-ho-san-mo-t'o* (Mahāsaṃmata), the noble cakravartin king who ruled at the beginning of the kalpa.<sup>331</sup> He was born among the *Che tseu* (Śākya), a wise and powerful family in *Yen-fou-t'i* (Jambudvīpa) in the clan (*gotra*) of the noble *Kiao-t'an* (Gautama).
- 2) At the time of his birth, rays (*raśmi*) illumined the *trisāhasramahāsāhasralokadhātu*. Brahmā Devarāja held a precious parasol (*ratnacchattra*) and Śakra Devendra received him on celestial precious garments (*divyaratnavastra*).<sup>332</sup> The nāgarāja *A-na-p'o-ta-to* (Anavatapta) and the nāgarāja *P'o-k'ie-to* [read *So-k'ie-lo* (Sāgara)] bathed him with warm perfumed water.<sup>333</sup>

- Although the Bodhisattva came from his mother's womb completely clean, he underwent the traditional bathing ceremony of the newborn. But as Foucher, *La Vie du Buddha*, p. 49-50, comments, the tradition of the bath is very variable:
- 1) Two currents of water (*vāridhāra*), one cold, the other warm, fell like rain from heaven to bathe the Bodhisattva and his mother: cf. Dīgha, II, p. 15; Majjhima, III, p. 123; Sanskrit Mahāvadāna, p. 91; Nieānakathā in Jātaka, I, p. 53, l. 5-7; Mahāvastu, I, p. 222, l. 12; II, p. 24, l. 20.
- 2) Two currents of water (*vāridhāra*), arising from the earth, filled two pools (*udapāna*) to bathe the infant, like a golden statue: cf. Mahāvastu, I, p. 220, l. 19-221, l. 2; II, p. 23, l. 4-7.
- 3) The nāgarājas Nanda and Upananda, appearing half-way from the sky, created two currents of water (*vāridhāra*), cold and warm, and bathed the Bodhisattva. Śakra, Brahmā, the Lokapālas and many other devaputras bathed the Bodhisattva with all kinds of scented water: cf.. Lalita, p. 83, l. 21-84, l. 3.
- 4) Remaining in the sky, Brahmā and Śakra bathed the aleader par excellence with pure scented water. Also the nāga kings (*uragarāja*) remaining in the sky made two currents of water flow, cold and warm. A hundred thousand gods bathed the Leader par excellence with scented water: cf. Lalita, p. 93, l. 1-5.
- 5) The nāgarājas bathed the Bodhisattva with two kinds of scented water, one cold, the other warm. In front of his mother there arose a large pool for her to wash in: cf. Mūlasarv. Vin, T 1450,k. 2, p. 108a20-23.

Folklore and carved monuments reflect the uncertainties of the literary tradition.

He was of the solar race and appears in most of the genealogies of the Buddha: cf. Dīpavaṃsa, III, v. 3; Mahāvamsa, II, v. 1; Mahāvastu, I, p. 348,4.

According to the old canonical tradition (Dīgha, II, p. 14; Sanskrit Mahāvadāna, p. 88; Majjhima, III, p. 122), it is the custom that the Bodhisattva, issuing forth from his mother's womb, is first received by the gods and then by men; before he touches the earth, the four devaputras take him and present him to his mother. - According to the Nidānakathā (Jātaka, I, p. 52-53) the four Mahābrahmās of pure mind received the Bodhisattva on a golden net (suvaṇṇjāla), the four heavenly Maharājas on antelope skins (ajinappaveṇi), and finally humans on a roll of fine linen cloth (dukūlacumbaṭaka). - According to the Lalitavistara, p. 83, Śakra Devendra and Brahmā Sahāpati coverd him with a heavenly garment made of Benares cloth (divyakāśikavastra). This last version, the most common in the literature, is adopted here by the *Traité*.

At the moment of his birth, the earth trembled in six ways (ṣaḍvikāram akampata). The Bodhisattva took seven steps (sapta padāni vikramate) calmly like the king of the elephants and, having regarded the four directions (caturdiśam vilokya), he uttered the lion's roar (simhanādam anadat) and proclaimed: I will have no further rebirths (iyaṃ me paścimā jātiḥ) and I will save all beings.<sup>334</sup>

#### 3. Physical marks and superhuman power

The recluse *A-sseu-t'o* (Asita)<sup>335</sup> examined him and said to king *Tsing-fan* (Śuddhodana):

"In the garden of Lumbinī, the place where the two nāgas bathed the divine child is shown sideby-side with the twin springs that no less miraculously appeared to furnish water for his bath." (A. Foucher): cf. Si yu ki, T 2087, k. 6, p. 902a28-902b5.

The carved monuments may be divided into two groups. In the first, the Bodhisattva is bathed, or more precisely, sprinkled by Brahmā and Śakra: this is the case at Gandhāra (Foucher, *Agb.*, p. 309, fig. 156 = Ingholt, fig. 16 = Marshall, fig. 58) and at Swāt (Tucci, *Il trono di diamante*, Bari, 1967, fig. 80-81). In the second group, he is escorted by two nāgas or sprinkled by them: this is the case at Mathurā (Vogel, pl. 51a, right; pl 52b) and on the steles at Benares (Foucher, *Agb.*, p. 413, fig. 209a, left).

We may ask why here the *Traité* replaces the two traditional nāgas, Nanda and Upananda, by two of their fellows, Anavatapta and Sāgara. This may be because at thetime of the birth of the Buddha, the first two were not yet converted and still had to be tamed by Maudgalyāyana (see below, k. 32, p. 300a29 seq.; k. 100, p. 752b12. However, it is doubtful that such a care for verisimilitude bothered the ancient exegetists. Identical in their behavior, the nāgarājas were practically interchangeable and it was permissible to choose freely from the list of the eight most important of them: Nanda, Upananda, Sāgara, Vāsukin, Takṣaka, Manasvin, Anavatapta, Utpalaka (cf. Saddharmapuṇḍ., p. 4, l. 11-12).

For the seven steps of the Bodhisattva, see above, p. 6F and note.

According to the Pāli sources, Asita, the old teacher and titular chaplain to king Śuddhodana, became a recluse and was living in retreat close to the royal palace, which did not prevent him from going to the Himalayan peaks and even to the Caturmahārājikadeva heaven. In the Sanskrit sources, he was a native of Dakṣināpatha, the son of the Brahmin Ujjayinī and spent his leisure time between Mount Vindhya and Mount Kailāsa, a chain of the Himalayas. However it may be, the hermit enjoyed extensive powers that allowed him to foretell the future. Hearing from the Trāyastriṃṣa gods that Śuddhodana had just had a son, he hastened to the royal palace to examine the newborn. Earlier, the experts in signs had already discovered that two paths only were open to the little Siddhārtha: he would be a cakravartin king or a full Buddha. Having carefully studied the 32 physical marks and the 80 minor marks of the child, Asita declared that without a doubt Siddhārtha would become Buddha some day. However, Asita was not present at this fortunate event for his death was near and he was destined to be reborn in ārūpyadhātu. And so, having rejoiced, Asita burst into tears. He was, however, consoled at the thought that his

- 1) On the soles of his feet are [two] wheels with a thousand spokes (*adhas tasya pādayoś cakre jāte sahasrāre*); his toes are joined by a web (*jālāvanaddhānguli*); he will be able to be firmly established in the Dharma (*dharme supratiṣṭitaḥ*) and nobody can shake him or destroy him.
- 2) His hands are marked with the śrīvatsa (śrīvatsalakṣitapāṇi) and adorned with a web (jālālaṃkṛta): with these hands he will be able to reassure beings and prevent them from being fearful.<sup>336</sup>

Continuing his examination, [Asita also noted the following marks]:337

- 3) On his head there is a fleshy bone (*uṣṇīṣaśiraskatā*) like the top of a mountain of blue pearls; rays of blue light radiate on all sides from it.<sup>338</sup>
- 4) On his head there is the mark of the cranium, the height of which cannot be seen  $(anavalokitam\bar{u}rdhat\bar{a})$ ; 339 among gods and men, nobody will be able to surpass him.

nephew, Nālaka or Naradatta, according to the sources, would one day benefit from the presence and teachings of the Buddha.

Later, the *Traité* (k. 29, p. 274b4; k. 40, p. 350a12-13) will return to this recluse, famed in Buddhist literature and art:

Pāli sources: Suttanipāta, p. 131-139: Commentary on the Suttanipāta, II, p. 483-501; Nidānakathā in Jātaka, I, p. 54-55.

Sanskrit sources: Mahāvastu, II, p. 30-45; Buddhacarita, I, verses 49-81; Lalitavistara, p. 101-112.

Chinese sources: Sieou hing pen k'I king, T 184, k. 1, p. 464a28; Ying pen k'i king, T 185, k.1, p. 474a4-5; Lalitavistara, T 186, k. 2, p. 495b6; Abhinişkramaṇasūtra, T 188, p. 618a27; Yin kouo king, T 189, k. 2, p. 636a18-19; Fo pen hing tasi king, T 190. k. 9, p. 693b23; k. 10, p. 697a6, p. 700a25; k. 12, p. 707b17-18; k. 14, p. 720c19; k. 15, p. 722c14, 723c14; k. 17, p. 734c17; Fo pen hing king, T 103, k. 1, p.60b19; Tchong pen k'i king, T 196, k. 1, p. 155c16; Mahīśāsakavinaya, T 1421, k. 15, p. 106a6; Mūlasarv. Vin., T 1442, k. 17, p. 716a26; T 1443, k. 8, p. 947c12; T 1450, k. 2, p. 108a26; 109b4; 19 and 21; k. 3, p. 109c4; 110a7; T 1451, k. 20, p. 298a19 and 21; 298c24; 299b9; 299c4; Chan ken liu, T 1462, k. 17, p. 791a9.

Illustrations: Gandhāra (Foucher, *Agb.*, p. 313, fig. 160d; p. 315, fig. 161; p. 316, fig. 162; p. 323, fig, 165a); Swāt (Facenna, II, 2, pl. 63, no. 4276; II, 3, pl. 467, no. 922); Nāgārjunakoṇḍa (Longhurst, pl. 20a; pl. 21a on right); Ājaṇṭā (Griffiths,pl. 45); Barabuḍur (Krom, pl. 31). 336 Here the *Traité* limits itself to citing the first of the 32 *lakṣaṇas* and the 84<sup>th</sup> and last of the *anuvyañjana*s according to the order established by the Pañcaviṃśati, T 223, k. 24, p. 395b28-396b9. Above, p. 272-279F, it has commented fully on the 32 *lakṣaṇas*, to which the reader is referred. 337 In the lines that follow, the *Traité* draws attention to twelve of the marks, namely, nine *lakṣaṇas* and three *anuvyañjanas*.

338 32<sup>nd</sup> laksana.

339 Anavolokitamūrdhatā 'Invisible cranial summit', in Chinese wou kien ting siang, in Tibetan, spyi gtsug bltar mi mthon ba. This anuvyañjana does not appear in the lists of marks given by the canonical

scriptures or the early biographies of the Buddha mentioned above (p. 271 and 272 as note) and seems to be an invention of the Mahāyāna.

The Sanskrit word *anavalokitamūrdhatā* is attested in the Suvikrāntavikrāmin, p. 114, l. 11 and the Bodh. bhūmi, p. 381, l. 2-3. In the editions of the Gaṇḍavyūha, p. 65, l. 18, the reading *avalokitamūrdhitā*, reproduced in Edgerton, *Dictionary*, p. 74, is faulty.

In the Pañcaviṃśati, T 223, k. 24, p. 395c28, *anavalokitamūrdhatā* is the first *anuvyañjana*; in the Śatasāhasrikā, T 220 (vol. VI), k. 381, p. 968c18-19, it is the 66<sup>th</sup> *anuvyañjana*. This minor mark appears again in numerous Mahāyāna sūtras and śāstras: Bimbisārarāja, T 41, p. 825b7; Brahmāyus, T 76, p. 884a18; Karuṇāpuṇḍarīka, T 157, k. 2, p. 177c4-5; Avataṃsaka, T 278, k. 6, p. 432c5; k. 17, p. 508a13; k. 46, p. 691b5-6; T 279, k. 27, p. 146a7 and 16; k. 62, p. 335c21; Śraddhābalādhānāvarāra, T 305, k. 5, p. 955a25-955b25; Che tchou touan kie, T 309, k. 4, p.997b29-997c1; Ratnakūṭa, T 310, k. 10, p.54b9; Tathāgataguhya, T 312, k. 8, p. 724a16; Bodhisattvapiṭaka, T 316, k. 27, p. 851b11; Amitāyurbuddhānusmṛti, T 365, p. 344a9; Wou chang yi king, T 669, k. 2, P. 474c24; Upāsakaśīla, T 1488, k. 1, p. 10293-6; Upadeśa, T 1509, k. 26, 256a9 and 17; king kang sien louen, T 1512, k. 5, p. 831b29; k. 9, p. 863a4-5; Yogācaryābhūmi, T 1579, k. 49; p. 567a2-3: 568a17-19; Mahāyānasaṃgraha and its commentaries, T 1594, k. 3, p. 149c1; T 1597, k. 9, p. 371c29; T 1598, k. 9, p. 437c27-28; Comm. on the Houan wou leang cheou by Tche li, T 1751, k. 6, p. 227a7-8.

We know that the 80 *anuvyañjana*s are supplementary to the 32 *lakṣaṇas*. In fact, the *anavalokitamūrdhitā* is a property of the 32<sup>nd</sup> lakṣaṇa of the Buddha, the cranial protuberance (*uṣṇīṣa*). This is what the Bodh. bhūmi says, p. 381: *Tatroṣṇīṣaśiraskatānavalokitamūrdhatā caikamahāpuruṣalakṣaṇaṃ veditavayaṃ tadvyatirekeṇānupalaṃbhāt*: "The two make up a single mark of the Great Man; there is no difference between them."

When the *Traité* says here that nobody can see the top of the Buddha's cranium and that nobody among gods and men can surpass him, it should be taken literally: the *uṣṇīṣa* of the Buddha is invisible and nobody can go above it This explains several mysterious episodes in the Buddha's life:

When the recluse Asita wanted to examine the new-born Buddha, the baby's feet turned upside-down and placed themselves on the chignon of the recluse (*bodhisattvassa pādā parivattitvā tāpasassa jaṭāsu patiṭṭhajiṃsu*): cf. Nidānakathā in Jātaka, I, p. 54, l. 25-26.

"When Gautama travels, heavenly gifts, precious parasols and flowers rain down like snow. The devas, nāgas and flying birds do not dare to fly above him for, among beings of the threefold world, none can see the summit [of his cranium]"; cf. Brahmāyuḥsūtra, T 76, p. 884a16-18.

Sātāgira and Hemavata who were flying to an assembly of yakṣas were stopped in full flight and forced to land because, if they had continued on their route, they would have passed above the Buddha: cf. Comm. on the Suttanipāta, I, p. 221-223; Comm. on the Udāna, p. 64.

Near Rājagṛha, at Yaṣṭivana 'Perch Forest': "Once a Brahmin, having heard that the Buddha's body was sixteen feet high, persisted in doubting and did not believe it. He wanted to measure the Buddha with a bamboo rod sixteen feet long, but the Buddha's body constantly rose above the top of the rod and surpassed sixteen feet. He continued growing so that the Brahmin, quite unable to reach the true height, threw away his stick and went away. As a result of this event, the bamboo stick remained planted

- 5) A tuft of white hair grows between his eyebrows ( $\bar{u}rn\bar{a}$   $c\bar{a}sya$  bhruvor madhye  $j\bar{a}t\bar{a}$ ) the white brilliance of which surpasses that of crystal (sphotika).  $^{340}$
- 6) He has clear eyes (viśuddhanetra), wide eyes (viśalanetra), the color of which is deep blue (abhinīlanetra).<sup>341</sup>
- 7) His nose is high (tunganāsa), fine (śucināsa) and pleasing. 342
- 8) His mouth has forty teeth (catvārimśaddanta), white (suśukla), pure, sharp and wondrous. 343
- 9) His four canine teeth are very white (śukladamstra) and very shiny. 344
- 10) His upper and lower lips (aṣṭha) are equal (sama), neither too big nor too small, neither too long nor too short.<sup>345</sup>
- 11) His tongue is thin and long (tanuprabhūtajihva); it is soft (mṛdu), red (lohitavarṇa), like a heavenly lotus (divyapadma).<sup>346</sup>
- 12) His brahmic voice (*brahmasvara*) is deep (*gambhīra*) and carries afar; those who hear him rejoice and are never tired of listening.<sup>347</sup>

in the ground and took root there." This anecdote is told by Hiuan-tsang in the Si-yu-ki, T 2087, k. 9, p. 920a7-12, and is represented on the bas-reliefsat agndhāra (Foucher, *Agb.* p. 505, pl. 251b; p. 522, pl. 256c) but has left no trace in the texts. However, a canonical passage should be noted where the Teacher forbade everyone except himself to measure a *pudgala*: *Mā puggalesu pamāṇikā ahuvatthu ... yo vā pan'assa madiso*. "Do not be one of those who measure men, for the person who takes the measure of men wounds himself. It is I who am able to take the measure of men, or someone like me." (Anguttara, III, p. 350, 351; V, p. 140, 143; Tsa a han, T 99, k. 35, p. 258a23-25; 258c7-8; Śūramgamasamādhi, p. 208; Śiksāsamuccaya, p. 92).

Like all the *lakṣaṇas* and *anuvyañjanas*, the *anavalokitamūrdhatā* is the fruit of immense merit accumulated over innumerable kalpas: "When he was Bodhisattva, the Buddha venerated the teachers, the ancient ones, the Buddhas and Bodhisattvas, for innumerable lifetimes; he prostrated [at their feet] with the top of his head, destroying all pride in himself: this is why he has obtained the mark of the invisible top of the cranium" (Upāsakaśīla, T 1488, k. 1, p.1039b3-6). Same explanation in King kang sien louen, T 1512, k. 5, p. 831b29; k. 9, p. 863a4-5.

For other comments, see H. Durt, *Note sur l'origine de l'Anavalokitamūrdhatā*, Indian and Buddhist Studies, XVI, p. 1967, p. 443-450.

- 340 31<sup>st</sup> lakṣaṇa according to the list of the Prajñāpāramitā.
- 341 29<sup>th</sup> lakşana.
- 342 2<sup>nd</sup> anuvyañjana.
- 343 22<sup>nd</sup> lakṣaṇa.
- 344 24<sup>th</sup> lakṣaṇa.
- 345 29<sup>th</sup> anuvyañjana.
- 346 27<sup>th</sup> lakṣaṇa.

- 13) The color of his body ( $k\bar{a}yavarna$ ) is marvelous, more beautiful than the gold of the Jāmbu river ( $j\bar{a}mbunadak\bar{a}ncana$ ). 348
- 14) A halo one arm-span in width (read *tchang kouang* =  $vy\bar{a}maprabha$ ) surrounds his body, of varied colors, incomparable in beauty.<sup>349</sup>

Endowed with these thirty-two marks, this man will, before long, leave home (*pravrajita*), will attain omniscience (*sarvajñāna*) and will become Buddha.

This is how the physical qualities ( $k\bar{a}yaguna$ ) of the Buddha should be [220a] recollected.

Moreover, the qualities (guna) and the physical strength ( $k\bar{a}yabala$ ) of the body of the Buddha surpasses ten myriads of white gandhahastins:<sup>350</sup> this is physical power inherited from his parents. His supernatural powers ( $abhijn\bar{a}$ ), his qualities and his strength are immense and limitless. The body of the Buddha is adorned with the thirty-two marks ( $dv\bar{a}trim\acute{s}allak\dot{s}ana$ ) and the eighty minor marks ( $a\acute{s}\bar{t}yanuvyañjan\bar{a}ni$ ); inwardly he has the innumerable attributes and qualities of the Buddhas: this is why one does not tire of seeing him. Those who see the Buddha's body forget about the five worldly objects of enjoyment ( $pañcak\bar{a}maguna$ ) and never think of them again. One's happiness is complete on seeing the Buddha's body; one never tires of seeing it.<sup>351</sup>

These are the qualities of the Buddha's body under which one should recollect him.

# 4. The five pure aggregates (anāsravaskandha)<sup>352</sup>

[1. Śīlaskandha]. – Furthermore, in the Buddha, maintenance of morality (śīla) is perfect (saṃpanna) and complete (pariṣhuddha). From the first production of the mind of Bodhi (prathamacittotpāda), he practices morality and accumulates it without measure. Endowed with the mind of compassion (karuṇācitta), he does not seek the fruit of retribution (vipākaphala). He does not lean toward the Bodhi of the śrāvakas or of the pratyekabuddhas. He is without fetters (saṃyojana). He maintains discipline from birth to birth only for the purification of his own mind (svacittapariśodhana) and so as not to harm beings. Thus, when he obtains the Bodhi of the Buddhas, his morality is perfected.

<sup>347 28&</sup>lt;sup>th</sup> lakṣaṇa.

<sup>348 40&</sup>lt;sup>th</sup> lakşana.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>349</sup> 50<sup>th</sup> *lakṣaṇa*: see above p. 277F, 453-456F.

The Buddha has the physical strength of Nārāyana, equal to myriads of white elephants in rut. See Tseng yi a han, T 125, k. 36, p. 749b23-749c13; Vibhāṣā, T 1545, k. 30, p. 155a-b; k. 83,p. 428c20; k. 191, p. 957a26; Kośa, VII, p. 72-74; Nyāyānusaāra, T 1562, k. 75, p. 748b; Abhidharmadīpa, p. 388-389. Thus at the moment of his death, the disciple Vakkali had nothing to blame himself for, but he felt one cruel regret; he confessed: "For a long time I wanted to go to the Buddha to contemplate him, but I did not have the strength in my body to go to visit him." (Saṃyutta, III, p. 120).

For these five anāsravaskandha, see references above, p. 1233, n. 3.

This is how one should recollect the aggregate of morality (śīlaskandha) of the Buddha.

[2. Samādhiskandha]. – Furthermore, the aggregate of samādhi (samādhiskandha) is perfected in the Buddha.

Question. – We can know that the Buddha is disciplined because his bodily and vocal actions (*kāyavakkarman*) are pure; we can know that he is wise because he explains the Dharma in detail and cuts through the doubts (*samśaya*) of beings. But in regard to meditative stabilization (*samādhi*), it is impossible to know if a third person is practicing it, especially if it is a Buddha.

Answer. – As the great wisdom  $(mah\bar{a}praj\tilde{n}\tilde{a})$  of the Buddha is perfect (sampanna), it must be concluded that his dhyānas and his absorptions  $(sam\bar{a}pattis)$  are perfected. Similarly, when we see that the lotus flowers (padmapuspa) are large, we agree that the pool (hrada) must also be large. When we see that the light of the lamp  $(d\bar{l}p\bar{a}loka)$  is large, we agree that there is also abundant oil (taila). And so, since the supernatural powers  $(abhij\tilde{n}\bar{a})$  and the prodigious strength  $(pr\bar{a}tih\bar{a}ryabala)$  of the Buddha are immense and incomparable, we know that the power of his dhyānas and his absorptions is also perfected. When we see that an effect (phala) is great, we know that its cause (hetu) is necessarily great.

Furthermore, in some circumstances, the Buddha himself said to people that his dhyānas and samāpattis are very deep ( $gambh\bar{i}ra$ ).

[The Miracle of  $\bar{A}$ dum $\bar{a}$ ].  $^{353}$  – It is said in a sutra that the Buddha was in the land of A-t'eou-mo ( $\bar{A}$ dum $\bar{a}$ ), seated in meditation under a tree (nisannah pratisamlayan $\bar{a}$ ya). Suddenly there was a heavy rainstorm with lightning and thunder. Four cowherds ( $gop\bar{a}laka$ ) and two workmen ( $k\bar{a}r$ saka) $^{354}$  were so frightened by the noise that they died. A few moments later, calm returned and the Buddha went out to walk (cankrame cankramyate).

This miracle appears in the various recensions of the Mahāparinirvāṇasūtra: Sanskrit Mahāparinirvāṇa, p. 272-276; Mahāparinibbāna in the Dīgha, II, p. 131-132; and various Chinese translations: T 1, k. 3, p. 19a21; T 5, k. 2, p. 168b13-21; T 6, k. 2, p. 183c23-184a3; T 7, k. 2, p. 198a17-198b4 (see E. Waldschmidt, *Lebensende des Buddha*, p. 155-157, a comparative study of these versions). The miracle is also told in Lieou tou tsi king, T 152, k. 7, p. 42c23-29 (tr. Chavannes, *Contes*, I, p. 281) and Mūlasarv. Vin., T 1451, K. 37, p. 391b3-18. Here is the Sanskrit version of the Mahāparinirvāṇasūtra:

Eko 'yaṃ Putkasa samaya Ādumāyāṃ viharāmi bhūtāgāre. pūrvāhṇe nivasya pātracīvaram ādāyādumāṃ piṇḍāya ... sphoṭatyāḥ śadbam. Prasannaś ca me puruṣo vaśīkṛtaḥ.

354 Most other sources say four oxen (balivardaka) and two workmen (kārṣaka).

Meeting the Buddha between Kuśinagarī and Pāpā, a minister of the Mallas called Putkasa spoke to him about his teacher Ārāḍa Kālāma and his extraordinary power of concentration: one day when he was deep in meditation, Ārāḍa did not hear the noise of a caravan of five hundred wagons that passed by close to him. The Buddha affirmed that he too possessed a similar power of absorption and gave him as proof an incident that had occurred in the village of Ādumā (in Pāli, Ātumā).

A vaisya, having bowed down to the Buddha's feet, walked along after him and said: Bhagavat, for a moment there was thunder, lightning and four cowherds as well as two workmen were so frightened by this noise that they died. Did the Bhagavat not hear the crash?

The Buddha said: I heard nothing.

The vaisya: Was the Buddha sleeping at that moment?

The Buddha said: No, I was not asleep.

The vaisya: Had you entered into the absorption of non-identification (asamjñisamāpatti)?

The Buddha: No, I was conscious (saminy eva sammanah), and I was just in meditative stability.

The vaisya exclaimed: That is wonderful (āścaryaṃ bata)! The dhyānas and the samāpattis of the Buddha are great and profound (mahāgambhīra). Being in meditation, fully conscious and fully awake (saminy eva samāno jāgram), he did [220b] not hear this great noise!

In other sūtras, the Buddha said to the bhikşus: "The samādhis into which the Buddha enters and comes out of, Śāriputra and Maudgalyāyana do not even know the names of them."355 How then (kim punar vādaḥ) would they know their nature?

See, for example, the samādhi of the King of Samādhi (samādhirājasamādhi). 356 the samādhi of the Lion's Play (simhavikrīditasamādhi), 357 etc.: when the Buddha enters them, he makes the universes of the ten directions shake in six ways; he emits great rays (raśmi) and by emanation he creates innumerable Buddhas who fill the ten directions.

[The miracle of the multiplication of the Buddhas]. 358 – One day Ānanda reflected thus: Formerly, under the Buddha Jan-teng (Dīpamkara), people were good, had long life (dīrghāyusa) and were easily converted. Today, under the Buddha Śākyamuni, people are actually bad, have a short life (alpāyuṣa) and are hard to convert. Is Śākyamuni going to enter into nirvāņa without having completed his work as Buddha (buddhakārya)?

357 See above, p. 472F, 479F, 518F, and below, k. 41, p. 361a9-10.

Mūlasarv. Vin, Bhaisajyavastu, in Gilgit Manuscripts, III, Part I, p. 171, l. 14-19: Api tu yāsām dhyānayimoksasamādhisamāpattīnām lābhī Tathāgatas tāsām pratyrkabuddhā nāmāni na jānanti. vāsām pratvekabuddhā lābhinas tāsām bhiksuh Śāriputo nāmāni na jānīte. vāsām lābhī Śāriputro bhikṣus tāsām Maudgalyāyano bhikṣur nāmāni na jānīte: "The trances, the liberations, the concentrations and the absorptions that the Tathagata obtains, the bhiksu Śariputra does not know their names. Those that Śāriputra obtains, the bhikṣu Maudgalyāyana does not know their names.

Fully described above, p. 433-438F.

An event closely analogous to the great miracle at Śrāvastī which the *Traité* has already related in detail above, p. 531-535F.

In the morning, Ānanda questioned the Buddha about this. The sun had just risen and, at that very moment, the Buddha entered into the samādhi of Daybreak (sūryodayasamādhi). Just as the rays of the rising sun lit up Jambudvīpa, so, from the body of the Buddha and from the pores of his skin (romakūpa) rays were emitted that illumined universes of the ten directions as many as the sands of the Ganges (gaṅgaʾadīvālukopama).

From each of these rays arose lotus flowers with a thousand petals made of the seven jewels (*saptaratnamayāni sahasrapattrāṇī padmāni*). On each of these flowers there was a seated Buddha each of whom emitted innumerable rays. From each of these rays arose other thousand-petalled lotus flowers made of the seven jewels on each of which was a seated Buddha.

All these Buddhas filled universes in the ten directions as numerous as the sands of the Ganges and converted beings. Some preached the Dharma, others were silent, others walked about, still others, by feats of magic (rddhiprātihārya), shot out water and fire successively. They converted beings of the five destinies in the ten directions by these skillful means (upāya).

By the power of the Buddha (*bhagavataḥ prabhāvena*), Ānanda saw all these things. Then the Buddha withdrew the bases of his magical power (*rddhipādān punar eva pratisaṃharati sma*), emerged from meditation and asked Ānanda if he had seen and heard these things. Ānanda replied: "Thanks to the Buddha's power, I saw and I heard."

The Buddha asked him: "Does the Buddha have enough power to be able to finish [quickly] his task as Buddha?"

Ānanda answered: "O Bhagavat, suppose that the beings filled universes in the ten directions as numerous as the sands of the Ganges and the Buddha lived only one single day, if, [in order to convert them], the Buddha used the power [which you have just demonstrated], he could certainly fully accomplish completely (atyantam) his task as Buddha (buddhakārya)." And Ānanda exclaimed: "It is truly wonderful (adhbhutam bata), O Bhagavat! The Buddha's attributes are immense (apramāṇa) and inconceivable (acintya)."

This is why we know that the dhyānas and the absorptions of the Buddha are perfected (sampanna).

[3. Prajñāskandha]. – Furthermore, the wisdom aggregate (prajñāskandha) is perfected (saṃpanna) in the Buddha. From the first production of the mind of Bodhi (prathamacittotpāda) and during incalculable periods (asamkhyeyakalpa), there is no dharma that he has not practiced. From existence to existence, he has accumulated qualities (guṇa). Mindful (smṛtimat) and resolute (ātāpin), he sacrificed his life to find wisdom (prajñā), as was the case for the bodhisattva Sa-t'o-po-louen (Sadāprarudita). 359

1106

This bodhisattva found a manuscript of the Prajñāpāramitā at Gandhāra in the city of Gandhavatī in the middle of a tower where the bodhisattva Dharmodgata had hidden it. It had been written on gold-leaf with molten beryl; sealed with seven seals, it was enclosed in a precious casket resting on a bed set with

Furthermore, as he has cultivated great compassion (mahākaruṇā) and wisdom (prajñā), the Buddha has perfected the wisdom aggregate (prajñāskandha). Other people do not have this great compassion, and even if [220c] they do have wisdom, they do not perfect great compassion. Wanting to save beings and seeking all kinds of wisdoms, the Buddha has destroyed even his attachment to the Dharma (dharmasaṅgha) and suppressed the sixty-two kinds of wrong view (dṛṣṭigata). He does not fall into the pairs of extremes (dvāv antau): 360 a life attached to the five objects of enjoyment and pleasure (pañcakāmaguṇeṣu kāmasukhallikānuyoga) or a life of personal mortification (ātmaklamathānuyoga), nihilism (ucchedadṛṣṭi) or eternalism (śāśvatadṛṣṭi), existence (bhava) or non-existence (vibhava), and other extremes of this kind.

Furthermore, the Buddha's wisdom is peerless (anuttara) and his penetration (prativedha) without equal (asama), for they are all the result of very deep concentrations (gambhīrasamādhi) and are not disturbed by coarse or subtle emotions (sthūlasūkṣmakleśa). He practices well the thirty-two auxiliaries to enlightenment (bodhipākṣikadharma), the four trances (dhyāna), the four formless absorptions (ārūpyasamāpatti), the eight liberations (vimokṣa), the nine successive absorptions (anupūrvavihārasamāpatti) and the other qualities (guṇa); he possesses the ten strengths (bala), the four fearlessnesses (vaiśaradya), the four unhindered knowledges (pratisaṃvid), and the eighteen special attributes (āveṇikadharma); he has obtained the unhindered and inconceivable liberations (asaktācintyavimokṣa): 361 this is why the wisdom aggregate of the Buddha is perfected (saṃpanna).

Furthermore, the Buddha has vanquished the great heretical scholars (*tīrthikamahopadeśācārya*), namely:

the seven jewels. To pay homage to bodhisattva Dharmodgata, Sadāprarudita 'Eternally Weeping' sacrificed his body several times and, not finding any water to wash the place where he was to meet the bodhisattva, "he took a sharp blade, pierced his body everywhere and sprinkled the place with his own blood" (tīkṣnaṃ śastraṃ gṛhītvā svākāyaṃ samantato viddhvā taṃ pṛthivīpradeśaṃ svarudhireṇa sarvam asiñcat).

The adventures of Sadāprarudita are told at length in various recensions of the Prajñāpāramitā:

- 1) Aṣṭasāhasrikā: Sanskrit text, chap. 30 and 31. p. 481-526 (transl. Conze, p. 201-223); Chinese versions, T 224, k. 9-10, p. 470c-477b; T 225, k. 6, p. 503c-507c; T 227, k. 10, p. 580a-586b.
  - 2) Pañcavimsati, T 221, k. 20, p. 141b-146b; T 223, k. 27, p. 416a-423c.
  - 3) Śatasāhasrikā, T 220 (vol. V), k. 498-400, p. 1059a-1073a.

But the chapters on Sadāprarudita and Dharmodgata are not part of the original edition of the Prajñāpāramitā. Actually, the Ratnaguṇasaṃcayagāthā which makes up the earliest summary of this literature does not mention these two bodhisattvas, and the chapters in question show indirect contacts with the Mediterranean gnosis of the beginning of our era. See E. Conze, *The Composition of the Aṣṭasāhasrikā*, BSOAS, XIV, 1952, p. 251-262.

The *Traité* will comment fully on the two chapters in question (k. 96-100, p. 731a-753c) and will often evoke the spirit of Sadāprarudita's sacrifice (k. 30, p. 283a20; k. 34, p. 314a12; k. 49, p. 412a20, 414c13.

<sup>360</sup> See above, p. 23F and note, 396F, 655F and below, k. 25, p. 246a.

For these *acintyavimokṣa* of the bodhisattva, see *Vimalakīrti*, p. 250-258.

Yeou-leou-p'in-li kia-chö (Urubilvākāśyapa), 362 Mo-ho-kia chö, Mahākāśyapa, 363 Chö-li-fou (Śāriputra), Mou-k'ien-lien (Maudgalyāyana), 364 Sa-tchö Ni-k'ien-tseu (Satyaka Nirgranthīputra), 365 P'o-ts'o-cheou-lo,366

Tch'ang-tchao (Dīrghanakha), 367 etc.

The same year as his enlightenment, the Buddha went to Urubilvā to convert the thousand Jațilas, fire worshippers, led by Urubilvākāśyapa, a venerable old man aged one hundred and twenty years, and his two brothers, Nadī- and Gatākāśyapa. To impress these heretics, the Buddha performed no less than eighteen miracles, beginning with the taming of a venomous snake. Finally convinced of not having attained sainthood (arhattva) and that he did not even know the Path, Urubilvākāśyapa asked to be received into the Buddhist order and his five hundred disciples made the same request. The Buddha agreed and the newly converted threw their garments of hide and their religious objects into the river in order to put on the Dharma robe.

Nadī- and Gayākāśyapa, further downstream, saw the cast-off garments of their co-religionists and fearing that some misfortune had occurred to them, they rushed to find out what had happened. They found their friends already shaven and wearing the saffron robes of the disciples of the Buddha. Influenced by this example, they too asked to be accepted into the Samgha of monks.

For these conversions, see Catusparişad, p. 304-315; Pāli Vin, I, p. 32-34; Mahīśāsaka Vin. T 1421, k. 16, p. 109a27-109b22; Dharmagupta Vin., T 1428, k. 33, p. 796b1-797a11; Mūlasarv, Vin. T 1450, k. 7, p. 133b25-134b2; Mahāvastu, III, p. 425-432; Nidānakathā in Jātaka, I, p. 82; Buddhacarita (Tib,), XVI, v. 23-38; Ying pen k'I king, T 185, k. 2, p. 482c2-483a8; Yin kouo king, T 189, k. 4, p. 649b6- 650a22; Tchong hiu mo ho ti king, T 191, k, 9-10, p. 960b27-962a10; Tchong pen k'I king, T 196, k. 1, p. 151c4-28.

For the miracles and the conversion of Urubilva, see the list of sources in E. Waldscmidt, Vergleichende Analyse des Catusparisarsūtra, Festscrfit Schubring, 1951, p. 106-113, from which the preceding references have been taken; an analysis of the illustrated monuments in Foucher, La Vie du Bouddha, p. 217-220; a study of the foundations in Bareau, Recherches, p. 253-320.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>363</sup> For Mahākāśyapa, see above, p. 87-103F, 190-196F, 287F and n.

The conversion of Śāriputra and Maudgalyāyana has been told above, p. 621-640F

For Satyaka Nirgranthīputra, see above, p. 48F and n.; below, k. 25, p. 242c7; k. 26, p. 251c10.

Perhaps Śrenika Vatsagotra, already mentioned, p. 32F note, 46F, 184F. See below, k. 37, p.334b4; k.77, p. 602b13.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>367</sup> Dīrghanakha (or Mahākausthila): see above, p. 46-51F, 184F, 633F, 639F; below, k. 25, 242c7; k. 26, p. 254b10.

The Buddha vanquished all these great scholars: this is why we know that his wisdom aggregate (prajñāskandha) is perfected (sampanna).

Furthermore, in the three Baskets (*tripiṭaka*), the twelve classes of texts (*dvādaśāṅgabuddhavacana*) and the eighty-four thousand articles of the Dharma (*caturśītisahasradharmaskandha*), we see how numerous were the words of the Buddha (*buddhavacana*): this is why we know that his wisdom also is great.

Thus, a vaiśya, seeing at dawn a place where there had been a lot of rain, said to the people: "Last night, the power of the rain-dragon (*varṣa-nāga*) was very great." The people asked him: "How do you know?" He answered: "I see that the ground is damp, the mud abundant, the mountain collapsed, the trees knocked down and the animals killed; that is how I know that the power of the dragon was great."

It is the same for the Buddha: although his profound wisdom is not visible to the eye, it makes the mighty rain of the Dharma (*mahādharmavarṣam abhivarṣati*) rain down; he vanquishes the great scholars (*mahopadeśācārya*) like the kings of the gods Śakra and Brahmā: this is why it is possible to know that the Buddha's wisdom is great.

Furthermore, as the Buddhas have acquired the unhindered liberations (*asaktavimokṣa*) over everything, their wisdom is unhindered.

Furthermore, this wisdom of the Buddha is completely pure (pariśuddha) and surpasses all ordinary analysis (vicāra). He does not see any nature in dharmas that is eternal (nitya) or non-eternal (anitya), finite (antavat) or infinite (anantavat), mobile (gamika) or immobile (agamika), existent (sat) or non-existent (asat), impure (sāsrava) or pure (anāsrava), conditioned (saṃskṛta) or unconditioned (asaṃskṛta), arising and perishing (utpanna-niruddha) or non-arising non-perishing (anutpanna-aniruddha), empty (śūnya) or non-empty (aśūnya). The eternal purity (nityaviśuddhitā) of dharmas is immense (apramāṇa), like space (ākāśasama)! This is why his wisdom is unhindered (asakta).

Those who see arising and cessation ( $utp\bar{a}danirodha$ ) [in dharmas] cannot see non-arising and non-cessation ( $anutp\bar{a}d\bar{a}nirodha$ ) in them; those who see non-arising and non-cessation in dharmas cannot see arising and cessation in them. If non-arising and non-cessation are real ( $bh\bar{u}ta$ ), then arising and cessation are false ( $abh\bar{u}ta$ ). If arising and cessation are real, non-arising and non-cessation are false. It is the same for all analyses of this type ( $evamvidhavic\bar{a}ra$ ). As the Buddha has unhindered wisdom (pratisamvid) [on this subject], we know that his wisdom is perfected.

[4. Vimuktiskandha]. – Furthermore, one recollects the perfection of the deliverance skandha (vimuktiskandhasampad) in the Buddha. The Buddha is free from all the disturbing emotions (kleśa) and their traces (vāsanā). As he has [221a] uprooted them, his deliverance is real (bhūta) and indestructible (akṣaya). Since he is endowed with omniscience (sarvajñānasamanvāgata), it is 'unhindered deliverance' (asaktavimukti). Since he has the eight liberations (vimokṣa) and these are profound (ganbhīra) and universal (vyāpin), it is 'complete deliverance' (sampannavimukti).

Furthermore, since the Buddha has left [the lower stages] of those who are liberated by chance (samayavimukta) and those liberated by wisdom (prajñāvimukta), he realizes the twofold deliverance

(*ubhayabhāgavimuti*) perfectly.<sup>368</sup> As he has these [two] deliverances, it is 'perfected deliverance aggregate' (*sampannavimuktiskandha*).

Furthermore, the Buddha has obtained deliverance because he has destroyed Māra's armies (*mārasenā*), <sup>369</sup> eliminated the negative emotions (*kleśa*), rejected the dhyāna systems, and also because he enters into and comes out of samādhi supremely and without obstacle.

Finally, in the path of seeing the truths (*satyadarśanamārga*),<sup>370</sup> the Bodhisattva attained sixteen profound deliverances (*vimukti*):

- (i) [The first vimukti] was a conditioned deliverance (saṃskṛtavimukti) associated with duḥkhe dharmajñāna. [Commonly called duhkhe dharmajñānaksānti].
- (ii) [The second vimukti] was an unconditioned deliverance (asaṃskṛtavimukti)<sup>371</sup> resulting from the abandonment (prahāṇa) of the ten fetters (saṃyojana) relating to the suffering [of kāmdhātu]. [Commonly called duḥkhe dharmajñāna.]

And so on up to [the sixteenth Vimukti] called mārge 'nvayajñāna.

Then, in the path of meditation (bhāvanāmārga), the Bodhisattva obtained eighteen deliverances:

- (i) [The first vimukti] was a conditioned deliverance (saṃskṛtavimukti) associated either with anvayajñāna or with dharmajñāna.
- (ii) [The second vimukti] was an unconditioned deliverance (asaṃskṛtavimukti) resulting from the abandonment of the three fetters to meditation (bhāvanāsaṃyojana) in ārūpyadhātu.

And so on up to the eighteenth vimukti where there is a conditioned deliverance associated with the destruction of the impurities (āsravakṣayajñāna) and an unconditioned deliverance resulting from the

The saint who is liberated from the obstacle of the disturbing emotions (*kleśāvaraṇa*) by the power of wisdom is said to be liberated by wisdom (*prajñāvimukta*): cf. Anguttara, IV, p. 452-453; Kośa, VI, p. 274, 276, 297; VII, p. 97; VIII, p. 181.

The saint who, by the power of wisdom, is freed from the obstacle of the disturbing emotions (*kleśāvaraṇa*) and who, by the power of concentration (*samādhi*), is freed from the obstacle which stands in the way of the eight liberations (*vimokṣāvaraṇa*), is said to be doubly delivered (*ubhayatobhāgavimukta*): cf. Anguttara,I, p.73; IV, p. 10, 77: Kośa, II, p. 205; VI, p. 273, 276. 369 Above, p. 341-343F.

<sup>368</sup> Of the six kinds of arhats, five are liberated as a result of chance (*samayavimukta*): their deliverance of mind (*cetovimukti*) is thus by chance (*sāmayikī*) because it depends on circumstance and is cherished because it must be guarded constantly; cf. Anguttara, III, p. 173; Kośa, p. 251, 154, 167, 274.

An allusion to the enlightenment of Śākyamuni who attained Bodhi in thirty-four moments of mind: sixteen of *darśanamārga* and eighteen of *bhāvanamārga*: see above, p. 130F note, and especially p. 1036F note.

On the difference between conditioned *vimukti* and unconditioned *vimukti*, see Kośa, VI, p. 2906.

abandonment of all the fetters (*sarvasaṃyojanaprahāṇa*). These two deliverances together constitute the 'perfection of the deliverance aggregate' (*vimuktiskandhasaṃpad*).

- [5) *Vimuktijñānadarśanaskandha*]. Furthermore, one recollects the perfection of the aggregate of the Buddha called knowledge and seeing deliverance (*vimuktijñānadarśanaskandha*). This aggregate is of two types:
- (i) In regard to emancipation from his disturbing emotions, the Buddha puts the knowledge of destruction of the impurities (āsravakṣayajñāna) to work: from his own experience (adhyātmasākṣātkāra) he knows: "In me, suffering is completely known, its origin has been abandoned, its destruction has been realized and the path [to its destruction] has been practiced" (duḥkham me parijñātam, samudayo me prahīno, nirodho me sākṣātkrto, mārgo me bhāvita iti): 372 this is the vimuktijñānadarśanaskandha consisting of the knowledge of the destruction of the impurities (āsravaksayajñāna).

Next, he knows this: "The suffering completely known by me is no longer to be known; [its origin abandoned by me is no longer to be realized]; the path [to its destruction] practiced by me is no longer to be practiced" (duḥkhaṃ me parijñātaṃ na punaḥ parijñātavyaṃ, samudayo me prahīṇo na punaḥ prahātavyo, nirodho me sākṣātkṛto na punaḥ sākṣātkartavyo, mārgo me bhāvito na punar bhavitavya iti): 373 this is the vimuktijñānadarśana consisting of the knowledge that the impurities, once destroyed, will not arise again (āsravānutpādajñāna).

ii) The Buddha knows that this particular person will find deliverance by entering the concentration of emptiness (\$\sigma u nyata a\$\text{nyata}\$), another person by entering into the concentration of signlessness (\$\sigma n imitta\$), yet another into the concentration of wishlessness (\$apranihita\$). He knows that one individual will be led to deliverance without resorting to any skillful means (\$upaya\$). Another will find deliverance after a long time, a third after a short time, a fourth in this very moment. One individual will find deliverance if he is addressed in subtle words, another in coarse words, yet another in varied conversation (\$sambhinnapralapa\$). One individual will find deliverance if he sees miracles (\$rddhibala\$), another if the Dharma is preached. The person in whom lust predominates (\$ragabahula\$) finds deliverance if his desire (\$raga\$) is increased; the one in whom hatred predominates (\$dve\$sabahula\$) finds deliverance if his hate is increased, as was the case for the nagas \$Nan-to \cdot 374\$ and \$Ngeou-leou-p \cdot in-louo\$ (Urubilva).\$375

Mahāvyut., no. 1321-1324; Kośavyākhyā, p.600, l. 7-9. Compare the canonical passage on the three turnings of the Wheel of the Dharma and on the twelve aspects (*dharmacakram triparivartam dvādaśākaram*): Vinaya, I, p. 11; Saṃyutta, V, p. 422, 436; Paṭisambidhā, II, p. 150 seq.; Catuṣpariṣad, p. 146-148.

<sup>373</sup> Kośavyākhyā, p. 600, l. 11-14.

One day the Buddha accompanied by five hundred monks went to the Trāyastrimśa gods but, in order to do so, he had to fly over the home of the nāga king Nandopananda. Fearing that the dust from the feet of these shaven monks might fall on his head, the nāga wanted to prevent them from passing overhead. He wound his coils seven times around Mount Meru in order to hide the Trāyastriṃśa heaven

It is for various reasons of this kind that people find deliverance, as it is

explained in regard to the Dharma eye (*dharmacakṣus*). Knowing and clearly seeing these various deliverances is called *vimuktijñānadarśanaskandhasaṃpad*. [221b]

Furthermore, one recollects the Buddha who knows all (sarvajñā), who sees all (sarvadarśin), his great loving-kindness (mahāmaitrī), his great compassion (mahākaruṇā), his ten powers (bala), his four

from them. The Buddha entrusted the task of conquering him to MaudgalyaÂana. The disciple took the form of a royal nāga and wound his coils around the body of his adversary fourteen times. Against the flames and smoke of Nandopananda, he sent out still stronger flames and smoke. Then taking on his human form, he entered the nāga's body which he traversed from top to bottom. When he came out, Nandopananda breathed out on him 'the wind from his nose', but Maudagalyāyana, in the fourth dhyāna, changed into the suparṇa bird, the sworn enemy of the dragons and began to chase the nāga while giving off 'the suparṇa breath'. Completely humbled, Nandopananda changed into a young Brahmin and took refuge in the Buddha.

This story is in the *Nandopanandanāgarājadamanasūtra*, of which three versions exist: A Pāli version in Visuddhimagga, ed. Warren, p. 336-337 (transl. Nanamoli, p. 436-438); a Tibetan translation entitled *Kluḥi rgyal po dgaḥ bo ñerdgaḥ ḥdul baḥI mdo*, OKC, no. 755 (Tib. Trip., vol, 21, p. 304-3-7); a Chinese translation by Tche K'ien, entitled *Long wang hiong to king*, T 597, p. 131.

Elsewhere there are frequent allusions to the discomfiture of Nanda: Divyāvadāna, p. 395; Legend of Aśoka (T 99, k. 23, p. 168a; T 2042, k. 2, p. 104b13; T 2043, k. 2, p. 138b9; Tseng yi a han, T 125, k. 28, p. 703b24; Jātaka, V, p. 126. The *Traité* will return to it later, k. 32, p. 300a29; k. 100, p. 752b12.

This is the nāga of Urubilvā on the Nairañjanā who occupied the Fire House (*agnyāgāra*) of the Jaţilas. Urubilvākāśyapa, the leader of these heretics, had authorized the Buddha to stay there. When the Buddha entered, the furious snake spat out smoke and flames; the teacher replied with the same, so much so that the building seemed about to burst into flame. During the night, Kāśyapa, who watched the stars, noticed the fire and wondered if the Buddha had not been burned to ash. But in the meantime, the Buddha, in meditation, developed so much light and heat that the nāga, completely dazzled, allowed himself to be placed peacefully in the Buddha's begging bowl. The next day Kāśyapa, a witness to the nāga's submission, sincerely admired the Buddha's magical powers, not without thinking himself to be more saintly than the Buddha.

Pāli sources: Vinaya, I, p. 24-25; Nidānakathā in Jātaka, I, p. 82; Manorathapūraņī, I, p. 299. Sanskrit sources: Catuṣpariṣad, p. 238-244; Mahāvastu, III, p. 428-429.

Chinese sources: Mahīśāsaka Vin., T 1421, K. 16, p. 108a8-24; Dharmagupt. Vin., T 1428, K. 32, p. 793b16-c9: Mūlasarv. Vin., T 1450, k. 6, p. 131a12-131b19; Ting pen k'I king, T 185, k. 2, p. 480c20-281a18; Yin kouo king, T 189, k. 4, p. 646a13-b16; Abhinişkramaṇa, T 190, K. 40-41, P. 958a6-b7; Tchong penk'I king, T 196, k. 1, p. 150b1-c3.

Illustrations: Sañcī (Marshall-Foucher, p. 210, pl. 51-52); Ganbdhāra (Foucher, Agb., I, p. 446-453, fig. 223-226; II, p. 343, fig. 461).

fearlessnesses (vaiśāradya) his four unhindered knowledges (pratisaṃvid) his eighteen special attributes (āveṇikadharma), etc.

Recollecting the immense and inconceivable qualities (*apramāṇācintyaguṇa*) is what is called 'recollection of the Buddha' (*buddhānusmṛti*).

This recollection takes place in seven stages (*bhūmi*). Sometimes it is impure (*sāsrava*), sometimes it is pure (*anāsrava*). If it is impure, it entails retribution (*savipāka*); if it is pure, it does not entail retribution (*avipāka*). It is associated with three *indriyas* (*indriyatrayasaṃprayukta*), namely, the indriyas of happiness (*sukha*), satisfaction (*saumanasya*) and indifference (*upekṣā*). 376

It is acquired by effort (*prāyogika*) or by retribution (*vaipākika*). That of the present universe is acquired by effort, e.g., when one practices the concentration of recollection of the Buddha (*buddhānusmṛtisamādhi*). That of the buddhafield of the Buddha *Wou-leang-cheou* (Amitāyus) is acquired by retribution; the people who are born there spontaneously (*svarasena*) recollect the Buddha.<sup>377</sup>

All this is fully explained in the Abhidharma.

#### II. RECOLLECTION OF THE DHARMA

Recollection of the dharma (*dharmānusmṛti*). – The Buddha said: "The yogin should recollect the Dharma, skillfully presented, obtaining its retribution in the present lifetime (*sāṃdṛṣṭika*) without fear of burning

Later (k. 29, p. 276a17-22), the *Traité* will return to this subject: "The bodhisattva always practices the *buddhānusmṛtisamādhi* and, for that reason, wherever he is reborn, he always encounters the Buddhas. Thus it is said in the *Pan tcheou san mei* (Pratyutpannasamādhi, T 318): The bodhisattva who enters this samādhi sees the Buddha Amita. This Buddha is asked: As a result of what action has he acquired rebirth in this field? – The Buddha answers: O son of noble family, it is because he has always practiced the *buddhānusmṛtisamādhi* and his mindfulness was infallible that he obtains rebirth in my buddhafield."

These three *indriya*s 'sovereign organs' in fact make up the members (*aṅga*) of dhyāna: see above, p. 1237F, n. 3; Kośa, VIII, p. 147.

The inhabitants of Sukkhāvatī, the buddhafield of Buddha Amitāyus, spontaneously and effortlessly recollect the Buddha, because it is precisely by the practice of *anusmṛti* that they are reborn in Sukhāvatī. See Amitāyurbuddhānusmṛtisūtra, T 365, p. 344c13-17: "There are three kinds of beings who will reborn in Sukhāvatī. Who are these three? 1) Beings with loving-kindness of mind (*maitrīcitta*), who do not kill and are endowed with morality (śīla); 2) those who study and recite the Vaipulyasūtra; 3) those who practice the six recollections (ṣaḍanusmṛti). If in applying these merits (puṇyapariṇāmanā) they express the wish to be reborn in this buddhafield and they fulfill these qualities (guṇa) in one to seven days, they will be reborn in Sukhāvatī."

(nirjvara), <sup>378</sup> independent of time  $(ak\bar{a}lika)$ , leading to the good place  $(aupan\bar{a}yika)$ , the penetration into which is unhindered." <sup>379</sup>

## 1. Dharma skillfully presented

It is skillfully presented because it is not contradictory to the two truths ( $satyadvay\bar{a}virodh\bar{a}t$ ), i.e., the conventional truth (samvrtisatya) and the absolute truth ( $param\bar{a}rthasatya$ ). The wise man ( $vij\tilde{n}a$ ) cannot refute it and the fool ( $b\bar{a}la$ ) cannot criticize it.

This Dharma is also free of the pairs of extremes (*antadvaya*), i.e., a life attached to the five objects of enjoyment and pleasure (*pañcakāmaguṇeṣu kāmasukhallikānuyoga*) or a life of personal mortification (*ātmaklamathānuyoga*).<sup>380</sup>

It is free of other pairs of extremes: eternalism (śāśvata) and nihilism (uccheda), self (ātman) and non-self (anātman), existence (bhava) and non-existence (abhava). Because it is not attached to these pairs of extremes, the Dharma is said to be 'skillfully presented'.

Heretics who boast of their own system (*svadharmotkarṣa*) and denigrate the systems of others (*paradarmapamsaka*) cannot express themselves skillfully.

## 2. Dharma, obtaining its retribution in the present lifetime

The Dharma obtains its retribution in the present existence (samdrṣtika): as it eliminates the various problems of the world caused by lust ( $r\bar{a}ga$ ) as well as the various teachings (upadeśa) and arguments caused by wrong views ( $mithy\bar{a}drṣti$ ), body ( $k\bar{a}ya$ ) and mind (citta) find happiness in it. Thus the Buddha said:

Observing morality is happiness:

Body and mind do not burn;

One sleeps well and, on awakening, one is happy;

One's fame extends afar. 381

In place of *tche-nao*, read *je-nao*, as in the following lines.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>379</sup> Here the *Traité* is taking liberties with the canonical formula cited in the preliminary note to this present chapter.

<sup>380</sup> See above, p. 23F, 396F, 655F, 1354F.

<sup>381</sup> Udānavarga, VI, 3, p. 149.

Moreover, in this Dharma of the Buddha, the linking of causes and conditions (hetupratyaya prabandha) produces the following fruit: Because of [221c] the purity of his morality (śīlaviśuddhi), the yogin has no regrets (kaukṛtya). His mind being without regrets, he produces the joy inherent in the Dharma (dharmopasaṃhitaprāmodya). By means of the joy of the Dharma, his body and mind have pleasure (praśrabdhi) and happiness (sukha). His body and mind having pleasure and happiness, he can concentrate his mind. Concentrating his mind, he understands in accordance with the truth (yathābhūtaṃ prajñanāti). Understanding in accordance with the truth, he finds disgust (nirveda). Finding disgust, he becomes detached from desire (virajyate). Detached from desire, he obtains deliverance (vimukti), he obtains the fruit of retribution (vipākaphala) of deliverance, he obtains nirvāna.<sup>382</sup>

As for the heretics (tīrthika), their Dharma is void (śūnya), painful (duṣkaracārin) and without result.

[Story of Jambuka]. – Thus the arhat Yen-fou (Jambuka) said the following when he acquired bodhi:

Formerly I was a heretic

For fifty-five years;

I ate only dried cow-dung

And I slept on thorns.

Having endured such cruel tortures, I gained nothing from them, not like today when, having seen the Buddha and having heard the Dharma, I have left home (*pravrajita*) and, in three days, having done what had to be done (*kṛtakṛtya*), I have become arhat.<sup>383</sup>

<sup>382</sup> Phrases borrowed from the stock of *nava prāmodyapūrvakā dharmāḥ*: Mahāvyuty., no. 1586-1595: *Prītimuditasya prītir jāyate, prītimanasah kāyah ... vimukto 'smīti jñānadarśanam bhavati*.

Saṃyutta, IV, p. 79; II, p. 95: Pamuditassa pīti jāyati, pītimanassa kāyo ... vimuccati, vimuttasmiṃ vimuttamhīti ñāṇaṃ hoti.

<sup>383</sup> Theragāthā, p. 34, v. 283-286: *Pañcapaññāsa vassāni rajojallam adhārayim / ... tisso vijjā anuppattā, katam buddhassa sāsanan ti //* 

Transl.- "For fifty-five years I covered myself with dust and dirt, eating only one meal per month, and I tore out my hair and beard.

I stood on one foot and refused to sit down; I ate dry dung and accepted no invitations.

Having followed this path that leads to the bad destinies for so long, borne along by the stream, I took refuge in the Buddha.

Wonder at this refuge! Admire the excellence of the Dharma! I have obtained the three knowledges and have carried out the Buddha's command."

For more details, see Comm. on the Theragāthā, I, p. 386 seq. (tr. Rhys Davids, *Brethren*, p. 179-180) and Comm. on the Dhammapada, II, p. 52-63 (tr. Burlingame, II, p. 130-137):

At the time of the Buddha Kāśyapa, Jambuka as an elder lived with a lay devotee. A wandering monk, in the course of his alms-round, came to the layman and was welcomed there. In a fit of jealousy,

This is why we know that the Dharma of the Buddha 'obtains its fruit in the present lifetime'.

Question. – If the Dharma of the Buddha obtains its fruit in the present lifetime, how is it that, among the disciples of the Buddha, some derive nothing from it?

Answer. – The yogin who knows the words of the Buddha and applies them constantly cannot fail to receive his reward  $(vip\bar{a}ka)$ . In the same way, the sick person  $(gl\bar{a}na)$  who follows the orders of a good physician (vaidva) and takes all the medicine (pratipaksa) cannot fail to be cured.

On the other hand, if the yogin does not conform to the Buddha's instructions and does not apply them constantly, his immorality (*dauḥśīlya*) and his distractions (*cittavikṣepa*) will cause him to obtain nothing. But it is false that the Dharma is not good.

Moreover, if those who have not attained bodhi do not arrive at nirvāṇa in the present lifetime, in the future lifetime they will, nonetheless, have wealth and happiness and, little by little (*kramaśas*), they will attain nirvāṇa. Finally, their efforts will not be in vain. Thus the Buddha said: "Those who have gone forth from home (*pravrajita*) in view of nirvāṇa will all reach nirvāṇa, some slowly (*mandam*) and other quickly (śīghram).<sup>384</sup> Thus the Dharma 'obtains its fruit in the present existence' (sāmdṛṣṭika).

#### 3. Dharma without torment of burning

The Dharma is without the torment of burning (nirjvara). These sufferings of burning are of two kinds: torments of the body ( $k\bar{a}yop\bar{a}y\bar{a}sa$ ) and torments of the mind ( $cittop\bar{a}y\bar{a}sa$ ). The torments of the body are fetters, prison, beatings, being put to death, etc. The torments of the mind are sadness (daurmanasya), fear

Jambuka insulted the visitor and declared that for his part he would never accept anything from lay people and rather preferred to eat dung, tear out his hair, go naked and sleep on the ground.

At the time of Buddha Śākyamuni, Jambuka took birth in a wealthy family of Rājagṛha, As a child, he refused all normal food and ate his own excrement; when he was grown, he went quite naked and slept on the ground. His parents put him in the hands of the Ājivikas, naked ascetics, who accepted him into their order. But Jambuka refused to follow his colleagues on their alms-rounds. When they were far away, he went into the public latrines to eat excrement. When he felt someone watching him, he stood on one foot and turned his open mouth into the wind. Among those who questioned him, he passed as a great ascetic, an eater of wind, refusing all food. Once a month, however, he accepted putting on his tongue a bit of butter and honey on the end of a piece of *kuśa* grass: such condescension, he said, would assure the spectators eternal salvation. He lived thus for fifty-five years. One day the Buddha came to stay in a near-by cave and Jambuka noticed that, during the night, the four kings of the gods, Śakra and Brahmā came to serve the Teacher. To his astonishment, the Buddha explained that he was superior to these great deities. Jambuka converted and attained arhathood.

This story should be compared to the Jāmbālāvadāna contained in the Avadānaśatsks, I, p. 279-288 (transl. Feer, p. 190-194) and translated into Chinese as the Siuan tso po yuan king, T 200, k. 5, p. 227a-228a.

Unidentified passage. On the superiority of the monastics' morality, see above, p. 839-846F.

(bhaya), etc., caused by desire  $(r\bar{a}ga)$ , hatred (dvesa), avarice  $(m\bar{a}tsrya)$  or jealousy  $(\bar{t}rsy\bar{a})$ . In the Dharma of the Buddha, since morality is pure, the body escapes from the torments of fetters, prison, beatings, being put to death, etc. Since the mind has eliminated the five objects of enjoyment (pañcakāmaguṇa), eliminated the five obstacles (pañcanīvaraṇa) and obtained true bodhi, it escapes from the torments of desire, hatred, avarice, jealousy, doubt (vicikitsā), etc., and as there are no torments, there is no burning (jvara).

Moreover, the trances (dhyāna) and the pure absorptions (samāpatti) produce joy and happiness including all the physical sensations (kāvavedanā): this is why all the burning has gone away. Thus, when a man tormented by great heat (gharmārta) reaches a clear cool pool (tadāga), the cold revives him and he no longer suffers from the heat.

Moreover, whether they depend on wrong views (drstyapekşa) or whether they depend on thirst (trsnapeksa), 385 the disturbing emotions (kleśa) are called 'burnings' (jvara). Since they are absent in the Dharma of the Buddha, the latter is called 'without torment of burning' (nirjvara).

## 4. The Dharma is independent of time

The Dharma is independent of time (akālika). The Dharma of the Buddha acts [222a] independently of time and gives its fruit (phalam dadāti) independently of time. Among the heretics (tīrthika), some rules hold when the sun has not risen but do not hold when the sun has risen; some hold when the sun has risen but do not hold when the sun has not risen; yet others are valid in the daytime but are not valid at night, and finally some hold at night but do not hold in the daytime. In the Dharma of the Buddha, time does not intervene: when one has cultivated the noble eightfold Path (āryāstāngikmārga), one attains nirvāna. Just as fire (agni) burns when it finds kindling (indhana), so pure wisdom (anāsrava prajñā), as soon as it arises, burns all the disturbing emotions (*kleśa*), and that independently of time.

Question. – But the Buddha spoke of medicine at the proper time  $(k\bar{a}labhaisajya)$ , of clothing at the proper time (kālavasana), of food at the proper time (kālabhojana), 386 and the good roots that are not yet ripe (aparipakvakuśalamūla) will ripen in a person when they meet up with the favorable time. How can you say that [the Dharma] is independent of time (akālika)?

Answer. – In these cases, when speaking of time, the Buddha is speaking in accord with worldly usage (lokasamvrti) and, in order that his doctrine should last for a long time, he has linked his arguments with time. But when one cultivates the Path, one obtains nirvāṇa and its wondrous qualities, the concentrations (samādhi) and wisdom (prajñā); these do not depend on time.

These two kinds of negative emotions are mentioned above, p. 211F, 213F.

For example, the Buddha authorized the use of five kinds of medicines "at the suitable time if they have been accepted at the appropriate time" (anujānāmi bhikkhave pañc bhesajjāni kāle pariggahetva kāle paribhuñitum): cf. Vinaya, I, p.200. Similarly, he carefully distinguished meals at the proper time (kālabhojana) from meals outside the proper time (vikālabhojana): cf. Saṃyutta, V, p. 470.

The rules of the heretics all depend on time; the Dharma of the Buddha demands only that the causes and conditions (hetupratyaya) be fulfilled. As long as [the three elements of the Path], morality ( $\dot{sil}a$ ), samadhi and wisdom ( $praj\tilde{n}a$ ) are not perfected (sampanna), one does not obtain bodhi. When morality, samadhi and wisdom are perfected, the fruit is attained and does not depend on time.

Moreover, we speak of time when a long time is necessary to obtain the fruit, but once the fruit is obtained, there is no further question of time. Thus, when a good dye ( $ra\tilde{n}jana$ ) has penetrated [the cloth], it is fixed; it is the same for a person whose mind is pure: as soon as he has heard the Dharma, he is tinged with it and he obtains the purity of the Dharma eye (dharmacakṣurviśuddhi). Therefore the Dharma is 'independent of time' ( $ak\bar{a}lika$ ).

## 5. Dharma leading to the good place

The Dharma leads to the good place (*aupanayika*). The thirty-seven pure auxiliaries of Bodhi (*saptatriṃśad anāsrava bodhipākṣikadharmāḥ*) lead (*upanayanti*) a person to nirvāṇa. Thus, when one sets sail on the Ganges, one necessarily reaches the great ocean.<sup>387</sup>

The outside heretical systems (anyatīrthika) which the Omniscient One (sarvajñā) did not preach that are full of wrong views (mithyadṛṣṭi) lead to the bad places or, if they sometimes lead to the heavens (svarga), one falls back from them and suffers. Not being eternal, these heavens are not 'the good place'.

Question. – If the leader (upanetr) does not exist, how 'to lead' to the good place?

Answer. – It is true that the leader does not exist. Only dharmas can lead other dharmas. The pure and good abandonment  $(an\bar{a}srvaku\dot{s}alaprah\bar{a}na)$  of the five aggregates of existence  $(pa\bar{n}caskandha)$  – aggregates to which is given the power of the name of being (sattva) – lead to nirvāṇa in the same way that the wind  $(v\bar{a}yu)$  blows the dust (rajas) or the water  $(v\bar{a}ri)$  carries away straw (trna). Even without a leader, there can be progress (gamana).

Moreover, in the complex of causes and conditions (*hetupratyayasāmagri*), there is neither agent (*kāraka*) nor leader (*upanetṛ*) who exercises control (*vaśita*) over the causes and conditions on which the retribution depends.

## 6. Dharma of unhindered penetration

-

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>387</sup> Canonical comparison: cf. Saṃyutta, IV, p. 179: Samuddaninno bhikkhave Gaṅgāya nadiyā soto samuddapoṇo samuddapabbhāro.

The Dharma is of unhindered penetration. Utilizing the seals of the Dharma  $(dharmamudr\bar{a})$  of the Buddha, 388 his penetration is unhindered in the same way that the holder of the royal seal  $(r\bar{a}jamudr\bar{a})$  is never delayed or restricted [in his movements].

By *dharmamudr*ā, the *Traité* means three fundamental characteristics of things preached by the Buddha: *Sarvasaṃskārā anityāḥ, sarvadharmā anātmānaḥ, śāntaṃ nirvāṇaṃ*, "All formations (i.e., all dharmas coming from causes) are impermanent; all dharmas are without self, peaceful is nirvāṇa": cf. K. 15, p. 170a2-4 (above, p. 912F); k. 22, p. 222a28-b1; k. 26, p. 253c13-15; k. 32, p. 297c23-24. As we are about to see, such statements are frequent in the canonical texts but, as far as I [Lamotte] know, the expression *dharmamudrā* does not appear in the Pāli Nikāya. On the other hand, in the Sanskrit Saṃyuktāgama translated into Chinese by Guṇabhadra (436-443), there is an *Āryadharmamudrāsūtra*, T 99, no. 80, k. 3, p. 20a25-b28. Before that, Dharmarakṣa had given a separate translation under the name *Cheng fa yin king*, T 103, p. 500a-b: it was published the 5<sup>th</sup> day of the 12<sup>th</sup> month of the 4<sup>th</sup> *yuan-k'ang* year, i.e., January 7, 295 (cf. Li-tai, T 2034, k. 6, p. 63c22-23). This sūtra was authoritative for the Sarvāstivādins as well as the Mādhyamikans: it is cited in the Vibhāṣā (T 1545, k. 104, p. 541c10; T 1546, k. 46, p. 359a23), the Che tchou p'i p'o cha louen (T 1521, k. 1, p. 25a17; k. 10, p. 73b23), the Maitreyapariprechopedeśa (T 1525, k. 2, p. 240b15) and the Satyasiddhiśāstra (T 1546, k. 6, p. 281c2; k. 12, p. 332c15; k. 15, p. 363b23, 365a26).

Whether it is used in the doctrines of the Lesser or the Greater Vehicle, the term *dharmamudrā* appears frequently in the Mahāyānasūtras: cf. Saddharmapuṇḍ., p. 28, l. 8, 92, l. 13; Avataṃsaka, T 279, k. 5, p. 22c1; k. 18, p. 97a17-18; Ratnolkādhāraṇi, T 299, k. 2, p. 891a24; Ratnakūṭa, T 310, k. 6, p. 35a11; k. 6, p. 36a1; k. 25, p. 141a; k. 116, p. 656c12; T 355, k. 1, p. 237a3.

The phrases used to express the nature of things permit many variations:

A. TWO STATEMENTS. – *Sabbe sankhārā aniccā, sabbe dhammā anattā:* cf. Saṃyutta, III, p. 132, l. 26; 133, l. 1 and 31; 134, l. 3.

B. THREE STATEMENTS. - *Sabbe sankhāra aniccā*, *sabbe sankhāra dukkhā*, *sabbe dhammā anattā*: cf. Anguttara, I, p.286, l. 8, 14 and 20.

The postcanonical Pāli sources call Tilakkhaṇa 'Three Natures' impermanence, suffering and non-self mentioned in this phrase: cf. Comm. on Jātaka, I, p. 48, l. 28; 275, l. 23; III, p. 377, l. 5.

- C. THREE STATEMENTS. *Sarvasaṃskārā anityāḥ, sarvadharmā anātmānāḥ, śāntaṃ nirvāṇam*: cf. Saṃyukta, T 99, k. 10, p. 66b14; 66c7 and 21; Vibhḥaṣā, T 1545, k. 9, p. 45a21; Northern Mahāparinirvāṇa, T 374, k. 13, p. 443a2-3.
- D. The same statements, but with the name *Sa fa yin* 'Three Dharmamudrās'. *Sarvasaṃskārā anityāḥ, sarvadharmā anātmanaḥ, śāntaṃ nirvāṇam*: cf. Mūlasarv. Vin., T 1442, k. 9, p. 670c2-3; Satyasiddhiśāstra, T 1646, k. 1, p. 243c17-18; Lien houa mien king, T 386, k. 2, p. 1077a23-24 and 26-27; Mahāyānāvatāra, T 1634, k. 1, p. 38c23.

As we have seen at the beginning of this note, this is the formula adopted by the *Traité*.

E. FOUR STATEMENTS, entitled *Sseu fa pen* or *Sseu fa pen mo* 'Fourfold beginning and end of dharmas' which may be reconstructed in Sanskrit as *Dharmapūrvāparānta*: *Sarvasaṃskārā anityāh*,

Question. – What are the seals of the Buddha's Dharma?

Answer. – There are three kinds of seals of the Buddha's Dharma: *i*) All conditioned dharmas (*saṃskṛtadharma*) arising and perishing from moment to moment are impermanent (*anitya*); *ii*) All dharmas are without self (*anātman*); [222b] *iii*) Peaceful is nirvāṇa (*śāntaṃ nirvāṇam*).

- [1. Sarvasaṃskārā anityāḥ]. The yogin knows that the threefold world (traidhātu) is entirely composed of arisings and ceasings governed by causes (saṃskṛtā utpādanirodhāh). The formations (saṃskāra) that previously existed no longer exist; those that exist now will not exist later. These instantaneous arisings and cessations (kṣaṇikā utpādanirodhāḥ) coming forth like a series (saṃtānasādṛṣya) may be seen and cognized in the way that one cognizes and sees a series of similar [moments] (sadṛṣasaṃtāna) in the water of a river (nadījala), the flame of a lamp (dīpajvāla) or a storm. This is why people consider them to be a living being (sattva) and, by a mistake consisting of taking what is impermanent to be permanent (anitye iti viparyāsaḥ), people speak about a changeable (gantṛ) [entity] lasting forever. That is the seal confirming the impermanence of all formations (saṃkārānityatā).
- [2. Sarvadharmā anātmānaḥ]. All dharmas are without self. In dharmas there is neither lord (īśvara, svāmin), nor agent (kāraka), knower (jānaka), seeing subject (paśyaka), living object (jīva), or doer of actions. All dharmas depend on causes and conditions (hetupratyayāpekṣa); depending on causes and conditions, they are not autonomous (svatantra); since they are not autonomous, they are not self, and the nature of self is non-existent (ātmalakṣaṇaṃ nopalabhyate), as is said in the P'o-wo-p'in

sarvasaṃskārā duḥkhāḥ, sarvasaṃskārā anātmānāḥ, śāntaṃ nirvāṇam:: cf. Ekottara, T 125, k. 18, p. 640b13-18; k. 36, p. 749a7-11.

This formula is evidently faulty for it is not just the *saṃskāras* but also all dharmas that are *anātman*.

F. FOUR STATEMENTS. – Sarvasaṃskārā anityāḥ, sarvasaṃskārā duḥkhāḥ, sarvadharmā anātmānāḥ, śāntaṃ nirvāṇam (cf. Sūtrālaṃkāra, p. 149, l. 1-3), or the variant Anityāḥ sarvasaṃskārāḥ, duḥkhāḥ sarvasaṃskārāḥ, anātmānaḥ sarvadharmāḥ, śāntaṃ nirvāṇam (cf. Bodh. bhūmi, p. 277, l. 5-10).

These four statements are variously named:

- 1) Sseu fa pen 'Fourfold root of dharmas': cf. Ekottara, T 35, k. 23, p. 668c3-8;
- 2) Fourold *dharmamudrā*: cf. Tathāgataguhyasūtra, T 312, k. 17, p. 741b7-12; Bodhisattvapiṭaka, T 316, k. 7, p. 794c21-24.
- 3) Fourfold *dharmoddāna* 'Summary of dharmas' (in Chinese, *Sseu fa yeou t'o na*): cf. Vimalakīrtinirdeśa, T 476, k. 6, p. 586c14; Sūtrālaṃkāra, p. 17, l. 3; 55, l. 6; 73, l. 22; Bodh. bhūmi, p. 277, l. 5 (T 1579, k. 46, p. 544a6).
- G. FIVE STATEMENTS. Anityāḥ sarvasaṃskārāḥ, duḥkhāḥ sarvasaṃskārāḥ, śūnyāḥ sarvadharmām anātmānah sarvadharmāh, śāntam nirvānam: cf. Vimalakīrti, p. 165.
- H. TEN STATEMENTS. *Che fa-yin* 'The ten dharmamudrās': cf. Avataṃsaka, T 279, k, 41, p. 218a6-15.
- This is fully explained in Kośa, IX, p. 279-281.

(Ātmapratiṣedhaprahraṇa) 'Chapter on the refutation of the self'. This is the seal of non-self  $(an\bar{a}tmamudr\bar{a})$ .

<sup>390</sup> Tenth chapter (*prakaraṇa*) of the Catuḥśataka 'The Four Hundreds' by Āryadeva. As its name indicates, this work consisted of 400 stanzas (*kārikā*) divided up into 16 chapters of 25 stanzas each.

The work exists completely only in Tibetan translation:

1) Bstan bcos b€i brgya pa €es baḥi leḥur byas pa (Catuḥśatakaśāstrakārikā), translated by Sūkṣmajāna in India and revised by Sūryakīrti of the Pa-tshab: cf. Tib. Trip., vol. 95, no. 5246, p. 131-1-1 to 139-5-3.

2) Byan chub sems dpaḥi ḥbyor spyod b€i paḥi rgya cher ḥgrel pa (Bodhisattvayogacaryācatuḥśatakaṭīkā), commentary by Candrakīrti, also translated by Sūkṣmajāna and Sūryakīrti: cf. Tib. Trip., vol. 98, no. 5266, p. 183-4-4 to end.

Sanskrit fragments of the work have been found and edited by Haraprasad Sastri in Memoirs of the Asiatic Society of Bengal, III, no. 8, 1914, p. 449514. See also P. Vaidya, Études sur Āryadeva et son Catuḥśataka, 1923, p. 69-167; G. Tucci, La versione cinese del Catuḥśaka... confrontata col testa sanscrito e la traduzione tibetana, Rivista degli Studi Orientali, X, 1925, p. 521-567; L. de La Vallée Poussin, Le Nirvāṇa d'après Āryadeva, MCB, I, 1931-32, p.130-135; Vidhushekhara Bhattacarya, The Catuḥśataka of Āryadeva, Chap. VII, Proceedings and Transactions of the 4<sup>th</sup> Oriental Conference, II, 1926, p. 831-871; The Catuḥśataka of Āryadeva, Sanskrit and Tibetan Texts with copious Extracts from the Commentary of Candrakīrti, reconstructed and edited, Part II (Visvabharati Series No. 2, 1931).

The Chinese also translated just the last chapters of the Catuḥśataka:

- 1) *Kouang po louen pen*, T 1570. Translation of kārikā no. 291-400 made by Hiuan-tsang at Ta ts'eu ngen sseu, the 10<sup>th</sup> day of the 6<sup>th</sup> month of the 1<sup>st</sup> *yong-houei* year, i.e., July 13, 650 (cf. K'ai-yuan, T 2154, k. 8, p. 556b21).
- 2) *Ta tch'eng kouang po louen che louen*, T 1571. Translation of the same kārikās with commentary by Dharmapāla, begun on the 27<sup>th</sup> day of the same year, January 20, 651 (cf. K'ai-yuan, T 2154, k. 8, p. 556b22).

The tenth chapter to which the *Traité* refers here is part of the chapter conserved in the three languages. It is dedicated to refutation of the ātman and entitled *Yogācārecatuḥśatake* ātmaśuddhyupāyasamdarśanam nāma daśamam prakaraṇam in the Sanskrit fragments (cf. Vaidya, o.c., p. 89), *Bdag dgag pa bsgom pa pstan pa* (Ātmapratiṣedhabhāvanāsaṃdarśana) in the Tibetan versions (Tib. Trip., vol. 95, no. 5246, p. 137-1-5; vol. 98, no. 5266, p. 241-2-6), *P'o wo p'in* (Ātmapratiṣedhaprakaraṇa) in the Chinese versions (T 1570, k. 1, p. 182c18; T 1571, k. 2, p. 194a27). It is also by the name *P'o wo p'in* that the *Traité* cites it here.

In the Madh. vṛtti on Nāgārjuna's Mūlamadhyamakakārikā, Candrakīrti refers to the Catuḥśataka by Āryadeva in various ways: *Uktam Āryadevena* (p. 16, 199), *Uktam Āryadevapādiḥ* (p. 220, 359, 376), *Uktam Śatake* (p. 173, 351, 372, 378, 396, 505), *Śatakaśāstre* (p. 506), *Śatakaśāstre cāryadevapādair* (p. 552). All these references have been identified by L. de La Vallée Poussin in his edition of the Mūlamadhyamakakārikā with comm. by Candrakīrti, 1903 and foll. This is indeed the Catuḥśataka. But the fact of having omitted the numeral *catuḥ* might lead to confusion because, besides

the Catuḥśataka 'Four Hunderds', Āryadeva also composed a *Śatakaśāstra* 'Treatise in a hundred [kārikās]', totally unknown in the Sanskrit and Tibetan traditions but which was authorized in China in the school of the Three Treatises.

This Śatakaśāstra by Āryadeva, with a commentary by Vasu-bodhisattva, was translated into Chinese by Kumārajīva under the title of Po louen: T 1569. The translation was done at Tch'ang-ngan in the 6<sup>th</sup> hong-che year, i.e., in 404 (cf. Tch'ou, T 2145, k. 2, p. 11a21; Li-tai, T 2134, K. 8, p. 79a5). The work has been fully translated into English by G. Tucci, *Pre-Dinnāga Buddhist Texts on Logic from Chinese Sources* (Gaekwad's Oriental Series, vol. 49), 1929, and partially into French by L. de La Vallée Poussin, *Le Nirvāna d'après Āryadeva*, MCB, I, 1931-2, p. 128-130. Kumārajīva's translation is introduced by a preface T 1569, p. 167c-168a; Tch'ou, T 2145, k. 11, p. 77b-c) by his disciple and collaborator Seng-tchao (384-414): "Eight hundred and some years after the Buddha's nirvāṇa, a great monastic scholar named *T'i-p'o* (Deva) composed a treatise in a hundred stanzas, the Śatakaśāstra. This treatise consisted of twenty chapters (*prakarṇa*) of five stanzas each. It was commented on by *P'o-seou k'ai-che* (Vasu, the bodhisattva), a scholar who was the authority of his time: "What he says cannot be disputed, what he refutes cannot be re-established." Kumārajīva, the Indian śramaṇa, translated the last ten chapters of this treatise (i.e., stanzas 51-100)."

It may be noted that the ten chapters of the Śatakaśāstra translated by Kumārajīva deal with the same subject as the eight chapters of the Catuḥśāstra translated by Hiuan-tsang and often carry the same titles. Thus the second chapter of the Śatakaśāstra, entitled *P'o chen p'in* (T 1569, k. 1, p. 170c11-174b21) correspond to the second chapter of the Catuḥśataka entitled *P'o wo p'in* (T 1570, k. 1, p. 182c18-183b10). But although the subject is the same, the explanation is quite different.

In citing the *P'o wo p'in*, the *Traité* does not refer to a chapter of the Prajñāpāmitā as I [Lamotte] first thought, for no chapter of this name appears in the *Tables Comparatives des versions des Prajñāpāramitā* prepared by Hikata and added to his edition of the Suvikrāntavikrāmipariprcchā. Neither does the *Traité* refer here to a chapter of the Mūlamadhyamakakārikā (or Madhyamaśāstra) of Nāgārjuna, for chapter XVIII which deals with the ātman is entitled 'Examination of the ātman' (*Ātmaparīkṣā* in Sanskrit, *Bdag brtag pa* in Tibetan, *Kouan-wo* in Chinese). The only chapter that enters into consideration here is the *Ātmapratiṣedhaprakaraṇa* of the Catuḥśataka by Āryadeva.

This citation is of importance because it proves that the first Madhyamika authors (Nāgārjuna, Āryadeva, Rāhulabhadra) were known to the author of the *Traité* and consequently the latter is later than them:

- 1) The *Mūlamadhyamakakārikās* (or *Madhyamakaśāstra*) of Nāgārjuna are, with the Prajñāpāramitā, the main source of inspiration for the *Traité*. Sometimes the latter cites entire passages without referring to it by name (e.g., p.1204F seq.), sometimes it gives the title: *Madhyamakaśāstra*; cf. k. 1, p. 64b11 (above, p. 69F); k. 19, p. 198a5 (above p. 1142F); k. 25, p. 245c7-8; k. 38, p. 338b29.
- 2) We have seen that it refers to Āryadeva's *Catuḥśataka* by designating it simply with the title of a chapter, a strange method of reference but to which it is accustomed.
- 3) Above (p. 1060-1065F), it has reproduced in its entirety Rahūlabhadra's *Prajñāpmaramitāstotra*.

Nāgārjuna, Āryadeva and Rāhulabhadra represent the first lineage of Madhyamika scholars. Their biographies are legendary and their dates uncertain. Not content with giving us contradictory information on them, the sources confuse them with the siddhas of the same name who were present at Nalandā several centuries later (see above, Vol, I, p, XIF, notes 8 and 9).

In the introduction to *Vimalakīrti*, p. 70-71, I [Lamotte] have tried to interpret the facts given in the 5<sup>th</sup> century by Kumārajīva, his disciples Seng-tchao and Seng-juoei and his illustrious friend Houei-yuan. It seems indeed that the eminent individuals place Nāgārjuna between 243 and 300 C.E.

The Indians, Chinese and Tibetans agree in making Āryadeva the pupil of Nāgārjuna. Here it will suffice to refer the reader to the note on Āryadeva published in *Ceylon Encyclopedia*, vol. II, p. 109-115. At the beginning of his commentary on the Catuḥśataka, Candrakīrti (c. 600-650 C.E.) tells us: "Āryadeva was born in the island of Siṃhala (Ceylon) and was the son of the king of the land. After having been crown prince, he renounced the world, went to Dakṣina (Dekkan), became a disciple of Nāgārjuna and followed his teachings."

The Ceylonese chronicles of the Dīpavaṃsa (XXII, v. 41 and 50) and the Mahāvaṃsa (XXXVI, v. 29) make mention of a mahāthera Deva who lived in Ceylon at the time of the heresy of the Vetullavāda, i.e., of the Mahāyāna which spead in the island. Deva attracted the good graces of kings Vohārikatissa (260-282 C.E.) and Saṃghatissa (293-297 C.E.). This detail allows us to place Deva in Ceylon in the second half of the 3<sup>rd</sup> century.

From Ceylon, Deva, alias Āryadeva, went to southern India and traveled over the entire continent. In the 7<sup>th</sup> century, Hiuan-tsang found traces of his passage from Śrughna near the sources of the Ganges (Si-yu-ki, T 2087, k. 4, p. 891b) to Prayāga at the junction of the Yamunā and the Ganges (k. 5, p. 897b), at Pāṭaliputra (k. 8, p. 912c), at Dakṣiṇakosala (k. 10, p. 929a-c) and in the land of Cola (k. 10, p. 931b). The meeting between Āryadeva and Nāgārjuna "who was already old and weak" took place at Pāṭaliputra, capital of Magadha. The Ceylonese monk embraced the ideas of the old man and became a convinced Mādhyamikan. His many adventures and his physical traits explain the large number of nicknames that serve to designate him: Kāṇadeva, Nīlanetra, Piṅgalanetra, Piṅgalacakṣus, Karṇatipa, etc. Among his works that he published, apparently after his teacher's death in the first years of the 4<sup>th</sup> century C.E, the Madhyamakaśāstra (T 1564), commentary on the Mūlamadhyamakakārikās of Nāgārjuna, and the 'Hundreds' (*Catuhśataka* and *Śatakaśāstra*), polemical works discussed above.

Rāhulabhadra was certainly associated with the Madhyamaka propaganda from the beginning, but we do not know where to place him exactly.

In a series of fourteen stanzas the original Sanskrit of which was found by G. Tucci and published in *Oriens Extremus*, IX, 1962, p. 49-51, Candrakīrti summarizes the activity of the early Mādhyamikans in the following way:

Spaṣṭaṃ Rāhilabhadrapādasahito Nāgārjuno tanmatam Devedāpy anugamyamānavacanaḥ kālaṃ ciraṃ diṣṭavān / tacchāstrapravivekamiścitadhiyas tḥirthyās vijityākhilāṃs tacchisyā api ṣāsanam munivarasyādiṣṭavantaś ciram // 6// "In the presence of the Venerable Rāhulabhadra, Nāgārjuna, whose words were followed also by Deva, has explained clearly and fully the mind of this [Buddha]. The disciples of this [Nāgārjuna] also, having their opinions determined by examination of the treatise by this [Nāgārjuna] and having vanquished all the heretics, have fully explained the doctrine of the best of Munis, [i.e., the Buddha]."

The term *Rāhulabhadrapādasahita*, in Tibetan, *Sgra gcan ḥdzin ni bzan poḥi* €al sna dan bcas, literally means 'endowed with the feet of Rāhulabhadra', but after a proper name, *pāda* is a title of respect; this is why I [Lamotte] have translated it as in the presence of the 'Venerable' Rāhulabhadra. Nevertheless, *pāda* has other meanings than that of 'feet', mainly that of 'verse, line with a 4-strophe'. Candrakīrti, by a play of words of which the Indians are so fond, perhaps chose the expression to suggest to the minds of his readers the famous 'strophes' of which Rāhulabhadra was the author, namely the twenty strophes of the *Prajñāpāramitāstotra* appearing as the heading to the Sanskrit manuscripts of the Prajñāpāramita (Aṣṭasāhasrikā, ed. R. Mitra; Pañcaviṃśatisāh., ed. N. Dutt; Suvikrātavikrāmin, ed. R. Hikata) and cited fully by the *Traité* (p. 1969-1965F).

In any hypothesis, it seems that to Candrakīrti's eyes Rāhulabhadra was Nāgārjuna's inspiration and preceded him in time.

But the problem is not that simple. Information equally as old in date but coming, it is true, from the Chinese, make Rāhulabhadra a contemporary of Nāgārjuna and a commentator of his works.

Ki tsang (549-623) of the San louen sect says: "The dharmācārya Rāhula was a contemporary of Nāgārjuna and explained the eight negations" (Tchong kouan louan chou, T 1824, k. 3, p. 40c16-17.

Tchan jan (711-782) of the T'ien t'ai sect, mentions four basic works in regard to Nāgārjuna: "There is the commentary of Piṅgalanetra called Madhyamakaśāstra which was translated by Kumārajīva of the Heou Ts'in (T 1564). Secondly, the commentary of Asaṅga called Chouen tchong louen which was translated by Bodhiruci of the Heou Wei (T 1565): there are only two rolls of it. The others have not been published. Thirdly, the commentary of the dharmācārya Rāhula, also called Madhyamakaśāstra; Paramārtha of the Leang translated it but we have only one chapter on the *hetupratyaya*. Fourthly, the commentary of the bodhisattva Bhāviveka, called Prajñāpraīpaśāstra; the Tripiṭaka master Po p'o (Prabhāmitra) of the T'ang translated it (T 1566); it is in sixteen rolls" (Tche kouan fou hing tchouan hong kiue, T 1912, k. 1, p. 140c1-5).

Rāhulabhadra appears here in appropriate place but it is especially his stotras that made him famous. In the words of Mochizuki, *Encyclopaedia*, p. 1953, E. Kawaguchi has brought from Tibet a manuscript of the Saddharmapuṇḍarīka with twenty stanzas of homage written by Rāhulabhadra in honor of this text. Other stanzas attributed to Rāhula or Rāhulabhadra are also cited by Sāramati in his Mahāyānāvatāraśāstra (T 1634, k. 2, p. 48a15 and 48c12) and by Asaṅga in the Chouen tchong louen (T 1565, k. 1, p. 40b18).

Like the other famous Mādhyamikas, Rāhulabhadra was drawn by the Chinese into the cycle of the patriarchs where he occupies the 15<sup>th</sup> or 16<sup>th</sup> place, after Nāgārjuna and Kāṇadeva: cf. Fou fa tsang yin yuan tchouan, T 2058, k. 6, p. 319c14-329a1; Fou tsou t'ong ki, T 2035, k. 5, p. 175b2-17; Fou tsou tai t'ong tsi, T 2036, k. 4, p. 504c8-505b2). He appears again in the lists of siddhas (cf. G. Tucci, *A Sanskrit Biography of the Siddhas and some questions connected with Nāgārjuna*, Jour. and Proc. of the

Question. – How is it that only the conditioned dharmas (saṃskṛtadharma or saṃskāra) are impermanent (anitya) whereas 'all' dharmas are non-self (anātman)?

Answer. – Unconditioned dharmas (asaṃskṛtadharma), being without causes (ahetuka) or conditions (apratyaya), do not arise and do not cease. As they do not arise and do not cease, they are not said to be impermanent.

Furthermore, one cannot produce attachment of mind (*cittābhiniveśa*) or error (*viparyasa*) toward unconditioned dharmas; this is why they are not said to be impermanent (*anitya*) but they can be said to be non-self (*anātman*). People say that the ātman is eternal (*nitya*), universally extended (*vyāpin*) and endowed with knowledge (*jñānin*); this is why [the sūtra] speaks of non-self in regard to 'all' dharmas,.

[3. Śāntaṃ nirvāṇam]. - Peacefulness is nirvāṇa because the fire of the three poisons (*triviṣa*) and the threefold degeneration is destroyed in it. This is the seal of peace (śāntamudrā).

Question. – Why does the seal of peace apply to only one dharma [namely, nirvāṇa] and not to several?

Answer. – In the first seal, it is a matter of the five aggregates (*pañcaskandha*); in the second seal, it is a question of all dharmas, qualified as non-self; in the third seal it is a question of the fruit (*phala*) of the first two, [namely, nirvāṇa]: it is called the seal of peace.

[By saying] that all the formations are impermanent (sarvasaṃskāra anityāḥ), the five outer objects of enjoyment (bāhyakāmaguṇa) considered as belonging to a self (ātmīya) are destroyed. [By saying] that all dharmas are without self (sarvadharmā anātmānaḥ), the inner self (adhyātman) is destroyed. The 'I' and the 'mine' being destroyed, there is śāntam nirvāṇam.

Considering the impermanence of the formations (*saṃskārānityatā*), the yogin experiences disgust (*nirveda*) for the suffering of the world but, while knowing this disgust and this suffering, he remains attached to the view of the svāmin, the sovereign entity "capable", he says, "of having this thought". – This is why there is a second seal of the Dharma (*dharmamudrā*): the yogin knows that all dharmas are without

Asiatic Soc. of Bengal, XXVI, 1930, p. 138-155). In turn, the Tibetan historians introduce him into the Nālandā cycle: Bu-ston (II, p. 123, 135) and make him the teacher of Nāgārjuna, whereas Tāranātha (p. 85-86) gives him as student of and successor to Āryadeva.

It is not impossible that  $N\bar{a}g\bar{a}rjuna$  would have cited him, but death prevented him from referring to the works of his close or distant successors such as  $\bar{A}ryadeva$  or  $R\bar{a}hulabhadra$ . The first was certainly his disciple and the  $S\bar{a}takas$  of which he was the author, while remaining in the lineage of the teacher, show a style and concerns that are quite different.

The *Traité*, which loosely quotes Nāgārjuna's *Mūlamadhyamakārikā*s, Āryadeva's *Śataka*, and Rāhulabhadra's *Stotra*, is not therefore the work of Nāgārjuna but, as has already been suspected by P. Demiéville, "the work of Sarvāstivādin adepts of the Lesser Vehicle converted to the Greater Vehicle of the Mādhyamika school" (JA, 1951, p. 282).

Otherwise, if the chronology presented here is correct, if the activity of  $N\bar{a}g\bar{a}runa$  is placed in the middle of the  $3^{rd}$  century and that of  $\bar{A}ryadeva$  between the end of the  $3^{rd}$  and the beginning of the  $4^{th}$  centuries, the compilation of the *Traité* should cover the first decades of the  $4^{th}$  century of our era

self (sarvadharmā anātmānaḥ). Analyzing the five aggregates (skandha), the twelve bases of consciousness (āyatana), the eighteen elements (dhātu) and the twelve causes (nidāna) inwardly and outwardly (adhyātmabahirdhā) to look for a svāmin, he does not find any. And as the latter does not exist, all dharmas are without self and are inactive. – Recognizing this, the yogin stops his futile proliferation (prapañca) and, having no other refuge (niśraya), he takes refuge only in cessation (nirodha): hence the seal of śāntam nirvānam.

Question. – In the Mahāyāna it is said: "Dharmas do not arise, are not destroyed and have but one single nature (*ekalakṣaṇa*), viz., the absence of nature (*alakṣaṇa*)."<sup>391</sup> Why is it said here that all conditioned dharmas are impermanent and that that is a seal of the Dharma? Are these two teachings not contradictory (*virodha*)? [222c]

Answer. - To consider impermanence ( $anityat\bar{a}$ ) is to consider emptiness ( $ś\bar{u}nyat\bar{a}$ ). If one considers form ( $r\bar{u}pa$ ) as momentary (kṣaṇika) and impermanent (anitya), one knows that it is empty ( $ś\bar{u}nya$ ). The past substance ( $at\bar{u}tam r\bar{u}pam$ ), being destroyed, it is invisible (adrśya) and thus without the nature of substance. The future substance ( $an\bar{a}gatam r\bar{u}pam$ ), not yet being born, is without activity, without function and invisible, thus without the nature of substance. The present substance ( $pratyutpanna r\bar{u}pam$ ) also is without duration, invisible and non-discernible, thus without the nature of substance. Absence of substance is emptiness; emptiness is non-arising and non-cessation. Non-arising ( $anutp\bar{u}da$ ) and non-cessation (anirodha), arising ( $utp\bar{u}da$ ) and cessation (nirodha) are in reality (tattvena) one and the same thing. The explanation can be both developed (vistara) and summarized (samksepa).

Question. – We accept that past and future substances, being invisible, do not have the nature of substance. But present substance is visible as long as it lasts. Why do you say that it does not have the nature of substance?

Answer. – Present substance also does not have any duration (sthiti). As I have said in regard to the four smṛṭyupasthānas (p. 1163F), every dharma, the nature of cessation of which we see after the event (paścat), must clearly possess this nature of cessation from its birth ( $utp\bar{a}da$ ) but, as it is subtle ( $s\bar{u}k\bar{s}ma$ ), we do not recognize it.

[If the duration of conditioned dharmas were a stable duration, there would never be cessation.] Let us suppose there is a man who is wearing sandals ( $p\bar{a}duk\bar{a}$ ): if these were new from the very first day, they would never wear out; afterwards ( $pa\dot{s}cat$ ), they would always be new and there would be no ageing. Having no ageing, they would be eternal (nitya). From the fact of this eternity, there would be no sin ( $\bar{a}patti$ ) and no merit (punya):<sup>392</sup> and, as there would be no more sin or merit, the usual rules of the Buddhist Path ( $m\bar{a}rga$ ) would be overturned ( $vik\bar{s}ipta$ ).

<sup>392</sup> Cf. Madh. vṛtti, p. 324: If action did not exist in itself (*svabhāvata*), it would certainly be eternal because existence in itself is not susceptible to modification. Thus action would never be accomplished. Action is what necessarily requires the activity of a free agent. But [if you presuppose eternity], it is not

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>391</sup> Pañcaviṃśati, p. 164, l. 8-9 (T 223, k. 4, p. 242c2-4; k. 8, p. 278c1-2): *Sarva ete dharmā... ekalaksanā yadutālaksanāh*.

Furthermore, since the natures of arising and cessation (*utpādabhangalakṣaṇa*) always go along with the formations (*saṃskāra*), there is no period of duration. If there were a period of duration, there would be neither arising nor cessation.

This is why present substance has no duration and, in duration, there is no arising or cessation, for duration reduced to a single moment ( $ekakşane\ sthitih$ ) is characteristic of the formations ( $samsk\bar{a}ra$ ).

This is the Dharma 'of unhindered penetration'. This is how the Dharma is to be recollected.

## 7. Other qualities of the Buddhist Dharma

Furthermore, there are two kinds of Dharma: <sup>393</sup> *i*) the Buddha's speech (*buddhavacana*), namely, the Three Baskets (*tripiṭaka*), the twelve-membered Buddha's words (*dvādaśāngabuddhavacana*) and the eighty-four thousand articles of the Dharma (*caturaśīti dharmaskandhasahasrāṇi*); *ii*) the meaning of the Dharma (*dharmārtha*) preached by the Buddha, namely the eightfold noble Path (*āryāṣṭāngamārga*) with [its three elements], discipline (*śīla*), concentration (*samādhi*), wisdom (*prajñā*) and the fruit of deliverance (*vimuktiphala*) of nirvāṇa.

The yogin should first recollect the speech of the Buddha and then recollect the meaning of the Dharma.

1) Recollecting the speech of the Buddha. –

The Buddha's speech is beautiful, marvelous, truthful and of great usefulness. The Buddha's speech is both profound (*gambhīra*) and not very profound; profound because it has in view the true nature (*bhūtalakṣaṇa*); not very profound because it is skillfully formulated. His repetitions are faultless because each has its significance.

The speech of the Buddha rests on four bases and is adorned with four qualities: i) wisdom ( $praj\tilde{n}\tilde{a}$ ), ii) truth (satya), iii) equanimity ( $upeks\tilde{a}$ ), iv) cessation (nirodha).

It is irrefutable because it uses four ways of responding to questions (*praśnavyākaraṇa*):<sup>394</sup> *i*) responding in a categorical way (*ekāmśena vyākaraṇam*), *ii*) responding by distinguishing (*vibhajya vyākaraṇam*), *iii*) responding by means of a question (*pariprcchāvyākaraṇam*), *iv*) responding by not answering (*sthāpanīya vyākaraṇam*).

explained. Why? Because an eternal entity cannot be accomplished (yasmāt kriyate na hi śāśvatam). That which possesses a real existence is 'eternal'. That which is real eludes accomplishment (karaṇa) and consequently does not depend on a cause. Even without having accomplished good or bad action, every person would be rewarded.

<sup>393</sup> See above, p. 1074F seq.

394 See references above, p. 158F, n. 2.

The words of the Buddha are either permissions followed by prohibitions, or prohibitions followed by permissions, or permissions not followed by prohibitions, or prohibitions not followed by permissions. These four methods are in harmony and are not contradictory.

The speech of the Buddha, which has the [true] nature of things, is free of futile proliferation (*prapañca*); being expressed rationally, it suppresses any commentary on existence and non-existence.

The speech of the Buddha is in accord with the absolute (*paramārtha*) and, [223a] even when it speaks about conventional things (*saṃvṛtidharma*), it is faultless, for it is not in contradiction with the twofold truth [absolute truth and conventional truth].

The speech of the Buddha aims at the good (*hita*): to the pure man, it addresses gentle words; to the impure man, harsh words. But whether they are gentle or harsh, they are alike without fault (*nirdoṣa*).

The speech of the Buddha is in accord with the holy Dharma (*saddharmam anuvartate*), but is not attached to it (*saddharma nābhiniviśate*).<sup>395</sup> It is the foe of impure laws but experiences no haughtiness toward them. It criticizes many things but does not blame anything. It praises the Dharma in multiple ways but remains without any support (*apratiṣthāna*).<sup>396</sup>

There is nothing to be added to and nothing to be removed (anūnānadhika) from the speech of the Buddha: whether it is summarized (saṃkṣipta) or developed (vistīrṇa), it is good at the beginning (ādau kalyāna) and good throughout.

The speech of the Buddha is abundant, but the flavor of the meaning (artharasa) is not abated: It attracts people's hearts but does not allow them to get attached (sanga); its sublimities are varied but they inspire no fear in anyone. It has its extensions everywhere but fools ( $b\bar{a}la$ ) cannot understand it.

The speech of the Buddha has different extraordinary (*adbhuta*) effects; it can make men's hair stand on end (*romaharṣa*) so that they sweat, become breathless and are terrified; it can also make the gods become angry so that their cries fill the ten directions and they shake the earth in six ways. It can make people attached to the world forever to leave it and others who are not attached to it, rejoice.

Wrong-doers who hear the speech of the Buddha become sad and tormented by their wrong-doings; good people, mindful (*smṛtimat*) and energetic (ātāpin), enter the Path. For those who hear it, it is as if they were tasting ambrosia (*amṛtarasa*), 'good at the beginning, good in the middle and good at the end' (ādau kalyāna, madhye kalyāna, paryayasāne kalyāna).

Furthermore, in the great assemblies, each person wants to hear something, and the Buddha answers him with a single sound (*ekasvareṇa*).<sup>397</sup> Each makes sense out of it and each thinks the Buddha has spoken for

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>395</sup> Cf. the *Kolopamasūtra* cited above, p. 64F, n. 1 to which the *Traité* will return later (k. 31, p. 290c22, 295b29; k, 85, p. 657a2.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>396</sup> On the Dharma without any support, see *Vimalakīrti*, p. 270-271; Śūraṃgamasamādhi, p. 187-188.

A belief characteristic of Indian Buddhism that has its extension into China. The subject has been masterfully explained by P. Demiéville in Hobogirin (Butsugo, p. 207-209; Button, p. 215-217). The *Traité* makes only a brief allusion to it here, but will return to it later (k. 30, p. 284a-b).

him alone.<sup>398</sup> In the great assemblies, whether the listener is far or near, the sound reaches him with the same intensity; it fills the *trisāhasramahāsāhasralokadhātu* and reaches innumerable universe in the ten directions. The beings who are to be converted (*vainryasattva*) hear it, those who are not to be converted do not hear it. It is as if a thunderbolt (*aśani*) struck the earth: the deaf (*badhira*) do not hear it but those who hear it understand what it is.

The Buddha preached the Dharma in various ways (cf. *Vimalakīrti*, p. 109-110) and notably by a single sound (*ekasvareṇa*) or by vocal emission in a single moment (*ekakṣaṇavāgudāhāreṇa*). This sound expresses the Dharma in its entirety, reaches all the universes of the ten directions, rejoices the minds of all beings and destroys the negative emotions. Each hearer, according to his level and capability, understands it and believes that the Buddha preached it for him alone.

The doctrine of the single sound was already formulated in some sects of the Lesser Vehicle. The Vibhajyavādins produced a stanza of praise of the Buddha (*tsan fo song*) cited in the Vibhāṣā (T 1545, p. 410a16; T 1546, k. 41, 306c24; T 1547, k. 9, p. 482c16): "The Buddha uses a single sound to enunciate the Dharma and then beings, each according to his category, understand it. All say: The Bhagavat uses the same language as I do, that is why he enunciates a certain meaning for me alone." – For the Mahāsāṃghikas as well, the Buddha enunciates all dharmas by means of a single sound (cf. Bareau, *Sectes*, p. 58, thesis 4).

But the Sarvāstivādins (Bareau, ibid., p. 145, thesis 54) rejected this doctrine and the Vibhāṣā (T 1545, k. 79, p. 410b25) comments that the previously cited stanza does not belong to the Tripiṭaka and gives (p. 410c8-9) a toned-down interpretation of it: "Even though the sounds of the Buddha are numerous and varied, they are equally useful, and that is why they are said to be one single sound."

The Mahāyānasūtras enthusiastically adopted the doctrine of one single sound.

The Prajñāpāramitā considers the single sound to be a secondary characteristic of the 18<sup>th</sup> lakṣaṇa, 'the brahmic voice', and places it in its list of *anuvyañjanas*: cf. Pañcaviṃśati, T 223, k. 24, p. 396b5; T 220, vol. VI, k. 381, p. 968c26-27; Cheng t'ien wang, T 231, k. 7, p. 723c1; Jen wang jou kouo, T 246, k. 2, p. 842c29

Avataṃsaka, T 278, k. 60, p. 787a27; T 279, k. 30, p. 164b18-19; k. 34, p. 182b4-5; k. 52, p. 275c23-24; k. 73, p. 401a11; k. 80, p. 443c28; Daśabhūmika, p. 79, l. 27-29; Bhadradarīpraṇidhāna, v. 30 (= T 293, k. 39, p. 843b11).

Ratnakuṭa, T 310, k. 62, p. 361b8-10; K. 100, p. 593b18; k. 102, p. 573b17-18; Bodhisattvapiṭaka, T 316, k. 16, p. 819a2. In the same collection, Pitāputrasamāgama, T 320, k. 3, p. 928a8-15: "Each one sees the Buddha face-to-face, that is an exclusive quality (āveṇikaguṇa) difficult to conceive. The pure Dharma is preached by a single sound, sometimes fully, sometimes abbreviated, and each one according to his mental aspirations, understands it...; each according to his destiny and his category makes sense of it..."

Sukhāvatīvūha, T 364, k. 2, p. 333b12-21.

Great Parinirvāṇa, T 374, k. 10, p. 423c10-14; T 375, k. 9, p. 665a2.

Vimalkakīrti, p. 108-110; 342.

398 Allusion to the passage of the Pañcavimsati commented on above, p. 525F.

These are the various ways of recollecting the speech of the Buddha.

2) Recollection of the meaning of the Dharma.

What is the meaning of the Dharma (*dharmārtha*)? It is faith (*śraddhā*), morality (*śīla*), generosity (*tyāga*), learning (*śruta*), concentration (*samādhi*) and wisdom (*prajñā*) constituting the Path, all the good dharmas, and also the three seals of the Dharma (*dharmamudrā*) already discussed above (p. 1368F) in regard to penetration (*prativedha*): "All conditioned dharmas are impermanent; all dharmas are without self; peaceful is nirvāṇa." This is the meaning of the Buddha's Dharma.

These three seals cannot be attacked by any scholar (upadeśacarya) and, no matter how many the tirades, no one can transform this nature of things (dharmata), not even if one transforms cold (śata) into heat (usna).

The nature of things (*dharmatā*) is irrefutable. And, supposing that one could harm space ( $\bar{a}k\bar{a}\dot{s}a$ ), these seals of the Dharma cannot be assailed. The saint ( $\bar{a}rya$ ) who knows this threefold nature of dharmas eludes controversial [223b] subjects ( $viv\bar{a}dasth\bar{a}na$ ) that all rest on wrong views ( $mithy\bar{a}drsti$ ). In the same way, the person endowed with sight (caksusmat), seeing blind men (andha) arguing about various colors, has pity on them and smiles but does not argue with them.

Question. – In the system of the śrāvakas, the Buddha spoke about four truths, [the four noble Truths]; in the Mahāyāna, there is only one truth, [absence of nature]. Why now speak of three truths, [the three seals of the Dharma]?

Answer. – The Buddha spoke of three realities (tattva), the seals of the Dharma ( $dharmamudr\bar{a}$ ), but when one understands them, they make four, and when one summarizes them, they make one:

- a. Impermanence (anitya) is the account of the truth of suffering (duḥkhasatya), the truth of the origin (samudayasatya) and the truth of the Path (pratipatsatya).
- b. Non-self (anātman) is the account valid for every dharma.
- c. Peace-nirvāna (śantam nirvānam) is the truth of the cessation of suffering (nirodhasatya).

Furthermore, conditioned dharmas are impermanent because they arise and perish from moment to moment. Depending on causes and conditions (hetupratyayāpekṣa), they have no independence (asvatantra). Being without autonomy, they are non-self (anātman). Since they are impermanent, non-self and without nature (alakṣaṇa), the mind does not become attached to them. As there is no nature or attachment, there is śāntaṃ nirvāṇam. Thus, although it is said in the Mahāyāna that "dharmas do not arise, do not perish and have but a single nature, namely, the absence of nature" dlakṣaṇa) is precisely Śāntaṃ nirvāṇam. It is the object of the concentration recollecting the Dharma (dharmanusmṛtisamādhi), the object of knowledge (jñānālaṃbana) that exhausts all the qualities of the bodhisattvas and pratyekabuddhas.

\_

<sup>399</sup> See above, p. 1376F, n. 1.

Question. Why does the recollection of the Buddha (buddhānusmṛti) have as object (ālambate) only the qualities of aśaikṣa present in the Buddha's body? Why does the concentration of the recollection of the Community (saṃghānusmṛtisamādhi) have as object the dharmas of the śaikṣa and aśaikṣa present in the bodies of the Buddha's disciples (buddhaśrāvaka)? And why are all the other good pure dharmas (kuśalānāsravadharma) the object (ālambana) of the concentration on the recollection of the Dharma (dharmānusmṛtisamādhi)? 400

Answer. – It was *Kia-tchen-yen-ni-tseu* (Kātyāyanīputra) who said that, but [we others], the Mahāyānists, say this:

- i) The object of *buddhānusmṛtisamādhi* is the qualities (*guṇa*) and magical powers (*ṛddhibala*) used by the Buddhas of the three times and the ten directions, and all the Buddhas in general during the perod from their first production of the mind of bodhi (*prathamacittotpāda*) until the disappearance of their holy Dharma (*dharmavipralopa*).
- ii) The object of dharmānusmṛtisamādhi is: a. the words of the Buddha (buddhavacana); b. the meaning of the Dharma (dharmārtha) preached by the Buddha. [The words of the Buddha] form a single metre (pāda), a single stanza (gāthā) up to the eighty-four thousand articles of the Dharma (caturśīti dharmaskandhasahasrāṇi). [The meaning of the Dharma preached by the Buddha] is the good dharmas (kuśaladharma), faith (śraddhā), morality (śīla), generosity (tyāga), study (śruta), concentration (samadhi), wisdom (prajñā), etc., up to and including nirvāna-without-residue (nirupādiśeṣanirvāṇa).
- *iii*) The object of *saṃghānusmṛtisamādhi* is the Community of bodhisattvas, pratyekabuddhas and śrāvakas, the Communities and qualities (*guṇa*) of all the other saints (*ārya*) excluding the Buddha.<sup>401</sup>

#### III. RECOLLECTION OF THE COMMUNITY

The objector puts forth here the Sarvāstivādin-Vaibhāṣika theories on the threefold taking of refuge. One takes refuge in the dharmas of the aśaikṣa or the arhat which constitute a Buddha and not in the material body ( $r\bar{u}pak\bar{a}ya$ ) of the Buddha which remains that of a bodhisattva. One takes refuge in all the Buddhas and not in one single Buddha. One takes refuge in the dharmas of the śaikṣa and the aśaikṣa which constitute the Saṃgha, the latter including among its members non-arhats and arhats. One takes refuge in the Dharma, i.e., in pratisaṃkhyānirodha or nirvāṇa. These theories are explained in Vibhāṣā. T 1545, k. 34, p. 177a seq.; Kośa, IV, p. 76-79; Nyāyānusāra, T 1562, k. 38, p. 555c seq.; Abhidharmadīpa, p. 125-127.

Kośakārikā, IV, v. 32 says: Buddhasaṃghakarān dharmān aśaikṣān ubhayāṃś ca saḥ / nirvāṇam caiti śaraṇaṃ yo yāti karaṇatrayam:

"He who takes the triple refuge takes refuge in the dharmas of the aśaikṣa which make up the Buddhas, in the dharmas of the two kinds [dharma of the aśaikṣa and of the śaikṣa] which make up the Saṃgha, and in nirvāna."

<sup>401</sup> The Buddha does not appear in the recollection of the Samgha because he is recollected separately.

Recollection of the Community (samgānusmṛti). — "The Community of disciples of the Buddha (śrāvakasamgha) is completely endowed with the discipline element (śīlaskandhasampanna), is completely endowed with the concentration element (samādhiskandha), the wisdom element (prajñāskandha), the deliverance element (vimuktiskandha), and the 'knowledge and vision of deliverance' element (vimuktijñānadarśanaskandha). It includes the four pairs of individuals (catvāri puruṣayugāni) or the eight individuals (aṣṭau puruṣapudgalāḥ). It is worthy of alms (dakṣīṇēya), worthy of homage (pūjanēya), worthy of veneration (arcinēya). It is the supreme field of merit for the world (anuttaraṃ puṇyakustraṃ lokasya)."

The yogin should recollect the Community celebrated by the Buddha in these words and meditate on the qualities (*guṇa*) of the śrāvakasṃgha, the pratyekabuddhasaṃgha and the bodhisattvasaṃgha making up the Holy Community (*āryasaṃgha*).

## 1. Community endowed with the five pure skandhas

The perfection of these five elements (skandhasampad) has already been discussed above (p. 1349F).

Question. – These five elements have already been used to praise the Buddha. Why use them again here to praise the Community? [223c]

Answer. – Here the praise of this perfection is about the five pure elements (*anāsravaskandha*) insofar as they are possessed by the disciples.

The perfection is of two kinds: i) real perfection ( $bh\bar{u}tasampad$ ); ii) nominal perfection ( $n\bar{a}masampad$ ). If one praises the perfection to be obtained or already obtained by the disciples of the Buddha,  $^{403}$  this is nominal perfection. If one has in mind the perfection of the Buddha, this is real perfection.

Furthermore, here the praise [of the Community of disciples] is made in order to distinguish it from the heretic (*tīrthika*) communities, wandering monks (*pravrajita*) and lay people (*grhastha*).

The communities of heretics and lay people boast of their prosperity, their nobility or their power. The communities of wandering monks boast about their wrong views (*mithyādṛṣṭi*), their asceticism (*duṣkacaryā*), their ties (*saṅga*), their wisdom (*prajñā*), their teachings (*upadeśa*) and their critics (*vivāda*). Here, in recollecting the community of monks, speaking about discipline (*śīla*), concentration (*samādhi*) and wisdom (*prajñā*) would not be enough. This is why the Buddha himself celebrates all the qualities (*guṇa*) of the śrāvakasaṃgha, its origins (*maula*), its establishment (*āvastha*), the perfection of its discipline (*śīlaskandhasaṃpad*) and so on up to the perfection in knowledge and vision of deliverance (*vimuktijñānadarśanaskandhasaṃpad*).

1132

<sup>402</sup> These five anāsrvaskandhas are not mentioned in the canonical formulation of the saṃghānusmṛti.

<sup>403</sup> The Samgha actually includes both śaikṣas and aśaikṣas in its ranks.

Based on the discipline element (śīlaskandhāśrita), the Saṃgha is unshakeable (acala). – It bends the bow of concentration (samādhidhanus). – It lets fly the arrow of wisdom (prajñeṣu). – It destroys the enemies, the disturbing emotions (kleśāmitra) and obtains deliverance (vimukti). – It produces knowledge (jñāna) and vision (darśana) in regard to this deliverance.

In the same way, a strong man (*balavān puruṣaḥ*) first makes his feet steady, bends his bow, lets fly the arrow and destroys his enemy. He frees himself thus from a twofold fear: he avoids offending the king and he escapes from the dangers of battle. Knowing and seeing precisely that his enemies have been destroyed, he experiences joy (*muditā*).

This is why we use the five [pure] elements to praise the Community.

#### 2. Community worthy of offerings, etc.

The Community is 'worthy of offerings' (*dakṣiṇīya*) thanks to the perfection of the qualities (*guṇasaṃpad*) represented by these five [pure] elements.

Just as a rich, noble and powerful person is extolled by the people, so the Community of the disciples of the Buddha, who hold the power of discipline (śīla), concentration (samādhi), wisdom (prajñā) wealth (ādhyatā), 404 deliverance (vimukti), knowledge and vision of deliverance (vimuktijñānadarśana), this Community, I say, is 'worthy of offerings' (dakṣiṇīya), 'worthy of homage' (pūjanīya), 'worthy of salutation' (añjalikaraṇīya), 'worthy of veneration' (arcanīya).

#### 3. Community, the best field of merit

The Community is 'the best field of merit for the world' (anuttaram punyaksetram lokasya).

There are two types of patrons (dānapati): the poor (daridra) and the rich (āḍhya). The poor dānapati is rewarded for his homage (vandana), his signs of respect (satkāra) and his eagerness (pratyutdgamana) toward the Community. The rich dānapati is rewarded, not only for his homage, his signs of respect and his eagerness toward the Community, but also for his gifts in kind (āmiṣadāna). This is why he Community is 'the best field of merit of the world."

Worked, plowed, planted at the proper time, watered and freely irrigated, a good field (*sukṣetra*) necessarily gives an abundant crop. It is the same for this field of merit, the Community. The plow of wisdom (*prajñāhala*) is used to plow up the roots of the fetters (*saṃyojanamūla*); the four immeasurables (*apramāṇacitta*) are taken to break it up and soften it; the *dāṇapati* sows the seeds of faith (*śraddhā*) and of generosity (*dāṇa*); he waters it with the water of the recollection of generosity (*tyāgānusmṛti*), respect

\_

<sup>404</sup> This mention of wealth is completely misplaced.

(satkāra) and pure mind (viśuddhacitta). In the present lifetime (ihajanma) or in the next lifetime (parajanamani), he obtains an immense worldly happiness (apramāṇalaukikasikha) and obtains the fruits of the three Vehicles (yānatrayaphala).

[Avadāna of Bakkula]. – Thus, at the time of the Buddha Pi-p'o-che (Vipaśyin), the bhikṣu Po-kiu-lo (Bakkula) offered a a-li-lö (harītakī) fruit to the Community. For ninety-one kalpas he enjoyed happiness among gods and men. He was never sick. And today, having met the Buddha Śākyamuni, he went forth from [224a] home (pravrajita), destroyed his impurities (kṣṇṇāsrava) and became arhat.<sup>405</sup>

Anavataptagāthḥa, ed. Bechert, p. 144-145; tr. Hofinger, p. 227-229; Fo wou po ti tseu, T 199,p. 194b16-c11; Mūlasarv. Vin., *Gilgit Man.*, III, part 1, p. 192-193, and T 1448, k. 17, p. 82c5-28: *Bandumatyām rājadhyānyām gāndhiko 'hām ... glānam abhijnanāmi tāvatkālikam apy aham*. Transl. — In the capital of Bandhumatī, I was once the owner of a hardware shop and, at the time of Vipaśyin, I invited the community of monks. During the Rains, the Community was invited, but nobody asked anything of me, except for one monk who begged for a single myrobalan (*harītaki*). For ninety-one kalpas, I had not a single bad destiny. See how useful was the reward for this gift of medicine! I have enjoyed much happiness for having done this small meritorious action. Having given this single myrobalan, I rejoiced for a long time in the heavens. Then, by virtue of the residue of my action, I have obtained a human birth, and I do not remember having accepted, while I was śaikṣa, the least offering in the kingdom. My life-span [was one hundred and sixty years] during that existence and, in all that time, I do not remember having suffered any illness.

The *Traité* will return later to this bhikşu: cf. k. 24, p. 238a5; k. 29, p. 271b18; k. 38, p. 341c3. This is a well-known monk called *Bakkula*, *Vakula* and *Vākula* in Sanskrit; *Bakkula*, *Bākula* and *Vakkula* in Pāli. The name means 'Two families' (*dvakkula*, *dvikkula*): actually, during his last lifetime, Bakkula had taken birth in a wealthy family in Kauśambī, but when his nurse was bathing him in the Yamunā, he was swallowed by a físh. The animal was sold to the wife of a merchant in Benares and when she opened the fish, she found the baby alive. She wanted to adopt him but the true parents of the child reclaimed him. The king cut through the dispute by declaring that the child henceforth belonged to the 'two families'. At the age of eighty, Bakkula met the Buddha, entered into the monastic order and, after seven days, attained the state of arhat. He lived for eighty more years, clothed in rags and tatters, declining any offering of food and refusing to preach even a stanza of two *pādas*. The Buddha designated him as the foremost of those free of sickness and with few desires. After his death, a stūpa was built for him. Later, during his well-known pilgrimage of holy places, the emperor Aśoka, contrary to his well-known generosity, placed a single piece of gold on the funerary monument of the arhat, but the latter had had so little desire that the protector spirit of the stūpa refused the gold piece.

The sources on Bakkula are very numerous, and here are the main ones:

Pāli sources. – Majjhima, III, p. 124-128; Anguttara, I, p. 25; Theragāthā, p. 29; Apadāna, p. 28-330; Commentaries on the Majjhima, IV, p. 190-197; on the Anguttara,I, p. 304-310; on the Theragāthā, p. 87; on the Apadāna, p. 481-483; Milinda, p. 215-217.

[Avadāna of Koṭīviṃśa]. – Thus, at the time of the Buddha Vipaśyin, the śramaṇa Eul-che-yi (Koṭīviṃśa) built a house (layana), covered the floor with rugs (dūṣya) and offered it to the Community. For ninety-one kalpas he enjoyed happiness among the gods and among men. His feet did not tread on the ground. When he was born, on the soles of his feet (pādatala) he had hair two inches long, soft and fine (romāṇi dvyaṅgulāni mṛdusaṃsparśāni śubhāni). Seeing this, his father rejoiced and gave him twenty koṭi ounces of gold. Koṭīviṃśa saw the Buddha, heard the Dharma and became arhat. Of the disciples, he was foremost in exertion (ārabdhavīṛyānām agṛyah).

Sanskrit sources. – Mahākarmavibhanga, p. 75 (where Bakkula is given as the son of Dharmayaśas, king of Kaśmir); Divyāvadāna, p. 396.

Chinese sources. – Hien yu king, T 202, k. 5, p. 385b5-386a4; Vibhāṣā, T 1545, K. 181, p. 906c-907a; Fen pie kong tö louen, T 1507, k. 4, p. 45c17-46a28; Tchouwei mo kie king, T 1775, k. 3, p. 359b10; King liu yi siang, T 2121, k. 37, p. 201a1-9 (transl. Chavannes, *Contes*, III, p. 229-230). 406 Cf. Anavataptagāthā, ed. Bechert, p. 116-127; tr, Hofinger, p. 207-210; Fo wou po ti rseu, T 199, p. 191c24-192a16; Mūlasarv. Vin., *Gilgit Man.*, III, part ip. 181-182, and T 1448, k. 19, p. 80a1-26; Pāli Apadāna, p. 2898, copied closely from the Sanskrit stanzas (cf. Hofinger, l.c., p. 208 as note): *Cāturdiśasya saṃdhasya mayaikaṃ layanaṃ krtam ... arhattvaṃ ca mayā prāptaṃ śūtībhūto 'smi nirvrtah*.

Transl. – I built a single house for the community in the capitalof Bandhumati, at the time of Vipaśyin. I spread out scattered carpets over the floor of this house and then, with joyous mind and happy spirit, I uttered the following vow: May I serve the perfect Buddha and receive ordination! May I reach nirvāṇa, supremely peaceful and unageing! By virtue of this merit, I have transmigrated for ninety-one kalpas; as god or as man, by the strength of my merit, I was well known. Then, thanks to the residue of my action, in the course of my last lifetime I was born at Campā, the only son of a high nobleman. When he learned of my birth, my father uttered the following: "I will give this child a fortune of twenty koṭis." On the soles of my feet I had hair four inches long, fine, soft to touch, beautiful, like cotton-down. For the ninety-one kalpas that passed, I do not remember having set my bare foot on the ground. I have served the Leader of the caravan, the perfect supreme Buddha. I have attained arhathood; I am cool and at peace.

The *Traité* will return three times (k. 26, p. 253b8-9; k. 29, p. 271b20-21; k. 32, p. 301b13) to this śramaṇa Koṭiviṃśa, whose full name was Śroṇa-koṭī-viṃśa, in Pāli Soṇa-kolivīsa. He came from a rich family in Campā, capital of Bengal. Summoned to Rājagṛha by king Bimbasāra, he met the Buddha there and having heard the preaching of the Teacher, he asked for and received ordination as a monk. He retreated to the Sītavana to meditate but did not succeed in concentrating himself. Restless and tormented, he walked to and for so long and so hard that the especially tender soles of his feet became lacerated and bled profusely. The Buddha came to find him and preached the *Vīnūpamovādasūtra* to teach him to moderate his ardor and temper his exertion. On this occasion he authorized Koṭiviṃśa to wear furred boots and soon extended this favor to all the bhikṣus. This anecdote is told in all the Vinayas: Pāli Vin, I, p. 179-185 (cf. Anguttara, III, p. 374-379); Mahīśāsaka Vin. T 1421, k. 21, p.

Since gifts as small [as those of Bakkula and Koṭīviṃśa] produce such great fruits of retribution (*vipākaphala*), [the Community] is called 'the best field of merit for the world'.

### 4. Community consisting of four pairs and eight classes of individuals

"In the Community, there are four pairs of individuals (*catvāri puruṣayugāni*) or eight classes of individuals (*aṣṭāu puruṣapudgalāḥ*)."<sup>407</sup>

145a13-146b15; mahāsāmghika Vin., T 1425, k. 31, p. 481a2- 182a1; Dharmagupta Vin., T 1428, k. 38, p. 843b12-145a25; Sarv. Vin., T 1435, k. 25, p. 183a15-b3; Mūlasarv. Vin., T 1447, k. 2, p. 1055c14-1056a15; T 1450, k. 16, p. 184b25-187c20.

The Buddha proclaimed Koṭīviṃśa the foremost of those who practice exertion (Anguttara, I, p. 24). According to the Si yu ki (T 2087, k. 11, p. 934c-935a), this śramaṇa made a statue of Maitreya in sandalwood, worked miracles and conversions in Koṅkan where Aśoka dedicated a stupa to him.

Śroṇa-koṭi-viṃśa should not be confused with the arhat Śroṇa Koṭīkarṇa, in Pāli Soṇa Koṭikaṇṇa, the foremost of the fine orators (aggaṃ kalyāṇavākkaraṇānaṃ), disciple of Mahākātyāyana and apostle of Avanti.

407 In contrast to the *pṛthagjana* 'the worldly', the  $\bar{a}ryas$  who have entered onto the Path and who make up the holy Community, are arranged into various groups:

A. TWO GROUPS: the śaikṣa 'those who are still in training' and the aśaikṣa 'those who no longer train', i.e., the arhat 'saints'.

- B. EIGHT GROUPS OF INDIVIDUALS (aṣṭāu puruṣapudgalāḥ), namely:
- 1. Prathamaphalapratipannaka, candidate for the first fruit of the religious life.
- 2. Srotaāpanna.
- 3. Dvitīyaphalapratipannaka, candidate for the second fruit.
- 4. Sakṛdāgamin.
- 5. *Tṛtīyaphalapratipannaka*, candidate for the third fruit.
- 6. Anāgamin.
- 7. Arhattvaphalapratipannaka, candidate for the fruit of arhat.
- 8. Arhat.
- C. FOUR PAIRS OF INDIVIDUALS (*catvāri puruṣayugāni*) formed by the eight preceding groups taken in pairs.
- D. TWENTY-SEVEN INDIVIDUALS, made up of eighteen types of śaikṣa (aṣtādaśa śaikṣāḥ) and nine types of aśaikṣa (navāśaikṣāḥ).

The eighteen types of śaikṣa are:

- 1. Prathamaphalapratipanna, candidate for the first fruit.
- 2. Srotaāpanna.
- 3. Dvitīyaphalapratipanna, candidate for the second fruit.

- 4. Sakṛdāgamin.
- 5. Tritīyaphalapratipanna.
- 6. Anāgamin.
- 7. Arhattvaphalapratipanna, candidate for the fruit of arhat.
- 8. Śraddhānusārin, pursuing [the truth] because of faith.
- 9. *Dharmānusārin*, pursuing [the truth] by means of dharmas, i.e., the twelve-membered Scripture.
  - 10. Śraddhādhimukta, convinced by faith.
  - 11. *Dṛṣṭiprapta*, in possession of the speculative view.
- 12. *Kulaṃkula* (Pāli: *kolaṅkola*), passing from family to family [among gods and men and attaining nirvāṇa after two or three rebirths].
- 13. *Ekavīcika* (in Pāli *ekabījin*; in Chinese *yi tchong* for Kuārajīva, *yi kien* for Hiuan-tsang), separated from nirvāṇa [by one rebirth].
  - 14. Antarāparinirvāyin, [anāgāmin obtaining] nirvāņa in the intermediate existence.
  - 15. *Upapadyaprinirvāyin*, [anāgāmin obtaining] nirvāṇa as soon as he is reborn.
  - 16. Sābhisaṃskāraparinirvāyin, [anāgāmin obtaining] nirvāna with effort.
  - 17. Anabhisaṃskāraparinirvāyin, [anāgāmin obtaining] nirvāṇa effortlessly.
- 18. *Ūrdhvasrotas*, [anāgāmin] with upward movement. [Not obtaining nirvāṇa in the place where he is reborn on leaving Kāmadhātu, but moving upward to the Akaniṣṭha or in Bhavāgra].

The nine kinds of aśaikṣa are:

- 19. Parihāṇadharman, [arhat] likely to fall
- 20. Cetanādharman, [arhat] likely to end his existence
- 21. Anurakṣaṇadharman, [arhat] likely to keep [what he has acquired]
- 22. Sthitākampya, [arhat] likely to remain [in the fruit] and not moving
- 23. Prativedhanābhavya, [Arhat] likely to penetrate effortlessly into the Unshakeables.
- 24. Akopyadharma, unshakeable [arhat not likely to fall]
- 25. Cetovimukta, {arhat] possessing deliverance of mind
- 26. Prajñāvimukta, [arhat] delivered by wisdom
- 27. *Ubhayatobhāgavimukta* (*kong kiai t'o* for Kumārajīva; *kiu kiai t'o* for Hiuan-tsang), [arhat] doubly delivered [from the obstacle of the disturbing emotions (*kleśāvaraṇa*) and the obstacle opposing the eight liberations (*vimokṣāvaraṇa*)].

The Pāli sources did not fix the number of individuals at twenty-seven, but they were aware of them and have given definitions for them.

For nos. 1 to 7, see, e.g., Samyutta, V, p. 202. – For nos. 8 to 11, see Dīgha, III, p. 105; Majjhima, I, p. 478-479; Aṅguttara, I, p. 64. – For nos, 12 and 13, see Saṃyutta, V, p. 205; Anguttara, I, p. 233;IV, p. 380-381; Nettippakaraṇa, p. 189. – For nos. 14 to 18 (five types of anāgāmin), see Dīgha, iii, p. 237; Saṃyutta, V, p. 70, 237, 285, 314, 378; Anguttara, IV, p. 14, 15, 146, 380; V, p. 120. – For nos. 26 and 27, see Dīgha, II, p. 71; Majjhima. I, p. 439, 477; Saṃyutta, I, p. 191; Anguttara, I, p. 73; IV, p. 10. 77. For the group, cf. Puggalapaññatti, p. 14-16; Nettippakaraṇa, p. 189-190.

It is due to these eight noble individuals (*aṣṭāv āryapudgalāḥ*) that the Buddha speaks of it as the 'best field of merit for the world'.

Question. – [In the Dakṣiṇīyasūtra] the Buddha said to the vaiśya Ki-kou-tou (Anāthapiṇḍada): "In the world there are two fields of merit (*puṇyakṣetra*), the śaikṣas and the aśaikṣas." <sup>408</sup> [According to this same sūtra, "the śaikṣas are eighteen in number and the aśaikṣas are nine in number." Why then does the Buddha, in the present passage speak only of eight [noble individuals]?

Answer. – In the place where the Buddha was explaining at length (*vistareṇa*), he spoke of 'eighteen plus nine'; but here, where he is summarizing (*saṃkṣepeṇa*), he mentions only eight. However, these twenty-seven are included (saṃgṛhīta) in these eight:

- *1-2*) The śraddhānusārin and the dharmānusārin are included in the srotaāpattiphalapratipannaka, or in the sakṛdāgāmiphalapratipannaka, or in the anāgāmiphalapratipannaka.
- 3) The kulaṃkula is included in the sakṛdāgāmiphalapratipannaka.
- 4) The ekavīcika is included in the anāgāmiphalapratipannaka.
- 5-9) The five kinds of anāgāmin, [namely, i) antarāparinirvāyin, ii) upapadyaparinirvāyin, iii) sābhisaṃskāraparinirvāyin, iv) anabhisaṃskāraparinirvāyin, v) ūrdhvasrotas] are included in the arhattvaphalapratipannaka.

The list of the twenty-seven individuals is one of the masterpieces of the Sarvāstivādin-Vaibhaṣika Abhidharma which, with the help of the canonical sources, has located them precisely along the Path to nirvāṇa: Vibhāṣā, T 1545, k. 77, p. 397a; k. 53, p. 274c-277b; Saṃyuktābhidharmasāra, T 1552, k. 6, p. 910c-914a; Abhidharmāmṛta, T 1553, k. 1, p. 973a27-c26 (reconstr. By Sastri, p. 85-88); Kośa, VI, p. 193-217, 2541-255, 277.

The Prajñāpmaramitās have used the preceding sources broadly to establish their twenty categories of saints, but - and this is essential – the end-pont of the career is no longer the entry into nirvāṇa but the arrival at the state of Buddha by the conquest of *anuttarasaṃyaksaṃbodhi*.

The description of this career may be found in the Pañcaviṃśati, p. 60-73 (transl. Conze, p. 33-41) and the Śatasāhasrikā, p. 266-281; a short description is in Abhisamayālaṃkāra, I, v. 23-24 (transl. Conze, p. 11-13); clear and precise definitions in Āloka,p. 35-36 (transl. Obermiller, *Analysis*, I, p. 51-56).

Later (k. 54, p. 447a), the *Traité* will return to these categories of saints.

The Vijñānavādins also had a list of the traditional twenty-seven types of individuals: Abhidharmasamuccaya, ed. Pradhan, p. 88-91 (T 1605, k. 6, p. 689a10-c24; T 1616, k. 13, p. 754b10-755c28).

408 Dakṣiṇēyasūtra in the Tchong a han (T 26, k. 30, p. 616a8-11) corresponding to Anguttara, I, p. 62-63.

409 Ibid. p. 619a11-13, cited in Kośavyākhyā, p. 566, l. 25-26.

10-11) When they pass into the path of meditation (*bhāvanāmārga*), the śraddānusārin and the dharmānusārin are given the names of śraddhādhimuktika and dṛṣṭiprāpta. This śraddhādhimuktika and dṛṣṭiprāpta are included in the [first] fifteen classes of Śaikṣas.

The nine fields of merit [of the aśaikṣa] are included in the arhattva.

#### 5. Other qualities of the Community

- 1) Moreover, the yogin should recollect the Community [by saying]: the Community are my true companions ( $sah\bar{a}yaka$ ) on the way to nirvāṇa. Joined with it in the same discipline and the same vision, I should be joyful, respect it wholeheartedly, follow it and not be in opposition to it. Previously I had bad people as my companions, women, sons, slaves, etc.: they accompanied me in the three bad destinies (durgati). Now that I have noble people ( $\bar{a}ryapudgala$ ) as companions, I go in safety to nirvāṇa. The Buddha is like the king of physicians ( $vaidyar\bar{a}ja$ ), the Dharma is like good medicine (bhaiṣajya)) and the Community is like a nurse ( $gl\bar{a}nopasth\bar{a}yaka$ ). I must obtain pure discipline (viśuddhaśila) and right thought ( $voniśo mansik\bar{a}ra$ ). I must undergo the medication prescribed by the Buddha. The Community is the sole means for me to cut through the sickness of the bonds ( $bandhanavy\bar{a}dhi$ ): it is my nurse. This is why it is necessary to recollect the Community.
- 2) Furthermore, the Community has immense perfections of discipline, concentration and wisdom (śīlasamādhiprajñāsampad) and the depth of its virtues cannot be plumbed (durvigāhya).

# THE DĀNAPATI WHO EXCLUDED THE ŚRĀMAŅERAS FROM HIS INVITATION<sup>411</sup>

<sup>410</sup> Classical comparison which will be repeated below, p. 1407F. Later (k. 85, p. 657b12-14), the *Traité* explains: "The sick man should seek the good physician and the medicinal herb. The Buddha is the good physician; the good roots (*kuśalamūla*) are the medicinal herb; the good friend (*kalyānamitra*) is the nurse. Furnished with these three things, the sick man is quickly cured."

Kośa, VI, p. 294 and Kośavyākhyā, p. 606: Vaidyabhūto Bhagavān anuttaro bhiṣak śalyaharteti sortāt, dharmabhaiṣajyadaiśikatvāc ca. bhaiṣajyabhūto dharmaḥ kleśavyādhibhaiṣajyatvāt. nirvāṇārogyasaṃprāpakatvāc copasthāyakabhūtaḥ saṃgho nirvāṇārogyaprāptaye parasparopasthānāt: "The Blessed One is physician, for the sūtra (Tsa a han, T 99, k.15, p. 105a-b; Kośavyākhyā, p. 514) calls him 'the supreme physician who pulls out the arrows' and because he preaches the medicine of the Dharma. The Dharma is medicine because it remedies the sicknesses of the passions. Finally, because it brings about the peace of nirvāṇa, the Community is the nurse, for its members support one another in order to obtain the peace of nirvāṇa."

We have already noted several times a certain number of borrowings by the *Traité* from the *Kalpanāmanḍitikā* by Kumāralāta or from its Chinese recension, the *Ta tchouang yen louen king* (T201),

Thus a noble wealthy banker (śreṣṭhin) who had faith in the Community (saṃghe prasannaḥ) said to the steward (vaiyāvṛṭyakara)<sup>412</sup> of the Saṃgha: "I invite the monks in order [of seniority] to dine with me." Day after day, he invited them in order; but when the day came for the turn of the novices (śrāmaṇera), the steward did not allow them to accept the invitation. The śrāmaṇeras said: "Why do you not allow us to accept the invitation?" He replied: "Because the patron [224b] (dānapati) does not like to invite the young monks." Then he spoke this stanza:

Bearded men with hair white as snow

Whose teeth have fallen out and whose faces are wrinkled,

Who walk bent over with decrepit bodies:

Those are whom the danapati likes to invite.

Now these śrāmaṇeras were all great arhats. Like lions struck on the head, they leaped up from their seats and spoke these stanzas:

This dānapati is a stupid man:

He sees forms and does not see virtues.

He neglects the young

And receives only decrepit ancient men.

Moreover, the Buddha has uttered these gathas:

The one who is called Venerable

Is not necessarily old.

There are old men, decrepit, bearded and with white hair,

better known under the name of *Sūtrālaṃkāra by Aśvaghoṣa*. In this regard, see the Gopālakāvadāna (above, p. 146-152F), the 'Complete gift of Karṇa the painter' (p. 672-675F), 'Aśoka and the bhikṣu with the sweet breath' (p. 695-698F), the Ṣaḍḍantajātaka (p. 716-718F), the Nigrodhamogajātaka (p. 972-975F), etc. The anecdote of the 'Dānapati excluding the śrāmaṇeras from his invitation', an anecdote that will be told in the following pages, is taken directly from the Kalpanāmaṇḍikā, ed. H. Lüders, p. 139-140, or from the *Ta tchouang yen louen king*, 3<sup>rd</sup> narrative, k. 1, p. 261a19-262c3 (transl. E. Huber, *Sūtrālaṃkāra*, p. 22-30). The translation of the *Traité* is closer to the *Kalpanāmaṇḍitikā* than to the *Sūtrālaṃkāra*. Few works have been as thoroughly studied as this said *Sūtrālaṃkāra of Aśvaghoṣa*, and it is rather surprising to note that the important loan made here by the *Traité* has not yet been acknowledged.

<sup>412</sup> *Vaiyāvṛṭyakara*, or also *vaiyāpṛṭyakara*, *vaiyāpaṭyakara*; in Pāli *veyyāvaccakara*: see Edgerton, *Dictionary*, p. 511; Mochizuki, *Enc.*, p. 2254b.

Who have 'grown old in vain' (mohajūrņa) and inwardly are without virtue. 413

He who, abandoning the fruits of wrongdoing and of merit,

Energetically pratices continence

And renounces everything,

He is truly called Venerable.<sup>414</sup>

Then the śrāmaṇeras had this thought: "We should not passively look at this dānapati who measures good and evil in the Saṃgha." And they again spoke these stanzas:

Our hearts remain unchanged

Under praise and blame;

But this man denigrates the Buddha and the Dharma:

We cannot help but instruct him.

Let us go quickly to his dwelling-place

To teach him the Dharma.

It would truly be a great pity

If we did not save him.

Then all the śrāmaṇeras changed their bodies and became transformed into old men. Their beards and hair were white as enow; their heavy eyebrows covered their eyes (*bhrūlamabhir avaguṇṭhitākṣa*); their skin was wrinkled like waves; their spine was bent like a bow (*dhanur iva vakrapṛṣṭha*) and they walked leaning on a stick (*yaṣṭiviṣaktapāṇi*).According to their turn (*anukrameṇa*), they received their invitation and started out, all faltering with unsteady pace: one would have said they were white poplars shaken by the wind.<sup>415</sup>

Seeing them coming, the dānapati rejoiced, went to meet them, greeted them and made them sit down. When they were seated, they resumed their youthful foms. Startled, the dānapati said to them:

These distinguished old men

Have recovered their youth

413 Dhammapada, v. 260; Udānavarga, XI, v. 11, p. 189.

414 Dhammapada, v. 267; Udānavarga, XI, v. 12, p. 189; Mahāvastu, III, p. 422.

415 Cf. the fragment of the Kalpanāmaṇḍikā, p. 138: Te sarve

palitavidyotitaśirogaṇḍapārśvabhrulomabhir avaguṇṭhitākṣi... dhanurvakkrapṛṣṭīvaṃśā yaṣṭiviṣaktapāṇayaḥ pavanabalapracalitā supuṣpitāḥ sindhuvāritagulmāḥ.

As if they had drunk the elixir of youth;<sup>416</sup>

How does such a miracle come about?

The śrāmaṇeras said to him: "Do not feel any fear or doubt; we are not demons (amānuṣa). You wanted to measure (pramāṇākartum) the Saṃgha, and that is very dangerous. Out of pity for you, we have manifested these transformations. The noble Saṃgha which you claim to know deeply is immeasurable (apramāṇa) for, as it is said:

[224c] Then it would be possible to sound the depth of the sea

With the fine proboscis of a mosquito;

But among gods and men

There is no one who is able to measure the Samgha.<sup>417</sup>

The Samgha cannot even be singled out

According to its qualities and its nobility,

And you claim to be able

To measure the great virtuous ones according to their age.

Great and small alike produce knowledge:

It is not found [exclusively] among the old or among the young.

If he is wise, brave and energetic

Even a young man is an Elder (sthavira).

If he is lazy and without wisdom

Even the old man is but a child.

In wanting to measure the Samgha today, you have committed a great fault. If somebody wanted to sound the depth of the great ocean (*mahārṇavam avagāhitum*) with his finger-tip (*aṅgulyagra*), he would be the laughing-stock of the sages.

[Daharasūtra]. – Have you not heard the Buddha say: "There are four things that, small as they are, cannot be mistaken ( $catv\bar{a}ro\ dahar\bar{a}\ iti\ n\bar{a}vaj\bar{n}ey\bar{a}h$ ): i) the crown prince ( $kum\bar{a}ra$ ), young as he may be, will be king of the country and cannot be despised; ii) the snake (uraga), small as it may be, kills people with its

<sup>416</sup> Ibid., p. 139: Rasāyanam iva prāsya punar bālatvam āgatāh.

<sup>417</sup> Ibid., p. 139: *Apy eva gādhaṃ varuṇālayasya svatuṇḍasūcyā maśako labheta na tv eva lokaḥ sacarācaro 'yam saṃghā*... "Perhaps a mosquito could reach the bottom of the sea with its proboscis; but the entire universe with its beings, mobile and immobile, [can never sound] the Saṃgha."

venom and cannot be despised. iii) a small fire, if it is badly tended, is able to burn down the forest and cannot be despised; iv) the śrāmaṇera, young as he is, is able to attain the noble supernatural powers  $(\bar{a}ry\bar{a}bhij\tilde{n}a)$  and absolutely cannot be despised."<sup>418</sup>

[Āmrasūtra]. – The Buddha also said: "There are four kinds of individuals like the mango (catvāra ima āmropamāḥ puruṣāḥ): i) a mango that is green but seems to be ripe (āmam pakvavarṇi), ii) a ripe mango that seems to be green (pakvam āmavarṇi); iii) a green mango that seems to be green (āmam āmavarṇi), iv) a ripe mango that seems to be ripe (pakvam pakvarṇi)."<sup>419</sup>

It is the same for the disciples of the Buddha (buddhaśrāvaka): i) some are endowed with noble qualities (āryaguṇasamanvāgata), but by their postures (īryāpatha) and their speech (vacana) do not seem to be good people; ii) others seem to be good people by their postures and their speech, but they are not endowed with good qualities; iii) still others do not seem to be good people by their postures and their speech and they are not endowed with noble qualities; and finally, iv) others seem to be good people by their postures and speech and are endowed with noble qualities.

Why do you not remember these words and want to measure the Saṃgha? By wanting to hurt the Saṃgha, you hurt yourself.<sup>420</sup> You have committed a great fault; it is a thing of the past and it cannot be blamed in retrospect. Therefore return to wholesome thoughts, send away doubts (*saṃśaya*) and regrets (*kaukṛtya*) and listen to these stanzas that we address to you:

The noble Samgha is immeasurable,

Difficult to understand in its positions (*īryapatha*).

It cannot be measured either on the basis of its background (kula)

Or on the basis of learning (bahuśruta),

Or on the basis of majesty (anubhāva)

Or on the basis of age (vayas)

Or on the basis of its bearing

Or on the basis of eloquence (vagviśuddhi):421

The noble Samgha is a great ocean

<sup>418</sup> *Daharasutta* in Samyutta, I, p. 68-70 (cf. Tsa a han, T 99, no. 1226, k. 46, p. 334c13-334b8; Pie tsa a han, T 1000, no. 53, k. 3, p. 391c2-392a25; Tseng yi a han, T 125, k. 25, p. 683b26-c6).

<sup>419</sup> Ambānisutta in Anguttara, II, p. 106-107 (cf. Tseng yi a han, T 125, k. 17, p. 634a17-b17).

The Kalpanāmaṇḍitikā, p. 139 is slightly different: *Kṣaṇyate pudgalaḥ pudgalaṣya pramāṇam udgrhṇan*: "The person who takes the measure of another person hurts himself." This is a canonical dictum: cf. Anguttara, III, p. 350, l. 6; 351, l. 14; V, p. 140, l. 20; 143, l. 17: *Khaññati h' Ānanda puggalo puggaleṣu pamāṇaṃ gaṇhanto*.

<sup>421</sup> Kalpanāmaṇḍitikā, p. 139: Neryāpthena na kulena na ca śrutena na... na vayasā na ca vāgviśuddhyā śakyaṃ pramātum iha kenacid āryasaṃghaḥ.

The qualities of which are very deep.

The Buddha has praised this Samgha in hundreds of ways.

Whatever little one gives, it produces abundant fruit.

This third jewel enjoys wide renown;

This is why one should venerate the Samgha.<sup>422</sup>

#### [225a] There should no distinction made between old and young

Learned or unlearned, light or shadow,

In the same way that a man seeing a forest does not distinguish

Between the campaka, the eranda or the śāla trees.

When you meditate on the Samgha

Avoid making distinctions between fools and saints.

When Mahākāśyapa went forth from home

His garment was worth a hundred thousand gold pieces;

Wishing to wear the lowly garb of a beggar,

He sought for rags and tatters but found none. 423

422 Ibid., p. 139: *Tam tuṣṭuve padaśatataiḥ svayam eva buddho yatrālpam apy upakṛtaṃ bahutām upaiti. Ratnaṃ tṛtīyam iti yat prathitaṃ pṛthivyām arcyaḥ sa Śākyamuniśiṣyagaṇaḥ samagraḥ:* "The Buddha himself praised this Saṃgha in hundreds of phrases. Even a small service given to it increases. Known on earth by the name of the Third Jewel, this entire group of disciples of Śākyamuni is worthy of being honored."

In the *Cīvarasutta* in Saṃyutta (II, p. 219-222), Mahākāśyapa says that in order to become a monk, he had a *paṭapilotikāṃ saṅghāṭi* made, 'an undergarment made of pieces of cloth'. According to he Commentary of Saṃyutta (II, p. 180), Kāśyapa meant the *saṃghaṭi* which was made by cutting up his garments of great value (*Iti mahārahāni vatthḥāni chinditvā kataṃ saṅghāṭiṃ sandhāya paṭopilotikānaṃ saṅghāṭin ti vuttaṃ*). The Buddha admired the quality of the material: *Mudukā kho tyāyaṃ Kassapa paṭapilotikānaṃ saṅghāṭi*. "That is why", continues Kaśyapa, "I made a gift to the Blessed One of my undergarment made of pieces of cloth, and I replaced them with the hempen rags use by the Blessed One" (*So khv āhaṃ paṭapilotkānaṃ saṅghāṭiṃ Bhagavato pādāsi, ahaṃ pana Bhabavato sāṇāni paṃsukūlāni nibbasanāno paṭipajjiṃ*).

It is the same for the noble Samgha:

If one looked there for the lowliest field of merit,

The donor would still be rewarded a hundred thousand times.

What is more, the search would fail, for it cannot be found there.

The Samgha is a great sea

Whose moral discipline is the shore.

If an immoral (*duḥśīla*) monk were to be found there

He would end up by not being counted in the number of the monks

For the Samgha is like the great ocean

Which refuses the company of corpses."424

Hearing these words and seeing the magical pwer (rddhibala) of the śrāmaṇeras, the dānapati became frightened and his hair stood on end. Joining his palms together, he said to the śrāmaṇeras: "Holy ones, I confess my sin (āpattim pratideśayāmi): I am but a common man (prthagjana) and my mind is always following after sin. I have a small doubt and would like to question you." And he spoke this stanza:

The great virtuous ones have broken through doubt

And I have met them today.

If I did not consult them

I would be the fool among fools.

The śrāmaneras said: "If you wish to ask, then ask; we will aswer according to what we have learned."

The dānapati asked: "Which is more meritorious, pure faith (*prasannacitta*) toward the Jewel of the Buddha or pure faith toward the Jewel of the Saṃgha?" 425

In the corresponding sūtra in the Saṃyuktāgama (Tsa, T 99, k. 41, p. 303b22; Pie tsa, T 100, k. 6, p. 418b6), it is stated that Kāśyapa's saṃghāṭi was worth one hundred thousand ounces of gold.

According to the legend related above (p. 190-196F), Kāśyapa actually remains at Rājagṛha within the Gṛdhrakūṭaparvata. He is clothed in the robes of the Buddha and must hand them over to the future buddha, Maitreya.

The great ocean has eight wonderful extraordinary qualities, one of which is not being able to cohabit with corpses: *Mahāsamuddo na matena kuṇapena saṃvasati; yaṃ hoti mahāsamudde mataṃ kuṇapaṃ, taṃ khippaṃ ñeva tīraṃ vāheti thalaṃ ussāreti*: cf. Vinaya, II, p. 237; Anguttara, IV, p. 198, 201; Udāna, p. 53,55. See also Daśabhūmika, p. 97, 1. 9-10.

The śrāmaṇeras answered: "We see no difference between the Jewel of the Saṃgha and the Jewel of the Buddha. Why?"

[*Udaya and Sundarikasutta*].  $^{426}$  – The Buddha was begging his food one day in Śrāvastī. There was a brahmin from the *P'o-lo-to-che* clan (*Bhāradvāja*) who lived there. Several times the Buddha went to his him to beg alms. The brahmin had the following thought: "Why does this śramaṇa come repeatedly as if he were a creditor (rna)?"  $^{427}$ 

Then the Buddha spoke these stanzas:

The seasonal rains always fall anew,

The five grains always grow anew.

The fields are cultivated always anew,

The harvest is reaped always anew.

One takes rebirth always anew,

And one dies always anew.

- 1) The gift to the Buddha and the gift to the Saṃgha each give a great fruit of retribution: Theses 170 and 171 of the Theravādins (Bareau, *Sectes*, p. 233; Kathāvatthu, XVII, 9-10, p. 553-556.
- 2) The gift to the Buddha does not give a great fruit of retribution because, having entered nirvāṇa a long time ago, the Buddha cannot enjoy the gift made to him and because the Buddha, in the passage in which we are interested here, has defined the Saṃgha as 'the best field of merit for the world': Thesis 5 of the Vetullakas (Bareau, *Sectes*, p. 255; Kathāvatthu, XVII, 10, p. 555-556); Thesis 21 of the Mahīśāsakas (Bareau, ibid., p. 185).
- 3) The gift to the Samgha does not give a great fruit of retribution because the Samgha is lower in merit than the Buddha and because the Sūtra (Majjhima, III, p. 254) gives the Buddha as the best field of merit: Thesis 4 of the Vetullakas (Bareau, ibid., p. 255; Kathāvatthu, XVII, 9, p. 553); Thesis 1 of the Dharmaguptakas (Bareau, ibid., p. 192).

See also Kośa, IV, p. 283, note; Nyāyānusāra, T 1562, k. 38, p. 558c. For the *Traité*, both kinds of gifts are equally fruitful.

426 Here the *Traité* is apparently combining two sutras from the Samyukta: 1) the *Udayasutta* of the Samyutta, I, p. 173-174 (Tsa, T 99, no. 1157, k. 42, p. 308a3-b18; Pie tsa, T 100, no. 80, k. 4, p. 401b11-c19) and 2) the *Sundarikasutta* of the Samyutta, I, p. 167-170 (Tsa, T 99, no. 1184, k. 44, p. 320b21-321a23; Pie tsa, T 99, no. 98, k. 5, p. 408b25-c26.

427 Saṃyutta, I, p. 173-174: Sāvatthi nidānaṃ. Atha kho Bhagavā pubbaṇhasamayaṃ nivāsetvā pattacīvaraṃ ādāya yena Udayassa ... Pakaṭṭho yaṃ samaṇo Gotamo punappuaṃ āgacch ati ti.

<sup>425</sup> A scholastic problem to which there are three theses:

But since the noble Dharma is realized always anew,

Who therefore would be born or die always anew?<sup>428</sup>

Having heard these stanzas, the brahmin thought: "The Buddha is a great saint who has completely understands my mind." Shamefully, he took the alms-bowl (*pātra*), went back into his house, filled the bowl with excellent food and offered it to the Buddha. [225b] The Buddha did not accept it and said: "I am being given this food for having spoken a stanza. I will not eat it." 429

The brahmin asked: "To whom should I give this food?"

The Buddha said: "I see nobody among gods and men who can digest this food. Take it and throw it on the ground somewhere where there are few plants (*alpaharite*) or in the water where there are no insects (*aprānaka udake*)." 430

The brahmin followed the Buddha's orders, took the food and threw it in the water where there were no insects. Immediately the water boiled; smoke and fire came out as though red-hot iron had been plunged into it.<sup>431</sup>

Seeing this, the brahmin was frightened and said: "It is extraordinary (*adbhuta*) that the magical power (*rddhibala*) contained in this food should be so great." He returned to the Buddha, bowed down before the Buddha's feet, confessed his sin (āpattim pratyadeśayat), asked for the going-forth (pravrajya) and received the precepts (śīla). The Buddha said to him: "Good! Come!" At that moment, the brahmin's beard and hair fell off by themselves and he became a śramaṇa. Gradually he cut through his fetters (saṃyojana) and attained the Bodhi of the arhats.

429 Samyutta, I, p. 168, where the Buddha answered thus: Transl. – "I cannot profit from the fact that I have chanted a stanza. The Buddhas refuse what is offered to them for having chanted a stanza. This rule is in force, O brahmin, wherever it is a question of the Dharma."

This stanza is also cited in Saṃyutta, I, p. 173; Suttanipāta, p. 14, 85. – For *gāthābhigīta*, see Edgerton, *Dictionary*, p. 50.

<sup>428</sup> Samyutta, I. p. 174.

<sup>430</sup> Saṃyutta, I, p. 168-169: *Atha kassa cāhaṃ imaṃ havyasesaṃ dammī ti... vā chaḍ dehi appāṇake vā udake opilāpehi ti.* This is a stereotyped phrase: cf. Vinaya, I, p. 157. 158, 225, 352; II, p. 216; Majjhima, I, p. 13, 207; III, p. 157.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>431</sup> Saṃyutta, I, p. 169: *Atha kho... brāhmaņo taṃ havyasesaṃ appāṇake udake opilāpasi... divasamtatto udake pakkhitto*.

<sup>432</sup> In contradiction to the sources that it uses, the *Traité* has the brahmin being ordained by means of *ehibhikṣukā upasaṃpadā*, one of the four kinds of ordination mentioned in the Mahāvastu, I, p. 2, l. 15. This is a quick ordination and undoubtedly the oldest form. The texts render it by the well-known formula: *Sa Bhagavatā ehibhikṣukayā ābhāṣitaḥ, shi bhikṣo cara brahmacaryam iti. Bhagavato vācāvasānaṃ eva muṇḍaḥ saṃvṛttaḥ saṃghāṭīprāvṛtaḥ pātrakaravyagrahastaḥ saptāhāvaropitakeśaśmaśrur varṣaśatopasaṃpannasya bhikṣor īryāpathenāvasthitaḥ:* "He was summoned with the phrase *Ehi bhikṣukā* by the Blessed One who said to him: 'Come, O monk, practice

[Dakṣiṇāvibhaṅgasūtra]. - There was also Mo-ho-kiao-t'an-mi (Mahāgautamī) who offered upper and lower precious robes, golden in color to the Buddha. Knowing that the Saṃgha could use them, the Buddha said to Gautamī: "Give these upper and lower robes to the Saṃgha". 433

This is why we know that [the gift] to the Buddha Jewel and [the gift] to the Saṃgha Jewel are equally meritorious.

The dānapati asked: "If the Saṃgha can direct and receive the gifts made to the Buddha, why did the Buddha not permit the Saṃgha to eat the food of the brahmin Bhāradvaja?"

the religious life.' As soon as the Bhagavat finished speaking, the neophyte found himself with his head shaved, clothed in the monastic robe, a begging-bowl and a flask in his hand, with hair and beard that would have grown in seven days, similar in his posture to a monk ordained for a hundred years." Cf. Divyāvadāna, p. 48, 281, 341, 558.

Beginning of the *Dakkhiṇāvibhangasutta* in Majjhima, III, p. 253: *Ekaṃ samayaṃ Bhagavā akkesu viharati Kapilavatthusmiṃ Nogrodhāra āme. Atha kho Mahāpajāpatī Gotamī navaṃ dussayugaṃ ... saṃghe te dinne ahañ c'eva pūjito bhavissāmi saṃgho cati.* Transl.— One day the Blessed One was at Kapilavastu among the Śākyas, in the Nyagrodha monastery. Then Mahāprajāptī, the Gautamī, carrying two new robes, went to the Blessed One and, having approached, she bowed down to the Blessed One and sat down to one side. Seated to the side, she said: "Venerable One, this new cloth has been cut up and stitched by me for the Blessed One: may the Blessed One have compassion for me and accept this." Then the Blessed One said to Mahāprajāpatī the Gautamī: "Gautamī, give it to the Saṃgha, if you give it to the Saṃgha, I will be honored and the Saṃgha also."

This is Mahāprajāpatī Gautamī, born to Devadaha, of the Śākya Añjana. Her brothers were Daṇḍapāṇi and Suprabuddha and her sister was Mahāmāyā, mother of the Buddha. The latter had died eight days after the birth and Mahāprajāpatī took the place of mother to the Buddha. Like her sister, she was the wife of Śuddhodana to whom she had born a son, the handsome Nanda. The Buddha accepted his aunt into the Buddhist order with her five hundred companions. Her entry into nirvāṇa, particularly glorious, has been noted above (p. 587-588F). According to some sources, Mahāprajāpatī presented only one robe to the Buddha, a yellow robe with gold thread (Tchong a han, T 26, k. 47, p. 721c23-722a4); a robe of *tie*, i.e., linen (Fen pie pou che, T 84, p. 903b23-c10); fine linen cloth, golden in color (Hien yu king, T 202, k. 12, p. 434a6-15); a *vassikasāṭikā*, i.e., a rain-cloak (Milindapañha, p. 240). On the other hand, the passage from the Majjhima cited at the beginning of the present note speaks of a pair of robes (*dussayuga*), and the Mahīśāsaka Vin. (T1421, k. 29, p. 185b17-23) also speaks of two new robes offered to the Buddha by Mahāprajāpatī. The Buddha said to the latter: "You may give them to the Saṃgha and you will obtain a great fruit of retribution. I too count among the Saṃgha." Finally, at his aunt's insisting, the Buddha decided to share: "I accept one robe and I give the other to the Saṃgha."

This variation among the sources is probably explained away by scholastic reasons, for we have seen above (p. 1400F, n. 1) that the sects differed in opinion about the respective value of a gift to the Buddha and a gift to the Saṃgha, and the Buddha's attitude to his aunt's offering bears directly on this problem (cf. Kathāvatthu, p. 553, l. 29-31; Nyāyānusmara, T 1562, k. 38, p. 558c6-7, 19).

The śrāmaṇeras asnswered: "It was in order to bring to light the great power (mahābala) of the Saṃgha. If [the brahmin] had not seen that this food, put into the water, had such great magical power (mahārddhibala), he would not have known how great is the power of the Saṃgha, but since the Saṃgha is able to accept things offered to the Buddha, we know that the power of the Saṃgha is great. Thus, when a master physician (bhaiṣajyaguru) wants to try out a poisoned drug (viṣauṣadhi), he gives it first to a chicken (kukkuṭa); then, when the chisken has died, he swallows the poison himself so that we know how great is the power (anubhāva) of the master physician. Know then, O dānapati:

The person who loves and honors the Buddha

Must also love and honor the Samgha

There can be no distinction

For both are equally 'Jewels'.

Then, hearing these words spoken, the danapati rejoiced and said: "From today on, I, so-and-so, will honor with an equal mind the young and the old who have entered into the ranks of the Samgha and I will avoid making distinctions."

The śrāmaṇeras said: "Since you honor the best field of merit (*anuttara buddhakṣetra*) with faith, you will before long attain Bodhi. Why?"

The learned (bahuśruta), the virtuous (śīlavat).

The sages  $(praj\tilde{n}\bar{a})$  and the ecstatics  $(dhy\bar{a}yin)$ 

All enter into the ranks of the Samgha

Like the ten thousand rivers flowing into the sea.

Just as all the plants and the medicinal herbs

Grow on the Snowy Mountain (himālaya),

Just as the hundred grains and all the bushes

Grow on the earth,

[225c] So all good people

Are found in the ranks of the Samgha.

[Gośṛṅgasūtra]. – Finally, have you not heard that one day the Buddha, apeaking to *Tch'ang* (Dīrgha), the general of the Yakṣas (yakṣasnānī), praised the three good disciples *A-ni-lou-t'o* (Aniruddha), *Nan-t'i-kia* (Nandika) and *Tch'e-mi-lo* (Kimbila)? The Buddha said [to Dīrgha]: "If the entire world with its gods and

men thinks about these three sons of noble family (*etān trīn kulaputrān prasannacittenānusmaret*) with faith, it will obtain immense benefits during the long night (*dīrgharātram*)."434

It seems that it would be better still to honor the Saṃgha, for these three men did not constitute a Saṃgha, 435 and if the Buddha attributes such fruits to recollecting these three men, then how much more fruitful still to recollect he whole Saṇgha with pure faith. This is why, O dānapati, one should recollect the Saṃgha with all of one's strength. A stanza says:

This group of holy people

Is a formidable army:

It destroys king Māra, our enemy;

It is our companion on the way to nirvāṇa.

434 *Cūlagosingasutta* in Majjhima, I, p. 205-211 (Tchong a han, T 26, k. 48, p. 729b-731a). Being in Nādikā in the Giñjakāvasatha, the Buddha paid a visit to three of his disciples, Anuruddha, Nandiya and Kimbila, who were meditating in the Gosingālavama. He congratulated these three monks for living together on the best of terms like a mixture of milk and water, looking after one another fondly. The friendly words between the Teacher and his disciples were interrupted by the arrival of the yakkha Dīgha Parajana who had come to greet the Buddha and who said: "Truly, it is a great benefit for the Vajji people (in Sanskrit (Vṛji) that the Tathāgata stays among them and that these three venerable disciples are also present." It is then that that the Buddha answered Dīgha with the phrase alluded to here by the *Traité*: *Sadevako ce pi Dīgha loko samārako sabhahmako sassamaṇabrāhmaṇI pajā ... sadevamanussāya dīghaarattaṃ hitāya suchāya*. "If the world with its devas, māras and Brahmās, if the population with its monks and brahmins, with its gods and men, thought of these three sons of noble family with faith, that would contribute to the good and welfare of this world and this population during the long night [of saṃsāra]."

Sections of the *Gosingasutta* occur in Majjhima III, p. 155-157 and the perfect harmony (*sāmaggi*) between Anuruddha, Nandiya and Kimbila is also noted in other places in the Canon: cf. Majjhima, I, p. 62; Vinaya, I, p. 350-352; II, p. 182. As for Dīgha Parajana, the yakṣa general, he appears in the list of gods and semi-gods favorable to Buddhism: Āṭānāṭiyasuttanta (Dīgha, III, p. 205, l. 7). 435 Indeed, they were only three, and there must be four in order to constitute a saṃgha according to the disciplinary rule: *Tayo janā sambahulā ti vuccanti, tato paraṃ saṃgho*: "Three people are said to be 'many'; more is a 'saṃgha' " (Comm. of the Udāna, p. 102). The Vinaya (I, p. 319-320) distinguishes three kinds of saṃgha according to whether it is composed of four, five, ten, twenty, or more than twenty bhikṣus. For the proper procedure of ordination, the Saṃgha must be composed of a minimum of ten members (*dasavagga bhikkhusaṃgha*). But the Buddha made exception for the frontier regions such as Avanti where monks were less numerous: in this district, five monks were enough to confer ordination (Vinaya, I, p. 197, l. 17-20).

Thus the śrāmaṇeras explained the holy qualities of the Saṃgha to the dānapati in many ways. Having heard them, the dānapati and his entire family, great and small, saw the four noble Truths (ārysatya) and attained the fruit of srotaāpanna,

This is why the sampha should be recollected wholeheartedly.

#### IV. RECOLLECTION OF THE MORALITIES

# 1. The various kinds of morality

There are two kinds of morality (\$\siz\$ila): i) impure morality (\$\siz\$asrava\siz\$ila); ii) pure morality (\$an\siz\$srava\siz\$ila).

Firstly, impure morality is of two kinds: i) the morality of discipline (samvaraśīla); ii) the morality connected with the meditative stabilizations ( $sam\bar{a}dhisah\bar{a}gataśīla$ ).<sup>436</sup>

During his early practices, the yogin recollects these three kinds of morality. Having practiced all three, then he recollects only the pure morality (*anāṣravaśīla*).

The morality of discipline (samvaraśīla) prevents the sins ( $p\bar{a}pa$ ) and corruption from gaining power. The morality of trance and concentration dissipates all the negative emotions (kleśa). Why?

When one has attained the inner happiness (*adhyātmasukha*) [of the meditative stabilizations], one no longer seeks worldly happiness (*lokasukha*). Pure morality (*anāsravaśīla*) uproots the roots of sins (*pāpa*) and negative emotions (*kleśa*).

Question. – Why recollect the moralities?

Answer. – As I have said above (p. 1393F) in regard the recollection of the Samgha, the Buddha is like the king of physicians (*vaidyarāja*), the Dharma is like good medicine (*bhaiśajya*), the Community is like the nurse (*glanopasthāyaka*) and morality is like submitting to the medical regime. The yogin says to himself: "If I do not fall in line with this obligation, the Three Jewels (*triratna*) will be of no use to me. If the guide (*nāyaka*) shows the good path but the traveler does not use it, that is not the fault of the guide."<sup>437</sup> This is why I should recollect morality (*śīla*)."

Furthermore, morality is the support (*adhiṣṭhāna*) of all good dharmas. Just as the hundred grains and the medicinal plants grow depending on the earth, in the same way, observing pure morality produces great profound concentrations and the knowledge of the true nature (*bhūtalakṣaṇa*). It is also the foremost gate

436 Cf. Kośakārikā, IV, 13:

Avijñaptis tridhā jñeyā saṃvarāsaṃvaretarā / saṃvaraḥ prātimokṣākhyo dhyānajo 'nāsravas tathā //

<sup>437</sup> The guide is simply the one who indicates the path (*mārgakhyāyin*): it is not up to him whether one follows his advice or not. Comparison already used by the Majjhima, III, p. 5-6.

(prathamadvāra) for monastics (pravrajita), the stick (daṇḍa) on which all monastics lean, the primary cause and condition (hetupratyaya) of reaching nirvāṇa (nirvāṇādhigama). As it is said: "Thanks to keeping morality, the mind is free of regret (kaukṛtya), and finally deliverance (vimukta), nirvāṇa, is attained."

# 2. Qualities of the Moralities to be recollected

The yogin recollects pure morality (viśuddhaśīla).

[According to the sūtras]: "The faultless moralities (śīlāny akhaṇḍāni), the moralities without cracks (acchidrāṇi), the moralities without rifts (aśabalāni), the unvarying moralities (akalamāṣāṇi), the liberating moralities (bhujiṣyāṇi), the [226a] moralities without careless attachment (aparāmṛṣṭāni), the moralities praised by the sages (vijñapraśastāni) and without defects (agarhitāni)<sup>438</sup> are pure morality."

- [1-2) Śīlāny akhaṇḍāny acchidrāṇi}. What are the faultless (akhaṇḍa) moralities?
- a. If, with the excepton of the four grave offenses formulated in the fivefold discipline (pañcaśīla), one violates all the other serious precepts, this is a violation 'with faults' (khanḍa). The other wrongdoings are 'cracks' (chidra).
- b. Moreover, the physical wrongdoings (*kāyikāpatti*) are called 'defects' and the vocal wrongdoings are called 'rifts'.
- c. Finally, the great sins are called 'defects' (defeats?) and the small wrongdoings are called 'cracks'.
- [3) Śīlāny aśabalāni]. If the good mind (kuśalacitta) is turned toward nirvāṇa and prevents the fetters (samyojana) and the various faulty examinations (vitarka) and subtle analyses (vicāra) from gaining access, there is morality 'without rifts' (aśabala).
- [4) Śīlāny akalmāṣāṇi]. If the mind goes [alternately] in two directions, sometimes toward nirvāṇa and sometimes toward saṃsāra, there is 'varying' morality (kalmāṣa). [If the mind goes exclusively toward nirvāṇa, there is 'unvarying' morality (akalmāṣa)].
- [5) Śīlāni bhujiṣyāṇi]. Following morality, not following after external conditions (bāhyapratyaya), like the independent (svatantra) unfettered man, observing pure morality without being enslaved by desire (tṛṣṇādāsya), this is 'liberating morality' (bhujiṣya).
- [6)  $\dot{S}\bar{\imath}l\bar{a}ny~apar\bar{a}mr\bar{\imath}t\bar{a}ni$ ]. In the face of morality, the yogin does not undergo the fetter of lust  $(r\bar{a}ga)$ , pride  $(m\bar{a}na)$ , etc. He knows the true nature  $(bh\bar{\imath}talak\bar{\imath}ana)$  of morality  $(\dot{s}\bar{\imath}laninittani~nodgrhn\bar{a}ti)$ . If he grasps the characteristics of morality, he would be like a prisoner held by manacles who, even after having been pardoned, remains attached to his golden manacles. The person attached [to his own morality] by the

<sup>438</sup> See the prelijiminary note to the present chapter, p. 1332F. Here Kumārajīva translates the canonical terms rather freely. The latter are explained literally in Visuddimagga, ed. Warren, p. 182-183.

passion of love is as if in prison: even if he manages to escape, he remains attached (*sakta*) to the morality like golden fetters. But the yogin who knows that morality is cause and condition for purity (*anāṣravahetupratyaya*) does not experience this attachment [to morality itself] and is liberated, free of fetters: this is what is called morality 'without thoughtless attachment' (*aparāmṛṣṭa*).<sup>439</sup>

[7) Śīlāni vijñapraśastāni]. – These are the moralities praised by the Buddhas, the bodhisattvas, the pratyekabuddhas and the śrāvakas. If the yogin practices such morality, uses such morality, these are the moralities 'praised by the sages' (vijñapraśasta).

The moralities of the heretics  $(t\bar{\imath}rthika\dot{s}\bar{\imath}la)$  are the moralities of the bull  $(go\dot{s}\bar{\imath}la)$ , the deer  $(mrga\dot{s}\bar{\imath}la)$ , the dog  $(kukkura\dot{s}\bar{\imath}la)$ , the flesh-eating demons  $(r\bar{a}k\dot{s}asa\dot{s}\bar{\imath}la)$ , the mute  $(m\bar{u}ka\dot{s}\bar{\imath}la)$ , the deaf  $(badhira\dot{s}\bar{\imath}la)$ : these moralities are not praised by the sages; they are cruel and do not bring any good retribution  $(vip\bar{a}ka)$ .

Furthermore, among the three kinds of morality, pure morality (*anāsravaśīla*) is praised by the sages. It is indestructible, unchanging and, by depending on this morality, one obtains true wisdom: therefore it is the morality 'praised by the sages'.

Pure morality is of three kinds: it is, as the Buddha said, right speech (*samyagvāc*), right action (*samyakkarmānta*) and right livelihood (*samyagājīva*). <sup>441</sup> The meaning of this threefold activity has been explained (p. 1182F) in regard to the eightfold noble Path (*āryāṣṭāṅgika mārga*). It is necessary to continue this explanation fully here.

# 3. The position of morality among the Path members

Question. – If morality is cause and condition for meditative stability ( $sam\bar{a}dhi$ ) and if meditative stability is cause and condition for wisdom ( $praj\tilde{n}\tilde{a}$ ), why is wisdom placed at the beginning ( $\tilde{a}dau$ ) of [the list] of the eightfold noble Path, morality at the middle (madhye) and meditative stability at the end ( $paryavas\bar{a}ne$ )?<sup>442</sup>

Answer. - When one is starting out on a trip, it is the rule to first consider the path to travel with one's eyes and then to travel. When one is traveling, one must be careful. While walking energetically, one always

The Buddha several times has condemned the unjustified trust in the efficacy of rituals and vows (*śīlavrataparāmarśa*): cf. Vinaya, I, p. 184; Majjhima, I, p. 433; Anguttara, III, p. 377; IV, p. 144. 440 Heretics having taken the vow of living in the manner of a given animal. Majjhima, I, p. 387 mentions a Puṇṇa who was a *govatika*, a Seniya who was a *kukkuruvatika*, etc. See also Dīgha, III, p. 6-7; Comm. On the Majjhima, III, p. 100; Nettipakaraṇa, p. 99.

<sup>441</sup> Majjhima, I, p. 301: Yā c'āvuso Visakha sammāvācā yo ca sammākammanto yo ca sammā ājīvo, ime dhammā sīlakkhandhe saṅgahītā.

This question has already been asked above, p. 838F. In the list of the eight members of the path, the first two constitute *prajñāskandha*, the next three *śīlaskandha* and the last three *samādhiskandha*.

recalls the advice of the guide. If these are remembered, one attentively follows one's route without going off on false paths. It is the same for right view (*samyagdrṣṭi*).

I) First, with right wisdom, one considers the five aggregates of attachment (upadānaskandha) which are always painful: this is what is called [the truth] of suffering (duḥkha). Suffering is the result of a group of fetters (samyojana), affection (anunaya), etc.: this is what is called the origin (samudaya). The cessation of the fetters (samyojananirodha), affection, etc., is called nirvāṇa. Considering the eight members (aṣṭānga) in this way is called Path. All of that is [226b] right view (samyagdṛṣṭi).

From that moment, the yogin whose mind is firm knows that saṃsāra is false and should be abandoned, that nirvāṇa is true and should be followed. This clear seeing of things (read *kiue-ting = vyavasāya*, *nirṇaya*) is called right view (*samyagdṛṣṭi*).

- 2) The yogin knows and sees these things, but the strength of his mind is not great and he is not yet able to start out on his journey. He reflects, calculates and stimulates the right view so that it may gain power. This is called right intention (samyaksamkalpa).
- 3-5) His wisdom being fervent, he wants to express it in words. This is why he then practices right speech (samyagvāc), right action (samyakkarmānta) and right livelihood (samyagājīva).
- 6) At the time when he practices morality, he is energetic, without laziness, and never stops in the meditative stabilizations with form and without form  $(r\bar{u}p\bar{a}r\bar{u}pyasam\bar{a}dhi)$ . This is called right exertion  $(samyagvy\bar{a}y\bar{a}ma)$ .
- 7) Using right view, he contemplates the four Truths (*catuḥsatya*). He never forgets that all the disturbing emotions (*kleśa*) are enemies (*amitra*) to be destroyed, that right view, etc., are friends to follow. This is called right mindfulness (*samyaksmṛti*).
- 8) He concentrates his mind on the four Truths without being distracted. He prevents it from being led toward the form and formless meditative stabilizations ( $r\bar{u}p\bar{a}r\bar{u}pyasam\bar{a}dhi$ ) but wholeheartedly moves toward nirvāṇa. This is clled right meditation ( $samyaksam\bar{a}dhi$ ).

At the beginning [during the preparatory Path], the yogin obtains the good-impure ( $ku\acute{s}al\bar{a}srava$ ) good roots called heat ( $u\~smagata$ ), summits ( $m\bar{u}rdhan$ ) and patience ( $k\~s\bar{a}nti$ ), <sup>443</sup> which are developed in beginning, intermediate and final minds.

When he penetrates into the pure mind (*anāsravacitta*) [constituting the first moment of the Path of seeing], he is perfected quickly in one instant. 444 Here there is no distinction between initial, intermediate and final minds.

<sup>443</sup> *Uṣmagata*, *mūrdhan*, *kṣānti* and *laukikāgradharma* are the four auxiliaries of the stage of penetration (*nirvedhabhāgīya*) of the Buddhist Truths and are practiced during the preparatory Path (*prayogamārga*) immediately preceding the Path of seeing the truths (*darśanamārga*): see above, p. 395F, n.

Right view (samyagdṛṣṭi) is associated with right conceptualizing (samyaksaṃkalpa), right effort (samyagvyāyāna), right mindfulness (samyaksmṛṭi), right concentration (samyaksamādhi); and the threefold morality [consisting of samyagvāc, samyakkarmānta and samyagājīva)] functions in concomitance with these five members (read wou fen):

- 1) Right view (samyagdṛṣṭi) distinguishes the beautiful and the ugly and deals with the good (hita).
- 2) Right intention (samyaksamkalpa) deals with encouraging right view.
- 3-5) Right speech (samyagvāc), etc., [namely, samyakkarmānta and samyagājīva) maintains all the qualities (guṇa) of this wisdom so that they are not lost.
- 6) Right effort (samyagvyāyāma) encourages wisdom so that it advances rapidly and does not stop.
- 7) Right mindfulness (samyaksmṛṭi) recalls and never forgets the seven things to be done.
- 8) Right concentration ( $samyaksam\bar{a}dhi$ ) makes the mind pure, free from stains ( $kas\bar{a}ya$ ) and distraction (viksepa). It assures the success (siddhi) of right view and the seven [preceding] members. It is like a lamp ( $d\bar{p}a$ ) inside a house sheltered from the wind that burns brightly.

In this way pure morality (anāsravaśīla) occurs in the eightfold noble Path and is praised by the sages (vijāpraśasta).

# 4. Impure morality

Question. – We accept that pure morality  $(an\bar{a}srava\acute{s}\bar{\imath}la)$  must be praised by the sages; but why praise impure morality  $(s\bar{a}srava\acute{s}\bar{\imath}la)$ ?

Answer. – Impure morality is similar to pure morality and, in harmony with it, implements causes and conditions [for salvation]. This is why the sages praise it jointly. Suppose that, in a band of brigands, someone rebels and comes to confide in me. Brigand though he was, now he is coming to me and I must welcome him. I am able to use him to destroy the thieves. Why should one not remember that these thieves that are the negative emotions (*kleśa*) are in the ramparts of the threefold world (*traidhātukanagara*)?

These roots of good (kuśalamūla) constituting impure morality (sāsravaśīla) that are called heat (uṣmagata), summits (mūrdhan), patience (kṣānti) and supreme worldly dharmas (laukikāgradharma) are indeed superior to other [good]-impure (kuśalasāsrava) dharmas. This is why the yogin uses them: it is thanks to them that he can destroy the brigands that are the disturbing emotions (kleśa) and that he can obtain the precious pure dharma (anāsrvadharma) that is the duḥkhe dharmajñānakṣānti. That is why [this impure morality] is praised by the sages.

The preparatory Path is followed by the Path of seeing the truths consisting of sixteen mindmoments. Starting with the first, i.e., the *duḥkhe dharmajñānakṣānti*, the ascetic becomes an Ārya, a candidate for the first fruit. See above, p. 1067F.

This is the recollection of morality (*śīlānusmṛti*).

#### V. RECOLLECTION OF ABANDONMENT

In regard to the recollection of abandonment ( $ty\bar{a}g\bar{a}nusmrti$ ), there are two kinds of abandonment ( $ty\bar{a}ga$ ): i) abandonment consisting of generosity ( $d\bar{a}naty\bar{a}ga$ ); ii) abandonment of all the disturbing emotions ( $sarvakle\acute{s}aty\bar{a}ga$ ). [226c] Abandonment consisting of generosity is of two kinds: i) material gifts ( $\bar{a}mi\dot{s}ad\bar{a}na$ ); ii) gift of the Dharma ( $dharmad\bar{a}na$ ) or preaching. Altogether these three kinds of abandonment ( $trividhaty\bar{a}gas\bar{a}magr\bar{t}$ ) make up abandonment ( $ty\bar{a}ga$ ).  $^{445}$ 

#### 1. Material generosity

Material generosity  $(\bar{a}misad\bar{a}na)$  is the root  $(m\bar{u}la)$  of all good dharmas.

The yogin has the following thought: It is thanks to the first four recollections (*anusmṛti*) that I will succeed in curing the sicknesses of the disturbing emotions (*kleśavyādhi*). How am I going to get these four recollections? Now, in previous existences and in this present lifetime, the occasions of making gifts to the Three Jewels are rare. Why? In this beginningless universe (*anādiko lokadhātu*), beings are ignorant of generosity to the Three Jewels: this is why their merits (*punya*) become exhausted and disappear. But the Three Jewels have immense qualities: this is why gifts made to them are inexhaustible and necessarily lead to nirvāṇa. Furthermore, if the Buddhas of the past have first produced the mind, this was as a result of their numerous or less numerous gifts. And so the Buddha said that generosity is the first aid to Bodhi.

Furthermore, human life is impermanent (*anitya*) and wealth (*dhana*) slips by like a flash of lightning. If they should be given even when people do not ask anything of you, then why would you not give them when they beg of you to give them? It is necessary to give in order to create conditions favorable to Bodhi.

Furthermore, wealth is cause and condition for all kinds of disturbing emotions ( $kle\acute{s}a$ ) and misdeeds ( $\bar{a}patti$ ), whereas morality ( $\acute{s}\bar{\imath}la$ ), concentration ( $sam\bar{a}dhi$ ), wisdom ( $praj\~n\bar{a}$ ) and the various good dharmas are cause and condition for nirvāṇa. Consequently, if one must rid oneself of one's wealth [because it is dangerous], why not make a gift of it to the excellent field of merit (punyakşetra)?

[The two brothers who got rid of their gold]. – Thus, there were two brothers, older and younger who, without companions, went on a voyage, each carrying ten pounds of gold. The older said to himself: "Why should I not kill my younger brother and take his gold? On this deserted path, nobody would know." The younger, in turn, said to himself: "I should kill my older brother and take his gold." The two brothers each had evil plans; their words and their looks differed.

1156

These kinds of generosity have been mentioned above, p. 700F.

But the two brothers came to themselves and felt remorse (*kaukṛtya*): "How would we be any different from demons (*amanuṣya*) and beasts (*tiryagoni*)? We are brothers born of the same parents and, for the sake of a little bit of gold, we are having such bad feelings for each other."

Together they came to the shore of a deep lake. The older brother took his gold and threw it into the water. The younger brother said: "Good, good!!" and, in his turn, threw his gold into the water. The older brother, too, said: "Good, good!"

The two brothers asked each other why they had said it was good and each answered the other: "Because of this gold, we had bad feelings and wanted to kill one another. Now that we are rid of our gold, we say that it is good and we both agree."

This is why we know that it is always necessary to renounce one's wealth, the cause of bad feelings. Why then not give it away when, by giving it, one gains great merit (mahāpunya)? Thus it is said:

Generosity is a precious treasure

It is also a good friend (kalyāṇamitra).

It is beneficial from one end to the other,

There is nobody who can destroy it.

# [227a] Generosity is an umbrella of wondrous secrets:

It can keep off the rain of hunger and thirst.

Generosity is a solid vessel;

It can cross the ocean of poverty.

Avarice (*mātsarya*) is a calamity:

Because of it, one experiences sadness and fear.

Bathing it with the water of generosity

At once brings good fortune and happiness.

The miser deprives himself of clothing and food;

At the end of his life he has neither joy nor happiness.

Although he is reputed to be rich,

He is no different from the poor person.

The miser's home

Is like a burial mound or a tomb;

The beggars keep far away from it

And finally nobody comes near it.

This is why the miser

Is rejected by the sages.

Even if the breath of life is not exhausted

He is no different from a dead man.

The miser has neither merit nor wisdom:

He is not firmly resolved to give.

About to fall into the pit of death,

His love of saving changes into suffering and hate;

Only his tears will depart with him,

The fire of sadness and regret will burn his body.

The good donor is happy

And, after death, has no suffering.

The person who practices generosity,

His renown fills the ten directions.

He is loved by the sages,

Entering into their assemblies, he is not afraid.

When his life over he is reborn among the gods

And in time he will certainly gain nirvāṇa. 446

446 The last two stanzas are to be compared with Anguttara, III, p. 40: *Dadam piyo bhajanti nam bahū* ...devānam sahavyagatā ramanti te.

Their Sanskrit correspondent is in the Sanskrit Mahāparinirvāṇasūtra, p. 189-190: *Dadat priyo bhayati bhajanti taṇ janāḥ ... devānāṃ syabhāyagatā ramanti te.* 

Condemning avarice (*mātsarya*) in many ways and praising generosity (*dāna*) is called 'recollection of material generosity' (*āmiṣadānānusmṛti*).

#### 2. Generosity of the Dharma

How is generosity of the Dharma (dharmadāna) recollected?

The yogin has the following thought: The benefits of generosity of the Dharma are very great: it is because of generosity of the Dharma that all the disciples ( $\dot{s}r\bar{a}vaka$ ) of the Buddha have found the Path.

Moreover, the Buddha said: "Of the two kinds of generosity, generosity of the Dharma is foremost." Why?

The retribution (*vipāka*) for material generosity (*āmiṣadāna*) is limited whereas the retribution of generosity of the Dharma is immense. Material generosity is rewarded in the desire realm (*kāmadhātu*) whereas generosity of the Dharma is rewarded in the threefold world (*traidhātuka*) and also beyond the threefold world

If the ascetic does not seek glory (śloka), profit (lābha) or power (prabhāva), if he exerts himself solely in the Path of the Buddhas and develops great loving-kindness (mahāmaitrī) and great compassion (mahākaruṇā), if he saves beings from the suffering of birth, old age (jarā), sickness (vyādhi) and death (maraṇa), then this is 'pure generosity of the Dharma' (viśuddhadharmadāna). Otherwise, it is only a business deal or a barter.

Moreover, when material generosity is practiced widely, wealth is exhausted; on the other hand, when generosity of the Dharma is practiced widely, the Dharma grows. Material generosity that has existed for countless generations is an old habit; on the other hand, generosity of the Dharma which did not exist before the blossoming of the holy Dharma (*saddharma*) is something new.<sup>448</sup>

Material generosity remedies only hunger and thirst ( $k\bar{s}utpip\bar{a}s\bar{a}$ ), sicknesses ( $vy\bar{a}dhi$ ) of cold, heat ( $s\bar{t}tos\bar{n}a$ ), etc.; generosity of the Dharma can drive away the sicknesses of the ninety-eight defilements ( $kle\dot{s}a$ ). <sup>449</sup> [227b]

Transl.: The donor is precious; people love him; he wins renown and his glory increases. He enters the assembly undisturbed, for the man who is without miserliness is fearless. This is why the wise give gifts, having effaced the stain of avarice and seeking happiness. Established for a long time in the heavens, they enjoy themselves in the company of the gods.

<sup>447</sup> Anguttara, I, p. 91, etc., cited above, p. 699F, n. 1.

This consideration has already been developed above, p. 699-700F.

<sup>449</sup> The 98 *anuśaya*s: cf. Kośa, V, p. 9.

For all these reasons, a distinction is made between material generosity and generosity of the Dharma. The yogin should reollect the generosity of the Dharma.

Question. – What is generosity of the Dharma (dharmadāna)?

Answer. – Generosity of the Dharma is the fact of teaching others the twelve classes of texts preached by the Buddha (*dvādaśāṅgabuddhavacana*)<sup>450</sup> with a pure mind and in view of merit (*puṇya*).

Futhermore, generosity of the Dharma is also the fact of using magical power (rddhibala) so that people may find the Path. Thus it is said in the Wang-ming p'ou-sa king (Jālinīprabhabodhisattvasūtra or Viśeṣacintibrahmapariprcchā): "People who see the brilliance of the Buddha find the path and are reborn among the gods." 451

Therefore if, without saying anything vocally, one brings others to find the Dharma, that is generosity of the Dharma

In this gift of the Dharma, the mental nature ( $cittasvabh\bar{a}va$ ) of beings, the greater or lesser number of their defilements ( $kle\acute{s}a$ ), the sharpness ( $t\bar{\imath}k\bar{\imath}nat\bar{a}$ ) or dullness ( $mrdut\bar{a}$ ) of their wisdom ( $praj\tilde{\imath}a\bar{a}$ ) must be taken into consideration; it is necessary to be based on what can be useful to them in order to preach the Dharma to them. In the same way, the medicine ( $bhai\bar{\imath}ajya$ ) is regulated for the sickness ( $vy\bar{\imath}adhi$ ) for which it is efficacious.

There are people who are especially lustful (*rāgabahula*), especially hateful (*dveṣabahula*), especially stupid (*mohabahula*), combining two of these tendencies, or mixing all three. For the lusful, contemplation of the horrible (*aśubhabhāvanā*) is preached. For the hateful, loving-kindness (*maitrīcitta*) is preached; for the stupid, the profound co-dependent production of phenomena (*gamabhīrapratītyasamutpāda*) is preached; for those who combine two of these tendencies, both of these practices are preached; for those who mix all three, all three practices are preached. If one does not know the nature of the sickness and one errs in the medicine, the sickness gets worse.

Those who believe in the existence of beings (*sattva*) are taught that only the five aggregates (*pañcaskandha*) exist, and that there is no ātman in them. Those who deny the existence of beings are taught the renewing of the five skandhas serially (*pañcaskandhasaṃtāna*) so that they do not fall into [the wrong view] of nihilism (*ucchedavāda*).<sup>452</sup> To those who seek wealth, generosity is preached. To those who wish to be reborn among the gods, morality (*śīla*) is preached. To those who are afflicted, the things of the gods are preached. To unfortunate lay people (*grhasta*), the regulations of the monks (*pravrajita*) are

<sup>450</sup> For a detailed description, see above, p. 692-693F.

Viśeşacintin, T 585, k. 1, p. 1b20-22; T 586, K. 1, p. 33c14-15; T 587, k. 1, p. 62c24-26. In the last version, we read: "The Tathāgata has a brilliance called *tchou-yi* 'stable profit". When the Buddha walks to and fro, the soles of his feet shine and beings are touched by this light. Those who encounter this light are reborn after their death among the gods."

For the Viśeṣacintibrahmaparipṛcchā, see above, p. 1268F, n. 2.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>452</sup> In this first series of cases, the sermon is from the therapeutic point of view (*prātipakṣika siddhānta*): see above, p. 33-35F.

preached. To lay people who love money, the fivefold discipline (*pañcaśīla*) of the upāsaka is preached. To those who hate saṃsāra, the three seals of the Dharma (*dharmamudrā*), impermanence (*anitya*), non-self (*anātman*), nirvāṇa, are preached. 453

Being based on the doctrine of the sūtras, the preacher himself shows the meaning (artha) and the logic ( $ny\bar{a}ya$ ) and adorns the gift of the Dharma with comparisons ( $avad\bar{a}na$ ) in order to preach it to beings.

#### 3. Abandonment of the afflicting emotions

To destroy, to reject all [the afflicting emotions] from the three fetters  $(samyojana)^{454}$  up to the ninety-eight latent tendencies  $(anu\acute{s}aya)$  is called 'abandonment'  $(ty\bar{a}ga)$ . By recollecting the rejection of these things as one rejects venomous snakes  $(\bar{a}\acute{s}\bar{t}visa)^{455}$  or like shackles, one acquires salvation (yogaksema) and joy  $(pr\bar{a}modya)$ .

Furthermore, recollection of the abandoning of the disturbing emotions (*kleśatyāgānusmṛti*) also enters into recollection of the Dharma (*dharmānusmṛti*).

Question. – If it enters into the recollection of the Dharma, why speak of it again here?

Answer. – Abandonment of the disturbing emotions is something splendid ( $c\bar{a}ru$ ), difficult to acquire (durlabha), peerless (anuttara) and immense ( $param\bar{a}na$ ); this is why it is mentioned separately.

Furthermore, there is a difference between recollection of the Dharma and recollection of abandonment. To recollect the Dharma is to recollect the Dharma of the Buddha, the foremost of all good dharmas. To recollect abandonment is to recollect the disturbing emotions  $(\bar{a}patti)$  and sins  $(\bar{a}patti)$  insofar as they are quickly rejected. Since their aspects  $(\bar{a}k\bar{a}ra)$  are distinct, the two recollections are different. [227c]

For these many reasons, the yogin should recollect abandonment [of the disturbing emotions]. This recollection of abandonment consitutes the first practice of knowledge as dhyāna where there is a risk of experiencing pride (*abhimāna*).<sup>456</sup>

#### VI. RECOLLECTION OF THE DEITIES

#### 1. Recollection of the gods–by-birth

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>453</sup> In this second series of cases, the sermon is from the individual point of view (*prātipauruṣika siddhānta*); see above, p. 31-32F.

<sup>454</sup> Satkāvādrsti, śīlavrataparāmarśa and vicikitsā: cf. Kośa, V, p. 85; Pañcaviṃśati, p. 79, l. 8-9.

<sup>455</sup> See the apologue of the four venomous snakes in the *Aśīviṣopamasūtra*: see above, p. 702-707F; *Vimalakīrtinirdeśa*, p. 136-137, note.

<sup>456</sup> See Kośa, V, p. 27.

In this recollection of the gods (*devatānusmṛti*), it is a question [of the six classes of gods of kāmadhātu], from the Cāturmahārājakāyikas up to the Paranirmitavaśavartidevas.

Question. – The disciples (*śrāvaka*) of the Buddha should recollect the Buddha and the Dharma of the Buddha exclusively; why [still] recollect the gods?

Aswer. – As a reward for their actions, people receive the happiness of the heavens (*svargasukha*); this is why the deities [who live there] are recollected.

Furthermore, the Buddha himself gave the reasons for practicing the eight recollections and declared:

"The noble disciple who recollects the deities should have the following thought: 'The Cāturmahārājikadevas are born in their paradise as a result of five good qualities (kuśaladharma), namely, faith ( $śraddh\bar{a}$ ) in [the retribution] of  $\sin$  ( $\bar{a}patti$ ) and merit (punya), the observance of morality ( $ś\bar{\imath}la$ ), hearing the holy Dharma (saddharma), the practice of generosity ( $ty\bar{a}ga$ ) and the practice of wisdom ( $praj\bar{n}\bar{a}$ ). I too possess these five qualities and I rejoice, for it is said that the deities, as a result of these five qualities, have taken birth in the blessed abodes. I too who possess these qualities could be reborn there if that is what I wanted. But as the happiness of the paradises is transitory, I will not do so.' And the disciple will reason in the same way [for the other five groups of deities] up to and including the Paranirmitavaśavartindevas."457

Question. – In the threefold world ( $traidh\bar{a}tuka$ ), there are many pure deities [occupying rūpadh $\bar{a}$ tu and  $\bar{a}r\bar{u}py\bar{a}dh\bar{a}tu$ ]. Why recollect only the gods of the desire realm ( $k\bar{a}madh\bar{a}tu$ )?

Answer. – It is in the śrāvaka system that it is a matter of just recollecting [only the deities of kāmadhātu; but in the Māhayāna it is forbidden to recollect the deities of the threefold world.

The yogin who has not yet attained the Path very often is still attached in mind to the five objects of enjoyment ( $pa\tilde{n}cak\bar{a}maguna$ ) belonging to the world of men. This is why the Buddha recommends recollecting the deities. If the yogin has been able to cut through lust ( $r\bar{a}ga$ ), he will be reborn among the gods of the two higher realms [ $r\bar{u}$ padhātu and  $\bar{a}r\bar{u}$ pyadhātu]. If he has not been able to cut through lust, he will be reborn among the six classes of gods of the desire realm [ $k\bar{u}$ madhātu] where the five objects of enjoyment ( $pa\tilde{u}$ cak $\bar{u}$ maguna) are excellent ( $pran\bar{u}$ ta), subtle ( $s\bar{u}$ ksma) and pure (visuddha).

The Buddha does not want people to be reborn again and enjoy the five objects of enjoyment; but there are beings who are unable to enter into nirvāṇa, and it is these beings that the Buddha tells to recollect the deities.

\_

According to the Sanskrit Āgamas faithfully quoted here, recollection of the deities brings a rebirth solely among the six classes of gods of kāmadhātu. According to the Pāli Nikāyas, it can bring a rebirth, not only among the six classes of gods of kāmadhātu, but also among the Brahmakāyika gods of rūpadhātu and the gods higher than the latter. See the citations and references in the initial note to the present chapter, p. 1333F.

Thus, one day the son of a king  $(r\bar{a}japutra)$  was standing in a high and dangerous place: it was impossible to get him down and he was about to fall to the ground, The king sent someone to spread a thick mattress on the ground so that when the prince fell he would not be killed by being crushed on the ground.

# 2. Recollection of gods of native purity

Furthermore, there are four kinds of gods:<sup>458</sup> *i*) metaphorical gods (*saṃmatideva*), *ii*) gods by birth (*upapattideva*), *iii*) pure gods (*viśuddhideva*), *iv*) gods of native purity (*upapattiviusuddhideva*):

- i) The actual god called T'ien-tseu "Son of a god or Devaputra", for example, is a metaphorical god.
- *ii*) [All the deities of the threefold world] from the Cāturmahārājikas up to the neither-discriminting-nor-non-discriminating gods (*naivasamjñānāsamjñā deva*) are gods by birth (*upapattideva*).
- iii) All the holy individuals (āryapudgala) born among humans are gods by purity (viśuddhideva).
- *iv*) All the holy individuals born among the gods of the threefold world (*traidhātuka*) are gods by native purity (*upapattiviṣuddhideva*), namely:
- a. The *srotaāpanna* called *kulaṃkula* and the *sakṛdāgāmin* called *ekavīcika* who, in the paradises, sometimes attain the state of *anāgāmin* or *arhat* are the *upapattiviśuddhadeva*.
- b. In the form realm (*rūpadhātu*), there are five kinds of *anāgāmin* who are no longer reborn in this realm [i.e., kāmadhātu] but attain the state of arhat in rūpadhātu.
- c. In the formless realm  $(\bar{a}r\bar{u}pyadh\bar{a}tu)$ , there is a kind of  $an\bar{a}g\bar{a}min$  who, being detached from the form realm  $(r\bar{u}padh\bar{a}tu)$ , is reborn in the formless realm  $(\bar{a}r\bar{u}pyadh\bar{a}tu)$ , cultivates the pure path there, becomes arhat and enters into nirvāṇa. [228a]

Therefore we call recollection of the deities (*devatānusmṛti*) the fact of recollecting two kinds of deities: *i*) the deities by birth (*upapattideva*) and *ii*) the deities of native purity (*upapattiviśuddhadeva*).

#### VII. RECOLLECTION OF BREATHING

On recollection of inhalation and exhalation (ānāpānusmṛti) see what is said in the *Tch'an king* (Dhyānasūtra).<sup>459</sup>

#### VIII. RECOLLECTION OF DEATH

<sup>458</sup> See above, p. 331F and note 2.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>459</sup> Dhyānasūtra, already cited above, p. 1024F. See below, k. 24, p. 239b8; k. 28, p. 264c25; k. 91, p. 705b6.

In regard to recollection of death (*maraṇānusmṛti*), there are two kinds of death: *i*) death by oneself (*ātmanā maraṇam*), *ii*) death by another (*pareṇa maraṇam*). 460

The yogin always recollects these two types of death. If nobody kills it, this body will die necessarily by itself. 461 Not even for the time of a finger-snap (acchṭāsamghitātamātram) can one believe that this conditioned dharma (saṃskṛtadharma) which is the body will not die. At all times within this body, death is present without even waiting for old age (jarā). One cannot be based on this mass of sorrows (śoka), sufferings (upāyāsa) and decrepitude (parijūnya). The desire for life makes us hope for safety (yogakṣema) and immortality (amṛta), but this hope arises only in fools (mohapuruṣa). In the body, the four great elements are all destroyed. As long as a person carries the chest containing the [four venomous snakes (āśīviṣa), 462 how can the wise think of safety?

That exhalation  $(praśv\bar{a}sa)$  should be followed by inhalation  $(\bar{a}śvasa)$ , that inhalation should be followed by exhalation, that awakening  $(nidr\bar{a})$  should follow sleep (prabodha), all these things are difficult to guarantee. Why? Because internally as well as externally, the body has many enemies (vairin), Thus it is said:

```
Some die in the womb,
```

Some die at birth,

Some die at a ripe age,

Some die during old age.

In the same way, when the fruit is ripe

It falls for all kinds of reasons.<sup>463</sup>

Phalānam iva pakkānam pāto papatanā bhayam /
evam jatānam maccānam niccam maranato bhayam //

According to the sūtra, there are four ways of taking on a new existence (ātmabhāvapratilamba): 1) that in which one's own volition (ātmasamcetanā) is acting and not that of another (parasamcetana); 2) that in which the volition of others is acting and not one's own, etc. : cf. Dīgha, III, p. 231; Anguttara, II, p. 159; Kośa, II, p. 219.

According to the Visuddhimagga, p. 189, it is necessary to recollect death at the normal time (*kālamaraṇa*) resulting from exhaustion of merit (*puññakkhaya*), from exhaustion of the lifespan (*āyukkhaya*) or both, and death at abnormal time (*akālamaraṇa*) resulting from an action putting an end to the action producing life.

For "the end of life is death" (maranantam hi jīvitam): Dhammapada, v. 148.

<sup>462</sup> See the apologue of the four venomous snakes in the  $\bar{A}\dot{s}\bar{\imath}visopamas\bar{\imath}tra$ , above, p. 702-707F;  $Vimalak\bar{\imath}rtinirde\dot{s}a$ , p. 136-137, note.

<sup>463</sup> Cf. Suttanipāta, v. 576, p. 113:

People always seek to avoid

Death, the cruel and wicked thief.

But it is hard to believe

That one can ever escape this thief and find safety. 464

Imagine a great and wise man

Of unsurpassable power and strength:

Neither before nor after

Nor at present will he escape death. 465

There are no skillful words,

There are no supplications that can free one.

Thee is no fortified place

Where one can hide from it.466

Neither by observing pure morality

Nor by exertion can one elude it.

Death is a pitiless thief.

"When the fruits are ripe, it is to be feared that they may fall in the morning; in the same way, when mortals are born, they risk death perpetually."

464 In the Visuddhimagga, p. 190, death appears as a butcher (*vadhaka*) who threatens all beings and, as soon as they are born, holds a knife at their throats.

<sup>465</sup> If people of great fame, great merit, great strength, great supernatural powers, great intelligence, if the pratyekabuddhas and the samyaksambuddhas themselves do not escape death, how could a man like me do so ( $m\bar{a}disesu\ kath\bar{a}\ va\ k\bar{a}$ )? Cf. Visuddhimagga, p. 192-193.

466 Cf. Dhammapada, v. 128:

Na antalikkhe, na samuddamajjhe na pabbatānam vivaram pavissa / na vijjatī so jagatippadeso yatraṭṭhitam nappasahetha maccu //

"Neither in the sky, nor in the niddle of the sea, nor by crawling into mountain caves can one find any place in this world where death cannot vanquish us."

When it comes, there is no place to escape from it.

This is why, in the course of transitory and dangerous existence, the yogin should not think of or hope to live

[Maraṇasmṛtisūtra]. 467 – One day when the Buddha was speaking to the bhikṣus on the meaning of death (saraṇasaṇjñārtha), a certain bhikṣu, having arranged his upper robe over his left shoulder (ekāṇṣam uttarāṣaṅgam kṛtvā), said to the Buddha: "I can meditate on the meaning of death."

The Buddha asked him: "How do you meditate?"

The bhikṣu said: "I do not hope to live longer than seven years."

The Buddha said: "That is an unmindful way to meditate on the meaning of death."

Another bhikṣu said: "I do not hope to live longer than seven months." Another bhikṣu said seven days, and yet others said six, five, four, three, two or one day. The Buddha said to them: "All of you are meditating unmindfully on the meaning of death (maraṇasamiñā)."

467 A slightly different version of the *Maraṇasutta I* of the Anguttara, III, p. 303-306, or IV, p. 316-319, partially quoted in the Visuddimagga, ed. Warren, p. 196 which has its correspondent in the Ekottarāgama (Tseng yi a han, T 125, k. 35, p. 741c27-742b2). The Pāli sources place this sūtra at Nāndika in Giñjakāvasatha; the Sanskrit sources place it at Śrāvastī in the Jetavana in the garden of Anāthapiṇdada.

Here are translations of a few extracts from the Maranasatisutta: *Maranasati bhikkhave bhāvitā bahukulīkatā mahapphalā* ... ahaṃ bhante bhāvemi maranasatin ti.

This first monk who wished or hoped to live for one night and one day in order to meditate on the Buddha's teaching on death was followed by three others who wished to live for one day (*divasam*), for the time of one meal (*ekam pindapātam*), or for the time of eating and swallowing four or five morsels (*cattāro pañca ālope*), respectively.

The Buddha declared that these four monks live unmindfully (*pamattā viharanti*) and practice a lazy 'recollection of death' for destroying impurities (*dandhaṃ maraṇasatiṃ bhāventi āsavānaṃ khayāya*).

Finally, two other monks came who wished to live the time of eating and swallowing a single morsel (*ekaṃ ālopam*) or even the time between an inbreath and an outbreath, or the time of a single inahalation (*yadantaraṃ assasitvā vā passasāmi passasitvā vā assasāmī*) in order to meditate on the Buddha's teaching on death.

The Buddha declared that these two monks lived without unmindfulness (*appamattā viharanti*) and practiced a 'recollection of death' effective in destroying the impurities (*tikkhaṃ maraṇasatiṃ bhāventi khayāya*).

According to the Ekottarāgama (l.c., p. 742a23), the monk who was certain of living only the time of one inbreath or outbreath was Vakkhali, well known by his suicide (Saṃyutta, III, p. 119-124).

One bhikṣu said [that he did not hope to live longer than one morning], fom morning until mealtime. Yet another, that he did not hope to live longer than a single meal (*eka piṇḍapāta*). The Buddha declared: "You also are meditating unmindfully on the meaning of death."

Finally a bhikṣu, having arranged his upper robe over is left shoulder, said to the Buddha: "[I hope to live only as long as the time needed] for an outbreath (yāvat prāśvasāmi) without waiting for the next inbreath, or the time required for an inbreath (yāvad āśvasāmi) without waiting for the next outbreath." The Buddha declared: "That is true meditation on the meaning of death, without unmindfulness. O bhikṣus, all conditioned dharmas (saṃskṛtadharma) arise and perish from moment to moment. Their time of duration (sthitikāla) is very brief. They are like a magic show (māyopama), deceiving the ignorant yogins." 468

It is for these many reasons that one recollects death.

## IX. LOGICAL ORDER OF THE EIGHT RECOLLECTIONS

Question. – The Dharma is the teacher  $(\bar{a}c\bar{a}rya)$  of all the Buddhas of the three times. Why then recollect the Buddha first? What is the order (anukrama) of the eight recollections?

Answer. -1-3) Although the Dharma is the teacher of the Buddhas of the three times (tryadhvan) and the ten directions, it is the Buddha who preached the Dharma because his skill is great.

[The king who built a ladder to facilitate the ascent of a mountain.] – In the Himavat there was a precious mountain (ratnagiri) at the summit of which there was a precious wish-fulfilling stone (cintāmaṇiratna) and all kinds of precious substances. People wanted to climb up there: some, having climbed halfway, turned back; others turned back from near the summit.

There was a very virtuous king who, out of compassion for beings, had a huge ladder built (*mahāsopāna*). The entire population, great and small down to children of seven years, succeeded thus in climbing the mountain and gathered the wish-fulfilling jewel and all kinds of precious substances as they pleased (*yatheṣṭam*).

It is the same for the Buddha. The 'precious mountain' is the true nature of all dharmas of the world The ninety-six kinds of heretics<sup>470</sup> cannot reach it; even Brahmā Devarāja who seeks the true nature of dharmas

Ekottarāgama (1.c., p. 742a27-29): "All formations (*saṃskāra*) are empty (*śūnya*) and calm (*praśānta*). That which is born and that which dies is a magical creation, without true reality."

469 Shortly after his enlightenment, the Buddha looked in the heavens and on earth for someone to venerate and serve. Finding nobody worthy of his homage, he chose the Dharma as his teacher. See the *Gāravasutta* of the Saṃyutta, I, p. 138-149 (T 99, no. 1188, k. 44, p. 321a27; T 100, no. 101, k. 5, p. 410a3-b9). This sūtra has been quoted above, p. 586F.

<sup>470</sup> See above, p. 432F, n. 1, and later k. 27, p. 261a15-16; k. 36, p. 325c11; k. 40, p. 349b22; k. 49, p. 412b5; k. 74, p. 581b18. Except for the Ekottarāgama, in the canonical scriptures no mention is made of these 96 sects.

cannot find it. What then could be said for other people? In his great loving-kindness ( $mah\bar{a}maitr\bar{i}$ ) and great compassion ( $mah\bar{a}karun\bar{a}$ ), the Buddha has pity on beings. Endowed with the six perfections ( $p\bar{a}ramit\bar{a}$ ) and possessing omniscience ( $sarvaj\bar{n}\bar{a}na$ ), wisdom ( $praj\bar{n}\bar{a}$ ) and skillful means ( $up\bar{a}ya$ ), he preaches the 'ladder' of the twelve classes of texts ( $dv\bar{a}da\acute{s}angabuddhavacana$ ) and the eighty-four thousand articles of the Dharma ( $catura\acute{s}\bar{t}tidharmaskandhasahasra$ ). A-jo-kiao-tch'en-jou ( $\bar{A}j\bar{n}\bar{a}takaundinya$ ),  $^{471}$   $Ch\ddot{o}$ -li-fo ( $^{\circ}\bar{b}ariputra$ ), Mou-k'ien-lien (Maudgaly $\bar{a}yana$ ), Mo-ho-kia-ch $\bar{o}ariputra$ 0 (Mah $\bar{a}ariputra$ 3) and even  $^{\circ}\bar{a}ariputra$ 3 and even  $^{\circ}\bar{a}ariputra$ 3.  $^{\circ}\bar{b}ariputra$ 472 (Sumana), all obtained the pure dharmas ( $an\bar{a}sravadharma$ 4), the faculties (indriya4), the powers (bala6), the [factors] of enlightenment (sambodhyanga6) and the true nature ( $bh\bar{u}talaksana$ 6). Althought this pure nature is wondrous, all beings who receive the kindness of the Buddha obtain it. This is why recollection of the Buddha comes first.

Next comes recollection of the Dharma and recollection of the Samgha Since the Samgha is based on the word of the Buddha to explain the Dharma, it comes third. On the other hand, other men cannot explain the Dharma, whereas the Sa<sup>a</sup>gha can: this is why it is described as a Jewel (*ratna*).

The Buddha is the Jewel among men; the Jewel among the ninety-six heretical systems is the Dharma of the Buddha; the Jewel among all the communities is the Samgha.

Finally, it is because of the Buddha that the Dharma appeared in the world and it is because of the Dharma that there is a Sa<sup>a</sup>gha.

4) The yogin wonders how to obtain the Jewel of the Dharma. By including himself in the ranks of the Sa<sup>a</sup>gha, he will avoid all misdeeds (duṣkṛta), gross ( $aud\bar{a}rika$ ) or subtle ( $s\bar{u}kṣma$ ) of body ( $k\bar{a}ya$ ) or speech ( $v\bar{a}c$ ). This is why morality ( $s\bar{i}la$ ) is listed next. [228c]

Below, k. 20, p. 271b27-c2, the *Traité* will return to this Sumana, also called Sumanas or Karṇasumana: "The bhikṣu Karṇasumana, in a previous lifetime, saw the stūpa of the Buddha Vipaśyin and gave it the sumanā flower that he was wearing behind his ear. As a result of this, for eighty-one kalpas he enjoyed happiness among gods and men and, in his last lifetime, he had behind his ear a sumanā flower the perfume of which filled the whole house; this is why he was called Karṇasumana. Then, disgusted with the world, he went forth from home and obtained the Bodhi of the Arhats."

For this legend and others connected to him, see the Anavataptagāthā, ed. Bechert, p. 109-115; transl. Hofinger, p. 205-207; Fo wou po ti tseu, T 199, p. 191b23-191c22; Mūlasarv. Vin., Gilgit Man., III, part 1, p. 180-181, and T 1448, k. 16, p. 79c1-29; Pāli Apadāna, p. 117; Theragāthā, p. 38, 46; Mahākarmavibhaṅga, p. 101; Avadānaśataka, II, p. 67-71 (200, k. 9, p. 245a3-b2); Commentary of the Dhammapada, IV, p. 120-137; Milindhapañha, p. 115, 291, 350.

When he was but seven years of age, Sumana was ordained by Aniruddha (Comment. on Dhammapda, IV, p. 136, l. 12). He may be identified, perhaps, with the Sumana who represented the monks from Pāvā at the second Council at Vaiśālī (Vinaya,II, p. 305; Dīpavaṃsa, IV, v. 51; Mahāvaṃsa, IV, v. 49, 59).

One of the first five disciples of Śākyamuni who witnessed the austerities of the Buddha and benefited from the Sermon at Benares: Vinaya, I, p. 12; Catuṣpariṣad, p. 152. The *Traité* has mentioned him above, p. 102F.

5) How does the yogin [who practices these first four recollections] differ from the seven categories [of disciples of the Buddhal?<sup>473</sup>

Possessing morality (śīla), the yogin wants to avoid the sins of mind (cittaduṣkṛta), [namely, covetousness (abhidhyā), malice (vyāpāda) and wrong view (mithyadṛṣṭi).

- a. Recollecting generosity (no. 5), he destroys greed (abhidhyā).
- b. Wanting the recipients of generosity (pratigrāhaka) to find happiness, he destroys malice (vyāpāda).
- c. Thinking of merit (punya) and its fruit of retribution (vipākaphala), he destroys wrong view (mithyādṛṣṛṭi).

Dwelling thus in the rules of morality (no. 4) and of generosity (no. 5), the vogin becomes established in the ten good paths of action (daśakuśalakarmapatha)<sup>474</sup> and escapes from the ten bad paths of action (daśākuśalakarmapatha).

- 6) The ten good paths of action have two kinds of fruits (phala):
- a. those who practice them in a superior way are reborn among the pure gods (viśuddhadeva) [of rūpa- and ārūpvadhātu].
- b. those who practice them in a medium way are reborn among the gods [of kāmdhātu].

This is why the yogin recollects the deities (no. 6) after morality (no. 4) and generosity (no. 5).

By practicing the dhyānas and the samāpattis, he has access to the deities of the two higher realms, he destroys the bad investigations (vitarka), gathers only the good dharmas and concentrates his mind onepointedly.

This is why he recollects the deities (*devatānusmṛti*).

7) Next the yogin recollects inhalation and exhalatioin (ānāpāna). By recollecting the in-and outbreath, he is able to destroy bad investigations (vitarka) like the rain dampens the dust.<sup>475</sup>

The seven categories of disciples of the Buddha have been enumerated by the *Traité* above, p. 577F. These are the bhikṣu, bhikṣunī, śikṣamāṇā, śrāmaṇa, śrāmaṇerikā, upāsaka and upāsikā (for details, see Vibhāsā, T 1545, k. 123, p. 643c).

What distinguishes the yogin from these seven categories of disciples is that he does not limit himself to recollecting the Buddha, the Dharma, the Saagha and śīla, but also abandonment (tyāga). The first four recollections destroy only the first seven akuśalakarmapathas, namely, the sins of body and speech, whereas recollection of abandonment destroys also the last three akuśalakarmapathas, namely, the sins of mind.

 $<sup>^{473}</sup>$  The yogin who practices the recollections of the Buddha, the Dharma, the Sa<sup>a</sup>gha and sīla who is being considered here seems to be confused with the seven categories of the Buddha's disciples who, inspired with perfect faith (*āvetyaprasāda*), recollect the same subjects daily (cf. Dīgha, II, p. 93-94; III, p. 227; Samyutta, II, p. 69-70; V, p. 343. 365, 386-387; Anguttara, IV, p. 406-407; V, p. 183-184.).

<sup>474</sup> Listed above, p. 501F.

Seeing the breath coming in and going out, he understands the dangers that menace the body; it is because of the inbreath and the outbreath that the body is maintained alive.

This is why he recollects the inhalation and the exhalation (ānāpānānusmṛṭi.

8) Finally, the yogin recollects death (*maraṇa*). It may happen actually that, conscious of possessing the first seven recollections and basing himself on their virtues (*guṇa*), the yogin becomes lazy (*kausīdya*). It is at this moment that he should recollect death for, if the work of death is constantly present, how could he be lazy and be content with the qualities he has acquired?

Thus, at the Buddha's death, A-ni-liu (Aniruddha) said:

Conditioned dharmas are like clouds:

The wise man should not be proud of them.

When the thunderbolt of impermanence (anityatāvajra) strikes

It destroys the king of mountains that was the Holy Master (ārṣa). 476

This is the order of the eight recollections.

# Third Section THE RECOLLECTIONS ACCORDING TO THE MAHĀYĀNA

Question. – You have just set forth the eight recollections practiced by the śrāvakas. How do the eight recollections practiced by the bodhisattva differ?

Answer. – The śrāvakas practice for themselves whereas the bodhisattvas practice for all beings.

In the śrāvakas, they free only from old age  $(jar\bar{a})$ , sickness  $(vy\bar{a}dhi)$  and death (maraṇa), whereas in the bodhisattvas they perfect the qualities (guṇ a) of omniscience  $(sarvaj\~n\bar{a}na)$ . These are the differences  $(vi\acute{s}esa)$ .

Furthermore, here in the Prajñāpāramitasūtra (above, p. 650F), the Buddha said to Śāriputra: "The bodhisattva-mahāsattva who abides in the Prajñāpāramitā by the method of non-abiding (asthānayogena) should fullfil the perfection of generosity (dānapāramitā) and the other qualities up to the eight recollections (anusmṛti) by basing himself on their non-existence (anupalabdhitām upādāya)."

<sup>475</sup> Ānāpānasmṛṭi is the antodote to vitarka: see Kośa, VI, p. 153.

<sup>476</sup> The recensions of the Mahāparinirvāṇasūtra, Sanskrit (ed. Waldschmidt, p. 400) as well as Pāli (Dīgha, II, p. 157) attribute rather different stanzas to Aniruddha.

For the expression Cheng-tchou 'Holy Master' used to render the Sanskrit  $\bar{a}rsa$ , see below, p. 1592F, n. 1.

First there is non-abiding ( $asth\bar{a}na$ ) and then non-existence ( $anupalabdhit\bar{a}$ ): these are the two seals ( $mudr\bar{a}$ ) by means of which [the anusmṛti of the bodhisattvas] differ. For the meaning of this non-abiding and this non-existence, see what has been said above (p. 656-657F).

(A note in red says that the eight recollections are finished.)

# **CHAPTER XXXVII: THE TEN CONCEPTS**

# PRELIMINARY NOTE (p. 1431F)

Various partially overlapping lists of *saṃjñā* have already been mentioned above, p. 1311F.

1. In the Pāli Nikāyas, there are two different lists of ten *saññās*: the first, in Dīgha, III, p. 291; Saṃyutta, V, p. 132-133; Anguttara, V, p. 105, 309; the second in Anguttara, V, p. 109.

1 <sup>st</sup> list	2 <sup>nd</sup> list
1. asubha-	1. anicca-
2. maraṇa	2. anatta-
3. āhāre paṭikkūla-	3. asubha-
4. sabbaloke anabhirati-	4. ādīnava-
5. anicca-	5. pahāna-
6. anicce dukkha-	6. virāga-
7. dukkhe anatta-	7. nirodha-
8. pahāna-	8. sabbaloke anabhirati-
9. virāga-	9. sabbasankhāresu anicca-
10. nirodha-saññā.	10. ānāpānasati-saññā.

The saññās 1-7 of the first list are defined in Anguttara, IV, p. 46-53; the second list is explained in Anguttara, V, p. 109-112.

2. In the Prajñāpāramitā, the Sanskrit list in Pañcaviṃśati (ed. Dutt, p. 20, l. 5-8) mentions ten *saṃjñās*; on the other hand, the Sanskrit list in the Śatasāsrikā (ed. Ghosa, p. 60, l. 15-61, l. 6) mentions only six:

Pañcaviṃṣati	Śatasāhasrika
1. anitya-	1. anitya-
2. duḥkha-	2. duḥkha-
3. anātma-	3. anātma-

4. aśuci-	4. aśubha-
5. maraṇa-	
6. sarvaloke 'nabhirati-	5. sarvalokānabhirati-
7. sarvaloke 'viśvāsa-	6. aviśvāsa-saṃjñā.
8. patijaya-	
9. saṃvṛti-	
10. yathāruta-saṃjñānam.	

3. Ten *saṃjñā*s also appear in the Chinese version of the Pañcaviṃśati by Kumārajīva (T 223, k. 1, p. 219a11-13) and in the Chinese versions of *all* the Prajñāpāramitās by Hiuan-tsang (T 220, col. V, k. 3, p. 12a22-23; T 220, vol. V, k. 37, p. 204a18-19; T 220, vol. VII, k. 402, p. 7c1-3):

Kumārajīva	Hiuan-tsang
1. anitya-	1. anitya-
2. duḥkha-	2. duḥkha-
3. anātma-	3. anātma-
4. āhāre pratikūla-	4. aśuci-
5. sarvaloke 'nabhirati-	5. maraṇa-
6. maraṇa-	6. sarvaloke 'nabhirati-
7. aśuci	7. āhāre pratikūla-
8. prahāṇa-	8. prahāṇa-
9. virāga-	9. virāga-
10. nirodha-saṃjñā.	10. nirodha-saṃjñā.

4. It is probable that, from their divergence from the original Sanskrit of the Prajñāpāramitās, the Chinese versions were modeled on the list of ten *saṃjñā*s appearing in the Sarvāstivādin-Vaibhaṣika Abhidharmas (Jñanaprasthāna, T 1543, k. 27, p. 894b27-29;T 1013, k. 18, p. 1013c18-20; Vibhāṣā, T 1545, k. 166, p. 836c20-22):

1. amityā-, 2. anitye duḥkha-, 3. duḥkhe 'nātma-, 4. aśuci-, 5. āhāre pratikūla-, 6. sarvaloke 'nabhirati-. 7. maraṇa-, 8. prahāṇa-, 9. virāga-, 10. nirodha-saṃjñā.

[**229a**] *Sūtra* (cf. Pañcaviṃśati, p. 20, l. 5-9; Śatasāhasrikā, p. 60, l. 15-61, l. 6). – [The bodhisattva-mahāsattva should completely fulfill] the ten concepts (*daśa saṃjñāḥ*), namely:

- 1. impermanence (anityasamjñā),
- 2, suffering (duḥkhasamjñā),
- 3. non-self (anātmasamjñā),
- 4. the disgusting nature of food (āhāre pratikūlasaṃjñā),
- 5. distaste for the entire world (sarvaloke 'nabhiratisamjñā),
- 6. death (maraṇasaṃjñā),
- 7. impurity (aśucisamijñā),
- 8. abandonment (prahāṇasamjñā).
- 9. detachment (virāgasamjñā),
- 10. cessation (nirodhasamjñā).

Śāstra.-

#### I. THE CONCEPT OF IMPERMANENCE

Question. – Why are all the practices sometimes called knowledges ( $j\tilde{n}\bar{a}na$ ), sometimes recollections (anusmrti) and sometimes concepts ( $samj\tilde{n}\bar{a}$ )?

Answer. – When one begins to practice the good dharmas so as not to lose them, they are called recollections (anusmrii); when one develops the object (nimitta) and develops the mind (citta), they are called concepts (samjna); when one understands precisely (niyata) without feeling any doubts (vicikitsa), they are called knowledges (jnana).

The concept associated with the wisdom (*prajñāsaṃprayuktasaṃjñā*) that considers all conditioned dharmas (*saṃskṛtadharma*) to be impermanent (*anitya*) is called the concept of impermanence (*anityasaṃjñā*).<sup>477</sup>

All conditioned dharmas (saṃskṛtadharma) are impermanent because they arise and perish incessantly, because they depend on causes and conditions (hetupratyayāpekṣa) and because they do not entail any

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>477</sup> Cf. Anguttara, V, p. 109: *Idho bhikkhu araññagato... pañcasu upādānakkhandhesu aniccānupasī viharati*.

accumulation (*upacaya*). Furthermore, at the moment of their arising, they come from nowhere and, at the moment of their cessation, do not go anywhere: this is why they are said to be impermanent.

Furthermore, they are said to be impermanent because the two kinds of worlds (*loka*) are impermanent: beings (*sattva*) are impermanent and the universe (*lokadhātu*) is impermanent. Thus it is said:

The great earth and its plants and trees disappear.

Mount Sumeru crumbles and the ocean dries up,

The abodes of the gods are entirely consumed:

Is there anything then in the universe that is eternal?

The Venerable One with the ten strengths had physical splendor,

The light of his wisdom was immense;

He saved all beings,

His renown filled the ten directions.

But today when he has been wiped out, where is he?

Who is the sage who would not be grieved by it?<sup>478</sup>

In the same way, Śāriputra, Maudgalyāyana, Subhuti and other holy individuals (āryapudgala), noble cakravartin kings, sovereigns of nations, the kings of the ever-happy gods, the deities, saints, great virtuous people, noblemen, they too all perish. The flame and the brilliance of the great fire<sup>479</sup> disappears suddenly and the world is reduced to nothing, like a lamp exposed to the wind, like the tree growing on a dangerous shore, like the filter filled with water that empties immediately. Therefore there is 'impermanence', because all beings and all the abodes of beings are transitory.

Question. – Why does the bodhisattva practice this concept of impermanence?

Answer. – Because beings who are victim to the mistake of taking what is impermanent to be eternal (*anitye nitya iti viparyāsaḥ*) undergo the mass of suffering and do not succeed in escaping from saṃsāra. [229b]

Sarvabhūtani loke 'smin nikṣepsyanti samucchrayam / evaṃvidho yatra śāstā lokeṣv apratipudgaḥ / tathāgatabalaprāptaḥ cakṣuṣmān parinivṛtaḥ //

479 The fire at the end of the kalpa.

Variations on the stanzas of lamentation uttred by the disciples at the death of the Buddha (above, p. 88-89F, Cf. the stanza of Brahmā in the Sanskrit Mahāparinirvāṇa, p. 400:

The yogin who possesses this concept of impermanence converts (*paripācayati*) beings, saying to them: "All dharmas are impermanent; do not become attached to the notion of eternalism; you will then lose the opportunity to practice the Path."

The four noble Truths ( $\bar{a}ryasatya$ ) are the supreme and wondrous teaching of the Buddha; of these Truths, the first is the truth of suffering (duhkhasatya), and the aspect of impermanence ( $anity\bar{a}k\bar{a}ra$ ) is the first aspect [of the truth of suffering]. <sup>480</sup> This is why the bodhisattva practices the notion of impermanence.

Question. – But there are people who still feel attached to impermanent things when they are present.

[The king who was attached to his wife because old age would make her ugly]. – There was a king who had a wonderful wife who had been born from the womb of the earth. In the form of a ten-headed rākṣasa, she was about to cross the great ocean. The king was very sad. A wise minister consoled him: "The king is endowed with the power of knowledge (jñānabala) and he [knows well] that the queen will return very soon. Why does he feel sad?" The king replied: "What saddens me is not to think that my wife cannot return; I am only afraid [that on her return] her youth will already have passed."

In the same way, seeing beautiful flowers or lovely fruits about to fade, people are even more attached to them. Thus, when one knows that things are impermanent, one develops even more fetters (*saṃyojana*). How can you say that impermanence calls forth disgust (*udvega*) and breaks the fetters?

Answer. – Seeing impermanence in that way is to understand only a small part of it (kamcid eva pradeśam) and not to realize it completely. You will be no different than the animals that see impermanence in this way. This is why, [here in the Prajñāpāramitasūtra], the Buddha tells Śāriputra that 'the concept of impermanence must be completely perfected' (anityasamjñā paripūrayitavyā).

Question. – Then what is this 'perfect' concept of impermanence?

Answer. – It is observing that conditioned dharmas (*saṃskṛtadharma*) arise and perish from moment to moment like dust blown by the wind, like water rushing down from the mountain, like the flame that is extinguished. Conditioned dharmas are without solidity or vigor; they cannot be grasped or retained; like magical fabrications (*nirmāṇa*), they deceive worldlings (*pṛthagjana*).

Thanks to this impermanence, the yogin succeeds in breaking through the threshold of emptiness ( $ś\bar{u}nya$ ) and, since no dharma exists in emptiness, it too is nonexistent. How is that? Birth ( $utp\bar{a}da$ ), duration (sthiti) and destruction (bhanga) do not co-exist in one and the same moment (kṣana); at the moment of birth, duration and destruction cannot exist; at the moment of duration, birth and destruction cannot exist; at the moment of destruction, birth and duration cannot exist. Birth, duration and destruction are mutually opposed (virodha) to one another in their characteristics (lakṣana) and their nature ( $svadbh\bar{a}va$ ); they do not exist together. Since they do not exist, neither does impermanence (anitya) exist.

Question. – If there is no impermanence, why did the Buddha speak of impermanence in regard to the truth of suffering (*duhkhasatya*)?

<sup>480</sup> Anitya is the first of the sixteen aspects ( $\bar{a}k\bar{a}ra$ ) characterizing the noble truths: see above, p., 641F.

Reasoning borrowed from Madh. kārikā, VIII, 2, p. 146; see above, p. 37F and note.

Answer. – Worldly people (*pṛthagjana*) who produce wrong views (*mithyādṛṣṭi*) have claimed that the world is eternal (*nitya*). The Buddha spoke of impermanence in order to destroy this eternalistic view (śāśvatadṛṣṭi) and not because he considered impermanence to be real (*bhūta*).

Furthermore, before the Buddha appeared in the world, ordinary people used only conventional means to remove the disturbing emotions (*kleśa*). But today, when it is a question of uprooting the roots of the disturbing emotions (*kleśamūla*), the Buddha speaks of impermanence.

Furthermore, heretical systems (*tīrthikadharma*) speak of deliverance (*vimukti*) when one is only apparently liberated from the five objects of enjoyment (*pañca kāmaguṇa*), but the Buddha has said: "It is on account of wrong concepts that one is bound up, and it is by considering the correct concept of impermanence that one is liberated (*vimukta*)."

Furthermore, there are two ways of thinking about the notion of [229c] impermanence: i) that which entails a residue, ii) that which does not entail a residue. Thus the Buddha said: "When all the beings and all the things have disappeared and only their names remain, impermanence 'involves a residue'; when all the beings and all the things have disappeared and their names have also disappeared, impermanence 'does not involve a residue'.

There are also two other ways of thinking about impermanence: *i*) the death of the body and its destruction; *ii*) births and deaths without continual renewal.

Furthermore, some say that morality ( $\dot{s}\bar{n}a$ ) is the most important. Why? Because in dependence on morality one obtains the cessation of the impurities ( $\bar{a}sravak\bar{s}aya$ ). – Others say that learning ( $bahu\dot{s}ruta$ ) is the most important. Why? Because in dependence on wisdom ( $praj\tilde{n}a$ ) the result is obtained. – Others say that meditative stabilization ( $sam\bar{a}dhi$ ) is the most important, for the Buddha said: "Concentration can attain Bodhi." 482 – Others say that the twelve strict observances ( $dh\bar{u}taguna$ ) are the most important. Why? Because they purify the practice of morality.

This is how each one, maintaining his own practice as the most imp[ortant, does not seek nirvaṇa diligently. But the Buddha said: "These qualities (guṇa) all lead to fractions of nirvaṇa; however, the consideration of the impermanence of dharmas (anityānupaśyanā) is the true path to nirvāna." 484

For all these reasons and even though dharmas are empty, the Buddha preached the concept of impermanence.

Finally, the concept of impermanence is synonymous with the noble Path (āryamārga). The Buddha designated the Path by all kinds of different names: sometimes he called it the four foundations of

<sup>483</sup> Twelve *dhūtaguṇa* according to the Sanskrit sources (Mahāvyut., no. 1127-1139); thirteen *dhūtanga* according to the Pāli sources (Vinaya, V, p. 131, 193; Visuddhimagga, p. 48-67).

<sup>482</sup> Cf. Anguttara, II, p. 45: Samādhibhāvanā bhāvitā bahulīkatā diṭṭhadhammasukhavihārārya... ñānadassanapatilābhāva samvattati.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>484</sup> Cf. Anguttara, IV, p. 46: *Satt' imā saññā bhāvitā bahulīkatā mahapphalā honti mahānisaṃsā amatogadhā amatapariyosānā*.

mindfulness (*catvari smṛtyupasthānāni*), sometimes he called it the four Truths (*catvāri satyāni*), sometimes the notion of impermanence.

[Anityatāsūtra]. – This is what is said in a sūtra:

"If the notion of impermanence is properly cultivated, it destroys all attachment to desire  $(k\bar{a}mar\bar{a}ga)$ , all attachment to subtle matter  $(r\bar{u}par\bar{a}ga)$ , all attachment to the formless  $(\bar{a}r\bar{u}pyar\bar{a}ga)$ , all pride  $(asmim\bar{a}na)$  and all ignorance  $(avidy\bar{a})$ ." 485

Thus it eliminates the fetters of the threefold world (*traidhātukasaṃyojana*). This is why it is synonymous with Path.

This concept of impermanence is sometimes impure  $(s\bar{a}srava)$  and sometimes pure  $(an\bar{a}srava)$ . When it understands impermanence correctly, it is pure; when it begins to study impermanence, it is impure.

In the Mahāyāna, the bodhisattvas with vast mind convert beings in many ways: this is why their notion of impermanence is both impure and pure.

If it is pure, it occurs in nine levels (*bhūmi*); if it is impure, it occurs in eleven levels.<sup>486</sup>

It has as object (ālambate) the five aggregates of attachment (upādānaskandha) of the threefold world. It is associated with four dominant organs (indriya), except that of unpleasantness (duḥkendriya). 487

For all the reasons given here, worldly people (*pṛthagjana*) and the saints (*ārya*) extol the qualities (*guṇa*) of the concept of impermanence.

## II. THE CONCEPT OF SUFFERING

In regard to the concept of suffering (duḥkhasaṃjñā), the yogin says to himself that all conditioned dharmas (saṃskṛtadharma), being impermanent (anitya), are painful (duḥkha).<sup>488</sup>

<sup>485</sup> Literal citation from a sūtra in Saṃyukta (T 99, no. 270, k. 10, p. 70c6-7) entitled *Chou king* 'Sūtra of the Tree'. Its correspondent is the *Aniccatāsutta* of Saṃyutta, III, p. 156, the wording of which is only slightly different: *Aniccasañnnā bhikkhave bhāvita bahulīkatā sabbaṃ kāmarāgaṃ pariyādiyati sabbaṃ rūparāgaṃ pariyādiyati sabbaṃ bhavarāgaṃ pariyādiyati sabbaṃ asmimānam pariyādiyati samāhanti.* 

<sup>486</sup> The term  $k\bar{a}ma$ -,  $r\bar{u}pa$ - and  $\bar{a}r\bar{u}pya$ - $r\bar{a}ga$  designates attachment in regard to the threefold world. According to Kośa, V, p. 8,  $k\bar{a}mar\bar{a}ga$  means attachment to  $k\bar{a}madh\bar{a}tu$ ;  $bhavar\bar{a}ga$ , attachment to the two higher realms,  $r\bar{u}pa$ - and  $\bar{a}r\bar{u}pyadh\bar{a}tu$ .

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>487</sup> See Kośa, I, p. 101.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>488</sup> The notion of suffering must bear upon all formations without distinction (*sabbasankhāresu anodhim karitvā*): Anguttara, III, p. 443.

Question. – If conditioned dharmas, as impermanent, are painful, are the dharmas of holy persons (āryapudgala), conditioned but pure (saṃskṛtānāsravadharma), also painful?

Answer. – Although dharmas are impermanent, only those who become attached to them experience suffering; those who are not attached to them are without suffering.

Question. – There are saints who, without being attached to them, nevertheless undergo suffering. Thus *Chö-li-fou* (Śāriputra) suffered from sicknesses of wind and heat, \*489 *Pi-ling-k'ie-p'o-ts'o* (Pilindavatsa) suffered from eye disease, \*490 and \*Lo-p'o-na-po-t'i (Lavaṇabhadrika) [Note by Kumārajīva: 'the foremost of the children who bawl a lot': Rāvaṇabhadrika?] suffered from hemorrhoids. \*491 Why do you say that they have no suffering?

489 According to the Vinayas, Śāriputra suffered from *kāyaḍāha* 'fever' (Pāli Vin., I, p. 214), a wind sickness (Dharmagupta Vin., T 1428, k. 42, p. 867b29-c19) of hot blood (Sarv. Vin., T 1435, k. 26, p. 190c24-191a8), of *dhātuvaiṣamya* 'unbalanced humors' (Mūlasarv. Vin., Gilgit Man., III, part 1, p. 239, l. 18-240, l. 22), of wind and hot blood (Mūlasarv. Vin, T 1440, k. 4, p. 528c18-23). He was cured by fibers and roots (*bisa*) of the lotus plant (*mulālikā*), lotus sap (*bisakṣīra*) or also by wheat broth and wheat juice. Another time when he was suffering from stomach wind (*udaravāta*), he was cured by garlic (*laśuna*): cf. Pāli Vin, II, p. 140.

<sup>490</sup> Pilindavatsa's eye disease has already been noted above, p. 121F, but actually this arhat also suffered from migraines (*sīsabhitāpa*), a wind ailment (*vātābhāda*), rheumatism of the legs (*aṅgavāta*), articular rheumatism (*pabbavāta*), etc: Cf. Pāli Vin., I, p. 204-206.

The Turfan manuscripts, confirmed by the Mahāvyut., no. 1061, have transmitted to us the correct name of this arhat: Lavaṇabhadrika and not Lāvaṇyabhadrika as Hofinger proposes. The previous lives and last lifetime of this disciple are summarized in the Anavataptagāthā (ed. Bechert, p. 184-187; transl. Hofinger, p. 272-274; Fo wou po ti tseu, T 199, p. 200a22-b21; Mūlasarv. Vin., T 1448, k. 17, p. 89c11-90a11). The similarity of the stories of the previous lives of this arhat found in the Anavataptagāthā and in the Apadāna, II, p. 489-491 allow the identification of the Lavaṇabhadrika of the Sanskrit sources with the Lakuṇṭabhaddiya 'the good dwarf' of the Pāli sources; Saṃyutta, Iip. 279; Anguttara, I, p. 23 (where the Buddha proclaimed him to be foremost among those with gentle voices (aggaṃ mañjussarānaṃ); Udana, p. 76; Theragātha, p. 49, v. 466-472.

According to the Commentary of the Dhammapada, III, 453-454, the Buddha spoke two well-known stanzas in regard to Lakuṇṭaka (Dhammapada, v. 294-295; Gāndhārī Dharmapada, p. 120, v. 12; Udānavarga, p. 377, v. 24; p. 494-495, v. 61-62; Nettippakaraṇa, p. 165):

Mātaraṃ pitaraṃ hantvā rājāno dve ca khattiye /
raṭṭḥaṃ sānucaraṃ hantvā anīgho yāti brāhmano //
Mātaraṃ pitaraṃ hantvā rājāno dve ca sotthiye
veyyagghapañcamaṃ hantvā anīgho yāti brāhmaṇo //

Transl. – Having killed his mother (disturbing emotions) and his father (pride) and the two warriors (the view of eternalism and the view of nihilism), having destroyed the kingdom (the twelve

Answer. – There are two kinds of suffering: i) bodily suffering ( $k\bar{a}yika$  [230a] duhkha), ii) mental suffering (caitasika duhkha). By the power of their wisdom ( $praj\tilde{n}\bar{a}bala$ ), the holy individuals ( $\bar{a}ryapudgala$ ) have no further mental suffering like sadness (daurmanasya), jealousy ( $\bar{i}rsy\bar{a}$ ), malice ( $vy\bar{a}p\bar{a}da$ ), etc. On the other hand, because they have received a body composed of the four great elements ( $mah\bar{a}bh\bar{u}tamaya$ ) as a result of actions in their previous existences ( $p\bar{u}rvajanmakarman$ ), they still have bodily sufferings such as old age ( $jar\bar{a}$ ) and sickness ( $vy\bar{a}dhi$ ), hunger and thirst ( $ksutpip\bar{a}sa$ ), cold and heat ( $s\bar{t}tosna$ ), etc., but these bodily sufferings are slight and quite rare.

The saint may be compared to a man who, knowing himself to be burdened with a debt (*rna*) with regard to a third party, does not consider it to be painful to discharge the debt. By contrast, the man who does not remember his debt and from whom the creditor demands it forcibly is furious, angry and full of suffering.

Question. – Painful sensation (duḥkhavedanā) is a mental event (caitasika dharma) co-existing with the mind (citta). The body, like grass or wood, is disjunct from the mind and without reasoning (vitarka). How can you say that the holy person feels (vedayati) only bodily suffering?

Answer. – When the worldly person (*pṛthagjana*) feels suffering (*duḥkhaṃ vedayati*), his mind creates a pang of grief (*daurmanasya*) stimulated by the *anuśaya* (negative propensity) of hostility (*pratigha*); his mind is turned only toward the five objects of enjoyment (*pañcakāmaguṇa*). As the Buddha said:

[Śalyatvena sūtra]. – Worldly people do not know that, outside of the five objects of enjoyment, there is another way of getting out of suffering (na hi prajānati pṛthagjano 'nyatra pañcakāmaguṇebhyo duḥkhasya niḥsaraṇam). In pleasant feeling (sukhavedanā), he is stimulated by the propensity of lust (rāgānuśaya); [in unpleasant feeling (duḥkhavedanā), he is stimulated by the propensity of hatred (pratighānuśaya); in the feeling that is neither unpleasant nor pleasant (aduḥkhāsukhavedanā), he is stimulated by the propensity of ignorance (avidhyānuśaya). 492 When the worldly person feels suffering,

bases of consciousness) along with its inhabitants (joy and desire), the brahmin proceeds without confusion.

Having killed his mother and father, two learned kings and a tiger, (the five obstacles to dhyāna, the fifth of which, the tiger, is doubt), without confusion the brahmin goes forth.

These stanzas are specimens of intentional language (*abhisaṃdhi*, *abhiprāya*, *saṃdhābhāṣya*): cf. Abhidharmasamuccaya. ed. Pradhan, p. 106-107. They have taxed the ingenuity of interpreters: see the note of Bhikkhu Nānamoli, *Nettippakaraṇa*, tr., p. 218, and the detailed study of F. Bernhard, *Zur Textgeschichte und Interpretation der Strophen: Dhammapada 294, 295*, Festschrift für Wilhelm Eilers, 1968, p. 511-526.

In an appendix *Sur le moine Lo-siun-yu*, Lin Li-kouang (*L'Aide-Mémoire de la Vraie Loi*, 1949, p. 278-290) has grouped, under the general theme of a deformed monk, a whole series of arhats of various names among whom Lavaṇabhadrika appears as well as the bhikṣu Lo p'in tchou or Lo p'in tchou mentioned above (p. 931-932F and note) by the *Traité*.

The bad propensities of lust (*rāga*), hatred (*pratigha*) and ignorance (*avidyā*) often form a separate group (cf. Majjhima, III, p. 285; Saṃyutta, IV, p. 205), but also appear in the lists of six (Kośa, V, p. 2) or seven *anuśaya* (Dīgha, III, p. 254, 282; Saṃyutta, V, p. 60; Anguttara, IV, p. 9).

inwardly ( $adhy\bar{a}tman$ ) he undergoes the suffering of the threefold poison (triviṣaduḥkha) – [namely, desire ( $r\bar{a}ga$ ), hatred ( $dve\acute{s}a$ ) and delusion (moha) -], and outwardly ( $bahirdh\bar{a}$ ) he suffers cold and heat ( $\acute{s}toṣna$ ), the whip and the stick, etc., just as an inwardly feverish man also is burning externally. "

The [same] sūtra says: "When the worldly person loses a loved object, both his body and his mind suffer from it: it is as if he was being pierced by two arrows (tadyathainam dvābhyāmśalyābhyām vidheyuh). The saints, however, do not have the suffering of pangs of grief (daurmanasya): they have only the bodily suffering (kāyikaduhkha) and no other suffering." 493

493 Extracts from the *Sallattena sutta* of the Samyutta, IV, p. 207-210 (Tsa a han, T 99, no. 470, k. 17, p. 119c28-120b14): *Assutavā bhikkhave puthujjano dukkhāya vedanāya phuṭṭho samāno socati kilamati* ... dutiyena sallena anuvijjheyyum, evam hi so bhikkhave puuriso ekasallena vedanam vediyati.

Transl. – When the ignorant worldly person, O monks, is touched by an unpleasant feeling, he is upset, he is troubled, he laments, he beats his breast and becomes confused. Thus he is feeling two sensations, one bodily and the other mental. It is as if a man were pierced with one arrow and then pierced with a second arrow: this man feels the pain of both arrows.

Thus, O monks, the ignorant worldly person, being touched by an unpleasant feeling, is upset, troubled, laments, beats his breast and becomes confused. Then he feels two sensations, one physical and the other mental. Being touched by an unpleasant feeling, he is full of hatred. As he is full of hatred for the unpleasant sensation, the propensity of hatred for the unpleasant feeling lies within him. And this man, being touched by the unpleasant feeling, wishes for the happiness of pleasure. Why? Because the ignorant worldly person does not know that the exit from unpleasant feeling can be other than in the happiness of the pleasures.

Since he wishes for the happiness of the pleasures, the propensity of the lust for pleasant feeling lies within him, He does not properly know the origin and cessation of these feelings, their flavors, their disadvantages and the way to exit from them.

Since he does not correctly know the origin and cessation of feelings, their flavors, their disadvantages or the way of exit from them, the propensity of ignorance toward the feeling that is neither unpleasant nor pleasant lies within him.

If he experiences a pleasant feeling, he feels it like an obedient slave; if he experiences an unpleasant feeling, he feels it like an obedient slave; if he experiences a feeling neither pleasant nor unpleasant, he feels it like an obedient slave. This means, O monks, that the ignorant worldly person is subjugated by birth, death, sorrows, lamentations, sufferings, sadness, torments: I say that he is subjugated by suffering.

But the noble learned disciple, being touched by an unpleasant feeling, is not grieved, is not troubled, does not lament, does not beat his breast and does not fall into trouble. He experiences only one feeling, namely, bodily sensation and not mental sensation. It is as if a man were pierced by one arrow but not pierced by a second arrow: this man feel the pain of just one arrow.

The same reasoning is taken up again by the Milindapañha, p. 44 (transl. Horner, I, p. 61). See also P. Demiéville, *Les versions chinoises du Milindapañha*, p. 120-121.

Furthermore, suffering is associated with the five consciousnesses (*pañcavijñānaprayukta*), and the sufferings of the whip and the stick, of cold and heat, etc., due to external causes, are bodily sufferings. The others are mental sufferings.

Furthermore, I have said that pure conditioned dharmas (*saṃskṛtānāsravadharma*) are not suffering because [the saints] are not attached to them. But the body of holy individuals is impure (*sāṣrava*). Since impure dharmas (*sāṣravadharma*) are painful, what is the mistake [in asserting that the saints feel bodily suffering]? But in fact, these sufferings felt by their bodies are faint and rare.

Question. – If all that is impermanent is suffering, the Path  $(m\bar{a}rga)$  too is suffering. How can you drive suffering away with suffering? 494

Answer. – The aphorism "All that is impermanent is suffering" applies to the five aggregates of attachment (*upādānaskandha*), but the Path, although impermanent insofar as it is formation (*saṃskāra*), is not called suffering. Why? Because it destroys suffering and does not create attachment (*abhiniveśa*). United with the wisdoms of emptiness (*śūnya*) and non-self (*anātman*), it is impermanent but it is not suffering.

This is why the arhats, at the moment they obtain the Path, say the following stanza:

We do not rejoice in being reborn,

Neither do we rejoice in dying;

With mindfulness and awareness

We are waiting to leave when the time comes.<sup>495</sup>

When the Buddha entered nirvāṇa, Ānanda and the disciples not yet detached from passion (*avītarāga*), who had not yet cultivated the eightfold noble Path (*āryāṣṭāṅgamārga*), wept and lamented; the anāgāmins, detached from desire (*vītarāga*) were all frightened; the arhats whose impurities were destroyed (*kṣīṇāsrava*) remained impassive and only said: "The Eye of the world has disappeared too soon" (*atiksipram caksur lokasvāntarhitam*).<sup>496</sup>

Nābhinandāmi maraṇaṃ, nābhisandāni jīvitaṃ / kālañ ca paṭikaṅkhāmi sampajāno patissato ti //

It is frequently repeated with the variant *nibbisaṃ bhatako yathā* at the end. The Theragāthā, v. 1002, the Milinda, p. 45 and the Comm. on the Dīgha put it in the mouth of Sāriputta, but it was also pronounced by the theras Nisabha (Theragāthā, v. 196), Saṃkicca (v. 607), Revata (v. 655) and Aññākoṇdañña (v. 686).

496 Cf. Dīgha, II, p. 157-158, 162: Parinibbute bhagavati tattha ye te bhikkhū avītarāgā appekacce bāhā paggayha kandanti chinnapapātam papatani āvaṭṭanti vivaṭṭanti: atikhippam bhagavā parinibutto, atikhippam sugato parinibbuto, atikhippam cakkhum loke antarahitam ti. Ye pana te bhikkhū vītarāgā te satā sampajānā adhivāsenti: aniccā saṃkhārā taṃ kut'ettha labbhā ti.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>494</sup> In the hypothesis imagined, how could one drive away the suffering of saṃsāra by the suffering of the Path?

<sup>495</sup> A well-known stanza:

[238b] It is because they possessed the power of the Path that these arhats who had received great favors from the Buddha and appreciated his immense qualities (apramāṇaguṇa) did not experience any suffering. This is why we know that the Path, although impermanent, is not a cause of suffering and therefore it is not called suffering. Only the five aggregates of attachment (upadānaskandha) are suffering. Why? Because one clings to them, because they are impermanent and insecure.

Here in regard to the meaning of suffering (*duḥkhārtha*), what has been said above (p. 1158F) concerning vedanāsmṛtyupasthāna should be fully repeated.

Furthermore, those who possess a body (*dehin*) are always suffering (*sadā duḥkhita*),<sup>497</sup> but out of stupidity (*moha*), they do not take it into account. Thus it is said:

Since it is very tiring to ride a horse,

One looks for a place to stand up.

Since standing up is very tiring,

One seeks a place to sit down.

Transl. – On the death of the Blessed One, of the monks who were not yet free from desire, some raised their arms to the heavens uttering cries, others threw themselves down on the ground, turning to and fro, thinking: "The Blessed One has died too soon! The Blessed One has entered nirvāṇa too soon! Too soon has the Eye of the world disappeared from the world!" But the monks who were free from desire endured their grief with contemplation and lucidity, saying: "Impermanent are the formations. How could they not disappear?"

The version of the Sanskrit Mahāparinirvāṇasūtra, p. 400-402, 406-408, differs slightly: Tatraikatyā bhikṣavaḥ pṛthivyām āvartante parivartante. ekatyā bāhūn pragṛhya prakrośanti. evam cāhuḥ: atikṣipraṃ bhagavān parinirvṛtaḥ. atikaṣipraṃ sugataḥ parinirvṛtaḥ. atikṣipraṃ cakṣur lokasyānatarhitaḥ. ekatyās cetoduḥkhasamarpitās tiṣṭhanti. ekatyā dharmatām eva pratismaranti: prāg evāsmākaṃ bhagavatākhyātaṃ sarvair iṣṭaiḥ kāntaiḥ priyair manāpair nānābhāvo bhaviṣyati vinābhāvo viprayogo visaṃyogaḥ. kuta etal labhyaṃ yat taj jataṃ bhūtaṃ kṛtaṃ saṃskṛtaṃ vedayitaṃ pratītyasamutpannaṃ kṣayadharmaṃ vyayadharmaṃ vibhavadharmaṃ virodhadharmaṃ pralokadharmam na prarujyate nedaṃ sthānaṃ vidyate.

Transl. – Then some monks rolled about on the ground; others raised their arms to the heavens, uttering cries: "The Blessed One has died too soon! The Blessed One has entered nirvāṇa too soon! Too soon has the Eye of the world disappeared!" Others, filled with mental anguish, stood about and others yet recalled the nature of things and said: "Previously the Blessed One spoke to us about all these things that are hoped for, loved, cherished, pleasant but destined to division, to separation, to disjunction. How could it be that what is born, fabricated, conditioned, felt, resulting from causes, destructible, transitory, insecure, inconsistent, perishable, not be broken up? This possibility does not exist."

497 See above, p. 584F.

Since sitting down too long is very tiring,

One looks for a place to lie down in peace.

Much fatigue results from these activities,

What at first was pleasant then becomes painful.

To look straight ahead or to the side, to breathe in and out

To bend down, to stretch out, to sit down, to get up,

To walk or to stand still, to go or to come:

Nothing can be done without suffering.

Question. – "The five aggregates of attachment are suffering" (pañcopādānaskandhā duḥkham),<sup>498</sup> but it is as a result of a [subjective] notion of suffering (duḥkhasamjñā) that they are suffering. Actually, if everything is suffering, why did the Buddha say: "There are three kinds of feeling: pleasant feeling (sukhavedanā), unpleasant feeling (duḥkhavedanā) and feeling that is neither unpleasant nor pleasant (aduḥkhāsukhavedanā)?"<sup>499</sup> And if suffering comes from a [subjective] notion of suffering, how can you say that the [holy] truth of suffering (duḥkhasatya) concerns a real suffering?

Answer. – Yes, the five aggregates of attachment are suffering, but ordinary people (prthagjana), under the nfluence of the fourfold error ( $vipary\bar{a}sa$ ) and urged on by desire ( $k\bar{a}map\bar{\iota}dita$ ), consider the five objects of enjoyment as happiness (sukha). It is as though someone smeared ointment onto a man's ulcer (ganda) and when his suffering has stopped, he thinks this ulcer, which itself is not happiness, is happiness.

The Buddha spoke of three kinds of feelings in accordance with the views of the world (*loka*), but in reality (*tattvena*) there is no happiness there.<sup>500</sup> If there were truly happiness in the five aggregates of attachment

<sup>498</sup> *Saṃkṣiptena pañcopādānaskandhā duḥkham*: aphorism taken from the Sermon at Benares: Nidānasaṃyuktam p. 194; Catuḥpariṣad, p. 158; Pāli Vinaya, p. I, 10; Dīgha, II, p. 307; Saṃyutta, V, p. 421.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>499</sup> Digha, III, p. 275; Samyutta, II, p. 53, 82; IV, p. 207; Anguttara, III, p. 400; Itivuttaka, p. 46: *Tisso vedanā: sukā vedanā, duḥkhā vedanā, adukhamasukhā vedanā.* 

<sup>500</sup> In the Rahogatakasutta of Samyutta, IV, p. 216-217 (tsa a han, T 99, no. 476, k. 17, p. 121c), the Buddha explain to a bhikṣu: *Tisso imā bhikkho vedanā vuttā mayā sukha vedanā dukkhā vedanā adukkhamasukhā vedanā, imā tisso vedanāvuttā mayā. Vuttaṃ kho pantaṃ bhikkho mayā: Yaṃ kiñci vedayitaṃ taṃ dukkhasmin ti. Taṃ kho panetaṃ bhikkhu mayā saṅkhārrānaṃ yeva aniccataṃ sandhāya bhāsitam: Yam kiñci vedayitam tam dukkhasmin ti.* 

(upādānaskandha), why did the Buddha say: "The destruction of the five aggregates of attachment is happiness" (pañcopādānaskandhanirodhaḥ sukham)?"501

Furthermore, since the mind of happiness (*sukhacitta*) arises in relation to the loved object, happiness is not assured definitively (*niyata*). If happiness were assured, it would not depend on attachment of the mind (*cittābhiniveśa*) in the same way that if fire (*agni*) were really hot, it would not depend on kindling to heat up. But as happiness is not assured, here it is called suffering.

Furthermore, what the world wrongly considers to be happiness can create innumerable fruits of suffering (apramāṇaduḥikhaphala) in the present lifetime and in the future lifetime (ihaparatra): this is why it is called suffering. Just as a little bit of poison (viṣa) poured into the water of a big river cannot change the water, 502 so the poisonous plant that the world wrongly thinks [is happiness] is no longer visible in the great waters of suffering. Thus it is said:

When a being falls from the paradises and is reborn in hell

He remembers the former bliss of paradise:

The palace courtesans showed themselves to him in a crowd,

The parks and pools rejoiced his heart.

[230c] Now he sees the fires of hell coming to burn him

Like a great fire consuming a bamboo forest.

Then, while still seeing the pleasures of paradise,

Transl. – I have spoken, O monk, of three feelings: pleasant feeling, unpleasant feeling, neither unpleasant nor pleasant feeling. Yes, I have spoken of these three feelings. But also, O monk, I said: All that is felt in suffering." It is in view of impermanence that I said "All that is felt in suffering."

An extract of the corresponding Sanskrit sūtra is cited in Kośavyākhyā, p. 519, l. 18-20: Saṃskārānityatām Ānanda saṃdhÂa mayā bhāṣitaṃ saṃskaravipariṇāmatāṃ: Yat kiṃcid veditam idam atra duḥkhasyeti: O Ānanda, it is in view of impermanence, it is in view of transformation of the formations, that I said: "All that is felt, there is suffering in it."

The Kośa (VI, p. 129-130) concludes that all feeling, including pleasant feeling, is suffering. Pleasant feeling has as object not a real pleasure but sometimes a remedy for suffering (duḥkhapratikāra), sometimes a modification of the suffering (duḥkhavikalpa).

501 *Upādānanirodhā...* sokaparidevadukkhadomanassupāyāsā nirujjanti: Pāli Vin, I, p. 1; Saṃyutta, II, p. 7; III, p. 14; Anguttara, I, p. 177.

502 Cf. Anguttara, I, p. 250: Seyyathāpi bhikkhave puriso loṇaphalaṃ Gangāya nadiyā pakkhipeyya. Taṃ kiṃ maññatha bhikkhave. Api nu sā Gangā nadī amunā loṇaphalena loṇā assa apeyyā ti. – No h'etam bhante.

He is alarmed in vain: that is useless.

The concept of suffering  $(duhkhasamj\tilde{n}\tilde{a})$  concerns the same objects as the concept of impermanence  $(anityasamj\tilde{n}\tilde{a})$ . Analysis of suffering in these many different ways is called the concept of suffering.

#### III. THE CONCEPT OF NON-SELF

Concept of non-self (anātmansamjñā). – "That which is suffering is non-self" (yad duḥkham tad anātmā). 504 Why? The five aggregates of attachment (pañcopādānaskandha) are all suffering and have no independence (aiśvarya, vibhitba). If they have no independence, they are non-self (anātman). If they had an independent self, "it would be impossible for the body to feel suffering" (na kāyo vyābādhāya samvarteta). 505 Thus it is said:

There are fools

Who consider their body or their mind as their self.

Gradually they become strongly attached to them:

They do not understand the law of impermanence.

There is no agent (kāraka) in this body

Neither is there any perceiver (vedaka).

This body is without a master, 506

And, nevertheless, it does all kinds of things.

From the six organs (*indriya*) and the six objects (*viṣaya*)

Arise the six kinds of consciousnesses (*vijñāna*);

The entire explanation that follows turns upon the canonical formula: *Yad aniccam tam dukkham, yam dukkham tad anattā, yad anattā tam netam mama neso ham asmi na meso attā ti*: "That which is impermanent is suffering; that which is suffering is non-self; that which is non-self is not mine, I am not that and that is not me." Cf. Samyutta, II, p. 22, 82, 84,; IV, p. 1.

505 Implicit reference to the Sūtra on the non-self which follows the sūtra on the four noble Truths (cf. Pāli Vin, I, p. 13-14; Saṃyutta, III, p. 66-68; Catuṣpariṣad, p. 162-164; Mahāvastu, III, p. 335-337: Rūpañ ced ātmabhaviṣyad rūpaṃ na vyābādhāya duḥkhāya saṃvarteta, labhyeta ca rūpasya: evaṃ me rūpaṃ bhavate evaṃ mā bhād iti.

Adopting the variant *tchou* in place of *cheng*.

<sup>503</sup> Namely, the five *upāsānaskandha*.

From the coming together of the three (*trikasaṃnipāta*)

Contact (*sparśa*) arises. <sup>507</sup>

From contact as condition

There arise feeling, memory and action,

In the same way as fire arises

When the lens, kindling and the sun come together.

Organs, objects and consciousnesses having come together,

The action to be accomplished is realized.

There is continuity (saṃtanaśādṛśya)

As in the seed, the sprout and the stem. 508

Furthermore, there is no ātman because the characteristics (lakṣaṇa) of the ātman do not exist. Dharmas must have a characteristic so that we may know that they exist. Thus, if we see smoke  $(dh\bar{u}ma)$  and we feel heat (uṣṇa), we know there is a fire (vahni). Because there are differences [in characteristics] between the five sense objects (visaya), we know they exist. Because beings of various sorts conceive and compute things in different ways, we know that there are minds (citta) and mental events (caitasikadharma). But since the atman has no characteristic, we know it does not exist.

Question. - However, there is breathing (ānāpāna) which is a characteristic of the ātman, and also the looking straight ahead and sideways (ālokitavilokita), life (āyus), mind (citta), suffering or happiness (duhkhasukha), affection or aversion (icchādvesa), the will (prayatna), etc., which are characteristics of the ātman. If there were no ātman, then who would have this breathing, this looking straight ahead or sideways, this life, this mind, this suffering or this happiness, this affection or this aversion, this will, etc.? Thus we know that there is an atman moving internally and that the life (ayus) and mind (citta) are properties of the ātman.509

If there were no atman, one would be like an ox (go) without an oxherd (sārthvāha). But since there is an ātman, it can govern the mind, penetrate things without any loss of attentiveness (pramāda).

According to the Pāli Abhidamma (Atthasālinī, p. 109) and the Sarvāstivādins (Kośa, III, p. 96), contact (sparśa), the sixth link in the pratītyasamutpāda chain (above, p. 350F), are six in number and arise from the coming together of the three (trikasamnipāta), namely, organ, object and consciousness. For the Sautrantikas, *sparśa* is only the meeting itself (Kośa, III, p. 96-97).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>508</sup> Cf. Kośa, IX, p. 296-299.

The objector here is the spokesman for the Vaiśeşikas who assume nine substances (*dravya*), including the ātman, endowed with qualities (guna): cf. Vaiśesikasūtra (I, I, 5-6).

If there were no  $\bar{a}$ tman, who would direct the mind and experience unhappiness or happiness? If there were no  $\bar{a}$ tman, one would be like a piece of wood ( $k\bar{a}$ stha), unable to distinguish between suffering and happiness, and it would be the same for affection or aversion, effort, etc.

Nevertheless, since the  $\bar{a}$ tman is subtle ( $s\bar{u}k\bar{s}ma$ ), it cannot be cognized by the five sense organs (indriya), and it is by these characteristics that we know it exists. [231a]

Answer. – But all these characteristics are characteristics of the consciousness (*vijñānalakṣaṇa*)! It is because there is consciousness that there is breathing, looking straight ahead or sideways, life, etc., and when the consciousness leaves the body, all of that disappears. <sup>510</sup> According to your concept of an eternal (*anitya*) and omnipresent (*vyāpin*) ātman, the corpse (*kuṇapa*) itself should still possess respiration, the ability to look straight ahead and sideways, life, etc.

Furthermore, breathing  $(\bar{a}n\bar{a}p\bar{a}na)$ , etc., are material dharmas  $(r\bar{u}pidharma)$  moving on the wind of the mind: these are characteristics of consciousness  $(vij\bar{n}\bar{a}na)$  and not characteristics of the  $\bar{a}tman$ . As for life  $(\bar{a}yus)$  which is a formation dissociated from mind  $(cittaviprayuktasamsk\bar{a}ra)$ , this also is a characteristic of consciousness.

Question. – When one enters into the absorption without mind  $(acittakasam\bar{a}patti)^{511}$  and possibly one sleeps without dreaming, the breathing  $(\bar{a}n\bar{a}p\bar{a}na)$  continues and life  $(\bar{a}yus)$  continues. How can you say that [breathing and life] are characteristics of consciousness?

Answer. - Although consciousness is temporarily suspended in the absorption without mind, shortly thereafter it must necessarily recur, for it does not leave the body; the time of duration of consciousness is long; the time when it disappears is short. This is why [breathing and life] are characteristics of consciousness. When a man goes out for a walk, we cannot say that his house is without an owner!

Sadness and happiness (duḥkhasukha), affection and aversion (icchādveṣa), will (prayatna), etc., are associated with the mind (cittasaṃprayukta), mutual conditions (sahabhūpratyaya) and accompanying the mind (cittānuparivartin): when mind exists, they exist; when mind does not exist, they do not exist. This is why these are characteristics of consciousness and not characteristics of the ātman.

Furthermore, supposing the ātman did exist, it would be either eternal (*nitya*) or non-eternal (*anitya*). But, as is said:

Āyur uṣmātha vijñanāṃ yadā kāyaṃ jahaty amī / apaviddhaḥ tadā śete yathā kāṣṭham acetanaḥ //

"When life, heat and consciousness leave the body, the body lies abandoned, like a piece of wood, without any feeling."

For this stanza, which shows variations, see Kośavyākhyā, p. 668, l. 16-17, and for the canonical sources, Majjhima, I, p. 206, l. 9-11; Samyutta, III, p. 13=43, l. 4-5.

Absorption without mind, also called absorption of non-discrimination (*asaṃjñisamāpatti*), during which mind and mental events are arrested: see Kośa, II, p. 201.

<sup>510</sup> The Buddha indeed said:

If the atman were eternal

There would be no new existence (punarbhava).

Eternal and without birth,

It would also be without deliverance.

It would also be infallible and inactive:

This is why we should know

That there would be neither sinner nor saint

Nor any object to be sensed (vedaka).

To abandon the 'me' (ātman) and the 'mine' (ātmīya)

Is then to attain nirvana.

But if there really were an ātman,

We would be unable to reject the idea of 'me'.

If the atman were non-eternal

It ought to perish with the body,

Like water rushing down from a high cliff.

There would no longer be either sin or merit. 512

Evam vidyād upādlam vutsargād iti karmaṇaḥ /
kartuś ca karmakartṛbhyām śeṣān bhāvān vibhāvayet //
Ātmany asati cātmīyam kuta eva bhaviṣyati /
nirmamo nirahamāraḥ śamād ātmātmanīnayoḥ //
Mamety aham iti kusīṇe bahirdhādhyātmam eva ca /
Nirudhyata upādānam tatkusayāj janmanah kṣayah //

Transl.- One should understand appropriation as the 'rejection' of action and agent. By means of action and agent, one will be able to recognize the other essences.

As the 'me' does not exist, how could the 'mine' exist? The [yogin] is freed from [the idea] of 'me' and [the idea] of 'mine' by means of the suppression of 'me' and what is profitable to the 'me.'

In an inaugural dissertation at Munich, M. Saigura has identified these three stanzas as Mūlamadhyamakārikā VIII, 12; XVIII, 2: XVIII, 4, of which here are the text and translation:

See [above, p. 735F] what has been said in the chapter on Dānapāramitā about the ātman, the cognizing ( $j\bar{a}naka$ ) or non-cognizing subject, and the active ( $k\bar{a}raka$ ) or non-active subject.

Since we cannot discover the characteristics of the ātman, we know that the ātman is absent in all dharmas. Since we know that there is no ātman in the dharmas, we cannot conceive the idea of ātman. Since there is no ātman, there cannot be an idea of ātmiya, 'the idea of things belonging to the ātman'. When the ātman and the ātmiya have disappeared, there is no longer any bondage, and when there is no longer any bondage, that is nirvāṇa. This is why the yogin should cultivate the concept of non-self (anātmasaṃjñā).

## IV. LINKS BETWEEN IMPERMANENCE, SUFFERING AND NON-SELF

Question. – Impermanence (anitya), suffering (duḥkha) and non-self (anātman) are one single thing or they are three things. If they are only one thing, we should not speak of three. If they are three things, why did the Buddha [identify them] be saying: "That which is impermanent is suffering; that which is suffering is non-self" (yad anityaṃ tad duḥkham, yad duḥkham tad anātma)? [231b]

Answer. – It is just one and the same thing, namely, the correct grasping of impure dharmas  $(s\bar{a}sravadharmapratigraha)$  but, since the points of view differ, there are three distinct [terms]:

- 1) Anityasamj $n\bar{a}$  is associated with the aspect of impermanence (anity $\bar{a}k\bar{a}rasamprayukta$ ). Duhkhasamj $n\bar{a}$  is associated with the aspect of suffering (duhkh $\bar{a}k\bar{a}r\bar{a}samprayukta$ ). An $\bar{a}tmasamj\bar{n}\bar{a}$  is associated with the non-self aspect (an $\bar{a}tm\bar{a}k\bar{a}rasamprayukta$ ). 513
- 2) Anityā does not penetrate into the threefold world (*traidhātuka*). *Duḥkha* makes known the defects (*doṣa*) of the threefold world. *Anātman* is rejection of the world (*lokaparityāga*).
- 3) Anitya produces the mind of disgust (udvegacitta). Duḥkha produces fear (bhaya). Anātman tears up in order to liberate.
- 4) Concerning *anitya*, the Buddha said: "The five aggregates of attachment are impermanent" (pañcopādānaskandhā anityāḥ). Concerning duḥkha, the Buddha said: "That which is impermanent is suffering" (yad anityam tad duḥkham). Concerning anātman, the Buddha said: "That which is suffering is non-self" (yad duḥkham tad anātmā).

What is called 'me' and 'mine' being suppressed both externally as well as internally, the appropriation is destroyed and the destruction of the latter [results] in the destruction of birth.

These kārikās have nothing in common with the stanzas presented here by the *Traité*. Many other fanciful comparisons may also be found in the dissertation in question 513 *Anitya*, *duḥkha* and *anātmaka* along with emptiness (śūnya) comprise the four aspects of the first noble Truth: above, p. 641F.

- 5) Concerning *anitya*, the Buddha spoke of the destruction of the five aggregates of attachment. Concerning *duḥkha*, the Buddha said that it pierces the heart like an arrow (śalya). Concerning *anātman*, the Buddha spoke of rejection (*utsarjana*).
- 6) Concerning *anitya*, he said that it destroys desire (*tṛṣṇā*). Concerning *duḥkha*, he said that it destroys pride of self (*asmimāna*). Concerning *anātman*, he said that it destroys wrong views (*mithyādṛṣṭi*). 514
- 7) Anitya dispels the view of eternalism (śāśvatadṛṣṭi). Duḥkha dispels the view in which there is the happiness of nirvāṇa in the present lifetime. Anātman dispels any possibility of attachment (abhiniveśasthāna).
- 8) Anity $\bar{a}$  is addressed to those who are attached to permanent things. Duḥkha is addressed to those who imagine a possibility of happiness. Anātman is addressed to those who imagine a stable Self.

[Anitya, duḥkha and anātman] are one notion with three different aspects.

The notion of non-self  $(an\bar{a}tmasamj\tilde{n}\bar{a})$  takes as its object  $(\bar{a}lambate)$  the multiplicity of things  $(n\bar{a}n\bar{a}tva)$ : see what was said with regard to the notion of suffering  $(duhhasamj\tilde{n}\bar{a})$ .

## V. THE CONCEPT OF REVULSION TOWARD FOOD

When one notices that food arises from disgusting causes and conditions ( $a\acute{s}ubhahetupratyaya$ ), this is the notion of revulsion toward food ( $\bar{a}h\bar{a}re\ pratik\bar{u}lasamj\tilde{n}\tilde{a}$ ). 515

Thus, meat  $(m\bar{a}msa)$  comes from sperm  $(b\bar{i}ja)$ , blood  $(\acute{sonita})$  and urine  $(m\bar{u}tra)$ ; it is the seat of pus  $(p\bar{u}ya)$  and worms (krmi). Ghee (ghrta), milk  $(k\bar{s}ra)$  and curdled milk (dadhi), products of a transformation of blood, are nothing but rottenness.

The cook also adds to it his sweat and all kinds of dirt. When food is put into the mouth, the throat (mastaka) secretes disgusting saliva (singhāṇaka) that runs down from two channels, joins with the mucus

Samyutta, IV, p. 147-148, expresses itself in an analogous manner: Understanding and seeing the six senses, the six objects, the six consciousnesses and the six contacts as *aniccato* suppresses wrong views (*micchādiṭṭhi*); seeing them as *dukkhato* suppresses the belief in the 'I' (*sakkāyadiṭṭhi*); seeing them as *anattato* suppresses all speculation on the self (*attānudiṭṭhi*).

<sup>515</sup> Cf. Anguttara, IV, p. 49: Āhāre paṭikūlasaññaparicitena bhikkuno cetasā bahulaṃ viharato rasataṇhāya cittaṃ paṭīliyati paṭikuṭati paṭivaṭṭati na sampasārīyati, upekkhā vā pāṭikkulyatā vā saṇṭhāti: "When a monk devotes himself deeply to reflection filled with disgust towards food, his mind escapes from desire for flavors, withdraws, shrivels up and is not released; indifference or repugnance is established."

 $(kheta)^{516}$  and then produces flavor (rasa). The food is thus formed like vomit (udara) where it is solidified by the earth [element]  $(prthiv\bar{\imath})$ , moistened by the water (ap), stirred by the wind  $(v\bar{a}yu)$  and cooked by the fire  $(tejas)^{.517}$  In the same way, when boiled rice  $(yav\bar{a}g\bar{u})$  is cooked in a pot  $(sth\bar{a}l\bar{\imath})$ , the dirt sinks to the bottom and the clean part stays at the surface. By means of a process similar to wine-brewing, the impurities are changed into excrement (vis) and the cleanliness into urine  $(m\bar{u}tra)$ .

The kidneys have three orifices. 518 By means of the [internal] wind, the fatty juice spreads throughout the hundred veins ( $asir\bar{a}$ ), joins with the blood, coagulates and is changed into flesh ( $m\bar{a}msa$ ).

From this new flesh arise fat (meda), bone (asthi) and marrow (majjam).

From that comes the organ of touch (*kāyendriya*). From the union of the recent flesh and the new flesh arise the five sense organs (*pañcendriya*). From the five sense organs arise the five consciousnesses (*pañcavijñāna*). From the five consciousnesses arises the mental consciousness (*manovijñāna*) which analyzes and grasps characteristics (*nimittāny udgrhnāti*) and distinguishes the beautiful from the ugly.

Next there arise the ideas of 'me' (ātman) and 'mine' (ātmīya), negative emotions (kleśa) and bad actions (nigha).

This is how the yogin meditates on food, the first and last causes of which involve many impurities ( $a\acute{s}ubha$ ). He knows that his internal ( $\bar{a}dhy\bar{a}tmika$ ) four great elements ( $mah\bar{a}bh\bar{u}ta$ ) are not different from the external ( $b\bar{a}hya$ ) four great elements, and it is only from the wrong view of the self ( $\bar{a}tmadrsti$ ) that the existence of the 'I' is created.

Furthermore, the yogin says to himself: "In order to make this food, somebody has worked very hard; he had to clear the land, plant, hoe, harvest, [231c] beat, grind, wash and cook. For a single bowl of cooked rice (odana), the laborers have combined oceans of sweat (sveda). If they are compared, the food is just a small amount but the sweat [poured forth to make it] is a huge amount. And this food that has required such great labor is nothing but bitter suffering. As soon as it is put into the mouth, it becomes dirt and is worth nothing. In the space of one night, it is changed into excrement and urine. At the beginning, it was a pleasant taste loved by people; changed into dirt, it is a disgusting thing that nobody wants."

The yogin also says to himself: "If I am attached to this bad food, I will fall into hell (*niraya*) where I will have to swallow red-hot iron balls (*ayoguḍā ādīptāḥ*). 519 Having come out of hell, I will become an animal

Salivary secretion influenced by the vegetative nervous system. The parotid or salivary glands are meant here, the excretory channel of which is called the *Stenon channel*, opening by a distinct orifice on either side (note by Dr. C. Harvengt).

<sup>517</sup> The internal four great elements give the body solidity, liquidity, movement and warmth, respectively.

Rather than kidneys, what is meant here is the bladder which has three orifices, two upper orifices, the ureters which bring in the urine excreted by the kidneys, and a lower orifice, the urethra, by means of which it expels this urine outside at intervals at greater or lesser intervals (note by Dr, C. Harvengt).

Punishment reserved for a particular hell described above, p. 963F and note.

(tiryagyoni), a cow (go), a sheep (edaka) or a camel (uṣṭra), and I will be acquitted of my former debt. Or else, I will be a pig (sūkara), a dog (kukkura) and I will always eat excrement."

Thinking of food in this way engenders the notion of disgust ( $udvegasamj\tilde{n}\tilde{a}$ ) and, by means of this disgust for food, one becomes disgusted with the five objects of enjoyment ( $pa\tilde{n}cak\tilde{a}ramguna$ ).

[The brahmin who unwittingly ate disgusting cakes.] – There was a brahmin who practiced the rules of [alimentary] purity. Having to go to some unclean land on business, he thought: "How will I manage to avoid all this uncleanliness? It will be necessary for me to eat dry food and so I will be able to maintain my purity."

He saw an old woman who was selling cakes of white marrow (meal, flour??) and said to her: "I have reason to stay here for about a hundred days. Make me these cakes regularly and bring them to me, I will pay you well." Each day the old woman made the cakes and brought them to him. The brahmin liked their taste and was happy with this plentiful food.

At the beginning, the cakes made by the old woman were white, but later, little by little they lost their color  $(r\bar{u}pa)$  and their taste. The brahmin asked the old woman what was the reason for this. She replied: "It is because the canker (ganda) is healed." The brahmin asked her what she meant by this and the old woman answered: "At my house, a prostitute contracted a canker on her privy parts and we applied flour (saktu), ghee (ghrta) and sweet herbs (yastimadhu) to it. 520 The canker ripened, the pus (puya) came out and mixed with the poultice. This happened every day and I made the cakes that I gave you with this: that is why they were so good. Now that the woman's canker has healed, where am I going to find [the wherewithal to make them]?"

Having heard this, the brahmin struck his head with his fists, beat his breast, vomited and shouted: "How can I say how much I have violated the rules of [alimentary] purity? But now my business is settled." Leaving all his affairs, he returned in haste to his native land.

It is the same for the yogin. He is attached to food and drink, is joyful and loves to eat. Seeing the beautiful colors of the food, its softness, its aroma and its taste, he does not think about the impurities (aśubha). Later when he has to undergo the painful retribution (duḥkhavipāka), how great will be his repentance (kaukṛtya)! If he can see the beginning and the end (pūrvāparānta) of food, he produces a mind of disgust (udvegacitta) and, eliminating the desire for food (āhāratṛṣṇā), he rejects the five<sup>521</sup> objects of enjoyment (pañcakāmaguṇa). Completely detached (virakta) from the happiness of the world of desire (kāmadhātu), he cuts through these five objects and is also free from the five fetters of lower rank (pañcāvarabhāgīyasaṃyojana).<sup>522</sup>

521 Adopting the variant wou in place of sseu.

<sup>520</sup> Mahāvyut., no. 5802.

The five fetters favorable to "the lower part", i.e., to kāmadhātu, either prevent one from leaving of this world or make one return to it. These are belief in the self (satkāyadṛṣṭi), unjustified trust in the efficacy of rituals and vows (śīlavrataparāmarśa), doubt (vicikitsā), love of pleasure (kāmacchanda) and

For all these reasons and these disadvantages [of food], the yogin no longer loves it and is no longer attached to it: This is what is called the notion of repugnance toward food  $(\bar{a}h\bar{a}re\ pratik\bar{u}lasamj\tilde{n}\bar{a})$ .

#### VI. LOGICAL ORDER OF THE TEN CONCEPTS

Question. – *Anityasamjñā*, *duḥkhasamjñā*, *anātmasamjñā* are associated with a pure wisdom (*anāsravaprajñā*) whereas the four following concepts, *āhāre pratikūlasamjñā*, [*sarvaloke 'nabhiratisamjñā*, *maraṇasamjñā* and aśucisamjñā] are [232a] associated with an impure wisdom (*sāsravaprajñā*). Why does [the sūtra] speak of them secondly?

Answer. – The Buddhist doctrine consists of a twofold path: i) the path of seeing the Truths ( $dar \acute{s}anam \ddot{a}rga$ ) and ii) the path of meditation ( $bh \ddot{a}van \ddot{a}m \ddot{a}rga$ ).

In the path of seeing the Truths, by using the three notions [of anitya, duḥkha and anātman], the yogin destroys wrong views (mithyādṛṣṭi), obtains the quality of ārya, but is not yet detached from desire (virakta).

It is with this detachment (vairāgya) in mind that, after having spoken of the first three notions, the sūtra now speaks of the four intermediate notions: āhāre pratikūlasamjñā, [sarvaloke 'nabhiratisamjñā, maranasamjñā and aśucisamjñā] by means of which the yogin succeeds in freeing himself from the afflictions, lust, etc. (rāgādikleśa).

Thus the first three notions are features of the path of seeing the Truths (satyadarśanamārga), the four intermediate notions are features of the path of meditation (bhāvanāmārga) and the last three notions [prahāṇasaṃjñā, vairāgyasaṃjñā and nirodhasaṃjñā] are features of the path of the saints who have nothing more to train in (aśaikṣamārga).

In starting to practice the foundation of mindfulness of the body ( $k\bar{a}yasmrtyupasth\bar{a}na$ ), the yogin still has some notion of revulsion toward food but, as he rarely uses it, the Buddha did not speak of it. 523 Here, so that the srotaāpannas and sakrdāgamins can escape from desire, the Buddha, having spoken about  $an\bar{a}tmasamj\tilde{n}\bar{a}$  [the third notion on the list], now speaks of the four [intermediate] notions beginning with  $\bar{a}h\bar{a}re\ pratik\bar{u}lasamj\tilde{n}\bar{a}$ .

## VII. THE CONCEPT OF DISSATISFACTION TOWARD THE ENTIRE WORLD

malice (*vyāpāda*): cf. Dīgha, I, p. 156; II, p. 92, 252; III, p. 234; Majjhima, I, p. 432: Saṃyutta, V, p. 61, 69; Anguttara, IV, p. 459; V, p. 17.

An allusion to the *Satipaṭṭhānasutta* of Majjhima, I, p. 55-63, which is silent about revulsion toward food.

Notion of dissatisfaction toward the entire world (sarvaloke 'nabhirati). – If one thinks about the world, its sense pleasures ( $k\bar{a}maguna$ ), sweet tastes (rasa), chariots, fine garments, warm rooms, gardens, houses and all kinds of pleasant things, one has a notion of contentment ( $abhiratisamjn\bar{a}$ ). If one thinks of the misfortunes and misdeeds of the world, the mind has a notion of dislike ( $udvegasamjn\bar{a}$ ). What are the ills of the world?

The ills of the world are of two types 1) beings (sattva); ii) lands (pradeśa).

# 1. Evils and wickedness of beings

a. Beings have eight kinds of evils and torments: 1) birth (*jāti*), 2) old age (*jāra*), 3) sickness (*vyādhi*), 4) death (*maraṇa*), 5) being separated from what one loves (*priyaviprayoga*), 6) gaining what one does not love (*apriyasamprayoga*), 7) not getting what one wants (*yad apīcchan paryeṣamāṇo na labhate*), 8) in short, the five aggregates of attachment are suffering (*saṃkṣiptena pañcopāpādanaskandhā duḥkham*). 524

b. As for the wickedness of beings:

Out of excessive lust  $(r\bar{a}gab\bar{a}huly\bar{a}t)$ , they do not differentiate between beauty and ugliness; they do not follow the teachings of their parents and teachers; they have no shame  $(hr\bar{\iota})$  or modesty  $(apatr\bar{a}pya)$  and are not different from the animals.

Out of excessive hatred (*dveṣabāhulyāt*), they do not differentiate between the light (*laghu*) and the heavy (*guru*); enraged by the poison of anger (*krodhaviṣa*), they go so far as to refuse the Buddha's word;<sup>525</sup> they do not want to hear the Dharma; they are not afraid of the bad destinies (*durgati*); they inflict violent beatings; they do not care about others' sufferings and, entering into the great shadows (*mahātamas*), they see nothing more.

Out of excessive ignorance ( $mohab\bar{a}huly\bar{a}t$ ), they do not find the means of realizing what they are looking for; they do not understand the causes of things, as if they were trying to get milk ( $k\bar{s}\bar{u}ra$ ) from a horn ( $vis\bar{a}na$ ). 526

Enveloped by ignorance (avidhyāvrta), even if they are in the light of the sun, they will never see anything.

Out of excessive greed (mātsaryabāhulvāt), their house is like a tomb which nobody comes near.

\_

<sup>524</sup> Excerpt from the Sermon of Benares: Pāli Vinaya. I, p. 10; Catuṣpariṣad, p. 158; Mahāvastu, III, p.

<sup>332;</sup> Lalitavistara, p. 417; Mahāvyut., no. 2223-2240.

Rejection of the holy Dharma (*saddharmapratikṣepa*) is a particularly serious fault: cf. Sarvadharmavaipulyasaṃgrahasūtra cited in Śikṣāsamuccaya, p. 95, and Pañjikā, p.147.

<sup>526</sup> Canonical comparison (Majjhima, III, p. 141: Seyyathāpi puriso khīratthiko khīragavesī khīrapariyesanañ caramāno gāviṃ taruṇavacchaṃ visāṇato āviñjeyya... abhabho khīrassa adhigamanāya.

Out of excessive pride and haughtiness ( $m\bar{a}nastambha$ ), they do not honor the saints ( $\bar{a}rya$ ) and do not venerate their parents.

Careless (*pramatta*), they ruin themselves and have no honesty.

Out of excessive wrong views (*mithyādrṣṭibāhulyāt*), they do not believe in the present existence (*ihajanman*) or in the future existence (*parajanman*), they do not believe in sin (*āpatti*) or merit (*puṇya*), and it is impossible to live with them.

All these afflictions abounding in them, these wretched people have no uprightness. Their sins are numerous, they commit the five heinous crimes of immediate retribution (*pañcānantarya*): sometimes they kill their father and mother; sometimes they wound the saints; sometimes they demand special honors, they slander faithful and celibate people and they are an offense to their kinsmen.

Furthermore, of the beings inhabiting the world, honest people  $(s\bar{a}dhu)$  are rare and evil people (durjana) are numerous.

It may be that people of good conduct are poor, lowly and ugly, and it may be that rich good-looking people are of bad conduct. It may be that those who love to give are poor and without resources, and it may be that rich [232b] fortunate people are miserly, greedy and unwilling to give.

If people see a thoughtful man silent and not speaking, they say that he is proud, haughty and does not want to serve. If they see an obliging man, benevolent and charitable, they say he is deceitful and a toady. If they see an eloquent orator, they accuse him of being dependent on inadequate knowledge and consider him to be proud.

If they see a simple straightforward honest man, they all join up to deceive him, subjugate him, direct him and tyrannize him. If they see an easy gentle man, they join up to despise him, trample him underfoot and treat him impolitely. If they see a man observing pure morality, they accuse him of hypocritical behavior, scorn him and do not respect him.

Such people are perverts and unlovable.

## 2 Wretchedness of lands

Wretchedness of lands. – All lands are filled with calamities and disadvantages: heat and cold (śtłoṣna), hunger and thirst (kṣutpipāsā), sickness, epidemics, malaria, suffering, old age, sickness, death, fears; there is no country free of them. Anywhere you go, all these evils follow you and there is no place where you can avoid them. Although there are wealthy peaceful lands, many are tormented by the defilements (kleśa) and do not deserve the name of happy lands. All involve the two kinds of suffering, bodily suffering (kāyika duhkha) and mental suffering (caitasika duhkha); no land is free of them. Thus it is said:

There are lands that are too cold,

There are lands that are too hot,

There are lands without safety and protection,

There are lands where the miseries abound.

There are lands perpetually in famine (durbhikṣa),

There are lands where sicknesses are abundant,

There are lands where merit is not cultivated.

Thus there is no happy place.

As beings and lands have all these troubles, it is said that there is no happiness in the world (loka).

The ills of the desire realm (*kāmadhātu*) are such [as we have spoken of], but when one dies in the two higher realms [rūpa- and ārūpyadhātu] and falls back down here, one suffers even greater humiliation than in this lower world: thus, when one falls from a very high place, one is smashed to pieces and crushed.

Question. – What are the differences between *anitya*, *duḥkha* and *anātmasaṃjñā* on the one hand and *sarvaloke 'nabhiratisaṃjñā* on the other hand, and why speak of them separately?

Answer. – There are two kinds of consideration (anupaśyanā): i) a general consideration (samastānupaśyanā), ii) a specific consideration (bhinnānupaśyanā). The first three concepts are of the general order whereas [the concept of the world] is of specific order.<sup>527</sup>

Furthermore, there are two kinds of consideration: *i)* consideration about things (*dharmānupaśyanā*), and *ii*) consideration about beings (*sattvānupśyanā*). The first three concepts are a consideration consisting of disapproval of all things, whereas here, the concept of the world is considering the wickedness and the troubles of beings: it is not the same.

Furthermore, the first three notions are the pure path  $(an\bar{a}sravamarga)$ , 528 whereas the concept of the world belongs to the impure path  $(s\bar{a}sravam\bar{a}rga)$ .

Finally, the first three notions are of the path of seeing the Truths (*satyadarśanamārga*) whereas the concept of the world is of the path of meditation (*bhāvanāmārga*).

Thus there are many differences. The concept of dissatisfaction in regard to the entire world (sarvaloke ' $nabhiratisamj\tilde{n}\tilde{a}$ ) is included in all the levels ( $sarvabh\bar{u}misamgrh\bar{t}ta$ ) and bears upon the dharmas of the threefold world.

#### VIII. THE CONCEPTS OF DEATH AND IMPURITY

The concepts of *anitya* and *duḥkha* include all conditioned dharmas (*saṃskṛta*) and the concept of *anātma* includes all dharmas without exception: they therefore have as object all dharmas inclusively. The concept of *sarvaloke 'nabhirati* is concerned only with beings (*sattva*) and lands (*pradeśa*).

Because they involve detachment in regard to the threefold world.

On the concept of death (*maraṇasaṃjñā*), see what has been said above (p. 1422F) about maraṇānusmṛti. – On the concept of impurity (*aśucisaṃjñā*), see what has been said above (p. 1151F) about kāyasmṛtyupasthāna.

#### IX. THE CONCEPTS OF RENUNCIATION, DETACHMENT AND CESSATION

[232c] The concepts of renunciation (*prahāṇasaṃjñā*), detachment (*virāgasaṃjñā*) and cessation (*nirodhasaṃjñā*) have the characteristics (*nimitta*) of nirvāṇa as object (*ālambante*). <sup>529</sup> Because the latter cuts through the fetters (*saṃyojana*), there is the notion of renunciation; because it renounces the fetters, there is the notion of detachment; because it suppresses the fetters, there is the notion of cessation.

Question. – If that is so, one single notion would suffice; why then mention three?

Answer. – It is again a matter of one and the same thing spoken of in three different ways as was the case above (p. 1452F), where it was said: That which is impermanent is suffering and that which is suffering is impermanent." It is the same here where the wickedness and the miseries of the entire world are so heavy that they are condemned in three ways. When a huge tree is being cut down, it is impossible to cut it down using just one saw. Since nirvāṇa is an excellent (*praṇīta*) dharma not yet attained previously (*apūrvaprāpta*), it is praised in diverse ways: hence the notions of renunciation (*prahāṇasaṃjñā*), detachment (*virāgasaṃjñā*) and cessation (*nirodhasaṃjñā*).

Furthermore, as nirvāṇa cuts through the three poisons (triviṣa), it is called abandonment (prahāṇa); as it abandons desire ( $r\bar{a}ga$ ), it is called detachment ( $vir\bar{a}ga$ ), and as it suppresses all suffering to the point that it no longer arises, it is called cessation (nirodha).

Furthermore, during the preparatory path (*prayogamārga*) consisting of heat (*uṣmagata*), summits (*mūrdhan*), patience (*ksānti*) and the supreme worldly dharmas (*laukikāgradharma*), 530 the yogin who has

Anguttara, V, p. 110-111, defines these three concepts in the following way: *Idh' Ānanda bhikkhu uppannaṃ kāmavitakkaṃ nādhivāseti pajahati vinodeti vyantīkaroti …taṇhakkhayo nirodho nibbānan ti. Ayaṃ vucat' Ānanda nirodhasaññā*.

Transl. – Here, O Ānanda, the monk refuses, abandons, removes, destroys and suppresses the thoughts of desire, malice, harm and wicked bad dharmas when they arise: this is the concept of abandonment.

Then the monk, withdrawn into the forest, under a tree or in an empty house, reflects and says to himself: The pacification of all the formations, the rejection of all conditionings, the destruction of desire, cessation, nirvāṇa, is a good thing, is an excellent thing: this is detachment.

Finally, the monk, withdrawn into the forest, etc. ...: this is the concept of cessation.

Note that this sūtra defines detachment and cessation in the same terms. These concepts are synonyms of nirvāṇa.

The four aids to insight (*nirvedhabhāgīya*) discussed above, p. 495F, 1067F, 1411F.

the vision of the correct knowledge ( $samyagj\tilde{n}\bar{a}na$ ), moves away from the defilements ( $kle\acute{s}a$ ): that is the notion of detachment ( $vir\bar{a}gasamj\tilde{n}\bar{a}$ ). — Obtaining the pure path ( $an\bar{a}sravam\bar{a}rga$ ), he cuts the fetters (samyojana): that is the notion of renunciation ( $prah\bar{a}nasamj\tilde{n}\bar{a}$ ). — When he enters into nirvāṇa, he suppresses the five aggregates of attachment ( $pa\tilde{n}cop\bar{a}d\bar{a}naskandha$ ) that will be continued no longer: that is the notion of cessation ( $nirodhasamj\tilde{n}\bar{a}$ ).

The notion of renunciation is nirvāṇa-with-residue (sopadhiśeṣanirvāṇa); the notion of cessation is nirvāṇa-without-residue (nirupadhiśeṣanirvāṇa); the notion of detachment is the means ( $up\bar{a}ya$ ), the door, to both nirvāṇas.

These three concepts, sometimes impure  $(s\bar{a}srava)$  and sometimes pure  $(an\bar{a}srava)$ , are included  $(samgrh\bar{t}ta)$  in all the stages  $(bh\bar{u}mi)$ .

# CHAPTER XXXVIII: THE ELEVEN KNOWLEDGES, THE THREE MEDITATIVE STABILIZATIONS AND THE THREE FACULTIES (p. 1465F)

## First Section THE ELEVEN KNOWLEDGES

## PRELIMINARY NOTE

According to the oldest sources, the Buddhist texts call for a number of knowledges (Sanskrit,  $j\tilde{n}\tilde{a}na$ ; Pāli,  $\tilde{n}\tilde{a}na$ ) which the scholastics will do their utmost to classify and define.

# I. THE TEN KNOWLEDGES IN THE SŪTRAPITAKA

Attempts at classification are relatively rare:

- 1. The suttas of the  $\tilde{N}\bar{a}nassa\ vatth\bar{u}ni$  of the Samyutta, II, p. 56-60 (Tsa a han, T 99, no. 356-357, k. 14, p. 99c19-100a11) propose two classes of  $\tilde{n}\bar{a}na$ , one of 44 and the other of 77 units. The first results from attributing to each of the eleven members of the causal chain from  $jar\bar{a}marana$  to  $sankh\bar{a}ra$  four knowledges relating to suffering, its origin, its cessation and the path to its cessation, which gives a total of 4 x 11 = 44. The second class results from attributing seven more knowledges to each of the same members, so 7 x 11 = 77.
- 2. Other more important groupings are also given by the Sūtrapiṭaka:
- a. Four knowledges concerning: i) things (dhamme ñānam), ii) consequences (anvaye ñānam), iii) analysis of another's mind (paricchede ñānam = paresam cittaparicchede ñānam), iv) conventions (sammutiñānam), respectively: cf. Dīgha, III, p. 226, 277; Vibhanga, p. 315, 330.
- b. Four other knowledges, altogether constituting right view (sammādiṭṭhi) and concerning i) suffering (duḥkhe ñānaṃ), ii) its origin (samudaye ñānaṃ), iii) its cessation (nirodhe ñānam), iv) the path to its cessation (mārge or nirodhagāminiyā paṭipadāya ñānaṃ): cf. Dīgha, II, p. 312; III, p. 227; Majjhima, III, p. 251; Saṃyutta, V, p. 8-9, 430: Paṭisambhidā, I, p. 41, 118, 133; Vibhanga, p. 104, 235, 293, 315, 328; DhammasanganI, p. 189.
- c. Two knowledges, belonging to the arhat, concerning cessation of the impurities (*khaye ñānaṃ*) and their non-rearising in the future (*anuppāde ñānaṃ*) respectively: cf. Dīgha, III, p. 214, 274.

Later scholasticism, adding the three groups together, will posit the category of ten knowledges.

#### II. THE TEN KNOWLEDGES IN THE SANSKRIT ABHIDHARMA

Working with the canonical sources that have been presented above, the Sanskrit Abhidharma established a list of ten knowledges, one of the masterpieces of the Sarvāstvādin-Vaibhāisika school. These are:

- 1) dharmajñāna,
- 2) anvayajñāna,
- 3) paracittajñāna,
- 4) samvṛtijñāna,
- 5) duḥkhajñāna,
- 6) samudayajñāna,
- 7) nirodhajñāna,
- 8) mārgajñāna,
- 9) kṣayajñāna,
- 10) anutpādajñāna.

This list, the order of which is sometimes slightly modified, appears on the following texts:

- 1. Vasumitra's Abhidharmaprakaraṇapāda, T 1541, k. 1, p. 628b7-c6; T 1542, k. 1, p. 693c22-694a14. Extracts of the original Sanskrit are cited by the Kośavyākhyā, p. 616, l. 29-617, l. 27.
- 2. Kātyāyanīputra's Abhidharmajñānaprathāna, T 1543, K. 12, p. 829c; T 1544, k. 9, p. 963c.
- 3. Dharmatrāta's Saṃyuktābhidharmasāra, T 1552, k. 6, p. 817a11-b5.
- 4. Ghoşaka's Abhidharmārtarasa, T 1553, k. 1, p. 974a5-6 (reconstr. Sastri, p. 89, l. 3-4).
- 5. Skandhila's (?) Abhidharmāvatāraprakaraņa, T 1554, k. 2, p. 985b12-13.
- 6. Harivarman's Satyasiddhiśāstra, T 1646, k. 16, p. 371c21-372c28.
- 7. Mahāvibhāṣā by the Five Hundred great Arhats, T 1545, k. 106, p. 549b21-c10.
- 8. Kośa, VII, p. 11.
- 9. Saṃghabhadra's Nyāyānusāra, T 1562, k. 73, p. 735c8-10.
- 10. Abhidharmadīpa, p. 374.
- 11. Mahāvyutpatti, no. 1234-1243.

In these texts there are precise definitions of these ten *jñāna*: those of the Abhidharmaprakaraṇapāda (T 1542, p. 693c23-694a15) partially cited in the Kośavyākhyā, p. 616, l. 29-617, l. 27 are presented here:

1.Dhamrajñānam katamat. kāmapratisaṃyukteşu saṃskāreşu yad amāsravaṃ .... 8. ... jñānam idam icyate 'nvayajñānam.

## 9-10. Missing in the Sanskrit version.

Transl. from the Chinese. – 1. What is the knowledge of things ( $dharmaj\tilde{n}\tilde{a}na$ )? The knowledge of things is: i) the pure knowledge concerning the formations associated with the desire realm; ii) the pure knowledge concerned with the cause of the formations associated with the desire realm; ii) the pure knowledge concerned with the the cessation of the formations associated with the desire realm; iv) the pure knowledge concerned with the path leading to the cessation of the formations associated with the desire realm; v) the knowledge concerned with the knowledge of things and the stage {Fr. terre} of the knowledge of things is also called knowledge of things.

- 2. What is subsequent knowledge ( $anvayaj\tilde{n}\tilde{a}na$ )? Subsequent knowledge is: i) the pure knowledge concerning the formations associated with the form realm and the formless realm; ii) the pure knowledge concerning the cause of the formations associated with the form realm and the formless realm; iii) the pure knowledge concerning the cessation of the formations associated with the form realm and the formless realm; iv) the pure knowledge concerning the paths leading to the cessation of the formations associated with the form realm and the formless realm; v) the pure knowledge concerning the subsequent knowledge and the stage of subsequent knowledge is also called consecutive knowledge.
- 3. What is the knowledge of another's mind (paracittajñāna)? Realized by cultivation of the knowledges (jñānabhāvanā), it is the support (niraya) of the fruit of this cultivation. Obtained by this cultivation, it is an unimpeded knowledge (apratihatajñāna) concerning another's mind (citta) and mental events (caitta) associated with the desire realm and also in part with the pure (anaāsrava) mind and mental events of another.
- 4. What is conventional knowledge (samvrtijñāna)? It is all the impureknowledges (sarvasāsravajñāna).
- 5. What is the knowledge of suffering (duḥkhajñāna)? It is the pure knowledge produced when the five aggregates of attachment are considered to be impermanent, painful, empty and without self.
- 6. What is the knowledge of the origin of suffering (*samudayajñāna*)? It is the pure knowledge produced when the cause of impure things is considered as cause, origin, production and condition.
- 7. What is the knowledge of the cessation of suffering (*nirodhajñāna*)? It is the pure knowledge produced when this cessation is considered as cessation, peace, excellent and bringing salvation.
- 8. What is the knowledge of the path of cessation of suffering (*mārgajñāna*)? It is the pure knowledge produced when the path is considered as path, logical, the definitive attainment and exit.
- 9. What is the knowledge of the suppression of the impurities (*kṣayajñāna*)? It is the pure knowledge produced when one thinks: "Suffering has been completely known by me; the origin has been abandoned by me; the cessation has been realized by me; the path has been practiced by me": it is a knowledge, a seeing, a science, an intelligence, a light, an understanding.

10. What is the knowledge of the non-rearising of the impurities (*anutpādajñāna*)? It is the pure knowledge produced when one thinks: "The suffering perfectly known by me is no longer to be known; the origin abandoned by me is no longer to be abandoned; the cessation realized by me is no longer to be realized; the path practiced by me is no longer to be practiced": it is a knowledge, a seeing, a science, an intelligence, a light, an understanding.

# III THE ELEVEN KNOWLEDGES IN THE MAHĀYĀNA

The Mahāyāna retains the list of ten knowledges established by the Sanskrit Abhidharma but gives it a very different interpretation and adds an eleventh knowledge at the end.

# 1. Lists of Eleven Knowledges in the Prajñāpāramitās in Sanskrit

List A appears in the Pañcavimsati, ed. N. Dutt, p. 208, l. 23—209, l. 1. It should also be on p. 20 of the same editions but the text is corrupt.

List B appears in the Aṣṭādaśasāhasrikā, ed. E. Conze, p. 193, l. 18-23, and the Śatasāhasrikā, ed. P. Ghosa, p. 61, l. 6-62, l. 16; p. 1440, l. 10-13.

List A	List B
1. <i>duḥka</i> -	1. duḥkha-
2. samudaya-	2. samudaya-
3. nirodha-	3. nirodha-
4. mārga-	4. mārga-
5. kṣaya-	5. kṣaya-
6. anutpāda-	6. anutpāda-
7. dharma-	7. dharma-
8. anvaya-	8. anvaya-
9. saṃvṛti-	9. saṃvṛti-
10. parijaya-	10. paricaya-
11. yathāruta-jñāna	11. yāthāruta-jñāna.

The last two numbers are problematic:

Paricaya- or parijaya-jñāna. – For the meaning of the word, see Edgerton, Dictionary, p. 322; Conze, Materials, p. 245. The Pañcaviṃśati defines it as pratipatparijayajñāna 'cognition of the mastery of the path' according to Conze. The Śatasāhasrikā, p. 1441, l. 20, defines it as pratipakṣajñāna 'knowledge of the antidote'. Neither of these definitions is satisfactory. But if we proceed by elimination, it is clear that in the list of the ten knowledges paricaya or parajayajñāna, whichever the orthography of the word, can here only designate the paracittajñāna 'knowledge of another's mind' rendered in the Pāli sources given above by the terms paricchede ñānam or cittaparicchede ñānam.

Yathārutajñāna. – Taken out of context, the expression can only mean 'knowledge that conforms to the expression'. But the Pañcaviṃśati, p. 209, l. 9 and the Śatasāhasrikā, p. 1441, l. 21, defines it as tathāgatasya sarvākārajñatājñānam 'knowledge of the consciousness of all aspects [of things], belonging to the Tathāgata'. If this explanation is valid, then I [Lamotte] think the reading yathārutajñāna should be corrected to yathābhūtajñāna 'consciousness conforming to reality', the variant attested by some Chinese versions.

## 2. Lists of the eleven knowledges in the Chinese Prajñāpāramitās

List A appears in the Pañcaviṃśati translated by Kumārajīva, T 223, , k. 1, p. 219a13-15; and in the Pañcaviṃśati by Hiuan-tsang, T 220, vol. VII, k. 415, p. 80b1-3.

List B appears in Kumārajīva's Pañcaviṃśati, T 223, k. 5, p. 254c19-21, and the translations of Hiuantsang in the Śatasāhasrikā (T 220, vol. V, k. 3, p. 12a25-27), the Pañcaviṃśati (T220, vol. VII, k. 402, p. 7c4-6), and the Aṣṭādaśasāhasrikā (T 220, vol. VII, k. 479, p. 429c24-26; ik. 489, p. 487c24-25).

It should be noted that Kumārajīva calls the eleventh knowledge *yathābhūtajñāna* whereas Hiuan-tsang always give it the reading *yathārutajñāna*.

List A	List B
1. dharma-	1. duḥkha-
2. anvaya-	2. samudaya-
3. paracitta-	3. nirodha-
4. saṃvṛti-	4. mārga-
5. duḥkha-	5. kṣaya-
6. samudaya-	6. anutpāda-
7. nirodha-	7. dharma-
8. mārga-	8. anvaya-

9. *kṣaya*- 9. *saṃvṛti*-

10. anutpāda- 10. paracitta-

11. yathābhūtajñāna in K; 11. yathābhūtajñāna in K;

yathaārutajñāna in H-t. yathārutajñāna in H-t.

## A. Definition of the eleven knowledges in the Prajñāpāramitās

This will be found in the following recensions:

- 1. Pañcavimáti, p. 209, l. 1-9; T 223, k. 5, p. 254c21-255a4; T 220, vol. VII, k. 415, p. 80b3-21.
- 2. Astadaśasahāsrikā, T 220, vol. VII, k. 489, p. 487c26-488a15.
- 3. Śatasāhasrikā, p. 1440, l. 13-1441, l. 22.

Here I [Lamotte] limit myself to restoring the Pañcaviṃsati translated by Kumārajīva, T 223, k. 5, p. 254c21-255a4, into Sanskrit:

1. Tatra katamad duḥkhajñānam. yad duḥkhasyānutpādajñānam idam ucyate ... 11. ... tathāgatasya sarvākārajñānam idam ucyate yathābhūtajñānam.

Transl. – 1. What is the knowledge of suffering? It is the knowledge of the non-production of suffering.

- 2. What is the knowledge of the origin of suffering? It is the knowledge of the abandonment of this origin.
- 3. What is the knowledge of the cessation of suffering? It is the knowledge of the original cessation of this suffering.
- 4. What is the knowledge of the path of cessation of suffering? It is the awareness of the noble eightfold Path
- 5. What is the knowledge of the cessation of the impurities? It is the knowledge of cessation of lust, hatred and ignorance.
- 6. What is the knowledge of the non-rearising of the impurities? It is the knowledge of the non-production of these impurities in the Blessed One.
- 7. What is the knowledge of things? It is the knowledge consisting of the discerning of [the characteristics, impermanence, etc.] of these things.
- 8. What is subsequent knowledge? It is the knowledge consisting of saying: "The eye is impermanent" and so on up to "Mind, contact, co-dependent production and feeling are impermanent."
- 9. What is conventional knowledge? It is the knowledge of the name of causes and conditions.
- 10. What is the knowledge of another's mind? It is to know the minds of other beings and other individuals by means of the mind.

11. What is knowledge conforming to reality? It is the knowledge, belonging to the Tathāgata, of the consciousness of all the aspects.

These explanations are exactly opposite to the definitions given above by the Sanskrit Abhidharma: they represent the Mahāyānist point of view and are commented on by the *Traité* in turn: below, p. 1483F and later, k. 27, p. 257c14-16; k, 48, p. 406b-c; k. 84, p. 650c9-15; k. 99, p. 749a14.

## [k. 23, p. 232c]

Sūtra (cf. Śatasāhasrikā, p. 61, l. 6-62, l. 16). – [The bodhisattva-mahāsattva must fulfill completely] the eleven knowledges (*ekādaśa jñānāni*):

- 1. the knowledge of things (dharmajñāna),
- 2. subsequent knowledge (anvayajñāna),
- 3. the knowledge of another's mind (paracittajñāna),
- 4. conventional knowledge (samvṛtijñāna),
- 5. the knowledge of suffering (duḥkhajñāna),
- 6. the knowledge of the origin of suffering (samudayajñāna),
- 7. the knowledge of the cessation of suffering (nirodhajñāna),
- 8. the knowledge of the path of the cessation of suffering (mārgajñāna),
- 9. the knowledge of the cessation of the impurities (kṣayajñāna),
- 10. the knowledge of the non-rearising of the impurities (anutpādajñāna),
- 11. the knowledge conforming to reality (yathabhūtajñāna).

# Śāstra. – I. DEFINITION OF THE ELEVEN KNOWLEDGES

- 1. The knowledge of things (dharmajñāna) is:
- a. the pure knowledge concerning things associated with the desire realm (kāmadhātusaṃprayukteṣu dharmeṣu yad anāsravaṃ jñānam).
- b. the pure knowledge concerning the cause of things associated with the desire realm (kāmadhātusamprayuktānam darmānām hetau yad anāsravam jñānam).
- c. the pure knowledge concerning the cessation of things associated with the desire realm (kāmadhātusamprayuktānām dharmānam nirodhe yad anāsravam jñānam).
- d. the pure knowledge concerning the path leading to the cessation of things associated with the desire realm (kāmadhātusamprayuktānām dharmāṇām prahāṇāya mārge yad anāsravam jñānam).

- e. also the pure knowledge concerning the knowledge of the things themselves and its stage (api khalu dharmajñāne dharmajñānabhūmau ca yad anāsravaṃ jñānam).
- 2. It is the same for the subsequent knowledge (*anvayajñana*) concerning [things associated] with the form realm and the formless realm (*rūpārūpyasahātusaṃprayukteṣu dharmeṣu*).
- 3. The knowledge of another's mind (paracittajñāna) cognizes:
- a. the mind (citta) and mental events (caitasikadharma) relating to the desire realm and the form realm (kāmarūpadhātusamprayukta) presently belonging to others,
- b. also a small part of their pure minds and mental events (anāsravacittacaitta).
- 4. Conventional knowledge (samvrtijñāna) is all of the impure knowledges (sarvasāsravajñāna).
- 5. The knowledge of suffering (duḥkhajñāna) is the pure knowledge produced when the five aggregates of attachment are considered as impermanent, suffering, empty and without self (pañcopādānaskandhān anityato duḥkhataḥ śūnyato 'nātmataś ca manasikurvato yad anāsravaṃ jñānanaṃ).
- 6. The knowledge of the origin of suffering (samudayajñāna) is the pure knowledge produced when the cause of impure dharmas is considered as cause, origin, successive and associated causation (sāsravahetukam hetutah samudayatah prabhavatah pratyayataś ca manasikurvato yad anāsravam jñānam).
- 7. The knowledge of the cessation of suffering (nirodhajñÔna) is the pure knowledge produced by considering this cessation as cessation, peaceful, excellent and bringing salvation (nirodham nirodhataḥ śāntataḥ praṇītato niḥsaraṇataś ca manasikurvato yad anāsravam jñānam).
- 8. The knowledge of the path of cessation (mārgajñāna) is the pure knowledge produced by considering this path as path, logical, attainment and ultimate exit (mārgaṃ mārgato nyāyataḥ pratipattito nairyāṇikataś ca manasikurvato yad anāsravaṃ jñānam).
- 9. The knowledge of the cessation of the impurities (kṣayajñāna = āsravakṣayajñāna) is the pure knowledge produced by thinking: "Suffering is completely known by me (duḥkham me parijñātam); the origin has been abandoned by me (samudayo me prahīṇaḥ); cessation has been realized by me (nirodho me sākṣātkṛtaḥ); the path has been practiced by me (mārgo me bhāvitaḥ)"; it [223a] is a wisdom (prajñā), a seeing (darśana), a knowing (vidyā), an understanding (buddhi).
- 10. The knowledge of the non-rearising of the impurities (anutpādajñāna) is the pure knowledge produced by thinking: "The suffering completely known by me is no longer to be known (duḥkhaṃ me parijñataṃ na parijñātavyaṃ); the origin abandoned by me is no longer to be abandoned (samudayo me prahīṇo na prahātavayaḥ); the cessation realized by me is no longer to be realized (nirodho me sākṣātkṛto na sākṣātkartavyaḥ); the path practiced by me is no longer to be practiced (mārgo me bhāvito nabhāvitavyaḥ)": it is a wisdom (prajñā), a seeing (darśana), a knowing (vidyā), an understanding (buddhi).

11. The wisdom conforming to reality (*yathābhūtajñāna*) is a knowledge conforming exactly to reality and free of obstacles (*apratihata*) concerning the general characteristics (*sāmānyalakṣaṇa*) and specific characteristics (*svalakṣaṇa*) of all dharmas.

#### B. The Ten Knowledges According to the Abidharam

- 1. Objects of the ten knowledges<sup>531</sup>
- 1) Dharmajñāna has as object (ālamabate): a. things associated with the desire realm (kāmadhātusaṃprayuktā dharmāḥ); b. the cause of things associated with the desire realm (kāmadhātusaṃprayuktānāṃ dharmāṇāṃ hetuḥ); c. the cessation of things associated with the desire realm (kāmadhātusaṃprayuktānāṃ dharmāṇāṃ nirodhaḥ); d. the path leading to the cessation of things associated with the desire realm (kāmadhātusaṃprayuktānāṃ dharmāṇāṃ prahāṇāya mārgaḥ).
- 2) *Anvayajñāna* is similar, [with the difference that it concerns the things of rūpa- and ārūpyadhātu, their cause, their cessation and the path to their cessation].
- 3) Samvṛtijñāna has as object all the dharmas.
- 4) *Paracittajñāna* has as object the mind (*citta*) and mental events (*caitasikadharma*), impure (*sāsrava*) or pure (*anāsrava*), occurring in the mind of another.
- 5-6) Duḥkhajñāna and samudayajñāna have as object the five aggregates of attachment (upādānaskandha).
- 7) Nirodhajñāna has as object the cessation (nirodha) [of suffering].
- 8) *Mārgajñāna* has as object the five pure elements (pañcānāsravaskandha).
- 9-10) Kṣayajñāna and anutpādajñāna together have as object the four truths (catuḥsatya).

# 2. Pure and impure knowledges<sup>532</sup>

Of the ten knowledges, one is impure (sāsrava), [namely, saṃvṛitjñāna], eight are pure (anāsrava) and one, namely, paracittajñāna, should be set apart since it is impure when it has an impure mind as object and pure when it has a pure mind as object.

- 3. Mutual inclusion of the ten knowledges<sup>533</sup>
- 1) Dharmajñāna contains (saṃgṛḥṇāti):
- a. dharmajñāna [properly called],

<sup>531</sup> Compare Prakaraṇapāda, T 1542, k. 1, p. 694b4-c4; Kośa, VII, p.5seq.; Abhidharmadīpa, p. 377, 1. 1-378, 1. 6.

<sup>532</sup> Cf. Kośa, VII, p. 4.

<sup>533</sup> Cf. Prakaranapāda, T 1542, k. 1, p. 694c5-19; Kośa, vii, p. 11-12.

- b. a small part, [namely, the part relating to kāmadhātu] of the *paracittajñāna*, of the *duḥkhajñāna*, of the *samudayajñāna*, of the *nirodhajñāna*, of the *mārgajñāna*, of the *kṣayajñāna* and of the *anutpādajñāna*.
- 2) Anvayajñāna, the same [replacing 'the part relating to kāmadhātu' with 'the part relating to rūpa- and ārūpyadhātu'.
- 3) Samvṛtijñāna contains:
- a. saṃvṛtijñāna [properly called],
- b. a small part of paracittajñāna, [namely, the impure part (sāsrava) of paracittajñāna].
- 4) Paracittajñāna contains:
- a. paracittajñāna [properly called],
- b. a small part [namely, that found in the mind of another] of dharmajñāna, of anvayajñāna, of saṃvṛtijñāna, of mārgajñāna, of kṣayajñāna and of anutpādajñāna.
- 5) Duḥkhajñāna contains:
- a. suḥkhajñāna [properly called],
- b. a small part, [that which has as object the truth of suffering], of dharmajñāna, of anvayajñāna, of kṣayajñāna, and of anutpādajñāna.
- 6-7) Samudayajñāna and nirodhajñāna are explained on the same principle.
- 8) Mārgajñāna contains:
- a. mārgajñāna [properly called],
- b. a small part, [that which has the truth of the path as object], of dharmajñāna, of anvayajñāna, of paracittajñāna, of kṣayajñāna, and of anutpādajñāna.
- 9) Kṣayajñāna contains:
- a. kṣayajñāna [properly called],
- b. a small part, [that having as object the suppression of the impurities], of *dharmajñāna*, of *anvayajñāna*, of *paracittajñāna*, of *duḥkhajñāna*, and of *mārgajñāna*.
- 10) Anutpādajñāna is explained according to the same principle.
- 4. The associates of the ten knowledges
- [a. The faculties (indriva).]

- i) Nine knowledges are associated (*samprayukta*) with eight faculties (*indriya*), excluding the faculty of wisdom (*prajñendriya*), the faculty of dissatisfaction (*daurmanasyendriya*) and the faculty of displeasure (*duḥkhendriya*). 534
- ii) Samvṛtijñāna is associated with ten faculties, excluding the faculty of wisdom (prajñendriya).
- [b. The concentrations (samadhi).]
- i) Dharmajñāna, anvayajñāna and duḥkhajñāna are associated with the samadhi of emptiness (śūnyatāsamādhi).
- ii) Dharmajñāna, anvayajñāna, nirodhajñāna, kṣayajñāna and anutpādajñāna are associated with the samādhi of signlessness (ānimittasamādhi).
- iii) Dharm,ajñāna, anvayajñāna, paracittajñāna, duḥkkhajñāna, samudayajñāna, mārgajñāna, kṣayajñāna and anutpādajñāna are associated wih the samadhi of wishlessness (apraṇihitasamādhi).
- [c. The concepts  $(samj\tilde{n}\tilde{a})$ .]
- i) Dharmajñāna, anvayajñāna, samvṛtijñāna, duḥkhajñāna, kṣayajñāna and anutpādajñāna are associated [with three concepts from the group of the ten concepts mentioned on p. 1433F]: the concept of impermanence (anityasamjñā), the concept of suffering (duḥkhasamjñā) and the concept of non-self (anātmasamjñā).
- ii) Saṃvṛtijñāna is associated with the four intermediate concepts [of the same group, namely, the concept of the repugnant nature of food (āhāre pratikūlasamjñā), the concept of displeasure in respect to the whole world (sarvaloke 'nabhiratsamjñā), the concept of death (maraṇasamjñā) and the concept of impurity (aśucisamjñā)].
- iii) Dharmajñāna, anutpādajñāna, nirodhajñāna, kṣayajñāna and anutpādajñāna are associated with the three final concepts [of the same group, namely, the concept of abandonment (prahāṇasaṃjñā), the concept of detachment (virāgasaṃjñā) and the concept of cessation (nirodhasaṃjñā)].

Some say that samvrtijñāna is sometimes associated with the concept of detachment (virāgasamjñā).

5. Mutual consciousness of the ten knowledges. 535

*Dharmajñāna* has as object (*ālambate*) nine knowledges, excluding *anvayajñāna*. The same for *anvayajñāna*, [excluding *dharmajñāna*].

Saṃvṛtijñāna, paracittajñāna, kṣayajñāna and anutpādajñāna have as object the ten knowledges. [233b]

Duhkhajñāna and samudayajñāna have as object samvṛtijñāna and the impure (sāsrava) paracittajñāna.

<sup>534</sup> See definitions in Kośa, I, p.101.

\_

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>535</sup> Cf. Saṃyuktābhidharma, T 1552, k. 6, p. 920b10-25; Abhidharmāmṛta, T 1553, k. 2, p. 974c8-12 (reconstred by Sastri, p. 92, l. 9-14); Kośa, VII, p. 43; Abhidharmadīpa, p. 377, l. 1-9.

Nirodhajñāna does not bear upon any knowledge.

Mārgajñāna has as object nine knowledges, excluding asmvṛtijñāna.

# 6. Aspects of the ten knowledges<sup>536</sup>

Dharmajñāna and anvayajñāna have the sixteen aspects (soḍaśakāra) [of the four noble Truths (p. 641F)].

Paracittajñāna has four aspects: [those of the truth of the Path (māragasatya)].

Duḥkha-, samudaya-, nirodha- and mārgajñāna have each of the four aspects [of their respective truths].

Kṣayajñāna and anutpādajñāna both have fourteen aspects, excluding the empty aspect ( $ś\bar{u}ny\bar{a}k\bar{a}ra$ ) and the non-self aspect ( $an\bar{a}tmak\bar{a}k\bar{a}ra$ ).

Saṃvṛtijñāna, when it occurs in heat (uṣmagata), summits (mūrdhan) and patience (kṣānti), has sixteen aspects. When it occurs in supreme worldly dharmas (laukikāgradharma), saṃvṛtijñāna has four aspects, [those of the truth of the path (mārgasatya)]. 537

7. Acquisition of the ten knowledges in the darśana- and aśaikṣamārga<sup>538</sup>

A. In the darśanamārga.

- 1) Entering into the first pure mind (*prathame 'nāsravacitte*), [i.e., *duḥke darmajñānakṣānti*], the saint (*ārya*) acquires one single knowledge, the *saṃvṛtijñāna*.
- 2-3) In the second mind [i.e., duḥkhe dharmajñāna], he adds duḥkhajñāna and dharmajñāna.
- 4) In the fourth mind [i.e., duḥkhe 'nvayajñāna], he adds anvayajñāna.
- 5) In the sixth mind [i.e., samudaye dharmajñāna], he adds samudayajñāna.
- 6) In the tenth mind [i.e., nirodhe dharmajñāna], he adds nirodhajñāna.

In regard to the precise subject of the acquisition of the ten knowledges in the darśana- and the āśaikṣamārga, cf. Saṃyuktābhidharma, T 1552, k. 6, p. 918c-16-27; Kośa, VII, p. 47-48; Abhidharmadīpa, p. 378, l. 7-17.

<sup>536</sup> Cf. Samyuktābhidharma, T 1552, k. 6, p. 918b11-c6; Abhidharmāmṛta, T 1553, k. 2, p. 974a26-b5 (reconstructed Sastri, p. 90, l. 12-17; Kośa, VIII, p. 15-16, 27-28.

This is a matter of the *saṃvṛtijñāna* practiced in the preparatory path (*prayogamārga*) during the four *nirvedhabhāgiyas*: heat, etc. See above, p. 395F, n. 1.

To follow this explanation and the next section easily, one must remember the great stages in the Path of nirvāṇa: 1) Path of seeing the truths (*satyadarśanamārga*) with its 16 moments of mind; 2) Path of meditation (*bhāvanāmārga*) with its 162 moments of mind; 3) Path of the saint at the end of his career (*arhat* or *aśaikṣa*). For a brief summary, see Lamotte, *Histoire du Bouddhisme indien*, p. 677-686, or references in the Introduction of L. de La Vallée Poussin in vol. V of the Kośa.

7-8) In the fourteenth mind [i.e., mārge dharmajñāna], he adds mārgajñāna.

But if he is already free of desire (*vītarāga*), [i.e., if, before entering into the supramundane path (*lokottaramārga*) of the darśanamārga, he has already been freed from desire by means of the worldly path (*laukikamārga*) of detachment], then the saint (*ārya*) also adds *paracittajñāna*.

- B. In the aśaikṣamārga.
- 9) In the path of the one of no further training (aśaikṣamārga), the arhat adds kṣayamārga.
- 10) If he has attained unshakeable deliverance (akopyā vimukti), he adds also anutpādajñāna.
- 8. Development of the ten knowledges in the threefold Path<sup>539</sup>
- A. In the darśanamārga.
- 1) In the first pure mind (*anāsravacitta*), [i.e. *duḥkhe dharmajñānakṣānti*], the yogin does not develop (*na bhāvayati*)<sup>540</sup> knowledge.
- 2) In the second mind, [i.e., duḥke dharmajñāna)], he develops two knowledges, present (pratyutpanna) and future (anāgata).
- 3) In the fourth moment, [i.e., *duḥkhe 'nvayajñāna*], he develops two present knowledges and three future knowledges.
- 4) In the sixth moment, [i.e., samudaye dharmajñāna], he develops two present and future knowledges.
- 5) In the eighth mind, [i.e., *samudaye 'nvayajñāna*], he develops two present knowledges and three future knowledges.
- 6) In the tenth mind, [i.e., nirodhe 'nvayajñāna], he develops two knowledges, present and future.
- 7) In the twelfth mind, [i.e., *nirodhe 'nvayajñāna*], he develops two present knowledges and three future knowledges.
- 8) In the fourteenth mind, [i.e., mārge dharmajñāna], he develops two knowledges, present and future.

<sup>539</sup> Cf. Saṃyuktābhidharma, T 1552, k. 6, p. 918c28-919c27; Abhidharmāmṛta, T 1553, k. 2, p. 974b5-c8 (reconstr. Sastri, p. 90, l. 18-92; l. 8: in line 18 of p. 90, the word asamāpattimadhyamadhyānabhūmyoḥ should be corrected to anāgamyadhyānāntarabhūmyoḥ; Vibhāṣā, T 1545, k. 107, p. 552a6-554b23; Kośa, VII, p. 48-50 and 54-59; Abhidharmadīpa, p. 379-381. 540 Cf. Kośavyākhyā, p. 632, l. 14-15: Iha dvividhā bhāvanādhikṛtā pratilaṃbhabhāvanā niṣevaṇabhāvanā; pratilaṃbhabhāvanā prāptitaḥ, niṣevaṇabhāvanā saṃmikhakhībhāvataḥ: "This is a twofold development here: a development of obtaining as acquisition, and a development of assistance from the fact of having preceded". This is why the ascetic can simultaneously develop present (pratyutpanna) and future (anāgata) knowledges.

9) In the sixteenth mind, [i.e., *mārge 'nvayajñāna*], he develops two present knowledges [*mārgajñāna* and *anvayajñāna*], and develops six future knowledges [*dharmajñāna*, *anvayajñāna*, *duḥkhajñāna*, *samudayajñāna*, *nirodhajñāna* and *mārgajñāna*]. If he is detached (*vītarāga*), he develops seven knowledges [by adding *paracittajñāna* to the preceding six].<sup>541</sup>

#### B. In the bhāvanāmārga.

- 10) The srotaāpanna who wishes to becomes detached from the fetters (*saṃyojana*) of kāmadhātu develops seven knowledges, excluding *paracittajñāna*, *kṣayajñāna* and *anutpādajñāna*, in the seventeenth mind.<sup>542</sup>
- 11) In the ninth deliverance ( $vimukti = vimuktim\bar{a}rga$ ), [when the saint becomes an agamin by destruction of the ninth category of passions of kamadhatu], 543 he develops four knowledges, excluding k and k are k and k and k and k are k and k and k and k are k are k and k are k and k are k and k are k are k are k and k are k are k are k are k and k are k are k and k are k are k are k are k and k are k

When, [by cessation of the fifth category of passions of kāmadhātu],<sup>544</sup> the person inspired by faith (*śraddhadhimukta*) becomes informed by possession of the view (*dṛṣṭipratpa*), he develops six knowledges in the twofold path<sup>545</sup>, excluding *paracittajñāna*, *saṃvṛtijñāna*, *kṣayajñāna* and *anutpādajñāna*.

541 Cf. Kośabhāṣya, p. 407, l. 17 – 408, l. 2: Avitarāgasya ṣodaṣe mārgānvayajñānakṣaṇe dve jñāne pratyutpanne: mārgajñānamārgānvayajñāne, purāgatani ṣaḍ bhavyante:

dharmānvayaduḥkhasamudayanirodhamārgajñānāni. Vītarāgasya paracittajñānam saptamam bhāvyate.

It is at the sixteenth mind-moment of the  $dar \acute{s}anam \bar{a}rga$ , which is also the first moment of the  $bh\bar{a}van\bar{a}m\bar{a}rga$ , that the saint  $(\bar{a}rya)$  takes possession of the first fruit of the religious life and becomes srotaāpanna.

542 See Kośabhāsya, p. 408:

Sarāgabhāvanāmārge tadūrdhvaṃ saptabhāvanā //
ṣoḍasāt kṣaṇād ūrdhvaṃ bhāvanāmārge yāvan na vītarāgo bhāvati tāvat sarveṣu
prayogānantaryavimuktiviśeṣamārgeṣu sapta jñānāni bhāvyante:
dharmānvayaduḥkhasamudayanirodhamārgasaṃvṛtijñānāni. laukikaś ced bhāvanāmārgaḥ
saṃvṛtijñānaṃ pratyutpannam. lokottaraś cec caturṇāṃ dharmajñānām anyatamat.

Transl. – "Above, in the Path of meditation associated with desire, there is the development of seven knowledges." - Beyond the sixteenth moment, in the Path of meditation, as long as one is not liberated from desire, in the preparatory paths, irresistible, freeing and excellent, seven knowledges are cultivated: dharma-, anvaya-, duḥkha-, samudaya-, nirodha-, mārga- and saṃvṛti-jñāna. If the path of meditation is mundane, saṃvṛtijñāna is developed; if the path of meditation is supramundane, another of the four dharmajñāna is cultivated.

543 One becomes anāgāmin by cessation of the ninth and last category of passions of kāmadhātu: one is never again reborn in kāmadhātu.

By cessation of the fifth category of passions of kāmadhātu, one becomes *śraddhādhimukta* or *dṛṣṭiprāpta* according to whether one is of weak faculties or strong faculties: Āloka, p. 35, 1. 20-21:

- 12) When the saint is detached from the passions belonging to seven stages (*bhūmi*), [namely, the four dhyānas of rūpadhātu, and the first three samāpattis of ārūpyadhātu], the following should be distinguished:
- a. in the uninterrupted paths (ānantaryamārga, also called prahāṇamārga), he develops seven knowledges, excluding paracittajñāna, kṣayajñāna and anutpādajñāna.
- b. in the paths of deliverance (*vimuktimārga*), he develops eight knowledges, excluding *kṣayajñāna* and anutpādajñāna.<sup>546</sup>
- 13) When the saint is detached from the passions of the summit of existence (*bhavāgra* or the fourth *samāpatti* of ārūpyadhātu), the following should be distinguished:
- a. in the [nine] uninterrupted paths (ānantaryamārga or prahāṇamārga of this sphere], he develops six knowledges, excluding paracittajñāna, saṃvṛtijñāna, kṣayajñāna and anutpādajñāna.
- b. in the [first] eight paths of deliverance (*vimuktimārga*), he develops seven knowledges, excluding saṃvṛtijñāna, kṣayajñāna and anutpādajñāna.<sup>547</sup>

Kāmavacarapañcaprakārakleśaprahāṇena dvitīyaphalapratipannako mṛdutīkṣnendriya evaikaḥ śraddhādṛṣṭiprāptaḥ.

In the unstoppable paths (ānantarya or prahāṇamārga) and in the paths of deliverance (vimuktimārga). Nine of each are needed in order to conquer the passions of a single given level.

546 Cf. Kośabhāṣya, p. 408:

Saptabhūmijayābhijñākopyāptyākīrṇabhāvite/ ānantaryapathesūrdhvamuktimārāstake 'pi ca //

sapta jñānāni bhāvyante iti ... anvayajñānānām dvayoś ca dharmajñānanayor anyatamat.

Transl. – "In the uninterrupted paths of conquest over the seven levels, of acquisition of the supernatural powers and unshakeable quality, of mixed meditation, [seven knowledges are developed] and also in the eight paths of deliverance of the above."

Fill in: 'seven knowledges are developed'. The seven levels are the four dhyānas and the [first] three ārūpyas. Victory over these seven levels is detachment. During this detachment from the seven levels, in the five supernatural powers, in the quality of unshakeability and in the mixed meditation, all the unstoppable paths practiced by the śaikṣa entail the development of seven knowledges, the same as the preceding. If the path of meditation is worldly, <code>saṃvṛtijñāna</code> is cultivated. If the path is supramundane, one of the four <code>anvayajñānas</code> and one of the two <code>dharmajñānas</code> are developed. But in the quality of unshakeability, <code>saṃvṛtijñāna</code> is not developed because it is not opposed to Bhavāgra. Here <code>kṣayajñāna</code> is the seventh knowledge.

Above the detachment from the seven levels, in the detachment from bhavāgra, during the [first] eight paths of deliverance, seven knowledges also are developed: *dharma-, anvaya-, duḥkha-, samudaya-, nirodha- mārga-* and *paracittajñāna*. *Saṃvṛtijñāna* is not developed because it is not opposed to bhavāgra. But one of the four *anvayajñānas* and one of the two *dharmajñānas* are actually cultivated 547 Cf. Kośabhāṣya, p. 408-409:

Śaikṣottāpanamuktau vā ṣaṭsaprtajñānabhāvanā /

C. In the aśaikṣamārga.

- 14) In the first mind of 'the one who has nothing further to practice' (aśaikṣasya prathamacitta), a mind coinciding with the ninth and last deliverance (vimukti) of bhavāgra,
- a. the arhat who is unconditionally liberated (asamayavimukta) develops the ten knowledges and all the impure and pure roots of good (sarvāstavanāsravakuśalamūla).
- b. the arhat who is conditionally liberated (*samayavimukta*) develops nine knowledges [excluding *anutpādajñāna*], and all the impure and pure roots of good.<sup>548</sup>

All of these distinctions are fully explained in the *A-p'i-t'an-men* (Abhidharmamukha?).

#### C. The Eleven Knowledges According to the Mahāyāna

1. Knowledge conforming to reality

The knowledge conforming to reality (*yathābhūtajñāna*) has a special characteristic (*viśeṣalakṣaṇa*): it will be fully explained in the following chapters of [233c] the Prajñāpāramitā. 549

ānataryapathe şaṇṇām.

Śaikṣasyendriyottāpanāyāṃ vimuktimārge sarāgasya ṣaṇṇāṃ bhāvanā: ... sarvānantaryamārgapratiṣiddhatvāt. kim arthaṃ pratiṣidhyate. apratipakṣatvāt.

Transl. "For the śaikṣa, in the path of deliverance of perfecting the faculties, there is the development of six or seven knowledges; in the uninterrupted path, development of six knowledges."

In the path of deliverance, during the devopment of the faculties, the śaikṣa who still has the defilements develops six knowledges: *dharma-, anvaya-, samudaya-, nirodha-* and *mārgajñāna*. If he is detached from desire, he develops seven, adding *paracittajñāna* to the previous ones.

Whether or not he is detached from desire, in the uninterrupted path of perfecting the qualities, he develops the six knowledges mentioned above, but not *saṃvṛtijñāna*, because [perfecting the faculties] is like the path of seeing; not *paracittajñāna* because this knowledge is excluded from any path of seeing. Why is this knowledge excluded? Because it does not counteract [the passions]. 548 Cf. Kośabhāsa, p. 409:

Akopyasya daśabhāvanā, tatsaṃcāre 'nantyamuktau ca / yas tv akopyadharmā bhavati tasya ... vimuktimārge daśānāṃ bhāvanā.

Transl. – "In the Unshakeable, ten knowledges are developed, and also during the passing into the quality of the unshakeable in the last path of deliverance."

The person who has the quality of unshakeability develops the ten knowledges, and also the person who passes into the state of unshakeability develops the ten knowledges in [the ninth] and last path of deliverance [of bhavāgra].

The saint whom the *Traité* speaks of as definitively delivered (*asamayavimukta*) corresponds to the Unshakakeable one of whom the Kośa speaks.

#### 2. The eleven knowledges

Some say:

1) The knowledge of things (*dharmajñāna*) cognizes the five aggregates of attachment (*pañcopādānaskandha*) as impermanent (*anitya*), painful (*duḥkha*), empty (śūnya) and without self (*anātmaka*). It knows that dharmas are all the result of a complex of causes and conditions (*hetupratyayasāmagryapekṣa*) in the sense that 'actions have ignorance as condition' (*avidyāpratyayāḥ saṃskārāḥ*) and so on up to 'old age and death have birth as condition' (*jātipratyayaṃ jarāmaraṇam*).

Thus the Buddha said to the brahmacārin *Siu-che-mo* (Susīma): "First it is necessary to use the knowledge [of the causality] of things in order to analyze dharmas, then to use the knowledge concerning nirvāṇa."550

2) Subsequent knowledge (anvayajñāna). – Knowing that the present five aggregates of attachment (pratyutpannopādānaskandha) are impermanent (anitya), painful (duḥkha), empty (śūnya) and non-self (anātmaka), one deduces that, in the past (atīta) and the future (anāgata) and in the form realm (rūpadhātu) and the formless realm (ārūpyadhātu) as well, the five aggregates of attachment are likewise impermanent, suffering, empty and without self.

Thus, if we notice that presently fire (agni) warms and burns, we know by induction (anumāna) that fires past and future or fires in other places likewise [warm and burn].

3) The knowledge of another's mind (*paracittajñāna*) cognizes the mind (*citta*) and mental events (*caitasikadharma*) of other beings.

Question. – If it cognizes the mind and mental events of others, why is it called simply the knowledge of the mind of another [and not the knowledge of the mind and mental events of others]?

Answer. – The mind being sovereign, it is sufficient to call it the knowledge of another's mind: by saying mind, we know that the mental events are understood as well.

- 4) Conventional knowledge (saṃvṛtijñāna) is a purely knowledge of designation (prajñaptijñāna). The saint knows that, in regard to reality (tattva), worldly people (pṛthagjana) know it only verbally (prajñaptitaḥ). This is why this knowledge is called knowledge of designation (prajñaptijñāna). In the same way, those for whom a house (grha) is just a word-list of boards (phalaka), posts (sthūṇā), pillars (stambha) and walls (bhitti) only understand these materials and do not understand the real meaning (bhūtārtha) of a house. That is conventional knowledge (saṃvṛtijñāna).
- 5) The knowledge of suffering (*duḥkhajñāna*) brings into play a knowledge about suffering in order to reprimand the five aggregates of attachment (*pañcopādānaskandha*).

Pañcaviṃśati. T 223, k. 5, p. 255a2; k. 21, p. 376b19. The *Traité* will comment on these passages: T 1509, k. 48, p. 406c7; k. 84, p. 647b14; 650c21-23; k. 99, p. 749a14. The *yathābhūtajñāna* summing up the entire knowledge of the Mahāyāna coincides with the *sarvākārajñāna* discussed above, p. 640-642F. Susīmasutta in Saṃyutta, II, p. 134 (Tsa a han, T 99, k. 14, p. 97b6): *Pubbe kho Susīma dhammaṭṭhiñāṇam pacchā nibbāṇe ñāṇam ti*.

Question. – The five aggregates of attachment are both impermanent (anitya), painful (duhkha), empty (śunya) and non-self (anatmaka). Why speak only of the knowledge of suffering (duhkha) and not speak of a knowledge of impermanence, emptiness and non-self?  $^{551}$ 

Answer. – We speak of the knowledge of suffering in regard to the truth of suffering, the knowledge of the origin in regard to the truth of the origin, the knowledge of cessation in regard the truth of cessation, and the knowledge of the path in regard to the truth of the path..

Question. – But the five aggregates of attachment have all kinds of evils; why proclaim only one truth on suffering and not proclaim truths on impermanence, emptiness and non-self as well?

Answer. – If truths on impermanence, emptiness and non-self were proclaimed, this would not offend the meaning of the [Buddhist] doctrine. But as beings are, above all, lovers of happiness (*sukhakāma*) and enemies of suffering (*duḥkhapratikūla*), the Buddha's lament that everything in the world is suffering (*loke sarvam duhkham*) was intended to lead beings to become detached from it.

On the other hand, being faced with impermanence, emptiness and non-self, beings are not very frightened; this is why the Buddha did not speak of them [as distinct truths].

Furthermore, in the Dharma proclaimed by the Buddha, the five aggregates of attachment carry different names, but all meaning 'suffering'. This is why the Buddha spoke only of the knowledge of suffering.

This duḥkhajñāna is sometimes impure (sāsrava), sometimes pure (anāsrava):

a. It is impure [in the preparatory Path], when it is in heat (*uṣmagata*), summits (*mūrdhan*), patience (*kṣānti*) and supreme worldly dharmas (*laukikāgradharma*). 552

b. It is pure when the ascetic penetrates into the Path of seeing the truths (satyadarśanamārga).

Why is that? From there on up to the supreme worldly dharmas, the yogin considers suffering in four ways.

6-8) It is the same for the knowledge of the origin, the knowledge of cessation and the knowledge of the Path.

Furthermore, the knowledge of suffering (duḥkhajñāna) cognizes that suffering nature (duḥkhākāra) does not really arise. – The knowledge of the origin [234a] (samudayajñāna) cognizes that dharmas are disjunctive and without conjunction. – The knowledge of cessation (nirodhajñāna) cognizes that dharmas are forever peaceful (ādiśānta) and like nirvāṇa (nirvāṇasama). – The knowledge of the path (mārgajñāna) cognizes that dharmas are forever pure (nityaśuddha), without rectitude or evil. 553

In other words, since everything is impermanent, suffering, empty and non-self, why did the Buddha who proclaimed a truth of suffering not proclaim a truth of impermanence, emptiness and non-self?

The four aids to penetration (*nirvedhabhāgīya*) developed in the preparatory Path (*prayogamārga*): see above, p. 395F, n., and Kośa, VI, p. 163-168.

This paragraph condenses the Mahāyānist interpretation of the four holy Truths into a few words.

- 9) The knowledge of the elimination of the impurities (*kṣayajñāna*) cognizes that all dharmas are non-existent (*anupalabdha*).
- 10) The knowledge of the non-rearising of the impurities (*anutpādajñāna*) cognizes that dharmas, being unreal (*abhūta*) and indeterminate (*aniyata*), do not arise (*anutpanna*).
- 11) The knowledge conforming to reality (yathābhūtajñāna) is that which can be cognized by the ten preceding knowledges. By means of this knowledge in accordance with reality, the characteristics (nimitta), conditions (pratyaya), special features (prabheda) and considerations (anupaśyanā) belonging to each of the ten knowledges are cognized, but in this knowledge conforming to reality, there is no characteristic, condition, or special feature; it destroys all considerations of things and itself has none.

In the first ten knowledges, there is the eye of the Dharma (*dharmacakṣus*) and the eye of wisdom (*prajñācakṣus*); in the knowledge conforming to reality, there is only the eye of the Buddha (*buddhackasus*). 554

The first ten knowledges are shared by the arhats, pratyekabuddhas and bodhisattvas; the Buddha alone possesses the knowledge conforming to reality. Why? Only the Buddha possesses the Dharma which does not deceive (aśāthyadharma); this is how we know that he alone possesses the knowledge conforming to reality.

Finally, when the ten knowledges enter into the knowledge in accordance with reality, they lose their original names and then there is only one true knowledge. Similarly, when all the rivers of the ten directions enter into the great sea (*mahāsamudra*), they lose their original names and are just called great sea.

These various explanations of the meaning of the eleven knowledges are given here in brief (*saṃkṣiptena*). A note in red says that the eleven knowledges are finished here.

# Second section THE THREE MEDITATIVE STABILIZATIONS

*Sūtra* (cf. Pañcaviṃśati, p. 20, l. 9-11; Śatasāhasrikā, p. 62, l. 17-63, l. 4). – [The Bodhisattva-Mahāsattva must fulfill completely the three meditative stabilizations (*samadhi*):

- 1. the concentration with both conceptualization and analysis (savitarkah savicārah samādhih).
- 2. the concentration without conceptualization and with analysis only (avitarko vicāramātraḥ samādhiḥ),
- 3. the concentration with neither conceptualization or analysis (avitarko 'vicāraḥ samādhiḥ).

Śāstra. –

<sup>554</sup> The five eyes (*māṃsa-, divya-, prajñā-, dharma-, buddhacakṣus*) are defined in Pañcaviṃśati, p. 77-83: Śatasāhasrikā, p. 290-301).

#### I. THE THREE CONCENTRATIONS ACCORDING TO THE ABHIDHARMA

#### 1. The three kinds of concentration

All the trances (*dhyāna*) and all the absorptions (*samāpatti*) that concentrate the mind are called concentration (*samādhi*), 'sphere of action of right thought' in language of the Ts'in. During this beginningless universe (*anādikāliko lokadhātu*), the mind is always wandering (*kuṭila*) and without uprightness; but when these spheres of action of right thought are obtained, the mind is straightened out. Thus the progress of the snake (*sarpagati*) is always sinuous, but when it enters into a bamboo tube, it is corrected.

This concentration is of three types: 555

- 1) In the desire realm ( $k\bar{a}madh\bar{a}tu$ ), the preparatory concentration ( $an\bar{a}gamya$ ) of the first trance and the first trance ( $dhy\bar{a}na$ ), the concentration is associated with conceptualization (vitarka) and analysis ( $vic\bar{a}ra$ ) and consequently is called 'furnished with conceptuality and analysis' ( $savitarakah \ savic\bar{a}rah$ ).
- 2) In the *dhyānāntara*, [a variety of the first trance, the concentration is associated with analysis alone and is consequently called 'without conceptuality but with analysis only' (*avitarko vicārammatraḥ*).
- 3) From the second trance (*dvitīyadhyāna*) up to the level of the summit of existence (*bhavāgra*, or the fourth *ārūpyasamāpatti*), the concentration is associated with neither conceptuality nor analysis and consequently is called 'without conceptuality or analysis' (*avitarko* 'vicāraḥ).

## 2. Vitarka and Vicāra. 556

Question. - The mind (*citta*) and mental events (*caitasikadharma*) associated with concentration (*samādhisaṃprayukta*) are as many as twenty.<sup>557</sup> Why mention only two here, namely, conceptualization (*vitarka*) and analysis (*vicāra*)?

Answer. – *Vitarka* and *vicāra* cause disturbance (*vicakṣuḥkaraṇa*) in concentration: this is why we limit ourselves to mentioning two here. Even if they are good (*kuśala*), they are enemies to meditative stabilization and it is difficult to escape from them. Some even say that a mind furnished with *vitarka* and

 <sup>&</sup>lt;sup>555</sup> Cf. Daśottara, p. 58; Dīgha, III, p. 219. 274; Majjhima, III, p. 162; Saṃyutta, IV, p. 362-363:
 Anguttara, IV, p. 300: Paṭisambhidā, I, p. 48; Vibhanga, p. 228; Kathāvatthu, p. 413; Tchong a han, T

<sup>26,</sup> k. 17, p. 538c3-6; k. 18, p. 543c20-21; Kośa, VIII, p. 183.

Two mental events already defined above, p. 1028-1029F. See also Kośa, I, p. 59; II, p. 173-175.

<sup>557</sup> Cf. Kośa, II, p. 167.

*vicāra* is not concentrated. This is why the Buddha stated that the concentration with *vitarka* and *vicāra* lacks solidity. <sup>558</sup>

When the power of *vitarka* and *vicāra* is minimal, it is possible to obtain concentration. *Vitarka* and *vicāra* are able to produce concentration and are also able to destroy it. They are like the wind  $(v\bar{a}yu)$  which is able to bring rain [234b] (varṣa) and also able to destroy it. Good *vitarka* and *vicāra*, which are of three types, can produce the first *dhyāna*; but when the first *dhyāna* has been obtained, as a result of the *vitarka* and *vicāra* that have caused great joy  $(mah\bar{a}pr\bar{t}ti)$ , the mind is distracted (vikṣipta) and loses concentration. That is why only *vitarka* and *vicāra* are mentioned here.

Question. – What are the differences between vitarka and vicāra?

Answer. –*Vitarka* is the coarseness of mind (*cittaudārikatā*) and *vicāra* is the subtlety of mind (*cittasūkṣmatā*)<sup>559</sup>. *Vitarka* is the first movement of the mind toward its objects (*prathamaṃ svālambane cittasyohanam*); the *vicāra* that follows is an analysis (*vibhanga*), a judgment on the beautiful and the ugly (*suvarṇadurvarṇa*).

There are three kinds of coarse (*audārika*) *vitarka*: *i*) the mind of lust (*kāmavitarka*), *ii*) the mind of malice (*vyāpādavitarka*), *iii*) the mind of harmfulness (*vihiṃsāvitarka*). 560

There are three kinds of good (*kuśala*) *vitarka*: *i*) the mind of renunciation of desire (*naiṣkramyavitarka*), *ii*) the mind of non-harmfulness (*avyāpādavitarka*), *iii*) the mind of non-harmfulness (*avihimsāvitarka*). 561

There are three kinds of subtle ( $s\bar{u}k\bar{s}ma$ ) vitarka: i) thinking of one's relatives ( $j\bar{n}\bar{a}tivitarka$ ), ii) thinking of one's country (janapadavitarka), ii) thinking of not dying (amaraṇavitarka). 562

Latukikopamasutta of Majjhima, I, p. 454 (Tchomg a han, T 26, k. 50. p. 743b2-3): Idam kho aham. Udāyi iñjitasmim vadāmi. kim ca tattha iñjitasmim. yad eva tathha vitakkavicārā aniruddhā honti idam tattha iñjitasmim: "Wherever vitarka and vicāra have not been destroyed, there is agitation."

Kośabhāṣya, p. 227, l. 14-15: *Nanu ca trīṇi dhyānāni señjitāny uktāni bhagavatā. yad atra vitarkaṃ vicāraritam atrāryā iñjitam ity āhuḥ:* "Did not the Bhagavat say that the [first] three dhyānas are agitated? And the Āryas have said that [the first *dhyāna*] where there is *vitarkita* and *vicārita* is agitated."

<sup>559</sup> Atthasālinī, p. 114: Vitakkanam vā vitakko ūhanam ti vuttam hoti. svāyam ārammane cittasa abhiniropanalakkhaņo, so hi ārammano cittam āropeti.

<sup>561</sup> In regard to these two classes of *vitarka*, cf. Majjhima, I, p. 114 (Tchong a han, T 26, k. 25, p. 589a14-18) where the Buddha said: *Yan nūnāhaṃ dvidhā katvā dvidhākarvā vitakke vihareyyan ti. So kho ahaṃ bhikkhave yo cāyaṃ kāmavitakko yo ca byāpādavitakko yo ca vihiṃsāvitakko imaṃ ekabhāgaṃ akāsiṃ, yo cāyaṃ nekkhammavitakko yo ca abyāpādavitakko yo ca avihiṃsāvitakko imaṃ bhāgaṃ akāsiṃ.* 

This classification appears frequently in the canonical texts, e.g., Anguttara, I, p. 275; II, p. 76; III, p. 429

Six kinds of *vitarka* prevent *samādhi*. The three kinds of good *vitarka* can open the gate to *samādhi*, but if the *vitarka* and *vicāra* are too prominent, they lead to the loss of *samadhi*. It is like the wind (*vayu*) that propels ships (*nau*); beyond certain limits, it destroys the ship.

These are the many distinctions to make in regard to *vitarka* and *vicāra*.

## 3. Dharmas with vitarka, etc.

Question. – The sūtras speak of three kinds of dharmas: *i*) with both *vitarka* and *vicāra*, *ii*) without *vitarka* and with *vicāra*, *iii*) with neither *vitarka* or *vicāra*. <sup>563</sup>

They also speak of the levels (*bhūmi*) with *vitarka* and with *vicāra*, without *vitarka* and with *vicāra*, with neither *vitarka* nor *vicāra*. 564 Why speak here of the concentrations with *vitarka*, etc., only?

Answer. – Because here we note only what is most useful.

- 1) The dharmas with *vitarka* and with *vicāra* are dharmas associated with *vitarka* and *vicāra* and occur in kāmadhātu (desire realm), in the anāgamya (preparatory concentration of the first dhyāna), and in the first dhyāna. These dharmas are good (*kuśala*), bad (*akuśala*) and indeterminate (*avyākṛta*).
- 2) The dharmas without *vitarka* but with *vicāra* are dharmas associated with *vicāra* alone and are found in the dhyānāntara (type of the first dhyāna). These dharmas are good, bad or indeterminate.
- 3) The dharmas with neither *vitarka* or *vicāra* are deprived of *vitarka* and *vicāra*, namely: *a.* all matter (*sarvaṃ rūpam*), *b.* formations dissociated from the mind (*cittaprayuktasaṃskāra*), *c.* unconditioned dharmas (*asaṃskṛtadharma*).

# 4. Levels with vitarka, etc.

These three *vitarka*s are taken from Saṃyutta, T 99, k. 16, p. 109c4-6. They appear in the Pāli sources also: *ñātivitakka*, *janapadavitakka* and *amaravitakka* (Mahānidesa, p. 501, l. 21-22; Vibhaṅga, p. 346, l. 18-20, but the last one is sometimes replaced by *anavaññapaṭisaṃyutta vitakka* 'the worry of not being mistaken' (Anguttara, I, p. 254). On this last word, see also Itivuttaka, p. 72; Vibhaṅga, p. 356. Vibhaṅga, p. 434-435 gives the complete list.

The *samādhis* should not be confused with their respective levels. Whether it is a question of *dhyāna* or *samāpatti*, the *samādhis* are of two types: *i*) the *samādhi* proper, namely, the concentrations raising the ascetic momentarily to certain psychic planes of rūpa-or ārūpyadhātu; *ii*) the *samadhi* spheres of existence where the gods of rūpa- or ārūpyadhātu have taken birth for a determined lifespan. The first are called cause-*samādhi* (*kāraṇasamādhi*), the second are called existence-*samādhi* (*upapattisamādhi*) or effect-*samādhi* (*kāryasamādhi*). See Kośa, VIII, p. 128.

- 1) The levels (*bhūmi*) with both *vitarka* and *vicāra* are: *a*. kāmadhātu, *b*. anāgamya (preparatory concentration of the first dhyāna), c. part of the brahmaloka (namely, the first two stages of the first dhyāna inhabited by the Brahmakāyikas and the Brahmapurohitas respectively.
- 2) The level without *vitarka* but with *vicāra* is the dhyānantara (higher stage of the first dhyāna). Those who develop this level thoroughly are the Mahābrahmarajās.
- 3) The levels with neither vitarka nor  $vic\bar{a}ra$  are the levels [inhabited by the following gods]:  $^{565}$  a. All the  $\bar{A}bh\bar{a}svaras$ , (namely, the Paritta $\bar{b}has$ , the Apram $\bar{a}n\bar{a}bhas$  and the  $\bar{A}bh\bar{a}svaras$  occupying the three stages of the second dhy $\bar{a}na$ ), b. all the  $\bar{S}ubhakrtsnas$ , (namely, the Par $\bar{a}ttasubhas$ , the Apram $\bar{a}nasubhas$  and the  $\bar{S}ubhakrtsnas$  occupying the three stages of the third dhy $\bar{a}na$ ), c. all the  $\bar{b}rhatphalas$ , (namely the Anabhrakas, the Punyaprasavas and the  $\bar{b}rhatphalas$  occupying the first three stages of the fourth dhy $\bar{a}na$ ),  $\bar{b}^{66}$  d. all the formless gods:  $\bar{A}r\bar{u}pya$  (belonging to the four dhy $\bar{a}nas$  of  $\bar{a}r\bar{u}pyadhatu$ :  $\bar{a}k\bar{a}s\bar{a}nanty\bar{a}yatana$ ,  $vij\bar{n}a\bar{a}nantaty\bar{a}yatana$ ,  $\bar{a}kimcany\bar{a}yatana$  and  $naivasamj\bar{n}a\bar{a}samj\bar{n}a\bar{a}ayatana$ , also called  $\bar{b}hav\bar{a}gra$ ).

## II. THE THREE CONCENTRATIONS ACCORDING TO THE MAHĀYĀNA

Here [in the Prajñāpāramitāsūtra], it is a matter of much higher things, namely, the meditative stabilizations (*samadhi*):

What are these concentrations?

- 1) The concentrations of the arhats and pratyekabuddhas, from the three concentrations of emptiness, etc. (śūnyatāsamādhi) up to the diamond concentration (vajrasamādhi).<sup>567</sup>
- 2) The concentrations of the Buddhas, from the concentration contemplating the Buddhas of the ten directions (daśadigbuddhasamādhi) up to the concentration of the hero's progress (śūramgamasamādhi),

The first three dhyānas each entail three stages or levels (*bhūmi*), the fourth entails eight. Each stage is inhabited by a class of gods. Here, out of concern for conciseness, the *Traité* designates the group of deities of a dhyāna by giving the name of their highest category.

The fourth dhyāna is inhabited by eight categories of gods: 1) Anabhraka, 2) Puṇyaprasava, 3) Bṛhatphala, the only ones mentioned here, plus five categories of Śuddhāvāsikas: 1) Avṛha, 2) Atapa, 3) Sudṛṣa, 4) Sudarśana, 5) Akaniṣṭha. See Kośa, III, p. 2.

<sup>567</sup> The meditative stabilizations of emptiness (\$\sigma u nyata \tilde{a}\$), signlessness (\$\alpha n imitta\$) and wishlessness (\$apranihita\$), also called the three \$\vimo k samukhas\$, have been studied above, p. 1209-1232F. The vajrasamādhi or more correctly the vajropamasamādhi, is the path of abandonment (\$prahaṇamārga\$) by means of which the ascetic abandons the ninth category (weak-weak) of the kleśas that attach him to the highest sphere of existence – the fourth \$samāpatti\$ or bhavāgra

from the concentration eliminating all doubts (sarvasaṃśayasamucchedasamādhi) up to the king of concentrations (samādhirājasamādhi). 568

These explanations briefly outline (saṃkṣiptena) the meaning of the three concentrations. It is finished!

# Third section THE THREE FACULTIES OF UNDERSTANDING

# PRELIMINARY NOTE

#### I. THE THREE FACULTIES OF UNDERSTANDING

This is a group of three dominant faculties (*indriya*), pure ( $an\bar{a}srava$ ) and supramundane (*lokottara*), assuring complete understanding ( $\bar{a}i\tilde{n}\bar{a}$ ) of the four truths at different stages. They are:

- 1. The faculty signifying "I will understand [the holy truths] which I do not yet understand" (anājñātamāsyāmīdriya).
- 2. The faulty of understanding assuring the understanding of these truths (ājñendriya).
- 3. The faculty belonging to the saint who has understood the truths (ājñātāvīndriya).

These three faculties which form a homogeneous group have already been mentioned in the canonical sources: Dīgha, III, p. 219; Samyutta, V, p. 204; Itivuttaka, p. 53;Tch'ang a han, T 1, k. 8, p. 50b13; Tsa a han, T 99, k. 26, p. 182a12-13.

They are defined in the Pañcavimsati, p. 209 and the Satasāhasrikā, p. 1442:

Anājñātamājñāsyāmīndriyam yac chaikṣāṇām pudgalānām anabhisamitānām ... pudgalānām arhatām pratyekabuddhānām bodhisattvānām tathāgatānām arhatām samyaksambuddhānānām śraddhendriyam, etc., up to prajñendriyam.

Translation. – The *anājñātamājñāsyāūndriya* is the faculty of faith, energy, mindfulness, concentration and wisdom in individuals who are still practicing and who have not yet understood [the truths]. The *ājñendriya* are the same faculties in individuals who are still practicing but who already possess the understanding of the truths. The *ājñātāvīndriya* are the same faculties in individuals who have nothing further to practice, namely the arhats, pratyekabuddhas, bodhisattvas and the Tathāgatas, saints, fully and completely enlightened ones.

These are the 108 or 120 samādhis belonging to the bodhisattvas and the Buddhas. A list accompanied by brief explanations of them is given by Pañcaviṃśati, p. 142-144, 198-203, and Śatasāhasrikā, p. 825-835, 1412-1426. See also Mahāvyut., no. 505-623.

These are definitions analogous to those found in the treatises of the Vijñānavādin school: Madhyāntavibhāga, p. 156, l. 6-14; Abhidharmasamuccaya, rec. Pradhan, p. 75, l. 25-76, l. 4; Siddhi, p. 449-452.

### II. THE TWENTY-TWO FACULTIES (INDRIYA)

In the Abhidharma treatises, Pāli as well as Sanskrit, the three faculties of understanding are included in a numbered list of twenty-two also described as faculties (*indriya*).

So far as I [Lamotte] know, this list of twenty-two *indriyas* does not appear in the Pāli Nikāyas or the Sanskrit Āgamas. However, according to the Kośa, I, p. 101 and the Abhidharmadīpa, p. 44, the Buddha taught it "in a sūtra": *Dvāviṃśatir indriyāṇi. katāni dvāviṃśatiḥ. cakṣurindriyam...* According to Vibhāṣā, T 1545, k. 142, p. 729a3; 730a7, the Buddha was speaking on that occasion to the brahmin *Cheng-wen*, i.e., to the brahmin Jātiśroṇa according to the Kośavyākhyā, p. 90, l. 25 and 28. We may, however, note that the Chinese characters *Cheng-wen* are often known in Pāli under the name of Jānussonī (cf. Akanuma, p. 240).

The list of twenty-two *indriya*s, cited here in the order most often adopted, appear in all the Abhidharmas which devote long explanations to them: Paṭisambhidā of the Khuddakanikāya, I, p. 7, l. 23-24; Vibhaṅga, p. 122; Kathāvatthu, p. 13; Visuddhimagga, p. 417; Prakaraṇapāda, T 1542, k. 15, p. 753c9; Jñānaprasthāna, T 1544, k. 14, p. 991b23-26; Vibhāṣā, T 1645, k. 152, p. 728c7-10; Abhidharmāmṛta, T 1553, k. 1, p. 871b28-c1 (rec. Sastri, p. 74); Satyasiddhiśāstra, T 1646, k. 1, p. 251b2-18; Kośa, p. 101; Kośavyākhyā, p. 90-91Nyāyānusāra, T 1562, k. 8, p. 377a14-17; Abhidharmadīpa, p. 44.

These twenty-two *indriva*s are constituted by the organs, the sensations or the faculties as follows:

1. sight (cakṣus), 2. hearing (śrotra), 3. smell (ghrāna). 4. taste (jihvā), 5. touch (kāya), 6. mind (manas), 7. male organ (puruṣendriya), 8. female organ (strīndriya), 9. vital organ (jīvitendriya), 10. sensation of pleasure (sukha), 11. sensation of displeasure (duḥkha), 12. sensation of satisfaction (saumanasya), 13. sensation of dissatisfaction (daurmanasya), 14. sensation of indifference (upekṣā), 15. faculty of faith (śraddhā), 16. faculty of energy (vīrya), 17. faculty of mindfulness (smṛti), 18. faculty of concentration (samadhi). 19. faculty of wisdom (prajñā), 20-22, the three faculties of understanding the truths defined above.

Among so many others, why are these twenty-two dharmas the only ones to be *indriyas*? The word *indriya*, derived from the root *id* or *ind*, is synonymous with great power (*paramaiśvarya*), with control (*ādhipatya*). The twenty-two dharmas in question have the characteristic of being dominant in regard to the living being (*sattva*) in that which concerns: 1. his primary constitution (*mauladravya*), 2. his distinctiveness (*vikalpa*), 3. his duration (*sthiti*), 4. his moral defilement (*samkleśa*), 5. his purification (*vyavadāna*). Indeed:

- 1. The point of support of the mind (*cittāśraya*) is made up of the six organs of consciousness, from the organ of sight to the mental organ (*indriyas* no. 1-6).
- 2. This point of support is distinguished by the two sexual organs (*indriyas* no. 7-8).
- 3. It lasts for a given time due to the vital organ (*indriya* no. 8).

- 4. It is defiled as a result of the five sensations (*indriya*s no. 10-14).
- 5. Its purification is prepared by the five moral faculties, faith, etc. (indrivas no. 15-19).
- 6. This purification is definitively assured by the three faculties of understanding (indriyas no. 20-22).

This nature of dominant-faculty is absent in other dharmas. This is why the *indriya*s are twenty-two in number, no more and no less.

All of this is explained in Kośa, II, p. 110-111.

Conforming to its custom, the *Traité* will explain in turn the viewpoint of the Sarvāstivādin Abhidharma and the view-point of the Mahāyāna concerning the three faculties of understanding, the only ones that are absolutely pure (*anāsrava*) and supramundane (*lokottara*). The difference between the two systems resides in the fact that, for the Abhidharma, understanding concerns the four noble Truths (*suḥkha, samudaya, nirodha, mārga*), whereas for the Mahāyāna, it concerns the true nature of all dharmas.

Sūtra (cf. Pañcaviṃśati, p. 20, l. 11-12; Śatasāhasrikā, p. 63, l. 4-6). – [The bodhisattva-mahāsattva must completely fulfill] three faculties (trīṇāndriyāṇi):

- 1) the faculty signifying: I will understand that which I do not understand (anājñātamājñāsyāmīndriya)
- 2) the faculty of understanding (ājñendriya)
- 3) the faculty of that which has been understood (ājñātāvīndriya).

# 1. The Three Faculties of Understanding According to the Abhidharma

#### A. Definition

1. The faculty signifying "I will understand that which I do not understand" (anājñātamājñāsyāmīndriya) is a group of nine pure faculties (navānāsravendriyasāmagrī).

In the individual who follows the truth as a result of faith (*śraddhānusārin*) or who follows the truth as a result of scripture (*dharmānusārin*)<sup>569</sup> and who is on the Path of seeing the truths (*satyadarśanamārga*), this group is called *anājñātamājñāsyamīndriya* and includes [the following nine *indriyas*]:

- *1-5*) the five faculties, namely, faculty of faith (*śraddhendriya*), [faculty of energy (*vīryendriya*), faculty of mindfulness (*smṛtīndriya*), faculty of concentration (*samādhīndriya*) and faculty of wisdom (*prajñendriya*)].
- 6) the sensation of satisfaction (saumansayensdriya).
- 7) the sensation of pleasure (sukhendriya).
- 8) the sensation of indifference (upekṣendriya).

These terms have been defined above, p. 1390F.

- 9) the mental organ (manasindriya). 570
- 2. In the person liberated by faith (śraddhādhimukta) or in the view-attainer (dṛṣṭiprāpta)<sup>571</sup> who is on the path of meditation (bhāvanāmārga), this [group] of nine indriyas changes its name and is called faculty of understanding (ājñendriya). [234c]
- 3. In the path of those of no more learning (aśaikṣamārga), this [group] of nine indriyas is called the faculty of those who have understood (ājñatāvīndriya).

#### B. Excellence of the three faculties of understanding

Question. – Of all the twenty-two *indriya*s, why does [the Prajñāpāramitāsūtra] choose these three *indriya*s [of understanding]?

Answer. –We call *indriya* [from the root *ind*] that which has a penetrating and obvious nature of dominance (ādhipatya).<sup>572</sup> But this characteristic of dominance is not completely perfected (*paripūrṇa*) in the other nineteen *indriyas*. This is why [the Prajñāpāramitā] does not mention them here. On the other hand, the three *indriyas* [of understanding] are sharp (*tīkṣṇa*) and lead directly to nirvāṇa.<sup>573</sup> Dominant (*adhipati*) among all the conditioned dharmas (*saṃskṛtadharma*), they hold sovereignty (ādhipatya, aiśvarya) and surpass all the other *indriyas*.

But it should be noted that the three *indriyas* of understanding made up in theory of these nine *indriyas* actually consist of seven because the sensations of pleasure, satisfaction and indifference never co-exist: the sensation of satisfaction is present in the first two dhyānas; the sensation of pleasure, in the third dhyāna; the sensation of indifference in the anāgamya, the dhyānantara, the fourth dhyāna and the first three ārūpyasamāpattis.

<sup>570</sup> Cf. Kośabhāṣya, p. 42: Manaḥsukhasaumanasyopekṣāḥ śraddhādini ca pañca tāni navendriyāṇI triṣu mārgeṣu trīṇīndriyāṇy apy ucyante: darśanamārge anājñātamājñāsyamīndriyam, bhāvanāmārge ājñēndriyam, aśaikṣamārge ājñātāvīndriyam: "In the three paths, these nine indriyas, the mental organ, the sensations of pleasure, satisfaction and indifference and the five faculties, faith, etc., are also called the three faculties [of understanding]: in the path of seeing, they constitute the anāñātamājñāsyamīndriya; in the path of meditation, the ājñendriya; in the path of the aśaikṣas, the ājñātāvīndriya."

<sup>571</sup> Terms defined above, p. 1390F.

<sup>572</sup> Cf. Kośabhāṣya, p. 38: *Kaḥ punar indriyārthaḥ. idi paramaiśvarye. tasya indantīti indriyāni. atha ādhipatyārtha*. See also Vibhāṣā, T 1545, k. 142, p.730c6-10; Abhidharmāmṛta, rec. Sastri, p. 75, l. 3; Visuddhimagga, p. 417-418.

The three faculties of understanding are dominant as to the ascending acquisitions (*uttarottarasamprāpti*), to nirvāṇa, etc.: cf. Kośabhāṣya, p. 40; Abhidharmadīpa, p. 49, l. 1-2.

Furthermore, [among the other nineteen *indriyas*], ten are exclusively impure (*sāsrava*) and therefore are of no benefit.<sup>574</sup> [These are: 1) the eye organ (*cakusurindriya*), 2) the ear organ (*śrotrendriya*), 3) the nose organ (*ghrānendriya*), 4) the tongue organ (*jihvendriya*), 5) the body organ (*puruṣendriya*), 6) the female organ (*strīndriya*), 7) the male organ (*puruṣendriya*), 8) the vital organ (*jīvitendriya*), 9) the sensation of displeasure (*duḥkhendriya*), 10) the sensation of dissatisfaction (*daurmansayendriya*)].

[Further, among the other nineteen *indriyas*], nine are morally indeterminate (*aniyata*), sometimes impure (*sāsrava*) and sometimes pure (*anāsrava*). [These are: 1) the mental organ (*manaindriya*), 2) the sensation of pleasure (*sukhendriya*), 3) the sensation of satisfaction (*saumanasyendriya*), 4) the sensation of indifference (*upekṣendriya*), 5) the faculty of faith (*śradddhendriya*), 6) the faculty of energy (*vīryendriya*), 7) the faculty of mindfulness (*smṛtīndriya*), 8) the faculty of concentration (*samādhīndriya*), 9) the faculty of wisdom (*prajñendriya*).]

[Since, of these other nineteen indriyas, some are always impure and others are sometimes impure and sometimes pure], the Prajñāpāramitāsūtra is careful not to say that the bodhisattva should fulfill them completely.

Question. – But the ten concepts (*daśasaṃjñā*) examined above (p.1433F) were also sometimes impure and sometimes pure. Why did the Prajñāpāramitāsūtra say there that the bodhisattva should fulfill them completely?

Answer. – Because these ten concepts are auxiliaries to the Path and the pursuit of nirvāṇa. But here the ten faculties, faith, etc., (*śraddhenndriya*), although good (*kuśala*), do not seek nirvāṇa exclusively.<sup>575</sup>

As is said in the Abhidharma: "Who is endowed with the five faculties, faith, etc. (śraddhādīndriyasamanvāgata)? The person who has not cut the roots of good (samaucchinnakuśalamūla)."576

Furthermore, when these five faculties become clear and pure (*anāsrava*), they are included in the three faculties [of understanding].

In the three faculties of understanding, there is inevitably the mental organ (manaindriya), and of the three sensations  $(vedan\bar{a})$  – [pleasure (sukha), satisfaction (saumanasya) and indifference  $(upek\bar{s}\bar{a}]$  – there is one

<sup>574</sup> On the division of the twenty-two *indriya*s into three moral categories, see Kośabhāṣya, p. 42, commenting on the kārikā, II, 8: *Amalaṃ trayam, rūpīni jīvitaṃ duḥkhe sāsravāṇi, dvidhā nava*: "The three faculties of understanding are pure (*amala* = *anāsrava*); the seven material organs, the vital organ, the two sensations (pleasure and dissatisfaction) are impure; the remaining nine organs are of two types, sometimes impure, sometimes pure).

Actually, although they are always good (*kuśala*), the ten faculties, faith, etc., are sometimes impure and sometimes pure. They are perfected in the ārya to the extent that the latter conquers the various fruits of the religious life, but they are perfectly pure only in the arhat. On this subject, see *Ekabhiññasutta* in Saṃyutta, V, p. 204-205, the Sanskrit recension of which is in Kośavyākhyā, p. 103, l. 1-9.

576 As a result, the person who retains some roots of good, absence of desire (*alobha*), absence of hatred (*advesa*) and absence of error (*amoha*), has so far not entered onto the Path of niryāna.

inevitably.<sup>577</sup> This is why the Prajñāpāramitāsūtra speaks here only of the three faculties [of understanding].

Finally, among the twenty-two indrivas, there are good ones (*kuśala*), bad ones (*akuśala*) and indeterminate ones (*avyākṛta*).<sup>578</sup> This is why the Prajñāpāramitāsūtra does not say that all of them should be fulfilled perfectly.

# C. Levels, objects, associates and causality of the three faculties

- 1) The three faculties [of understanding] are contained (samgrhita) in the aggregate of feeling (vedanāskandha), the aggregate of volition (samskāraskandha) and the aggregate of consciousness (vijñānaskandha).
- 2) The anājñātamājñāsyāmīndriya occurs in six levels (bhūmi), [namely, the four dhyānas, the anāgamya and the dhyānantara]. The ājñātāvīndriya occurs in nine levels [adding the first three ārūpyasamāpattis to the preceding levels]. 579
- 3) The three faculties [of understanding] take as object (ālambante) the four noble Truths (catuḥsatya).
- 4) The three faculties [of understanding] are associated (samprayukta) with six concepts: i) the concept of impermanence ( $anityasamj\tilde{n}\tilde{a}$ ), ii) the concept of suffering ( $duhkhasamj\tilde{n}\tilde{a}$ ), iii) the concept of non-self ( $an\tilde{a}tmasamj\tilde{n}\tilde{a}$ ), iv) the concept of abandonment ( $prah\tilde{a}nasamj\tilde{n}\tilde{a}$ ), v) the concept of detachment ( $vir\tilde{a}gasamj\tilde{n}\tilde{a}$ ), vi) the concept of cessation ( $nirodhasamj\tilde{n}\tilde{a}$ ).
- 5) The *anājñātamājñāsyāmīndriya* is cause (*hetu*) of three *indriyas*: [itself and the two following ones]. 580 The *ājñendriya* is cause of two *indriyas*, [itself and the following one].

The ājñātāvīndriya is cause of ājñātāvīndriya only.

<sup>577</sup> See above, p. 1495F, note.

<sup>578</sup> Eight *indriyas*, the five faculties, faith, etc., and the three faculties of understanding are alone good (*kuśala*). Dissatisfaction (*daurmanasya*) is good or bad. The mental organ (*manaindriya*) and four sensations (*sukha*, *duḥkha*, *saumanasya* and *upekṣa*) are good (*kuśala*), bad (*akuśala*) or indeterminate (*avyākṛta*). The five material organs, sight, etc., the vital organ and the sexual organs are indeterminate (*avyākṛta*): cf. Kośabhāṣya, p. 46; Abhidharmāmṛta, rec. Sastri, p. 75, l. 20-24; Vibhaṅga, p. 125 (differs).

<sup>579</sup> Cf. Abhidharmadīpa, p. 53: Anājñātamājñāsyāmīndriyam şaṭsu bhūmişu: caturṣu dhyāneṣv anāgamye dhyānāntarikāyām ca... Ājñendriyam ājñātāvīndriyam ca navasu bhūmiṣu: āsv eva ṣaṭsu triṣu cādvāsv ārūpyabhūmisu.

Here, by cause we should understand 'dominant condition' (*adhipatipratyaya*). The three faculties of understanding are dominant with regard to their own ascending acquisitions (*uttarottarasamprāpti*) and dominant among them in the sense that the first is dominant in regard to acquisition of the second, the second in regard to acquisition of the third, and the third in regard to acquisition of nirvāṇa: cf. Kośabhāṣya, p. 40, 1. 3-4.

6) The anājñātamāsyāmīndriya in its turn produces two indriyas.

The  $\bar{a}j\tilde{n}endriya$  produces in its turn either an impure ( $s\bar{a}srava$ ) indriya or the  $\bar{a}j\tilde{n}endsriya$  or the  $\bar{a}j\tilde{n}endsriya$ .

The ājñātāvīndriya produces either an impure indriya or the ajñātāvīndriya.

This is fully explaind in detail in the Abhidharma.

# 2. The Three Faculties of Understanding According to the Mahāyāna

#### A. In the Darśanamārga

The faculty signifying "I will understand that which I do not understand" (anājñātamājñāsyāmīndriya) concerns the true nature (bhūtalakṣaṇa) of dharmas. Wishing to understand that which he has not yet understood, [the yogin] produces the five faculties, faith, etc. (śraddhādīndriya) and by the power of these five faculties, he is able to discover the true nature of dharmas.

Thus, when a person enters the womb (*garbha*), he acquires two organs: *i*) the bodily organ (*kāyendriya*) and *ii*) the vital organ (*jīvitendriya*). At that time, he is like a piece of shapeless meat and his organs are unable to discern anything. But when these five organs, [eye, ear, nose, tongue and body] are completed (*saṃpanna*), he will be able to cognize the five objects [color, sound, smell, taste and touch].

It is the same for the bodhisattva. From his first production of the Bodhi mind (*prathamacittotpāda*) he wants to become Buddha but he has not yet perfected (*na paripūrayati*) the five moral faculties [faith, mindfulness, concentration and wisdom]. Although he has the aspiration (*praṇidhāna*) for it and wants to know the true nature (*bhūtalakṣaṇa*) of dharmas, he has not yet come to the cognition of it. But when the bodhisattva produces these five faculties, fath, etc., he will be able to cognize the true nature of dharmas.

It is like the eye (*cakṣus*). What we call 'eye' is an assemblage of the four great elements (*mahābhūta*) and a [subtle] matter derived from the four great [235a] elements (*mahābhautikarūpa*).<sup>581</sup> But at the beginning, although he already possesses the four great elements, the [subtle] matter derived from these four great elements has not yet crystallized. This is why this eye is not yet [a real] visual organ (*cakṣurindriya*).

Similarly, every person who has not broken the roots of good (*asammucchinnakuśalamūla*) possesses faith (*śraddhā*), but as the latter is not clear, it is not yet [a real] faculty of faith (*śraddhendriya*). 582

On the distinction between the four great elements (*mahābhūta*) and the subtle matter derived from the four great elements (*upādāya rūpa, bhautika, rūpaprasāda*), see Kośa, I, p. 22, 63-66.

Here the *Traité* will repeat, point by point but interpreting them from the Mahāyāna perspective, the nine *indriya*s taking place in the constitution of the three faculties of understanding above, (p. 1496F).

- 1) If the bodhisattva acquires the five moral faculties, faith, etc. (śraddhendriya), he will then be able to believe in the true nature (bhūtalakṣaṇa) of dharmas. This nature is unborn (anutpanna) and unceasing (aniruddha), neither defiled (asaṃkliṣṭa) nor purified (avyavadāta), neither existent nor non-existent (naivasan nāsat), neither accepted (anupātta) nor rejected (aparityakta), always at peace (śānta), perfectly pure, like space (ākāśasama), ineffable (anirdeśya), inexpressible (anabhilāpya); it is the cessation of all ways of speech (sarvavādamārgagoccheda), it surpasses the realm of all the minds and mental events (sarvacittacaitasikadharma-gocarasamatikrānta); it is like nirvāna; it is the Dharma of the Buddhas. 583
- 2) Using the power of the faculty of faith (*śraddendriya*), the bodhisattva acquires the faculty of energy (*vīryendriya*); he progresses energetically without regressing or straying.
- 3) By the power of the faculty of mindfulness (*smṛtīndriya*), he prevents bad dharmas from entering and gathers all the good dharmas.
- 4) By the power of the faculty of concentration (samādhīndriya), when his mind is distracted (vikṣipyate) by the five objects of enjoyment (pañcakāmaguṇa), he concentrates it on the true nature (bhūtalakṣaṇa).
- 5) By the power of the faculty of wisdom (*prajñendriya*), he obtains a greater or lesser participation in the wisdom of the Buddhas, the taste (*rasa*) of which cannot be destroyed.
- 6-9) The support of these five faculties (*pañcendriyāśraya*), his mental faculty (*manaindriya*) is inevitably joined with the sensations (*vedanā*): sensation of satisfaction (*saumansaya*), pleasure (*sukha*) or indifference (*upekṣā*).

Being supported by these [nine] indrivas, the bodhisattva will enter into the assurance of the ultimate attainment of enlighenment of the bodhisattva (bodhisattvaniyāma).<sup>584</sup> But as long as he has not obtained

1) It is at this point that he enters into definitive possession (*pratilābha*, *pratilambha*, *pratilambhatā*) of the conviction or the certainty that dharmas do not arise (*anutpattikadharma-kṣānti*): Sūtrālaṃkāra, p. 122, l. 2; 131, l. 17; Madhyāntavibhāga, p. 105, l. 11; Bodh. bhūmi, p. 350, l. 27; 351, l. 13-14.

2) The possession of this *kṣānti* is accompanied by the Great Prophecy (*mahāvyākaraṇa*) regarding the final triumph of the Bodhisattva: Lalitavistara, p. 35, l. 21; Daśabhūmika, p. 71, l. 24; Saddharmapuṇḍ., p. 266, l. 1-2; Sūtrālaṃkāra, p. 20, l. 15; 141, l. 27; 165, l. 12; Madhyāntavinhāga, p. 190, l. 18; 192, l. 1.

3) From that time on, the Bodhisattva's destiny is assured (*niyāma*: see below, k. 27, p. 262a18-b2). He is determined as to his future buddhahood: *niyato bhavaty anuttarāyāṃ samyaksaṃbodhau* (Sūtrālaṃkāra, p. 83, l. 24); *tṛtīyaniyatipātapatito bhavati* (Bodh. bhūmi, p. 367, l. 12).

Compare the definitions of 'the true nature of all dharmas' in Pañcavimśati, T 223, k. 2, p. 231b13-14; k. 3, p. 234c12; k. 4, p. 244a1-2; k. 6, p. 257b13-14; k. 23, p. 392a19-24; k. 27, p. 416c8-11.

In other words, the bodhisattva will enter into the eighth bodhisattva bhūmi, the Acalā, the 'Unshakeable One'. According to most sources, the Acalā marks an important turning point in the bodhisattva's career:

the fruit resulting from the conviction that dharmas do not arise (anutpattikadharmakṣānti), it is not yet a matter of the anājñātamājñāsyāmīndriya, the faculty signifying "I will understand that which I do not yet understand".

#### B. In the bhāvanāmārga

Here the Bodhisattva cognizes the true nature ( $bh\bar{u}talak\bar{s}a\bar{n}a$ ) of dharmas and, because he understands it well, it is a matter of the  $\bar{a}j\tilde{n}endriya$ , the faculty of understanding.

From the time when he has obtained the fruit attached to the conviction that dharmas do not arise (anutpattikadharmakṣāntiphala), when he is installed in the irreversible level (avaivartikabhūmi), when he has received the prophecy (vyākaraṇa), up to the time when he completes the ten levels (daśabhūmi), when he is seated on the seat of enlightenment (bodhimaṇḍa) and when he obtains the diamond concentration (vajraṣamādhi), all of this is included in the interval called ājñendriva.<sup>585</sup>

#### C. In the Aśaikṣamārga

Finally, the bodhisattva cuts through all the habitual propensities (*sarvakleśavāsanā*) and obtains supreme perfect enlightenment (*anuttarā samyaksambodhi*). Because he has understood and completely fulfilled everything to be known (*sarvajñeyadharma*), this is called *ājñātāvīndriya* 'faculty of that which has been understood'.

In other words, he is a non-regressing (*avaivartika*) bodhisattva having non-regressing conviction (*avaivartikakṣāntipratilabdha*: Saddharmapuṇud., p. 259, l. 13). As well, the eighth bhūmi is also called *Niyatabhūmi* 'Determined Level' (Bodh. bhūmi, p. 367, l. 11); *Avivartyabhūmi, avinivartanīyabhūmi, avaivartikabhūmi* "Level without regression' (Daśabhūmika, p. 71, l. 12; Sūtrālaṃkāra, p. 176, l. 22; Bodh. bhūmi, p. 235, l. 18). It marks the beginning of the non-reversible career (*abandhyacaryā*) which will be followed in the last three bhumis (Mahāvastu, I, p. 1, l. 3; 63, l. 13-14; Bodh. Bhūmi, p. 290, l. 21).

4) Finally and in particular in the eighth bhūmi, the Bodhisattva's activity is practiced spontaneously, without action (*abhisaṃskāra*) or mental changing (*ābhoga*), for it is unaffected by objects or notions: this is why it is called *anabhisaṃskārābhogavihāra* or *anābhoganirnimittavihāra*: Madhyāntavibhāga, p. 105, l. 18-21; Sūtrālaṃkāra, p. 178, l. 3; Bodh. Bhūmi, p. 367, l. 11; Saṃgraha, p. 202.

The functioning of the ājñendriya extends from the eighth to the tenth bhūmi. The latter is called Dharmamegha 'Cloud of Dharma' (Saṃgraha, p. 202-203), Paramavihāra 'Ultimate abode' (Bodh. bhūmi, p. 367, l. 13), Sarvajñānābhiṣekabhūmi 'Level of consecration into omniscience' (Daśabhūmika, p. 82, l. 8) or Abhiṣekāvasthā 'State of consecration' (Madhyāntavibhāga, p. 190, l. 24). According to the Pañcaviṃśati, p. 225, l. 8 and Āloka, p. 104, l. 8-9: Bodhisattvo daśamyām sthtitaḥ saṃs Tathāgataeveti vaktavyo na tu Samyaksambuddhaḥ: "The Bodhisattva who is on the tenth level ahould be called simply tathāgata, but not yet the completely and fully Enlightened One.

# CHAPTER XXXIX: THE TEN POWERS OF THE BUDDHA ACCORDING TO THE ABHIDHARMA

# PRELIMINARY NOTE

In chapter XVII to chapter XXX, the six perfections (*pāramitā*) to be fulfilled completely (*paripūrayitavya*) by the bodhisattva were discussed. They constitute the essentials of his career provided that he fulfills them by 'the method of non-dwelling' (*asthānayogena*), without grasping the characteristics (*na nimittodgrahena*).

Chapters XXXI to XXXVIII dealt with the Path of nirvāṇa, its auxiliaries and its aids. The dharmas of the Path belong to adepts of both Vehicles but under different headings. The śravakas aspire to nirvāṇa, whereas the bodhisattvas delay their nirvāṇa in order to dedicate themselves to the welfare and happiness of all beings. The result is that the dharmas of the Path 'must be realized' (sākṣātkartavya) by the śrāvakas but merely completely 'fulfilled' (paripūrayitavya) or 'cultivated' (bhāvitavya) by the bodhisattvas. The intention of the bodhisattva is to convert beings and introduce them into the Greater Vehicle, the Vehicle of the Buddhas. They consider the dharmas of the Path as inefficacious or even non-existent (anupalabdha) and propose a new method of liberation. But how can they divert the śrāvakas from the dharmas of the Path if they have not themselves cultivated them? Someone will certainly say to them: "You criticize the old method because you are unable to use it!" It is, therefore, important for the bodhisattvas to be aware of both the theory and practice of things of the Path in order that they can discuss them in a valid manner.

In chapter XXXIX to the beginning of chapter XLII, it will be a matter not only of the perfections of the bodhisattva or the dharmas of the Path but also of the great attributes of the Buddhas. Since the bodhisattva does not yet possess them, it is not a matter of his completely fulfilling them or developing them; he can simply formulate the 'desire to know them' (*jñatukāma*), the 'desire to attain them' (*prāptukāma*).

In the present chapter, the *Traité* limits itself to presenting the Abhidharmic theories concerning the ten powers of the Buddha; it is in the next chapter that it will present the Mahāyāna point of view.

# I. THE DAŚABALASŪTRA

Pāli recension. – Anguttara, V,p. 32-36; Majjhima, I, p. 69-71; Paṭisambhida, II, p. 174-176.

Dasa yimāni bhikkhave tathāgathassa tathāgatabalāni yehi balehi samannāgato tathāgāto āsabhaṇ ṭhānaṃ ... sacchikatvā upasampajja viharati ... yam pi bhikkhave tathāgato ...

Sanskrit recension (attesting to many variations) cited in Kośavyākhyā, p. 641, l. 14-642, l. 26. Add numerous fragments of Central Asian provenance: S. Lévi. *Textes sansrits de Touen-houang*, Jour. Asiatique, X, 16 (1910), p. 440-444; L. de La Vallée Poussin, *Documents sanscrits de la Seconde Collection M.A. Stein*, Jour. Roy. Asiatic Soc., 1911, p. 1063-1064; E. Waldschmidt, *Bruchstücke buddhistischer Sūtras aus dem zentralasiatischen Sanskritkanon*, Leipzig, 1932, 207-225; *Ein zweites Daśabalasūtra*, Mitteilungendes Instituts für Orientforschung. VI, 1958, p. 382-405.

Daśemāni bhikṣavas tathāgatasya balāni yaiḥ samanvāgatas tathāgato 'rhan samyaksaṃbuddha udāram ārṣabhaṃ ...karaṇīyaṃ nāparam asmād bhāvaṃ prajñānānīti. yat tathāgaḥ ...

Translation of the Sanskrit. – These, O monks, are the ten powers of the Tathāgata, endowed with which the holy One, the fully and completely enlightened One who claims the noble place, the place of the bull, turns the wheel of Brahmā and utters the true Lion's Roar in the assembly. What are these ten?

1. First, the Tathāgata cognizes, in accordance with reality, the possible as possible and the impossible as impossible.

That the Tathāgata cognizes, in accordance with reality, the possible as possible and the impossible as impossible is the first power of the Buddha, endowed with which, the Tathāgata, the holy One, the fully and completely enlightened One who claims the noble place, the place of the bull, turns the wheel of Brahmā and utters the true Lion's Roar in the assembly.

- 2. Furthermore, the Tathāgata cognizes, in accordance with reality, actions of the past, future and present according to their place, their cause, their object and their retribution. That the Tathāgata...
- 3. Furthermore, the Tathāgata cognizes, in accordance with reality, the defilement, the purification, the types and the purity of the trances, liberations, concentrations and absorptions. That the Tathāgata...
- 4. Furthermore, the Tathāgata cognizes, in accordance with reality, the degree of the moral faculties of other beings, other individuals. That the Tathāgata...
- 5. Furthermore, the Tathāgata cognizes, in accordance with reality, the diverse aspirations of other beings, other individuals. That the Tathāgata...
- 6. Furthermore, the Tathāgata cognizes, in accordance with reality, the world with its various acquired dispositions, with its many acquired dispositions. That the Tathāgata...
- 7. Furthermore, the Tathāgata cognizes, in accordance with reality, the route that leads to the various destinies. That the Tathāgata...
- 8. Furthermore, the Tathāgata remembers many previous abodes, for example, one lifetime, two, three, four, five, ten, twenty, thirty, forty, fifty lifetimes, one hundred lifetimes, one thousand lifetimes, one million lifetimes, one hundred million lifetimes, several hundred lifetimes, several thousand lifetimes, several hundreds of thousands of lifetimes, one period of disappearance, one period of creation, one period of disappearance-creation, several periods of disappearance-creation, several periods of disappearance-creation. He thinks: "I had such and such a name, such and such a family, such and such a clan, such and such food among beings

at that time; I experienced such and such happiness and such and such pain. I had such and such longevity, such and such a duration, such and such a life-span. When I left that place, I was reborn in that other place. And from that other place I was born here." Thus the Tathāgata remembers his many previous abodes with their aspects, their origins and their details. That the Tathāgata...

- 9. Furthermore, the Tathāgata, with his divine eye, purified, surpassing that of men, sees beings dying and being born and recognizes them in reality as beautiful, ugly, lowly or excellent, going towards a good or a bad destiny, according to the results of their actions. He thinks: "These beings laden with bodily misdeeds, laden with misdeeds of speech and mind, slandering the saints, having false views, acting wrongly out of their wrong views, for this cause and this reason, at the dissolution of the body after death are born in a miserable state, in a bad destiny, in the hells. On the other hand, these beings endowed with good bodily actions, endowed with good actions of speech and mind, not slandering the saints, having right views, acting well due to their right views, for this cause and this reason, at the dissolution of the body after death are born in a good destiny, the heavens, among the gods." That the Tathāgata...
- 10. Furthermore, the Tathāgata, by the cessation of the impurities, having realized in the present existence by means of his own wisdom the pure liberation of mind and the pure liberation by wisdom, takes his stand and knows: "Birth is exhausted by me, the religious life has been practiced, that which had to be accomplished has been accomplished, I see no further existence for myself." That the Tathāgata...

# II. LISTS OF JÑĀNABALAS

Lists of the ten *jñanabalas* 'powers consisting of wisdoms' have been prepared on the basis of this sūtra. They do not all follow the same order and numerous variations may be found. Here I [Lamotte] mention only a few:

- 1. Mahāvastu, I, p. 159, l. 10-160, l. 5: verse list (see notes by É. Senart, p. 502-505.
- 2. Lalitavistara, p. 433.
- 3. Vibhanga, p. 335-3444 (with a long commentary).
- 4. Kathāvatthu, p. 228-238.
- 5. Mahāvibhāṣā, T 1545, k. 30, p. 156c seq.
- 6. Kośa, VII, p. 67-72; Kośavyākhyā, p. 641, l. 10-14.
- 7. Nyāyānusāra, T 1562, k. 75, p. 746a seq.
- 8. Abhidharmadīpa, p. 382 seq.
- 9. Pañcavimsati, p. 210, l. 11-23; Satasāhasrikā, p. 1446, l. 16-1448-l. 5.
- 10. Āloka, p. 455, l. 15-19.
- 11. Samgaha, p. 286.

- 12. Abhidharmasamuccaya, rec. Pradhan, p. 98, l. 1-5..
- 13. Bodh. bhūmi, p. 384.
- 14. Mahāvyut. no. 120-129.
- 15. Arthaviniścaya, p. 577-579.

Here is the list from Kośa (l.c.): 1. sthānāsthāna-, 2. karmavipāka-, 3. dhyānavimokṣasamādhisamāpatti-, 4. indriyaparāpara-, 5. nānādhimukti-, 6. nānādhātu-, 7. sarvatragāminīpratipad-, 8. pūrvanivasānasmṛti-, 9. cyutpapāda-, 10. āsravakusayajñānabala.

[k. 24, p. 235b]

Sūtra. – Furthermore, O Śāriputra, the bodhisattva-mahāsattva who wishes to know completely the ten powers of the Buddha, the four fearlessnesses, the four infallible knowledges, the eighteen special attributes, great loving-kindness and great compassion, must exert himself in the Perfection of Wisdom (punar aparaṃ Śāriputra bodhisattvena mahāsattvenā daśa tathāgabalāni catvāri vaiśāradyāni catasraḥ pratisaṃvido 'ṣṭadaśāveṇikān buddhadharmān mahāmaitrīṃ mahākaruṇāṃ parijñātukāmena prajñāpāramitāyam śikṣitavyam).

Śāstra. –

# **First Section GENERAL QUESTIONS**

# I. ATTRIBUTES OF THE ŚRĀVAKA AND ATTRIBUTES OF THE BUDDHA

[235b] Question. – The ten powers *(bala)*, the four fearlessnesses (*vaiśāradya*), etc., are the peerless attributes reserved for the Buddhas. They should therefore be treated first. Why does [the Prajñāpāramitā] speak first of the nine concepts (*navasaṃjñā*) [in chapter XXXV], the eight recollections (*aṣṭānusmṛtayaḥ*) [in chapter XXXVI], etc.?

Answer. – The Prajñāpāramitā first spoke [in chapters XVII to XXX] of the six perfections (pāramitā) to be practiced by the bodhisattva. The thirty-seven auxiliaries of enlightenment (saptatriṃśad bodhipākṣikadharmāḥ) and the other qualities including the three pure faculties (anāsravendriya) [which were the object of chapters XXXI to XXXVIII] are the qualities of the śrāvaka. By practicing the six perfections, the bodhisattva has acquired power (bala): he then wants to bypass the levels (bhūmi) of the śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas, convert people engaged in [the Vehicles] of the śrāvaka and

pratyekabuddha and introduce them into the Vehicle of the Buddhas. This is why he criticizes these dharmas of the Lesser Vehicle ( $h\bar{n}nay\bar{a}na$ ) of abandoning all beings and being of no benefit.

The śrāvakas say to the bodhisattva: "You are a worldly person (*pṛthagjana*) who has not yet destroyed the impurities (*akṣ̄māsrava*) and, because you are unable to practice these qualities, you criticize them rashly." That is why [here, in the Prajñāpāramitā], the Buddha said: "The thirty-seven auxiliaries of enlightenment (*bodhipākṣikadharma*) and the other qualities of the śrāvakas should be completely fulfilled by the bodhisattva, but only by basing himself on their non-existence (*anupalabdhitām upādāya*)."586

Although the bodhisattva practices these qualities, he considers them to be non-existent (*anupalabdha*): it is for beings devoted to bad practices (*duścarita*) that the bodhisattva practices these good practices of the śrāvaka and never rejects these qualities, non-existent and empty though they are. Neither does he hasten to realize his own nirvāṇa (*nirvāṇasākṣātkāra*).

If the bodhisattva did not understand, did not practice, this Lesser Vehicle and limited himself to criticizing it, who would want to believe him? If the Buddha Śākyamuni had not previously carried out the practices of austerity (*duṣkaracaryā*) for six years and had limited himself to criticizing them by saying that they were not the Path, nobody would have believed him. This is why he exerted himself in practices of austerity more than anyone else; then, when he had realized the Bodhi of the Buddhas, he criticized this path of austerities and everyone believed him. This is why, following the six perfections, the bodhisattva practices the qualities of the śrāvaka.

Furthermore, these [qualities of the śrāvaka] are not just śrāvaka qualities. The bodhisattva who practices them in conjunction with the Dharma, without abandoning the mind of beings, 'fulfills completely' (*paripūrayati*) all the Buddha qualities. As he uses the knowledge of the emptiness of non-existence (*anupalambhaśūnyatā*)<sup>588</sup> [for this purpose], these śrāvaka qualities are also called bodhisattva qualities.

<sup>586</sup> See above, p. 1137F.

Described, among other sources, in the Duşkaracaryāparivarta of the Lalitavistara, p. 243-260. The comments made by A. Foucher, *La Vie du Bouddha*, p. 134, on the mortifications of Śākyamuni connect up rather oddly with the considerations developed here by the *Traité*. The Buddha had to submit freely to the excesses of asceticism in order to be able, in the Sermon at Benares, to criticize from an awareness of the cause:

<sup>&</sup>quot;There are two extremes which the person who is leading a spiritual life should avoid. The one is a life of pleasure, devoted to pleasures and enjoyment ( $k\bar{a}me\bar{s}u$   $k\bar{a}masukhallik\bar{a}nuyoga$ ): it is base, ignoble, contrary to the spirit, unworthy, vain. The other is a life of mortification ( $\bar{a}tmaklamath\bar{a}nuyoga$ ): this is sad, unworthy, vain...The flawless one has found the middle way ( $madhyam\bar{a}$  partipad)..." (cf. Vinaya, I, p. 10; Catuṣpariṣaḍ, p. 140; Mahāvastu, III, p. 331; Lalitavistara, p. 416). 588 Knowledge about the fifteenth of the eighteen śūnyatās postulated by the Prajñāpāramitā: Pañcaviṃśati, p. 197, l. 15; Śatasāhasrikā, p. 1473, l. 1-2. This is the fact that dharmas past, future and present do not exist (nopalabhyante). The translation 'unascertainable emptiness' is guilty of timidity.

Question. – If the bodhisattva completely fulfills the thirty-seven auxiliaries of enlightenment (bodhipākṣikadharma), why does he not enter into the predestination of the śrāvakas (śrāvakaniyāma)?<sup>589</sup>

Answer. – When we say that he 'fulfills completely' (*paripūrayati*), we mean that he sees them and knows them completely but without taking on their realization (*sākṣātkāraṃ nopagṛhṇāti*). By seeing and knowing them clearly, he 'fulfills them completely'.

Let us take, for example, this saying of the Buddha:

Everyone fears the stick and the rod.

There is no one who does not protect his own life.

Inspired by the indulgence one has for oneself,

One does not inflict the stick on anyone. 590

Although the Buddha says that *everyone* fears the stick and the rod, [this does not hold true] for beings of the formless realm  $(\bar{a}r\bar{u}pyadh\bar{a}tu)$  who have no body. Neither does it hold true for the realm of subtle form  $(r\bar{u}padh\bar{a}tu)$  where, there are bodies but no whip or rod. In the desire realm  $(k\bar{a}madh\bar{a}tu)$ , it is not valid for the Buddhas, the noble cakravartin kings, the Yāma gods and other higher deities who have nothing to fear from a beating. It is in reference to those [235c] who do have reasons to fear the rod that the Buddha said "Everyone fears being beaten by the rod."

It is the same here when we speak of 'fulfilling completely' [the śrāvaka qualities]: 'fulfilling them completely' is not to seek to realize them  $(s\bar{a}k\bar{s}atkr)$  or to be attached to them.

Furthermore, as has been said above, the bodhisattva does not abandon beings and [although he fulfills completely the śrāvaka qualities], it is by joining them with the knowledge bearing upon the emptiness of non-existence (anupalambhaśūnyatā).<sup>591</sup> This is why he does not fall into the class of the śrāvakas.

1237

The śrāvakaniyāma is the assurance of the śrāvaka as to his future attainment of nirvāṇa, The śrāvaka is called *samyaktvaniyāvakrānta* ( *samyaktva = nirvāṇa*); as soon as he has this guarantee, he is an ārya. In a similar way, *bodhisattvaniyāma* is the certainty for the bodhisattva of some day reaching supreme perfect enlightenment which makes him a Buddha. See Kośa,VI, p. 180-182 and notes.

590 Udānavarga, V, v, 19 (p. 144):

Sarve dandasya bibhyanti, saveṣāṃ jīvitaṃ priyam / ātmānam upamām kṛtvā, naiva hanyān na ghātayet //

<sup>&</sup>quot;Everyone fears the rod; life is precious to everyone. By taking oneself as the point of comparison, one avoids killing or making another kill."

Cf. Dhammapada, v. 130:

Sabbe tasanti daṇḍassa, sabbesaṃ jīvitaṃ piyaṃ / attānaṃ upamaṃ katvā, na haneyya na gātaye //

The same stanza will be cited later, k. 30, p. 278b23-24.

<sup>591</sup> See above, p. 153F, n.

#### II. ATTRIBUTES TO BE FULFILLED AND ATTRIBUTES TO BE COGNIZED

From the six perfections up to the three pure faculties [i.e., from chapter XVII to chapter XXXVIII], the *Prajñāpāramitā* spoke only [of the qualities] 'to be completed fully' (*paripūrayitavya*); why will it speak from now on of qualities which the bodhisattva is 'desirous of obtaining' (*prāptukāma*) or 'desirous of knowing' (*jñātukāma*) and in view of which 'he must practice the perfection of wisdom' (*prajñāpāramitāyāṃ śikṣitavyam*)?

Answer. – The śrāvaka qualities [that are the object of chapters XXXI to XXXVIII] are measured and limited and this is why *Prajñāpāramitā* spoke of the qualities 'to be completely fulfilled' (*paripūrayitva*). But from now on in what follows, it will be a matter of profound (*gambhīra*) and immeasurable (*apramāṇa*) Buddha qualities which the bodhisattva has not yet attained; this is why the Prajñāpāramitā will speak of qualities that the bodhisattva is 'desirous of attaining' (*prāptukāma*) or 'desirous of knowing '(*jñātukāma*), and in view of which he must exert himself in the perfection of wisdom.

Furthermore, as the śrāvaka qualities are easily penetrated, easily understood, the Prajñāpāramitā calls them 'to be completely fulfilled' (*paripūrayitavya*). But as the bodhisattva qualities and Buddha qualities are difficult to penetrate, difficult to understand, it now says that 'he must exert himself in them'.

Finally, the śrāvaka qualities [concern] the general characteristics (sāmānyalakṣaṇa) of things. The śrāvakas understand suffering (duḥkha), the origin of suffering (duḥkhasamudaya), the cessation of suffering (duḥkhanirodha) and the path leading to the cessation of suffering (duḥkhanirodhagāminī pratipad) only.

For example, take two physicians (*bhiṣaj*). The first understands only the sickness (*ābādha*), the cause of the sickness (*ābādhasamutthāna*), the cure for the sickness (*ābādhaprahāna*) and the remedy (*bheṣaja*) that cures the sickness; <sup>592</sup> but he does not know every sickness, nor does he know all the causes of sickness or all the cures for sickness or all the remedies curing the sicknesses. It may be also that he knows how to treat the sicknesses of men but he does not know how to treat the sickness of animals; it may be that he can cure one country but cannot cure other countries. It may also be that he can treat ten kinds of sicknesses but he does not know how to treat completely the four hundred and four kinds of sicknesses. And it is the same in regard to the causes of the sicknesses, the cures for the sicknesses and the remedies curing the sicknesses. The second physician knows the four things completely: he knows all the remedies, he knows all the sicknesses.

For the comparison of the physician, see also P. Demiéville in Hobogirin, *Byβ*, III, p. 230-231.

<sup>592</sup> Compare the Vyādhyādisūtra in Saṃyukta (T 99, k. 15, p. 105a-b, the original Sanskrit of which is cited by Kośavyākhyā, p. 514: Caturbhir aṅgaiḥ samanvāgato bhiṣak śalyapahartā rājārhaś ca bhavati tājayogyaś rājāṅgatve ca saṃkhyāṃ gacchati. katamaiś caturbhiḥ. ābādhakuśalo bhavati, ābādhasamutthānakuśalo bhavati, ābādhaprahāṇakuśalaḥ prahīṇasya cābādhasyāyatyām anutpādakuśalaḥ.

The śrāvaka is like the lesser physician and does not know everything; the bodhisattva-mahāsattva, however, is like the greater physician; there is no illness that he does not know; there is no remedy that he does not find. This is why the śrāvaka qualities should be 'completely fulfilled' (*parpūrayitavya*), whereas those of the bodhisattva should be 'practiced'.

# III. DEFINITION OF THE TEN POWERS ACCORDING TO THE DAŚABALASŪTRA<sup>593</sup>

The Buddha has ten powers (bala):

- 1) He knows, in accordance with reality, that which is possible (*sthāna*) and impossible (*asthāna*): this is the first power.
- 2) He knows the actions (*karmasamādāna*), past, future and present, of beings and he knows them according to place (*sthānatas*), cause (*hetutas*) and retribution (*vipākatas*): this is the second power.
- 3) He knows, in accordance with reality, the defilements (samkleśa), the purity (vyāvadāna) and the modalities (vyavasthāna) of the trances (dhyāna), liberations (vimokṣa), concentrations (samādhi) and absorptions (samāpatti): this is the third power.
- 4) He knows, in accordance with reality, the degree of the moral faculties (*indriyaparāparatā*) of other individuals: this is the fourth power.
- 5) He knows the diverse aspirations (*nānādhimukti*) of other beings: this is the fifth power.
- 6) He knows the world (*loka*) with its diverse and numerous acquired dispositions (*dhātu*): this is the sixth power.
- 7) He knows the route (*pratipad*) that leads to the different destinies (*sarvatragagāmin*): this is the seventh power.
- 8) He remembers his many previous abodes (*pūrvanivāsa*) with their aspects (*ākāra*) and their causes (*nidāna*), namely, one existence (*jāti*), two existences and so on up to a hundred thousand existences and many periods of [236a] creation (*vivarta*) and disappearance (*saṃvarta*) of the world: There, among those beings, I had such and such a family (*gotra*), such and such a name (*nāman*), such and such food (*āhāra*), such and such suffering (*duḥkha*), such and such happiness (*sukha*), such and such longevity (*dīrghāyus*). When I died in this place, I was reborn in that place and when I died there, I came to be born here where I have such and such a name, such and such a family, such and such food, such and such suffering, such and such happiness and such and such a longevity: this is the eighth power.

1239

Here the *Traité* quotes the *Daśabalasūtra*, taking some liberties, the text of which was given above, p. 1506-1508F.

9) With the divine eye (divyacakṣus), purified, surpassing that of gods and men, the Buddha sees beings dying and being born and knows them to be handsome (suvarṇa) or ugly (durvarṇa), great or small, falling into a bad destiny (durgati) or falling into a good destiny (sugati) and, as a result of the actions they have committed (yathākarmapaga), suffering the appropriate retribution (vipāka). As a result, these beings, burdened with misdeeds of body (kāyaduścarita), burdened with misdeeds of speech (vāgduścarita), burdened with misdeeds of mind (manoduścarita), slandering the saints (āryāṇām apavādaka), having wrong views (mithyādṛṣṭikarmasamādāna), for this cause and this reason, at the dissolution of the body after death enter into a bad destiny (durgati) and are born in hell (niraya). On the other hand, these other beings endowed with good bodily actions, endowed with good actions of speech, endowed with good actions of mind, do not slander the saints, having right view, acting well from the fact of their right view, for this cause and this reason, at the dissolution of the body after death enter into a good destiny (sugati) and are reborn in heaven (svarga): this is the ninth power.

10) By the cessation of the impurities (āsravāṇāṃ kṣayāt), having realized, in the present existence (dṛṣṭa eva dharme) by his own knowledge (svayam abhijñāya), the pure liberation by wisdom (prajñāvimukti), the Buddha cognizes in accordance with reality: Birth is exhausted for me (kṣīṇā me jātiḥ), the religious life has been practiced (uṣitaṃ brahmacaryam), that which had to be done has been done (kṛtaṃ karaṇīya), I see no other existence for myself (nāparam asmād bhāvam iti): this is the tenth power.

#### IV. WHY TEACH THE TEN POWERS?

Question. – The bodhisattvas have not yet obtained the ten powers and the śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas are unable to obtain them; why speak of them here?

Answer. – 1) It is true that the śrāvakas are unable to obtain them but if they hear about the qualities of these ten powers, they tell themselves that the Buddha himself has these great qualities and they rejoice saying: "We have obtained great gains ( $l\bar{a}bh\bar{a}$  nah  $sulabdh\bar{a}h$ ) and have received an unlimited benefit." Thanks to the purity of their faith ( $\acute{s}raddh\bar{a}cittavi\acute{s}uddhi$ ), they enter into the path of cessation of suffering ( $duhkhakṣayam\bar{a}rga$ ).

As for the bodhisattvas who hear about these powers, they diligently cultivate the bodhisattva path and will obtain these great fruits that are the ten powers, etc.

Furthermore, there are śrāvakas and bodhisattvas who, practicing the concentration of recollection of the Buddha (*buddhānusmṛṭisamādhi*), do not recollect merely the Dharmakāya with its many Buddha qualities. They must make the following reflections:

The Buddha is able to explain all dharmas in all their aspects  $(\bar{a}k\bar{a}ra)$ : this is why he is called 'Omniscient'  $(sarvaj\tilde{n}a)$ .

In accordance with reality, he analyzes and skillfully preaches all dharmas: this is why he is called 'Seeing everything' (*sarvadarśin*).

By direct perception (*pratyakṣam*), he cognizes all dharmas: this is why he is called 'the One whose knowledge and vision are unhindered' (*apratihatajñānadarśana*).

He loves all beings impartially: this is why he is called 'the Being of great loving-kindness and great compassion' (mahāmaitrīmahākarunā).

He possesses great loving-kindness and great compassion: this is why he is called 'Savior of the world' (*lokarātṛ*).

He comes by a path that is in accord with the truth (yathābhūtamārgena gacchati): this is why he is called 'Tathāgata'.

He has the right (arhati) to receive the worship  $(p\bar{u}j\bar{a})$  of the entire world this is why he is called 'Arhat'.

He is endowed with a wisdom free of error (aviparītaprajñā): this is why he is called 'Samyaksambuddha'.

His morality  $(\dot{s}\bar{\imath}la)$ , his concentration  $(sam\bar{a}dhi)$  and his wisdom  $(praj\tilde{n}\bar{a})$  are complete (sampanna): this is why he is called 'Vidyācaraṇasampanna, endowed with sciences and practices'.

He does not turn back: this is why he is called 'Sugata'.

He cognizes the general characteristics (*sāmānyalakṣaṇa*) and the specific characteristics (*svalakṣaṇa*) of the world: this is why he is called 'Lokavid, knower of the world'.

[234b] He skillfully preaches the path of supramundane salvation (*lokottarakṣemamārga*): this is why he is called 'Anuttarapuruṣadamyasārathi, supreme leader of beings to be converted'.

He saves beings by the threefold teaching  $(\dot{s}\bar{a}sana)$ : this is why he is called 'Śāstā devamanuṣyāṇām, master of gods and men'.

He can awaken himself and awaken people from the sleep of all the afflictions (*kleśa*) of the world: this is why he is called 'Buddha'.

He is endowed with all the aspirations (*sarvapranidhānopeta*): this is why he is called 'Bhagavat, endowed with qualities'.

He is endowed with the ten powers (daśabalasampanna): this is why he is called 'Dhīra, strong'. 594

He has obtained the four fearlessnesses (*caturvaiśāradyaprāpta*): this is why he is called 'Puruṣasiṃha, man-lion'.

He has obtained immense profound knowledge ( $j\tilde{n}\bar{a}na$ ): this is why he is called 'Mahāguṇasāgara, great ocean of qualities'. 595

<sup>594</sup> Mahāvyut., no. 35.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>595</sup> Ibid., no. 36.

All these statements are without obstacles (apratihata): this is why he is said to be like the wind  $(v\bar{a}yusama)$ .

He has neither aversion (*pratigha*) nor fondness (*anunaya*) for all that is beautiful (*suvarṇa*) or ugly (*durvarṇa*): this is why he is said to be like the earth (*prthivīsama*).

He burns the kindling of all the fetters (sarvasamyojananendhana): this is why he is said to be like fire (tejahsama).

He has skillfully destroyed all the lingering traces of the afflictions (sarvakleśavāsanā): this is why he is said to be fully liberated (vimukta).

His abode being supreme (uttarāvasatha), he is called 'Bhagavat'.

Since the Buddha possesses such qualities, one should recollect the Buddha. This is why the bodhisattva-mahāsattva who wants to attain the ten powers (*bala*), the four fearlessesses (*vaiśāradya*) and the eighteen special attributes (*āveṇikadhrma*) of the Buddhas should practice the Prajñāpāramitā.

- 3) Furthermore, at Rājagṛha on the Gṛdhrakūṭaparvata, when the Buddha was preaching the Prajñāpāramitā, the four communities (catuṣpariṣad) and a great crowd of heretics (tīrthika), lay people (gṛhastha), monastics (pravrajita), devas, yakṣas, etc., gathered together. The Buddha entered into the concentration of the King of Samādhis and emitted great rays of light (raśmi) that illumined universes as numerous as the sands of the Ganges (gaṅgānadīvālukopama lokadhātu); the earth trembled in six ways (pṛthivī ṣaḍvikāram akampata);596 then the Buddha preached the Prajñāpāramitā from the six perfections up to the three faculties, [i.e., chapter XVII to chapter XXXVIII]. At this moment, some beings experienced doubts (saṃśayajāta) and wondered by means of what powers and by means of how many strengths the Buddha could be of such inconceivable (acintya) and such moving service (upakāra). Knowing that these beings had such doubts, the Buddha said to them: "I possess the power of knowledge (jñānabala) of the true nature (bhūtalakṣaṇa) of all dharmas. This power has ten kinds of applications and thanks to these ten kinds of knowledges, I am able to carry out these moving miracles (prātihārya) and even surpass those that have been done." This is why it is said [in the Prajñāpāramitā] that the bodhisattva who wants to attain the ten powers must exert himself in the perfection of wisdom.
- 4) Furthermore, some disciples of the Buddha (*buddhaśrāvaka*) who have planted the roots of good (*avaropitakuśalamūla*) lifetime after lifetime can, out of some fault, fall into heresy. Now heretics (*tīrthika*) often say: "The Buddha does not really have the power of the qualities (*guṇabala*): it is by magical powers (*māyabala*) that he seduces (*āvartayati*) the minds of beings." 597 And the disciples of the Buddha who have fallen into heresy have doubts and wonder if indeed the Buddha is not the Great Man (*mahāpuruṣa*). Wanting to counteract this insult (*abhyākhyāna*), the Buddha said: "I truly possess the ten powers (*bala*) and the four fearlessnesses (*vaiśāradya*) with which I save beings: it is not magic (*māyā*)."

<sup>596</sup> Events described and commented on above, p. 431F seq.

<sup>597</sup> A spiteful insinuation often found in the mouths of heretics (Majjima, I, p. 375, 381; Anguttara, II, p. 190, 193): Samaņo hi bhante Gotamo māyāvī, āvaṭṭaniṃ māyaṃ jānāti yāya aññatitthiyānaṃ sāvake āvaṭṭeti.

5) Finally, for the bodhisattvas who cultivate the bodhisattva path, the practice of austerities (duṣkaracaryā) is difficult to observe and difficult to realize and they have the tendency to laziness (kausīdya). This is why the Buddha says to them: "Practice the ten powers and you will obtain an immense fruit of retribution (vipākaphala)."

[236c] It is like the leader of a caravan (sārthavāka) who encourages his merchants by saying: "Be careful and avoid fatigue (klamatha): by means of energy, diligence effort and strength, you will arrive at the jewel mountain (ratnagiri) and there you will find the seven jewels (saptaratna) and the wish-fulfilling gem (cintāmaṇi)." In the same way, the Buddha encourages the bodhisattvas and says to them: "Do not be lazy; cultivate the bodhisattva path diligently and with energy; practice the ten powers and you will obtain an immense fruit of retribution."

It is because of these many benefits that [the Prajñāpāramitā] deals with the ten powers, etc., here.

#### V. WHY ARE THERE ONLY TEN POWERS?

Question. – The Buddha possesses innumerable powers; why speak of only ten here?

Answer. – It is true that the Buddha possesses innumerable powers but in order to save beings, to speak of ten powers is sufficient to settle the question:

- 1) By the power of the knowledge of what is possible and what is impossible (*sthānāsthānajñānabala*), the Buddha distinguishes (*vibhanakti*) and evaluates (*tulayati*) those beings who can be converted (*vaineyasattva*) and those who cannot be converted (*avaineya*).
- 2) By the power of the knowledge of retribution of actions (*karmavipākajñānabala*), he distinguishes and evaluates in one given person the obstacle consisting of action (*karmāvaraṇa*), in another person the obstacle consisting of retribution (*vipākāvaraṇa*), in yet another person the absence of obstacles. 598
- 3) By the power of the knowledge of the *dhyānas*, *vimokṣas*, *samādhis* and *samāpattis*, he distinguishes and evaluates those who are attached to the flavors of trance (*rasarakta*) and those who are not attached to them.
- 4) By the power of the knowledge of the moral faculties (*indriyaparāparajñānabala*), he distinguishes and evaluates the degree of peoples' strength of knowledge.

By āvaraṇa is meant that which is an obstacle to the Path and to the roots of good preparatory to the Path (nirvedhabhāgīya). The Buddha said that there are three obstacles: i) the obstacle constituted by action (karmāvaraṇa), namely, the five sins of immediate (ānantarya) retribution; ii) the obstacle constituted by the conflicting emotions (kleśāvaraṇa), chronic (abhīkṣṇika) and violent (tīkṣṇa) passion;

*iii*) the obstacle consisting of retribution (*vipākāvaraṇa*): the three bad destinies and some good destinies: cf. Anguttara, III, p. 436; Kośa, IV, p. 201-203 and notes; Bodh. bhūmi, p. 79.

1243

- 5) By the power of the knowledge of the various aspirations of beings (*nānādhimuktijñānabala*), he distinguishes and evaluates what is loved by beings.
- 6. By the power of the knowledge of the various dispositions acquired by beings (*nānādhātujñānabala*), he distinguishes and evaluates the progression of profound thoughts (*gambhīracitta*) of beings.
- 7. By the power of the knowledge of the route leading to the various destinies (sarvatragāminīpratipajjñānabala), he distinguishes and evaluates the doors to deliverance (vimokṣamukha) among beings.
- 8. By the power of the knowledge of previous abodes (*pūrvanivāsajñānabala*), he distinguishes and evaluates the earlier comings and goings of beings.
- 9. By the power of the knowledge of birth and death (*cyutyupapādajñānabala*), he distinguishes and evaluates the places of birth of beings (*upapattisthāna*), beautiful (*suvarna*) or ugly (*durvarna*),
- 10. By the power of the knowledge of the cessation of the impurities (āsravakṣayajñānabala), he distinguishes and evaluates the attaining of nirvāṇa by beings.

By using these ten types of powers, the Buddha saves beings. True and free of error, all are perfected (*sampanna*). This is why, although the Buddha possesses innumerable powers, we speak only of these ten powers.

#### VI. WHY THE FIRST POWER INCLUDES THE OTHER NINE

- 1) Futhermore, by the power of the possible and the impossible, he knows exactly from what cause a certain fruit of retribution comes. This power includes the nine others to save beings. Nine different modalities occur in this first power. How is that?
- 2) Beings in the world *see* the grain grow from the seed with their eyes (*pratykaṣam*), but they do not *know* it. How then would they know the fruit of retribution (*vipākaphala*) caused by the mind and mental events (*caitasikadharma*)? The Buddha, however, knows clearly and fully the fruit of retribution in its inner and outer causes (*adhyātmabāhyahetupratyaya*): thus this is a 'power'.<sup>599</sup>

The Buddha knows the beings who are bound (baddha) by actions (karman) and defilements (kleśa) and the beings who are freed (mukta) by the pure dhyānas, samāpattis, samādhis and vimokṣas. He knows fully and completely the three kinds of actions of all beings, past, future and present, the lightness or gravity, the depth or superficiality, the coarseness or subtlety of their afflictions: thus this is a 'power'.

3. He knows fully and completely the depth or the shallowness of the *dhyānas*, *samāpattis*, *samādhis* and *vimokṣas* of all beings and the causes for their liberation (*vimukti*): this is thus a 'power'. [237a]

1244

Power (bala) here being taken in the sense of jñānabala 'power consisting of knowledge'.

- 4. In view of the future lifetime (*punarjanman*), beings of weak faculties (*mṛdvindriya*) carry out shameful or meritorious actions; in view of not being reborn, people of keen faculties (*tīkṣṇendriya*) accumulate actions (*upacinvanti*). The Buddha knows fully and completely the beauty or ugliness of these superior or inferior faculties: thus this is a 'power'.
- 5. The Buddha knows the two kinds of aspirations (*adhimukti*) in all beings that are the determining causes of their higher or lower faculties (*indriya*); he knows fully and completely the kindness, the malice and the various modalities of these two kinds of aspirations: thus this is a 'power'.
- 6. These two kinds of aspirations (*adhimukti*) being cause and condition for the two kinds of acquired dispositions (*dhātu*), the Buddha knows fully and completely the progress of the profound thoughts (*gambhīracitta*) of beings: thus this is a 'power'.
- 7. By reason of their various acquired dispositions ( $dh\bar{a}tu$ ), beings follow two types of paths (pratipad), the good path and the bad path. The Buddha knows fully and completely the many gates and destinations: thus this is a 'power'.
- 8-9. The unhindered knowledge of [the mechanism] of causes and results in past and future existences is called the power of the knowledge of previous abodes (*pūrvanivāsajñāna*) and the knowledge of death and rebirth (*cyutyupapādajñāna*).
- 10. To know the causes and results of the past and the future and, being fully aware of skillful means  $(up\bar{a}ya)$ , to break the continuity (prabandha) of the mechanism of cause and effect, this is the power of the cessation of impurities  $(\bar{a}sravak\bar{s}ayabala)$ . The Buddha knows the twofold causality of the three times, distinguishes and evaluates the moral faculties (indriya), the aspirations (adhimukti) and the acquired dispositions  $(dh\bar{a}tu)$  of beings and, in order to break their impurities, he preaches the Dharma to them. This is what is called the power of cessation of the impurities  $(\bar{a}sravak\bar{s}aya)$ .

# Second Section THE TEN POWERS IN PARTICULAR

#### I. THE POWER OF THE POSSIBLE AND THE IMPOSSIBLE

Question. – What is the power of the knowledge of the possible and the impossible (sthānāsthānajñānabala)?

Answer. – The Buddha knows all dharmas, their causes and conditions (*hetupratyaya*) and the mechanism of the fruit of retribution (*vipākaphalaniyāma*): from such and such causes and conditions there arises such and such a fruit of retribution; from such and such other causes and conditions there arises such another fruit of retribution. How is that?

[Bahudhātukasūtra].<sup>600</sup> – As it is said in the *To-sing king* (Bahudhātukasūtra) in regard to things possible and impossible:

"It is impossible that a woman should be a noble cakravartin king" (aṭṭhānam etaṃ anavakāso yaṃ itthi rājā assa cakkavattī, n' etaṃ thānaṃ vijjati). Why? Because any woman dependent on a man cannot obtain sovereignty (aiśvarya). And if a woman cannot be a noble cakravartin king, how then could she be Buddha? If a woman obtains liberation, nirvāṇa, it is thanks to a man that she obtains it. It is impossible that she could obtain Bodhi by herself (svataḥ). 601

"It is impossible that two noble cakravartin kings appear simultaneously in the world" (aṭṭhānam etaṃ anavakāso yaṃ ekissā lokadhātuyā dve rājāno cakkavattino apubbaṃ acarimaṃ uppajjeyyum, n' etaṃ ṭhānaṃ vijjati). Why? Because a cakravartin king never encounters any rivalry (pratyarthikatva). And if two noble cakravartin kings cannot be in the same world, how could two Buddhas?

"It is impossible that a bad action [of body, speech or mind] could result in a pleasant [agreeable] retribution." (aṭṭhānam etaṃ anavakāso yaṃ kāyavacīmanoduccaritassa iṭṭho kanto manāpo vipāko nibbatteyya, n'etaṃ ṭhānaṃ vijjati). And if a bad action cannot bring worldly happiness (laukikasukha), how then could it bring supramundane happiness (lokottarasukha)?

"It is impossible that the person who is of bad conduct [of body, speech or mind] could, as a result of this fact, [at the dissolution of the body] be reborn in heaven" (atthānam etam anavakāso yaṃ kāyavacīmanoduccaritasamangī tannidānā tappaccayā kāyassa bhedā param maraṇā sugatiṃ saggaṃ lokaṃ uppajjeyya, n'etaṃ thānaṃ vijjati). And if the person who is of bad conduct cannot be reborn in the heavens, how then could he obtain nirvāṇa? In fact, the five obstacles (pañcāvaraṇa) cover the mind, one is distracted (vikṣipta) and, without developing the seven factors of enlightenment (saṃbodhyaṅga), it is impossible to attain nirvāṇa. As long as the five obstacles cover the mind and one does not cultivate the seven factors of enlightenment, it is impossible to attain the Bodhi of the śrāvakas, not to speak of the Bodhi of the Buddhas. But when the mind is free of obstacles, the Bodhi of the Buddhas can be obtained and, all the more so, that of the śrāvakas.

All of these possibilities and impossibilities the Buddha has explained from his own mouth in the *To-sing king* (Bahudhātukasūtra) but, relying on the word of the Buddha, scholars have developed these possibilities and impossibilities at length: 603

[237b] It is impossible that the Buddhas have defects and errors, that the saints (ārya) seek out heretical teachers, that the saints fall into the bad destinies (durgati), that the fetters (samyojana), once destroyed by

<sup>600</sup> An extract of the Bahudhātukasutta of Majjhima, III, p. 64-67 (Tchong a han, T 26, k. 47, p.

<sup>723</sup>c28-724b28), repeated in Anguttara, I, p. 26-30 as well..

<sup>601</sup> See also above, p. 134F, 545F.

<sup>602</sup> See above, p. 302-303F, 535F.

The *Traité* undoubtedly has in mind the Abhidharma authors who have considerably increased the list of possibilities and impossibilities drawn up by the Buddha: see, e.g., Vibhanga, p. 335-338; Kathāvatthu, p. 172; Puggalapaññatti, p. 11, 12.

the path of seeing the truths (*satyadarśana*), re-arise, that the saints hide their faults, and that the srotaāpannas are reborn twenty-five times.<sup>604</sup> See what has been said at length in the classification of the saints (*āryavibhanga*).

It is impossible that people guilty of the five heinous crimes of immediate retribution (ānantarya), the five types of eunuchs (pañcavidhasandha), beings in the four bad destinies (caturdurgatipatitasattva), the inhabitants of Uttarāvati and the retinue of Māra (māraparivāra), being hindered by the three obstacles (āvaraṇa), 605 can attain the Path....606 [237c]

There are innumerable impossibilities (*asthāna*) of this kind and it is the same for the possibilities. The Buddha knows the possible things and the impossible things; he distinguishes (*vibhanakti*) them and evaluates (*tulayati*) them. For beings able to be converted (*vaineyasattva*), he preaches the Dharma; for beings unable to be converted, it is the [free] play of causes. The Buddha is like a good physician (*vaidya*) who understands the curable and incurable illnesses.

On the other hand, the śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas know very few things. Sometimes they want to convert beings unable to be converted, as was the case for the *Cheou-lo* (Asura?); sometimes they do not convert beings who ought to be converted, as was the case [for Śrīvṛddhi] who was not converted by Śāriputra.

The srotaāpanna is *saptakṛtvaḥ paramaḥ*, i.e., he will be reborn a maximum of seven times: cf. Anguttara, I, p. 233, l. 13; IV, p. 381, l. 13; Nettippakaraṇa, p. 169, l. 27; p. 189, l. 28; Visuddhimagga, p. 611, l. 26; Kośa, VI, p. 200.

The obstacle consisting of action (*karmāvaraṇa*) bars the Path to people guilty of the five *ānantaryas*; the obstacle consisting of passion (*kleśāvaraṇa*) bars it to eunuchs; the obstacle consisting of retribution (*vipākāvaraṇa*) bars it to beings in the four unfortunate rebirths (*nāraka, tiryagyoni, preta* and *asura*) and to the inhabitants of Uttarakuru: cf. Kośa, IV, p. 201-213.

<sup>606</sup> The *Traité* continues by mentioning still other possibilities.

<sup>607</sup> Cf. Kośabhāṣya, p. 412-413: Sthaviraśāriputreṇa pravrajyāprekṣapuruṣapratyākhyānam:

<sup>&</sup>quot;Sāriputra rejected a man who asked for the going-forth from home."

The Kośavyālkhyā, p. 644, tells the circumstances for this refusal: Āryaśāripureṇa kila kasyacit pravrajyāprekṣasya puruṣasya ... dhatupāṣāṇivare nilīnam iva kāñcanam //

Transl. – It is said that a man asked for admission into the monastic Order. The noble Śariputra looked for some root of good in him before producing the deliverance but, as he saw none, he refused him and did not allow him into the Order. The Buddha, however, found one and allowed him into the Order. The monks questioned the Buddha about this man and the Blessed One said: Here is an action done by this man which will be worth arhathood for him. Actually, actions do not ripen in the elements earth, water, fire or wind, but indeed in the aggregates, the elements and the bases of consciousness appropriated by him. And the Buddha said: "I definitely see in him a very small seed of deliverance, like a speck of gold caught in the interstices of a mineral."

This story is told in full in the following collections:

The Buddha himself makes no blunders. [His knowledge of the possible and the impossible] is intact (avyāhata) and invincible (prajānāti) and, since he knows fully and completely (prajānāti), it is called the first 'power'.

#### II. THE KNOWLEDGE OF THE RETRIBUTION OF ACTIONS

The power of the knowledge of the retribution of actions (*karmavipākajñānabala*). - Whether it is a matter of actions carried out by the body or speech, of actions unaccomplished in the present lifetime, of actions resulting from discipline of vow (*samādānaśīla*),<sup>608</sup>, of bad actions, of actions to be carried out during one day and one night <sup>609</sup>, of sinful or meritorious actions: the Buddha has summarily explained the threefold sphere of action of all of these, and this is what is called the natures of karman.

1) The Buddha knows the past (*atīta*) actions of all beings the retribution of which is also past, the past actions the retribution of which is taking place in the present (*pratyutpanna*), the past action the retribution of which is in the future (*anāgata*), the past actions the retribution of which is in the past and the present, the past actions the retribution of which is in the past actions the retribution of which is in the past actions the retribution of which is in the past, future and present. It is the same for present actions.

The hero of the story was called *Fou-tseng* or *Che-li-li-t'i* (restored by P. Pelliot as Śrivṛddhi). After having been refused by Śāriputra and some other disciples, he was finally admitted into the Order by the Buddha himself, the only one who found a minute seed of deliverance in him: in the past, when he had been attacked by a tiger, he had uttered the cry: *Namo buddhāya*.

It is perhaps of Śrivṛddhi that the authors of the Vibhāṣā (T 1545, k. 102, p. 530c19-27) were thinking when they noted the following: The Buddha and the venerable Śāriputra were walking somewhere and someone approached them. The Buddha asked Śāriputra: Can you see where this person was your friend? Then Śāriputra, passing from the first to the fourth dhyāna resorted to memories of his earlier abodes (*pūrvanivāsānanusmṛti*) in order to find this person, but saw nothing. Coming out of his samādhi, he said to the Buddha: The power of my concentration is unable to see him. The Buddha said to Śāriputra: Once in the past, during such and such a kalpa, this being was your friend, but the time is so distant that it is not within the range of śrāvakas or of pratyekabuddhas; this is why you cannot know him.

a. P'ou-sa pen-cheng man louen, T 160, k. 4, p. 343c23-344b28. – On this work, see J. Brough, *The Chinese Pseudo-Translation of Ārya-Śūtra's Jātaka-Mālā*, Asia Major, XI, 1964, p. 27-53.

b. Kalpanāmaņdikā, T 201, no. 57, k. 10, p. 311b24-312b13 (transl. E. Huber,  $S\bar{u}tr\bar{a}lamk\bar{a}ra$  d'Aśvaghoṣa, p. 283-287).

c. Hien yu king, T 202, no. 23, k. 4, p. 376b2-380a10.

<sup>608</sup> Discipline of vow, see above, p. 819-852F.

Also called discipline of *upavāsastha*: cf. p. 825-929F.

- 2) Furthermore, among the good minds (*kuśalacitta*), there are those that undergo the retribution of good (*kuśala*), bad (*akuśala*) or indeterminate (*avyākṛta*) actions.<sup>610</sup> It is the same for bad (*akuśala*) minds and indeterminate (*avyākṛta*) minds.
- 3) Furthermore, as a result of a salutary (kṣema) action, one undergoes a pleasant retribution (iṣṭavipāka); as a result of a pernicious (akṣema) action, one undergoes an unpleasant retribution (aniṣṭavipāka); as a result of an action that is neither salutary nor pernicious (naivakṣemanaākṣema) action, one undergoes a neither unpleasant nor pleasant retribution.

As a result of an action to be experienced in the present lifetime (*dṛṣṭadharmavedanīya*), one undergoes a retribution in the present lifetime; as a result of an action to be experienced after having been reborn (*upapadyavedanīya*), one undergoes a retribution after having been reborn [i.e., in the very next lifetime to come]; as a result of an action to be undergone later (*aparaparyāyavedanīya*), one undergoes a retribution in a later existence [from the third onward]. 612

As a result of an impure (aśubha) action, one undergoes a retribution of torment; as a result of a pure (śubha) action, one undergoes a retribution free of torment. As a result of a mixed (saṃbhinna) action, one undergoes a mixed retribution.

610 Vibhāṣā, T 1545, k. 51, p. 263a6; Kośabhāṣya, p. 227, l. 5: Kuśalam akuśalam avyākṛtaṃ karmati. 611 Kośabhāṣya, p. 227, l. 7-9: Kṣemaṃ karma kuśalaṃ yad iṣṭavipākaṃ nirvāṇaprāpakaṃ ca duḥkhaparitrānāt tatkālam atyantaṃ ca. akṣemam akuśalaṃ kṣemapratidvandvabhāvena yasyāniṣṭo vipākaḥ. tābhyām itarat karma naivakṣemaṇākṣemaṃ yat tatkuśalākuśalābhyām itarat veditavyam.

Transl. – Good action is salutary whether it brings a pleasant retribution or whether it makes one obtain nirvāṇa; in the first case, temporarily, in the second case, once and for all. Bad action is pernicious, for it is, by nature, opposed to salvation: it is unpleasant retribution. An action different from the two preceding ones, namely, good and bad, is neither salutary nor pernicious.

Here it is a matter of determinate (*niyata*) action, i.e., action that must necessarily be experienced (*niyatavedanīya*). It is of three kinds: cf. Kośabhāṣya, p. 229-230: *Niyataṃ trividhaṃ dṛṣṭadharmavedanīyam upapadyavedanīyam aparaparyāyavedanīam... tatra dṛṣṭdharmavedanīyaṃ yatra janmani kṛtaṃ tatraiva vipacyate. upadyavedanīyaṃ dvitīye janmani. aparaparyāyavedanīyaṃ tasmāt pareṇa: "Determinate action is of three kinds: <i>i*) action to be experienced in the present lifetime or action that ripens in the same existence as it was accomplished in; *ii*) action to be experienced after having been reborn or action that ripens in the existence following the one in which it was accomplished; *iii*) action to be experienced later or action that ripens in a later existence, after the third."

That is the canonical doctrine: cf. Anguttara, III, p. 415: *Tividdhāhaṃ bhikkhave kammānaṃ vipākaṃ vadāmi: diṭṭh' eva dhamme upapajjaṃ vā pariyāye*. See also Majjhima, III, p. 214-215; Anguttara, V, p. 294, 297; Visuddhimagga, p. 515; L. de La Vallée Poussin, *Morale bouddhique*, 1927, p. 177-181.

4. Furthermore, there are two kinds of actions: the action that must necessarily be experienced (niyatavedanīya) and the action that will not necessarily be experienced (aniyatacedanīya).<sup>613</sup>

The action that must necessarily be experienced is that from which one cannot escape.

a. Sometimes the action that must necessarily be experienced depends (apekṣate) on the time ( $k\bar{a}la$ ), a person (pudgala) and the place (sthāna) in order to undergo its retribution.

Thus a person who is to enjoy happiness in the company of a noble cakravartin king awaits the moment when the noble cakravartin king appears in the world, and that is the moment when he attains his reward: therefore he depends on the time. He depends also on an individual, on the occurrence of the noble cakravartin king, and finally, he depends on the place, i.e., the place where the noble cakravartin king is born.

But there are actions that must necessarily be experienced which do not depend on any skill or any deed. Whether they are beautiful (suvarna) or ugly [238a] (durvarna), they present themselves without being sought. Thus for the person who has taken birth in the paradises, the happiness resulting from merit (punyasukha) appears by itself, and for the person who is in hell (niraya), the suffering resulting from the sin (āpattiduḥkha) follows him by itself. These actions do not depend on causes and conditions because they are especially serious (guru).614

As actions inevitably to be experienced (niyatavedanīya), see for example the army of P'i-lieou-li (Virudhaka) that killed seventy-two thousand men who were in possession of the Path (mārgaprāpta) and innumerable lay practitioners (upāsaka) who were keeping the five precepts (pañcaśiksāpada).615

See also the great magicians (mahārddhika) like Mou-lien (Maudgalyāyana), etc., who could not be saved.616

According to some sources, this was a matter of a simple mental sin: Anavataptagāthā (ed. Bechert, p. 94-97; transl. Hofinger, p. 199-202, p. 190c15-191a16; T 1448, k. 16, p. 78c22-79a28; Tchong king siuan tsa p'i yu, T 208, no. 15, k. 1, p. 535a23-b4); Pāli Jātaka, V, p. 125-126.

According to others, on the other hand, Maudgalyāyana really assassinated his blind parents in a pretended attack by robbers: Pāli Apadāna, I, p. 31-33; Commentary of the Dhammapada, III, p. 65-69

<sup>613</sup> See Kośa, IV, p. 241.

In order to estimate the lightness or heaviness of an action, six causes must be considered: see Kośa, IV, p. 241.

After having massacred the Śākyas, Viruḍhaka (Viḍūdabha in Pāli) and his army established their encampment on the shores and the bed of the Aciravati river. During the night, a sudden flood drowned them and they all perished. See above, p. 508-509F, note.

Although he was the most powerful of the magicians, Maudgalyāyana ended his last lifetime tragically: he was beaten like sugar-cane by heretics who reduced his bones to powder, and this resulted in his death. The great disciple thus expiated a sin he had committed against his parents in an earlier lifetime.

See also *Po-kiu-lo* (Bakkula) who was thrown by his step-mother into the fire, into boiling water and into water, but who did not die. 617

Finally, the Buddha, when he was traveling through the kingdoms as a wandering mendicant (*pravrajita*), was begging and did not lack for offerings of food. However, five hundred carts brought him kingly food; in the foliage [alongside of which] he was walking, there grew seeds of rice (*śāli, tanḍula*) and in his cooked rice (*odana*) there was an emulsion of a hundred flavors (*ojaḥ śatarasam*).<sup>618</sup>

Good or bad, actions of this kind are to be experienced (*niyatavedanīya*) necessarily; the others do not necessarily have to be experienced (*aniyatavedanīya*).

5) The desire realm ( $k\bar{a}madh\bar{a}tu$ ) is the place ( $sth\bar{a}na$ ) where one undergoes the retribution ( $vip\bar{a}ka$ ) for three kinds of actions, namely, action to be experienced pleasantly ( $sukhavedan\bar{i}ya$ ), action to be experienced unpleasantly ( $duhkhavedan\bar{i}ya$ ) and action to be experienced neither unpleasantly nor pleasantly ( $aduhkh\bar{a}sukhavedan\bar{i}ya$ ).

The form realm  $(r\bar{u}padh\bar{a}tu)$  is the place where one undergoes the retribution of two types of actions, namely, the action to be experienced pleasantly  $(sukhavedan\bar{v}ya)$  and the action to be experienced neither unpleasantly nor pleasantly  $(duhkh\bar{a}sukhavedan\bar{v}ya)$ .

(transl. Burlingame, II, p. 304-307); W, Rockhill, *Life of the Buddha*, p. 109-110; P. Bigandet, *Vie en Légende du Gaudama*, p. 266-267.

617 For Bakkula, see above, p. 1386F. The detail given here appears, to my [Lamotte's] knowledge, only in the King liu yi siang, T 2121, k. 37, p. 201a1-9 (transl. Chavannes, *Contes*, III, p. 229-230): Bakkula lost his mother at the age of seven and his father took another wife who hated the son of her predecessor. While she was steaming some cakes in an earthenware jar, the child asked his step-mother for some and she threw him into the jar; then she closed the opening with a plate in the hope of killing the boy; but the latter, finding himself inside the jar, ate the cakes and did not die.

At another time, she took the child and put him on a red-hot baking-sheet; but he ate the cakes on the sheet and did not die. .

Later, having gone to the river bank to wash clothes, the woman threw the boy into the river; a fish swallowed him, etc.

On the Buddha's food (*ojas* or *ojā*) of a hundred flavors (*śatarasa*), see above, p. 125F, note 1. The Mūlasarv. Vinaya (*Gilgit Manuscript*, III, part 1, p. 38-39; T 1448, k. 10, p. 47a9-23) also tells the following: When the Bhagavat began to eat the barley (*yava*) at Verañja, the venerable Ānanda, completely upset, began to weep: The Bhagavat, he said, in the course of his existences, gave the gift of his hands, his feet and his head; at the end of three incalculable periods, he attained omniscience and now here he eats barley growing in holes! The Bhagavat said to him: Ānanda, do you want to eat these barley grains stuck between the teeth of the Tathāgata? When Ānanda said yes, he gave him one of these grains and said: This, O Ānanda, is the very pure food of the Tathāgata; it eclipses the the best of all flavors. If the Tathāgata eats no matter how coarse a food, this food changes for the Tathāgata into food of a hundred flavors (*yadi tathāgataḥ prākṛtam apy āhāraṃ paribhunkte tad api tathāgatasyānnaśatarasaṃ saṃparivartate*).

The formless realm (ārūpyadhātu) is the place where one undergoes he retribution of one single kind of action, namely, the action to be experienced neither unpleasantly nor pleasantly (adḥukhāsukhavedanīya).619

- 6) There are retributions dependent on an object (vastupek,sa) and it is thanks to this object that one obtains the retribution of action. Thus, in the pools ( $tad\bar{a}ga$ ) of king Fou-kia-lo-p'o [erroneous transcription for Fou-kia-lo-so-li = Pukkusāti $^{620}$ ] there grew thousand-petaled golden lotuses ( $sahasrapattr\bar{a}nisuvarn\bar{a}vabh\bar{a}sani\ padm\bar{a}ni$ ), as large as chariot wheels $^{621}$  and, because of them, a large crowd of people were overjoyed and many went forth from home (pravrajita) and obtained Bodhi.
- 7) The Buddha knows the places ( $sth\bar{a}na$ ) where beings carry out their actions, whether in the desire realm ( $k\bar{a}madh\bar{a}tu$ ), the form realm ( $r\bar{u}padh\bar{a}tu$ ) or the formless realm ( $\bar{a}r\bar{u}pyadh\bar{a}tu$ ).

If it is in the desire realm, he knows in what destiny (gati); if it is in the divine destiny (devagati), he knows among which gods; if it is among humans (manusya), he knows in what continent  $(dv\bar{v}paka)$ ; if it is in Jambudv $\bar{v}$ pa, he knows in what kingdom  $(r\bar{a}stra)$ ; if it is in a kingdom, he knows in what city (nagara) or village (nigama); if it is in a vih $\bar{v}$ ara, he knows in what place; if it is in a city (naga), he knows in what quarter  $(v\bar{v}$ ata), in what street  $(v\bar{v}$ thi), in what house  $(pr\bar{a}s\bar{v}$ ada) and in what room  $(sth\bar{v}$ ana).

- 8) The Buddha knows at what time a given action has been carried out, whether it was one generation ago, two generations ago, up to a hundred thousand generations ago.
- 9) He knows the number of times the retribution of a given action (*karmavipākaphala*) has been undergone, has not yet been undergone, will necessarily be undergone or not necessarily undergone.
- 10) He knows the good or bad tools that have been used [to carry out an action]; a knife (śastra), a stick (daṇḍa), an order for an execution (vadhaśāsana), etc.; he knows if one has killed oneself or if one has ordered someone else to kill. It is the same for all other bad actions and also all good actions.
- 11) The Buddha knows what generosity ( $d\bar{a}na$ ) and what disciplines ( $\hat{s}\bar{t}la$ ) have been cultivated.

Pukkusāti, king of Takṣaśilā, a contemporary and friend of Bimbisāra, king of Magadha. Having read the description of the Three Jewels on a golden plaque sent to him by Bimbisāra, Pukkusāti renounced his throne, put on the yellow robe of a monk and went to search for the Buddha. Stage by stage he came to Rājagṛha and took his lodging at the home of the potter Bhaggava. The Buddha himself joined him there and during the night preached the *Dhātuvibhaṅgasūtra* (Majjhima, III, p. 237-247) to him. Pukkusāti requested and obtained ordination. Leaving immediately to seek for an alms- bowl and robe, he was attacked and killed by a cow. The Buddha disclosed to his monks that Pukkasāti had attained the fruit of anāgamin and has taken rebirth in the Avṛha heaven.

The history of this disciple is fully told in the Commentary of the Majjhima, V, p. 33 seq. 621 These giant lotuses have been described above, p. 571F.

<sup>619</sup> All of this is fully explained in Kośa, IV, p. 109.

In regard to generosity, if a thing has been given, he knows if it is land, a house (grha), a garment (cīvara), food (pindapāta), medicine (bhaiṣajya), a bed or seat (śayanāsana), an object made of the seven jewels (saptaratnamaya vasu).

In regard to discipline (śīla), the Buddha knows if it is a discipline of vow (samādānaśīla), a discipline acquired naturally (dharmatāprātilambhikaśīla), 622 a discipline of mental order (caitasikaśīla), a discipline of speech (vākśīla), an ekadeśakakārin discipline, a pradeśakārin discipline, a yadbhūyaskārin discipline, a paripūrnakārin discipline,<sup>623</sup> a discipline of a single day (ekadivasasīla),<sup>624</sup> a discipline of observing the seven good paths of action (saptakuśalakarmapatha). 625 a discipline observing the ten precepts fully (daśaśiksāpada), or a discipline joined with concentration (samādhi).

- 12) In regard to meritorious works (punya), the Buddha knows those who cultivate the first, second, third or fourth dhvāna, the four immeasurables of loving-kindness (maitrī), compassion (karuṇā), joy (muditā) and equanimity (*upeksa*) and other similar causes and conditions of good actions.
- 13) The Buddha knows the various causes and conditions of bad actions, such as greed (mātsarya), malice (vyāpāda), fear (bhaya), bad views (mithyādrṣṭi), [238b] bad friends (pāpamitra), etc. He knows the various causes and conditions of good actions such as faith (śraddhā), compassion (karunā), respect (satkāra), trance (dhyāna) and absorption (samāpatti), wisdom (prajñā), good friends (kalyāṇamitra), etc.

Actions are dominant (adhipati): there is no one among gods or men who is able to change the nature of actions.

For thousands of years, myriads, hundreds of thousands of existences, action always follows its perpetrator without release, like a creditor (rnāyika) pursuing his debtor.<sup>626</sup>

In Kośa, IV, p. 49, n. 3, L. de La Vallée Poussin explains: We distinguish the samādhiśīla, the discipline obtained by making a vow, a resolution: "I will not do this or that" (type: Pratimokşa discipline) and the dharmatāprātilambhikaśīla, the discipline acquired either without vow or act of speech: this is the discipline acquired just by the fact of possessing a dhyāna (for one possesses a dhyāna only by becoming detached from the afflictions of kāmadhātu) or by entering into the Path (pure discipline involving abstention from certain actions).

<sup>622</sup> See the list of disciplines in Pañcavimsati (T 223, k. 23, p. 390b13-14; T 220, vol. VII, k. 467, p. 15-17). As the Kośa says, the discipline of vow (samādānaśīla) depends on a vijñāpti, on an information, whereas the discipline acquired naturally (dharmatāprātilambhikaśīla or dharmatāśīla), i.e., arisen from samādhi, is just avijñapti, non-information.

<sup>623</sup> These four disciplines, ekadeśakārin, etc., in regard to the layperson have already been defined above, p. 821F and note.

<sup>624</sup> See above, p. 825F.

The discipline consisting of the observing of the seven good paths of material  $(r\bar{u}pin)$  action

<sup>(</sup>karmapatha): abstaining from the three misdeeds of body and the four misdeeds of speech. The comparison of the creditor is canonical: cf. Samyutta, I, p. 170, 171: Paccūsamhi inayikā detha dethā ti codenti.

When the action meets the combination of causes and conditions ( $hetupraty\bar{a}yas\bar{a}magr\bar{\imath}$ ), it produces its fruit of retribution ( $vip\bar{a}kaphalam\ dad\bar{a}ti$ ), like a seed ( $b\bar{\imath}ja$ ) planted in the soil, encountering the complex of causes and conditions and the right time ( $hetuprat\bar{a}yas\bar{a}magr\bar{\imath}m\ pr\bar{a}pya\ k\bar{a}lam\ ca$ ), germinates anew. 627

Action projects the being into an existence of the six destinies with the speed of an arrow...

All beings are heirs to their actions ( $karmad\bar{a}y\bar{a}da$ ) in the way that sons inherit the wealth of their fathers which is bequeathed to them. 628

When the fruit of action is in progress, it cannot be stopped, like the fire at the end of the kalpa  $(palpodd\bar{a}ha)$ .

Action distributes beings among the various places where they are to be reborn, like the great king of a country distributes administrative posts according to the services rendered.

When a man dies, action covers up his mind like a great mountain extending its shadow over things.

Action assigns various bodies [to beings] like the master artist (citrakmara) who makes different images ( $pratim\bar{a}$ ).

If a person acts well, action procures a fine reward for him; if the person acts badly, action procures a bad punishment for him, like the man who serves a king and is rewarded according to his services.

This is a classification of actions and their retribution.

14. [Mahākarmavibhaṅgasūtra].<sup>629</sup> — Moreover, in the Fen-pie-ye-king (Karmavibhaṅgasūtra), the Buddha said to Ānanda: "[It may happen] that a man who does bad deeds is reborn in a good place (sugatim utpadyate) and that a man who does good deeds is reborn in a bad place (durgatim utpdyate)."

Ānanda asked: "How is that possible?"

The Buddha replied: "If the bad action ( $p\bar{a}pakarman$ ) done by the evil man during the present lifetime (drsta eva dharme) has not yet ripened (aparipakva) and if a good action done by him during a previous

Na praṇaśyanti karmāṇi kalpakoṭiśatair api /

sāmagrīm prāpya kālam ca phalanti khalu dehinām //

628 Cf. Saṃyutta, II, p. 101-102; III, p. 152: Seyyathāpi bhikkhave rajako vā cittakāro vā sati rajanāya vā lākkhāya vā haliddiyā vā nīliyā vā mañjeṭṭāya vā suparimaṭṭhe va phalake bhittiyā vā dussapaṭṭe vā itthirūpaṃ vā abhinimmineyya sabbaṅgapaccaṅgaṃ..."Just as a painter, using colors, lacquer, ginger, indigo or madder, using a well-polished piece of wood, a wall or a cloth, draws a picture of a woman or man with all its members and limbs..." so action, which is mind (citta), in imitation of the painter (citraka), creates all the destinies of beings.

The Saddharmasmṛtyupasthāna (T721, k. 5, p. 23b18-c25) is inspired by this canonical passage in the parable dedicated to the mind of the painter. This parable has been commented learnedly and fully by Lin Li-Kouang, *L'Aide-mémoire de la Vraie Loi*, 1949, p. 65 seq.

629 Sutta from Majjhima, III, p. 207-215 (Tchong a han, T 26, k. 44, p. 706b12-708c28).

<sup>627</sup> Paraphrase of the classical stanza:

lifetime (pūrve kṛtaṃ kalyānakarma) is already ripened (paripakva), then for this reason - although presently he is doing something bad - he takes rebirth in a good place. Or again if, at the moment of his death (maraṇakāle), a good mind (kuśalacitta) and good mental events (kuśalacaitasikadharma) arise in him, then for this reason, he takes rebirth in a good place."630

"[It may also happen] that a man who has done a good deed takes rebirth in a bad place. If the good action (kalyāṇakarman) done by the honest man during the present lifetime (dṛṣṭa eva dharme) has not yet ripened (aparipakva) and if a bad deed done by him during an earlier lifetime (pūrve kṛtaṃ kalyāṇakarma) is already ripe (paripakva), then, for that reason and although he is doing good actions presently, he is reborn in a bad place. Or also if, at the moment of his death (maraṇakāle), a bad mind (akuśalacitta) and bad mental events (akuśalacaitasikadharma) arise in him, then, for that reason he takes rebirth in a bad place."

630 Majjhima,III,p. 214, l. 17-26: Tatr' Ānanda, yvāyam puggalo idha pāṇātipātī adinnādāyī — pe — micchādiṭṭhī, kāyassa bhedā param maraṇā sugatim saggam lokam uppajjati, pubbe vā 'ssa katam hoti kalyāṇakammam sukhavedanīyam, pecchā vā 'ssa tam katam kalyāṇakammam sukhavedanīyam, maraṇakāle vā 'ssa hoti sammādiṭṭhī samattā samādiṇṇā; tena so kāyassa bhedā param maraṇā sugatim saggam lokam uppajjati. Sace kho so idha pānātipāti hoti adinnādāyī hoti — pe — micchādiṭṭhī hoti, tassa diṭṭhe va dhamme vipākam paṭisaṃvedeti uppaajjam apare vā pariyāye.

Transl. – It may happen, O Ānanda, that an individual who is actually a murderer, a thief and of wrong views, at the dissolution of the body after death, is reborn in a paradise world, either if a good action to be experienced favorably has been done by him or a good action to be experienced favorably was done by him after, or, at the moment of death, a right view has been adopted by him and strongly held by him. This is why, at the dissolution of the body after death, he is reborn in a good destiny, in a paradise world. But being actually a murderer, a thief and of wrong view, he undergoes the retribution of this action either in the present existence or in the existence following [the one in which he had done that], or in a later existence [starting from the third].

631 Ibid., p. 215, l. 4-14: Tatr' Ānanda, yvāyaṃ puggalo idha pānātipātā paṭivirato adinnādānā paṭivirato – pe – sammādiṭṭhī, kāyassa bhedā param maraṇā apāyaṃ duggatiṃ vinipātaṃ nirayaṃ uppajjati, pubbe vā kataṃ hoti pāpakammaṃ dukkhavedanīyaṃ, pacchāvā 'ssa taṃ kataṃ, maraṇakāle vā 'ssa hoti micchādiṭṭhī samattā samādiṇṇā; tena so kāyassa bhedā param maraṇā apāyaṃ duggatiṃ vinipātaṃ nirayaṃ uppajjati. Yañ va kho so idha pāṇātipātā paṭivirato hoti adinnādānā paṭivirato hoti – pe – sammādiṭṭhī hoti, tassa diṭṭhe va dhamme vipakaṃ paṭisaṃvedeti uppajjaṃ vā apare vā pariyāye.

Transl. – It may happen, O Ānanda, that an individual who is actually abstaining from killing living beings, abstaining from robbing and is of right view, nevertheless, on the dissolution of the body after death, is born into misfortune, the bad destiny, the abyss, hell, if a bad deed to be experienced unpleasantly had been carried out by him previously, or if a bad deed to be experienced unpleasantly had been carried out by him afterwards, or if, at the moment of death, a bad view was adopted and fervently held by him. This is why, on the dissolution of the body after death, he is reborn in misfortune, the bad destiny, the abyss, hell. But actually abstaining from killing living beings, abstaining from stealing and

Question. - This way of seeing in regard to action already ripened (*paripakva*) and action not yet ripened (*aparipakva*) is acceptable. But how can the mind at death (*maraṇacitta*), which lasts only a short time, prevail over the power of actions (*saṃskārabala*) that extend over an entire lifetime?<sup>632</sup>

being of right view, he receives the reward either in the present lifetime, or in the next lifetime, or in a later lifetime [from the third onwards].

This is the objection made by Milinda to Nagasena in the Milindhapañha, p. 80: *Tumhe evam bhaṇata: yo vassasataṃ akusalaṃ kareyya maraṇakāle ca ekaṃ Buddhagataṃ satiṃ paṭilabheyya so devesu uppajjeyyāti; etaṃ na saddahāmi*: You say: "The one who has done bad deeds for a hundred years but who, at the moment of death, has even one single thought of the Buddha, is reborn among the gods", that I do not believe.

But every Indian - and not just Buddhists - puts great importance on the last mind, the 'mind at death' (*maraṇacitta*). We read in the Bhagavadgīta, VIII, 6: "Whatever existence is conceived of by the person who, at the end of his life, is separated from his body, this is the existence into which he passes; it is always in this condition that he is reborn."

Buddhists, it is true, deny the existence of a soul, but, nevertheless, they recognize that the mind at conception (*upapatticitta*) is the continuation of the mind at death (*maraṇacitta*). Hence the necessity of properly preparing the dying person for death.

Well-meaning rather than enlightened, the deities of gardens, forests and trees invite the householder Citta to wish to become a cakravartin king, but the dying person refuses because that is a transitory (*anicca*) unstable (*addhuva*) situation destined to pass away (Saṃyutta, IV, p. 302-304).

The Buddha entrusts to the Upasāka the duty of consoling the sick and maintaining the dying (Samyutta, V, 408-410). "Have you not heard", he asks his cousin Mahānāman, "that an upāsaka endowed with wisdom should encourage an upasaka endowed with wisdom who is sick, who is suffering, who is gravely ill?" He is reminded that he has intelligent faith (aveccappasāda) in the Three Jewels and the moral precepts dear to the saints. If he is troubled about the outcome of his affairs, he is invited to lay aside such worries inasmuch as his death is near and he will be unable to do anything more about them. If he remains attached to the five objects of sense enjoyments (colors, sounds, smells, tastes and tangibles), he is asked to renounce these human pleasures, scorned by the gods. If he aspires to the bliss of the paradises, he is told to notice that even Brahma's heaven is impermanent and not final, because it involves the idea of self (sakkāyapariyāpanna). Finally, a pressing invitation is made: "Lift you mind up and apply it to the cessation of the self (cittam vuṭāpetvā sakkāya nirodhe cittam upasamhara)." Indeed, the Buddha has stated that there is no difference as to the deliverance of the mind between such an upāsaka and a bhikṣu whose mind is liberated from the afflictions. If the upāsakas must assist one another, what can be said of residential monks (āvāsika bhikṣu) specially charged with the care of the householders? According to the Anguttara, III, p. 263-264, the resident monk is held to five services: "He leads them to a high morality (adhisīla). He causes them to live in the mirror of the Dharma (dhammadassana). He visits the sick and encourages them to fix their attentiveness (sati), the most important thing of all. He encourages the populace to welcome strangers who are monastics

properly, for their coming is an occasion to gain merit. He eats good or bad food offered to him in order not to spoil a gift given in faith."

The Buddha's concern for the sick and the dying has been shared by his disciples in the course of the centuries:

- a. Already at the time of the Buddha, the housewife Nakulamātā addressed admirable advice to her dying husband, the purports of the texts of which have been preserved for us (cf. Anguttara, III, p. 295-298).
- b. Several centuries later, the emperor Aśoka was concerned about the salvation of those whom he had condemned to death. In his fourth pillar edict (cf. J. Bloch, *Les Inscriptions d'Aśoka*, p. 165), he proclaimed: "For prisoners whose penalty is fixed and who are condemned to death, I reserve three days for their use. Their relatives will intercede to save their lives, or if there is nobody to intercede, they will do charitable deeds or will carry out a fast in view of the next world. For this is what I desire: that even after the expired time limit, they will gain the other world."
- c. In Ceylon at the time of Buddhaghosa (cf. Visuddhimagga, p. 469), a kind of sacrament for the dying was carried out. Friends came to the sick person and said to him: A worship of the Buddha is going to be carried out according to your wishes; be of peaceful mind therefore (tav' atthāya Buddhapūjā kariyati, cittam pasādehi). Five kinds of offerings are prepared: flowers, garlands, flags and banners for the eye, recitations of the text and music for the ear, incense and perfume for the smell, honey and cakes for the taste, cloth for the touch. "Touch these objects", the dying person is told; "these are the offerings that will be given by you." The mind at death thus represents a complete sacrifice to the Buddha and will determine the future mind at conception favorably.

In Buddhist pietism, the last thought will preferably be a final invocation to a Buddha or a bodhisattva of choice. The invocation itself is indispensible. An enviable fate is promised to those who have heard the name of the Tathāgata Bhaiṣajyaguru: "At the time of their death, eight bodhisattvas miraculously present themselves and show them the path" (Bhaiṣajyagurusūtra cited in Śikṣasamuccaya, p. 175: teṣām maraṇakālasaye 'ṣṭau bodhisattvā ṛddhyāgatya mārgam upadarśayanti). Surrounded by magical monks, Amitabha is present at the death of his devotees who, in ecstasy on seeing this Tathāgata and without detaching their minds from him, leave this world to take rebirth in Sukhāvati (Sukhāvativyūha, p. 48: te tena tathāgatadarśanaprasādālambanena samādhināpramuṣitayā smṛtyā cyutās tatraiva buddhakṣetre pratyājaniṣyanti). No matter how great his crimes, the devotee of Avalokiteśvara is comforted in his last moments by twelve Tathāgatas: "Fear not, O son of good family; you have heard the Kāraṇdavyūha, you will wander in saṃsāra no longer; there will be no further birth, old age or death for you" (Kāraṇdavyūha, p. 23, 95).

But the problem that arises is to know whether the mind at death is able to wipe out completely a life of sin. This is what the *Traité* maintains here by emphasizing the primordial role of the last mind, abandoning the body and the organs. Nevertheless a few comments may be made:

1) The state of death (*maraṇāvasthā*) is physically and mentally lifeless (*mandika*), and at death as at birth, the mental consciousness (*manovijñāna*) is associated with the feeling of indifference (see Kośa, III, p. 118, 131). Therefore the last mind is not as sharp (*paṭu*) as is claimed.

Answer. – Although this mind may be very short, its power (bala) is intense (patu). It is like fire (agni) or poison (visa) that, although small, can accomplish great things. The mind at death is so determinate (niyata) and so strong (dhrta) that it prevails over the power of action ( $samsk\bar{a}rabala$ ) extending over a century.

This last mind is called 'the great mind' ( $mah\bar{a}citta$ ) for it has, as its urgent task, the abandoning of the body ( $svadehaparity\bar{a}ga$ ) and the organs (indriya). Thus the man in battle (rana), who does not spare his life, is called a hero ( $s\bar{u}ra$ ), and the arhat, who gives up attachment to life, attains arhathood. [238c]

Those are the various retributions of sinful and meritorious actions as well as their functioning (prayrtti).

The śrāvakas know only that bad action is punished and good action rewarded, but they are unable to analyze the problem with such clarity. 634 The Buddha himself understands fully and completely both action and the retribution of action. The power of his knowledge ( $j\tilde{n}\bar{a}naprabh\bar{a}va$ ) is without obstacle ( $avy\bar{a}hata$ ), is indestructible (akṣaya) and invincible (ajeya): this is why it is described as the second 'power'.

- 2) The person is not the master of his last mind. Practically and logically, is good death is possible only if one has lived well, for, according to the fortunate expression of the Buddha, "the tree falls to the side in which it was leaning" (see above, p. 1082-1083F and notes).
- 3) According to orthodox opinion, every volitional past action entails a retribution. Therefore the last mind in no way prevents the other mind-actions from bearing their fruit: in some circumstances, however, it can be rewarded before the others. In regard to the order in which actions are rewarded, we are reduced to hypotheses. A stanza by the sthavira Rāhula cited by the Kośabhāṣya, p. 477, l. 20-21, and commented on in Kośavyākhyā, p. 719, presents it as follows:

Yad guru yac cāsannaṃ yac cābyastaṃ kṛtaṃ ca yat / pūrvaṃ pūrvaṃ pūrvāṃ vipacyate karmasaṃsāre //

In other words, the following are rewarded in order: the grave (guru) action; in its absence, the recent  $(\bar{a}sanna)$  action that perfumes the dying mind; in its absence, the habitual (abhyasta) action; lacking the preceding ones, an action from an earlier life  $(p\bar{u}rvakrtam)$  the efficacy of which has been delayed by those of more serious actions.

This present note is especially inspired by the works of L de La Vallée Poussin on the last mind: see *Death* in HERE, IV, p. 448-449; *Notes bouddhiques*, Bull. Cl. Lett. Acad. Roy. De Belgique, 1925, p. 18-20; *Morale bouddhique*, 1927, p. 55, 181, 233.

On "One Mind" in Amidism, see P. Demiéville, *Les versions chinoises du Milindapañha*, BEFEO, 1924, p. 166, 231-246.

633 See Kośa, II, p. 133.

The Buddha declared that the retribution of actions is incomprehensible and forbids trying to understand it: *Kammavipāko bhikkhave acinteyyo na cintetabbo yaṃ cintento ummādassa vighātassa bhāgī assa* (Anguttara, II, p. 80).

# III. THE KNOWLEDGE OF THE DHYĀNAS, ETC.

The power of the knowledge of defilement, purification and the types of trances, liberations, concentrations and absorptions (*dhyānavimokṣasamādhisamāpattīnāṃ saṃkleśo vyvadānam vyavasthānam*).

By trance (*dhyāna*) is meant the four *dhyānas*.

The Buddha knows these dharmas auxiliary to the Path: he knows their name ( $n\bar{a}man$ ) and their characteristics (lak sana), their order and their practice; he knows if they are impure ( $s\bar{a}srava$ ) or pure ( $an\bar{a}srava$ ), in the course of being practiced (sik sita) or already practiced (asik sita), purified ( $vyavad\bar{a}ta$ ) or defiled ( $vyavad\bar{a}ta$ ) or without flavor ( $vyavad\bar{a}ta$ ) or superficial, and other distinctions of this kind.

The eight liberations (*vimokṣa*) have been explained in detail in reference to the *dhyānas* (above, p. 1291F). The *dhyānas* include all the meditative stabilizations of the form realm (*rūpadhātu*); the liberations include all the absorptions (*samāpatti*) and the perfection of trance (*dhyānapāramitā*). The *vimokṣas*, *dhyānas*, *samāpattis* and *samādhis* are 'concentrations', and by concentrations is meant the non-distraction of the mind (*cittāvikṣepa*).

[The Buddha knows their defilement] and by defilement (samkleśa) is meant the conflicting emotions (kleśa) such as affection (anunaya), wrong view (drṣṭi), pride ( $m\bar{a}na$ ), etc.

[The Buddha knows their purification] and by purification is meant the true concentrations: those that are not mixed with the conflicting emotions – affection, wrong view, pride, etc. – and that are like real gold.

[The Buddha knows] the types (*vyvasthāna*): among these concentrations, we must distinguish those where only one mind is functioning, those where several minds are functioning, those that are always functioning and those that do not always function, the concentrations into which it is difficult or easy to enter, difficult or easy to come out of, the concentrations that grasp the characteristics of the object separately or those that grasp them inclusively, the concentrations to be avoided and those not to be avoided.

As concentrations to be avoided, we may cite for example the mind of loving-kindness (*maitrīcitta*) if one is full of passion, the meditation on the horrible (*aśubhabhāvana*) if one is full of hate, the meditation on the finite and infinite (*antānantabhāvana*) if one is stupid, the use of the knowledge and discrimination of dharmas if one is excited, the desire to concentrate the mind if one is depressed. But in the reverse cases, the cited concentrations are not to be avoided.

Furthermore, in regard to the concentrations, time  $(k\bar{a}la)$  and place  $(sth\bar{a}na)$  must be distinguished. If the body is exhausted, that is not the time to practice concentration. This is what the Bodhisattva said when he was practicing austerities  $(duskaracary\bar{a})$ : "Now I am incapable of producing a meditative stabilization." Also, places where there are crowds are not desirable places to practice concentration.

<sup>635</sup> The text here seems to be corrupt.

Furthermore, the Buddha knows the loss (*dhvaṃsa*) of the *dhyānas*, the duration (*sthiti*) of the *dhyānas*, the increase (*vardhana*) of the *dhyānas* and the *dhyānas* that end up in nirvāṇa.

Furthermore, the Buddha knows those who enter into and come out of concentration with difficulty, those who enter and come out of concentration easily, those who enter easily and come out with difficulty, and, finally, those who enter with difficulty and come out easily.

The Buddha knows that such and such a man should obtain such and such a *dhyāna*. He knows that such and such a man who has lost the *dhyāna* is enjoying the five objects of enjoyment (*pañcakāmaguṇa*). He knows that such and such a man, having enjoyed the five objects of enjoyment, will obtain the *dhyāna* anew and depending on this *dhyāna*, he will attain arhathood.

By means of his profound knowledge, the Buddha knows fully these *dhyānas*, *vimokṣas*, *samādhis* and *samāpattis*, and as this knowledge is intact (*avyāhata*) and invincible (*ajeya*) [in him, it is called the third 'power'.

# IV. THE KNOWLEDGE OF THE DEGREE OF THE MORAL FACULTIES

The power of the knowledge of the degree of the moral faculties of beings (parapudgalānām indriyaparāparajñānabalam). - The Buddha knows the beings who are of sharp faculties (tīkṣnendriya), of weak faculties (mrdvindriya) or of medium faculties (madyendriya). The strong knowledge (tīkṣṇajñāna) is called superior (para); the weak knowledge (mrdujñāna) is called inferior (apara). [239a]

Using this awareness of the degree of the faculties of beings, the Buddha distinguishes (*vibhanakti*) the beings who are of keen, medium or weak faculties:

Such and such an individual who has such and such faculties can, in the present existence (*ihajanma*), obtain only the first fruit (*phala*), i.e., the fruit of srotaāpanna, but cannot obtain the other fruits; such and such another individual can obtain only the second, the third or the fourth fruit.

Such and such an individual can obtain only the first dhyāna; such and such another can obtain only the second, third or fourth dhyāna, etc., up to the absorption of the cessation of discrimination and feeling (samjñāvedayitanirodhasamāpatti).

Such and such an individual will become conditionally liberated (*samayavimukta*); such and such another individual will become unconditionally liberated (*samayavimukta*)<sup>637</sup>.

-

In Saṃyutta, III, p. 272, the Buddha distinguishes four kinds of meditators (*jhāyin*): the person who is skillful in staying in concentration and unskillful in coming out of concentration (*samādismiṃ thitikusalo na samādhismiṃ vuṭṭhānakusalo*), etc.

<sup>637</sup> See Kośa, VI, p. 251-252.

Such and such an individual can obtain the first rank (*agratā*) among the śrāvakas; such and such another can obtain the first rank among the pratyekabuddhas; such and such another, completely fulfilling the six perfections (*pāramitā*), can obtain supreme perfect enlightenment (*anuttarā samyaksaṃbodhi*).

Knowing all this, the Buddha also knows those who pass to the other shore ( $p\bar{a}raga$ ) if [the Dharma] is preached to them in brief (samksepeṇa), fully (vistareṇa), or in brief and fully at the same time. He knows which beings are to be instructed by means of gentle words (slaksṇavacana), which by means of rough words (paruṣavacana), or which by means of both gentle and rough words.

Such and such an individual who already possesses the other faculties (indriya) should act so as to increase further his faculty of faith (śraddhendriya); such and such another should act so as to produce the faculties of exertion ( $v\bar{v}ya$ ), mindfulness (smrti), concentration (samadhi) and wisdom ( $praj\tilde{n}a$ ).

By using his faculty of faith (śraddhendriya), such and such an individual enters into certitude [of the acquisition] of the supreme good (samyaktvaniyāmam avakrāmati); such and such another individual, by using the faculty of wisdom (prajñendriya), enters into the certitude [of the acquisition] of the supreme good.

These people, of keen faculties (*tīkṣnendriya*), are hindered by the fetters (*saṃyojana*): for example *Yang-k'iun-li-mo-lo* (Aṅgulimāla),<sup>638</sup> etc. Certain others, of keen faculties, are not hindered by the fetters, for example *Chö-li-fou* (Śāriputra), *Mou-lien* Maudgalāyana), etc.

Angulimāla, son of the brāhmin Bhaggava, chaplain of king Pasenadi of Kosala, studied at the university of Takkasilā and soon became the favorite of his teacher. But the latter suspected him of having failed to respect his wife and demanded fees of a very special kind from his disciple: a thousand fingers cut from the right hand of a human. To acquit himself of his debt, the young man lay in ambush in the Jālinī forest at Kosala, killed all those who tried to cross through it, cut off a finger from each corpse and from the cut fingers he made a garland which he wore around his neck. Hence the nickname Angulimala, meaning 'Finger Garland'.

In order to complete the number of a thousand demanded by his teacher, there remained only one more finger to be cut. And so, when his mother came to warn him that he was being hunted by the king, Angulimala prepared to kill her. But the Buddha, foreseeing his destiny, came in person towards him, prevented him from committing this last crime and, having won him over, admitted him into the Order according to the swiftest procedure. Subsequently Angulimala showed himself to be an exemplary monk.

Quite a body of literature has grown up around Angulimala, but the main source remains the *Angulimalasutta* in Majjhima, p. 97-105, translated many times into Chinese: Tsa a han, T 99, no. 1077, k. 38, p. 280c18-281c2; Pie yi tse a han, T 100, no. 16, k.1, p. 378b17-379a22; Tseng yi a han, T 125, k. 31, p. 719b20-722c22; three separate versions (T 118-120) of which the oldest, entitled Yang kiue mo king, is by Dharmarakṣa.

The Buddha knows the individuals of weak faculties (*mṛdvindriya*) but who are not hindered [by the fetters], for example *Tcheou-li-pan-t'o-k'ie* (Cūḍapanthaka).<sup>639</sup> But there are people of weak faculties who are hindered by the fetters.

Angulimala occupies an important place in the Pāli commentaries: Comm. on Majjhima, III, p. 328-344; on Dhammapada, III, p. 169-170 (tr. Burlingame, III, p. 6-14); of the Theragāthā, (tr. Rhys Davids, *Brethren*, p. 318-325); of the Jātakas, V, p. 456 seq.

In the neighborhood of Śrāvastī, a stūpa marked the place where Aṅgulimala was converted. This monument was mentioned by the Chinese pilgrims Fa hien (T 2085, p. 860b11) and Hiuan-tsang (T2087, k. 6, p. 899a19).

He recognizes his own stupidity in the Anavataptagāthā (ed. Bechert, p. 163-166; transl. Hofinger, p. 249-250); Fo wou poi tseu, T 199, p. 197c16-198a3; Mūlasarv. Vinaya, T 1448, k. 17, p. 85b21-c12). His last life and his earlier existences are told in full in the Cūḍapanthakāvadāna in the Mūlasarv. Vinaya (Dīvyavadāna, p. 483-515; T 1442, k. 31-32, p. 794c26-803c21), a northern source in which H. Bechert (l.c.) has revealed a borrowing from the golden legend of the Jains.

Mahāpanthaka and Cūḍapanthāka were born from the union of a wealthy young girl in Rājagṛha and a slave. They were born at the side of a great highway which is why they were named Great Path and Lesser Path respectively. Raised by their grandparents, they embraced the Buddhist faith. Mahāpanthaka was the first to become a monastic and, shortly thereafter, welcomed his brother into the Order. Entrusted with his religious instruction, he gave him a very simple stanza to learn by heart: Pāpaṃ na kuryān manasā na vācā, etc., but Cūḍapanthaka was so dim-witted (duṣprajñā) that at the end of three months, he had not yet succeeded in memorizing it. Then he passed into the service of the ṣaḍvargīya monks, which did not make him any smarter. At the instigation of the latter, he requested a subject of study (svādhyāyanikā) from this elder brother, but Mahāpanthaka, judging that he would be cured only by scorn, grabbed him by the neck and threw him out of the monastery, Weeping, Cūḍapanthaka went to the Buddha and confided the reason for his tears: "I am neither a monk nor a lay-man; I am a great idiot (paramacūḍa), a great fool (paramadhandha)." The Buddha replied: "There is no fool but the one who thinks he is smart" (cf. Udānavarga, XXV, v. 22), gave him two lines to meditate on "I remove the dust, I remove the dirt" (rajo harāmi malaṃ haraṃi) and sent him to clean the monks' shoes (upanāhān poñcchitum), an important detail which the Traité will mention below (k. 28, p. 268a6-7).

While he was busy with this simple task,  $C\bar{u}$ dapanthaka discovered the mystery: To remove the dust is to suppress desire  $(r\bar{a}ga)$ , hatred  $(dve\bar{s}a)$  and ignorance (moha). At once, all his passions were cut through and he attained arhathood.

To test his new qualities, the Buddha appointed him instructor (*avavādaka*) of the nuns. Those who thought him to be a fool were expecting the worst, but the new arhat accomplished such feats of magic and preached the Dharma with such eloquence that they were forced to change their minds. Swept along by his zeal, he kept his listeners until late in the night, a violation which the Buddha condemned by proclaiming the 22<sup>nd</sup> *pācittiya* (see Pāli Vinaya, IV, p. 54-55; Dharmaguptaka Vin. T 1428, k. 12, p. 647b9-648a17; Sarv. Vin., T 1435, k. 11, p. 80b2-81a11).

The Buddha knows the people whose [passions] have been destroyed by seeing the truths (satyadarśanahīna) and whose faculties are weak, the people whose [passions] have been destroyed by meditation (bhāvanāhīna) whose faculties are keen, the people whose passions have been destroyed by meditation and whose faculties are keen, the people whose passions have been destroyed by meditation and whose faculties are weak, and finally, the people whose passions have been destroyed by seeing the truths and whose faculties are keen.

In such people, all the faculties (indriya) are equally weak (mrdu) or equally keen ( $t\bar{t}ks\bar{n}a$ ); in others all the faculties are neither equally weak nor equally keen.

A given person is of great strength as a result of previous causes ( $p\bar{u}rvahetu$ ); another person is of great strength as a result of present conditions.

A given person, while searching for bondage (*bandhana*), finds liberation (*mukti*); another person while searching for liberation, finds bondage. Thus, Angulimala, who wanted to kill his mother and torment the Buddha, found liberation, whereas a bhikṣu who had obtained the four *dhyānas* and developed pride (*abhimāna*) because of that, fell into hell.<sup>640</sup>

Finally, the Buddha knows that such and such an individual will fall into the bad destinies (*durgati*), that a second individual will come out only with difficulty, that a fourth will come out easily, that a fifth will come out quickly and that a sixth will come out after a long time.

The Avadāna also mentions an episode concerning the future arhat. The day that Cūḍapanthaka became a monk, the famous physician Jīvaka invited the Buddha and the Saṃgha except for Cūḍapanthaka whom he deemed to be too stupid. The Buddha accepted the invitation, but noticing that the Saṃgha was not complete, he refused to partake of the meal. Jīvaka sent someone to look for Cūḍapanthaka in the monastery, but the latter created thirteen hundred fictive monks exactly like himself magically and by this trick made himself invisible. A formal order by the Buddha was necessary for him to consent finally to come to Jīvaka's house.

Since Cūḍapanthaka had created fictive monks to confuse Jīvaka and since he had also triumphed over the distrust of the monks, the Buddha proclaimed him the foremost among those who create spiritual shapes and change minds (see also Anguttara, I, p. 24; Tseng yi a han, T 125, k. 3, p. 558a15-17; T 126, p. 831b29).

Besides the *Cūḍapanthakāvadāna*, which has just been summarized here, we should also mention the Mahākarmavibhaṅga (p. 43) which briefly tells the story of the arhat, and especially the Vibhāṣā (T 1545, k. 180, p. 902) which analyzes the story precisely and in detail.

The Pāli sources are in agreement with the northern sources, at least in regard to the last lifetime of Cūḍapanthaka. Among the main texts, we may mention the Theragāthā, v. 557-566; the Apadāna, I, p. 58; the commentaries of the Jātakas, I, p. 114-20, of the Anguttara, I, p. 209-220, and aboive all of the Dhammapda, I, p. 239-255 (transl. Burlingame, I, p. 299-310).

640 See above (p. 1052-1053F) the story of the bhikṣu who confused *dhyāna* and fruits of the Path and fell into the Avīci hell.

The Buddha knows fully and completely (*prajānāti*) all these various degrees of the faculties of beings and since this knowledge is intact (*avyāhata*) [in him] and invincible (*ajeya*), it is called the fourth 'power'.

#### V. THE KNOWLEDGE OF THE ASPIRATIONS OF BEINGS

The power of knowledge of the various aspirations of beings (nānādhimuktijñānabala). -

By aspiration (adhimukti) is meant trusting joy (prasāda), inclinations (ruci).

[Beings] love the five objects of enjoyment (pañcakāmaguṇa), as did Souen-t'o-lo-nen-t'o (Saundarananda).<sup>641</sup>

They love fame (yaśas), as did T'i-p'o-ta (Devadatta).<sup>642</sup>

They love worldly goods (lokadhana), as did Siu-mi (var. na)-tch'a to-lo (Sunakṣetra). 643

They love the life of a monk (pravrajyā), as did Ye-chö (Yaśas). 644

[239b] They love faith (śraddhā), as did Po-kia-li (Vakkhali). 645

Nanda surnamed Nanda the Handsome, ordained as the result of a trick and who mourned for his young wife. See p. 118F, 226F, 286F.

<sup>642</sup> See p. 868-878F.

Sunakṣetra, a Licchavi of Vaiśālī, who entered into the Order and for a time was the Buddha's assistant (*upasthāyaka*), but who later became attached to the bad teachers, Khorakkhattiya, Kandaramasaka and Pāṭiputta. According to the *Traité* (k. 100, p.755a12-14), he had been a disciple of the Buddha out of greed.

Later the *Traité* (k. 49, p. 411b20-22) summarizes his story in a few words: "Yaśas, son of a *śreṣṭhin* [of Benares], having seen in the middle of the night that all the courtesans resembled corpses, left his precious sandals (*maṇipādukā*) worth a hundred thousand *kārṣāpanas* on the bank of a river and, crossing it by means of a ford, went to find the Buddha." The following is known: Yaśas, also known as Yaśoda, taught by the Buddha, attained arhathood and entered into the Order while his aged parents entered into the lay community. Cf. Catuṣpariṣad, p. 172-202; Mūlasarv. Vinaya, T 1450, k. 6, p. 128c-129b; Pāli Vinaya, I, p. 15-18; Mahīśasaka Vin., T 1421, k. 15, p. 105; Dharmaguptaka Vin., T 1428, k. 32, p. 789b-790a; Mahāvastu, III, p. 402-413; Nidānakathā, p. 82; Comm. on Dhammapada, I, p. 87; Yin kouo king, T 189, k. 4, p. 645; Fo pen hing tsi king, T 190, k.35, p. 815-824; Tchong hiu mo ho ti king, T 191, k. 8, p. 954c-955a; Fo so hing tsai, T 192, k. 4, p. 30c (cf. E. H. Johnston, *Buddha's Mission and Last Journey*, Acta Orientalia, XV, 1937, p. 12; Tchong pen k'I king,T 196, k. 1, p. 149a-b; Tchou yao king, T 212, k. 29, p. 769a-b).

According to the Mūlasarv. Vinaya (T 1448, k. 4, p. 15b11-c3; Divyāvadāna, p. 49), Vakkhali, whose name means 'Clothed in bark', was a ṛṣi dwelling on Mount Musalaka, not far from Śūrpāraka in Aparānta. Having seen the Buddha from the top of this mountain, he felt great admiration for him and

They love the rules ( $\dot{s}ik_{\bar{s}}\bar{a}$ ), as did *Lo-heou-lo* (Rāhula), etc.

They love generosity ( $d\bar{a}na$ ) as did Che-po-lo (Śaivala), <sup>646</sup> [a note in red says that he was the son of Kan-lou (Amṛtā, aunt of the Buddha]. <sup>647</sup>

felt strongly drawn to him and, so as to join him more quickly, he threw himself into the void. The Buddha caught him by his magical power, taught him the Dharma and ordained him by the quick method. He declared Vakkhali to be the foremost of those who feel faith toward him (*agro me śraddhādhimuktānām*).

The same episode is told in the Pāli sources (Apadāna, II, p. 467, v. 26-33; Comm on Anguttara, I, p. 248-251; Comm. on Dahammapada, IV, p. 119), but these make Vakkhali to be a brāhmin native of Śrāvastī who, long after his ordination, threw himself from the top of Gṛdhrakūṭaparvata in despair of being deprived of seeing the Buddha. The latter, wearied by the constant attendance of his disciple, had momentarily gone away from him saying: "It is enough for you, O Vakkhali, to contemplate my rotting body: he who sees the Dharma sees me, and he who sees me sees the Dharma."

Vakkhali having fallen gravely ill, the Buddha consented to visit him. Vakkhali confided to the Master that he had no twinges of conscience and that his only regret was the lack of enough strength to go himself to the Buddha. Beyond that, he was deeply convinced of the impermanent nature, painful and ever-changing, of the five aggregates of existence.

After the Buddha's visit, Vakkhali had himself carried in a litter to the Black Rock on Mount Rṣigiri. The next day at dawn, he "took the knife" (*satthaṃ āharesi*) and killed himself. The Buddha revealed to the monks that Vakkhali had entered nirvāṇa.

Vakkhali's suicide is told in the canonical sources: Samyutta, III, p. 119-124; Tsa a han, T 99, no. 1265, k. 346b7-347b13; Tseng yi a han, T 125, k. 19, p. 642b29-643a22.

646 Śaivala, Sivali in Pāli, was proclaimed by the Buddha (Anguttara, I, p. 24) to be the foremost of those who receive (*aggaṃ lābhīnam*) and his generosity equaled his wealth. In the Anavataptagāthā (ed. Bechert, p. 142), he explains the 'fabric' of his actions:

```
Abhāvaṃ jyeṣṭhaputro 'ham Kṛkirājño yaśvinaḥ /
prathamaṃ ca mayā chattraṃ jinastāpaṃ pratiṣṭham //
tat karma kuśalaṃ kṛtvā yatra yatropapannavān /
devabhūto manuśyad ca kurtapuṇyo virocitaḥ //
bhavāmy āḍhyo mahābhāgas tāsu tāsūpattiṣu /
mahādānapatiś cāhaṃ bhavāmi dhanadhānyavān //
```

Transl. – I was the eldest son of the glorious king Kṛkin (of Benares), and the first parasol was planted by me on the stūpa of the Victorious ( $K\bar{a}$ śyapa).

Having done this good deed, everywhere that I was born, as god or as man, I gained merit and I was famous.

I was rich, opulent in all these existences. I was a great master of generosity, loaded with wealth and rice.

647 See above, p. 227F, where it is said that Amṛtā, daughter of Saṃhahanu and sister of Suddhoddhana, had a son named *Che p'o lo* (Śaivala, and not Dānapāla as I [Lamotte] have erroneously

They love the strict observances (*dhūta*) and solitude (*viveka*), as did *Mo-ho-kia-chö* (Mahākāśyapa).

They love solitary meditation (pratisamlayana), as did Li-po-to (Revata). 648

They love wisdom (*prajñā*), as did *Chö-li-fou* (Śāriputra).

They love learning (bahuśrautya), as did A-nan (Ānanda).

They love to understand the discipline (vinaya), as did Yeou-p'o-li (Upāli), etc.

All these disciples of the Buddha each had their preferences, and the worldly people (prthagjana), they too, each have their own tastes: some are pleased with desire ( $r\bar{a}ga$ ), others with hatred ( $dve\bar{s}a$ ).

Furthermore, the Buddha knows those who abound in lust  $(r\bar{a}gabahula)$ , those who abound in hatred (dveşabahula) and those who abound in ignorance (mohabahula).

Question. –What are the characteristics (*lakṣaṇa*) of those who abound respectively in lust, hatred or ignorance?

Answer. – Here it is necessary to cite fully the characteristics of the threefold poison (*triviṣa*) described in the *Tch'an king* (Dhyānasūtra). Knowing these characteristics, the Buddha corrects especially lustful people by means of a sermon (*paryāya*) on the horrors of the body (*aśubha*); he corrects those who are especially hateful by means of a sermon on the mind of loving-kindness (*maitrīcitta*); and he corrects those who are especially stupid by means of a sermon on dependent origination (*pratītyasamutpāda*).

In this way, he preaches the Dharma according to the aspirations (*adhimukti*) of beings. If these aspirations are good (*kuśala*), he preaches in accordance with the minds of the beings, like a boat going along with the current (*naur anusrotogāminī*); if these aspirations are bad (*akuśala*), he addresses them with rough words

restored it). For the geneology of the Buddha, see the notes above, p. 226-227F, and A. Bareau, *La légende de la jeunesse du Budha dans les Vinayapiṭaka anciens*, Oriens Extremus, IX, 1962, p. 8-11.

According to the Pāli sources (Udāna, p. 15-18; Comm. on Anguttara, I, p. 243-248, of Dahammapada, IV, p. 192-194, tr. Rhys Davids, *Brethren*, p.60-62, and Jātaka, I, p. 407-409), Sīvali was the son of Suppavāsā, princess of the Koliyas, who carried him in her womb for seven years. At his birth, the baby was able to speak. Sāriputta spoke with him and, with the approval of his mother, proceeded to ordain him. During the ceremony of his tonsure at each snip of the scissors, the child attained a new fruit of the religious life, becoming successively srotaāpanna, sakṛdāgāmin, anāgāmin and finally arhat.

648 Revata surnamed Khadiravaniya "Of the acacia forest". He was the youngest brother of Śāriputra, and the Buddha proclaimed him to be the foremost of those who live in the forests (*aggam āraññikānam*): cf. Anguttara, I, p. 24. His taste for retreat was well known. A lay disciple named Atula, accompanied by five hundred upāsakas, visited him one day in hopes of receiving his teachings. Revata who was enjoying meditation like a solitary lion (*paṭisallānārāmo sīho* viya *ekacāro*) did not gratify their wishes with even a single word (Comm. on Dhammapada, III, p. 326).

(paruṣavacana) according to the method of driving out a peg by means of a counter-peg (āṇīpratyāṇīnirhārayogena). 649

...

An expression recorded in the Mahāvyutpatti (ed. Sakaki, no. 6865; ed. Wogihara, chap. 245, no. 460). The meaning presents no problem. It results from a passage in Majjhima, I, p. 119: *Seyyathā pi bhikkhave dakkho palaganḍo vā palaganḍantevāsi vā sukhumāyaāṇiyā oļārikaṃ āṇIṃ abhinīhaneyya abhinīhareyya abhinīhareyya abhinīhareyya...* "Jut as, O monks, a skillful carpenter or his apprentice, by means of a small peg, is able to take out, drive out, tear out, a big peg..."

But the corresponding passage in Madhyamāgama (T 26, k. 25, p. 588a14-15) is completely different: "Just as a master carpenter or his apprentice, taking a line (*kālasūtra*), places it on a piece of wood, then with a sharp axe, hacks along it and smoothes it out to make it straight."

Chinese scholars have always rendered the expression  $\bar{a}n\bar{p}raty\bar{a}n\bar{n}irh\bar{a}rayogena$  by means of the characters *jou yi sie tch'ou sie fang pien* "a way of taking out a wedge by means of a wedge". This is the phrase used by Bodhisuci (T 675, k. 3, p. 679a8), by Paramārtha (T 1593, k. 3, p. 127a29; T 1595, k. 11, p. 235b6), by Dharmagupta (T 1596, k. 8, p. 305c6) and by Hiuan-tsang (T 676, k. 3, p. 702b11; T 1594, k. 3, p. 146c18; T 1597, k. 8, p. 361c27-28; T 1598, k. 8, p. 427b10-11).

On the other hand, the Tibetan translations present difficulties: here are some differences: Mahāvyut., ed. Sakaki, no. 6865: *khye ḥus khye ḥu ḥbyun baḥI tshul du*.

Transl of the Samdhinirmocana ed. in *Explication des Mysteres*, 1935, p. 115, l. 28-30: *khye ḥus khye ḥu dbyun tshul du*.

Transl of the Mahāyanasaṃgraha ed. in *Somme du Grand Véhicule*. I, 1938, p. 70, l. 26-27: *khe hus khye hu dbyun bahI tshul du*, with the variant *khyi hus khyi hu sbyun hahi tshul du*.

But *khye hu* means a boy and *khyi hu* a little dog, which would give the expression an unsatisfying meaning: "As one drives out a boy by means of a boy" or "As one drives out little dog by means of a little dog". See Tibetan-English Dictionary, S. C. Das, p. 160, v. *khihuhi-khyihu*.

My [Lamotte] respected colleague, Walter Simon, has examined the question and proposes to correct *khye ḥu* by *ke ḥu*, "wedge", a word mentioned in the *Manual of Colloquial Tibetan* by Sir Charles Bell, 1905, p. 438. The phrase would then mean: "As one drives out a peg by means of a peg", in perfect agreement with the original Sanskrit and the Chinese translation.

Consulted in turn by W. Simon, Prof. J. Brough comes to the following conclusion: [In English] As an alternative for consideration, I would like to suggest that *khye ḥu* might be the correct reading, but that the word is used as a technical term in 'carpenter's language' for 'peg' or 'pin'. The semantic situation would then be similar to that of English 'male screw'.

Information gathered in the Tibetan culture would confirm Prof. Simon's conjecture. In a letter dated July 3, 1967, P. Denwood writes from Kathmandu: [In English] "I have been asking my Tibetan friends about your *ke hu*. Both Tashi and Pasang Khambache know the word. Tashi knows it as a piece of 'carpenter's language', Pasang as a word in Sherpa language, and both agree that it means a wedge of hard wood or metal used for splitting wood. First an axe cut is made, then the wedge driven in with a hammer. A wedge for holding open a door or other static use is known to all Tibetans I have asked as 'tsab' This word is given as *rtsabs* on pg. 957 of Lama Dawa Ssamdup Kazi's English-Tibetan

These aspirations are fully and completely known (*prajānāti*) by the Buddha and as this knowledge is intact (*avyāhata*) and invincible (*ajeya*) [in him], it is called the fifth 'power'.

# VI. THE KNOWLEDGE OF ACQUIRED DISPOSITIONS

The power of the knowledge of acquired dispositions (*dhātujñānabala*). The Buddha knows the world with its many varied acquired dispositions (*nānādhātukaṃ lokam anekadhātukaṃ prajānāti*).

By acquired disposition (*dhātu*) is meant an accumulated habitual pattern (*ācitavāsanā*). The characteristics (*lakṣaṇa*) arise from the *dhātu*. The aspiration (*adhimukti*) functions in accordance with the *dhātu*. Sometimes the *dhātu* results from the *adhimukti*. Habitual patterns (*vāsanā*) and aspirations (*adhimukti*) realize the *dhātu*. *Dhātu* is the lofty resolution (*adhyāśaya*), *adhimukti* arises as a result of the conditions (*pratītyasamutpanna*). These are the differences between *adhimukti* and *dhātu*. 650

The Buddha knows "the world with its many various acquired dispositions"; indeed, each being has many dispositions, infinite (*apramāṇa*) and incalculable (*asaṃkhyeya*) dispositions. This is what is called the many dispositions of the world.

There are two kinds of world (loka): the world as universe ( $lokadh\bar{a}tu$ ) and the world of beings ( $sattvadh\bar{a}tu$ ). Here it is a question of the world of beings only.

The Buddha knows that beings have such and such acquired dispositions (*dhātu*), such and such aspirations (*adhimukti*) and that they come from such and such a place (*sthāna*). He knows the beings endowed with good roots (*kuśalamūla*) or bad roots (*akuśalamūla*), those who are able to be converted (*vaineya*) or incapable of being converted (*avaineya*), determinate (*niyata*) or indeterminate (*aniyata*), destined or not

Dictionary which also has *ka-ru* and *skyeg-bu* for 'wedge'. Tashi pronounces 'kiu' (unaspirated) and Pasang "khiu" (aspirated). Other Tibetans have not heard the word. The shape seems to be normal wedge-shape."

This digression may perhaps be of some use to many readers of *Buddhist-Hybrid Dictionary* by Edgerton where the innocent phrase *āṇīpratyāṇīnirhārayogena* which appears on p. 91 is interpreted as 'by homosexual procedure'.

650 Kośavyākhyā, p. 385: Pūrvajanmasu guṇadoṣavidyāśilpakarmābhyāsebhyo yā vāsana tās khale iha dhātavo viśeṣeṇa boddhavyāḥ: "Here in particular, by dhātu we should understand the traces resulting from the qualities, faults, sciences and arts, actions and habitual patterns in the course of previous rebirths."

Dhātu should be interpreted in the same way in the canonical passage (Samyutta, II, p. 154, 157): Dhātuso sattā saṃsandanti samenti: "It is because of their acquired dispositions that beings come together, marry." The hīnādhimuktikas join with the hīnādhimuktikas, the kalyānādhimuktikas with the kalyānādhimuktikas.

There is a slight difference between adhimukti, dhātu and āśaya, as the Traité says here.

destined; he knows in what practices they are engaged, in what places they are born, in what lands they are to be found.

Furthermore, the Buddha knows the various dispositions particular to beings. According to the place where they are led, they have such and such inclinations, such and such evaluations, such and such high resolutions, such and such actions, such and such conduct, such and such emotions, such and such knowledge of life, determination, attitude, ways of seeing, ways of thinking; they do or do not acquire such and such fetters (samyojana).

Among them, attachment rules aspiration, aspiration rules defiled mind (variant: profound), defiled mind rules direction, direction rules evaluation, [239c] evaluation rules inquiry (*vitarka*), inquiry rules judgment ( $vic\bar{a}ra$ ), inquiry and judgment rule speech ( $bh\bar{a}s\bar{a}$ ), 651 speech rules mindfulness, mindfulness rules activity, activity rules action and action rules retribution.

Furthermore, using this power of knowledge of the various acquired dispositions, the Buddha knows the beings capable or incapable of being converted, the beings to be converted in the present existence or in a future existence, the beings to be converted at this very moment or at another time, the beings to be converted publicly or without being seen, the beings to be converted by the Buddha, by a śrāvaka or by both together, the beings to be necessarily converted or not, the beings to be converted by a short discourse, by a developed discourse or by a discourse first shortened and then developed, the beings to be converted by praise or by blows, the beings to be converted by seeing them frequently or by leaving them alone, the beings to be converted by a subtle teaching or by an obvious teaching, the beings to be converted by suffering, by gentleness, or by both suffering and gentleness.

The Buddha knows those who have wrong views (*mithyādṛṣṭi*) and those who have right views (*samyagdṛṣṭi*), those who are attached to the past (*atīta*) or the future (*anāgata*), attached to nihilism (*uccheda*) or eternalism (*śāśvata*), attached to the view of existence (*bhavadṛṣṭi*) or the view of non-existence (*vibhyavadṛṣṭi*), wanting to be reborn or disgusted with rebirth, seeking happiness in wealth and fame or attached to dull wrong views.

The Buddha knows those who profess the non-existence of causes and conditions; those who profess wrong causes and conditions or right causes and conditions; those who profess non-action, bad action or right action; those who advocate non-seeking, wrong seeking or right seeking; those who esteem the self, the five objects of enjoyment, gain, drink and food, joking; those who like crowds, company (samsarga) or solitude (parivarjana), those who indulge especially in pleasures (rāgacaritra) or those who indulge especially in wrong views (dṛṣṭicarita); those who love faith or those who love wisdom; those who should be kept or those who should be left behind; those who esteem discipline (śīla), concentration (samādhi) or wisdom (prajñā); those who understand easily or those who understand with difficulty by means of explanations; those whom it is enough to guide and those to whom it must be explained word by word; those who are of keen faculties (tīkṣnendriya), of weak faculties (mṛdvindriya) or of medium faculties

1269

According to the principle *Vitarkya vicārya vācaṃ bhāṣate nāvitarkya nāvicārya*. Cf. Majjhima, I p. 301; Saṃyutta, IV, p. 293.

(madhyendriya); those who are easy to pull out or tear out and those who are difficult to pull out or tear out; those who are afraid of wrong-doing and those who have heavy faults; those who fear samsara and those who do not fear samsāra; those who abound in desire  $(r\bar{a}ga)$ , in hatred  $(dve\bar{s}a)$  or in ignorance (moha); those who abound in both desire and hatred, or in desire, hatred and ignorance; those whose emotions are slight and those whose emotions are heavy; those who have few afflictions (mala) and those who have many; those who have a clouded wisdom, a shallow wisdom or vast wisdom.

The Buddha knows the people who understand well the five aggregates (skandha), the twelve bases of consciousness (āvatana), the eighteen elements (dhātu), the twelve-membered dependent origination (dvādaśāngapratītyasmautpāda), the things that are possible (sthāna) and the things that are impossible (asthāna), suffering (duhkha), its origin (samudaya), its cessation (nirodha) and the path to its cessation (mārga); who understand well how to enter [240a] into meditative stabilization (samādhipraveśa), come out of it (vyuţthāna) or remain in it (sthiti).

Furthermore, the Buddha knows the beings belonging to the desire realm (kāmadhātu), the form realm (rūpadhātu) or the formless realm (ārūpyadhātu); the beings [in the realms of the] damned (naraka), animals (tiryagyoni), hungry ghosts, humans (manusya) or gods (deva): born from eggs (andaja), from the womb (jarāyuja), from moisture (samsvedaja) or of apparitional birth (upapāduka); with form (rūpin) or formless (arūpin); aware (samjñika) or unaware (samjñika); of short life (alpāyuṣa) or of long life (dīrghāyusa); simple ordinary people (prthagjana) who have not yet destroyed desire (avītarāga) or ordinary people who have destroyed the desire of the lower levels (avarabhūmi) but have not yet destroyed the desire of the dhyānas. The Buddha knows all these beings up to and including the beings who are neither discriminating nor non-discriminating (naivasamjñānāsamjñā), the holy candidates [for the fruits] of the path (mārgaphalapratipannaka) or in possession of the fruits of the path (phalaprajāā), the pratyekabuddhas or the buddhas at unhindered liberation and various other categories of this type: the five destinies (gati), the four modes of birth (yoni), the three categories ( $r\bar{a}\dot{s}i$ ),  $^{652}$ the designations ( $praj\tilde{n}apti$ ), the obstacles (āvatana), the aggregates (skandha), the bases of consciousness (āvatana), the elements (dhātu), the roots of good (kuśalamūla), the roots of bad (akuśalamūla), the fetters (samyojana), the levels (bhūmi), actions (karman), the fruits (phala), the beings capable of being converted (vaineya) or incapable of being converted, the knowledge of the destruction of suffering (nirodhajñāna), etc.

These are all the distinctions that "the Buddha knows the world with its many and varied acquired dispositions" and its deliverance is without obstacle. The Buddha knows completely and fully these many diverse dispositions and, since this knowledge is intact (avvāhata) and invincible (ajeva) [in him], it is called the' sixth power'.

217; Dhammasanganī, p. 186; Kośa, III, p. 137.

The category predestined for salvation (samyakvaniyatarāśi), the category predestined to bad rebirths (mithyāniyatarāśi), the category foreign to the two previous ones (aniyatarāśi): see Dīgha, III, p.

# VII. THE KNOWLEDGE OF THE WAY LEADING TO THE VARIOUS DESTINIES

The power of the knowledge of the way leading to the various destinies (sarvatragāminīpratipajñānabala).653

- 1) Some say that action (*karman*) is this way (*pratipad*). Why? It is because of action that one circulates through the destinies (*pañcagati*). If action exists, there is the possibility of destroying it and putting an end to it. This ending consists of the three elements of the noble Path (*āryamārga*)<sup>654</sup> and pure intention (*anāṣravacetanā*). This is why actions are the way leading to the various destinies.
- 2) Others say that it is the concentration of five members and five knowledges. [A note in red says that this is pure concentration (*anāsravasamādhi*) and the five factors of trance (*dhyānānga*).] In all cases, it realizes profitable things (*upakāra*).
- 3) Others say that the fourth *dhyāna* is the way in question. Why? The fourth *dhyāna* is the culmination of all the concentrations; as is said in the sūtras, the good minds (*kuśalacitta*), concentrated (*samāhita*), free of distraction (*avikṣipta*), collected (*samgrhita*), all enter into the fourth *dhyāna*.655
- 4) Others say that mindfulness of the body (*kāyasmṛtyupasthāna*) is the way leading to the various destinies (*sarvatragāminī pratipad*), for it is the origin (*mūļa*) of the benefits (*upakāra*) resulting from the Path.

attained and remained in the first... second...third... fourth dhyāna."

The fourth dhyāna is the best way to nirvāṇa. According to the canonical scriptures (Dīgha, III, p. 106, 228; Anguttara, II, p. 149-152;V, p. 63) there are four ways: *i*) the difficult way for slow intellects (*pratipad duḥkhā dhandhābhijñā*), *ii*) the difficult way for quick intellects (*pratipad duḥkha kṣiprābhijñā*), *iii*) the easy way for slow intellects (*pratipad sukhā dhandhābhijñā*), *iv*) the easy way for quick intellects (*pratipad sukhā kṣiprābhijñā*). And the Kośabhāṣyā, p. 382, explains: *Caturdhyāneṣu mārgaḥ pratipad aṅgaparigrahaśamathavipaśyanāsamatābhyām ayatnavāhitvāt*: "The path followed in the *dhyānas* is the easy path for it proceeds effortlessly, being furnished with the factors [of the *dhyānas*] and having a complete balance of quietude and insight,."

<sup>653</sup> *Pratipad*, 'way', should be understood as the cause determining the five destinies (*naraka*, *tiryagoni*, *preta*, *manuṣya*, *deva-gati*) and nirvāṇa: cf. Vibhaṅga, p. 339. l. 8-10. We may note, with Kośa, VII, p. 70, that *pratipad* is the cause of the destinies but not of *nirodha*.
654 *Śīla*, *samādhi* and *prajñā*.

Entry into the dhyānas is the natural culmination of a state of mental concentration. Śākyamuni had this experience on the night of his awakening: Vin., III, p. 4; Majjhima, I, p. 21, 117, 186, 242-243; III, p. 85-87; Samyutta, IV, p. 125; V, p. 68, 76, 331, 332; Anguttara, I, p. 148, 282; II, p. 14; Itivuttaka, p. 119-120: Āraddham kho pana me viriyam ahosi asallīnam, upaṭṭhitā sati asammuṭṭhā, passaddho kāyo asāraddho, samāhitam cittam ekaggam. So kho aham... pathamam... dutiyam... tatiyam... catuttham jhānam upasampajja vihāsim: "There opened within me an energy without laziness; present, an unfailing mindfulness; my body was relaxed and impassive; my mind, concentrated and one-pointed. This is how I

- 5) Others say that it is a question of all the noble paths (āryamārga) for, by using these noble paths, one obtains the benefits at will (yathestam).
- 6) Finally, there are teachers who have explained all the good paths, all the bad paths, all the noble paths, and for each of them, [the Buddha] knows the culmination as is said in the *Mao-chou king* (Romaharṣaṇīyasūtra).<sup>656</sup>

The Buddha knows all of this fully and completely (*prajānati*) and, since this wisdom is intact (*avyāhati*) and invincible (*ajeya*) [in him], it is called the 'seventh power'.

# VIII. THE KNOWLEDGE OF FORMER ABODESS

The power of the knowledge of former abodes (pūrvanivāsajñānabala).

Former abodes  $^{657}$  are of three types: *i*) those of which one has the awareness *(abhijñā)*, *ii*) those of which one has the knowledge *(vidyā)*, *iii*) those that are the object of the power of knowledge *(jñānabala)*.

The ordinary person has only the awareness of them. The śrāvaka has both the awareness and the knowledge of them. The Buddha has the awareness, the knowledge and the power [of the knowledge] of them. Why is that? The ordinary person knows only through which former abodes he has passed but does not know what sequence of karmic causes and conditions (*karmahetupratyayabandha*) provoked them.

The Hair-raising Sūtra, understood here not as a sign of fear but as a sign of joy. This is the *Mahāsīhanāda* of the Majjhima, I, p. 68-83. At the end of this text, Nāgasamāla asks the Bhagavat how to name this sūtra, and the Buddha gives him the title, in Sanskrit, *Romaharṣaṇīyasūtra*, cf. Karmavibhangopadeśa, p. 158, 1. 11), in Pāli, *LomahaÔanapariyāya* (cf. Majjhima, I, p. 83, 1. 25; Milindapañha, p. 396, 1. 2) or *Lomahaṃsanasutta* (Sumangala, I, p. 179, 1. 3).

This is one of the rare cases where a Hīnayāna sūtra itself gives its own title. On the other hand, the Mahāyānasūtras generally end by allocating two or three titles to themselves. Cf. Vimalakīrti, p. 392, n. 42.

The *Mahāsīhanāda*, alsias *Lomahaṃsana*, has been the object of several Chinese translations, the oldest of which were incomplete: Tsa a han, T 99, no. 684, k. 26, p. 186b26-187b6; Tseng yi a han, T 125, k. 23, p. 670c2- 672b3; k. 42, p. 776b14-777a14; k. 48, p. 811a29-812b13; Chen mao hi chou king, T 757, p. 591c-600b; Sin kiai tcho li king, T 802, p. 747a-748c.

This sūtra alludes to a number of śrāmaṇas and brahmaṇas searching for the path of deliverance and purity (śuddhi) in food (āhāra), saṃsāra, rebirths (upapatti), dwellings (āvāsa), sacrifice (vajña) or sacrifices (agniparicāraṇa). The Buddha, who has followed all these paths in the course of innumerable existences which he remembers, declares that they are not the true Path.

We may recall that former abodes ( $p\bar{u}rvaniv\bar{a}sa$ ) form the object of the fifth  $abhij\bar{n}\bar{a}$  (within the range of the ordinary person as well as the saint), of the first  $vidy\bar{a}$  (reserved for the śrāvaka) and the eighth  $j\bar{n}\bar{a}nabala$  (belonging to the Buddha).

This is why the ordinary person has only awareness ( $abhij\tilde{n}\tilde{a}$ ) of former abodes, but does not have knowledge ( $vidy\bar{a}$ ) of them.

Because he knows the truth of the origin of suffering [240b] (samudayasatya), the śrāvaka knows clearly the sequence of causes and conditions from which the previous abodes derived. This is why the śrāvaka has the awareness ( $abhij\tilde{n}\bar{a}$ ) and the knowledge ( $vidy\bar{a}$ ) of them.

If at the start, when he was still an ordinary person (*pṛthagjana*), the śrāvaka had awareness of his previous abodes and later, having entered into the path of seeing the truths (*satyadarśanamārga*), he recognized the causes and conditions of their origins, it is during the eighth pure mind (*aṣṭamake 'nāṣravacitte*) that he succeeds in cutting off wrong views (*dṛṣṭi*) and from then on the [simple] awareness (*abhijñā*) [that he had of his previous existences] changes into knowledge (*vidyā*). Why? Because knowledge (*vidyā*) is the root of seeing (*darśanamūla*).

On the other hand, if the śrāvaka first obtains the noble path [of seeing the truths] and only later does the knowledge of former abodes arise in him, he has already recognized the power of the causes and conditions which are the origin [of suffering] and, from then on, the awareness ( $abhij\tilde{n}a$ ) that he has of his former abodes changes into knowledge (vidva).

Question. - But at the beginning, when he was still the Bodhisattva, the Buddha had awareness of his earlier abodes, then cut off the passions inherent in the sphere of nothingness ( $\bar{a}kimcany\bar{a}yatana$ ) and finally entered into the noble path [of seeing the truths]. [658 [In these conditions], why did the Buddha say: "In the first watch of the night [of the enlightenment, when I was still a worldly person], I obtained the first knowledge ( $vidy\bar{a}$ ), [i.e., the knowledge of former abodes]"? [659]

[According to your reasoning, the Buddha should have said that he obtained the awareness ( $abhij\tilde{n}\tilde{a}$ ) of former abodes and not their knowledge ( $vidv\tilde{a}$ ).]

Answer. – At that time, [during the first watch of the night of enlightenment], it was not yet a knowledge  $(vidy\bar{a})$ . But later, when the Buddha was in public, he said: "It was at that time that I attained this knowledge", and he declared to people: "This knowledge was obtained by me during the first watch."

When he was seated under the Bodhi tree, Śākyamuni was still only a worldly person (*pṛthagjana*). He attained enlightenment in 34 moments of mind: 16 moments of the Path of seeing and 18 moments of the path of meditation. See above, p. 434F, 1036F; Kośa, II, p. 206; VI, p. 137, n. 3; J. May, *Candrakīrti*, p. 216-217 and notes.

Majjhima, I, p. 22, l. 23-25; 248, l. 13-15; Mahāvastu, II, p. 283, l. 13-14; Lalitavistara, p. 344, l. 5-8. Although at that very time the future Buddha was still an ordinary person, all the sources agree in saying that he had acquired the knowledge (*vidyā*) - not the awareness (*abhijñā*) - of former abodes (*pūrvanivāsa*), also called the divine eye (*divyacakṣus*).

On the acquisition of the three knowleges by the bodhisattva, see Majjhima, I, p. 22, l. 9-23, l. 28; p. 117; p. 247, l. 36-249, l. 22; Tchong a han, T 26, k. 25, p. 589c14-23; Tsaeng yi a han, T 125, k. 23, p. 666b22-666c20; Dharmagupataka Vin., T 1428, k. 31, p. 781b5-c11; Mūlasarv. Vin., T 1450, k. 5, p. 124a9-b7; Mahāvastu, II, p. 283, l. 13-285, l. 21: Lalitavistara, p. 344, l. 5-345, l. 22.

He may be compared to the king who, before exerting his kingship, had fathered a son. Only later, when this king was exerting his kingship, people questioned him about his son and asked when he had been born. The king replied: "The king's son was born at such and such a date." However, at the time when his son had been born, the king was not yet exerting his kingship, but as now he is the king, he considers his son as son of the king and he affirms that 'the king's son' was born at that particular date.

It is the same for the Buddha. At the time when he knowledge of former abodes ( $p\bar{u}rvaniv\bar{a}saj\tilde{n}\bar{a}na$ ) arose in him, it was not yet a knowledge ( $vidy\bar{a}$ ) but was only an awareness ( $abhij\tilde{n}\bar{a}$ ). But in the course of the last watch [of enlightenment], the Buddha recognized the causes and conditions of the origin [of suffering] and from then on this 'awareness' [of former abodes] changed into 'knowledge'. And later in public, the Buddha declared: "During the first watch, I obtained this knowledge."

Question. – That is what should be understood by awareness ( $abhij\tilde{n}\tilde{a}$ ) and knowledge (vidya) [of former abodes]. Then what is the power (bala) [consisting of awareness of these abodes]?

By using this knowledge  $(vidy\bar{a})$ , for himself as well as for other people, the Buddha knows the former abodes occupied during innumerable and infinite generations as well as the many causes and conditions from which they derive. The Buddha knows this fully and completely  $(praj\bar{a}nati)$ , and as this knowledge is intact  $(avy\bar{a}hata)$  and invincible  $(ajeya)^{660}$  in him, it is called the 'eighth power'.

#### IX. THE KNOWLEDGE OF DEATH AND REBIRTH

The power of the knowledge of death and rebirth (*cyutyupapādajñānabala*). Using the divine eye, the Buddha sees the place of deaths and rebirths of beings.

The worldly person (*pṛthagjana*) using the divine eye sees, at the maximum, one universe of four directions (*caturdvīpaka*). The śrāvaka, at the maximum, sees about a small chiliocosm (*sāhasracūḍika lokadhātu*); he sees it entirely from top (*ūrdhvam*) to bottom (*adhas*).<sup>661</sup>

661 Cf. Kośabhāṣya, p. 419-430: Kiyad dūraṃ punar divyena cakṣuṣā paśyati. yasya yādṛśaṃ cakṣur bhavati. śrāvakapratyekabuddhabuddhās tv anabhisaṃskāreṇa sāhasradvisāhasrakān lokadhātūn yathāsaṃkhyaṃ paśyanti... savābhisaṃskāreṇa saha śrāvakao 'pi dvisahasraṃ lokadhātuṃ divyena cakṣuṣā paśyati, trisāhasra ṃ khadgaviṣāṇkalpaḥ, buddhas tu bhagavān asaṃkhyeyān lokadhātūn paśyati yāvadevecchati.

Transl. – To what distance does one see with the divine eye? That depends on who possesses the eye and the eye itself. The śrāvakas, pratyekabuddhas and the Buddhas, without any effort, see sāhasra, dvisāhasra and trisāhasra universes respectively. With effort, with the divine eye, the śrāvaka sees up to one dvisāhasra, the rhinoceros-like [pratyekabuddha] sees a trisāhasra, and the Buddha Bhagavat sees as many innumerable universes as he wishes.

The sāhasra, dvisāhasra and trisāhasra universes have been defined above, p. 337-448F.

<sup>660</sup> According to the variant no. 9 in the Taisho edition, p. 240.

Question. – But the great Brahmarāja, he too is able to see a chiliocosm. How does the śrāvaka differ from him?

Answer. – The great Brahmarāja, standing in the middle (madhya) of the chiliocosm, sees it all, but standing at the edge  $(p\bar{a}r\acute{s}ve)$ , he does not see the other parts. This is not so for the  $\acute{s}r\~{a}vaka$ : wherever he is, he always sees [all of] the chiliocosm.  $^{662}$ 

The pratyekabuddha sees a hundred thousand universes (*lokadhātu*); the Buddhas see innumerable (*apramāṇa*) and infinite (*ananta*) universes.

In worldly people (*pṛthagjana*), the knowledge of the divine eye (*divyacakṣurjñāna*) is an awareness (*abhijñā*) but not yet a knowledge (*vidya*). He sees only the things (*vastu*) that exist, but he cannot see for what karmic causes and conditions (*karmahetupratyaya*) they have taken birth. See what has been said in regard to former abodes (p. 1555F).

Furthermore, in *A-ni-lou-teou* (Aniruddha), the foremost of those who possess the divine eye, the material derived from the four great elements (*caturmahābhautikarūpa*) of the form realm – the matter constituting his divine eye – was only semi-pure (*prasanna*). On the other hand, in the Buddha, the divine [240c] eye, material derived from the four great elements, is completely pure: this is the difference.

Furthermore, it is in the concentrations (samadhi) in which he is dwelling (viharati) that the śrāvaka obtains the divine eye and it is in the concentrations in which he is dwelling that he can see, and this is a matter of concentration with investigation and analysis (savitarkasavicārasamādhi), of concentration without investigation but with analysis (avitarka vicāramātra samādhi), or of concentration with neither investigation or analysis (avitarkāvicārqsamādhi). On the contrary, as soon as he enters (praviśati) into concentration, the Buddha, if he so wishes, is able to see everything. Abiding in concentration without investigation or analysis, he obtains the divine eye; entering into concentration with investigation and analysis, or into concentration without investigation but with analysis, he can see equally.

Furthermore, when the śrāvaka sees by means of the divine eye and if his mind in concentration (*samādhicitta*) enters into another concentration, his divine eye disappears. This is not the case in the Buddha: even if his mind enters into another concentration, his divine eye does not disappear.

By means of this knowledge, the Buddha knows the places of birth and death of all beings and since this knowledge is intact ( $avy\bar{a}hata$ ) and invincible (ajeya) [in him], it is called the 'ninth power'.

# X. THE POWER OF THE DESTRUCTION OF THE IMPURITIES

The power of the knowledge of the destruction of the impurities (āsravakṣayajñānabala).

Being natural and acquired by birth, the divine eye of the gods, including Brahmarāja, is defiled by eleven *apakṣāla*; as it is acquired by *abhijñā*, the eye of the śrāvaka is free of defilement and is very pure (*suviśuddha*). Cf. Kośavyākhyā, p. 279, l. 5-9.

Question. – There are differences in the degrees of knowledge for the first nine powers: [namely, of the śrāvakas, the pratyekabuddhas or the Buddha]; but here the destruction of the impurities (āsravakṣaya) is the same [for all]. How is [the knowledge of the Buddha] different here from that of the śrāvaka and the pratyekabuddha?

Answer. – Although the destruction of the impurities (āsravakṣaya) is the same [in all], the various knowledges (jñānaviśeṣa) [which recognize them] is very different.<sup>663</sup>

In the śrāvaka, the very strong fetters to be destroyed by meditation (*bhāvanāheyasaṃyojana*) are destroyed at three times: *i*) the time of arising (*utpādabhāga*), *ii*) the time of duration (*sthitibhāga*) and *iii*) the time of disappearance (*bhaṅgabhāga*). This is not the case in the Buddha: it is at the very moment of their arising that they are completely destroyed.

It is acknowledged in both Vehicles that liberation (*vimukti*), in other words, the destruction of the impurities (*āsravakṣaya*), is the same in the śrāvaka, the pratyekabuddha and the Buddha (cf. Vibhāṣā, T 1545, k. 31, p. 62b-c; Kośa, VI, p. 282; Vasumitra, transl. Masuda, p. 49 (thesis 37 of the Sarvāstivādin), p. 62 (thesis 22 of the Mahīśāsaka), p. 64 (thesis 3 of the Dharmaguptaka); Saṃdhinirmocana. X, §2; Sūtrālaṃkāra, XI, v. 53 (*vimokṣatulyatva*); Saṃgraha, p. 327-328; Buddhabhūmiśāstra, T 1530, k. 5, p. 312b7-15.

No matter that there are many differences between the *bodhi* of the śrāvakas and the pratyekabuddhas on the one hand and the *anuttarasamyakasambodhi* of the Buddhas on the other hand. They are noted in many texts: Vibhāṣā, T 1545, k. 143, p. 735b; *Traité* here and at k. 53, p. 436b. The latter is perhaps inspired by the Upāsakaśīlasūtra, T 1488, k. 1, p. 1038a-c (analysed in Hobogirin, p. 87):

The śrāvakas obtain bodhi by debating, the pratyekabuddhas by reflecting, and they understand only a part of the truth; the Buddhas understand everything without a teacher, without listening, without meditating, as a result of their practices.

The śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas know the general characteristics (*sāmānyalakṣaṇa*) of things; the Buddhas know the specific characteristics (*svalakṣaṇa*) and only they are omniscient.

The śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas know the four noble truths (*satya*) but not causes and conditions (*hetupratyaya*); the Buddhas know the causes and conditions. The water of the Ganges being compared to the river of *pratītyasamupāda*, the śrāvaka is like a rabbit that crosses the river without knowing its depth; the pratyekabuddha is like a horse that knows the depth when it touches the bottom; the Buddha is like the elephant that knows its full depth.

The śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas have cut off the passions ( $kle\acute{s}a$ ) but not their habitual tendencies ( $v\bar{a}san\bar{a}$ ); the Buddha has cut off everything at the root.

- We should recall once more that all these differences are of interest only to the scholar of the Lesser Vehicle of whom the *Traité* here is only a spokesman without sharing his opinions. From the Mahāyāna point of view to which the *Traité* subscribes, *bodhi* is only a name and, in the true sense, śrāvaka, pratyekabuddha and Buddha do not exist: see *Vimalakīrti*, p. 195-196, 423-425.

In the śrāvaka, the fetters to be destroyed by seeing the truths (*satyadarśanaheyasaṃyojana*) are destroyed at the moment of their arising, but the fetters to be destroyed by meditation (*bhāvanāheyasaṃyojana*) are destroyed at three times. For the Buddha there is no difference between the fetters to be destroyed by seeing the truths the fetters to be destroyed by meditation.

When the śrāvaka enters the noble path [of darśanamārga] for the first time, the moment of entry (praveśakāla consisting of the duḥkhe dharmajñānakṣānti) is distinct from the moment of understanding (abhisamayakāla consisting of the duḥkhe dharmajñāna). In the Buddha, it is in a single moment of mind that the entry (praveśa) and the understanding (abhisamaya) occur. He obtains omniscience (sarvajñāna), destroys all the obstacles (āvaraṇa) and obtains all the attributes of Buddha in a single moment of mind.

The śrāvakas have two kinds of liberation (*vimukti*): *i*) liberation from the passions (*kleśavimukti*) and *ii*) liberation from the obstacles to the Dharma (*dharmāvaraṇavimukti*). The Buddha possesses liberation from all the conflicting emotions and also liberation from all the obstacles to the Dharma.<sup>665</sup>

The passions to be abandoned during the Path of meditation are called *bhāvanāheyakleśa*, *bhāvanākleśa* or also *savastukakleśa* 'passions with point of support' (Kośa, VI, p. 257). Each of the nine levels – kāmadhātu, four dhyānas, four samāpattis – making nine categories: strong-strong, strong-medium, strong-weak, medium-strong...(Kośa, VI, p. 199). Thus there are in all 81 categories of *bhāvanāheyakleśa* of which each is destroyed by one moment of abandoning or expelling (*prahāna* or *ānantaryamārga*) and one moment of liberation (*vimuktimārga*) (Kośa, VI, p. 198-199); in all, 162 moments of mind.

The passions to be abandoned in the course of the Path of seeing the truths are called darśanaheya, drgheya or also avastuka 'passions without point of support' In their nature they are 'wrong view' (dṛṣṭi), belief in a self, etc. (Kośa, VI, p. 257). They are destroyed by seeing the four noble truths, suffering, its origin, its cessation and the path to its cessation. The ascetic takes possession of each of these truths by two moments of mental acceptance (kṣānti) and by two moments of knowledge (jñāna): in all, sixteen moments of mind. The mental acceptances are the path of destruction (prahāṇamārga) or the uninterrupted path (āṇantaryamārga) because they cut through doubt; the knowledges are possession of the cessation of doubt (Kośa, VI, p. 183-185, 189-191). For a succinct explanation of the Path, refer to my [Lamotte's] Histoire du bouddhisme indien, p. 677-686.

For the ordinary practitioner, the *bhāvanamārga* is long, whereas the *darśanamārga* is quick (Kośa, VII, 8). This is why it destroys the passions to be destroyed by meditation in three times and the passions to be destroyed by seeing in one time. The Buddha destroys all the categories in one single moment. This does not prevent the scholastic from attributing 34 moments of mind to the enlightenment of a Buddha (see above, p. 1556F, n. 1).

A passage the extreme conciseness of which makes it obscure. If I [Lamotte] understand it well, the śrāvaka is liberated from the obstacle consisting of the conflicting emotions (*kleśāvaraṇa*) and only a part of the obstacle to knowledge (*jñeyāvaraṇa*), that which opposes awareness of the Dharma and the four noble truths. The Buddha is free of the obstacle consisting of the passions and the obstacle opposing the grouping of knowledge, of awareness of all things in all their aspects (*sarvākārajñāna*).

It is by himself (svatas) that the Buddha attains wisdom ( $praj\tilde{n}\bar{a}$ ). The śrāvakas, on the other hand, obtain it by following the teachings ( $deśan\bar{a}$ ) of another.

Furthermore, some say: When the Buddha cuts off the defilements (*kleśa*) of all beings by means of his wisdom, his own knowledge is neither dulled nor diminished. Just as a red-hot iron ball (ādīptāyoguḍā) set down on a cotton cloth (tūlapaṭṭikā) burns the cotton without its power of combustion being diminished, so the Buddha's wisdom burns all the defilements without the power of his knowledge (jñānabala) being thereby diminished.

Furthermore, the śrāvakas know only if their own impurities are destroyed. The Buddhas know that their own impurities are destroyed and also know if those of others are also destroyed. On this subject see the *Tsing king* (Praśāntasūtra).<sup>666</sup>

Above (p. 346F), the *Traité* has mentioned the triad of obstacles consisting of the passions (*kleśa*), action (*karma*) and retribution (*vipāka*). This triad is of canonical origin (Anguttara, III, p. 435; Vibhaṅga, p. 341). The Adhyadhaśatikā (T 240, k. 1, p. 776b6-7; T 243, k. 1, p. 784b14; T 244, k. 1, p. 786c22-23) and the Laṅkāvatāra, p. 241, propose another triad: *kleśa-, karma-*, and *dharma-āvaraṇa*, but do not define the last one.

A sūtra presenting, beside the Buddha, the bodhisattva Mañjuśrī and the devaputra Praśāstavinayeśvara (in Tibetan, *Rab tu &i ba rnam par dul baḥi dbaṅ phyug*), a name usually misinterpreted in Chinese as Prāśanta-vinaya-avara: *Tsi chouen liu yin* according to Dharmarakṣa, (T460, p. 448b3), *Tsi tiao fou yin* according to Kumārajīva (T 1489, p. 1075c10), *Tsi tiao yin* according to Fa hai, (T 1490, , p. 1081a19). The Chinese have maltreated the name of Avalokiteśvara in the same way, which they most often render as Avalokita-svara. The sūtra in question here deals with conventional and absolute truth (*saṃvṛtiparamārthasatya*) in its first section. This explains the many titles under which it has been cited. It was translated into Chinese four times (but the second translation has been lost) and into Tibetan once.

1) T 460: Wen chou che li tsing liu king (Mañjuśrīpraśantavinayasūtra), tr. by Dharmarakṣa of the Si Tsin. The colophon of this translation is preserved in the Tch'ou (T 2145, k. 7, p. 51b8-13): The śramaṇa Tchou Fa-hou (Dharmarakṣa), at the capital (Lo-yang), met Tsi-tche of the Western Land who issued this sūtra orally. The sūtra still contained many chapters which this man had forgotten, but what he did issue was soon translated into the language of the Tsin. Having recovered the original, Dharmarakṣa corrected and completed the translation on the 8<sup>th</sup> day of the 4<sup>th</sup> month of the *t'ai-k'ang* year (May 14, 289) at the Po-ma sseu [of Lo-yang]. Nie Tao-tchen wrote it down with the brush."

This translation was listed in the Tchong king lou (419) of Tchou Tao-tsou (Li, T 2034, k. 6, p. 63a11-12; K'ai, T 2154, k. 2, p. 495a1-2).

2) T 1489: *Ts'ing-tsing p'i-ni fang-kouang king* (Praśantavinayavaipulyasūtra), tr. by Kumārajīva of the Later Tsin, at an undetermined date between 402 and 409. This was the third translation, also called *Tsing liu king* (Praśāntavinayasūtra): cf. K'ai. T 2154. k. 4, p. 513a3; k. 12, p. 606b19.

Finally, the Buddha is the only one who knows the modalities inherent in the minds of beings with their ninety-eight perverse tendencies (*anuśaya*)<sup>667</sup> and their ninety-six errors (*paryavasthāna*).<sup>668</sup> no one but the Buddha knows them. [241a]

The Buddha is also the only one who knows the nature of the fetters destroyed in the course of the *duḥkhe dharmajñāna*, the *duḥkhe 'nvayajñāna* and so on up to the *mārge 'nvayajñāna*. Similarly, he knows [the fetters] destroyed by meditation (*bhāvanāhīna*) in the course of the nine moments of liberation (*vimuktimārga*).<sup>669</sup>

The Buddha knows these things about beings fully and completely (*prajānāti*). The little that the śrāvaka knows of them or says about them may be ascribed to the Buddha's teachings.

This is the power in the Buddha of the knowledge of destruction of the impurities (āsravakṣayajñānaprabhāva) and, since this knowledge is intact (avyāhata) and invincible (ajeya) [in him], it is called the 'tenth power'.

At the end of the sūtra (T 1489, p. 1081a7-9), Ānanda asks the Buddha what he should call it, and the Buddha proposes three titles to him: *i) Tsi tiao fou yin t'ien tseu so wen* (Praśāntavinayasvaradevaputraparipṛcchā); *ii) Ts'ing tsing p'i ni* (Praśāntabinaya); *iii) Yi ts'ie fo fa* (Sarvabuddhadharma).

3) T 1490: *Tsi tiao yin so wen king* (Praśāntavinayasvaraparipṛcchāsūtra), tr. by Che Fa hai of the Lieou Song (420-479) from an original identical with that of Dharmarakṣa. This was the fourth translation and it was also called *Jou-lai so chouo ts'ing tsing tiao fou king* (Tathāgatoktaṃ Praśāntavinayasūtram): cf. Nei, T 2149, k. 4, p. 261b26; K'ai, T 2154, k. 1, p. 484c3-4; k. 5, p. 532b23-24.

4) Tib. Trip. no. 846, vol. 34, p. 104-2-7 to 113-5-6: *Kun rdzob dań don dam paḥi bden pa bstan pa* (Saṃvṛtiparamārthasatyanirdeśa. – In Mahāvyut., no. 1368: Paramārthasaṃvṛtisatyanirdeśa), tr. by Śākyaprabha, Jinamitra and Dharmatāśḥila, in the first quarter of the 9<sup>th</sup> century.

On p. 113, fol. 279a3, the Buddha proposes as the only title of the sūtra: *Kun rdzob dan don dam paḥI bden pa bstan pa*.

This sūtra contrasts the śrāvaka Vinaya with that of the bodhisattva and it particularly notes: "Personally cutting one's own bonds of the passions (*kleśabandhana*) is the Śrāvakavinaya; wanting to cut the passions of all beings is the Bodhisattvavinaya" (cf. T 1489c7-8; T 460, p. 450b16-18; T 1490, p. 1083b1-2; OKC, 846, p. 107, fol. 263a7-8).

This is the passage referred to here by the *Traité*.

667 Cf. Vibhāṣā, T 1545, K. 46, p. 237b-238a; Kośa, V, p. 9.

668 For this expression, see Kośa, V, p. 3-5 and notes.

The Buddha knows the *darśanaheyakleśa* that are destroyed during the sixteen moments of mind of the Path of seeing, and the *bhāvanāheyakleśa* from which the practitioner is liberated during the 81 *vimuktimārga* of the Path of meditation, nine *vimuktimārgas* for each of the nine levels.

# Third Section APPENDICES TO THE TEN POWERS

#### I. THE BEST OF THE TEN POWERS

Question. – Which is the best (*śrestha*) of these ten powers?

Answer. – Each is great in its own domain (svadeśa), just as water ( $v\bar{a}ri$ ) that moistens and fire (agni) that burns each has its own power.

- 1) Some say that the first is the greatest because it includes all the ten at once (cf. p. 1522F).
- 2) Others say that the power bearing on the destruction of the impurities (āsravakṣaya) is the greatest because it contributes to the attainment of nirvāna.
- 3) Some scholars say that the ten forces together constitute the root  $(m\bar{u}la)$  of unhindered liberation  $(avy\bar{a}hatavimukti)$  and that this unhindered liberation is sovereign (adhipati).

#### II. WHY THE BUDDHA THINKS HIGHLY OF HIS TEN POWERS

Question. – The ten powers are exclusive to the Buddha and, in the course of the present lifetime (*ihajanmani*), none of his disciples (*śrāvaka*) is able to obtain them.<sup>670</sup> Then why does the Buddha speak of them?

Answer. – The Buddha wants to cut off peoples' doubts (samśaya) about these ten powers, to strengthen the minds of the ignorant and lead the fourfold assembly (catuṣpariṣad) to rejoice and to say: "Our great teacher (mahācārya) is the only one to possess such powers which he does not share with anyone."

Furthermore, the heretics (tīrthika) say: "The śramaṇa Gautama dwells always in peace (vyupaśama) and his wisdom (prajñā) is decreasing." This is why the Buddha makes this statement of truth (satyavacana): "In me, the ten powers (jñānabala) and the four fearlessnesses (vaiśāradya) are well-established (supratiṣṭha) and complete (saṃpanna)." In the great assembly, the Buddha speaks of his perfect wisdom (saṃpannaprajñā), converts beings (sattvān paripācayati), utters the lion's roar fully (saṃyak siṃhanādaṃ nadati) and turns the wheel of Brahmā (brahmacakraṃ pravartayati) which no heretic, god or human, can turn. Therefore it is to arrest criticism that the Buddha speaks of his ten powers.

This is the matter of a controversy among the Sarvāstivādins which the *Traité* refrains from discussing. As will be seen the following chapter, the *Traité* does not include the ten powers among the attributes exclusive to the Buddha.

#### III. THERE IS NO BOASTFULNESS IN THE BUDDHA

Question. – According to a rule of human decency, even the sage cannot boast. How then (kaḥ punarvādaḥ) could a being free of egotism boast of his ten powers? Indeed, it is said:

To boast about oneself (ātmotkarṣaṇa), to blame oneself (ātmapaṃsana),

To boast about another (parotkarṣaṇa) and to blame another (parapaṃsana)

Those are four things

Which the sage does not do.

Answer. – Although free of egotism and attachment, the Buddha possesses innumerable powers and, out of his great compassion (*mahākaruṇā*) to save beings, he speaks of only ten powers: that is not boasting.

Thus, the good caravan leader ( $s\bar{a}rthav\bar{a}ha$ ), seeing robbers (caura) deceiving his merchants and inviting them to take the wrong road, is moved by compassion and says to his merchants: "It is I who am truthful ( $satyav\bar{a}din$ ); do not follow these hypocrites ( $\acute{s}atha$ )!" And also, when charlatans are deceiving the sick ( $gl\bar{a}na$ ), the good physician (vaidya), out of compassion for these [sick people], tells them: "I have the good remedy (bhaisajya) and I am able to cure your illness; do not believe these impostors! You will become even more sick." [341b]

Furthermore, the qualities (*guṇa*) of the Buddha are profound and distant; if the Buddha did not speak about himself, nobody would know him, and the little that he does say is very useful to beings. This is why the Buddha himself speaks about his ten powers.

Furthermore, there are beings to be converted (*vaineya*) to whom it is necessary to speak, and among the things to say to them, he must, at the proper time, speak of the ten powers. If one did not speak about them, [these people] would not be converted. This is why the Buddha himself tells them about them.

Thus when the sun  $(s\bar{u}rya)$  and the moon (candra) rise, they do not think: "By lighting up the world, we will have glory." The mere fact of their rising is worthy itself of glory. It is the same for the Buddha: he thinks not at all about collecting glory when he speaks about his own qualities. When the Buddha is preaching the Dharma in a pure voice and the brilliance of his rays (raśmiprabhasa) destroys the shadows of ignorance among beings (mohatamas), he derives great glory from that automatically. Therefore there is nothing wrong in the Buddha himself speaking of his ten powers and his other qualities.

Power can have results. By using the ten powers, the Buddha increases wisdom (*prajñāṃ vivardhayati*): this is why he can confound the scholars (*upadeśacārya*). By using the ten powers, he increases wisdom: this is why he preaches the Dharma. By using the ten powers, he increases wisdom: this is why he triumphs over his adversaries. By using the ten powers, he increases wisdom; this is why he attains sovereignty (*aiśvarya*) over all the dharmas, just as the great master of a kingdom gets sovereignty over the ministers, the people and the populace.

This has been a brief explanation of the ten powers according to the  $\pm \sqrt{671}$ 

The Mahāyāna system on the ten powers will be explained in the following chapter.

# CHAPTER XL: THE FOUR FEARLESSNESSES AND THE FOUR UNOBSTRUCTED KNOWLEDGES (p. 1567F)

# First Section THE FOUR FEARLESSNESSES OF THE BUDDHA ACCORDING TO THE ABHIDHARMA

# PRELIMINARY NOTE

This chapter is poorly entitled and poorly divided. The previous chapter dealt with the ten powers (*bala*) of the Tathāgata according to the Sarvāstivādin Abhidharma. The present chapter consists of three sections:

- 1. The four fearlessnesses (vaiśāradya) of the Buddha according to the Abhidharma.
- 2. The ten powers and the four fearlessnesses of the Buddha and the bodhisattva according to the Mahāyāna.
- 3. The four unobstructed knowledges (*pratisaṃvid*) according to the Abhidharma, then according to the Mahāyāna.

# I. THE VAIŚĀRADYASŪTRA

The basic canonical text is the sūtra on the fearlessnesses vouched for by numerous sources:

1. Pāli wording in the Vesārajjasutta: Anguttara, II, p. 8-9; Majjhima, I, p. 71, l. 32-72, l. 14:

Cattār' imāni Sāriputta tathāgatassa vesārajjāni yehi vesārajjehi samannāgato tathāgato āsabhan ṭhānaṃ ... dukkhakkhayāyāti, tatra vata maṃ...na samanupassāmi... etaṃ p'ahaṃ... viharāmi.

2. Sanskrit wording in Kośavyākhyā, p. 645, l. 30–646, l. 13; Pañcaviṃśati, p. 211, l. 1-15; Śatasāhasrikā, p.1448, l. 6–1449, l. 17; Arthaviniścaya, p. 578-579:

Catvārīmāni Śāriputra tathāgatasya vaiśāradyāni yair vaiśāradyaiḥ samanvāgatas tathāgato'rhan ... na samanupaśyāmi, idam ātra nimittam... sahadharmeṇa.

3. Chinese translations: Tseng yi a han, T 125, k. 19, p. 645b17; k. 42,p. 776c21-777a2; Vibhāṣā, T 1545, k. 31, p. 158a17-b13; Pañcaviṃśati, T 223, k. 5, p. 155b23-c20; T 220, vol. VII, k. 415, p. 81a-b20.

Transl. of the Sanskrit. – Here, O Śāriputra, are the four fearlessnesses of the Tathāgata; endowed with these fearlessnesses, the Tathāgata, the holy One, fully and completely enlightened, who claims the noble

place of the bull (var. of the Rṣi), rightly utters the lion's roar in the assembly and turns the wheel of Brahmā. What are these four?

- 1. While I claim to be fully and completely enlightened, I see no reason to fear that a śramaṇa, a brahmaṇa, a god, Māra, Brahmā or anyone in the world can legitimately object that such and such dharmas are unknown to me. Seeing no reason to fear that, I have obtained security, absence of fear, certainty, and I abide there; I claim the noble place of the bull (var. Rṣi), I rightly utter the lion's roar in the assembly and I turn the wheel of Brahmā never yet set in motion legitimately by a śramaṇa, a brāhmaṇa, a god, Māra, Brahmā or anyone in the world.
- 2. While I claim to have destroyed the impurities, I do not see any reason to fear that a śramaṇa... can legitimately object that such or such impurities have not been destroyed by me. Not seeing any reason to fear that...
- 3. I see no reason to fear that a śramaṇa... can legitimately claim that the dharmas presented by me as obstacles to the Path do not constitute obstacles in the person who brings them into play. Seeing no reason to fear that...
- 4. I see no reason to fear that a śramaṇa... can legitimately claim that the way shown by me as the noble path leading to release does not lead the person who follows it to the proper cessation of suffering, to the suppression of suffering. Seeing no reason to fear that, I have obtained security, absence of fear, certainty, and I remain there; I claim the noble place of the bull (var. of the Rṣi), I utter the lion's roar rightly in the assembly and I turn the Wheel of the Dharma never yet legitimately set in motion by a śramaṇa, brāhamaṇa, god, Māra, Brāhma or anyone in the world.

# II. THE VAIŚĀRADYAS IN THE ABHIDHARMA AND THE ŚĀSTRAS

The Pāli Abhidhamma mentions them often but with scarcely any explanation. In contrast, the Abhidharma treatises and the śāstras of both Vehicles have analyzed them plentifully and commented upon the sūtra of the fearlessnesses. Here I [Lamotte] will limit myself to indicating the ones that seem to me to be most instructive:

- 1. Among the Sarvāstivādin treatises: Saṃyuktābhidharmasāra, T 152, k. 6, p. 922c; Abhidharmāmṛta, T 1553, k. 2, p. 974c20-23 (reconstr. Sastri, p. 93, l. 4-8); Vibhāṣā, T 1545, k. 31, p. 158a17-159b13; Kośa, VII, p. 74-75; Kośabhāṣya, p. 414; Nyāyānusāra, T 1562, k. 75, p. 748b23-749a15; Abhidharmadīpa, p. 389-390.
- 2. Among the Yogācāra treatises: Sūtrālaṃkāra, XXI, v. 52 (p. 186); Bodh. bhūmi, p. 402; Saṃgraha, p. 286-287, 298-299; Abhidharmasamuccaya, T 1605, k. 7, p. 691c4-14 (reconstr. Pradhan, p. 98, l. 6-14); T 1606, k. 14, p. 760c13-761a18.

In the Kośa (*l.c.*) the four vaiśāradyas are designated in the following way:

1. Sarvadharmābhisambodhivaiśāradya.

- 2. Sarvāsravakṣayajñānavaiśāradya.
- 3. Āntarāyikadharmavyākaraṇavaiśāradya.
- 4. Nairyānikapratipadvyākaranavaiśāradya.

Compare the readings in Dharmasamgraha, § 77, and in Mahāvyut., no. 131-134.

# 1. Definition of the Four Fearlessnesses in the Vaiśāradyasūtra

Here are the four fearlessnesses (vaiśāradya):

- 1. The Buddha makes the following proclamation (pratijñā): I am fully and completely enlightened (samyaksaṃbuddha) and I see not the slightest reason to fear that a śramaṇa, a brāhmaṇa, a god, Māra, Brahmā or anyone else can say truthfully that I do not know certain dharmas. This is why I have obtained security (kṣemaprāpta), I have obtained absence of fear (abhayaprāpta), I occupy the place of the Holy Teacher (viharāmy ārṣaṃ sthānam) like that of the royal bull (ārṣabha),<sup>672</sup> in the great assemblies I utter the lion's roar (pariṣatu siṃhanādaṃ nadāmi) and I turn the Wheel of Brahmā (brāhmaṃ cakraṃ pravartayami) which no śramaṇa, brāhmaṇa, god, Māra, Brahmā or anyone [241c] else is truly able to turn. This is the first fearlessness.
- 2. The Buddha makes this proclamation: I have destroyed the impurities (kṣṇṇāsrava) and I see not the slightest reason to fear that a śramaṇa, brāhmaṇa, deva, Māra, Brahmā or anyone else can say truthfully that I have not destroyed these impurities. This is why I have obtained security, I have obtained absence of fear, I occupy the position of Holy Teacher like that of a king-bull, in the great assemblies I utter the lion's roar, and I turn the wheel of Brahmā which no śramaṇa, brāhmaṇa, deva, Māra, Brahmā or anybody else is truly able to turn. This is the second fearlessness.
- 3. The Buddha makes this proclamation: I have expounded the dharmas that create obstacles (āntarāyikadharma) and I do not see the slightest reason to fear that a śramaṇa, brāhmaṇa, god, Māra, Brahmā, or anyone else can say truthfully that these dharmas which create obstacles are not obstacles to the Path. This is why I have obtained security, I have obtained absence of fear, I occupy the place of the holy Teacher like that of the bull-king, in the great assemblies I utter the lion's roar and I turn the wheel of Brahmā that no śramaṇa, brāhmaṇa, deva, Māra, Brahmā or anyone else can truly turn. This is the third fearlessness.
- 4. The Buddha makes this proclamation: The noble path shown by me can lead out of the world ( $y\bar{a}$  mayā pratipad ākhyatā āryā nairyānikī niryāti) and the one who follows it is able to destroy all the sufferings (tatkarasya samyag duḥkhaṣayāyāyati), and I see not the slightest reason to fear that a śramaṇa, bhrāmaṇa, god, Māra, Brāhma or anyone else can say truthfully that the one who follows this path cannot get out of the world or destroy suffering. This is why I have obtained security, I have obtained the absence of fear, I

1285

Here the *Traité* is juxtaposing the two readings *ārsa* and *ārsabha* mentioned above.

occupy the place of the holy Teacher like that of the king-bull, in the great assemblies I utter the lion's roar, and I turn the wheel of Brāhma which no śrmamṇa, brāhmaṇa, deva, Māra, Brāhma or anyone else is able truly to turn. This is the fourth fearlessness.

# 2. Why the Buddha Mentioned His Four Fearlessnesses

Questions. – For what reasons does the Buddha speak of his four fearlessnesses?

Answer. – The Buddha calls himself omniscient ( $sarvaj\tilde{n}\tilde{a}$ ) and omnivoyant ( $sarvadar\acute{s}in$ ). But in the world, there are infinite treatises, arts ( $kal\tilde{a}$ ), sciences (vidhi), knowledges ( $j\tilde{n}\tilde{a}na$ ), crafts ( $\acute{s}ilpa$ ), methods ( $up\tilde{a}ya$ ). For all the beings taken together to know all these things would already be difficult: it would be more difficult still for the Buddha himself alone to possess omniscience. So many things, so many difficulties!

The Buddha, who experiences no fear, wishes to destroy incorrect suspicions and, in order to refute objection, he speaks of the four fearlessnesses.

Furthermore, before the Buddha appeared in the world, heretics ( $t\bar{t}rthika$ ) in various ways deceived people who were searching for the Path or seeking merit. There were those who ate all kinds of fruits (phala), all kinds of vegetables ( $vya\tilde{n}jana$ ), all kinds of plants (trna) and roots ( $m\bar{u}la$ ), cow-dung (gomaya) or false millet, who ate once a day, every second day, every tenth day, once a month or once every two months, who swallowed smoke, drank water, ate moss and other things of this kind, who dressed themselves in tree bark, leaves or grass, deer-skins or wooden planks, who slept on the ground, on branches, on ashes or spines, who, in the cold season went into the water, or in the hot season scorched themselves between five fires, who died by going into the water, entering into the fire, by throwing themselves on picks or by starving themselves to death.  $^{673}$  In the course of these different austerities ( $duskaracary\bar{a}$ ), they were seeking paradise (svarga) or they were seeking nirvāṇa. They also recommended their disciples not to renounce these practices and, by leading people of little intelligence in this way, they collected homage ( $p\bar{u}j\bar{a}$ ).

As long as the sun  $(s\bar{u}rya)$  has not risen, the firefly  $(khadyotaka)^{674}$  gleams somewhat; but when the sun has risen and is shining, the moon (candra) and stars  $(t\bar{a}raka)$  no longer shine and even less so, the firefly. Similarly, as long as the Buddha had not yet appeared in the world, the heretics were illuminating the world with a feeble light and receiving homage; but as soon as the Buddha has appeared in the world, he eclipses the heretics and their disciples by the brilliance of his great knowledge  $(mah\bar{a}j\tilde{n}\bar{a}n\bar{a}loka)$  and none of them

The austerities described here are those of the naked ascetics (*acelaka*) already described by the Buddha in the Udumbarika-Sīhanādasuttanta (Dīgha, III, p. 40-42; Tch'ang a han, T 1, k. 8, p. 47c; Ni keou t'o fan tche king, T 11, k. 1, p. 223b; Tchong a han, T 26, k. 26, p. 592b).

The example of the firefly or the shining worm (Sanskrit *khadyotaka*, Pāli *khajjopanaka*) is classic: cf. Majjhima, II, p. 34, 41; Visuddhimagga, p. 347; Pañcaviṃśati, p. 41.

receive homage.<sup>675</sup> Having lost homage and profits, they increase their lies (*mṛṣāvāda*) against the Buddha and his disciples.

[Sundarīsūtra].<sup>676</sup> - As has been said in the Souen-t'o-li-king (Sundarīsūtra), they accused the Buddha of having killed Sundarī. They said to people: "The lowest man in the world would not do that, and the person who is mistaken about human laws on this point is even more mistaken about nirvāṇa."

Wishing to destroy such slander, the Buddha himself proclaimed his own true qualities (*guṇa*) and his four fearlessnesses (*vaiśāradya*), saying:

"I alone am omniscient ( $sarvaj\tilde{n}\tilde{a}$ ) and nobody can truthfully say that I am not cognizant. I do not fear that."

"I alone have destroyed all the impurities (āsrava) and their traces (vāsanā) and nobody can truthfully say that the Buddha has not destroyed the impurities. I do not fear that."

"I have proclaimed the dharmas that create obstacles to the Path to nirvāṇa (nirvāṇamārgāntarāyikadharma) and nobody can truthfully say that these dharmas do not create obstruction to nirvāṇa. The Buddha does not fear that."

"The Buddha has stated the path to the destruction of suffering (*duḥkhanirodhapratipad*) that leads to nirvāṇa and nobody can ruthfully say that this path does not lead to nirvāṇa. The Buddha does not fear that."

In summary (samksepena), here is the nature of these four fearlessnesses: 677

- 1. Complete knowledge of all the dharmas (sarvadharmābhisambodhi).
- 2. Destruction of all the impurities (sarvāsravakśaya) and their traces (vāsanā).
- 3. A report of the dharmas that create obstacles to the path (mārgāntarāyikadharmavyākarana).
- 4. A report of the path of the cessation of suffering (duḥkhanirordhapartipadvyākaraṇa).

The Buddha does not fear that anyone can truthfully say that he does not fully know these four things. Why? Beecause he knows them precisely and fully.

The first two fearlessnesses are personal qualities or perfections [for the Buddha]; the last two fearlessnesses are qualities useful to beings. $^{678}$ 

In the first, third and fourth fearlessness, it is a matter of knowledge; in the second, it is a matter of destruction (*kṣaya*). The matter is governed by the perfection of wisdom and cessation.

<sup>675</sup> Considerations already developed in the Pāli Udāna, p. 12.

<sup>676</sup> See references above, p. 507F note; add Arthapadasūtra, transl. Bapat, p. 22-24.

<sup>677</sup> Cf. Kośa, VII, p. 75; Dharmasamgraha, § 77; Mahāvyut., no. 131-134.

<sup>678</sup> Sūtrālaṃkāra, p. 186: Atra jñānaprahāṇakārakatvena svārthe, niryāṇavighnadeśilatvena ca parārthe, nirādhṛṣyatvād anyatīrthyair bhagavato yathākramaṃ caturvidhaṃ vaiśāradhyam udbhāvitam. See also Bodh. bhūmi, p. 402.

#### 3. Similarities and Differences Between Powers and Fearlessnesses

[242b] Question. – The ten powers (*bala*) are knowledges (*jñāna*) and the four fearlessnesses (*vaiśāradya*) are also knowledges. What are the similarlties and the differences?<sup>679</sup>

Answer. – When the qualities (*guṇa*) of the Buddha are explained at length (*vistareṇa*), this is *bala*; when they explained in brief, this is *vaiśāradya*.

Furthermore, when there is activity (*kriyā*), this is *bala*; when there is neither doubt (*saṃśaya*) nor difficulty (*duṣkara*), this is *vaiśāradya*.

When wisdom  $(praj\tilde{n}\bar{a})$  is accumulated, this is bala; when ignorance  $(avidy\bar{a})$  is dispersed, this is  $vai\dot{s}\bar{a}radya$ .

Accumulating good dharmas (kuśaladharma) is bala; destroying bad dharmas (akuśaladharma) is vaiśāradya.

Possessing wisdom personally is bala; there being no one who can destroy you is vaiśāradya.

The vigor of wisdom is bala; being able to respond to objections (praśna) is vaiśāradya.

Accumulating the wisdoms is bala; using them outwardly is vaiśāradya.

Similarly, when the noble cakravartin king is endowed with his seven jewels (*saptaratnasamanvāgata*), this is *bala*; having obtained these seven jewels, when he travels through the four continents (*caturdvīpa*) subduing the entire world, this is *vaiśāradya*.

Similarly also, when the good physician (*vaidya*) knows the remedies (*bhaiṣajya*) well, this is *bala*; when he mixes the remedies to give them to people, this is *vaiśāradya*.

Realizing one's own personal (svārtha) benefit is bala; realizing the benefit of others (parārtha) is vaiśāradya.

Destroying one's own disturbing emotions (*kleśa*) is *bala*; destroying the disturbing emotions of others is *vaiśāradya*.

Not wasting away is bala; being without difficulty or decline is vaiśāradya.

Being able to realize one's own good is bala; being able to realize the good of others is vaiśāradya.

The knowledge of good planning (suvidhijñatā) is bala; the application of this knowledge is vaiśāradya.

Omniscience (sarvajñatā) and the awareness [of things] in all their aspects (sarvākārajñatā) is bala; the manifestation of this omniscience and this awareness of all the aspects is vaiśāradya.

<sup>679</sup> Cf. Saṃyuktābhidharmasāra, T 1552, k. 6, p. 922c12 seq.; Vibhāṣā, T 1545, k. 31, p. 159a23 seq.; Nyāyānusāra, T 1562, k. 75, p. 749a6 seq.

The eighteen special attributes (āvenikadharma) of the Buddhas are bala; the outward manifestation of these eighteen special attributes is vaiśāradya.

Completely penetrating the nature of things (*dharmatā*) is *bala*; if one asks all kinds of questions (*praśna*) and does not think any more and if one replies in the very same moment, this is *vaiśāradya*.

Possessing the Buddha eye (*buddhacakṣus*) is *bala*; seeing beings to be converted (*vaineya*) with this Buddha eye and preaching the Dharma to them is *vaiśāradya*.

Obtaining the [first] three unobstructed knowledges (*pratisaṃvid*) is *bala*; obtaining the unobstructed knowledge of elocution (*pratibhānapratisaṃvid*) is *vaiśāradya*.

Mastery of omniscience (*sarvajñatāvaśita*) is *bala*; adorning one's speech with all kinds of stories (*avadāna*) and apologues (*nidāna*) and preaching the Dharma is *vaiśāradya*.

Destroying the troops of Māra is *bala*; destroying the heretics (*tīrthika*) and the scholars (*upadeśācārya*) is *vaiśāradva*.

These are the various ways of distinguishing bala and vaiśāradya.

Question. – What is fearlessness called?

Answer. – The absence of doubt (niḥsaṃśaya), the absence of fear (nirbhaya), the non-decline of wisdom, not becoming discouraged (anālīnatā), not becoming exasperated (aromaharṣa), acting in all ways as has been said (yathāvādī tathākārī), all that is vaiśāradya.

# 4. How Do We Know That The Buddha is Fearless?

Ouestion. – How do we know that he was fearless?

Answer. -1) Had he had fear, he would not have led the great assemblies by welcoming, dismissing, roughly reprimanding or teaching by means of gentle [242c] words.

Thus, one day the Buddha sent Śāriputra and Maudgalyāyana away but then, out of compassion (*karuṇā*) received them back again.<sup>680</sup>

680 *Cātumasutta* in Majjhima, I, p. 456-457 (Tseng yi a hab, T 125, k. 41, p. 770c; Chö li fou... yeou sseu k'iu king, T 137, p. 860a-b):

One day the Bhagavat was in Cātumā, in the Myrobalan Garden. At that time, five hundred bhikṣus headed by Śāriputra and Maudgalyāyana came to Cātumā to see the Bhagavat. The newcomers exchanged greetings with the resident monks, prepared their lodgings, arranged their bowls and robes, uttered loud cries and shouted at the tops of their voices (*uccāsaddā mahāsaddā ahesum*). Then the Bhagavat asked Ānanda: What are these loud shouts, these loud cries? One would say they were fishermen catching fish (*kevaṭṭā maññe macchavilopa*). [Chinese transl.: One would say that somebody was cutting wood or stones.]

2) There were formidable people, such as these scholars (*upadeśācārya*) who were absorbed in the height of pride (*mānastambha*). Intoxicated by their false wisdom, they presented themselves as unique in the world and unrivalled. Knowing their own books deeply, they refuted others' books and criticized all the systems with wicked words. They were like mad elephants caring for nothing. Among these madmen, we cite: *Ngan-po-tcha* (Ambaṭṭha), *Tch'ang-tchao* (Dīrghanakha), *Sa-tchö-tche Ni-k'ien* (Satyaka Nirgranthīputra), *P'i-lou-tch'e* (Pilotika), etc.<sup>681</sup>

The Buddha subdued all these scholars. Had he been afraid, this would not have been the case.

The five wandering mendicants (*parivrājaka*) beginning with *Kiao-tch'en-jou* (Kauṇḍinya),<sup>682</sup> the thousand Jaṭila *ṛṣis* beginning with *Ngeou-leou-p'in-louo Kia-chö* (Uruvilva Kāśyapa),<sup>683</sup> Śāriputra, Maudgalyāyana, Mahākāśyapa, etc., all entered into religion (*pravrājita*) in the Buddha's Dharma.

A hundred thousand *Che-tseu* (Śākya) who all were great kings in Jambudvīpa, king *Po-sseu-ni-che* (Prasenajit), king *P'in-p'o-so-lo* (Bimbisāra), king *Tchan-t'o Po-chou-t'i* (Caṇḍa Pradyota), king *Yeou-t'ien* (Udayana), king *Fou-kia-lo-p'o-li* (Pukkusāti), king *Fan-mo-to* (Brahmadatta), etc., all became his disciples. <sup>684</sup>

The Bhagavat summoned the perpetrators and said to them: "Go away, O bhikṣus; I send you away; you cannot stay in my presence (gacchatha bhikkhave paṇāmemi vo, na vi mama santike vatthabbam)."

Below (k. 26, p. 247c), the *Traité* will return to this event. Yet another time, five hundred monks meeting at Śrāvastī were similarly driven away by the Buddha (cf. Udāna, p. 24-25).

681 Ambaṭṭha was a young brāhmin of the Ambaṭṭha clan, versed in the three Vedas and auxiliary sciences. He lived at Ukkaṭṭhā in Kosala and had as teacher Pokkharasādi. The Buddha preached the Ambaṭṭhasutta for him (Dīgha, I, p. 87-110), but in contrast to his master, he was not converted.

For Dīrghanakha, also called Mahākauṣṭhila, see above, p. 46-51F and notes, 184F, 633F, 639F. For Satyaka Nirgranthīputra, see above, p. 46-47F and notes: below, k. 26, p. 251c10; k. 90, p. 699a9.

Pilotika, already mentioned above (p. 221F) was a parivrājaka sage (Majjhima, I, p. 175 seq.). 682 Ājñāta Kauṇḍinya, the foremost of the group of five (*pañcavargīya*) who were witnesses of the Buddha's austerities and were present at the sermon at Benares. They became arhats when the Buddha preached the *Anattalakkhaṇasutta* to them (Vinaya, I, p. 14; Catuṣpariṣad, p. 170). The *Traité* has already mentioned them above, p. 102F, 1426F.

683 See above, p. 1355F, note 2.

According to some sources mentioned above (p. 177F, note) five hundred Śākyas were forced to enter the religious life by an edict of king Śuddhodana.

Prasenajit, king of Kosala, became upāsaka after the preaching of the *Daharasutta* (Saṃnyutta, I, p. 70; Mūlasarv. Vin, T 1450, k. 9, p. 142b-143a). The *Traité* has already mentioned this king and will return to him later, k. 27, p. 261a18; k. 33, p. 305a8; k. 58, p. 470b15.

Bimbisāra, king of Magadha, had two well-known meetings with the Buddha. The second took place at the Supatithacetiya of the Latthivanuyyāna; it was then that the king was converted with all his

Brāhmin householders (*gṛhsatha*), having gone through all the worldly sciences and respected by great kings such as *Fan-mo-yu* (Brahmāyus), *Fou-kia-*lo-*p'o-li* (Puṣkarasārin), *Kieou-lo-t'an-t'o* (Kūṭadanta), etc., all became his disciples. Some obtained the first [fruit] of the Path; others the second, third or fourth fruits.

people and became srotaāpanna (references above, p. 30F as note). Further mentions in the *Traité* at p. 93F, 147F, 175F, 186F 637F, 990-992F and notes.

Caṇḍa Pradyota, king of Avanti, was converted by the disciple Mahākātyāyana specially sent to him. The stanzas that the disciple addressed to him on this ocaasion are preserved in the Theragāthā, p. 52, v. 496-499.

After having been noted for his great cruelty (cf. above, p. 993F and note), Udayana, king of Kauśāmbhī, during a friendly visit to the disciple Piṇḍola Bhāradvāja, was converted and entered into the brotherhood of the upāsakas (Saṃyutta, IV, p. 110-113).

For Pukkhusāti, king of Takṣaśilā before his entrance into the religious life, see above, p. 1531F.

Brahmadatta is the dynastic name of the kings of Benares: many jātakas in which they make an appearance concern early times. At the time of the Buddha, Kāśī (Benares) was incorporated into the kingdom of Kosala, and Prasenajit reigned over both countries.

Brahmāyus was a brāhmin from Mitilā in Videha. He was versed in the three Vedas and the auxiliary sciences. At the age of 108 years, he sent his disciple Uttara to the Buddha to learn if the latter indeed possessed all the physical marks of the Mahāpuruṣa. The disciple was able to reassure him not only on the physical integrity of Śākyamuni but also on his perfect deportment. Shortly afterwards, the Buddha came to Mithila and settled at Makhādevambavana. Brahmāyus went to visit him and confirmed *de visu* the secret signs of the Buddha. Prostrating at his feet, he begged the Teacher to come to his home with the monks and he entertained them for a week. After the departure of the Community, Brahmāyus died and the Buddha declared that the old brāhmin had found the fruit of anāgāmin. – This is told in the *Brahmāyusutta* of the Majjhima, II, p. 133-146 (Tchong a han, T 26, k. 41, p. 685a-690a; Lao p'o lo men king, T 75). See also Vibhāṣā, T 1546, k. 1, p. 3a4; Mahāvastu, II, p. 76-82.

Puṣkarasārin according to the Divyāvadāna, p. 620, Pokkharasāti or Pokkharasādi according to the Pāli sources, was a brāhmin of high lineage, famed for his science, his wealth and his beauty. He lived at Ukkaṭṭhā in Kosala on some property that he had been given by king Prasenajit. He presided over the brāhmin assemblies and had many disciples, Ambaṭṭha, Vaseṭṭha, Dubha Todeyya, etc. Wanting to find out the real merit of the Buddha, he sent his disciple Ambaṭṭha to him, but as the latter had presented himself in a boorish manner to the Teacher, Puṣkarasārin came himself to apologize and invited the Buddha to a meal. Impressed by the teachings of the Teacher, he declared himself his follower and obtained the fruit of srotaāpanna (Dīgha, I, p. 110). – Puṣkarasārin appears in various sūtras: *Ambaṭṭha* (Dīgha, I, p. 87-110), *Subha* (Majjhima, II, p. 200-201), *Vāseṭṭha* (Suttanipāta, p. 115), *Tevijja* (Dīgha, I, p. 235); he is mentioned in Vibhāṣā, T 1545, k. 16,, p. 77b26-27.

Kūṭadanta, another learned brāhmin dwelling at Khānumata in Magadha, was a feudatory of king Bimbisāra. The Buddha, passing through that area, was interrogated by the brāhmin on the way of

Great yakṣas such as *A-lo-p'o-kia* (Āṭavaka),<sup>686</sup> *Pi-cho-kia* (Viśvakarman?),<sup>687</sup> etc., great nāga-kings such as *A-po-lo* (Apalāla),<sup>688</sup> *Yi-lo-po-to-lo* (Elapatra),<sup>689</sup> etc., evil men such as *Yang-k'iun-li-mo-lo* (Aṅgulimāla). etc., submitted and took refuge in him.

correctly carrying out "the sacrifice with its threefold methods and its sixteen accessory instruments" (tividhayaññasampadam soļasaparikkhāram). The Teacher preached the Kūṭadantasutta (Dīgha, I, p.127-149) for him and, at the end of the sermon, Kūṭadanta obtained the fruit of srotaāpanna. 686 Dwelling in the Āṭavī forest, between Śrāvastī and Rājagṛha, the yakṣa Āṭavaka ate the humans beings whom the king of the country had pledged to provide for him. The population was rapidly decimated and the time came when the only prey to be offered to the yakṣa was the king's own son, prince Āṭavika. The Buddha wanted to save him and appeared at the yakṣa's dwelling without having been invited. Āṭavaka used his magical power to try to drive him away. The Buddha resisted all his attacks victoriously, but agreed to solve eight puzzles that intrigued the yakṣa (Saṃyutta, I, p. 213-215; Suttanipāta, p. 31-33). Satisfied with this solution, Āṭavaka was converted and attained the fruit of srotaāpanna. Also, when the young prince was brought to him as food, he took him and offered him to the Buddha who, in turn, gave him back to his parents (Comm. on the Suttanipāta, I, p.230). As the young Āṭavika had thus been passed from hand to hand, he was surnamed Hastaka Āṭavika (see above, p. 562-565F and note).

687 If this transcription is correct, this would be Viśvakarman, in Pāli Vissakamma, the architect apponted by the Devas: cf. Akanuma, p. 774.

The *Traité* has already twice mentioned the nāga Apalāla whom it places sometimes in Magadha (p. 187-188F) and sometimes in the north-west of India, in the kingdom of the Yue-tche (p. 547F). To tame him, the Buddha called upon the yakṣa Vajrapāṇi. For details, see my [Lamotte's] article *Varapāṇi en Inde*, in Mélanges de Sinoligie offerts à Paul Demiéville, I, 1966, p. 130-132.

A famous nāgarāja, called *Elapatra*, *Elāpatra*, *Airāvaṇa* in Sanskrit, *Erapata* in the inscriptions at Bhārhut, Erāpatha, Erakapatta, Erāvaṇa, Erāvaṇa in Pāli, a name invoking both the *eraka* plant, 'cardamom', used to make blankets, and Airāvaṇa, Indra's mount, who was an elephant and not a snake.

The monster animal still merits a monograph although it has already claimed the attention of historians: see H. Lüders, *Bhārhut*, p. 165 seq.; J. Ph. Vogel, *Indian Serpent Lore*, p. 207 seq.; and especially the *Bhārhut Inscriptions*, Corpus Inscriptionum Indicarum, vol. II, part II, 1963, p. 110 seq. I [Lamotte] will limit myself to adding a few more to an already heavily loaded dossier.

A. Elapatra in folklore.

A late source, the Commentary on the Dhammapada, III, p. 230-236 (tr. Burlingame, III, p. 56-60) tells that at the time of the Buddha Kassapa, the young monk Erakapatta, traveling along the Ganges, passed by a thicket of cardamom (*eraka*) and seized a leaf which tore off while the boat was passing by. This was a serious wrong-doing, but he neglected to confess it; the result was that he was reborn in the Ganges in the form of an enormous snake-king called Erakapatta. Waiting for the future Buddha, he tried to find out when the latter would appear in the world. To this end, he taught his daughter a *gāthā* containing questions which only a buddha would be able to answer. Each evening he had her dance on his hood and sing this *gāthā*, promising his daughter and all his goods to whoever could solve the

questions asked. In the long space of time separating the Buddha Kassapa from his successor Śākyamuni, many attempted to decipher the enigma, but without success. One day however, Śākyamuni was sitting in a grove of seven śūriṣa trees not far from Benares and heard that a young brāhmin, Uttara, had resolved to attempt it and, wanting to help him, he revealed the correct answers to him. Uttara communicated these to Erakapatta who thus knew that a new Buddha had appeared. Joyfully, he struck the waters of the Ganges with his tail, not without causing a flood. Then the nāga went to visit the Buddha, received his teachings and, but for his animal shape, he would have attained the fruit of srotaāpanna.

A fragment of this legend has passed into the Mahāvastu, III, p. 383, l. 19-386, l. 7. It is found, in a much more developed form, in the Chinese sources, with the difference that the young brāhmin who communicated the solution of the enigma to Elapatra was not Uttara but his brother Nārada (Naradatta), nephew of Asita and sometimes identified with Kātyāyana. Among these sources are:

- 1. Abhinişkramaṇasūtra, T 190, k. 37-38, p. 825a138-831b9 (transl. Beal, *Romantic Legend*, p. 275-280).
  - 2. Mahīśāsaka Vin., T 1421, k. 15, p. 106a14-107a11.
  - 3. Dharmagupta Vin., T 1428, k. 32, p. 791a6-792c15.
  - 4. Mūlasarvast. Vin., T 1451, k. 21, p. 303a6-305a17 (cf. Rockhill, Life, p. 46-47).
  - 5. Fou kai tcheng hing so tsi king, T 1671, k. 11, p. 741b6-742a9, sūtra attributed to Nāgārjuna.

The legend is represented on the balustrade of the Bhārhut stūpa with two inscriptions: *Erapato* nāgarājā and *Erapato* nāgarājā bhagavato vadate; cf. *Bhārhut Inscriptions* (Corpus), p. 110, pl. 19 and 39; A. Coomaraswamy, *La sculpture de Bhārhut*, p. 48-49, pl. 8, fig. 25 center. It appears also on a basrelief at Gandhāra; Foucher, *Art Gréco-bouddhique*, I, p. 505, fig. 251a.

Prof. Waldschmidt has pointed out the complete agreement between the Bhārhut sculpture and the Pāli version of the legend.

B. Elapatra in magical phrases.

In the words of the earliest sources, this naga king is invoked in the case of snake bites. Three groups of texts are to be considered: the texts telling of the death of Upasena, Śariputra's younger brother; the texts about the death of an anonymous bhikṣu; a passage of the Mūlasarvāstivādin Vinaya.

- I. Texts about the death of Upasena.
- 1. *Upasenasutta*, of Saṃyutta, IV, p. 40-41. In a cave of the Sitavana at Rājagaha, Upasena was bitten by a snake. Since he had long ago eliminated notions of me and mine, the snake-bite in no way changed his body or his senses. Nevertheless, he caused himself to be borne up into the sky, and there his body was scattered like a fistful of straw (*bhūsamutthi*).
- 2. Hien yu king, T 202, k. 10, p. 417b10-418a5. Story of the death of Upasena along with a jātaka giving an explanation.
- 3. Upasenasūtra of Saṃyuktāgama, T 99, no. 252, k. 9, p. 60c14-61b28; original Sanskrit published By E. Waldscmidt, *Das Upasenasūtra, ein Zauber gegen Schlangenbiss aus dem Saṃyuktāgama*, Nachrichten der. Akad. Der Wissens. in Göttingen, 1957, no. 2, p. 27-44. Corresponds to the Pāli *Upasenasutta*, but with an important addition: Informed of Upasena's death, the Buddha

declared that he would not have died if he had recited certain stanzas  $(g\bar{a}th\bar{a})$  and certain magical syllables (mantapada).

The stanzas, nine in number, express the loving-kindness (*maitrī*) of the wounded one towards all beings in general and to eight families of snakes in particular: 1) *Dhṛṭirāṣṛṭra*, 2) *Airāvaṇa*, 3) *Chibbāputra*, 4) *Kambalāśvatara*, 5) *Karkoṭaka*, 6) *Kṛṣṇagautamaka*, 7-8) *Nandopananda*.

The magical syllables are a dhāraṇī: Otumbile, tumbile, etc.

- 4. Mūlasarv. Vinayavibhanga, T 1442, k. 6, p. 654b28-657b22. Corresponds essentially with no. 3, with the same *gāthā* and the same *mantrapada*.
  - 5. Souei jong tsouen tchö king, p. 773. Same comment as for the preceding.
  - II. Texts about the death of the anonymous bhikşu.
- 1. Anguttara, II, p. 72-73. At Sāvatthi, a bhikṣu whose name is not given is bitten by a snake and dies. The Buddha declares that he would not have died if he had included in his loving-kindness four families of snake-kings (ahirājakula): 1) Virūpakka, 2) Erāpatha, 3) Chabyaputta, 4) Kaṇhāgotamaka. The Buddha then formulates a Parittā 'charm'' to ward off snake bites.
  - 2. Vinaya, II, p. 109-110. Same as preceding.
- 3. Mahīśāsaka Vin., T 1421, k. 26, p. 171a16-28. Similar to the two preceding texts with the difference that eight, not four, families of snakes must be involed: 1) *Dhṛṭṭrāṣṭra*, 2) Tan-tch'e (?), 3) *Airāvaṇa*, 4) *Chibbā*, 5) *Kaṃbalāśvaṭara*, 6) *Virūpākṣa*, 7) *Gautamaka*, 8) *Nandopananda*.
- 4. Dharmagupts Vin., T 1428, k. 42, p. 870c22-871a7. Here also eight families of snakes are to be invoked: 1) *Virūpākṣa*, 2) K'ie-ning (?), 3) *Gautamaka*, 4) *Chibbāmitra*, 5) To-che *Airāvaṇa*, 6) *Kalambalāśvatara*, 7) *Dhṛtirāṣtra*, 8) (missing).

All these texts propose  $g\bar{a}th\bar{a}s$  to be recited as Parittā, but none make any mention of mantrapada.

III. A passage of the Mūlasarvāst. Vin., in Gilgit Manuscripts, III, Part 1, p. 285, l. 8-2888, l. 20.

The hero of the story is a newly ordained monk named Svāti (cf. Anavataptagāthā, ed. Bechert, p. 158-161). Wishing to be of service to the Buddha, he went to cut wood in the forest and was bitten on the big toe by a snake. The physician prescribed a vile food (*vikṛtabhojana*), i.e., excrement and urine of young calves, ash from five kinds of trees, earth taken from a depth of four fingers. The unfortunate Svāti derived no relief from it. The Buddha was consulted and the latter, without mentioning any nāgarāja to be conjured by these stanzas, advised Ānanda to memorize and to go and recite the *Mahāmāyūrī vidyā* near the sick monk. It consisted of an homage to the Buddha, the Dharma and the Community, followed by a *dhāranī: amale, vimale, nirmale*, etc. Svāti was cured immediately.

C. Elapatra's residence and treasure.

Fa-hien (T 2085, p. 864a10-20) locates the place where the nāga Elapatra asked the Buddha when he would be free of his dragon form at Mṛgadāva in Benares, but Elapatra had his usual home in the north-west of India. The evidence of Huian-tsang (T 2087, k. 3, p. 884c4-12) is formal: The pool where the nāga-king Elapatra lives is more than 70 *li* north-west of Takṣaśilā. This nāga is the bhikṣu who, at the time of the Buddha Kāśyapa, had torn off a caradamom (*eraka*) leaf. From then on, when the native people pray for rain or fine weather, they should go to the pool in question with a śramaṇa: by

addressing the Nāga, they are sure to see their prayers answered in the time of a finger-snap. More than 30 *li* south-east of the pool, a stūpa built by Aśoka marks the place where, at the coming of Maitreya, one of the four great treasures is to appear. We may add that archeologists identify this stūpa with the ruins at Baoti Pind (cf. Marshall, *Taxila*, I, 1951, p. 348).

The four great treasures (*mahānidhāna*, *mahānidhi*) which the Buddhist tradition speaks of bear the names of their guardians, the *catvāra mahārājāś caturmahānidhisthāḥ* (Divyāvadāna, p. 61, l. 1-2) or *catvāro nidhānādhipatayo nāgārājānaḥ* (Mahāvastu, III, p. 383, l. 20). According to most sources (no. 4 and 5 below), they still exist and are used by the indigenous people on the 7<sup>th</sup> day of the 7<sup>th</sup> month:

1) A stanza locates them:

Pingalaś ca Kalingeşu, Mithilāyām ca Pāṇḍukaḥ /

Elāpatras ca Gāndhāre, Śankho Vārāṇasīpure //

- Cf. Divyāvadāna, p. 61, l. 3-4; Mūlasarv. Vin., T 1448, k. 6, p. 25a12-15; Maitryavyākaraṇa, T 455, p. 426c1-4.
- 2) As in 1), except that Pingala is placed at Surāṣṭra: cf. Tseng yi a han, T 125, k. 44, p. 788a14-18; k. 49, p. 818c6-18; 819a16-17; Maitreyavyākaraṇa, T 453, p. 421b19-22; T 454, p. 424a25-28; T 456,p. 430a10-13.
- 3) As in 1), except that Pāṇḍuka is located at Bcom-brlag = Mathurā: cf. the Tibetan version of Maitreyavyākaraṇa, ed. S. Lévi, *Mélanges Linossier*, II, p. 384, v. 25; ed. N Dutt, *Gilgit Manuscripts*, IV, p. 194, l. 13-14.
- 4) As in 1), except that Pāṇḍuka is located at Vidiśa: cf. Upāsakaśīlassūtra, T 1488, k. 5, p. 1063.a.
- 5) As in 1), except that Elapatra is located at Takşaśilā: cf. Mahāvastu, III, p. 383, l. 18-19: catvāro mahānidhayo: Saṃkho Vārāṇasyāṃ, Mithilāyāṃ Padumo, Kalingeşu Piṃgalo, Takṣaśilāyāṃ Elapattro.
- 6) Elāpatra in the northern region, at the city of Takṣaśilā; Pāṇḍuka in the land of the Kalingas in the city of Mithilā; Pingala in the land of Vidiśā, in the city of Surāṣtra; Śaṅkha in the sountry of Kāśī in the city of Vāraṇasī: cf. Sūtra of the conversion of the seven sons by Anāthapiṇḍada, T 140, p. 862b.
- 7) Treasure of gold at Gandhāra, guarded by the nāga Elāpatra; treasure of silver guarded by the nāga Pāṇḍuka; treasure of *maṇi* at Surāṣṭra guarded by the nāga Piṅgala; treasure of vaiḍūrya at Vārāṇasī: cf. Maitreyavyākaraṇa, T 457, p. 434c.
- 8) Simple mention of four treasures in Pūrvāparāntasūtra in the Tchong a han, T 26, k. 14, p. 53a15.

According to the *Vimalakīrtinirdeśa*, p. 278, the four great inexhaustible treasures (*akṣayamahānidhāna*) were also found in the house of Vimalakīrti in Vaiśālī. The same text compares the bodhisattvas as well to inexhaustible treasures.

Daridrāṇāṃ ca satvānāṃ nidhānā bhonti akusayāḥ / teṣāṃ dānāni datvā ca bodhicittam janenti te //

This is a well-known stanza often quoted by the Madhyamika scholars such as Śāntideva (Śikṣāsamuccaya, p. 326, l. 5-6; Bodhicaryāvatāra, III, v. 9).

Had the Buddha been afraid, he could not have sat by himself on the lion seat (*siṃhāsana*) at the foot of a tree.

When he was about to attain supreme complete enlightenment (*anuttara samyaksambodhi*), king Māra and his army (*senā*) created heads of lions (*siṃha*), tigers (*vyāghra*), wolves, bears (*rkṣa*): some had but a single eye, others had many eyes; some had but a single ear, others, many ears. Carrying mountains and spitting fire, they surrounded the Buddha on all four sides.<sup>690</sup> The Buddha struck the earth with his fingers (*mahīṃ parāhanati sma*) and in the blink of an eye, everything vanished.<sup>691</sup>

He guided the minds of the great asuras such as *Pi-mo-tche-ti-li* (Vemacitrin), <sup>692</sup> Che t'i p'o-na-min (Śakra devānām indra), Fan-t'ien-wang (Brahmā devarāja), etc., and all became his disciples.

Had he been afraid, in the middle of the great assemblies he could not have preached the Dharma. Because he had no fear, he was able to preach the Dharma in these great assemblies of devas and yakṣas. This is why he is said to have no fear (viśārada).

- 3) Furthermore, the Buddha is the most venerable and the highest of all beings. He has reached the other shore of all the dharmas (*sarvadharmāṇāṃ pāraṃ gataḥ*). Having obtained great glory (*yaśas*), he himself proclaimed his *vaiśāradya*. [243a]
- 4) But let us put aside these [supernatural] qualities of the Buddha. In regard to his mundane qualities (*laukikaguṇa*), no one is able to attain them because he has rooted out dreadful things at their very roots. These dreadful things are: *i*) being born into a low family (*nīcakulajanman*); *ii*) a low place of birth (*nīcajātisthāna*); *iii*) ugliness (*durvarṇatā*); *iv*) lacking right attitudes (*īryāpatha*); *v*) coarse speech (*pārusvayāda*). 693
- *i)*. Birth in a low family (*nīcakulajanman*). Those of the śūdras for example who take birth in low families of the eaters of dead flesh, night-soil men, chicken or pig farmers, hunters, executioners, tavern-keepers, mercenaries, etc. Such people are very fearful in the great assemblies.

The Buddha himself from the very beginning (ādita eva) has always taken birth in the lineage of noble cakravartin kings. He was born into the families of the lineage of 'sun kings': king Ting-cheng (Māndhātṛ

The Chinese have taken it literally and are entitled by it to institute currency of the Inexhaustible Treasure (*wou tsin tsang yuan*): see J. Gernet, *Les aspects économiques du bouddhisme*, 1956, p. 210.

690 See the description of Māra's armies in Lalitavistara, p. 305-307.

<sup>691</sup> Mahāvastu, II, p. 342, l. 1-2; Lalitavistara, p. 318, l. 16; Nidānakathā, p. 74, l. 23-24. The earth-

touching gesture (*bhūmisparśamudrā*) is often reproduced in Buddhist iconography.

<sup>692</sup> Vemacitra asurinda: see above, p. 610-612F and notes.

<sup>693</sup> Variation on a canonical theme (Saṃyutta, I, p. 93; Anguttara, I, p. 107; II, p. 85; III, p. 385): *Idha ekacco nīce kule paccājāto hoti caṇḍalakula vā nesādakule vā veṇakule vā rathakārakule vā pukkusakule vā dalidde appannapānabhojane kasiravuttike, yattha kasirena ghāsacchādo labbhati; so ca hoti dubbaṇṇo...* "Here one may be reborn in a low family, a family of outcasts, of hunters, of basket-makers, cartwrights or road-sweepers, in a poor family where the food and drink is scarce, where life is difficult and where food and clothes are hard to get; one is ugly..."

or Mūrdhāta), king *K'ouai-kien* (Sudarśana), king *So-kie* (Sāgara), king *Mo-ho-t'i-p'o* (Makhādeva), etc.<sup>694</sup> This is why he has no fear.

ii) Low place of birth (nīcajātisthāna). – For example:

Ngan-t'o-lo (Andhra),695

Cho-p'o-li (Śavara). – [Note by Kumārajīva: The Land of the Naked Ones].

Chö-k'ie'lo (Tukhāra).696

According to the sources mentioned above (Preface to vol. I, p. xii seq.), Nāgārjuna, the presumed author of the *Traité*, lived part of his life in Andhra at Śrīparvata, and had friendly relations with the Śatavāhana or even the Ikṣvākus who reigned over the region in the 2<sup>nd</sup> and 3<sup>rd</sup> century C.E. In that case, it is hard to see why the writer of the *Traité* shows so much scorn for Andhradeśa by putting it at the top of the list of bad places to be born.

The Tukhāras were designated by Hiuan-tsang (T 2087, k. 1, p. 872a6) under the name Tou-houo-lo (formerly T'ou-houo-lo) according to Kumārajīva's note, the land of the Lesser Yue-tche: an important piece of information in S. Lévi, *Les Tokharien*, JA, 1933, p. 1-30 and commented upon by P Pelliot, *Tokharien et koutchéen*, JA, 1934, p. 23-106.

At the beginning of the 2<sup>nd</sup> century B.C.E., the Yue-tche were living between Touen-houang and the K'i lien-chan, in western Kan-sou. Towards 176 C.E., driven out of eastern Mongolia by the Hiong-nou, most of them turned westward and ended up reaching Ta-hia, i.e., Bactriana. Nevertheless, as Sseu-m Ts'ien tells us (Che-ki, chap. 123), "their other small tribes, who did not leave, settled among the K'iang of the Nan-chan and they are called the Lesser Yue-tche."

But P. Pelliot has commented rightly: "These are the Lesser Yue-tche of north-western India and not those remaining in the region south of Touen-houang, who should, in my eyes, be the 'Lesser Yue-tche' whom Kumārajīva says are identical with the Tukhāras". I [Lamotte] would like to add a comment: Kumārajīva here does not mean the Tukhāras speaking a language foreign to and unaffected by Buddhism, not these Tukhāras of "northern India in the kingdom of the Yue-tche" to which the *Traité* alludes above (p. 547F) and which it evidently considers as the second sacred land of Buddhism.

During the first five centuries of our era, the dynasties of Yue-tche origin played an important role in the history of India and Iran. The Kuṣāṇa built a powerful empire extending from the Oxus to the Ganges with Bactriana and Kabul as center and extensions into Sogdiana and Central Asia. They

All these names appear in the genealogy of king Mahāsammata listed, among other sources, by the Dīpavaṃsa, III, v. 1-50, and the Mahāvaṃsa, II, v. 1-33. On Māndhātṭ or Mūrdhāta, see above, p. 930-931F; later, k. 73, p. 576b21.

The territory included between the Godāvari basin and the Kistna basin, occupied by people of Dravidian race and of Telugu language and called Andhradeśa nowadays. The Śavara are probably represented by the Saravalu or Saura of the Vizagapatam mountains and the Savari of the Gwalior territory. On the Andhra whose territory has been incessantly modified, see L. de La Vallée Poussin, *L'Inde aux temps des mauryas*, p. 203-219 and Lamotte, *Histoire du bouddhisme indien*, p. 373-384.

Sieou-li (Sòli, Sogdiana).<sup>697</sup>

Ngan-si (Arsak, Persia).<sup>698</sup>

Ta-Ts'in (Mediterranean west).

Those who are born in the border-lands (*pratyantajanapada*)<sup>699</sup> are very frightened when they are in the middle of the great assemblies.

respected and even favored the beliefs of their subjects and some of them, such as Kanişka and Vāsudeva, became benefactors of Buddhism in the Indian portion of their territories. They were no strangers to it and the Buddhist texts compare the Sons of Heaven of China, the Mediterranean west and the Yue-tche, to the 'devaputras of India' (Che eul yeou king, T 195, p. 147b; P.Pelliot, *La Théorie des Quatre Fils du Ciel*, T'ouan Pao, 1923, p. 97-199;S. Lévi, Devaputra, JA, 1934, p. 1-21). A Buddhist prediction often repeated attributes the future disappearance of the Holy Dharma to foreign kings of western origin, Scythian, Parthian, Greek and *Tuṣāsa*, variaint of *Tukhāra* (Prediction to Kātyāyana, T 2029, p. 11b12; T 2028, p. 8c24; Aśokāvadāna, T 2042, k. 6, p. 126c; Saṃyuktāgama, T 99, k. 25, p. 177c; Candragarbhasūtra, T 397, k. 56, p. 377b; sources translated in *Histoire du bouddhisme indien*, p. 217-222).

The *Sieou-li* of the *Traité*, of the north of the Tukhāra domain, are the Sogdians, the *Sou-li* of Hiuan-tsang (T 2087, k. 1, p. 871a11), possessing a special scripture and a definite literature.

Ngan-si (Arsak) designates Parthia proper, or Arsadian Persia, since the year 224 C.E. under the Sassanid dymasty. Buddhists have not hidden their scorn for the Persians (Pārasīka) and their seers (the *Mou-kia*) who advised the killing of aged father and mother, the sick, and authorized sexual intercourse with mother, sister or a woman of one's own *gotra* (cf. Vibhāṣā, T 1545, k. 116, p. 605c17-22; 606a17-22; Kośabhāṣya, p. 240, l. 23; 241, l. 8; Kośavyākhyā, p. 394, l. 6; T 1558, k. 16, p. 85b23-24; T 1559, k. 12, p. 241a25-27; Nyāyānusāra, T 1562, k. 41, p. 576c20-22; 577a11; Kārikāvibhāṣā, T 1563, k. 22, p. 879b28-29). Besides, as the *Traité* will note later (k. 91, p. 705a22-23), all those born in the border-lands such as the *Ngan-si* are by nature fools and unable to be converted.

Despite its wealth and military power, the *Ta-Ts'in*, the Mediterranean west, did not enjoy a good reputation.

where the religious discipline is carried out in all its rigor, and the Frontier Lands (*pratyantajanapada*) enjoying ease and indulgences. In the early sources, the Central Land, roughly corresponding to Āryāvarta, was limited in the east by the Puṇḍravardhana (northern Bengal) and the city of Kacaṅgalā (see above, p. 170F note), to the south by the Śarāvatī river, to the west by the villages of the Sthūṇopasthūṇka brāhmins, to the north by the Śīragiri (cf. Vinaya, I, p. 197; Dharmagupta Vin., T 1428, k. 30, p. 846a; Sarvāstivād. Vin., T 1435, k. 25, p. 181c; Mūlasarv. Vin. in *Gilgit Manuscripts*, III, part IV, p. 190, and Divyāvadāna, p. 21; Yeou-pou-p'i-ko-che, T 1447, k.1, p. 1053a; E. Waldschmidt, *Zur Śroṇakoṭikarṇa-Legende*, NAWG, 1952, p. 137). Bounded in this way, this Land included fourteen of the sixteen *mahājanapada* recorded in the 6<sup>th</sup> century B.C.E. (see *Histoire du bouddhisme indien*, p. 8-9) and was 500 leagues long, 250 leagues wide with a perimeter of 900 leagues; its inhabitants were

virtuous; noble persons, including the Buddhas, gladly chose it as a cradle (cf. Sumangala, I, p. 173; Jātaka, III, p. 115-116; Comm. on Dhammpada, p. 248). It included seven major cities: Śrāvastī, Sāketa, Campā, Vārāṇasī, Vaiśalī, Rājagrha and Kauśāmbī (Dīgha, II, p. 146; Sanskrit Mahāparinirvānasūtra, p. 304; Tch'ang-a-han, T 1, k. 3, p. 21b; T 5, k. 2, p. 169c; T 6, k. 2, p. 185b; T 7, k. 2, p. 200c).

In my introduction to *Vimalakīrti*, I [Lamotte] think I was able to show that Kumārajīva and the Kaśmir school, Nāgārjuna, the author of the Madhyamakaśāstra, must have lived in the 3<sup>rd</sup> century, between 243 and 300 C.E., and everything leads one to believe that, strictly based on these works, the *Traité* must have been produced during the 4<sup>th</sup> century. At that time, the religious map of India had been transformed considerably and Buddhist propaganda had reached central Asia and China. Its spokesmen were not only Indians but also the foreign Yue-tshe, Sogdians and Parthians. Under the Han, during the second half of the 2<sup>nd</sup> century C.E., missionaries and translators who worked at Lo-Yang consisted of a true mosaic of nationalities: it consisted of two Parthians, the bhikṣu Ngan Che-kao and the upāsaka Ngan Hiuan; three Yue-tche, Tche Leou-kia-tch'an (Lokakṣema?), Tche Yuan and Tche Leang, two Sogdians, K'ang Mong-siang and K'ang kiu; and three Indians Tchou Fo-che, Tchou Ta-li (Mahābala?) and T'an-kouo (Dharmaphala?).

Later, at the time of the Three Kingdoms (220-280), the Wou empire, in the Blue River basin, welcomed the Yue-tche Tche K'ien, the Sogdian K'ang Seng-houei and the Indians Wei-k'i-nan (Vighna?) and Tchou Tsiang-yen to Wou-tch'ang and Kie-ye (Nanking). The Wei empire in the Yellow River basin did not lag behind and at Lo-yang had the Indian T'an-ko-kia-lo (Dharmakāla), the Sogdian K'ang Seng-k'ai (Dharmavarman) and the two Parthians T'an-wou-ti (Dharmastaya?) and Ngan Fa-hien (Dharmabhadra?).

It is impossible that the disciples of Nāgārjuna, writers of the *Traité* - and especially Kumārajīva, his official translator-annotator - were unaware of this internationalization of the Buddhist propaganda in the first centuries of our era. If they passed over in silence this passage on the merits of the foreigners with which we are here concerned, it was from an Indian reaction. From their point of view, the Buddhist Madhyadeśa is purely Indian; the frontier regions where Aryan is not spoken are low places of birth (*nīcajātisthāna*). A list of foreign languages appears in the three versions of the Vibhāṣā which have come down to us: 1) translation by Saṃghabhadra made at Tch'ang-ngan in 383 (T 1547, k. 9, p. 482c18-21); 2) translation by Buddhavarman and his group made at Leang-tcheou in 435 (T 1546, k. 41, p. 306c26-29); 3) translation by Hiuan-tsang made at Tch'ang-ngan (T1545, k. 79, p. 410a19-21). These languages are the *tche-na* (Chinese), *cho-kia* (Śaka, Scythian), *ye-fa-na* (Yavana, Greek), *ta-la-t'o* (Drāvidian), *mo-lo-p'o* (Mar-po, perhaps Ladakh: cf. Si-yu-ki, T 2087, k. 4, p. 890a9), *k'ie-cha* (Kāśgar), *tou-houo-lo* (Tukhāra), *po-ho-lo* (Bakhla, Bactrian).

There is some similarity between this list of foreign languages and the list of low places of birth presented by the *Traité*.

It goes without saying that the ideas developed here lose their value if the passage under discussion is an interpolation attributable to an author unaware of affairs in India and leading a life of luxury in Kucha or in China as was the case for Kuamārajīva. This is the opinion of R. Hikata (*Suvikrāntavikrāmin*, Introduction, p. LV).

The Buddha himself, who was born at *Kia-p'i-lo-p'o* (Kapilavastu), has no fear.

*iii*) Ugliness (*durvarṇatā*). – There are people whose physical form is worn-out, ruined, thin, and whom no one wants to look at. In the middle of the great assemblies, they too are afraid.

The Buddha with his golden color (*suvarṇavarṇa*) and his brilliance (*prabhā*) is like the fire that illumines the Mountain of Red Gold (*kanakagiri*). Having such beauty, he is not afraid.

- *iv*) Absence of proper bodily positions. In their way of entering, of standing, moving, sitting or rising up, there are people who lack etiquette and they too are afraid. The Buddha does not have any of these defects.
- v) Coarse speech ( $p\bar{a}rusyav\bar{a}da$ ). There are people who pronounce badly, stammer, repeat themselves and lack coherence. As they displease people, they have fear.

The Buddha has no such fear. Why? The voice of the Buddha (buddhavāc)<sup>700</sup> is truthful (satya), gentle (mrduka), continuous (sahita), easily understood, neither too fast nor too slow, neither too concise nor too prolix, without subsiding (alīna), stainless (vimala), without bantering. It surpasses the (harmonious) sounds of the kia-ling-p'i-k'ie bird (kalavinka).<sup>701</sup> Its letter (vyañjana) and its meaning (artha) are clear (vispaṣṭa); it causes no harm. Free of passion (rāga), it is without blemish (anupalipta); having destroyed hatred (dveṣa), it is without conflict (apratigha); having eliminated error (moha), it is easy to penetrate. Since it increases joy in the Dharma (dharmarati), it is pleasant (premaṇīya). Since it opposes wrong-doing (āpatti), it is safety (kṣema). It follows another's mind (paracitta) and favors liberation (vimukti); its meaning (artha) is profound (gambhīra) and its expression (vyañjana) marvelous. Having its reasonings, it is logical (yukta). Thanks to its examples (upāmā), it is well-expressed. Its work over, it reviews it well. Since it takes into account the various minds of others, it is expressed with variety. Finally, all its words lead to nirvāṇa; this is why they are of one taste (ekarasa).<sup>702</sup>

Adorning his speech in multiple and innumerable ways, the Buddha has no fear when he speaks. And if, thanks to these purely worldly attributes (*laukikadharma*), the Buddha is without fear, what can be said then about his supramundane attributes (*lokottaradharma*)? This is why it is said that the Buddha possesses the four fearlessnesses (*vaiśāradya*).

<sup>700</sup> In the list that follows, the *Traité* is inspired in part by a topic related to "The Speech of the Tathāgata endowed with sixty aspects" (*tathāgatasya ṣaṣtyākāropetā vāk*), a subject appearing in the Tathāgatacintyaguhyanirdeśa (T 310, k. 10, p. 55c20-56a5; T 312, k. 7, p. 719c7-720a29) of which the original text is preserved in the Sūtrālaṃkāra, p. 79-81 and the Mahāvyut, no. 445-504.

For other qualities of the Buddha's voice, see Hobogirin, s.v., *Bonnon* (p. 133-135); *Butsugo*, p. 207-208; *Button*, p. 215-217.

<sup>701</sup> A bird with melodious song, not to be confused with the *kācilindika* famed for the softness of its down (cf. Śūramgamasamādhi, p. 261 note).

<sup>702</sup> Cf. Vinaya, II, p. 239; Anguttara, IV, p. 203; Udāna, p. 56; Tchong a han, T 26, k. 8, p. 476c11; Tseng yi a han, T 125, k. 37, p. 753b1): *Seyyathā pi mahāsamuddo ekaraso loṇaraso evam eva ayam dhammavinayo ekaraso vimttiraso*: "Just as the ocean has but one taste, the taste of salt, so this Dharma and this discipline have but one taste, the taste of deliverance."

# 5. Why Distinguish Between the Powers and the Fearlessnesses?

Question. – Do the ten [powers (bala) of the Buddha not contain the fearlessnesses (vaiśāradya)? If they do contain the fearlessnesses, one should not speak only of four fearlessnesses, [but of of ten]. If they also contain the subjects of [243b] fear, why is it said that the Buddha is endowed with fearlessnesses (vaiśāradyasamanvāgata)?

Answer. – One and the same knowledge  $(j\tilde{n}\bar{a}na)$  in ten places  $(sth\bar{a}na)$  means that the Buddha is endowed with ten powers, in the same way that one and the same man who knows ten things is called after these things.

When the ten powers (bala) appear and function in four places, these are the four fearlessnesses (vaiśāradya).

[The first power], the knowledge of things possible and things impossible (*sthānāsthānajñāna*) and [the tenth power], the knowledge of the cessation of the impurities (*āsravakṣayajñāna*) constitute the first fearlessness [i.e., *sarvāsravakṣaya*] and the second fearlessness [i.e., *sarvāsravakṣaya*] respectively.

Although the other eight powers are extensive, it is said that they are mixed up with the third fearlessness [mārgāntarāyikadharmavyākaraṇa] and the fourth fearlessness [duḥkhanirodha-pratipadvyākaraṇa].

Thus, although the fearlessnesses are contained in the ten powers, there is nothing wrong in speaking of them separately.

# 6. Literal Commentary on the Vaiśāradyasūtra

### A. "I am fully and completely enlightened"

I am fully and completely enlightened. – The Buddha knows all dharmas without error (viparyāsa), fully (samyak) and unmistakenly, in the same way as the other Buddhas of the past. He is therefore called Samyaksambuddha.

Thus the Buddha said to Ānanda: "That which is unknown to the entire world with its gods and men, the Buddha himself knows completely: this is why he is called Samyaksambuddha."

But there are people who say that the Buddha does not know certain dharmas.

Question. – Who are these people?

Answer: In the same place, the Buddha said: *A śramaṇa, a brāhmaṇa, a deva, Māra, Brahmā or someone else*. They want to debate with the Buddha [and challenge him on his knowledge of certain dharmas].

What are these dharmas?

For some, it is the sacred texts of which the Buddha has not spoken, eighteen great holy texts:  $^{703}$  heretical sūtras, grammars ( $vy\bar{a}karana$ ), arithmetical ( $samkhy\bar{a}$ ), Vedas, etc.

For others, it is the weight of Mount Sumeru, the thickness of the great earth (*mahāpṛthivī*) and the total number of plants.

For others, it is the fourteen difficult points to which the Buddha has not replied (*avyākṛtavastu*): is the world eternal (*śāśvata*) or non-eternal (*aśāśvata*), finite (*antavat*) or infinite (*anantavat*), etc.?<sup>704</sup>

For others, it is material dharmas ( $r\bar{u}pin$ ) or non-material dharmas ( $ar\bar{u}pin$ ), visible (sanidarśana) or invisible (anidarśana), resistant (sapratigha) or non-resistant (apratigha), impure ( $s\bar{a}srava$ ) or pure ( $an\bar{a}srava$ ), conditioned (samskrta) or unconditioned (asamskrta), etc. [According to them,] the Buddha knows only the causes and conditions of the category of things concerning the Dharma but, in regard to the various causes and conditions of other things, sometimes the Buddha does not know them completely.

[In the phrase: A śrāmaṇa, brāhmaṇa, deva, Māra, Brahmā, or some one else...], śramaṇa means a monk who has gone forth from home (pravrajita); brahmāṇa means a sage dwelling at home; deva means an earth deity or a deity of space; Māra is the six groups of Kāmadevas; Brahmā is one of the deities whose leader is Brahmā Devarāja and also all the deities of rūpadhātu; finally, some one else designates all the others with the exception of the previously mentioned.

[That he is able to speak] in accordance with the truth...i.e., being able to object correctly, with logic.

*I do not see the slightest reason to fear...*: reason (*nimitta*) means 'grounds'. I do not see the least grounds for fearing that he will be able to attack me in accordance with the truth (*saha dharmena*).

Seeing none, I claim to occupy the place of a-li-cha (ārṣaṃ sthānam). [Note by Kumārajīva: In the language of the Ts'in, Cheng-tchou, 'Holy Teacher'].

### B. "I have destroyed all the impurities"

The Buddha proclaims: "I have destroyed all the impurities  $(k \bar{s} \bar{m} \bar{a} s r a v a)$ ." If people say that he has not destroyed them, he is not afraid.

What are the impurities (*āsrava*)? These impurities are of three kinds: *i*) lust impurity (*kāmāsrava*); *ii*) existence impurity (*bhavāsrava*); *iii*) ignorance impurity (*avidyāsrava*).<sup>705</sup>

<sup>703</sup> The eighteen great holy texts of the heretics already mentioned above, p. 48F, 92F, 637F, 639F. See Mochizuki, *Cyclopedia*, p. 2360.

See above, p. 164-159F, 421F, 529F, 913F; and later, k. 26, p. 153b; k. 28, p. 266a' k. 35, p. 321c.
 Majjhima, I, p. 55; Anguttara, I, p. 165; III, p. 414; Samyutta, IV, p. 256; V, p. 56, 189; Itivuttaka, p. 49.

Furthermore, the impurities are mental events (*caitasika dharma*) associated with defiled minds (*saṃkliṣṭacittasaṃprayukta*) arising in regard to the six sense organs (*ṣaḍindriya*).

Finally, see the *Yi-ts'ie leou-tchang king* (Sarvāsravasūtra) which distinguishes seven kinds of impurities.<sup>706</sup>

#### C. "I have stated the dharmas that constitute an obstacle"

[243c] By dharmas that constitute an obstacle to the path (āntarāyika) is meant the impure actions (sāsravakarman), the conflicting emotions (kleśa) to be remunerated in the bad destinies (durgati) and, insofar as they are worldly (laukika),<sup>707</sup> generosity (dāna), morality (śīla), the observing of the ten good paths of action (kuśalakarmapatha) and the enjoyment of the dhyānas of delight. In short (saṃkṣepeṇa), everything that puts an obstacle to nirvāṇa, whether it be good (kuśala) or undefined (avyākṛta) is called 'dharma constituting an obstacle to the path' (mārgāntarāyikadharma).

## D. "The noble path indicated by me can lead to exit from the world"

Some say that this way (pratipad) is two things: the holy concentration ( $\bar{a}ryasam\bar{a}dhi$ ) and the holy wisdom ( $\bar{a}ryapraj\tilde{n}\bar{a}$ ) and that these two things lead to nirvāṇa.

Others say that it is the path with its three elements (*triskandhaka mārga*): morality ( $\hat{sila}$ ), concentration ( $sam\bar{a}dhi$ ) and pure ( $an\bar{a}srava$ ) wisdom ( $praj\tilde{n}\bar{a}$ ).

Others say that it is four things: the four noble truths (āryasatya).

Others say that it is the five supramundane faculties (lokottarendriya).

Others say that it is the six elements leading to emancipation (nihsaranīva dhātu). 708

Transl. – There are six elements leading to emancipation: emancipation from malice is liberation of the mind by means of loving-kindness; emancipation from harm is liberation of the mind by means of joy; emancipation from sorrow is liberation of the mind by means of joy; emancipation

<sup>706</sup> Sabbāsavasutta of Majjhima, I, p. 7 (Tchong a han, T 26, k. 2, p. 432a10; Yi ts'ie lieou chö cheou yin king, T 31, p. 813b5; Tseng yi a han, T 125, k. 34, p. 740b1): There are impurities to be destroyed (āsavā pahātabbā) by visions (dassana), by control (saṃvara), by right usage (paṭisevana), endurance (adhivāsana), avoidance (parivajjana), elimination (vinodana) and meditation (bhāvanā).

<sup>707</sup> I.e., insofar as they still constitute an attachment to the world.

<sup>708</sup> Dīgha, III, p. 247-250; Anguttara, III, 290-292; Tch'ang a han, T 1, k. 8, p. 52a8-16; 54b1-9: Cha nissāraņīyā dhātuyo... Nissaraṇaṃ h'etaṃ vyāpādassa yadidaṃ mettā cetovimutti... Nissaraṇaṃ h'etaṃ vihesāya yadidaṃ karuṇā cetovimutti... Nissaraṇaṃ h'etaṃ aratiyā yadidaṃ muditā vetovimutti... Nissaraṇaṃ h'etaṃ rāgassa yadidaṃ upekhā cetovimutti... Nissaraṇaṃ h'etaṃ subbanimittānaṃ yadidaṃ animittā cetovimutti... Nissaraṇaṃ h'etaṃ vicikicchākathaṃkathāsallassa yadidam asmīti mānasamugghāto.

Others say that it is the seven factors of enlightenment (sambodhyanga).

Others say that it is the eight members of the noble path (āryāṣṭāṅgamārga) leasing to nirvāṇa.

Some scholars (*upadeśācārya*) say that it is all the pure paths (*anāsravamārga*) leading to nirvāṇa.

"I see not the slightest reason to fear that a śramaṇa, brāhmaṇa, etc., can say according to the truth that that is not true. Not seeing anyone, I claim to occupy the ārṣa sthāna."

### E. "I hold the place of Holy Teacher"

Question.- Why does the Buddha claim that he occupies the ārṣa sthāna?<sup>709</sup>

from desire is liberation of the mind by means of equanimity; emancipation from all the signs [of desire, matter and permanence] is liberation of the mind by means of the signless; emancipation from the arrow of doubt and uncertainty is complete destruction of the pride of 'I am'.

For the corresponding Sanskrit sources, see Dasottara, p. 77-80; Mahāvyut., no. 1596-1602.

709 A canonical expression showing some interesting variations:

1. In the Pāli texts: āsabhaṃ thānaṃ (āsabhanthānaṃ, āsabhaṭṭhānaṃ) paṭijānāti: "He lays claim to the place of the bull": cf. Majjhima, I, p. 69; Saṃyutta, II, p. 27; Anguttara, II, p. 8,9; III, p. 417; V, p. 33; Vibha∆ga, p. 317, 344; Paṭisambhidā, II, p. 174.

The commentary of Majjhima, II, p. 26 explains: *Āsabhaṃ ṭhānan ti seṭṭhaṭṭhānaṃ*, *uttamaṭuthānaṃ*. *Āsabhā vā pubbabuddhā, tesaṃ ṭhānam ti attho*: "The place of the bull, i.e., the best place, the supreme place. Or else, the bulls are the Buddhas of the past and he occupies their place."

In the corresponding Sanskrit texts: *Udāram ārṣabhaṃ sthānaṃ pratijānāti*: "He lays claim to the noble place of the bull": cf. fragments of the Daśabalasūtra (L. de La Vallée Poussin, *Documents sanscrits de la seconde collection M. A. Stein*, JRAS, 1911-1912, p. 1063; E. Waldschmidt, *Bruchstücke budd. Sūtras*, p. 209, 211, 215; Mitteilungen des Instituts für Orientforschung, VII, 3, 1958, p. 400); Avadānaśataka, II, p. 105, l. 15; Kośavyākhyā, p. 645, l. 31-32; Pañcaviṃśati, p. 211, l. 5; Śatasāhasrikā, p. 1448, l. 12; Bodh, bhūmi, p. 386, l. 13.

Ārṣabha is an adjective derived from rṣabha 'bull'.

- 2. The variant ārṣaṃ sthānaṃ partijānāti "he lays claim to the place of the Ḥṣi" is vouched for by the Bodh. bhūmi, p. 385, l. 15-18 (Yogācārabhūmi, T 1579, k. 49, p. 569a24). As we will see, it is preferred by the most prominent Chinese translators and Edgerton wrongly condemns it in his Dictionary, p. 105. The Bodh. bhūmi explains: Āryāṣṭāṅga mārgeṇa labhyatvāt sarvopadravabhayāpagatvāc cārṣam ity ucyate. ātmanas tadadhigamapatijñānāt pratijānātīty ucyate: "Faced with being attained by means of the eightfold noble path and being free of all suffering and all fear, this place is called 'of the Ḥṣi'. As he maintains that he has acquired it himself, he lays claim to it. "
  - Ārṣa is an adjective derived from ṛṣi and means 'related to the sage, archaic'.
- 3. The Chinese versions of the Āgamas do not come out in favor of either variant. Gunabhadra renders the phrase by *sien fo tchou tch'ou*, 'place of the ealier Buddhas' (Tsa a han, T 99, k. 14, p.

Answer. - His own qualities (guna) are complete (sampanna) and, moreover, he makes beings find happiness (sukha) and the good (hita).

If the Buddha obtained a pleasant abode (sukhavihāra) for himself but did not bring about the good of others, he would not occupy the ārṣa sthāna.

If he brought about only the good of beings but did not fulfill his own qualities completely, he would not occupy the ārsa sthāna either.

But since he himself has the qualities and also brings about the good of beings, he lays claim (pratijānāti) to occupy the ārṣa sthāna.

Furthermore, the Buddha has destroyed evil for himself and also destroys evil for others. Destroying these two evils, he is absolutely pure (paramaviśuddha). Preaching the Dharma in a wondrous way, he occupies the *ārsa sthāna*.

Moreover, the Buddha turns, explains, teaches and propagates this [wheel of the Dharma] of the four noble truths (āryasatya), the wheel of three revolutions (triparivarta) and twelve aspects (dvadaśākāra). 710 This is why he affirms that he occupies the *ārṣa sthāna*.

Finally, as he has driven away all doubts (samśaya) and wrong views (mithyādrsti), the Buddha is able to answer all the most profound questions (atigambhīra praśna). This is why he occupies the ārṣa sthāna.

[Note by Kumārajīva: Ārṣa means absolute, supreme, very high. Not falling back, not refusing, not collapsing, completely fulfilling the qualities, not having any weakness is called *ārsa sthāna*.]

#### F. "In the assemblies I utter the lion's roar"

In the assemblies, I utter the roar of the lion. – By assemblies (parśad) is meant the eight assemblies: i) assembly of śramanas, ii) assembly of brāhmanas, iii) assembly of warriors (kṣatriya), iv) assembly of

98a15), and Gautama Samghadeva by yu chen kien so tchö, 'without attachment for the world' (T 125, k. 19, p. 645b28; k. 42, p. 776a19-20).

On the other hand, Kumārajīva and Hiuan-tsang resolutely favor the variant ārsam sthānam:

The former transcribes it as a-li-cha tch'ou (Traité, T 1509, k. 25, p. 243b25) and translates it as cheng-tchou tch'ou 'the place of the holy Teacher' (ibid., and Pañcavimsati, T 223, k. 5, p. 255b28; k. 24, p. 395a22). The latter, resorting to the equivalence rsi = sien, translates it as ta sien tsouen wei, 'the place of the great immortal' (Mahāprajñāpāramitā, T 220, vol. VII, k. 415, p. 81b9; Vibhāṣā, T 1545, k. 31, p. 158a22; Abhidharmasamuccayavyākhyā, T 1606, k. 14, p. 760c21).

710 See *Vimalakīrti*, p. 107, note.

devas, *v*) assembly of Cāturmahārājikas, *vi*) assembly of Trāyastriṃśa devas, *vii*) assembly of Māra, *viii*) Brahmā assembly.<sup>711</sup>

Beings hope to find wisdom in the bosom of these eight assemblies and this is why only these eight assemblies are mentioned in this sūtra.

But the Buddha utters the lion's roar (*simhanādaṃ nadati*) in all the [244a] assemblies. This is why this sūtra adds: *and in all the other assemblies*. Why? Because those who hear the voice (*ghoṣa*) of the Buddha constitute all those assemblies.

Moreover, some say: "The Buddha preaches the Dharma alone and in secret". This is why it is specified that it is in these assemblies that the Buddha declares that he possesses the ten powers and the four fearlessnesses. Hence the phrase: *In the assemblies I utter the lion's roar*.

Finally, the Buddha declares: "I am absolutely truthful. I am the teacher of the whole world and I am omniscient (sarvajña). Let those who doubt or who do not believe come and I will explain to them." This is why the sūtra says: In the assemblies I utter the lion's roar.

The Buddha *utters the lion's roar*. He is like the king of the lions (*siṃharāja*).

[*Prosopeia of the Buddha-lion*.].<sup>712</sup> – This lion-king is born of a pure race. He dwells in the deep mountains and great valleys. He has a square jaw, large bones and his flesh is fat and full. His head is large, his eyes are wide, brilliant and clear. His eyebrows are arched and pure white. His muzzle is big, heavy and massive. His teeth are sharp, joined, pointed, and he shows a pink tongue. His ears are pricked up high and his mane is striking. The forepart of his body is broad; his skin and flesh are firm. He has a long spine, a narrow waist and an invisible belly. He has a long tail, sharp claws and well-planted paws. He has a big body and great strength. When he comes out of his den, he bends and stretches his spine. Striking the ground with his paw, he manifests his great power. He does not let the hour of his meal pass by, he announces the dawn and shows the strength of the lion-king. He terrifies the deer, bears, tigers, leopards and wild boars. He awakens those who have been sleeping for a long time; he humbles the strong and powerful. He opens the way for himself by uttering loud roars. When he roars in this way, those who hear him are either joyful or fearful. The animals who live in holes hide; those who live in the water dive deeply; those who live in the mountains withdraw; the tame elephants shake off their fetters and flee in bewilderment; the birds fly off into the sky and, gaining altitude, disappear in the distance.<sup>713</sup>

The Buddha-lion is very similar. He is born into the great families of the six perfections ( $p\bar{a}ramit\bar{a}$ ) and the four ancient stocks of saints ( $\bar{a}ryavam\dot{s}a$ ).<sup>714</sup> He lives in the high mountain of cessation (nirodha) and the deep valley of the  $dhy\bar{a}nas$  and the  $sam\bar{a}pattis$ . The acquisition of the knowledge of all the aspects

These eight assemblies are mentioned in the canonical sources: Dīgha, II, p. 109; III, p. 260; Majjhima, I, p. 72; Aṅguttara, IV, p. 307-308; Sanskrit Mahāparinirvāṇa, p. 138, 142, 300. The lists show some variations.

Prosopeia using canonical texts; cf. Manorathapūranī, III, p. 65-72.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>713</sup> Cf. Anguttara, II, p. 33; Samyutta, III, p. 84-85.

<sup>714</sup> Dīgha, III, p. 224-225.

(sarvākārajñāna) is his head. The accumulation of the roots of good (kuśalamūla) is his muzzle. The pure right vision (anāsrava samyagdrṣṭi) is his brilliant eye. The practices of concentration (samādhi) and wisdom (prajñā) are his high wide eyebrows. The four fearlessnesses are his white sharp canine teeth. The unhindered liberations (apratihatavimokşa) are his perfect muzzle. The four right efforts (samyakpradhāna) are his strong chin. The thirty-seven auxiliaries of enlightenment (bodhipākṣika) are his sharp teeth, joined and pointed. The practice of the meditation on the horrible (aśubhabhāvana) is his pink tongue. Mindfulness (smrti) and wisdom (prajñā) are his pricked-up ears. The eighteen special attributes (āvenikadharma) are his dazzling shiny mane. The three gates of deliverance (vimokṣamukha) are the forepart of his body with firm flesh. The three wonders (prātihārya)<sup>715</sup> are his long spine. The perfection of the sciences and practices (vidyācaraṇasampad) is his invisible belly. Patience (kṣānti) is his narrow waist. The practice of solitude (praviveka) is his long tail. The four foundations of magical power (rddhipāda) are his well-planted paws. The five faculties (indriya) of the aśaikṣa are his sharp claws. The ten powers (bala) are his enormous strength. The collection of the pure dharmas (anāsravadharma) is his perfect body. The royal concentrations of the Buddhas (buddhasamādhirāja) are the den out of which he comes. It is with the four unhindered knowledges (pratisamvid) that he stretches out (vijrmabhati). It is on the earth of the dharmas that he strikes the paw of his unhindered liberations (ānantaryavimokṣa). Based on the ten powers, he does not [244b] let the time of saving beings pass by. It is to the entire world with its gods and men that he announces (the morning of deliverance). He manifests all the qualities of the king of Dharma. He terrifies the heretics (*tīrthika*), the scholars (*upadeśācārya*) and the heterodox. He awakens to the four truths those who have been sleeping. He humbles the pride and haughtiness (mānastambha) of those who are attached to the five aggregates (pañcaskandha) as their self. He opens the way through the theories (upadeśa) and wrong views (mithyādrṣṭi) of the heretics (pāsanda). Bad people (mithyācarita) are afraid and good faithful people (adhimukta) rejoice. He spurs on the lazy, he comforts his disciples and he destroys the heretics  $(t\bar{i}rthika)$ . The gods of long life  $(d\bar{i}rgh\bar{a}yu\bar{s}a)$  who for ages have enjoyed heavenly bliss finally recognize impermanence (anityatā). Thus, beings who hear the lion's roar of the four truths all experience a mind of disgust (nirvedacitta) for the world; being disgusted, they withdraw from it; being withdrawn from it, they enter into nrvāna.

This is the meaning of the expression: *In the assemblies, I utter the lioon's roar.* 

Moreover, there are differences between the roar of the Buddha and the roar of the lion.

When the lion roars, all the animals  $(pa\acute{s}u)$  fear either death or the sufferings of coming close to death. When the Buddha roars, it is to abolish the fear of death.

When the lion roars, he causes the fear, from age to age, of the sufferings of death. When the Buddha roars, he announces death in the present lifetime and the absence of all later suffering.

When the lion roars, his voice is rough and unpleasant and nobody likes to hear it because it brings fear of saṃsāra. When the Buddha roars, his voice is sweet (mṛduka): those who hear it do not tire of it and

<sup>715</sup> Dīgha, III, p. 220.

everybody is deeply happy. It is heard everywhere at a distance and can bring two kinds of happiness: *i*) the happiness of a rebirth among the gods and *ii*) the happiness of nirvāṇa.

These are the differences.

Question. – But when the Buddha roars, it is to frighten his listeners also; how does his roar differ from that of the lion?

Answer. – Those who hear the roar of the Buddha are somewhat afraid for some moments but afterwards are greatly benefited.

People attached to the idea of a self (ātmacittābhiniviṣṭa), hoping for the happiness of this world (lokasukhādhimukta), bound by the errors (viparyāsa) consisting of believing to be eternal [that which is not eternal], having their minds disturbed by wrong views (mithyādṛṣṭi): these are the ones who are afraid [when they hear the Buddha's preaching]. Thus it is said in a sūtra:

"When the Buddha preaches the four truths (satya), even the higher gods are afraid and think: 'So we too are impermanent (anitya), full of suffering (duhkha), impersonal (anatman) and empty (sativata tangent tang

This is the difference.

Furthermore, all those who hear the roar of the lion are afraid except those who have renounced desire  $(v\bar{t}tar\bar{a}ga)$ . When the Buddha roars an invitation to nirvāṇa, even those who have renounced desire are afraid.

When the lion roars, the good and the bad are afraid. When the Buddha roars, only the good are afraid.

Furthermore, when the lion roars, he frightens at all times. When the Buddha roars, he does indeed frighten beings a little by revealing the world's defects for those who hope to be born there no more. But by making them see the qualities and advantages of nirvāṇa, he drives away all the fears of the world, he closes the bad destinies (*durgati*), he opens the good path and he makes people reach nirvāṇa.

Finally, there are twenty reasons why the Buddha's voice is called the lion's roar: 1) it depends on the ten powers; 2) it is not too concise; 3) it is not too [244c] prolix; 4) it has the accents of Brahmā; 5) it is wondrous (*adbhūta*); 6) it leads the great assemblies; 7) it frightens wicked Māra; 8) it throws Māra's people into disorder; 9) it makes the gods rejoice; 10) it delivers one from Māra's net; 11) it breaks Māra's fetters; 12) it breaks Māra's fish-hook; 13) it bypasses Māra's domain; 14) it increases its own system; 15) it reduces others' systems; 16) its fruit of retribution is not deceptive; 17) his preaching is not futile; 18) worldly people (*pṛthagjana*) enter into the noble Path; 19) those who have entered the noble Path obtain

716 Sīhasutta of Saṃyutta, III, p. 85 and Anguttara, II, p. 33: Ye pi te bhikkhave devā dīghāyuskā vaṇṇavanto sukhabahulā uccesu vimānesu ciraṭṭhitikā te pi kho Tathāgatassa dammadesanaṃ sutvā yebhuyyena bhayaṃ samvegaṃ santāsaṃ āpajjanti. Aniccāva kira bho mayaṃ samānā nicc'amhā ti amaññimha, addhuvā kira bho mayaṃ samānādhuv'amhā ti amaññimha, asassatā va kira bho mayaṃ

samānā sassatā tiamaññimha. Mayaṃ hi kira bho aniccā addhuvā asassatā sakkāyapariyāpannā ti.

complete destruction of the impurities (āsravakṣaya); 20) according to needs, one acquires the three Vehicles. This is why the Buddha's voice is called the roaring of the lion.

In its general characteristics (*sādhāraṇalakṣaṇa*) and its specific characteristics (*svalakṣaṇa*) this is the meaning of the Roar of the Lion.

#### G. "I turn the Wheel of Brahmā"

I turn the Wheel of Brahmā. – Because it is pure (viśuddha), it is called 'of Brahmā'. The wisdom of the Buddha (buddha prajñā) and of the Dharma associated with his wisdom (tatprajñāsaṃprayuktadharma) is called 'Wheel'. Because those who adopt it follow the Dharma (anudharmaṃ caranti), it is a wheel.<sup>717</sup>

[The Wheel of Brahmā]. – This wheel has the four perfect foundations of mindfulness (smṛṭyupasthāna) as its hub (nābhi). The five spiritual faculties (indriya) and the five strengths (bala) are its spokes (ara). The four foundations of magical power (rddhipāda) are its solid rim (nemi) and the right efforts  $(samyakpradh\bar{a}na)$  are the joints. The three liberations (vimoksa) are its pegs  $(\bar{a}n\bar{i})$ . Concentration (samādhi) and wisdom (prajñā) are the coachman. Pure morality (anāsravaśīla) is the perfume with which it is sprinkled. The seven factors of enlightenment (sambodhyanga) are the varied flowers with which it is ornamented. Right view (samyagdrsti) is its turning to the right. Purity of faith (cittaprasāda) is its beauty. Right exertion (samyagvīrya) is its speed. The fearless lion's roar is its pleasant sound which frightens Māra's wheel, breaks the twelve-membered wheel [of dependent origination] (dvādašāngapratītyasamutpada), destroys the wheel of samsāra, drives away the wheel of the passions (kleśa), derails the wheel of karma, stalls the wheel of the world and crushes the wheel of suffering. It brings forth the joy of the yogins and the respect of gods and men.

No one [other than the Buddha] can turn this Wheel for it consists of the Dharma of the Buddha. This is why the latter declares: *I turn the Wheel of Brahmā*.

[*The Wheel of the Buddha and the wheel of the cakravartin.*] – Moreover, the Buddha turns the Wheel of the Dharma like the noble cakravartin king turns the jewel of the wheel.<sup>718</sup>

Ouestion. – What resemblance is there between the Buddha and the noble cakravartin king?<sup>719</sup>

Answer. – This king is pure and takes birth in an unmixed lineage (vaṃśa). In accordance with his family (kula), his actions are perfect. All the physical signs (lakṣaṇa) adorn his body. His royal virtues are complete and he is able to turn the jewel of the wheel. Anointed with perfumed water on his head (mūrdhābhiṣikta), he takes up his royal rank and reigns over the four continents (caturdvīpa). He has destroyed banditry so well that no one dares to oppose him. His treasury of jewels is abundant and the morale of his troops is raised by the presence of the seven jewels (of the cakravartin). He wins over

More details will be found in Manorathapūranī, III, p. 9-10.

The wheel (*cakra*) is one of the seven jewels with which the cakravartin king is furnished: cf. Dīgha, II, p. 17, 172-177.

<sup>719</sup> A subject already discussed above, p. 116F.

(samgrahavastu) all beings by the four methods of captivating. He exercises the royal law well and delegates the noble families. He governs the kingdom by means of his prefects, his soldiers and his ministers. He loves to distribute his most precious wealth. From beginning to end, his knowledge and his mindfulness are unchanging.

The Buddha, king of the Dharma, is just like that. The Buddha - Śākyamuni, Dīpamkara, Ratnapuspa, etc. – takes birth in the pure family of the Buddhas. He actualizes the bodily positions ( $\bar{i}ry\bar{a}patha$ ) of the previous Buddhas. He possesses all of the thirty-two physical marks (lakṣaṇa) that serve him as [245a] adornments. His attitudes as Holy Teacher ( $\bar{a}rṣery\bar{a}patha$ ) being perfect, he turns the true Wheel of Dharma. He receives the crucial anointment with the elixir of wisdom ( $praj\bar{n}\bar{a}ras\bar{a}yana$ ): he is the elder in the triple world (jyeṣta). He destroys the bandits that are the conflicting emotions (kleśa). None dare to transgress the precepts ( $ś\bar{i}la$ ) that he has put in place; the assemblies of śaikṣas and aśaikṣas rejoice. The immense precious treasure of his Dharma is filled. The seven factors of enlightenment are his ornament; the eighty-four thousand articles of the Dharma (dharmaskandha) are his troops. By means of the four supraworldly means of captivating ( $lokottara\ samgrahavastu$ ), he wins over beings. He knows the skillful means ( $up\bar{a}ya$ ), he peaches the Dharma of the four noble truths ( $\bar{a}ryasatya$ ): that is the attitude of a king of Dharma. Great generals ( $sen\bar{a}pati$ ) such as Śāriputra, (ramastarata), Maitreya, etc., govern the Buddha's kingdom well. He loves to share his most precious wealth: the pure spiritual faculties (indriya), the powers (bala), the [factors] of enlightenment (sambodhyanga). He carefully seeks for the good of beings and the mindfulness that he keeps is firm.

These are the similarities.

Furthermore, the Buddha is superior to the noble cakravartin king.

The noble cakravartin king has not eliminated all the passions (*kleśa*); the Buddha has eliminated them definitively.

The noble cakravartin king is plunged in the mud (panka) of old age  $(jar\bar{a})$  and death (marana); the Buddha has come out of it.

The noble cakravartin king is subject to the emotions; the Buddha has transcended them.

The noble cakravartin king follows the dangerous path of samsāra; the Buddha has transcended it.

The noble cakravartin king is immersed in the shadows of error (*mohatamas*); the Buddha lives in the supreme light (*paramāloka*).

The noble cakravartin king reigns over a maximum of four continents (*caturdvīpa*); the Buddha reigns over innumerable and infinite universes.

720 Śāriputra was called *dharmasenāpati* 'general of the Dharma') Apadāna, I, p. 29, 44; Theragāthā, p. 96), while Ānanda bore the title of *dharmabhāṇdāgmarika* 'treasurer of the Dharma'.

The noble calravartin king has at his disposal material jewels (āmiṣaratna); the Buddha has at his disposal the jewels of the spirit (*cittaratna*).

The noble cakravartin king aspires to celestial bliss (*divyasukha*); the Buddha who has attained the bliss of the summit of existence (*bhavāgra*) has renounced it.

The noble cakravartin king derives his happiness from others; the Buddha fosters happiness by his own mind.

This is why the Buddha is far superior to the noble cakravartin king.

Moreover, the noble cakravartin king whose hand turns the jewel of the wheel encounters no obstacle in space; the Buddha who turns the Wheel of the Dharma encounters neither obstacle nor resistance in the entire world with its gods and men.

Those who see the jewel of the wheel eliminate the material poisons (*viṣa*); those who encounter the Wheel of the Dharma of the Buddha eliminate the poison of all the passions (*kleśa*).

Those who see the jewel of the wheel avoid calamities (*vipatti*) and torments (*viheṭhana*); those who encounter the Wheel of the Dharma of the Buddha see the calamities and the torments of all wrong views (*mithyādṛṣṭi*) and all doubts (*viciktsā*) disappear.

The king with his wheel governs four continents (*caturdvīpa*); the Buddha with the Wheel of the Dharma governs the entire world with its gods and men and makes them obtain mastery over the Dharma (*dharmavaśita*).

These are the resemblances.

Moreover, the Wheel of the Dharma has great superiority over the jewel of the wheel.

The jewel of the wheel is deceptive; the Wheel of the Dharma is absolutrly truthful.

The jewel of the wheel increases the fire of the three poisons (*triviṣāgni*); the Wheel of the Dharma extinguishes the fire of the three poisons.

The jewel of the wheel is impure (sāsrava); the Wheel of the Dharma is pure (anāsrava).

The jewel of the wheel is connected to the happiness resulting from the five objects of enjoyment (pañcakāmaguṇa); the Wheel of the Dharma is connected to the happiness of the Dharma.

The jewel of the wheel is a basis for fetters (*saṃyojanasthāna*); the Wheel of the Dharma is not a basis for fetters.

The jewel of the wheel has a limited domain (*mitagocara*); the Wheel of the Dharma has an unlimited domain (*apramaṇagocara*).

The jewel of the wheel can be acquired from lifetime to lifetime thanks to [245b] a single purity of mind (*cittaviśuddhi*) or a gift; the Wheel of the Dharma is acquired thanks to all the causes for good actions and the wisdoms accumulated for innumerable incalculable periods (*asamkhyeyakalpa*).

The jewel of the wheel no longer turns when the king is dead; the Wheel of the Dharma still keep turning after the Buddha's nirvāna.

The jewel of the wheel belongs to one single person; the Wheel of the Dharma belongs to all beings capable of being converted (*vaineyasattva*).

[Wheel of Brahmā or Wheel of the Dharma.] – Moreover, [in the expression Brahmacakra], brahma means vast (bṛhat), for the Wheel of the Buddha or the Wheel of the Dharma extends everywhere in the ten directions.

Furthermore, it is called the Wheel of Brahmā because the Buddha teaches the four abodes of Brahmā (*brahmavihāra*), because at the very beginning, when the Buddha attained enlightenment, Brahmā, the king of the gods, invited him to turn the Wheel of the Dharma, because at Benares when the Buddha turned the Wheel of the Dharma and Ājñāta Kauṇḍinya obtained the Path, the Buddha voice penetrated as far as the Brahmā heaven, or else because there are people who respect the god Brahmā and want to please him.

Question. - Sometimes the Buddha says Wheel of the Dharma, sometimes Wheel of Brahmā. 721

Answer. – There is no diffrence between Wheel of Brahmā and Wheel of Dharma. However, according to some, we say Wheel of Brahmā when it discloses the four immeasurables (*paramāṇacitta*), and Wheel of the Dharma when it teaches the four noble truths.

Furthermore, we say Wheel of Brahmā when the path is acquired thanks to the four immeasurables, and Wheel of the Dharma when it is acquired thanks to some other thing.

The Wheel of Brahmā teaches the four *dhyānas*, and the Wheel of the Dharma teaches the thirty-seven auxiliaries of enlightenment (*bodhipākṣikadharma*). The Wheel of Brahmā teaches the path consisting of the practice of concentration (*samādhibhāvanā*), and the Wheel of the Dharma teaches the path consisting of the cultivation of wisdom (*prajñābhāvanā*).

These are the various distinctions to be made between the Wheel of Brahmā and the Wheel of the Dharma.

# 7. Nature and Order of the Fearlessnesses

Question. – What is the nature (svabhāva) of the fearlessnesses (vaiśāradya)?

Answer. – When the Buddha attained enlightenment, he obtained all the attributes of Buddha, the powers (*bala*), the absence of fear (*abhaya*), etc. Subsequently, he obtained the dharmas associated with knowledge free of fear (*abhayajñānasaṃprayuktadharma*), dharmas called fearlessnesses. Similarly also [the dharma] associated with the four immeasurables is called *maitra*.

<sup>721</sup> See references above, p. 467F, note 2.

<sup>722</sup> The Kośabhāṣya explains, p. 414, l. 8: Jñānakṛtam vaiśārdyam yujyate, na jñānam eva:

<sup>&</sup>quot;Fearlessness is the result of knowledge, but it is not knowledge."

Question. – What is the order (krama) of these four fearlessnesses?

Answer. – In the first fearlessness, the Buddha declares that he knows all dharmas (sarvadharmābhisaṃbodhi). Since he knows all dharmas, he affirms that he has destroyed the impurities (āsravakṣaya). Since he has destroyed the impurities, he claims to know the dharmas that are obstacles to the Path (mārgāntarāyikadharma). Since he has destroyed these dharmas that are obstacles, he preaches the Path (mārgavyākarana).

Furthermore, the first fearlessness is like the master physician (*bhaiśajyaguru*) in possession of all the remedies (*oṣadhi*). The second proclaims the destruction of all sicknesses (*vyādhikṣaya*). The third knows what one should abstain from. The fourth proclaims the foods that it is necessary to take.

Finally, in the first fearlessness, the Buddha speaks of the awareness [of things] under all their aspects (sarvakārajñāna). In the second fearlessness, he speaks of the absence of all the passions (kleśa) and their traces (vāsanā). In the third fearlessness, he preaches a Dharma without deceit or fault. In the fourth fearlessness, he deals with things that bring one to nirvāṇa.

# Second Section THE TEN POWERS AND THE FOUR FEARLESSNESSES ACCORDING TO THE MAHĀYĀNA

#### PRELIMINARY NOTE

In the preceding chapter and in the first section of the present chapter, the *Traité* has spoken of the ten powers (*bala*) and the four fearlessnesses (*vaiśāradya*) of the Buddha according to the doctrine of the Sūtras and the Abhidharma. Now it will discuss the conceptions of the Mahāyāna in regard to the same subject.

It will position itself successively from the absolute truth point of view (*paramārthasatya*) and the relative truth point of view (*samvṛtisatya*).

1. From the absolute point of view, the *balas* and the *vaiśāradyas* are without distinctive natures and, like all other dharmas, come within the emptiness of non-existence (*anupalambhaśūnyatā*) in terms of which "dharmas, whether past, future of [present, do not exist at all" (Pañcaviṃśati, p. 197, l. 15-16: *ye dharmā atītānāgatapratyutpannās te nopalabhyante*).

Bala and Vaiśāradya fall under the judgment of the Prajñāpmaramitāsūtras (Pañcaviṃśati, p. 146, l. 9-20; Śatasāhastikā, p. 839, l. 13-842, l. 17):

"The bodhisattva does not grasp (*nopalabhate*) the ātman, whatever the names by which it is designated: sattva, jīva, poṣa, puruṣa, pudgala, manuja, mānava, kmaraka, vedaka, jānaka, paśyaka. He does not grasp things, skandha, dhātu, āyatana, or their pratītyasamutpāda. He does not grasp the noble truths, duḥkha,

samudaya, nirodha, mārga. He does not grasp the threefold world, kāma-, rūpa- and ārūpyadhātu. He does not grasp the levels of concentration, apramāṇa, dhyāna and ārūpyasamāpatti. He does not grasp the thirty-seven auxiliaries of enlightenment, smṛṭyupasthāna, samyakpradhāna, ṛddhipāda, indriya, bala, bodhyaṅnga and mārga. He does not grasp the Buddha attributes, daśabala, caturvaiśāradya, aṣṭādaśāveṇika. He does not grasp the categories of saints, srotaāpanna, sakṛdāgamin, anāgamin, pratyekabuddha, bodhisattva, buddha. If he does not grasp them, it is because of their absolute purity (atyantaviśuddhitā). What is this purity? Non-production (anutpāda), non-manifestation (aprādurbhāva), non-existence (anupalambha), non-activity (anabhisaṃskāra)."

2. From the relative or conventional pont of view, it is permissible to consider things and to find their distinctive characteristics for, just as empty space  $(\bar{a}k\bar{a}\dot{s}a)$  does not oppose matter, so "the emptiness of non-existence is not an obstacle to any dharma."

Provided that he is not attached at all to his mind - in other words, provided that he recognizes its fundamental non-existence - the bodhisattva can, for the purpose of saving beings, discourse very well on the various attributes of the Buddha: the ten *balas*, the four *vaiśaradyas*, the four *pratisamvids* and the eighteen *āveṇikabuddhadharmas*.

The sūtras and the Hīnayāna Abhidharmas make no distinction between Buddha attributes and bodhisattva attributes for the valid reason that the bodhisattva is a future Buddha and between the former and the latter there can be only a difference of degree and not of nature.

The Prajñāpāramitāsūtras have remained at this stage. Thus the Pañcaviṃśati (p. 203-212), setting out to define the Mahāyāna, suggest twenty-one practices to be completely fulfilled (paripūrayitavya) or to be imitated (śikṣitavya). The first seventeen are dharmas of the śrāvaka: 1) four smṛṭyupasthānas, 2) four samyakpradhānas, 3) four ṛḍdhipādas, 4) five indriyas, 5) five balas, 6) seven bodhyaṅgas, 7) eight mārgāṅgas, 8) three samādhis, 9) eleven jñānas, 10) three indriyas, 11) three samādhis, 12) ten anusmṛṭis, 13) four dhyānas, 14) four apramānas, 15) four samāpattis, 16) eight vimokṣas, 17) nine anupūrvavihāras). The last four are Buddha dharmas: [18) ten tathāgatabalas, 19) four vaiśāradyas, 20) four pratisaṃvids, 21) eighteen āveṇikabuddhadharmas]. Nowhere is there any mention made of dharmas belonging strictly to the bodhisattva.

But in a later approach, other Mahāyānasūtras have deemed it proper to propose, apart from these Buddha attributes, a series of bodhisattva attributes distinct from the preceding, but also including ten *balas*, four *vaiśāradyas*, four *pratisaṃvids* and eighteen *āveṇikadharmas*.

Although the *Traité* presents itself simply as a faithful commentary on the *Prajñāpāramitāsūtra*, it does not hesitate to borrow these lists of bodhisattva dharmas from the more recent Māhayānasūtras. Its or their authors want to appear as knowledgable of the latest progress in scholasticism with the result that, from the scholastic point of view, an important Mahāyanist production has been intercalated between the Prajñāpāramitasūtras and the *Traité*.

With the exception of the eighteen  $\bar{a}venikabuddhadharmas$  which the old texts do not mention, the lists of Buddha attributes, namely, the ten balas, four  $vais\bar{a}radyas$  and the four pratisanvids, have been fixed since the time of the canonical sutras ( $nik\bar{a}ya$  and  $\bar{a}gama$ ) and are maintained practically without any change throughout the later literature.

It was not the same for the lists of bodhisattva dharmas, the elaboration of which has given room for hesitation and alteration. Here I [Lamotte] will examine only the Mahāyānasūtras with which the *Traité* was familiar and which make up its sources and I will designate them by the following:

 $\dot{\mathbf{S}} = \dot{\mathbf{S}}$ ūraṃgamasamādhisūtra.

V = Vikurvaņarājaparipṛcchasūtra

A = Buddhāvataṃsaka.

 $\mathbf{R} = \text{Ratnameghas}\bar{\mathbf{u}}\text{tra}.$ 

 $\mathbf{Vyut} = \mathbf{Mah}\mathbf{\bar{a}}\mathbf{vyut}$ patti, dependent on the preceding ones.

#### 1. First list of ten bodhisattvabalas:

**Ś**. – T 642, k. 2, p. 643a25-b3 (p. 254-255 in my [Lamotte's] translation of the Ś*ūraṃgamasamādhi*). – Tib. Trip., vol. 32, vol. 32, no. 800, fol. 330b2-4.

V. – T 420, k. 2, p. 932c13-27. – T 421, k. 2, p. 945b8-25. – Tib. Trip., vol. 33, no. 834, p. 263, fol. 213b1-214a2.

It is this first list that the *Traité* will adopt here.

2. Second list of ten bodhisattvabalas:

**A**. – T 278, k. 39, p.649c5-14. – T 279, k. 56, p. 295b29-c10; Tib. Trip., vol. 26, no. 761, p. 84, fol. 204b1-8.

**R**. – T 660, k. 4, p. 301b14-17. – T 489, k. 7, p. 722b7-11. – Tib. Trip., vol. 35, no. 897, p. 192, fol. 50b6-7. **Vyut.**, no. 760-769.

List I	List II
1. dṛḍhādhyāśayabala	1. āśayabala
2. sarvasattvāparityāgabala	2. adhyāśayabala
3. mahākaruṇābala	3. prayogabala
4. mahāvīryabala	4. prajñābala
5. samādhibala	5. praṇidhānabala

6. prajñābala

6. yānabala

7. saṃsāraparikhedabala

7. caryābala

8. anutpattikadharmakṣāntibala

8. vikurvaņabala

9. vimuktibala

9. bodhibala

10. pratisamvidbala

10. dharmacakrapravartanabala

# 3. List of four bodhisattvavaiśāradyas:

V. – T 420, k. 2, p. 932c27-933a7. – T 421, k. 2, p. 945b-c10.– Tib.Trip., vol. 33, no. 834, p. 263, fol. 214a2-8.

**R** .- T 660, k. 4, p. 301b17-25. – T 489, k. 7, p. 722b11-19. – Tib. Trip., vol. 35, no. 897, p.192, fol. 50b7-51a3.

Vyut., no. 782-785.

This is the list adopted by the *Traité* here.

4. List of ten bodhisattvavaiśāradyas:

**A**. – T 278, k. 39, p. 649c16-650b24. – T 279, k. 56, p. 295c11-296b17.- Tib. Trip., vol. 26, no. 761, p. 84-85, fol. 204b8-207b1.

5. First list of eighteen āveņikabodhisattvadharmas:

V. – T 420, k. 2, p. 933a7-934b3. – T 421, k. 2, p. 945c11-947b4. – Tib. Trip., vol. 33, no. 834, fol. 214b1-218b4.

6. Second list of eighteen āveņikabodhisattvadharmas:

**R**. – T 660, k. 4, p. 301b25-c12. – T 489. k. 7, p. 722b19-c4. – Tib. Trip., vol. 35, no. 897, p. 192, fol. 51a3-51b2.

Vyut., no. 787-804.

7. List of ten āveņikabodhisattvadharmas:

**A**. – T 278, k. 40, p. 650c4-651b21. – T 279, k. 56, p. 296b20-297b1. – Tib. Trip., vol. 26, no. 761, p. 85-86, fol. 207b2-210b2.

8. List of ten bodhisattvasamādhis:

**R**. – T 660, k. 4, p. 301a11-17. – T 489, k. 7, p. 722a7-12. – Tib. Trip., vol. 35, no, 897, p. 192, fol. 50a1-3. **Vyut**., no. 737-745.

9. List of twelve bodhisattvadhāraṇīs:

**R**. – T 660, k. 4, p. 301a18-25. – T 489, k. 7, p. 722a12-17. – Tib. Trip., vol 35, no. 897, p. 192, fol50a3-6. **Vyut**., no. 747-758.

10. List of six bodhisattvābhijñās:

R. – T 660, k. 4, p. 301a25-28. – T 489, k. 7, p. 722a17-20. – Tib. Trip., vol. 35, no. 897, p. 192, fol. 50a6-7.

11. List of ten bodhisattvavaśitas:

**R**. – T 660, k. 4, p. 301a28-b14. – T 489, k. 7, p. 722a20-b7. – Tib. Trip., vol 35, no. 897, p. 192, fol. 50a7-50b5.

Vyut. - no. 771-780.

It may be noted that the lists of bodhisattva dharmas given here do not appear in the two oldest Chinese translations of the Ratnameghasūtra: the Pao yun king (T658) made by Mandrasena in 503, and the Ta tch'eng pao yun king (T 659) made by Mandrasena and Seng k'ie p'o lo.

[k. 25, p. 245c]

# I. THE EMPTINESS OF NONEXISTENCE

Question. – In the Prajñāpāramitā it is said that [the dharmas], from the five aggregates (skandha) up to the ten balas, the four vaiśāradyas and the eighteen [245c]  $\bar{a}veṇikadharmas$ , are all empty (śūnya). Why then do you distinguish the characteristics here?

Answer. – In the Buddhadharma, the emptiness of non-existence  $(anupalambhaśūnyat\bar{a})$  is not an obstacle to any dharma. It is precisely because of the emptiness of non-existence that one can speak of the teachings

<sup>723</sup> Pañcaviṃśati, p. 146, l. 9-20: Śatasahāsrikā, p. 839, l. 13-842, l. 17; passage cited above, p. 1605F.

of the Buddha or of the twelve classes of texts ( $dv\bar{a}da\dot{s}\bar{a}ngabuddhavacana$ ). In the same way, it is because space ( $\bar{a}k\bar{a}\dot{s}a$ ) is nothing at all that everything depends on it and develops.

Furthermore, if here we distinguish powers (bala) and fearlessnesses (vaiśāradya), it is not that we are grasping characteristics (nimittodgrahaṇa) or that we are attaching our mind (cittābhiniveśa) to them; we want only to save beings, for knowing that the being comes from causes and conditions (hetupratyayotpanna) [and is not independent] is to obtain deliverance (vimukti). In the same way, the medicinal plant (oṣadhi) is used only to cure the sickness and not at all to investigate the characteristics (nimitta) of the medicinal plant.

See what is said by the *Tchong-louen* (Madhyamakaśāstra):

If you believe in the emptiness of dharmas

You are in agreement with logic.

If you do not believe in the emptiness of dharmas,

Everything becomes contradictory.<sup>724</sup>

If one rejected emptiness,

There would be nothing more to do.

Activity would exist without being undertaken,

One would be agent without being active.<sup>725</sup>

724 Madh. kārikā, XXIV, 14, p. 55; Tchong louen, T 1564, k. 4, p. 33a22-23:

Sarvam ca yujyate tasya śūnyatā yasya yujyate / sarvam na yujyate tasya śūnyam na yujyate //

Transl. J. May, *Candrakīrti*, p. 234: "If emptiness is logical, everything is logical; if it is absurd, everything is absurd."

The translator compares this stanza of the Vigrahavyāvartanī, ed. Johnston and Kunst, p. 150:

Prabhavati ca śūnyateyam yasya prabhavanti tasya sarvārthāḥ/ prabhavati na tasya kiṃcinna prabhavati śūnyatā yasya //

S. Yamaguchi, *Pour écarter les vaines discussions*, JA, 1929, p. 60. translates: "Where non-substantiality is possible, everything is possible. Where non-substantiality is not possible, nothing is possible."

For the Madhyamaka, dependent origination (*pratītyasamutpāda*) equals emptiness (*śūnyatā*) and, in this regard, Candrakīrti, in his Madh. vṛtti, p. 500, cites the well-known stanza:

Yaḥ pratyayair jāyati sa hy ajāto na tasya utpāda svabhāvato 'sti / yaḥ pratyayādhinu sa śūnya ukto yaḥ śūnaytaṃ jānmati so 'pramattaḥ //

"That which arises from conditions is not born really; its production does not exist as intrinsic nature. That which depends on conditions is called empty. He who knows emptiness is free of mistakes."

This [true] nature of dharmas,

Who then would be able to conceive of it?

Only the pure and straight mind.

Here words have no foundation.<sup>726</sup>

Eliminate the views of existence and non-existence

And the mind will be exhausted inwardly by itself.<sup>727</sup>

Question. – This is how the śrāvaka system speaks of the ten powers (bala) and the four fearlessnesses (vaiśāradya). How does the Mahāyāna distinguish them in its turn?

Answer. – An exhaustive knowledge, a universal knowledge, is contained in these ten *balas* and four *vaiśāradyas*, and it is in this regard that the ten *balas* and four *vaiśāradyas* are spoken of in the Mahāyāna.

725 Madh. kārikā, XXIV, 37, p. 513; Tchong louen, T 1564, k. 4, p. 34b18-19:

Na kartavyam bhavet kimcid anārabdhā bhavet kriyā / kārakaḥ syād akurvāṇaḥ śūnyatām pratibādhatas //

"There would be nothing to do; activity would exist without being undertaken; one could be agent without doing anything if one rejects emptiness."

In other words, denying emptiness is to condemn oneself to imputing a sin that he has not committed (*akṛtābhyāgama*) to an innocent person and to considering as nothing and non-existent every accomplished action (*kṛtavupraṇāśa*): cf. Madh. vṛtti, p. 325,. l. 3, and note; Pañjikā, p. 469, l. 9; Mahāvyut., no. 7529-7530.

726 Madh. kārikā, XVIII, 7, p. 365; Tchong louen, T 1564, k. 3, p. 24a3-4:

Nivṛttam abhidhātavyaṃ nivṛtte cittagocare / anutpannāniruddhā hi nirvāṇam iva dharmatā //

"All that can be named is destroyed if the object of the mind is destroyed. Indeed the [true] nature of things in unborn, not destroyed, like nirvāṇa."

727 Unidentified stanza, but several centuries later, Śāntideva expressed himself in almost the same terms (Bodhicaryāvatāra, IX, st. 35):

Yadā na bhāvo nābhāvo mateḥ saṃtiṣṭhate puraḥ / tadānayagatyabhāvena nirālambā praśāmyati //

"When existence or non-existence no longer arise to the mind, then without any other alternative, the mind, deprived of object, is exhausted."

It is said that after having pronounced this stanza, Śāntideva rose up into the sky and disappeared.

Question. – But in the śrāvaka system it is also a question of this exhaustive knowledge, this universal knowledge. 728 Why does the Mahāyāna return to it?

Answer. – The scholars (*upadeśācārya*) say the following: That the Buddha cognizes in an exhaustive way, a universal way, was not said by the Buddha himself; it is here in the Mahāyāna and in regard to the ten *balas* and the four *vaiśāradyas* that the Buddha himself declares that he cognizes in an exhaustive way, in a universal way.

Furthermore, when he preaches the ten *balas* and four *vaiśāradyas* to the śrāvakas, it is in connection with the four truths (*catuḥsatya*), the twelve causes (*dvādaśasnidāna*) and other śrāvaka theories all serving to arrive at nirvāṇa. But here in the Mahāyāna, when he preaches the ten *balas* and four *vaiśāradyas*, it is in connection with great compassion (*mahākaruṇā*), the true nature (*bhūtalakṣaṇa*) of dharmas and the doctrine of non-arising (*anutpāda*) and non-cessation (*anirodha*).

# II. THE TEN POWERS OF THE BODHISATTVA729

Question. – The Buddha possesses ten powers (*bala*) and four fearlessnesses (*vaiśāradya*). Does the bodhisattva possess them?

Answer. – He does possess them. What are they?

- 1) He makes the resolution [to reach] omniscience ( $sarvaj\tilde{n}at\bar{a}$ ): this is the power of high resolve ( $drdh\bar{a}dhy\bar{a}\dot{s}ayabala$ ).
- 2) Because he is endowed with great loving-kindness (*mahāmaitrīsamanvāgata*), he possesses the power of not abandoning beings (*sarvasattvāparityāgabala*).
- 3) Because he does not seek any benefit by way of worship  $(p\bar{u}j\bar{a})$  or veneration  $(satk\bar{a}ra)$ , he possesses the power of great compassion  $(mah\bar{a}karun\bar{a}bala)$ . [246a]
- 4) He believes in all the attributes of the Buddha and his mind never tires in order to reproduce them completely in himself; this is why he possesses the power of great exertion (*mahāvīryabala*).
- 5) He is mindful (*smṛtimat*) and he conducts himself intelligently<sup>730</sup> and does not transgress the attitudes ( $\bar{r}y\bar{a}patha$ ); this is why he possesses the power of the concentrations ( $sam\bar{a}dhibala$ ).
- 6) He avoids the pairs of extremes (antadvaya), he acts in conformity with the twelve-membered [pratītyasamutpāda], he destroys false views (mithyādṛṣṭi), he suppresses all thought (manasikāra), all

<sup>728</sup> Actually, in the definition of the ten balas, the canonical texts cited above, p. 1506F, each time use the word *pratijānati* to insist on the exhaustive and universal nature of these knowledges.

Here the *Traité* adopts the first list of 10 *bodhisattvabala*s already prepared by the Śūraṃgamasamādhi and the Vikurvaṇaparipṛcchā: see references cited above, p. 1606F.

<sup>730</sup> Adopting the variant *houei hing*.

discursiveness (*vikalpa*) and all idle proliferation (*prapañca*); this is why he possesses the power of wisdom (*prajñābala*).

- 7) He ripens beings (*sattvān paripācayati*), he takes on innumerable births and deaths (*apramaṇāni jātimaraṇāny ādadāti*), he relentlessly accumulates the roots of good (*kuśalamūlāny ācinoti*), he knows that the whole world is like a dream (*svapnasama*): this is why he possesses the power of being tireless in the voyage through transmigration (*saṃsārāparikhedabala*).
- 8) He sees the true nature (*bhūtalakṣaṇa*) of dharmas; he knows that there is neither one's self (*ātman*) nor beings (*sattva*); he is convinced (*adhimucyate*) that dharmas do not arise, are unborn: this is why he possesses the conviction that things are unborn (*anutpattikadharmaksāntibala*).
- 9) He has passed through the gates of liberation (*vimokṣamukha*), namely, emptiness (*śūnyatā*), signlessness (*ānimitta*) and wishlessness (*apraṇihita*); he knows and sees the liberation of the śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas: this is why he possesses the power of deliverance (*vimuktibala*).
- 10) He has mastery over the profound dharmas (*gambhīradharmavaśita*), he knows the wanderings of the mind and the behavior of beings (*sattvavittacaritragati*): this is why he possesses the power of the unhindered knowledges (*pratisaṃvidbala*).

These are the ten powers of the bodhisattva.

### III. THE FOUR FEARLESSNESSES OF THE BODHISATTVA<sup>731</sup>

What are the four fearlessnesses (vaiśāradya) of the bodhisattva?

- 1) He retains all that he has heard (śruta), he possesses the dhāraṇīs and he suffers no loss of memory (smṛtihāni): this is why [he possesses] the fearlessness of preaching the Dharma in the assemblies (parṣatsu dharmanirdeśavaiśāradya).
- 2) He has obtained liberation in all things (*sarvadarmeşu vimukti*), he distinguishes, cognizes and uses all the remedies of the Dharma (*dharmabhaiṣajya*) and he knows the spiritual faculties (*indriya*) of all beings: this is why he possesses the fearlessness of preaching the Dharma as is suitable in the great assemblies (*mahāparṣatsu anukūladharmanirdeśavaiśāradya*).
- 3) Having driven away every fear definitively, the bodhisattva never asks if there is anyone in the ten directions who could come and make objections (*codana*) to him and to whom he would be unable to answer. Not seeing any reason to fear that, he possesses the fearlessness of preaching the Dharma in the great assemblies.

Resuming the definitions already given above, p. 339F, the *Traité* here adopts the list of the 4 *bodhisattvavaiśāradyas* from the Vikurvaṇarājaparipṛchā and the Ratnamegha, a list also repeated in Mahāvyutpatti: see references above, p. 1607F.

4) He allows everyone to come and question him, and to each question he replies without the slightest hesitation (*samśaya*): this is why he has the fearlessness of preaching the Dharma in the great assemblies.

These are the four fearlessnesses of the bodhisattva.

# Third Section THE FOUR UNHINDERED KNOWLEDGES (p. 1614F)

#### PRELIMINARY NOTE

The *pratismvids*, literally 'special knowledges', in Pāli, *paţisambhidā*, in Tibetan *so so yan dag par rig pa*, in Chinese *ngai kiai, wou nagi tche, wou, ngai pien*, 'explanations, knowledges or unhindered speech' are the unimpeded, unfailing knowledges (*asaktam avivartyaṃ jñānam*) that make a good preacher.

The pratisamvids are four in number:

- 1. Arthapratisamvid: knowledge of the thing designated (bhāṣitārtha) or more precisely, knowledge of its self-nature (svalakṣaṇa): for example, knowing the thing designated by the word 'earth' the intrinsic nature of which is solidity.
- 2. *Dharmapratisaṃvid*: knowledge of the designation (*bhāṣitadharma*), or the names (*nāman*), phrases (*pada*), syllables (*vyañjana*) used to designate the thing: for example, knowing that the name 'pṛthivī' serves to designate the earth.

From the Buddhist perspective, dharma respresents the teaching (*deśanādharma*), the word of the Buddha having nine or twelve members: sūtra, geya, vyākaraṇa, etc., and especially the eight-membered Path (*aṣṭāṅgamārga*) that constitutes its essence.

- 3. *Niruktipratisaṃvid*: knowledge of vocal expression (*vāc*, *adhivacana*). It is not enough to know the word *in abstracto*, but it is also necessary to express it with the appropriate number (singular, dual, or plural), gender (masculine, feminine, neuter) and case, taking account of its etymology. All of this varies according to the language used so that, considering everything, *niruktipratisaṃvid* is none other than the knowledge of languages.
- 4. *Pratibhānapratisaṃvid*: knowledge of elocution or, more simply, eloquence. This is the ability to speak in a precise and easy way (*yuktamuktaprtibhāna*) resulting from mastery in regard to the Path (*mārgavaśita*) and unfailing attentiveness.

The pratisamvids are inseparable: the person who possesses one possesses all of them. On the other hand, they are the same in all, although realized to varying degrees. Thus, there is no way to make distinctions between the pratisamvid of the śrāvaka, the bodhisattva or the Buddha if this is not in the mind or intention governing their practice.

It is often a question of the pratisamvids in the canonical and scholastic literature, but the definitions given are rather rare and often divergent. Here I [Lamotte] will mention a few particularly interesting texts:

1) In the Nikāyas and the āgamas: Anguttara, I, p. 24,l. 29; II, p. 160; III, p. 113, 120; Tseng yi a han, T 125, k. 21, p. 656c26-657a17; Mahāniddeaa, I, p. 234; Paṭisambhīda, I, p. 88, 119, 132; II, p. 150, 157-158, 185, 193.

The Buddha accepts that bhikşus can have the *pratisaṃvids* and gives Mahākauṣṭhila as an example. But Śāriputra, the wisest of all, held them in only a limited way (*odhiso*) and in a manner of speaking (*vyañjanaso*); in these conditions, those who wish clarifications should speak to the Buddha rather than to him.

- 2) In the Pāli Abhidhamma: Vibhanga, p. 293-305, commented on in Visuddhimagga, ed. Warren, p. 372-376 (transl. Nanamoli, p. 485 seq.). The theory is well summarized in a note appearing in the appendix to *Points of Controversy*, p. 379-381).
- 3) In the Sarvāstivādin Abhidharma and śāstras: Prakraṇapāda, T 1542, k. 5, p. 712b11-12; Jñānaprasthāna, T 1544, k. 18, p. 1018b; Vibhāṣā, T 1545, k. 180, p. 903c-906b; Kośa, VII, p. 89-94; Kośabhāṣya, p. 418-421 (very clear explanation); Abhidharmadīpa, p. 393.
- 4) In the Mahāyānasūtras: for example Pañcaviṃśati, p. 211, l. 15-16; Śatasāhasrikā, p. 1449, l. 18-21; Daśabhūmika, p. 77. Brief commentary in Āloka, p. 455, l. 25 seq.
- 5) In the Vijñānavādin treatises: Sūtrālaṃkāra, p. 138-139; Saṃgraha, p. 293, with commentary as note; Bodh. bhūmi, p. 258, l. 4-17; Abhidharmasamuccayavyākhyā, T 1606, p. 759b23-c16; Siddhi, p. 652.

# I. THE PRATISAMVIDS ACCORDING TO THE ABHIDHARMA

The four *pratisaṃvids* 'unhindered knowledges' are: *i) arthapratisaṃvid* [bearing on the thing designated or *bhāṣitārtha*],<sup>732</sup> *ii) dharmapratisaṃvid* [bearing on the designation or *bhāṣitadharma*], *iii) niruktipratisaṃvid* [bearing on vocal expression or *nirukti*], *iv) pratibhānapratisaṃvid* [bearing on elocution or *pratibhāna*].<sup>733</sup>

# 1. Arthapratisamvid

corresponding to Kośabhāsvā, p. 5, 1, 20).

Artha has several meanings, but in the expression arthapratisamvid it means thing and not meaning or signification. However, out of long habit, the better Chinese translators, such as Kumārajīva and Hiuan-tsang. render it as yi, notion of a thing, idea, signification (in English, meaning, purport, interpretation). Without being so presumptuous as to try to correct these virtuosos of Chinese Buddhism, I [Lamotte] would prefer to read the character king, sometimes used by Hiuan-tsang to translate artha taken in the meaning of visaya, 'object' (e.g., in his translation of the Kośa, T 1558, k.1, p. 2b7,

733 The *Traité* will put forward here the Ābhidhārmikas' definitions for the main part: cf. Vibhanga, p. 293, l. 4-6; Visuddhimagga, ed. Warren, p. 372, l. 29-52; Vibhāṣā citing the Prakaraṇapāda, T 1545, k. 180, p. 904a8-13; Kośabhāṣya, p. 419, l. 17-18; Nyāyānusāra, T 1562, k. 76, p. 751a2 seq; Abhidharmadīpa, p. 393, l. 6-12; Āloka, p. 455, l. 25 seq.

The pratisamvid of the designated thing. – Things (vastu) expressed with the help of names ( $n\bar{a}man$ ) and by the voice ( $v\bar{a}c$ ) each have their own nature (lak sana): for example, the nature solidity (khakkhatalak sana). <sup>734</sup>

In this example, the solid nature (*khakkhaṭalakṣaṇa*) of the earth (*prthivī*) is the *artha* 'the thing designated'; the name (*nāman*) 'earth' is the dharma 'designation'; to say 'earth' using the voice (*vāc*) is the *nirukt*i 'expression'; the ease of speaking (*muktābhipāpitā*), the mastery (*vaśitva*) over these three kinds of knowledge is the *pratibhāna* 'elocution'. Penetrating these four things without difficulty constitutes the pratisamvid 'unhindered knowledge'.

The solidity (khakkhaṭatva) characterizing earth (pṛthivī), the moistness (daratva) characterizing water (ap), the heat (uṣṇatva) characterizing fire (tejas), the movement (īraṇatva) characterizing wind (vāyu), the intelligent nature of the mind (citta), the impermanent (anitya) painful (duḥkha) and empty (śūnya) nature of the five aggregates of attachment (pañcopadānaskandha), the non-self nature (anātmaka) of all dharmas, those are general characteristics [246b] (sāmānyalakṣaṇa) and specific characteristics (svalakṣaṇa). Distinguishing them in this way is called arthapratisaṃvid 'unhindered knowledge of the [designated] thing'.

# 2. Dharmapratisamvid

The pratisamvid of designation. – Knowing the name  $(n\bar{a}man)$  of the thing (artha), knowing that solidity is called earth  $(prthiv\bar{i})$  and having no difficulty in distinguishing all the names of this type, is called *dharmapratisamvid* 'unhindered knowledge of the designation'.<sup>735</sup>

This is all well summarized in the definition in the Abhidharmadīpa (l.c.): Dvādaśāṅgasaṃgrhīteṣu vakṣyamāṇārthasambandhiṣu vivakṣiteṣu nāmakāyādiṣu yad avivartyaṃ jñānaṃ sā dharmapartiasaṃvid: "The unfailing knowledge of the groups of names, etc., contained in the twelve-membered [speech of the Buddha] referring to things to be expressed and brought into discussion is the dharmapratisaṃvid."

The object of *arthapratisaṃvid* is the *artha* for the Vibhanga, the Kośa and the Nyāyānusāra; the *paramārtha* for the Vibhāṣā; the *dharmalakṣaṇa* for the Āloka. We can say with the *Traité* that it is the real thing, constituted by its own nature and capable of being designated.

<sup>735</sup> The object of *dharmapratisaṃvid* is the *dharma* [taken in the sense of *deśana*] for the Vibhāṣā; the *paryāya* 'preaching' for the Āloka; the *nāman* for the Nyāyānusāra; the *nāma-pada-vyañjana-kāya* 'groups of names, phrases and syllables' for the Vibhāṣā and the Kośa. It is a question therefore of a knowledge bearing upon the designation, the preaching. But in the Buddhist perspective, this designation, this preaching, is limited to the speech of the Buddha. This is why the Vibhaṅga, p. 294, l. 22-24, specifies: *Idha bhikkhu dhammaṃ jānāti suttaṃ geyyaṃ veyyākaraṇaṃ gmathaṃ udānaṃ itivuttakaṃ jātakaṃ abbhutadhammaṃ vedallaṃ: ayaṃ vuccati dhammapaṭisambhidā*.

Why? Because the thing is not grasped separately from the name  $(n\bar{a}man)$  and one can recognize the thing only by the name. This is why the designation (dharma) comes immediately after the thing (artha).

Question. – Is the thing (artha) joined with the name ( $n\bar{a}man$ ) or separate from the name? If it were joined with the name, we would burn our mouth by saying "fire". If it were separate from the name, we would get water by saying "fire".

Answer. – The thing is neither joined with nor separate from the name. Out of convention (*saṃvṛti*), the ancients fixed the names designating things, and their descendants, thanks to these names, recognized things. Thus for each thing there is a name called *dharma* [here].

# 3. Niruktipratisamvid

But what has to be done in order that beings can obtain the consciousness of this name  $(n\bar{a}man)$  and this thing (artha)? Recourse must be made to expressions (nirukti), to various ornamentations, so that people can comprehend them. Penetrating these processes without difficulty is called niruktipratisamvid 'unhindered knowledge of expression'.

# 4. Pratibhānapratisamvid

-

A problem already asked by Plato at the beginning of the *Cratylus* (383A) and which preoccupied the sophists of his time: do words have a natural pertinence – which Cratylus, a disciple of Heraclitus, maintains, or, as Hermogenes would have it, are they due to convention? On this subject, see Leroy, *Étymologie et linguistique chez Platon*, Bull. Cl. Lettres de l'Ac. Roy. De Belgique, LIV, 1968, p. 121-152.

<sup>737</sup> Niruktipratisaṃvid has as object the atthadhammaniruttābhilāpa 'the expression of language relating to the thing designated and to the designation' according to the Vibhanga; the vāc 'voice' according to the Vibhāṣā, the Kośa and the Nyāyānusāra; the janapadabhāṣā 'the speech of the region' according to the Āloka.

By voice the Kośabhāṣya, p. 410, l. 17-18 means the [correct] expression of singular, dual, plural, masculine, feminine, etc. (*ekadvibahustrīpuruṣādyadhivacan*). But *nirukti* also means the etymological explanation (*nirvacana*): for example *rūpyate tasmād rūpam*.

If the speech (*abhilāpa*) is provided with logic (*nyāya*), if the account (*prakāśana*) is inexhaustible and also if the orator has obtained mastery over the concentrations (*samādhivaśitā*), there is then an ease [of speech] called *pratibhānapratisaṃvid* 'unhindered knowledge of elocution.'<sup>738</sup>

# 5. Levels, knowledges and types of pratisamvid

1) The first and the fourth *pratisaṃvid* occur in nine levels: [kāmadhātu, four dhyānas and four samāpattis]. The second and third *pratisaṃvid* occur in kāmadhātu and the four Brahmā heavens, [i.e., in the four dhyānas].<sup>739</sup>

2) The second and third *pratisaṃvid* are worldly knowledges (*saṃvṛitjñāna*).

The first *pratisaṃvid* is ten knowledges (*daśajñāna*).

The fourth *pratisamvid* is nine knowledges [by excluding the knowledge of cessation of suffering  $(nirodhaj\tilde{n}\bar{a}na)$ ]. <sup>740</sup>

738 For the Vibhāṣā, the Kośa and the Nyāyānusāra (l.c.), *pratibhānapratisaṃvid* is the knowledge of correct and easy elocution and of mastery in regard to the path (*mārgavaśita*), which presupposes that the orator has mastery over the concentrations.

739 Cf. Kośabhāṣya, p. 418-419: Sā punar arthapratisaṃvid sarvabhūmika... Dharmapratisaṃvid pañcabhūmikā kāmadhātucaturthadhyānasaṃgrhītā, ūrdhvaṃ nāmakāyābhāvāt... Niruktipratisaṃvid kāmadhātuprathamamadhyānabhūmikā, ūrdhvaṃ vitarkābhāvāt... Sarvabhūmikā [pratibhānapratisaṃvit] kāmadhātau yāvad bhavāgre vānmārgayor anyatarālambanāt. – "The arthapratisaṃvid arises in all the levels... The dharmapratisaṃvid is in five levels, in kāmadhātu and the four dhyānas; the nāmakāya is absent above [and consequently the pādakāya and vyañjanakāya also]... The niruktipratisaṃvid had the kāmadhātu and the first dhyāna as levels; vitarka is absent above... The pratibhānapratisaṃvid is in all the levels from kāmadhātu to bhavāgra, since it has as object either the voice or the Path."

But according to the information of the Vibhāṣā, T 1545, k. 180, p. 904a25-b2, this opinion is not unanimous.

740 Cf. Kośabhbhāṣyā, p. 418-419: Dharmaniruktipratisaṃvidau saṃvṛtijñānasvabhāva nāmakāyādivāgālambanasvabhāvatvāt... Arthapratibhānasamvit [should be corrected to: arthapratisaṃvit] sarvadharmāś ced artha daśa jñānāni, nirvāṇaṃ ṣaḍ jñānāni dharmānvayanirodha-kṣayānutoādasaṃvṛtijñānāni... Navajñānasvabhāvā pratibhānapratisaṃvid anyatta nirodhajñānāt. - "The dharma- and the niruktipratisaṃvid are conventional knowledge because they have as object the nāmakāyas, etc., and the voice... The arthapratisaṃvid, if by artha is meant all dharmas, is ten knowledges; but if by artha is meant nirvāṇa, it is six knowledges: dharma, anvaya, nirodha, kṣaya, anutpāda and saṃvṛtijñāna. The pratibhānapratisaṃvid is nine knowledges, excluding the nirodhajñāna."

3) The *pratisamvids* are higher (*agra*), middling (*madhya*) or lower (*avara*): higher among the Buddhas, middling among the great bodhisattvas, lower among the great arhats.

Question. – The *balas*, the *vaiśāradyas* and the *pratisaṃvids* are all knowledges (*jñāna*). Having the *balas* inwardly and the *vaiśāradyas* outwardly would be complete (*paripūrṇa*). Why speak further of the *pratisaṃvids*?

Answer. – The *balas* and the *vaiśāradyas* have been explained. There are people who, while fearlessly preaching the Dharma in the great assemblies, still have hesitations.<sup>741</sup> This is why particularly the *pratisamvids* are spoken of. The *pratisamvids* 'adorn' the *vaiśāradyas* and the *vaiśāradyas* adorn the *balas*.

Moreover, when we speak of the *vaiśāradyas*, some people have doubts and ask how anyone would not experience any fear in the great assemblies. But the Buddha first experiences the ten *balas* and finally the four *pratisamvids*. This is why, in the great assemblies, he has no fear of preaching the Dharma.

This completes the explanation of the four *pratisamvids*.

# II. THE PRATISAMVIDS ACCORDING TO THE MAHĀYĀNA

Question. – Are there also four *pratisamvids* of the bodhisattva in the Mahāyāna? Answer. Yes. <sup>742</sup> They are as follows:

# 1. Arthapratisamvid

Pratisamvid of the thing designated. – The thing designated (*artha*) is the true nature (*bhūtalakṣaṇa*) of all dharmas, which is inexpressible (*anabhilāpya*).

The thing designated (artha), the name ( $n\bar{a}man$ ) and the voice ( $v\bar{a}c$ ) are not different (abhinna), and this is so at the beginning ( $\bar{a}dau$ ), at the end ( $paryavas\bar{a}na$ ) and in the middle (madhya): that is the artha. Apart from name ( $n\bar{a}man$ ) and voice ( $v\bar{a}c$ ), there can be no artha. It is as a result of the identity of the three things ( $vastutrayasamat\bar{a}$ ) that there is artha.

See also Vibhāṣā, T 1545, k. 180, p. 904b14-23, which mentions other opinions also.

Hesitations about their capacity to preach the Dharma.

Note that, in contrast to the *balas* and the *vaiśāradyas*, the *pratisaṃvids* of the Buddhas, the bodhisattvas and the śrāvakas bear the same names but are practiced in a different spirit.

<sup>743</sup> This is not a theory on the nature of language. If the word is mixed up with the thing, it is not that it is naturally tied to it, but because, from the point of view of the true nature of dharmas, words and things are alike empty and non-existent.

Furthermore, knowing clearly and penetrating without difficulty the [246c] reality (*artha*) of all dharmas is called *arthapratisamvid* 'unhindered knowledge of the thing designated'.

# 2. Dharmapratisamvid

Pratisamvid of designation. – The designation (dharma) is applied to things (artha) because the name ( $n\bar{a}man$ ) serves to make known the thing (artha).

Furthermore, having entered into the *dharmapratisamvid*, the bodhisattva always believes the [authentic] teaching but does not believe in the person who is teaching (*dharmāya śraddhadhāti na tu pudgale śraddadhāti*);<sup>744</sup> he takes refuge in the truth and does not take refuge in error (*dharmapratisaraṇa na tv adharmapratisaraṇaḥ*). Taking refuge in the truth, he is free of error. Why? Because he knows that the person (*pudgala*), names (*nāman*) and speech (*vāc*) are without intrinsic nature (*svalakṣaṇahita*).

Finally, by this *pratisaṃvid*, the bodhisattva distinguishes the three kinds of Vehicles (*yānatraya*), but while distinguishing them, 'he does not contradict the fundamental element (*dharmadhātuṃ na vilomayati*).'<sup>745</sup> Why? "Because the fundamental element has but a single nature, namely, the absence of nature" (*dharmadhātur ekalakṣaṇo yadutālakṣaṇaḥ*).<sup>746</sup> The bodhisattva who uses his voice (*vāc*) to preach the Dharma knows that the voice is empty (*śūnya*) like an echo (*pratiśrutkāsama*).<sup>747</sup> The Dharma that he preaches to beings leads them to believe and recognize one and the same fundamental element (*dharmadhātu*).

Penetrating the names  $(n\bar{a}man)$  and voices  $(v\bar{a}c)$  to be uttered deeply and without difficulty, that is dharmapratisamvid 'unhindered knowledge of the designation'.

# 3. Niruktipratisamvid

Pratisamvid of expression. – Using the voice  $(v\bar{a}c)$ , the bodhisattva expresses names  $(n\bar{a}man)$  and things (artha). Adorning his discourse in various ways  $(n\bar{a}n\bar{a}prak\bar{a}rena)$  and in harmony with the needs of the

<sup>744</sup> According to the Sūtra of the four refuges (*catvāri pratisaraṇāni*): *dharmapratisaraṇena bhavitayyam na pudgalapratisaranena*. See above, p. 536-539F.

According to the Sūtra of the four great teachings (*mahāpadeśa*) where it is said, more or less, in the Sanskrit version (Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra, p. 4; Pañjikā, p. 431): *Buddhavacanasyedaṃ lakṣaṇaṃ yat sūtre 'vatarati vinaye saṃdṛśyate dharmatāṃ ca na vilomayati.* – "The characteristic mark of the Word of the Buddha is that is is found in the Sūtra, appears in the Vinaya and does not contradict the nature of things." – For detail see: *La critique dans le bouddhisme*, India Antiqua, Leyden, 1947, p. 218-222.

<sup>746</sup> See references in footnote 74 above.

<sup>747</sup> Comparison developed at length in *Vimalakīrti*, p. 148-149 and Śūraṃgamasamādhi. p. 188-189.

circumstances, he makes beings find an understanding of all languages (*nirukti*): the language of the devas; the languages of the nāgas, yakṣas, gandharvas, asuras, garuḍas, mahoragas and other amanuṣyas; the languages of Śakra, Brahmā, Cāturmahārājika and other lords of the world, human languages; one language, two languages, or several languages; concise or prolix language; language of women or language of men; languages of the past, the present or the future. He causes everybody to understand all these languages and that there is no disharmony between one's own language and that of others.

How is that? The totality of things is not in language; language is not a true reality. If language were a true reality, it would be impossible to express evil by way of good words. It is solely in order to lead people to nirvāṇa that the bodhisattva speaks in a way that he can be understood, but without being attached to speech.

Finally, the bodhisattva uses speech so that beings may act in accordance with the authentic teaching (*dharma*) and reality (*artha*). His discourses all aim at the true nature (*bhūtalakṣaṇa*) of dharmas. That is called *niruktipratisaṃvid* 'unhindered knowledge of expression'.

# 4. Pratibhānapratisamvid

Pratisamvid of elocution. – In a single phoneme (akşara) the bodhisattva can express all the phonemes; in a single word (ghoşa), he can express all words; in a single dharma, he can express all dharmas.<sup>748</sup> Everything that he says is Dharma, is true, is real, and also useful, since it is adapted to beings to be converted (vaineya).

To those who like sūtras, he preaches sūtras; to those who like *geyas*, he preaches *geyas*; to those who like *vyākaraṇas*, he preaches *vyākaraṇas*; to those who like *gāthās*, *udānas*, *nidānas*, *avadānas*, *ityuktas*, *jātakas*, *vaipulyas*, *adbhutadharmas* or *upadeśas*, he preaches all these texts.

He adapts himself to the spiritual faculties (*indirya*) of beings in order to preach to them: if they like faith, he preaches them the faculty of faith [247a](*śraddhendriya*); if they like exertion, he preaches to them the faculty of exertion (*vīryendriya*); if they like mindfulness, he preaches to them the faculty of mindfulness (*smṛtyīndriya*); if they like concentration, he preaches to them the faculty of concentration (*samādhīndriya*); if they like wisdom, he preaches to them the faculty of wisdom (*prajñendriya*). And he does likewise for all the roots of good (*kuśalamūla*) as he does for these five faculties.

Moreover, there are 21,000 faculties (indriya) of passionate people ( $r\bar{a}gacarita$ ) and it was on this subject that the Buddha preached the 84,000 topics of the Dharma (dharmaskandha) as counteragents.<sup>749</sup> In regard

\_

<sup>748</sup> Daśabhūmika, p. 77: Sarvadharmaprajñaptyavyavacchedena dharmam deśayati.

On these 84,000 (or 80,000) *dharmaskandhas* preached by the Buddha, see *Histoire du bouddhisme indien*, p. 155, 162-163. They serve to cure the four groups of 21,000 beings dominated by lust (*rāga*), hatred (*dveṣa*), ignorance (*moha*) or a mixture of the three, respectively: cf. Kośa, I, p. 47; Nyāyānusāra, T 1562, k. 3, p. 346c; Satyasiddhiśāstra, Y 1656, k. 9, p. 314a.

to these faculties, the bodhisattva speaks about the series of counteragents (*pratipakṣadharma*): this is his 'elocution' (*pratibhāna*).

There are 21,000 faculties of the hateful person (dveṣacarita), etc.

There are 21,000 faculties of the foolish man (mohacarita), etc.

There are 21,000 faculties of the person with mixed passions, and on this subject the Buddha preached the 84,000 topics of the Dharma that counteract them: this is his 'elocution'.

This is what is called *pratibhānapratisaṃvid* 'unhindered knowledge of elocution'.

Furthermore, using this pratisamvid, during the course of a kalpa or half a kalpa, the bodhisattva adorns his preaching of the Dharma (*dharmanirdeśa*) but 'does not contradict the nature of the fundamental element' (*dharmadhātum na vilomayati*).

Sometimes this bodhisattva hides and becomes invisible, but preaches the Dharma through all his hair-pores  $(romak\bar{u}pa)$ , <sup>750</sup> and, while adapting himself to the needs [of beings to be converted], he does not fail in his original practices  $(p\bar{u}rvacarya)$ .

The wisdom  $(praj\tilde{n}\tilde{a})$  of the bodhisattva is immense: no scholar  $(upadeś\bar{a}c\bar{a}rya)$  is able to exhaust it or, even less, destroy it.

When, in possession of this pratisamvid, the bodhisattva transforms himself and takes on rebirths, he spontaneously and completely understands (*svataḥ samjānīte*) the holy texts (*sūtra*), the mantras, the knowledges (*jñāna*) and the arts (*kalā*) possessed by sages having the five supranormal powers (*pañcābhijñārṣi*): for example, the four Vedas, the six Vedaṅgas, the Atharva, the [Jyotiṣka] dealing with the sun, the moon and the five planets, oniromancy [??], earthquakes, the language of the yakṣas, the language of birds, the language of hands,<sup>751</sup> the language of quadrupeds and of people possessed by demons, divination, abundance or famine, struggle against the sun, the moon and the five planets, pharmacology, calculus, spells, scenic plays, music. The bodhisattva knows deeply and penetrates poetry, the arts, the treatises of this kind better than anyone, better than the heretics, but he is not at all boastful and troubles no one. He knows that these ordinary sciences do not serve for nirvāṇa.

Because this bodhisattva is endowed with the four pratisamvids, his beauty, his power, his brilliance surpass those of the Brahmās. The Brahmās honor him, love him and respect him, but his mind is detached (asakta), Respected and honored by all these gods, he is without attachment. He produces only the ideas of impermanence (anitya), of suffering (duḥkha), of emptiness (śūnya) and of non-self (anātman). By means of his supranormal powers (abhijñā) he encourages the gods, leads them to aspire ardently and preaches them the Dharma inexhaustibly [247b] and impeccably. He destroys their doubts and establishes them in 'anuttarā samyaksambodhi'.

According to the Mahāyāna, this is the power of the four *pratisaṃvids* of the bodhisattva, a power capable of saving beings, This is the meaning of the four *pratisaṃvids*.

<sup>750</sup> Daśabhūmika, p. 80: Sarvaromakūpebhyo ghoṣān niścārayati.

<sup>751</sup> Adopting the variant *cheou yu*.

# CHAPTER XLI: THE EIGHTEEN SPECIAL ATTRIBUTES OF THE BUDDHA

#### PRELIMINARY NOTE

## I. THE EIGHTEEN ĀVEŅIKADHARMAS OF THE BUDDHAS

By special attributes (āveṇikadharma) we mean the attributes possessed by the Buddha alone which are not shared with others.

As far as we know, they do not appear in the old canonical sūtras except for the Chinese translation of the *Brahmāyuḥsūtra* of the Madhyamāgama by Tche K'ien (T 76, p. 885b17-18).

On the other hand, eighteen āveṇikabuddhadharmas, the details of which are not given, are frequently mentioned in the Hīnayānist post-canonical literature and the Mahāyānasūtras. Most often they are cited equally with the ten *balas* and the four *vaiśāradyas* to which other categories of attributes came to be added, such as the three *vidyās*, the four *pratisaṃvids*, *mahāmaitrī*, *mahākaruṇā*, the *sarvajñānas*, etc.

In the Hīnayāna literature, see: Lieou tou tsi king, T 152, k. 7, p. 43b5-6;P'ou sa pen hing king, T 155, k. 1, p. 108c25; Hien yu king, T 202, k. 10, p. 418c29-419a1; k. 12, p. 433a9; Tsa pao tsang king, T 203, k. 10, p. 496b16; Abhiniṣkramaṇasūtra, T 190,k. 47, p. 871a2-3.

In the Mahāyānist or semi-Mahāyānist literature, see: Lalitavsitara, ed. Lefmann, p. 5, 1, 2; 403, 1. 2; and T 186, k. 7, p. 528c28; T 187, k. 5, p. 565b16-17;; k. 8, p. 585a22-23; k. 11, p. 605b8-9, 611b6; Pañcaviṃśati, T 223, k.1, p. 219a17-19; k. 2, p. 228a19-20; k. 4, p. 243a22-23; k. 7, p. 266c17-19; k. 9, p. 285c18-20; k. 17, p. 345c19-20; k. 23, p. 384a25-26, and many other Mahāyānasūtras.

The Pāli texts, with the exception of those of late date, are practically silent about the Buddha's *āveṇikas*, but the Milindapañha should be mentioned which three times notes (p. 105, 216, 285) the 18 attributes of the Buddha (*aṭṭārasabuddhadahmmā*) without, however, giving any further explanations.

When the sources do detail the 18 *āveņikas*, we find three different lists, two of Sarvāstivādin or Vaibhāṣika origin and the third of Mahāyalist, probably Mahāsāṃghika, origin.

The first Sarvāstivādin list. – It is by far the best established and what is special about it is that it considers the 18 āveņikas not as dharmas distinct from the other attributes of the Buddha but rather as a simple group of the four categories of buddhadharmas already appearing in the old canonical sūtras, namely, the 10 balas, 4 vaiśāradyas, 3 smṛtyupasthānas and mahākaruṇā, making up 18 āveṇikas. The balas and the vaiśāradyas have already been dealt with in the preceding chapters; as for the three smṛtyupsathānas belonging to the Buddha, they are also found "in the sūtra" (Pāli version in Majjhima, III, p. 221; Sanskrit version in Kośavyākhyā, p. 646, l. 34-647, l. 19).

This list is customary in the Sarvāstivādin Abhidharmas and the Vaibhāṣika Śāstras: Vibhāṣā, T 1545, k. 17, p. 85a26-27; k. 120, p. 624a14-15; k. 143, p. 735c16-18; T 1546, k. 37, p. 277b13-14; Saṃyuktabhidharmasāra, T 1552, k. 6, p. 922c15-17; Kośa, VII, p. 66-67; Kośabhāṣya, p. 411; Kośavyākhyā, p. 640, l. 33-34; Nuāyānusāra, T 1562, k. 75, p. 746a11-12; Kośakārikāvibhāṣā, T 1563, k. 36, p. 955b2-3.

The Dīvyāvadāna, p. 182, l. 20; 268, l. 4, also mentions the 10 balas, 4 vaiśāradyas, 3 smṛṭyupasthānas and mahākaruṇā as a group, but does not describe them as āveṇikabuddhadharmas.

A somewhat aberrant list is in Mañjuśrīparipṛcchā (T 468, k. 2, p. 505a28-29: the 18 āveṇikas are the 10 balas, the 4 vaiśāradyas plus the 4 great apramānas (maitrī, karunā, muditā and upeksā).

The second Sarvāstivādin list. – Here the āveņikabuddhadharmas are not mixed in with the other categories of attributes but rather form an independent and distinct series. To my [Lamotte's] knowledge, the *Traité* is the only one to speak of it (see below, p. 1699F). It seems to attribute it to a group of Sarvāstivādin or Vaibhāṣika scholars and will comment that this list does not appear in the Tripiṭaka or in any of the other sūtras.

The Mahāyānist list. – Here also it is a matter of 18 āveṇikabuddhadharmas completely independent and distinct from the other categories of attributes of Buddha. Even though they are not of canonical origin, this list is by far the best known and is adopted by all the Mahāyānasūtras. Its title shows some divergences and the 18 āveṇikadharmas are not always cited in the same order.

The Sanskrit version of this list appears in the Prajñāpāramitāsūtras and especially in the Pañcaviṃśati, p. 211, l. 17-212, l. 7, and the Śatasāhasrikā, p. 1449, l. 22-1450, l. 14. The text of the editions contain some misprints which I [Lamotte] will take the liberty of correcting:

Punar aparam Subhūte bodhisattvasya mahāsattvasya mahāyānam yad utḥāṣṭādaśāveṇikabuddhadharmāḥ. katame 'ṣṭādaśa. Yāñ ca rātrim Subhūte tathāgato 'rhan anuttarām samyaksambodhim abhisambuddho yāñ ca rātrim anupādāya parinirvāsyaty etasminn antare Subhūte.

- 1. nāsti tathāgasya skhalitam,
- 2. nāsti ravitam,
- 3. nāsti muşitasmṛtitā,
- 4. nāsti nānātvasamjñā,
- 5. nāsty asamāhitam cittam,
- 6. nāsty apratisamkhyāyopekṣa,
- 7. nāsti chandaparihānir,
- 8. nāsti vīryaparihāņir,

- 9. nāsti smṛtiparihāṇir, < nāsti sammadhiparihānir>,
- 10. nāsti prajñāparihāņir,
- 11. naÔti vimuktiparihānir,
- 12. nāsti vimuktijñānadarśanaparihāņir,
- 13. sarvam tathāgatasya kāyakarma jñānapūrvamgamam jñānānuparivarti,
- 14. sarvam vākkarma jñānapūrvamgamam jñānānuparivarti,
- 15. sarvam manaskarma jñānapūrvamgamam jñānānuparivarti,
- 16. atīte 'dhvany apratihatam asangam darśanam,
- 17. anāgate 'dhvany apratihatam asangam jñānam darśanam,
- 18. pratyutpane 'dhvany apratihatam asangam jñānam darśanam.

For the corresponding Chinese versions, see Kumārajīva's translation in Pañcaviṃśati (T 223, k. 5, p. 255c25-256a5; k. 24, p. 395b20-28) and Hiuan-tsang's translation in Mahāprajñāpāramitāsūtra (T 220, vol. V, k. 53, p. 302a17-27; vol. VII, k. 415, p. 81b26-c4; k. 490, p. 489b4-14).

I [Lamotte] have described this list as Mahāyānist because it has been adopted by all the Mahāyānasūtras where it is discussed at length, e.g., in the Ratnakūṭa, section of the Bodhisattvapiṭaka (T 310, k. 40, p. 229b-233a; T 316, k. 15, p. 815b-818b). However, it was known by all Buddhists whatever their affliliation:

- 1) It appears in the Chinese version of the Lalitavistara by Dharmarakşa: T 186, k. 6, p. 522c16-24.
- 2) It appears in the Mahāvastu, I, p. 160, l. 8-16.
- 3) It is mentioned in the Kośavyākhyā next to the first list of the Sarvāstivādins, p. 640, l. 34-641, l. 8.
- 4) It is repeated in the Vijñānavādin treatises: Sūtrālamkāra, XXI, 57, p. 187; Samgraha, p. 288-290, 302; Abhidharmasamuccayavyākhyā (T 1606, k. 14, p. 761c5-762a27) where it is commented on at length; Yogācārabhūmi, T 1579, k. 79, p. 738b18-c25. We may note, however, that beside these 18 *āveṇikas*, the Yagācārabhūmi also accepts 40 others (T 1579, k. 50, p. 574b4; Bodh. bhūmi, p. 375, l. 3).
- 5) Glossaries such as the Dharmasamgraha, chap. 79, the Mahāvyutpatti, no. 136-151 and the Arthaviniśacaya, cap. 24, p. 579-580, list it.
- 6) It was known to the Ceylonese masters of late date such as Buddharakkhita (5<sup>th</sup> cent.), author of the Jinālaṅkāra, and Moggallāna (12<sup>th</sup> cent.) author of the Abhidānappadīpikā: cf. Burnouf, *Lotus*, p. 649; Kern, *Histoire*, I, p. 283.

In the pages that will follow, the Traité will unreservedly adopt this Mahāyānis list and will criticize the two Sarvāstivādin lists which, in its opinion, include attributes not exclusively belonging to the Buddha himself.

## II. THE EIGHTEEN ĀVEŅIKADHARMAS OF THE BODHISATTVAS

In the preceding chapter we have seen that the *Traité*, on the basis of various Mahāyānasūtras, juxtaposed the *balas*, *vaiśāradyas* and *pratisaṃvids* of the bodhisattva to the *balas*, *vaiśāradyas* and *pratisaṃvids* of the Buddha. We would expect it to do the same here and that, after having explained the *āveṇikadharmas* of the Buddha, it deals with the *āveṇikadhrmas* of the bodhisattva. This omission is more odd in that some sources used by the *Traité*, such as the Ratnameghasūtra (cited at k. 100, p. 756b7-8) contained a list of 18 *āveṇikabodhisattvadharmas* (T 660, k. 4, p. 301b25-c12; T 489, k. 7, p. 722b19-c4; Tib. Trip., vol. 35, no. 897, fol. 51a3-51b2), the original Sanskrit of which has been reproduced by the Mahāvyut., no. 787-804. Here is the text and the translation:

- 1. Bodhisattvā anupadistadānāh
- 2. anupadistaśīlāh,
- 3. anupadistaksāntayāh,
- 4. anupadistavīryāh,
- 5. anupadistadhyānāh,
- 6. anupadistaprajñāh,
- 7. saṃgrahavastusarvasttvasaṃgrāhakāḥ,
- 8. parinānamanavidhijñāh,
- 9. upāyakauśaly[ena] sarvasttvacaritādhipat[a]ya[h] paramayayānaniryāṇasaṃdarśakāḥ
- 10. mahāyānācyutatāḥ,
- 11. samsāranirvānamukhasamdarśakāh,
- 12. yamakavyatyastāhārakuśalāh,
- 13. jñānapūrvaṃgamā [a]nabhisaṃskāranirvadye[na] sarvajanmābhimukhapravṛttāḥ,
- 14. daśakuśalopetakāyavagmanaskarmāntāḥ,
- 15. sarvaduḥkhaskandhasaha[mā]nātmopadānā[t] sarvasattvadhātvaparityāginaḥ,
- 16. sarvajagadabhirucisamdarśakāh,
- 17. kiyatkṛcchrabālaśraāvakamadhy[e] śubhavyūharatnakalpavṛkṣa[sama]dṛḍhasarvajñatā-cittāsaṃpramuṣitāḥ,
- 18. sarvadharmapaṭṭābhiṣekaprāpti[to] buddhadharmasamdarśanānirvṛttāḥ.

Transl. -1- 6. The bodhisattvas possess a generosity, morality, patience, exertion, trance and wisdom which were not taught to them by others; 7. they charm beings by means of captivating means; 8. they know the rule of applying [merits]; 9. sovereign teachers of all the activities of beings by virtue of their

skill in skillful means, they show how to escape from saṃsāra by way of the Greater Vehicle; 10. they do not regress from the Greater Vehicle; 11. they show the direction of saṃsāra and of nirvāṇa; 12. they are skilled in uttering reverse and inverse sounds (cf. Vimalakīrti, *Introduction*, p. 33-37); 13. preceded by knowledge, they impeccably go towards all [kinds] of rebirths; 14. their actions of body, speech and mind are endowed with the ten good [paths of action]; 15. taking up existences capable of supporting the mass of suffering, they never abandon the world of beings; 16. they load beings with contentment; 17. in the midst of fools and listeners no matter how difficult, they never forget the strong mind of omniscience towards the pure wonders such as the precious Kalpavṛkṣa 'the wish-fulfilling tree'; 18. having acquired the crown and the anointing of all the dharmas, they never cease to preach the Buddhadharma.

Above (p. 1607F) I [Lamotte) have mentioned the other lists of *āveṇikabodhisattvadharmas*.

## First Section MAHĀYĀNIST LIST OF THE EIGHTEEN SPECIAL ATTRIBUTES OF THE BUDDHA

[k. 26, p. 247b]

## I. TEXT OF THE LIST ACCORDING TO THE PRAJÑĀPĀRAMITĀ

Here are the eighteen special attributes (aṣṭādaśāveṇikadharma):

- 1. The Tathāgata has no bodily defect (nāsti tathāgatasya skhalitam).
- 2. He has no vocal defect (*nāsti ravitam*).
- 3. He has no failure of memory (*nāsti muṣitasmṛtitā*).
- 4. He has no notion of variety (nāsti nāmātvasamjñā).
- 5. He does not have an unconcentrated mind (nāsty asamāhitam cittam).
- 6. He does not have thoughtless indifference (nāsty apratisamkhyāyopeksā).
- 7. He has no loss of zealousness (*nāsti chandaparihānih*).
- 8. He has no loss of exertion (nāsti vīryaparihāṇiḥ.
- 9. He has no loss of mindfulness (*nāsti smrtiparihānih*).
- 10. He has no loss of wisdom (nāsti prajñāparihāṇiḥ).
- 11. He has no loss of liberation (nāsti vimuktiparihāṇiḥ).
- 12. He has no loss of the knowledge and vision of deliverance (nāsti vimuktijāmanadarśanapariānih).

- 13. Every bodily action of the Tathāgata is preceded by knowledge and accompanies knowledge (sarvaṃ tathātagatasya kāyakarma jñānapūrvaṃgamaṃ jñānānuparivarti).
- 14. Every vocal action is preceded by knowledge and accompanies knowledge (*sarvaṃ vākkarma jñānapūrvaṃgamaṃ jñānānuparivarti*).
- 15. Every mental action is preceded by knowledge and accompanies knowledge (*sarvaṃ manaskarma jñānapūrvamgamam jñānānuparivarti*).
- 16. He has non-attached and unobstructed knowledge about past time (atīte 'dhvany asaṅgam apratihatam jīmanaṃ darśanam).
- 17. He has non-attached and unobstructed knowledge about future time (anāgate 'dhvany asaṅgam apratihatam jñānam darśanam).
- 18. He has non-attached and unobstructed knowledge about the present time (*pratyutpanne 'dhvany asangam apratihatam jñānam darśanam*).

Question. - Thirty-six attributes 752 are all attributes of the Buddha. Why are just these eighteen special?

Answer. – The śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas possess some of the eighteen first attributes, but they do no share this second series of eighteen attributes.

Thus, Sāriputra was able to answer any question whatsoever and always develop it with further words because he penetrated it without any obstacle, and the Buddha congratulated him saying that he understood the fundamental element well (*dharmadhātu*).<sup>753</sup>

Aniruddha was the foremost of those who possess the divine eye (divyacakşukāṇām agryaḥ). 754

If Śāriputra is able to preach the Dharma with such 'assurance', it is because he possesses the four *vaiśāradyas*. Therefore the *vaiśāradyas* are not attributes exclusively reserved for the Buddha.

754 Anguttara, I, p. 23: *Etad aggaṃ mama sāvakānaṃ bhikkhūnaṃ dibbacakkukānām yadidaṃ anuruddho*.

A first group of 18 buddha attributes consisting of the 10 *balas* (discussed in chap. XXXIX), the 4 *vaiśāradyas* and the 4 *pratisaṃvids* (discussed in chap. XL) plus a second group of 18 attributes that are the object of the present chapter. The Sarvāstivādins consider the first group to be the special attributes of the Buddha, whereas the Mahāyānists disagree with this affirmation: for them, the second group alone constitutes the all the special attributes of the Buddha.

<sup>753</sup> Cf. Nidānasamyukta, p. 203-204 (Tsa a han, T 99, k. 14, p. 95c8-16); Samyutta, II, p. 54 and 56): Śāriputra says: *Saced ekam divasam, ekam rātridivisam, saptāpi .... praṣnam prṣṭo vyākurvām:* "If for one day, for one night and one day, and even for seven nights and seven days, the Blessed One asked me a question on a given subject always with different phrases and different syllables, I would be able, for these seven nights seven days, to answer the Blessed One on this same subject for and seven nights and seven days, always with new phrases and new syllables." And the Buddha declares: "It is indeed in this way that the fundamental element is well understood to its depths by the monk Śāriputra."

Such śrāvakas all shared the four fearlessnesses (*vaiśāradya*), and since they shared them, the Buddha said: "Among my disciples who utter the lion's roar (*siṃhanādika*), the foremost is *Pin-t'ou-lo P'o-lo-to-che* (Pindola Bhāradvāja)."<sup>755</sup>

Śāriputra affirmed of himself: "For seven nights and seven days I was able to expand on the same subject", so inexhaustible his knowledge on the four ways of answering (catvārivyākaraṇāni).

The arhats Śāriputra, Maudgalyāyana, Pūrṇa, Ānanda, Kātyāyana, etc., also know things (*artha*), names (*nāman*), expressions (*nirukti*) and elocution (*pratibhāna*).<sup>756</sup>

This is why the eighteen first attributes [of the Buddha] do not merit the [247c][name of 'special attributes of the Buddha'.

#### II. DETAILED COMMENTARY ON THE LIST

## 1-2. The Buddha has no bodily or vocal defect

Question. – Why does the Buddha have no bodily defect (skhalita) or vocal defect (ravita)?

Answer. – For innumerable incalculable periods (asaṃkhyeyakalpa) the Buddha has observed purity of morality (śīlaviśuddhi): this is why his bodily and vocal actions are faultless. The other arhats such as Śāriputra, etc., have cultivated the precepts for less time, sixty kalpas at maximum:<sup>757</sup> this is why they have faults. For innumerable incalculable periods the Buddha has accumulated and perfected the pure precepts (viśuddhiśīla), he has always practiced the profound concentrations (gambhīrasamādhi), he has obtained all the marvelous knowledges and has properly cultivated the mind of great compassion (mahākaruṇācitta): this is why he is without faults.

Furthermore, the Buddha has uprooted all the root causes of the wrongdoings: this is why he is faultless. The root causes of the wrongdoings are of four kinds: i) lust  $(r\bar{a}ga)$ , ii) hatred (dveṣa), iii) (bhaya), iv) ignorance (moha). The Buddha has uprooted these root causes and their traces  $(v\bar{a}san\bar{a})$ . The arhats and pratyekabuddhas, although they have uprooted the causes of the wrongdoings, have not eliminated the traces  $(v\bar{a}san\bar{a})$ : this is why they sometimes have faults. The Buddha himself knows all these dharmas fully and completely,

One cannot utter the lion's roar without having the *vaiśāradyas*. The fact that Piṇḍola utters it shows that the Buddha is not alone in possessing the *vaiśāradyas*.

<sup>755</sup> Ibid., p. 23: Etad aggam mama sāvakānam bhikkhūnam sīhanādikānam yadidampindola-Bhāradvājo.

<sup>756</sup> If these disciples know these four things, it is because they had the four *pratisamvids*; therefore the Buddha is not alone in having them.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>757</sup> Cf. Vibhāṣā, T 1545, k. 71, p. 366c11-12; k. 101, p. 525b19.

Those who do not know them [thus] commit faults. Thus, Śāriputra while walking with five bhikṣus came to an empty house where he spent the night. It was a day when the pratimokṣa is recited. Śāriputra was not familiar with the rules for the inner limits  $(anthas\bar{t}m\bar{a})$  and the outer limits  $(b\bar{a}hyas\bar{t}m\bar{a})$ . This was reported to the Buddha who said: When one leaves the residence  $(\bar{a}v\bar{a}sa)$  at the end of one night, there are no determined limits.

Another time Śāriputra and Maudgalyāyana returned leading five hundred bhikṣus who uttered loud shouts and cries (*uccaśabdā mahāśabdā abhūvan*). Then the Buddha chased them away (*praṇāmayati sma*).<sup>759</sup> This was a vocal fault [on the part of the disciples].

Another time Śāriputra had neglected the dietary rules and the Buddha said to him: You are eating impure food (aviśuddhāhāra).<sup>760</sup>

Thus, therefore, [the arhats] had bodily and vocal faults. But the Buddha who has eliminated the traces of the passions (*kleśavāsanā*) has no such faults.

Finally, in the Buddha, all the bodily and vocal actions accompany knowledge (*jñānānuparivartin*): this is why his body is faultless and his voice is faultless.

For all these kinds of reasons, the Buddha has no defect of body (*nāsti skhalitam*) and no defect of speech (*nāsti ravitam*).

## 3. The Buddha has no lapse of mindfulness

There is no failure of mindfulness (nāsty muusitasmṛtitā). Indeed, during the long night (dīrgharātram) he developed the mind of the four foundations of mindfulness (smṛtyupasthāna), he developed the profound concentrations (gambhīrasamādhi), his mind was without any distractions (avikṣipta), he eliminated the thirst of desires (kāmatṛṣṇā) and joy of the dharma (dharmaprīti), his mind was not attached to any dharma and he attained the supreme safety of mind (paramacittakakṣemavihāra). If the mind is fearful or hasty, there are lapses of mindfulness; but the mind of the Buddha has none of these faults: this is why is he has no lapses.

Furthermore, by means of the [memory of] former abodes ( $p\bar{u}rvaniv\bar{a}s\bar{a}nusmrti$ ), the sciences (vidya) and the powers (bala), the Buddha has triply adorned his mindfulness which is perfect and without defect because his mindfulness often bears upon the past.

Furthermore, as his faculty of mindfulness (*smṛtīndriya*) is of immense and inexhaustible power, his memory has no lapses.

1338

These are the precepts relating to the boundaries of the parishes  $(s\bar{t}m\bar{a})$  and the celebration of the Upoşada in common: cf. Vinaya, I, p. 102-136.

<sup>759</sup> Episode related in Majjhima, I, p. 456-457 and already mentioned above, p. 1575F.

<sup>760</sup> Episode related in detail above, p. 120-121F

Finally, in the Buddha, all mental actions accompany knowledge (*sarvaṃ manaskarma jñānānuparivarti*): this is why his mindfulness has no lapses since at each moment it accompanies the mind.

This is what is understood by mindfulness without lapse. See what has been [248a] said in the *T'ien wen king* (Devatāparpṛcchāsūtra).<sup>761</sup>

[The deity asked]:

Who is the man without fault?

Who is the man with unfailing mindfulness?

Who is the ever-attentive man (*smṛtimat*)

Who accomplishes what he must do?

[The Buddha answered]:

The man who knows all dharmas perfectly,

Who is freed of all obstacles

And is endowed with all the qualities:

He is unique: it is the Buddha.

## 4. The Buddha has no notion of variety

He has no notion of variety (nāsti nānātvasaṃjñā). The Buddha has no point of distinctions (vibhaṅga) among beings; he makes no difference between those who are far away and those who are close; he does not say: This one is noble and I can speak to him; that one is lowly and I must not speak to him. Just as the sun lights up everything, so the Buddha with the rays of his great compassion (mahākaruṇāraśmi) has pity for all and saves all alike. Whether one honors him or does not honor him, whether it concerns enemies or relatives, noblemen or scoundrels, all are alike to him.

See for example this stranger, the dung-sweeper called *Ni-t'o* (Nītha): the Buddha converted him and he became a great arhat.<sup>762</sup>

<sup>761</sup> Araham sutta of the Samyutta, I, p. 14, already cited above, p. 67-68F and notes.

<sup>762</sup> Nītha (?) was a refuse-sweeper. His long hair hung down in disorder; he was filthy and his clothes were in tatters. When he found a rag on his way, he used it to mend his garments. On his back he carried a jar full of refuse. One day when the Buddha was visiting Rājagṛha, Nītha, lowly and impure, did not dare to come near him for fear of increasing his misdeeds further. He took flight across the city, but at each corner the Buddha appeared before him. The Teacher said to him: "Although your body is impure, your heart possesses the excellent and wonderful perfume of the Dharma. You must not think of yourself as lowly." Having received the Buddha's teaching, Nītha entered the religious life and became an arhat.

See also the vaiśya *Tö-hou* (Śrīgupta) who wanted to harm the Buddha with a ditch full of fire and with poisoned rice. The same day, the Buddha liberated him from the threefold poison (*triviṣa*) and extinguished the fire of wrong views (*mithyādrsti*) in him.<sup>763</sup>

Such examples show that the Buddha has no notion of variety (nānātvasamjñā).

Furthermore, the Buddha has no fondness (*anunaya*) for the practitioners of his doctrine such as Śāriputra, the bodhisattva Maitreya, etc.; he has no aversion (*pratigha*) either for people of wrong view such as Devadatta or the six heretic masters, Pūraṇa, etc. As the Buddha has formed his mind [in total impartiality] for innumerable incalculable periods (*asaṃkhyeyaklpa*), he is the Jewel (*ratna*) among beings and, like pure gold, he does not undergo variations.

Furthermore, "three times during the night and three times during the day, the Buddha considers beings with his Buddha eye" (*trī rātres trir divasasya ṣaṭkṛtvo rātrimdivasena buddhacakṣuṣā lokaṃ vyavalokayati*)<sup>764</sup> and never allows the time of asking himself who can be converted (*vaineya*) to pass by. Considering beings impartially, he has no notion of variety.

Furthermore, the Buddha has praised the good dharmas (*kuśaladharma*) in many ways (*anekaparyāyeṇa*) and criticized the bad dharmas (*akuśaladharma*) in many ways. However, faced with good or with bad, his mind shows no increase or decrease (*anūnānadhika*): it is only in order to save beings that he makes distinctions. Thus he has no notion of variety.

Furthermore, it is said in the *Yi-ts'ie-pou-hing king* (Sarvadharmāpravṛttinirdeśa):<sup>765</sup> "The Buddha considers all beings as his own self, as having fulfilled their role (*kṛtya*) and having neither beginning, middle or end (*anādimadhyaparyavasmana*)."<sup>766</sup> That is why he has no notion of variety.

The name of the dung-sweeper is poorly established: *Nītha* or *Nīthi* in the fragments of the Kalpanāmaṇḍitikā, *Sunīta* in Pāli, *Ni-t'o* and *Ni-t'i* in the Chinese transcriptions. His story is told in the following sources:

Kalpanāmaṇḍitikā, p. 158-160 (very mutilated fragments) and Sutrālaṃkāra said to be by Aśvaghoṣa, T 201, no. 43, k. 7, p. 203c-297a (transl. Huber, p. 192-210): Theragāthā, p. 63-64, v. 620-631, and its commentary (tr. Rhys Davids, *Psalms of the Brethren*, p. 271-274); Hien yu king, T 202, k. 6, no. 35, p. 397a-390a; Tch'ou yao king, T 212, k. 19, p. 710a1-c1.

Nītha is also mentioned in passing in the Hien yu king, T 202, k. 4, p. 377a12, and the Sarvāstivādavinayavibhanga, T 1442, k. 42, p. 858a28-29.

- 763 For Śrīgupta, see above, p. 184F, note 4.
- 764 Stock phrase: cf. Divyāvadāna, p. 95, 124, 265; Avadānaśataka, I, p. 16, 30, 72, etc.
- The correct title is indeed Sarvadharmāpravṛttinirdeśa (cf. Śikṣāsamuccaya, p. 6, l. 16; 90. l. 19;
- 99. l. 3; Mahāvyut. no. 1362) 'Teaching of the non-functioning of all dharmas' and not

Sarvadharmapravrttinirdeśa as it is spelled most often in western lists. This sutra has come down to us in three Chinese translations and one Tibetan translation:

1) T 650: Tchou fa wou hing king, transl. by Kumārajḥiva.

Furthermore, the Buddha sees that all beings and all things are, from the beginning, unborn (*anutpanna*), unceasing (*aniruddha*), always pure (*śuddha*) and like nirvāṇa: thus he has no notion of variety.

Finally, the *Pou-eul-jou fa-men* (Advayapraveśadharmaparyāya) or the 'Teaching on the entry into non-duality'  $^{767}$  is the doorway to the true nature of dharmas (*dharmāṇāṃ bhūtalakṣaṇa*). Variety (*nānātva*) is duality (*dvaya*), and duality is wrong view (*mithyādṛṣṭi*). But the Buddha is not a deceiver (*amāyāvin*) and cannot commit a deception (*māyā*). He always applies the Teaching on the entry into non-duality, and deception is variety.

That is why he has no notion of variety.

#### 5. The Buddha has no non-concentrated mind

He has no non-concentrated mind ( $n\bar{a}sty\ asam\bar{a}hitacittam$ ). Concentration ( $sam\bar{a}dhi$ ) is the non-distraction of the mind ( $citt\bar{a}vik\bar{s}epa$ ). In a distracted mind, it [248b] is impossible to see the truth: distraction is like a body of water disturbed by waves where one cannot see one's own face; it is like a lamp ( $d\bar{t}pa$ ) in the full wind which cannot illumine well. This is why it is said that the Buddha does not have a non-concentrated mind.

Question. – The concentrations go from the *anāgamya* [preliminary concentration of the first dhyāna] on up to the absorption of cessation (*nirodhasamāpatti*). When one enters into these absorptions, it is impossible to assert any physical action (*kāyakarman*) or vocal action (*vākkarman*). Hence, if the Buddha is always concentrated (*samāhita*) and has no non-concentrated mind, how can he travel through the kingdoms, take up the four positions (*īryāpatha*) and preach the Dharma to the great assemblies with all kinds of *nidānas* and *avadānas*? Whether these actions are of the domain of the desire realm (*kāmadhātvavacara*) or of the Brahmā world, the Buddha cannot enter into concentration if he wants to accomplish them.

Answer. – When we said that he has no non-concentrated mind, that can have several meanings.

<sup>2)</sup> Tchou fa pen wou king, transl. under the Souei by Jinagupta between the 6<sup>th</sup> and 7<sup>th</sup> month of the 15<sup>th</sup>, *k'ai houang* year or August to September 595 (cf. Li, T 2034, k. 12, p. 103c6).

<sup>3)</sup> T 652: Ta tch'eng souei tchouan chouo tchou fa king, transl. under the Pei Song (960-1127) by Chao tö and others.

<sup>4)</sup> OKC 847: Chos thams cad hbyun ba med par bstan pa, transl. by Rin chen mtsho.

<sup>766</sup> Cf. Tchou fa wou hing king, T 650, k. 1, p. 751a28-29: "Beings are Bodhi; Bodhi is beings. Bodhi and beings are one and the same thing, namely, the Bhagavat."

According to the practice somewhat current at its time, the *Traité* here refers to the Vimalakīrtinirdeśasūtra by citing the title of one of its chapters instead of the title of the sūtra itself. It refers to chapter VIII: 'Introduction to the doctrine of non-duality' (p. 301-318 of my [Lamotte's] translation of the *Vimalakīrtinirdeśa*).

Being concentrated means being fixed on the good dharmas with a mind that is always absorbed (sadāsaṃgṛhītacittena). Now the Buddha is fixed on the true nature (bhūtalakṣaṇa) of dharmas and never strays from that. Therefore he does not have a non-concentrated mind.

Furthermore, in the desire realm ( $k\bar{a}madh\bar{a}tu$ ) there are some concentrations where those who have entered into them are able to preach the Dharma. Thus, in the Abhidharma it is a question of [concentrations] belonging to the desire realm ( $k\bar{a}madh\bar{a}tvavacara$ ), such as the four levels of saints ( $\bar{a}ryavam\dot{s}a$ ),  $^{768}$  the four foundations of mindfulness ( $smrtyupasth\bar{a}na$ ), the four right efforts ( $samyakpradh\bar{a}na$ ), the four bases of magical power ( $rddhip\bar{a}da$ ), the five faculties (indriya), the five strengths (bala), the concentration preventing being attacked by others ( $aran\bar{a}sam\bar{a}dhi$ ),  $^{769}$  the knowledge resulting from aspiration ( $pranidh\bar{i}jn\bar{a}na$ ),  $^{770}$  and the four unhindered knowledges (pratisamvid). There are marvelous qualities of this kind in which the Buddha is established while entering into the world of desire: this is why he has no non-concentrated mind.

When the śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas emerge from concentration (samādher vyuthitāḥ), they enter into an undefined mind (avyākṛtacitta), they enter into a good mind (kuśalacitta) or they enter into a defiled mind (samalacitta). But when the Buddha comes out of concentration and enters into a concentration of the desire realm (kāmadhātusamādhi),<sup>771</sup> he has not a single moment of distracted mind (vikṣiptacitta): this is why he has no non-concentrated mind.

Furthermore, according to the śrāvaka system, when the magically created beings (*nirmita*) preach the Dharma, their creator (*nirmātṛ*), [namely, the śrāvaka, does not speak, and when the creator speaks, the magically created beings do not speak. It is not so with the Buddha: the magically created beings and their creator, [namely, the Buddha,] preach the Dharma together.<sup>772</sup> [In the śrāvakas, the mind in concentration (*samādhicitta*) is necessarily different [from the mind of creation (*nirmāṇacitta*)] and when the śrāvaka enters into concentration, he does not speak. The Buddha himself, while remaining in concentration, is able to preach the Dharma and to walk about (*cankramitum*). This is what is said in the *Mi-tsi king* (Guhyasūtra,

Pér Being content with clothing (*cīvara*), food (*piṇḍapāta*), beds (śayanāsana) and delighting in renunciation and meditation (*prahāṇabhāvanā*): cf. Dīgha, III, p. 224-225; Anguttara, II, p. 27-28.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>769</sup> See above, p. 4F and note 1, 633F, 1041F; Kośa, VII, p. 86-87.

<sup>770</sup> See Kośa, VII, p. 88-89.

<sup>771</sup> In other words, when the Buddha comes out of a *dhyāna* or a *samāpatti* of the two higher realms in order to enter into the concentrations of the desire realm so as to devote himself to the practice of the *bodhipākṣikadharmas*.

Here the *Traité* is repeating what it has already said above, p. 468-469F. Once more it seems to stray from the canonical sources in whose words the *nirmitas* of the śrāvakas speak when the śrāvaka speaks and remain silent when the śrāvaka is silent. Only the Buddha was able to converse with his *nirmitas*.

or Tathāgatācintyaguhyanirdeśa), in regard to the Secret of the mind (*cittaguhya*):<sup>773</sup> "The mind of the Buddhas is always in concentration", but they are still able to preach the Dharma.

Furthermore, distractions (*vikṣiptacitta*), fetters (*saṃyojana*), doubts (*vicikitsa*) do not exist in the Buddha. Although he has no doubts concerning the four truths (*catuḥṣatya*), the arhat often still has doubts about dharmas. The eternally concentrated Buddha has no doubts about dharmas: this is why he has no non-concentrated mind.

Moreover, the arhat who still has traces of the disturbing emotions (*kleśavāsanā*) and is capable of regressing (*parihāṇadharman*) has distractions. The Buddha who, in his omniscience, has complete knowledge, has no distractions. He is like a vessel (*ghaṭa*) full of water where there is neither sound (*svara*) nor movement (*īraṇa*). The Buddha is the only person who can be called free of deception (*amāyāvin*);<sup>774</sup> he is the foremost of the three strong individuals (*dṛḍhapudgala*).<sup>775</sup> His mind remains unchanged in suffering as in happiness.

All the characteristics of things (*dharmalakṣaṇa*), unity (*ekārtha*), multiplicity (*nānārtha*), production (*utpāda*), cessation (*nirodha*), interruption (*uccheda*), permanence (*śāśvata*), coming (*āgama*) and going (*nirgama*) are deceptions, [248c] the formation (*saṃskāra*) of a collection of falsehoods.<sup>776</sup> Since the Buddha is well established (*supratiṣṭhita*) in the true nature (*bhūtalakṣaṇa*) of dharmas, his mind is never non-concentrated and, being never non-concentrated, it does not change.

Moreover, among the five incomprehensible things (*acintyadharma*), the attributes of the Buddha are the most incomprehensible: 777 these eighteen special attributes (*āveṇikadharma*) are the profound treasure

773 Cf. T 310, k. 11, p. 59c8 and seq; T 312, k. 9, p. 724c14 and seq.: "From the night when the Tathāgata realized the Bodhi of the Buddhas until the day when he was nirvāṇized, during that interval, the Tathāgata is free of doubt and transformation: his mind is without thought, without movement, without instability, without mixing, without scattering, without distraction, without change...".

For the Tathāgatacintyaguhyanirdeśa, one of the sources of the *Traité*, see above, p. 10F, note 3; p. 560F; amd later, k. 26, p. 253b3; k. 30, p. 284a17-18; k. 57, p. 466b6; k. 88, p. 684a22.

774 However, the bhikṣu who has destroyed the impurities (kṣṇṇāsvara) is also without cheating or deceit (asatho hoti amāyāvi): cf. Majjhima, I, p. 97; II, p. 95, 25; Anguttara, III, p. 65; V, p. 15.

According to the Tseng yi a han (T 125, k. 12, p. 607a2-5), the three individuals worthy of homage  $(p\bar{u}j\bar{a})$  are the Tathāgata, the disciple of the Tathāgata who has destroyed the impurities and is arhat, and the cakravartin king. For the pratyekabuddhas, these individuals are worthy of a stūpa (Dīgha, II, p. 142;Anguttara, II, p. 245).

776 The eight characteristics in question are rejected by Nāgārjuna in the dedication to his Madhyamakakārikā (cf. Madh. vṛtti, p. 3, l. 11:

Anirodham anutpādam anucchedam aśāśvatam / anekārtham anānārtham anādamam anirgamam //

These are the eight well-known Nāgārjunian negations.

777 The *Traité* lists five *acintyas*: cf. k. 30, p. 383c17-20: "The sūtra speaks of five incomprehensible things, namely: *i*) the number of beings, *ii*) retribution of action (*karmavipāka*), *iii*) the strength of a man

(gambhīranidhāna) of the Buddha. Who can understand them? This is why it is certain that the Buddha hs no non-concentrated mind.

Although the Buddha enters into concentration, he does not have these coarse minds (*audārikacitta*) of investigation (*vitarka*) and analysis (*vicāra*) and, having incomprehensible knowledge (*acintyajñāna*), he can preach the Dharma.

The heavenly musical instruments (*divyatūrya*) make all sorts of sounds dear to the gods, and they do so while being without mind (*citta*) or consciousness (*vijñāna*) by virtue of the merits (*puṇya*) acquired by the gods.<sup>778</sup> If these heavenly musical instruments that are without mind or consciousness do such things, how could it be said that the Buddha, who is endowed with mind, cannot preach the Dharma?

This is why it is said that the Buddha does not have a non-concentrated mind.

## 6. The Buddha has no unconsidered equanimity

He has no unconsidered equanimity ( $n\bar{a}sty\ apratisamkhyopeks\bar{a}$ ). — Beings have three types of sensations ( $vedan\bar{a}$ ): unpleasant ( $duhkhavedan\bar{a}$ ), pleasant ( $sukhavedan\bar{a}$ ), neither unpleasant nor pleasant

in trance (*dhyāyibala*), *iv*) the strength of the nāgas (*nāgabala*), *v*) the power of the Buddhas. Of these five incomprehensible things, the power of the Buddhas is the most incomprehensible." – See also later, k. 90, p.698b20; k. 93, p. 714a21; k. 98, p. 743b14. – The same list is repeated by T'an louan (476-542) in his notes on the Amitāyuhsūtra, T 1819, k. 2, p. 836b7-10.

However, the canonical sūtras list only four *acintyas* (in Pāli, *acinteyya*):

- 1) Anguttara, II, p. 80: *Cattar' imāni bhikkhave acinteyyāni na cintetabbāni yāni cintento ummādassa vighātassa bhāgī assa. katamāni cattāri? Buddhānaṃ buddhavisayo... jhāyissa jhānavisayo... kammavipako... lokacintā:* "Here, O monks, are the four incomprehensible things about which you should not think, for the person who thinks about them will be prey to mistakes and trouble. What are these four things? The Buddha domain of the Buddhas, the domain of the person in trance, the retribution of action, and philosophical speculations about the world."
- 2) Ekottarāgama, T 125, k. 18, p. 6406-9: i) lokadhātu, ii) sattva, iii) nāgaviṣaya, iv) buddhaviṣaya.
  - 3. Ibid., k. 21, p. 657a2-21: i) sattva, ii) lokadhātu, iii) nāgaviṣaya, iv) buddhaviṣaya.
- 4) Ratnakūṭa, T 310, k. 8, p. 43c16-18; k. 86, p. 493c16-19: i) karmaviṣaya, ii) nāgaviṣaya, iii) dhyānaviṣaya, iv) buddhaviṣaya.

Contrary to the *Traité*, the Vibhāṣā (T 1545, k. 113, p. 586b24; T 1546, k. 22, p. 163a8-9) considers that, of the five *acintyas*, *karmavipāka* is the most profound.

Finally, in the Hien yang cheng kiao louen (T 1602,k. 6, p. 510c2-6), Asanga postulates six acintyas: i) ātman, ii) sattva, iii) loka, iv) sarvasattvakarmavipāka, v) dhyānasākṣātkāra and dhyānaviṣaya. vi) buddha and buddhaviṣaya.

778 See above, p. 1049F, the comments on the lute of the Asuras.

 $(adhkh\bar{a}sukhavedan\bar{a})$ . The unpleasant sensation produces hatred  $(dve\bar{s}a)$ , the pleasant sensation produces love  $(r\bar{a}ga)$ , the neither unpleasant nor pleasant produces confusion (moha). Of these three kinds of sensation, the unpleasant sensation produces suffering (duhkha), abides in suffering and destroys happiness; the pleasant sensation produces happiness (sukha), abides in happiness and destroys suffering; as for the neither unpleasant nor pleasant sensation, one does not know if it is suffering or if it is happiness.

Other people who are of weak faculties (mrdvindriya) experience the unpleasant and the pleasant sensations especially, but they do not feel the neither unpleasant nor pleasant sensation, they do not know it and have only indifference ( $upek s\bar{a}$ ) for it: they are fettered by the fetter of confusion (mohasamyojana). The Buddha, on the other hand, knows completely the moment of arising ( $utp\bar{a}da$ ), the moment of duration (sthiti) and the moment of cessation (bhanga) of the neither unpleasant nor pleasant sensation: this is why it is said that the Buddha has no unconsidered equanimity.

Question. – But what is equanimity  $(upek s\bar{a})$  here? Is it the absence of suffering and happiness which is  $upek s\bar{a}$ , or is it a matter of the  $upek s\bar{a}$  that is one of the seven factors of enlightenment (sambodhyanga), or again is it the  $upek s\bar{a}$  that is one of the four immeasurables  $(apram\bar{a}nacitta)$ ?

Answer. – The absence of suffering and of happiness constitutes the twofold domain ( $sth\bar{a}nadvaya$ ) of  $upeks\bar{a}$  and the abandoning [of this domain] is also called  $upeks\bar{a}$ . How is that?

In the course of a neither unpleasant nor pleasant sensation, other people do not take into account, from moment to moment, the moments of arising (*utpāda*), of duration (*sthiti*) and cessation (*bhanga*) of this sensation: it takes a long time for them to notice it. But the Buddha cognizes [these three moments] completely each successive moment.

 $Upek \bar{s}\bar{a}$  is also part of the seven factors of enlightenment (sambodhyanga); when the mind is completely balanced, when it is not sinking ( $n\bar{a}v\bar{a}l\bar{i}yte$ ) or being scattered ( $na\ vik \bar{s}ipyate$ ), this is when equanimity ( $upek \bar{s}\bar{a}$ ) should be practiced. In the moments of sinking, one practices the notion of exertion ( $v\bar{v}ryasamj\tilde{n}\bar{a}$ ), and in the moments of distraction, one practices the notion of concentration of the mind ( $cittasamgrahanasamj\tilde{n}\bar{a}$ ).

In some circumstances, the arhats and pratyekabuddhas concentrate their mind wrongly or excite it wrongly, and their equanimity is thus in disequilibrium. The Buddha, however, is never without completely cognizing the coarseness or the subtleness, the profundity or the superficiality inherent in the instantaneous minds. Knowing that, he is [truly] indifferent.

Question. – If that is so, how was the Buddha able to talk to the bhikṣus about Nan-t'o, saying: "In Nanda, the sensations  $(vedan\bar{a})$  are completely conscious at the moment when they arise, completely conscious when they endure and completely conscious at the moment when they are destroyed, and it is the same for the notions  $(samj\tilde{n}\tilde{a})$  and investigations (vitarka)"? [Is that not a privilege reserved to the Buddha?]

Answer.- There are two ways of being conscious: [249a]

1) When a *duḥkhavedanā* 'unpleasant sensation' arises, knowing that a *duḥkhavedanā* is arising; when a *duḥkhavedanā* continues, knowing that a *duḥkhavedanā* is continuing; when a *duḥkhavedanā* ceases, knowing that a *duḥkhavedanā* is ceasing. When a *sukhavedanā* 'pleasant sensation' arises, knowing that a

sukhvedanā is arising; when a sukhavedanā continues, knowing that a sukhavedanā is continuing; when a sukhavedanā ceases, knowing that a sukhvedana is ceasing. The same for a duḥkhāsukhavedanā 'neither unpleasant nor pleasant sensation'. This is knowing only the general characteristics (sāmānyalakṣaṇa), but not the specific characteristics (svalakṣaṇa) of the sensation. [This way of being conscious was that of Nanda.]

2) Having full consciousness and full awareness from moment to moment of the *duḥkha-, sukha-* and *aduḥkhāsukha-vedanā* succeeding one another from moment to moment (*kṣanekṣaṇā*) and not ignoring the mental events (*caitasikadharma*) following one another from moment to moment. [This is the way of being conscious of the Buddha.] This is why it is said that he has no unconsidered indifference.

Furthermore, the Buddha sometimes went away from beings in order to enter into deep meditation (*pratisamlayitum*) for one or two months.<sup>779</sup> There are people who doubt and wonder: The Buddha came into the world to save beings; why then is he always in concentration?

The Buddha tells them: "It is for many reasons and knowingly that I am leaving beings. There is no unconsidered indifference (*apratisaṃkhyāyipekṣā*) in me."

Question. – What are the reasons why he leaves them knowingly?

Answer. – In the middle of the great assemblies, the Buddha is tired and that is why he wants to rest for a while. 780

These retreats of the Buddha have been frequently mentioned in the texts: Vinaya, III, p. 68, 230; Dīgha, II, p. 237; Saṃyutta, V,p. 12-13, 320, 325. The Buddha always used the following expression to tale leave: *Iccham' ahaṃ addhamāsaṃ* (or *temāsaṃ, cattāro māse*) *paṭisallīyituṃ, n'amhi kenaci upasaṃkamitabbo aññatra piṇḍapātanīhārakena*: "I wish to go into meditation for two weeks (three or four months); I do not wish to be approached by anyone except the person who will bring me food." 780 Several times, having preached until late in the night, the Buddha was tired and asked one of his disciples, Śāriputra, Ānanda or Maudgalyāyana, to continue with the teaching. The episode is always related in the following words:

Dīgha, III, p. 209; Majjhima, I, p. 354; Saṃyutta, IV, p. 184; Anguttara, V, p. 126: Atha kho Bhagaā... āyasmantaṃ sāriputtaṃ āmantesi: Vigatathīnamiddho kho Sāriputta bhikkhusaṃgho, paṭibhātu taṃ Sāriputta bhikkhūnaṃ dhammaikathā. Pitthi me āgilāyati, tam ahaṃ āyamissāmīti. — Evam bhante to kho āyasmā Sāriputto Bhagavato paccassosi. — Atha kho Bhagavā catugguṇaṃ saṃghāṭiṃ paññāpetvā dakkhiṇena passena sīhaseyyaṃ kappesi, pāde pādaṃ accādhāya sato saṃpajāno utthānasaññam manasikaritvā.

"Then the Blessed One said to venerable Śāriputra: 'The community of monks is free of langor and torpor, O Śāriputra; let the religious instruction [for it] come into your mind. My back is sore: I am going to lie down.' Saying: 'May it be so, O Lord', the venerable Śāriputra gave his assent to the Blessed One. Then the Blessed One, having folded his cloak into four, lay down on his right side in the lion pose, one foot resting on top of the other, attentive, lucid, after having fixed his mind on the time to re-arise."

Furthermore, from lifetime to lifetime, the Buddha has always liked solitude (naişkramya).

When, as a bodhisattva, he was in his mother's womb ( $m\bar{a}trkuk\bar{s}i$ ), his mother loved solitude as well, and it was at forty li from the capital, in the forest of Lan-pi-ni (Lumbin $\bar{v}$ vana) she gave birth to him. <sup>781</sup>

When the Buddha attained Bodhi, it was in the forest of *Ngeou-leou-p'in lo* (Uruvilvāvana) alone, at the foot of a tree that he became Buddha.<sup>782</sup>

When he turned the wheel of the Dharma for the first time, it was also at *Sien-jen tchou-tch'ou* (Rṣipatana) in the forest of *Lou-lin* (Mṛgadāva).<sup>783</sup>

When he entered nirvāṇa, it was in the forest of So-lo trees (Śālavana) under two trees.

Thus, during the long night ( $d\bar{v}ghar\bar{a}tram$ ), he liked to practice solitude: this is why he entered into concentration.

Furthermore, the Buddha always has the mind of solitude (naiṣkramyacittasamanvāgata): that is why he entered into concentration.

Furthermore, the Buddha avoided crowds (saṃsarga) and places of unnecessary speech (saṃbhinnapralāpasthāna) and, by contemplating his own treasury of Buddha qualities (buddhaguṇanidhāna), he experienced happiness of supreme purity (paramaśuddhasukha): that is why he entered into concentration.

Furthermore, when the Buddha finished preaching the Dharma, he always advised the bhikşus to practice solitary meditation (*pratisamlayana*) in the manner of having no regret (*paścāttāpa*) and, as he himself applied the advice that he gave (*kanthokta*), he entered into concentration.

Furthermore, he disliked homage  $(p\bar{u}j\bar{a})$  but, when he knew there were beings to be converted (*vaineya*), he entered into concentration and created fictive beings (*nirmitapuruṣa*) to come to save them.<sup>784</sup>

Furthermore, there are beings whose concentrations ( $sam\bar{a}dhi$ ) are rare and whose wisdoms ( $praj\bar{n}\bar{a}$ ) are numerous. By giving them the example of his own practice of the dhyānas, the Buddha converts them.

Furthermore, there are people who get tired of always seeing the Buddha, and the Buddha withdraws a little so that they might aspire to see him again.<sup>785</sup>

For the corresponding Sanskrit wording, see Sanskrit Mahāparinirvāṇasūtra, p. 264, 286: Pṛṣṭhī ma āvilāyati tāṃ tāvad āyāmayiṣye...Atha bhagavān gaṇaguṇāṃ saṃghātiṃ śirasi pratiṣṭhāpya dakṣiṇena pārśvena śayyāṃ kalpayati pāde pādam ādhāyāloksaṃjñī pratismṛtaḥ saṃprajāna utthānasamjñām manasi kurvānah.

<sup>781</sup> See above, p. 21F, note 2.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>782</sup> See above, p. 179F, 227-228F.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>783</sup> See above, p. 87F; 182F, note 1, 420F.

Ree the miracle of the multiplication of the fictive buddhas, p. 531-534F and notes; 1352-1353F.

Allusion to the schism at Kauśāmbī related above, p. 896-898F and notes.

Furthermore, when the Buddha wished to preach the Dharma to the devas, he went to a solitary place (vivikte sthāne).<sup>786</sup>

Furthermore, it is in order to establish a rule for future generations that the Buddha meditated and, when he turned the Wheel of Dharma, he passed this custom on to his disciples: this is why he entered into concentration.

Furthermore, the Buddha has shown a twofold path for gathering beings (sattvasaṃgrahāya): that of concentration (samādhi) and that of wisdom (prajñā). When the Buddha preaches the Dharma in the great assemblies, he illustrates the path of wisdom (prajñāmārga); but when he concentrates his mind in a solitary place (vivikte sthāne cittaṃ saṃgrhṇāti), he illustrates the path of concentration (samādhimārga). [249b]

Finally, in the face of the six sense objects (sadviṣaya), beings have three kinds of reactions (saṃskāra): i) seeing beautiful colors (rūpa), they experience the happiness of joy (prītisuklha); ii) seeing ugly colors, they experience the suffering of sadness (daurmanasyaduḥkha); iii) seeing neither unpleasant nor pleasant colors, they experience a feeling of indifference (upekṣacitta). And it is the same for [the other sense objects] on up to dharmas. The Buddha, however, has control (vaśita) over the six sense objects (ṣaḍviśaya): in the face of pleasant or unpleasant objects, he is able to produce a feeling of indifference as has been said in regard to his holy magic (rddhi).

These are the various reasons why he enters into concentration and does not have any unconsidered indifference.

#### 7. The Buddha has no loss of zeal

He has no loss of zeal (nāsti chandaparihāṇiḥ). – Knowing the value of the good dharmas (kuśaladharma), the Buddha always wants to accumulate the good dharmas and since his mind never tires of cultivating the good dharmas, he has no loss of zeal.

[The Buddha helps a blind bhikṣu thread his needle.] Thus there was once an partially blind old bhikṣu who was repairing his cloak ( $samgh\bar{a}t\bar{t}$ ). Unable to thread his needle ( $s\bar{u}c\bar{t}$ ), he said to people: "Would someone who wants to gain merit thread my needle for me?" The Buddha appeared before him and said: "I am someone who loves merit without ever tiring of it. Bring your needle." Full of respect, the bhikṣu caught a glimpse of the Buddha's radiance and recognized his voice. He said to the Buddha: "The Buddha

already related above, p. 569-570F.

Thus Śakradevendra was converted in the Indraśailaguhā (abive, p. 180F, note 2), and the four Caturmahārājakāyikadevas, on the shores of lake Mandākini (Sarvāstivādin Vin., T 1435, k. 26, p. 193a; Mūlasarv. Vin., in *Gilgit Manuscripts*, III, I, p. 256-259; Tch'ou yao king, T 212, k. 23, p. 734b; Vibhḥaṣā, T 1545, k. 79, p. 410a; T 1546, k. 41, p. 306c; T 1547, k. 9, p. 482c).

has exhausted the ends and the depths of the immense sea of qualities (apramāṇaguṇasāgara); why is he not yet satisfied?" The Buddha said to the bhikṣu: "The reward of the qualities (guṇavipāka) is very profound (gambhūra). There is nobody who knows their benefits as I do. Although I have exhausted the ends and the depths, my zeal (chandacitta) for merit is not yet satisfied (atṛpta): this is why I have become Buddha, Consequently, even now I do not stop. Although there are no further qualities that I might obtain, my zeal does not cease." In fear, gods and men understood: "If the Buddha, [perfect as he is] is so insatiable for the qualities (guṇeṣv atṛptaḥ), what would it be for other people?" The Buddha preached the Dharma to the bhikṣu and at once his fleshly eye (māṃsacakṣus) was enriched with the pure eye of wisdom (prajñācakusus).

Question. - But the Buddha had previously eliminated the zeal for all the good dharmas (*sarveṣu kuśaleṣu dharmeṣuchandaḥ*); why is it said here that he has not lost zeal (*nāsti chandapariāṇiḥ*)?

Answer. – When he ruled out zeal for all the good dharmas, he had in mind those who are "zealous to obtain good dharmas that have not yet been obtained" (anutpannānām kuśalānām dharmāṇām utpādāya chandam janayanti) or who "are zealous so that good dharmas already obtained should develop" (upannānām kuśalānām dharmāṇām bhūyobhāvāya chandam janayanti). The Buddha does not have that type of zeal. Completely endowed with all the qualities (sarvaguṇasampanna), there is nothing that he has not obtained and he has nothing to increase. Here the word 'zeal' (chanda) means what I have said above: although the Buddha is endowed with all the qualities, his zeal for them has not come to a stop.

In the horse-jewel (aśvaratna),<sup>789</sup> even if it has arrived at its destination, the desire to go forward never ceases and persists until death. It is the same for the Buddha-Jewel. When the great fire at the end of the kalpa (mahākalpoddāha) has burned and consumed the trisāhasramahāsāhasralokadhātu,<sup>790</sup> the power of fire has not disappeared. It is the same for the fire of the Buddha's wisdom: when he has burned up all the passions (kleśa) and illumined all things, the zeal associated with this wisdom (prajñāsaṃprayuktachanda) is not extinguished.

Moreover, although the Buddha fulfills all the good dharmas and all the qualities, beings are inexhaustible (*akṣaya*) in number and this is why the desire which the Buddha has to save them all does not stop.

Question. – If the desire that the Buddha has to save all beings never [249c] ceases, why then does he enter into nirvāṇa?

Answer. –There are two ways to save beings: some obtain salvation when the Buddha is present, others obtain salvation after his nirvāṇa.<sup>791</sup> Thus it is said in the *Fa-houa king* (Saddharmapuṇḍarīkasūtra):

<sup>788</sup> Two of the four *samyakpradhānas*.

<sup>789</sup> One of the seven jewels of the cakravartin king.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>790</sup> Cf. Kośa, III, p. 184.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>791</sup> In the view of the Mahāyāna, the nirvāṇa of the Buddha is not an historical fact but simply skillful means  $(up\bar{a}ya)$ , a fiction destined to convert beings.

"When the master physician had given the medicinal plants he had gathered to his sons, he left them." This is why the Buddha enters into nirvāṇa.

Moreover, there are beings with weak faculties (*mṛdvindriya*) and slight virtues who are incapable of realizing the grand undertaking [of salvation] and who can only plant the causes of merits. This is why the Buddha enters into nirvāṇa [without waiting for them to reach their salvation].

Question. – But even after the death {nirodha} of the Buddha, there are still people who become arhat; why do you say that they can only plant the causes of merits?

Answer. – Although some become arhat, they are so rare that it is not worth mentioning. On the other hand, as soon as the Buddha preaches the Dharma, there are, in the ten directions, innumerable and incalculable beings who obtain Bodhi. After the death of the Buddha, it is the same. Similarly in a great kingdom, there are indeed some punitive military expeditions, but these are so rare that we do not speak about them. This is why, although beings are inexhaustible in number, the Buddha enters into nirvāṇa.

Finally, it is said in the *Mo-ho-yen Cheou-leng-yen king* (Mahāyāna Śūraṃgamasamādhisūtra): "In the Pratimaṇḍitā universe, the Buddha has a life-span of seven hundred incalculable periods (*asaṃkhyeyalkalpa*) during which he saves beings."<sup>793</sup> This is why it is said that the Buddha has no loss of zeal (*chandaparihāṇi*).

792 Saddharmapundarīka, p. 322, l. 5-6 (cf. Transl. of Kumārajīva, T 202, k. 6, p. 43a27-28: *Sa* (vaidyapuruşa) evam tān putrān upāyakauśalyenānuśiṣyānayataram janapadapradeśam prakrāntah.

A physician, having returned from a voyage, found his sons sick from a poisonous drink. He offered them an antidote. Some of his sons took it and were cured at once. Others, repulsed by the smell and taste of the remedy, refused to drink it. In order to make these recalcitrants take the potion, the physician resorted to a skillful stratagem. He gave them the antidote again, then he left for a foreign land. From there, he spread the rumor of his death, and his afflicted sons, in memory of their father, finally took the remedy and were cured. Knowing that his sons were free of their illness, the physician showed himself to them again.

Similarly, the Buddha preaches the path of salvation, but some of his listeners refuse to take it. Then the Buddha pretends to enter into nirvāṇa so that the obstinate ones, grieved by his death, finally consent to be converted. Actually this nirvāṇa is just a skillful stratagem.

<sup>793</sup> T 642, k. 2, p. 644c16-645a13; Tib. Trip., vol. 32, no. 800, fol. 336a6-337b2; my {Lamotte] translation of the Śūramgamasamādhi, 1965, p. 267-270.

"The public ministry of the Buddha Śākyamuni lasted only 45 years. Working for such a short period of time for the good and happiness of beings, Śākyamuni experienced only a rather lukewarm zeal. How can you say that he had no loss of zeal?"

In order to answer this objection, the *Traité* appeals here to a passage from the Śūraṃgamasamādhi identifying the Śākyamuni of the Sahā universe, who entered nirvāṇa at the age of 48 years, with the buddha Vairocana of the Pratimaṇḍitā whose life-span is seven hundred incalculable periods.

#### 8. The Buddha has no loss of exertion

He has no loss of exertion ( $n\bar{a}sti\ v\bar{\nu}ryaparih\bar{a}nih$ ). – See what hs been said about loss of zeal: zeal (*chanda*) is synonymous with exertion ( $v\bar{\nu}rya$ ).

Question. - If that is so, the special attributes (āveṇikadharma) are no longer eighteen in number [but just seventeen]. Furthermore, in the list of mental events (caitasikadharma), a distinction is made between zeal and exertion.<sup>794</sup> Then why do you say that zeal is confused with exertion?

Answer. – Zeal is the action taken at the beginning and, when zeal is developed, it has the name of exertion. This is what the Buddha said: "All dharmas have zeal as their root" (*chandamūlakāḥ sarve dharmāḥ*).<sup>795</sup> Zeal is like a thirsty man who wants to find something to drink; exertion is like the means (*upāya*) used to seek something to drink. Zeal is mind (*citta*), desire to find: exertion serves to realize the thing. Zeal comes from a mental action (*manakarman*); exertion comes from three actions: [mental action, vocal action and physical action]. Zeal is internal; exertion is external. These are the resemblances and the differences.

In the passage in question, the bodhisattva Dṛdhamati asks Śākyamuni: "How long is your lifespan and when will you enter nirvāṇa?" Śākyamuni answers: "My life-span is exactly the same as that of the buddha Vairocana of the Pratimaṇḍitā." Dṛḍamati then goes to this universe to ask Vairocana who replies that his life-span will be exactly seven hundred incalculable periods like that of the buddha Śākyamuni. Returning to the Sahā universe, Dṛḍhamati communicates this information to the disciples of Śākyamuni and the latter finally acknowledges: "The buddha Vairocana is myself who, under a different name, assures the welfare and the happiness of all beings."

The result is that the zeal of Śākyamuni is not limited to 45 years but extends over seven hundred incalculable periods.

Nevertheless, it would be a complete misunderstanding of the intent of the Mahāyāna to identify Śākyamuni with one or another Buddha in particular: in reality, he is mixed up with all the Buddhas whose true way of existing (*tathatā*) is an inconceivable 'non-existence'.

In another passage (p. 129-131 of the translation), the Śūraṃgamasamādhi states that the Tathāgatas are non-existent in the past, the present and the future, and that they are identical in that they are like magic and a mirage, without coming or going. And the Vimalakirtinirdeśa (p. 355-359) in turn affirms that the true manner of seeing the Tathāgata is 'to see him as if there was nothing to see'.

The Pāli Abhidhamma (cf. *Compendium of Philosophy*, p. 237 and seq.) lists 52 mental events (*cetasika*); the Sarvāstivādin Abhidharma (cf. Kośa, II, p. 150-165) has 46. Both make a distinction between *chanda*, defined as 'desire for action' (*kartukamatā*) and *vīrya*, defined as 'endurance in the

<sup>795</sup> Anguttara, IV, p. 339, l. 4; V, p. 107, l. 6; Tchong a han, T 26, k. 28, p. 602c4: *Chandamūlakā*, *āvuso*, *abbe dhammā*.

mind' (cetaso 'bhyutsāhaḥ).

Moreover, exertion is loved by the Buddhas: it is in this way that the Buddha Śākyamuni skipped over nine kalpas<sup>796</sup> and quickly attained *anuttara samyaksambodhi*.

[Śaikṣasūtra.] – Moreover, it is said that one day the Buddha said to Ānanda: "Preach the Dharma to the bhikṣus; my back hurts (pṛṣṭhī ma āvilāyati); I am going to rest for a while." Then the Bhagavat folded his upper garment in four (caturguṇam uttarāsaṅgaṃ prajñapya), spread it on the ground and with his cloak (saṃgāṭī) as a pillow (bimbohana), lay down. Ānanda preached the seven factors of enlightenment (saptasaṃbodhyaṅga). When he had come to the factor 'exertion' (vīryasaṃbodhyaṅga), the Buddha arose with a start and said to Ānanda: "Ānanda, are you praising exertion?" (pratibhātaṃ ta Ānanda vīryam) Ānanda answered "I am praising it." And this happened three times. Then the Buddha said: "Good, good! Exertion well cultivated leads to the supreme perfect enlightenment (vīryam āsevitam anuttarasamyaksaṃbodhaye) and all the more so to the other Bodhis." 797

This is why the Buddha has no loss of exertion and, if he does not stop [250a] even when he is sick, what can be said about when he is not sick?

Moreover, in order to save beings, the Buddha gives up the happiness of his very deep concentration  $(gambh\bar{i}rasam\bar{a}dhi)$  and he saves beings by means of all kinds of bodies  $(k\bar{a}ya)$ , by all kinds of voices  $(v\bar{a}c)$ , by all kinds of means  $(up\bar{a}ya)$ . Sometimes he borrows dangerous paths; sometimes he eats bad food; sometimes he suffers cold and heat  $(s\bar{i}tospa)$ ; sometimes he encounters wicked objections  $(mithy\bar{a}codana)$ , harmful words  $(p\bar{a}rusyav\bar{a}da)$  and curses. He endures them patiently without disgust. Although he has mastery (vasita) over all dharmas, the Buddha accomplishes these things without producing laziness  $(kaus\bar{i}dya)$ .

[Conversion of Subhadra.]<sup>799</sup> – Thus, after having saved beings, when the Buddha had lain down in the Solo-lin (Śālavana) under two trees, the brahmacārin Siu-p-t'o (Subhadra) said to Ānanda: "I have heard that this very night (adya rātryām) the Omniscient One (sarvajñā) will die: I would like to see the Buddha." Ānanda stopped him, saying: "The Buddha has preached the Dharma far and wide to people and he is very sick (klānta)." The Buddha overheard and said to Ānanda: "Let Subhadra approach: he will be the last of my disciples (ayam me paścimo bhaviṣyati śrāvānām)." Subhadra was able to approach, questioned the

Normally a bodhisattva needs a hundred kalpas to accomplish the actions productive of the marks of the Great Man, but Śākyamuni, thanks to his exertion, accomplished them in 91 kalpas. On these nine kalpas skipped over thus by Śākyamuni, see the references above, p. 252, note 1.

This has already been cited twice, p. 243-244F and 942-943F. To the references given on p. 244F, the Sanskrit Mahāparinirvāṇasūtra, p. 286-288, should be added and the Chinese version Pan ni yuan king (T 6, k. 2, p. 184b14-28) summarized by E. Waldschmidt, *Lebensende des Buddha*, p. 169-170. See also Tsa a han (T 99, no. 727, k. 27, p. 195b29-196a11.

<sup>798</sup> Invited to Verañjā by the Brahmin Agnidatta, the Buddha was reduced to eating barley: see above, p. 124F and n. 1.

On the conversion of Subhadra, see above, p. 205-209F and n. To these references, add the account of this conversion given in the Sanskrit Mahāparinirvāṇasūtra, p. 366-386.

Buddha on his doubts; the Buddha preached the Dharma to him as he wished and cut through his doubts. Subhadra obtained Bodhi.

Before the Buddha entered into nirvāṇa without residue (*anupadhiśeṣa nirvāṇa*), the bhikṣus said to the Buddha: "Bhagavat, it is wonderful (*adbhuta*) that, right at the end, you had compassion for this brahmcārin heretic and you spoke with him." The Buddha said: "It is not just in the present lifetime (*ihajanman*) that I have saved him as I was dying. In an earlier lifetime (*pūrvajanman*), when I had not yet obtained Bodhi, I saved him as I was dying."

[Jātaka of the deer who sacrificed himself.] $^{800}$  – Once, innumerable and incalculable periods (asamkhyeyakalpa) ago, there was a great tree in the forest that sheltered many birds and animals. A forest fire ( $d\bar{a}va$ ) broke out which blazed on three sides at once: only one direction was saved, but it was blocked off by a river ( $nad\bar{i}$ ). All the animals crowded in there miserably without finding a way to save their lives by flight.

At that time there was a deer (mrga) who was big and strong. With my forefeet I leaned on one bank, with my hind feet I crouched on the other bank. I ordered the animals to cross over by walking on my back (prstha). My skin (tvac) and my flesh  $(m\bar{a}msa)$  were completely torn, but by the power of my compassion  $(karun\bar{a})$ , I supported them up to my death.

At the end, there was one hare (śaśaka) left. My strength was exhausted, but at the price of a supreme effort, I let him cross. When he had crossed over, my back broke and I fell into the river and died.

This happened a long time ago and it is not just today [that I have saved someone when I was at the end of my strength]. Those who at that time were the first to cross are my present disciples; the hare who crossed last is today Subhadra.

This Jātaka exists in three different versions: The first appears in the Tibetan version and the Chinese version of the Mūlasarv. Vinaya (T 1451, k. 38, p. 397b21-c13), the one edited and the other translated by E. Waldschmidt in the Sanskrit Mahāparinirvāṇasūtra (p. 476-478). The original Sanskrit occurs in the Avadānaśataka, I, p. 235-236 (tr. Feer, p. 157-158): Bhūtapūrvaṃ bhikṣavo 'tūte 'dhvani anyatarasyāṃ parvatadaryāṃ m rgayūthapaḥ prativasati ... kauśināgarā Mallā mṛgataśavako 'yaṃ Subhadrah.

The second version is that of the *Traité*. It differs slightly from the preceding. The herd of deer is not controlled by the king, but is forced to flee by a fire. The last animal to pass on the deer-king's back is not a baby deer but a hare. Finally the first animals to cross are not the actual Mallas of Kuśinagara but the actual disciples of the Buddha.

The third version, even nmore aberrant, is in the *Lieou tou tsi king*, T 152, no. 57, k. 6, p. 32c11-33a5 (transl. Chavannes, *Contes*, I, p. 218-220). Here a herd of five hundred deer is encircled; the deer-king stands on the rope that encircles them and lets all the other deer escape by passing over on his back. There is no fire and no little animal that is the last.

Also, the deer is one of the favorite animals of Buddhist folklore and often appears in other Jātaka tales such as the Ruru and the Nigrodhamiga Jātaka (see above, p. 972-975F).

1353

\_

Therefore it is from lifetime to lifetime that the Buddha likes to use exertion, and it is not just today that he never stops. This is why it is said that he has no loss of exertion.

#### 9. The Buddha has no loss of mindfulness

He has no loss of mindfulness (nāsti smṛtiparihāṇiḥ). – Since he is endowed with all the knowledges (sarvajñāna) of the things of the three times (tryadhvadharma), his memory (smṛti) is perfect (saṃpūrṇa) and without lapse (aparihāṇi).

Question. – First it was said that the Buddha has no failure of mindfulness (*muṣitasmṛtitā*) and now it is said that he has no loss of mindfulness (*smṛtiparihāṇi*). Are the absence of failure of mindfulness and the absence of loss of mindfulness the same or different? If they are the same, why repeat it; if they are different, what does the difference (*viśeṣa*) consist of?

Answer. – Failure of mindfulness ( $musitasmrtit\bar{a}$ ) is a mistake (viparyaya); loss of mindfulness ( $smrtiparih\bar{a}ni$ ) is a defect (abhibhava). Failure of mindfulness is an error in the postures ( $\bar{i}ry\bar{a}patha$ ), the way one holds one's head, comes or goes; non-loss of mindfulness is the mindfulness lasting during the concentrations ( $sam\bar{a}dhi$ ) and the superknowledges ( $abhij\bar{n}\bar{a}$ ), the unhindered penetration (apratiataprativedha) of the past and the present. [250b]

Question. – Why is just non-loss of mindfulness (*smṛṭyuparihāṇi*) itself a special attribute of the Buddha?

Answer. – The śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas who practicethe four foundations of mindfulness (*smṛtyupasthāna*) well have strong minfulness; but, strong as it is, it still has lows (*ānatva*) and obstacles (*vighna*) and does not penetrate deeply. As I have said in regard to the power of the mindfulness of former abodes (*pūrvanivāsānusmṛtijñānabala*), <sup>801</sup> the śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas remember their former abodes for a maximum of 84,000 kalpas: beyond that they have lapses of memory. Moreover, in the path of seeing the truths (*satyadarśanamārga*), they cannot distinguish the successive moments [of the sixteen minds making up this path]. The Buddha himself distinguishes the three characteristics of each of these moments: [arising, duration and cessation]. There is not a single thing that the Buddha does not remember: this is why he alone has no loss of mindfulness.

Moreover, the power of knowledge of the former abodes is a knowledge ( $j\tilde{n}\bar{a}na$ ) depending on the memory. That is what the Buddha has power (bala) in. The śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas do not possess this power of memory (smrtibala) and other people still less.

Finally, the Buddha guards his mindfulness by his unobstructed deliverance (*apratihatavimukta*) and his omniscience: this is why he has no loss of mindfulness.

For all these reasons, the Buddha has no loss of mindfulness.

<sup>801</sup> Above, p. 1555F.

#### 10. The Buddha has no loss of wisdom

He has no loss of wisdom ( $n\bar{a}sti\ praj\tilde{n}\bar{a}parih\bar{a}nih$ ). — As the Buddha has obtained all these wisdoms ( $praj\tilde{n}\bar{a}$ ), he has no loss of wisdom; as his wisdom of the three times ( $tryadvaj\tilde{n}\bar{a}na$ ) is unobstructed, he has no loss of wisdom.

Moreover, he is endowed with the ten powers (bala), the four fearlessnesses ( $vaiś\bar{a}radya$ ) and the four unhindered wisdoms (pratisamvid): this is why he has no loss of wisdom. If the oil (taila) is plentiful and the wick ( $vartik\bar{a}$ ) is clean, the flame of the lamp ( $d\bar{t}pajv\bar{a}la$ ) is excellent. 802 It is the same for the Buddha who has concentrations such as the Samādhirājasamādhi as oil and, as clean wick, the absence of loss of mindfulness. This is why the radiance of his wisdom is immense and uneclipsed.

Moreover, since his first production of the mind of awakening (*prathamacittotpāda*) and for innumerable and incalculable periods (*asamkhyeyakalpa*), the Buddha has accumulated all the wisdoms and, in accordance with his high resolution (*adhyāśaya*), he has sacrificed his head (*śiras*), his eyes (*nayana*), his marrow (*majjā*) and his skull (*mastaka*), he has given all his inner and outer possessions, he has entered into fire, he has thrown himself down from mountains, he has flayed his skin, he has nailed his body, etc.;<sup>803</sup> there is no suffering that he has not endured, careful to accumulate wisdom. This is why he has no loss of wisdom.

Furthermore, the wisdom of the Buddha is aided by all the qualities: morality  $(\dot{s}\bar{\imath}la)$ , concentration  $(sam\bar{a}dhi)$ , etc. This is why he has no loss of wisdom.

Furthermore, from lifetime to lifetime, he has studied all the books, whether it is the conventional sciences (saṃvṛtidharma) or the Buddha dharma, coarse (audārika) or subtle (sūkṣma), good (kuśala) or bad (akuśala), he has studied it all and understands it all. This is why he has no loss of wisdom.

Furthermore, he has read, thought about, meditated on and investigated the teachings heard from the mouths of the innumerable Buddhas of the ten directions. This is why he has no loss of wisdom.

Furthermore, in the interest of beings and to increase all the good dharmas, he has destroyed ignorance  $(avidy\bar{a})$  everywhere. This is why he has no loss of wisdom.

Furthermore, his wisdom really understands the [true] nature of dharmas, non-arising (anutpāda), non-cessation (anirodha), non-defilement (asaṃkleśa), non-purification (avyavadāna), non-action (anabhisaṃskāra), non-functioning (asamudācāra). He makes no distinction between true knowledge and false knowledge. He knows that the dharmas are identical and equally pure (viśuddha), without

<sup>802</sup> Cf. Saṃyutta, II, p. 86: Seyyathāpi bhikkhave telaṃ ca paṭicca vaṭṭiṃ ca paṭicca telappadīpo jhāyevva.

These deeds of the future Buddha have been told in preceding poages (143-144F, 688-691F, 714-720F, 755-766F, 889-890F, 972-977F, etc.). Most took place in the north-west of India.

An idea often developed by the *Traité*, e.g., p. 1058F, 1106F.

defilement (*akliṣṭ*a) and without stain (*nirupalepa*) like space (ākāśa). Disregarding all duality, he acquires the [true] nature of the Dharma, i.e., [250c] entry into non-duality (*advayapraveśa*). This entry into non-duality, characteristic of the Dharma, is immense (*apramāṇa*) and infinite (*ananta*). This is why he has no loss of wisdom.

For various reasons of this kind, the Buddha has no loss of wisdom.

#### 11. The Buddha has no loss of deliverance

He has no loss of deliverance (nāsti vimuktiparihāṇih). — Deliverance (vimukti) is twofold: i) conditioned (saṃskṛta) and ii) unconditioned (asaṃskṛta). So Conditioned deliverance is the deliverance associated with pure wisdom (anāsravaprajñāsaṃprayukta). Unconditioned deliverance is the cessation without residue of all the disturbing emotions (kleśa) with their residues (vāsanā). In the Buddha there is no loss of this twofold deliverance. Why? The śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas whose wisdom is not very keen (tīkṣnā) and whose disturbing emotions have not been entirely destroyed have loss of deliverance, but the Buddhas whose wisdom is supremely keen and whose disturbing emotions and the traces of the emotions have ceased definitively without residue have no loss of deliverance.

Moreover, as I have said above (p. 1560F) in regard to the power of the destruction of the impurities (āsravakṣayabala), there are differences between the deliverance of the Buddhas and that of the śrāvakas. The Buddha has the power of the destruction of the impurities and therefore has no loss of deliverance; the adepts of the two Vehicles, (i.e., the śrāvakas and the pratyekabuddhas], do not have this power and therefore have loss of deliverance.

#### 12. The Buddha has no loss of the wisdom and the vision of deliverance

There is no loss of the wisdom and the vision of deliverance (nāsti vimuktijñānadarśanaparihāṇiḥ). – In regard to these deliverances, the wisdom of the Buddha is immense (apramāṇa), infinite (ananta) and pure (viśuddha): this is why he has no loss of the wisdom and the vision of deliverance.

Question. – The Buddha has no loss of anything; why would it be only in regard to such things [*chanda*,  $v\bar{v}rya$ , smrti,  $praj\tilde{n}a$ , vimukti and  $vimuktij\tilde{n}anadarśana$  mentioned in the special attributes no. 7 to12] that there is no loss?

Answer. – In order to realize one's own benefit (*svārtha*) and the benefit of others (*parārtha*), the first four things are enough: *i*) *chanda* 'zeal' is the basis (*mūla*) for seeking all the good dharmas; *ii*) *virya* 'exertion' is capable of acting; *iii*) *smrti* 'mindfulness' mounts guard like a gatekeeper (*dauvārika*): it lets the good enter but keeps out the bad; *iv*) *prajñā* 'wisdom' illumines all the teachings (*dharmamukha*) and destroys

\_

<sup>805</sup> Cf. Kośa, VI, p. 296 seq.

the disturbing emotions (*kleśa*). Using these four things allows the realization of the goal: [the benefit of oneself and that of others].

The fruit of retribution (*vipākaphala*) of these four things is twofold: *i*) *vimukti*, 'deliverance'; *ii*) *vimuktijñānadarśana*, 'knowledge and vision of deliverance'. The meaning of *vimukti* has been defined above. As for *vimuktijñānadarśana*, it is by using it that one understands the two kinds of deliverance, i.e., conditioned deliverance (*saṃskṛta*) and unconditioned deliverance (*asaṃskṛta*), and one also understands the other kinds of deliverance; occasional deliverance (*sāmayikī vimukti*), non-occasional deliverance (*asāmayikī vimukti*), deliverance of mind (*cetovimukti*)], deliverance by wisdom (*prajñāvimukti*), twofold deliverance (*ubhayatobhāgavimukti*), destructible deliverance (*bhedayavimukti*), indestructible deliverance (*abhedyavimukti*), the eight liberations (*vimokṣa*), the inconceivable liberations (*acintyavimokṣa*), the unobstructed liberations (*avyāhatovimokṣa*), etc.

The Buddha distinguishes all these deliverances, solid or non-solid: that is why 'he has no loss of the knowledge and the vision of deliverance.'

As has been said above (p. 1358F) in regard to the recollection of the Buddha, among the five elements of sainthood (aśaikṣaskandha), the latter possesses the element consisting of the knowledge and vision of deliverance (vimuktijñānadarśanaskandha). Here it is necessary to speak about it at length.

Question. – We say 'knowledge and vision of deliverance': it should be enough to say 'knowledge'  $(j\tilde{n}\bar{a}na)$ ; why add 'vision'  $(dar\acute{s}ana)$  as well?

Answer. – By saying knowledge and vision, we reinforce the matter. It is like with ropes (*rajju*): when two ropes are joined together into one, it is stronger.

Moreover, to say only 'knowledge' would not include all the wisdoms ( $praj\tilde{n}\tilde{a}$ ). See what the Abhidharma says:

"The wisdoms (*prajī*nā) are of three types: *i*) involving knowledge (*jīnāna*) and not vision (*darśana*); *ii*) involving vision and not knowledge; *iii*) involving both knowledge and vision. Those that involve knowledge and not vision are: the knowledge of the destruction of the impurities (*āṣravakṣayajīnāna*), the knowledge of non-arising (*anutpādajīnāna*) and the knowledge associated with the [**251a**] first five consciousnesses (*paīncavijīnānasaṃprayuktajīnāna*). Those that involve vision and not knowledge are the eight *kṣāntis* [of the path of seeing the truths], right worldly vision (*laukikā samyagdṛṣṭi*) and the five wrong views (*mithyadṛṣṭi*). Those that involve both knowledge and vision are all the other wisdoms."806

[In the case we are dealing with here] simply saying 'knowledge' would exclude vision; simply saying 'vision' would exclude knowledge. This is why we say 'knowledge and vision': that makes it complete (sampanna).

Moreover, whatever is conceived (*vikalpita*) and determined (*vicārita*) as a function of the teachings of a third person is called knowledge (*jñāna*); what one realizes by oneself (*svataḥ śākṣātkṛta*) is called vision (*darśana*). Similarly, if the ear hears something but still has doubts, that is called knowledge; on the other

\_

<sup>806</sup> See the detail in Vibhāsā, T 1545, k. 95, p. 490b-c.

hand, if the eye sees and perceives by itself unhesitatingly, that is called vision. These are the differences (viśeṣa) between knowledge and vision.

Furthermore, according to some, arhats still doubt their own deliverance (*vimukti*) and do not recognize it personally. But such arhats are not real arhats. Also, in order to cut this wrong view (*mithyadṛṣṭi*), the Buddha said that the saints (*āryapudgala*) recognize and see deliverance. But although these arhats may have obtained the knowledge and vision of deliverance, they can lose this knowledge and vision of deliverance because they do not have omniscience (*sarvajñmat*ā), they are not endowed with an absolutely superior wisdom (*nādhimātraprajñendriyasamvāgata*) and they cannot recognize the various special characteristics (*bhinnalakṣaṇaviśeṣa*) of things, [namely], the moments of instantaneous arising and cessation (*kṣaṇikotpādanirodha*).

The Buddha, on the other hand, is endowed with an absolutely pure faculty of wisdom (adhimātraprajñendriyasamanvāgata) and cognizes the instantaneous arisings and cessations (kṣaṇikotpādanirodha) belonging to each dharma. This is why he 'has no loss of knowledge and vision of deliverance'.

Finally, the Buddha is endowed with the perfection of the Dharma eye (*dharmacakṣurviśuddhi*) and, as is said in regard to this Dharma eye, the Buddha knows the beings who enter nirvāṇa either by the gate of deliverance of emptiness (*śūnyatāvimokṣamukha*) or by the gate of deliverance of signlessness (*ānimittavimokṣamukha*) or by the gate of deliverance of wishlessness (*apraṇihitavimokṣamukha*). He knows those who see the five aggregates (*skandha*), the twelve bases of consciousness (*āyatana*) and the eighteen elements (*dhātu*), and who, by these various teachings (*nānāvidhadharmamukha*), obtain deliverance. In this knowledge and this vision of deliverance, the Buddha has a complete and universal knowledge. This is why it is said that he has no loss of the knowledge and vision of deliverance.

#### 13-15. Every physical, vocal or mental action of the Buddha accompanies knowledge

All his bodily actions, all his vocal actions and all his mental actions accompany knowledge (sarvāṇi kāyavāgmanaskarmāṇi jñānānuparivartini). - In the Buddha, all bodily, vocal and mental actions are preceded by knowledge (jñānapūrvaṃgama) and, subsequently, accompany knowledge (jñānānuparivartin).

Of all the bodily, vocal or mental actions of the Buddha, there is not one that is not useful to beings: this is why it is said that his actions are preceded by knowledge and accompany knowledge.

Thus it is said in a sūtra: "In the Buddhas, even the outbreath (*praśvāsa*) and the inbreath (*āśvāsa*) are useful to beings." How, then, would their bodily, vocal and mental actions not be useful to them? The wicked who smell the perfume (*gandha*) of the breath (*ānāpāna*) of the Buddha obtain pure faith (*cittaprasāda*) and love the Buddha. The gods who breathe the perfume of his breath renounce the five objects of desire (*pañcakāmaguṇa*) and resolve to practice the good. This is why it is said that his bodily, vocal and mental actions accompany knowledge.

The śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas do not have this privilege. First they do good in their mind and then only afterwards by means of bodily or vocal actions. Sometimes even their mental action (manaskarman) is indeterminate (avyākṛta) and is produced without accompanying knowledge. [If that is so for [251b] them], what can be said for other people?

Take for example the bhikṣu *Kiao-fan-po-t'i* (Gavāmpati): although he was arhat, he spit up his own food and then swallowed it again.<sup>808</sup> Such an action does not accompany knowledge.

See also the bhikṣu-arhat *Mo-t'eou-po-sseu-tcho* (Madhuvāsiṣṭha) who climbed onto scaffolding (gosāraka), walls (bhitti) and trees (vrksa). 809

- A. Tchong a han, T 26, k. 8, p. 471a16-29.
- B. Mahāsāṃghika Vin., T 1425, k. 29, p. 464a13-27.
- C. Mūlasarv. Vin., T 1450, k. 12, p. 163c8-164a12.
- D. Anavatapatagāthā (ed. Bechert, p. 188-191; transl. Hofinger, p. 275-278): Mūlasarv. Vin., Bhaisajavastu, T 1448, k. 18, p. 90a12-b27; Fo wou po ti tseu, T 199, p. 200b22-201a6.
- E. Hien yu king, T 202, no, 54, k. 12, p. 429c10-430c3; Dzan-lun, transl. I.J. Schmidt, *Der Weise und der Thor*, chap. XL.
  - F. Mahāvastu, T 1545, k. 99, p. 514c29-515a14.
  - G. Vibhāṣā, T 1546, k. 49, p. 372a13-27.
  - H. Traité, T 1508, k. 26, p. 251b2-4; k. 38, p. 337a6-8; k. 84, p. 649c10-13.
  - I. Si-yu-ki, T 2087, k. 4, p. 890b19-c3 (transl. Watters, I, p. 309).
  - J. Ibid., T 2087, k. 7, p. 908b16-21 (transl. Watters, II, p. 65).

Once, at the time of the buddha Kāśyapa, a young bhikṣu, on seeing another śramaṇa leaping over a canal, shouted: "This man is as agile as a monkey!" Bad luck overtook him: this irreverent comment brought him rebirth in the form of a monkey for five hundred lifetimes (sources E, H).

It was only during his last lifetime as a monkey that he met the Buddha Śākyamuni. A Brahmin named Vasiṣṭha was grieving because he had no son and the heretical teachers whom he consulted held out no hope for him. On his wife's advce, he went to find the Buddha and offered him a new robe. The Teacher consoled him and predicted that he would soon have a son called to high destinies. Full of gratitude, the brahmin Vasiṣṭha invited the Buddha and the Sangha to a meal. On their return, Śākyamuni and his monks stopped near a pool and set down their bowls on the ground. It was then that there took

According to the principle: *Cetanāham, bhikkhave, kammam vadāmi; cetayitvā kammam karoti kāyena manasā:* "I say that action is volition, and it is after having willed that one does an action by the body, speech or mind" (Anguttara, III, p. 415; Kathāvatthu, p. 393; Tchong a han, T 26, k. 27, p. 600a24). In ordinary beings, volition must be followed by a bodily or vocal 'gesture' in order to be effective; in higher beings, volition is enough to realize the intention.

<sup>808</sup> For Gavāmpati, see above, p. 97F and n. 2. In his earlier existences, he had been a ruminant and later, becoming an arhat, he always re-swallowed his food.

Whenown in the Pāli sources, the legend of Madhuvāsiṣṭha, 'Excellent Honey', appears in fragmentary state in the Chinese texts, but can easily be reconstituted:

place the meeting between the Buddha and a monkey who was none other than the young monk who had been insolent in past times (source E).

The texts are not in agreement on the place where this meeting took place and have proposed, respectively:

Vaiśālī and more precisely, the Markaṭahradatīra 'Edge of the Monkey Pool' in the Kūṭāgāraśala 'Hall of the Belvedere' (sources A, D, F, J).

The shore of the *Li-k'i-tcho* river, not otherwise identified (source B).

Nādikā Kuñjikāvasatha (in Pāli, Nādika Giñjikāvasatha), i.e., 'Nādikā, in the Tiled House', a village in the land of the Vrjis between Kotigrāma and Vaiśālī (sources C, G).

Śrāvastī (source E).

A dried-up pool near *Mathurā* (source I).

Whatever the exact place, the monkey in question seized the Buddha's bowl. The monks were afraid that he would break it and started off in pursuit, but the Buddha called them back. The monkey went off with the bowl, climbed up into a śāla tree (Vatica robusta), took some honey with which he filled the bowl, came back down carefully and gravely presented the pot of honey to the Buddha but the latter did not accept it. The monkey retreated several paces and, with a bamboo stem, took out the insects caught in the honey, came back again and presented the bowl anew, but again without any success. Not discouraged, he went to a clear spring, washed the honey with water and for the third time offered it to the Buddha who finally accepted it and shared it with his disciples (sources A, B, C, D, E, F, G, I).

Seeing his offering accepted, the monkey leapt with joy, but while he went away dancing, he lost his footing, fell into a ditch or hole where he died (sources B, C, E, F, G, I). One source (B) has it that he gained the Trāyastriṃśa heaven, but it is generally thought that he took birth directly into the world of humans (sources C, D, R, F, G, I).

He was incarnated in the womb of Vasiṣṭha's wife and, as a reward for his merit, great wonders were realized: during the months of his gestation, a rain of *madhu* i.e., honey, fell from the sky (source C); on the day of his birth, all the utensils in the house were spontaneously filled with honey (source E). As honey seemed to follow him everywhere and his father was called Vasiṣṭha, he was given the name Madhu-Vāsiṣṭha (sources C, E).

At the required age, Madhuvavāsiṣṭha, triumphing over the resistance of his parents, entered the religious life, and the Buddha gave him ordination according to the quick procedure of *ehibhikṣukā* (source E). He practiced *brahmacarya* and became arhat (source B, C, D, E, F, G). But the miracle of honey followed him throughout his religious life: every day he was miraculously gratified by three pots of honey which he gave respectively to the Buddha, the Saṃgha and to his parents (source C); when he was walking with his colleagues and when he saw them faltering, it was enough for him to hold out his bowl and it became filled immediately by the gods (sources C, D).

Nevertheless, his great holiness had not liberated him from the traces of his passions (*kleśavāsanā*) and, retaining the habits of monkeys, he was often seen climbing on walls and in trees (source H).

Finally, see *Pi-ling-k'ie-p'o-ts'o* (Pilindavatsa) who insulted the Ganges and treated it as a little slave (vatsala)<sup>810811</sup>

Such bodily and vocal actions are not preceded by knowledge (*jñānpūrvaṃgama*) and do not accompany knowledge (*jñānāparivartin*). The Buddha himself has none of these things.

\*\*\* \*\*\* \*\*\*

## Digression on a case brought against the Buddha<sup>812</sup>

It has long been noticed that, in the Si-yu-ki, Hiuan-tsang locates the monkey's offering at a dried-up pool near Mathurā (source I) and locates farther east, at Vaiśalī, the place where *the monkeys* dug the pool that bears their name (*markaṭahrada*) and, not far from there, filled the Buddha's bowl with honey (source J). The dividing up of the legend and the multiplying of the monkeys poses a twofold problem which has been resolved wisely by A. Foucher (*AgbG*, I, p. 512-515; *La Vie du Bouddha*, p. 291-293).

The offering of the monkey has been identified on the following monuments: 1) North gate of the great stūpa of Sañcī (*Monuments of Sanchi*, I, p. 219; II, pl. 36c2). 2) Stūpa of Sikrī (AgbG, I, p. 513, fīg. 254; Lyons and Ingholt, *Gandhāran Art in Pakistan*, p. 82, fīg. 115). 3) Stela in Gupta style at Benares (*AgbG*, II, p. 539, fīg., 498; Majumdar, *Guide to Sārnāth*, pl. XIII). 4) Medieval sculpture at Magadha (*AgbG*, II, p. 545, fīg. 500). 5) Nepalese miniatures (Foucher, *Iconographie bouddhique*, I, p. 168 and pl. VII 1 and X 4).

- [Note by Migme Chodron: Edgerton's Dictionary gives *vatsa* = 'dear little child'.
- 811 See above, p. 121-122F and notes.
- Above (p. 507-517), there was a accusation against the Buddha: it was asked if the nine or ten torments that the Buddha had to suffer were not the punishment for faults committed by him in the course of his previous lifetimes. To the references collected at that place should now be added a Sanskrit fragment related to torments 5 to 8, published in *Gilgit Manuscripts*, III, part I, p. 211-218.

But here it is a matter of an infinitely more serious case concerning the alleged bodily, vocal or mental faults which Śākyamuni may have committed after his enlightenment when he was already buddha. If these grievances proved to be justified, they might cause the validity to be disputed of the *āveṇikadharmas* numbers 13 to 15 in the words of which: "Every bodily, vocal or mental dharma of the Buddha is preceded by knowledge and accompanied by knowledge."

I [Lamotte] do not think that the criticisms raised against Śākyamuni here are the deeds of heretics trying to sully the memory of the last Buddha to have appeared on this earth. They might have come from sincere disciples, but the reading of some texts had made them perplexed and anxiously wondering if the Buddha had not acted badly in such and such a circumstance.

In this imaginary case, we should note that the defense produces unknown pieces of accusation evidently borrowed from more recent sources. The impression is inescapable that some schools, mainly

#### 1. The Accusation

Question. – So be it! But the Buddha sometimes has physical and vocal actions (*kāyavākkarman*) that do not seem to accompany knowledge (*na jñānānuparivartin*). How is that?

- 1. He goes into the assemblies of heretics (*tīrthikapariṣad*) to preach the Dharma, but nobody believes him or accepts him.
- 2. One day when he was preaching the Dharma in the great assembly (*mahÔamgha*), he bared his breast and showed it to *Ni-k'ien-tseu* (Nirgranthīputra).
- 3. When some doubted the two physical marks (*lakṣāṇa*) that were not visible to them, in the middle of the great assembly the Buddha showed the mark of his tongue (*jihvālakṣaṇa*) and the mark of his cryptorchidia (*kośagatavastiguhya*).
- 4. He insults his disciples and treats them like foolish men (*mohapuruṣa*).
- 5. He insults Devadatta and says to him: "You are a fool (mūḍha), a corpse (śava), a spit-swallower (kheṭāśika)."
- 6. The Buddha forbids the possession (*dhāraṇa*) of eight kinds of begging-bowls (*pātra*) and authorizes the bhikṣus to use only two kinds of bowls: *i*) fired clay (*mṛttikāpātra*) and *ii*) iron (*ayaḥpātra*) but he himself uses a stone bowl (*śailapātra*).
- 7. One day when the heretics (*tīrthika*) were questioning him, he remained silent and did not respond.
- 8. In various places, the Buddha says that the ātman exists and, in other places, he says that it does not exist.
- 9. In various places he speaks of the existence of dharmas and, in other places, he speaks of the non-existence of dharmas.

Such physical and vocal actions do not seem to accompany knowledge and since physical and vocal actions (kāyavākkarman) are inseparable from mental action (manaskarman), the result is that his mental actions, as well, did not accompany knowledge. Then why is it said that his actions always accompany knowledge (sadājñānānuparivartin)?

#### 2. The Defense

that of the Sarvāstivādin, have reviewed and corrected the Āgamas and the Vinayas in such a way as to be able to justify the actions of Śākyamuni on every point and to answer in advance any blame to which he might have been exposed.

Answer. – That does not hold (*ayuktam etad*). In all of those circumstances, all of the Buddha's actions were preceded by knowledge (*jñānapūrvaṃgama*) and accompanied knowledge (*jñānānuparivartin*). Why is that?

#### A. Meeting With The Heretics

Entering into an assembly of heretics, the Buddha knew well that he would not be believed nor accepted in the present lifetime (*ihajanman*), but he wanted to plant great roots of good (*mahānidāna*) for future lifetimes (*parajanmani*).

Moreover, he wanted to put an end to the slander of the heretics who said: "The Buddha is proud (*unnata*)." This is the reason why he went personally into their assemblies.

Moreover, the heretics said: "The Buddha claims to have great compassion (*mahākaruṇā*), the same for all, but he preaches the Dharma only to the fourfold [Buddhist] assembly. And yet we too are religious mendicants (*pravrajita*) who are seeking the path and he does not preach to us!"

Finally, according to the sūtra [to which you allude], the Buddha went to an assembly of heretics and preached the Dharma there, but the sūtra does not say that nobody believed him and nobody accepted him:

[Śramanasatyasūtra.]<sup>813</sup>- Seeing at a distance a great assembly of heretics (tīrthikapariṣad) <sup>814</sup> who were debating in loud voices (uccaśabda), the Buddha wanted to go elsewhere and was turning around to leave.

The scholars (*upadeśācārya*) who had seen the Buddha approaching from afar said to their assembly: "Be quiet! The Buddha is a person who likes solitude (*vivekakāma*). If you look quiet and are silent, perhaps he

B. Brāhmaṇaparivrājakasūtra, in Tsa a han, T 99,no. 972, k. 35, p. 251a20-b19. Sanskrit fragments of this version have been published by R. Pischel, *Bruchstücke des Sanskritkanons... aus Idykutsari*, 1904, p. 817-818.

<sup>813</sup> This sūtra has come down to us in numerous very divergent versions and bears various titles:

A. Samanasaccasutta, in Anguttara, II, p. 176-177.

C. Pie yi tsa a han, T 100, no. 206, k. 11, p. 450c5-451a10.

D. Vibhḥaṣā, T 1545, k. 77, p. 400b5-c12 (transl. L. de La Vallée Poussin, *Les deux vérités*, MCB, V, 167-169.

E. Nyāyanusāra, T 1562, k. 58, p. 667c2-21 (transl. Idem, ibid., p. 183-185.

The comparison with Tseng yi a han, T 125, k. 18, p. 639a1-11, proposed in the edition of Taisho, is to be avoided.

These were very illustrious Paribbājakas, living on the banks of the Sappinī river in Paribbājakārama, namely, Antabhāra, Varadhara, Sakuludāyin, and other famous medicants Version A. Versions B and C locate them at Magadha on the shores of the Sumangādhā pool.

will come here." [251c] The assembly maintained silence. The Buddha entered into this assembly and preached the three truths of the brāhmaṇas (*brāhmaṇasatya*).815

The heretic assembly remained silent ( $t\bar{u}sn\bar{u}mbh\bar{u}ta$ ). The Buddha thought: "These angry people are in Māra Pāpīmat's grasp. This teaching is so wondrous that none of them will try to become my disciple." Having had this thought, the Buddha arose from his seat and went away.

But the heretics, free from the grasp of Māra, thought: "We have been able to hear a marvelous Dharma; how can we profit from it?" At once they went to the Buddha, became his disciples, found the Path and escaped from suffering.<sup>817</sup>

815 Here the *Traité* introduces an episode not found in the other sources; it is, in fact, a stock phrase (cf. Dīgha, I, p.179; III, p. 37, 39; Majjhima, I p. 514; II, p. 2, 3, 30; Anguttara, V, p. 185, 190): *Appasaddā bhonto hontu, mā bhonto saddamakattha. Ayaṃ Samaṇo Gotamao āgacchati, appasaddakāmo kho pana so āyasmā, appasaddassa vaṇṇavādī, appeva nāma appasaddam parisaṃ viditvā upasamkamitabbaṃ maññeyyāti.* 

By 'brāhmaṇa truths', we should understand here the truths of the adepts of the Buddhist religion (*buddhadharmastha*). Remember that the Wheel of the Buddha is often called *Brahmacakra* and that the Buddha described himself sometimes as *Brāhmaṇa* (cf. Udānavarga, XXXIII, stanza 68-73). Version A lists four brāhmaṇa truths, but the text of the PTS is faulty and should be corrected by that of the Commentary of the Anguttara, III, p. 162: *Brāhmaṇa evam āha: 1) Sabbe pāṇā avajjhā ti..., 2) Sabbe kmama aniccā dukkhā vipariṇāmadhammā ti..., 3) Sabbe bhavā aniccā dukkhā vipariṇāmadhammā ti..., 4) Nāhaṃ kbacana kassaci kiñcana tasmiṃ na ca mama kvacana katthaci kiñcanaṃ n' atthīti. – "The Brāhmaṇa says: 1) No being should be killed; 2-3) All pleasures (all existences) are impermanent, suffering and perishable; 4) I am in no way whatsoever an individual, and in no way whatsoever is there anything whatsoever that is me. (p. 1664F, n. 3)* 

The other versions that list only three truths boil down to this: No being should be killed; everything that is subject to production is subject to destruction; I am not that and that is not me.

These three truths are in contrast with the practices and beliefs of the traditional Brahmanism. In the words of the Vibhḥaṣā (l.c.), the brāhmins sacrifice cattle and sheep, accept nihilism or eternalism, and practice continence in order to be reborn in heaven and enjoy heavenly pleasure.

816 This disillusioned reflection is also noted in versions B and C.

817 The Pie yi Tsa a han (version C) is the only canonical source coming out in favor of the conversion of the heretics, and here are its words:

The Buddha had not long gone when the deity of the Summagadhā pool pronounced these gāthās: "Just as soon trace designs on the water, harvest a crop by seeding a salt-pan, spray a dung-heap with perfume, dive into the water moistening the bank, make beautiful music by blowing into an iron pipe, hope for a mirage in the middle of winter: these heretics are so blunt that even if they hear the wondrous Dharma, they do not believe and do not accept it."

Finally, the disciples of the heretics did not dare to go to the Buddha out of fear of their teachers. This is why the Buddha entered into their assemblies. When they hear the Dharma, their faith is strengthened; they no longer fear their teachers, they become disciples of the Buddha and sometimes they obtain 'the traces of the Path'. 818

It is for all these wise reasons that the Buddha enters into the assemblies of the heretics.

#### **B.** Display of His Breast

[Cūḍā-Satyakasūtra.]<sup>819</sup> – Moreover, Sa-tchö-k'i (tche) Ni-k'ien-tseu (Satyaka Nirgranthīputra), his breast covered with copper plates, proclaimed: "There is no one who, engaged in debate with me (mayā vādena vādam samārabdhah), would not be sweating (sveda) in streams and would not be defeated. Even a big elephant, a piece of wood, a stone, that would hear my objections, would sweat in streams."820

Having made this declaration, he went to the Buddha and debated with him. The Buddha questioned him but Nirgrantha was unable to respond. His sweat flowed until it moistened the ground and his whole body was soaked. The Buddha said to him: "You just said: 'There is no one who, engaged in debate with me, would not be sweating o streams.' Now it is your sweat that is flowing and that moistens the ground. Do you want to examine the Buddha and see if he has any signs of sweat?" Immediately the Buddha took off his upper robe *uttarāsanga*) and asked: "Where is the sweat?"

However, there are people who say: "It is possible to be sweating on the forehead but the body is not sweating. Although the Buddha does not have a sweaty brow, certainly his body sweats." This is why the Buddha removed his upper robe and showed his body. As a result of this, the heretics directed themselves to the faith and all entered into the Buddha Dharma.

Therefore this physical action of the Buddha was in accordance with knowledge.

Hearing the deity of the pool pronounce these gāthās, the brāhmaṇas quickly went to join the Buddha and asked to be allowed to enter the religious life. The Buddha accepted them and, having gone forth from the world, they cultivated the Path with exertion and obtained arhathood.

- The characters *tao tsi* are often used to render the expression *dharmābhisamaya* 'understanding of the Dharma' (cf. T 1462, k. 2, p. 688c5).
- 819 *Cūlasaccasutta* of the Majjhima, I, p. 227-237; Tsa a han, T 99, k. 5, p. 35a-37b; Tseng yi a han, T 125, k. 30, p. 715a-717b.
- 820 Cf. Majihima, I, p. 227.
- According to Majjhima (*l.c.*), the Bhagavat, in this assembly, uncovered his golden-colored body (*Bhagavā tasmim parisatim suvannavannam kāyam vivari*). According to the Tsa a han, T 99, k. 5, p. 36b23, he opened his upper garment (*uttarāsanga*) and showed his breast. According to the Tseng yi a han, T 125, k. 30, p. 716b4-5, he removed his three robes (*tricīvara*) and said to Nirgrantha: "Determine if the arm-pits of the Tathāgata have any sweat."

### C. Display of His Tongue and His Cryptorchidia 822

The Buddha showed the mark of his tongue (jīhvālakṣaṇa) and the mark of his cryptorchidia (kośagatavastiguhya). Some people had doubts about these two marks of the Buddha's body; they should have obtained the Path but because of these doubts, they did not obtain it. This is why the Buddha showed them these two marks. He put out his tongue and covered his whole face with it: although his tongue was so great, it easily went back into his mouth. Those who saw it had their doubts satisfied.

Some people, seeing the Buddha put out his tongue, still had feelings of scorn, for putting out one's tongue is what little children do; but when they saw him withdraw his tongue and preach the Dharma without any difficulty, they felt respect and cried out at the wonder.

Some people had doubts about the Buddha's cryptorchidia which is an invisible mark; then the Buddha created by magic a wondrous elephant or a wondrous stallion and, showing them, he declared: "My cryptorchidia is an invisible mark just like that."

Some even said that the Buddha made his secret organs come out and showed them to someone to suppress his doubts. Scholars (*upadśācārya*) say that, [by acting in this way], the Buddha was manifesting his great compassion [252a] (*mahākaruṇā*) for, if a man sees the Buddha's cryptorchidia, he is able to accumulate the roots of good (*kuśalamūla*) and produce the thought of *anuttarasamyaksambodhi*. And those who can rejoice greatly and produce a mind of faith and veneration obtain the sight of the Buddha's cryptorchidia and cut through their doubts; but other than them, nobody can see it.

Out of great compassion and in order to save beings, the Buddha showed himself three times in the space of a flash of lightning, and the beings who saw him knew that the Buddha has great compassion and that he really has no blind attachment (*parāmarśa*) or prejudice (*abhiniveśa*) towards the moral precepts (*śīla*).

It is for these reasons that the Buddha showed these two marks: it was neither out of play nor out of a sense of modesty.

#### D. Insults to the Disciples

The Buddha had hard words for the bhiksus and treated them like fools (*mohapurusa*). 823

822 According to the sources noted above (p. 275-276F), the Buddha showed these two secret marks to

Ambaṭṭha, Brahmāyu and Sela. The fact is not contested; it only proves that the Buddha was not embarrassed by prejudice when it was a matter of converting beings.

For various breaches of discipline, the Buddha frequently treated the bhikṣus as 'foolish people' (in Sanskrit, *mohapuruṣa*; in Pāli, *moghaparisa*). The adjective is so commonplace that it makes up the formulary style and is the custom in stock phrases (cf. Vinaya, I, p. 45, 58, 60, 78, 154, 159-160, 189, 301, 305; II, p. 1, 14, 105, 161; III, p. 20-21, 45, 111, 188): *Kathaṃ hi nāma tvaṃ moghapurisa...; m'etaṃ moghapurisa appasannānaṃ vā pasādāya pasannānaṃ vā bhiyyobhāvāya*. - "How then, you

There are two kinds of hard words: *i*) insult coming from an evil intention (*duṣcitta*); *ii*) insult out of compassion for beings and with the intention of converting them (*paripācana*).

In the person detached from desire (*virakta*), there is no insult coming from a bad intention; how then would there be one in the Buddha? It is out of pity for beings and in order to convert them (*paripācanārtham*) that the Buddha had these strong words.

There are beings who are not introduced into the path by gentle words (ślakṣṇavāc) or by friendly instructions. They need strong words and heavy instructions for them to enter into the Dharma. They are like a good horse (aśva) who starts up when he sees the shadow of the whip (kaśācchāyā) or the stupid donkey (gardabha) who starts walking only when he receives a blow. There are wounds that are cured only by a gentle herb (mrḍvoṣadhi), by saliva (kheṭa) or a magic spell (mantra): there are wounds that are cured only when the sick flesh is cut out with a knife and a strong medicine applied to it.

Moreover, there are five kinds of strong words:

- 1) Merely idle speech (sambhinnapralāpa).
- 2) Harmful speech (pāruṣyavāda) plus idle speech (saṃbhinnapralāpa).
- 3) Harmful speech (pāruṣyavāda) plus idle speech (sambhinnapralāpa) plus falsehood (mṛṣāvāda).
- 4) Harmful speech (pāruṣyavāda) plus idle speech (saṃbhinnapralāpa), falsehood (mṛṣāvāda) plus malicious gossip (paiśunyavāda).
- 5) Hard speech coming from a pure mind (*aklistacitta*) the aim of which is to teach beings to distinguish the good (*kuśala*) from the bad (*akuśala*) and to remove them from this level of suffering.

[The strong speech] that combines the four vocal faults (cf. no. 4) is the most serious. The third, second and first are [respectively and in order] smaller and smaller faults.

If a lay disciple of the Buddha (śrāvaka avadātavasana) who has obtained the first or the second paths [i.e., the state of srotaāpanna or sakṛdāgāmin] uses harmful speech (pāruṣyavāda) to command his slaves (dāsa), for him this is not a bad path of action (akuśalakarmapatha).<sup>824</sup>

He who has accepted the discpline (*samāttasaṃvara*) is capable of committing two kinds [of harsh words]: either merely idle speech (*saṃbhinnapralāpa*) (cf. no, 1) or harmful speech (*pāruṣyavāda*) plus idle speech (cf. no. 2).

foolish man, can you...; that does not contribute, O foolish man, to the conversion of unbelievers or the increase of beleivers."

The Buddha cannot be blamed for having used this strong language. In the view of the two Vehicles, all the words of the Buddha, rough as well as gentle, have only the purpose of benefiting beings; in the perspective of the Greater Vehicle, the Buddha never loses the view of the twofold non-existence of beings and of things (*pudgala* and *dharma nairātmya*): there is no one to be insulted and there is nothing to be blamed for; see *Vimalakīrtinirdeśa*, p. 171-176, on this subject.

824 See above, p. 820F.

The anagamins and the arhats utter harmful words ( $p\bar{a}ru\bar{s}yav\bar{a}da$ ) without any passion ( $kle\acute{s}a$ ); only with pure intention and when reproach is needed to convert beings do they speak harmful words ( $p\bar{a}ru\bar{s}yav\bar{a}da$ ) and idle words ( $sambhinnapral\bar{a}pa$ ). If the harmful speech is uttered without passion by the anagamins and the arhats, it is the same and even more so in the Buddha.

Moreover, if the Buddha speaks harsh words, there is no need to hesitate and ask whether the Buddha utters these words with a bad intention (dustacittena). Why? The Buddha long ago destroyed any bad intentions and it is only with the best intentions ( $adhy\bar{a}\dot{a}ya$ ) that he thinks of beings. He is like a loving father teaching his sons; when he reprimands them, it is to correct them; it is not with a bad intention.

When the Buddha was still a bodhisattva and had not yet destroyed the threefold poison (*triviṣa*), he was the ṛṣī named *Tch'an-t'i* (Kṣānti) and, when the wicked king cut off his ears, nose, hands and feet, he did not feel any bad feeling [252b] and did not utter any harmful words.<sup>825</sup> At that time he had not attained bodhi, but he had no bad feelings. And now that he has attained *anuttarasamyaksambodhi*, destroyed the three poisons (*triviṣa*) and is endowed with great loving-kindness (*mahāmaitrī*) and great compassion (*mahākaruṇā*), can one still ask if he has bad feelings and rough words?

Moreover, when the Buddha treats [the bhikṣus] as fools (*mohapuruṣa*), it is gentle speech (*ślakṣṇavāc*) and true speech (*satyavāc*). These disciples are fools, under the power of the threefold poison (*triviṣa*): they are fools because the Buddha wants to benefit them and they do not accept it because they do not understand the Buddha's intentions and do not accept his words.

Moreover, in regard to lower things (*adhyātmam*), the Buddha always puts into action his knowledge of non-existence of self (*anātmajñāna*) and, in regard to external things, he always contemplates the emptiness of dharmas (*dharmaśūnyatā*). In these conditions [where there is nobody to speak to and nothing to say], why would the Buddha have harmful words (*pāruṣyavāda*)?

But beings who do not understand the mind of the Buddha seek out faults in his words. If beings knew with what good intentions (*adhyāśaya*) the Buddha has pity on them, they would joyously throw themselves into a great fire if he asked them to, and that with as much enthusiasm as a person tormented by heat (*gharmārta*) throws himself into a clear cool pool. And all the more so, why not accept his words?

But beings, under the grasp of Māra, do not know with what good intention the Buddha thinks of them; this is why they do not accept the words of the Buddha and this is why the Buddha treats them as fools.

Finally, there are people who, on hearing the reprimands of the Buddha, rejoice and say: "It is because he loves me that he speaks so." That is why the Buddha had treated them as foolish people.

#### E. Insults to Devadatta 826

The *Kṣāntijātaka* has been fully narrated, p. 264F, 889-890F.

The story of Devadatta, cousin and rival of the Buddha, has been told above (p. 868-878F), but here we must return to the detail of why the Buddha treated him as *kheļāpaka* (*kheļāsika*, *kheļopaka*) in

the Pāli Vinaya (II, p. 188, 333), *kheļāsaka* in the Samantapāsādikā (VI, p. 1275), *kheļāsika* in the Commentary of the Dhammapada (I, p. 118).

In his Samantapāsādikā (l.c.), Buddhaghosa has the following explanation: *Kheļāsako 'ti micchājīvena uppannapaccayā ariyehi vantabbā kheļasadisā, tathārūpe paccaye ayaṃ ajjhoharatī 'ti katvā keļāsako 'ti bhagavatā vutto*: "The foods which are procured by wrong livelihood must be spat out up by the Noble Ones like spit. In regard to the fact that Devadatta ate such food. Devadatta was treated by the Lord as *kheļasaka* 'to be spat out like spit'. Hence the translation of 'evil-living' proposed by Rhys-Davids and Oldenberg (*Vinaya Texts*, III, p. 239) and the translation 'to be vomited like spittle', better and more literal, given by I. B. Horner (*The Book of the Discipline*, V, p. 264). Thus it would seem to be just a 'swear word' not corresponding to an actual fact.

Nevertheless, taken literally, the expression *khelapaka* or *khelāsika* can mean 'eater of spit' and Rhys Davids-Stede in their *Pāli-English Dictionary* render it as 'an abusive term meaning eating phlegm'.

- I. In the case with which we are dealing here, the accusation claims that Devadatta never swallowed spit and as a result, treating him as *khelāpaka* is an unwarranted insult and a falsehood. The accusation can be based on an entire series of canonical texts:
- 1) According to the Pāli Vinaya (II, p. 184-185), the Dhammapada Commentary (I, p. 118), the Mahīśāsaka Vinaya (T 1421, k. 3, p. 17c21-25), the DharmaguptakaVinaya (T 1428, k. 4, p. 592a9-18) and the Ekottarāgama (T 125, k. 47, p. 802c21-24), Devadatta, in order to win over prince Ajātaśatru, transformed himself into a youth clothed with a waistband of snakes and appeared on the lap of the prince. The latter, frightened, asked who he was, and Devadatta made himself known. The prince said: "If you are really Devadatta, take your original form." Putting off the form of a youth, Devadatta reappeared dressed in monastic robes and carrying a begging bowl in his hand. From then on, the favors of Ajātaśatru were granted to him.
- 2) According to the same sources, several days later, Devadatta asked the Buddha to retire and hand over the Community to him. The Buddha, indignant, said to him: "I would not entrust the Community even to Śāriputra and Maudgalyāyana, so why should I entrust it to you, you corpse (*chava*), to be spat out like spit (*kheļāsaka*)." This is the version of the Pāli Vinaya (II, p. 188-189) and it is confirmed by the Mahīśāsaka Vinaya (T 1421, k. 3, p. 18b20) which, in the edition of the Souei and the Ming, render the expression *kheļāsaka* by *jou sien t'o*, 'like spit', as does the Dharmaguptaka Vinaya (T 1428, k. 4, p. 592b13-14) which translates it as *t'i t'o tche chen* 'a mass of tears and spit'.

Nothing in Devadatta's previous conduct seems to justify such an outrage. Thus the accusation would seem to be an unwarranted insult and lie. However, the matter is more serious in that the Buddha himself said in the Majjhima, I, p. 395: *Yaṃ Tathāgato vācaṃ jānāti abhūtaṃ... na taṃ Tathāgato vācaṃ bhāsati*: "The Tathāgata never pronounces a word that is false", no matter whether that word is pleasant or unpleasant to others.

II. In order to refute this major accusation, the defense produces here some articles unknown to the prosecutor and apparently taken from more recent canonical sources. These articles allow it to be established that Devadatta really had swallowed Ajātaśatru's spit and that consequently the Buddha, treating him as *khelāsaka* (in Sanskrit *kheṭāśika*) spoke the truth.

1) In the words of this source, the intention of Devadatta was not to frighten but to seduce the crown prince. For this purpose, he multiplied the transformations and changed successively into an elephant, a horse, an ox, which came to Ajātaśatru by passing through the wall and going out through the door or vice versa. He also changed into a monk and even into a veil or a hat, which Ajātaśatru made into a turban. Finally he took the form of a child adorned with a necklace of precious stones. Charmed, the crown prince took him in his arms, played with him and invariably ended up by putting some spit into his mouth. Out of love for honor and gain, Devadatta agreed to swallow it.

This new version first appeared in the Chinese Udāna (T 212, k. 14, p. 687c23-28) and a Vinaya of unknown origin (T 1464, k. 2, p. 859b22-29), each translated into Chinese in the years 382 and 383 by Tchou Fo-nien.

It also appears in the Saṃyuktāgama of the Kāśyapīya school (T 100, k. 1, p. 374b13-19), translated by a translator, whose name has not been preserved, about 400 C.E.

Finally, it was repeated and developed in the Sarvāstivādin Vinaya (T 1435, k. 36, p. 257c4-12) translated between 404 and 405 by Kumārajīva, and the Mūlasarvāstivādin Vinaya (T 1450, k. 13, p. 168c7-16) of which an incomplete translation was made by Yi-tsing between 700 and 712.

It was to this evidence that the great exegetists of the 4<sup>th</sup> century turned, the five hundred Kaśmirian arhats who compiled the Mahāvibhāṣā (T 1545, k. 85, p. 443a1-8) and, as we will see, the author or the authors of the *Traité*.

- 2. When Devadatta asked the Buddha to retire and entrust the Community to him, the Buddha refused curtly and treated his cousin as *mūdha* 'fool', *śava* 'corpse' and *kheṭāśika* 'eater of spit'. Those who remembered the kiss exchanged between Ajātaśatru and Devadatta could not help but see an allusion in it to this repugnant action. This is why the translators of the previously cited sources translated *kheṭáśika* by the following characters:
  - a. Tan t'o 'eater of spit' (Sarv. Vin, T 1435, k. 36, p. 258b7),
  - b. Che t'o tchö 'eater of spit' (Mūlasarv. Vin., T 1450, k. 13, p. 169b26).
  - c. Che jen t'o tchö 'eater of human spit' (Mahāvibhāṣā, T 1545, k. 85, p. 443a6-7).
  - d. Seou t'o jen 'swallower of spit' (Traité, T 1509, k. 26, p. 252c3).

If the Buddha treated Devadatta as a swallower of spit, it is because the latter took Ajātaśatru's spit, and because the Buddha spoke only the truth.

In the Majjhima, I, p. 395, the Buddha stated: *Yañ ca kho Tathāgato vācaṃ jānāti bhūtaṃ...*, *tatra kālaññāTathāgato hoti tassā vācāya veyyākaraṇāya*: "Every word that the Buddha knows to be true, he waits for the opportunity to offer it", whether it be pleasant or unpleasant for someone else.

In this case, the Buddha had the perfect right to treat Devadatta as *kheṭāśika* and the accusation made against him is invalid. In the words of the 14<sup>th</sup> *āveṇikadharma*, all vocal actions of the Buddha are preceded by knowledge and accompanied by knowledge.

A 'fool' because, due to the gravity of his sins, Devadatta had to fall into the Avīci hell: hence the triple insult.

A 'corpse' because, in the appearance of a living man, Devadatta did not accumulate the roots of good (*kuśalanūla*). With his shaved head and his monk's robes, one would have said he was a saint (*āryapudgala*), but inwardly he had no wisdom: he was, therefore, a corpse.

Corpses are adorned in many ways, but they gradually decompose and it is impossible to revive them. This was the case for Devadatta. Each day the Buddha taught him in many ways, but his bad intentions (dustacitta) increased, his evil tendencies ( $p\bar{a}p\bar{a}ku\acute{s}alacitta$ ) grew from day to day, and he finally committed three sins of immediate retribution ( $\bar{a}nantarya$ ):<sup>827</sup> he was therefore a corpse.

He was also a 'swallower of spit'. Devadatta, coveting gain (*lābha*) and honor (*satkāra*), changed himself into a yong boy (*kumāraka*) of heavenly appearance and appeared in the arms of prince Ajātaśatru. The prince breathed into his mouth and gave him his spit to swallow. This is why Devadatta was a swallower of spit.

Question. – Devadatta who possessed the concentrations (*samādhi*) had renounced sensual desires (*vītarāga*). Why would he still swallow another's spit?

Answer. – In this individual, the evil tendencies (*duṣṭacitta*) were deep, but his faculties were keen (*tīkṣnendriya*). Having renounced sensual desires (*vītarāga*), he could change himself. When he swallowed the spit, he lost his sharp faculties, but when he wanted to, he recovered them. This is why he was called 'swallower of spit'.

Futhermore Devadatta said to the Buddha: "The Buddha is worn out [252c] (*jīrṇa*). Since he has always loved retreat (*viveka*), let him go into the forest and enjoy dhyāna there and let him entrust the Community to me." The Buddha replied: "Śāriputra and Maudgalyāyana have great wisdom, are good, gentle and pure men, and yet I would not entrust the Community to them. Why then would I entrust it to you who are a fool, a corpse, a swallower of spit?"828

It is for these reasons that the Buddha, although he had no attachment toward things, offered harsh words (on occasion), but with the sole purpose of converting beings.

#### F. Use of a Stone Bowl

"The Buddha forbade the bhikṣus to use eight kinds of bowls (pātra)."829

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>827</sup> He fomented a schism, injured the Buddha's foot and mortally struck the nun Utpalavarnā: see above, p. 873-876F.

<sup>828</sup> Ibid., II, p. 188: Sāriputtamogallānānam pi kho aham, Devadatta, bhikkhusamgham na nissajjeeyyam. Kim pana tuyham chavassa kheļāpakassā 'ti.

According to its custom when it deals with disciplinary matters, here the *Traité* again refers to the Sarvāstivādin Vinaya, T 1435, k. 37, p. 260b6-8, where the Buddha says to the bhikṣus: "Starting from

[Bowls 1-4]: Precious bowls of gold (suvarṇa), silver ( $r\bar{u}pya$ ), [beryl ( $vaid\bar{u}rya$ ) and pearl (maṇi)]. – Since people covet precious things, since the latter are hard to find (durlabha) and because people are attached to them, the Buddha prohibits the keeping ( $dh\bar{a}raṇa$ ) of these precious substances.

He does not allow even touching (*sparśana*) that which is 'precious' and neither does he allow keeping it.<sup>830</sup> If such a gift is made [to the bhikṣus], he allows them to realize their value, but not too expensive.<sup>831</sup>

[Bowl 7]: The wooden  $(d\bar{a}ru)$  bowl. – Since it retains grease (meda) and is not clean, the Buddha does not permit it to be kept.

Bowls 5, 6, 8]: The other three bowls [copper (tāmra), tin (trapu) and stone (śaila) do not have such disadvantages.

Question. – But the baked clay  $(mrttik\bar{a})$  bowl and the iron (ayas) bowl [permitted by the Buddha] also retain grease and are no different from the wooden bowl. Why does the Buddha allow them?

Answer. – If the baked clay bowl and the iron bowl are not steamed ( $v\bar{a}sita$ ), the Buddha does not permit them either, for they should be steamed in order not to retain grease.

As for the stone ( $\dot{s}aila$ ) bowl, it is thick ( $aud\bar{a}rika$ ) or thin ( $s\bar{u}ksma$ ). Thin, it does not retain bad grease and that is why the Buddha used it himself, but he does not allow the bhiksus to keep them because of their weight. A swallow of milk by the Buddha surpasses in power that of a myriad of perfumed white elephants (gandhahastin); this is why [the stone bowl] does not seem heavy for him, but out of compassion ( $karun\bar{a}$ ) for the bhiksus, he does not allow them to keep them.

Question. – But the assistants (*upasthāyaka*) such as *Lo-t'o* (Rādha), *Mi-hi-kia* (Meghika), *Siu-na-tch'a-to-lo* (Sunakṣetra), *Na-k'ie-so-p'o-lo* (Nāgasamāla), *A-nan* (Ānanda), etc., who followed the Buddha, brought him his utensils.<sup>832</sup> Why did the Buddha not have pity on them?

today on, I forbid you to have (*dhāraṇa*) eight kinds of bowls (*pātra*); bowls made of gold (*suvarṇa*), silver (*rūpya*), beryl (*vaiḍūrya*), pearl (*maṇi*), copper (*tāmra*), tin (*trapa*), wood (*dāru*) and stone (*śaila*). He who keeps (*dhārayati*) such a one commits a duṣkṛta. But I allow you to keep two kinds of bowls: iron (*ayas*) and baked clay (*mṛttikā*)". - Compare Pāli Vinaya, II, p. 112; Mahīśasaka Vin., T 1421, k. 26, p. 169c-170a; Mahāsāṃghika Vin., T 1425, k. 29, p. 462a; Mūlasarv. Vin., T 1451, k. 2, p. 213c. 830 The 18<sup>th</sup> naiḥṣargikā pāyantika of the Sarvāstivādins: *Yaḥ punar bhikṣuḥ svahastaṃ rūpyam udgṛhṇīyad vā udgrāhayed vā nikṣiptam vā sādhayen niḥṣargikā pātayantikā*: "If a bhikṣu takes in his hand a precious object (gold or silver), or causes it to be taken, or tolerates it being placed in his hand, there is a fault involving surrender of the object." – For the other Vinayas, see W. Pachow, *Comparative Study of the Prātimokṣa*, p. 112; *Prātimokṣa-Sūtra of the Mahāsāṇghikas*, p. 18.

831 For this bit of casuistry, see Sarv. Vinayavibhanga, p. 103; P. Demiéville, *A propos de Concile de Vaiśālī*, T'oung Pao, p. 272-275.

832 Each Buddha had his assistant (*upasthāyaka*), a monk specially attached to his person, entrusted with fanning him, carrying his robe and bowl for alms-round, introducing visitors. The Sanskrit Mahāvadānasūtra, ed. by S. Waldschmidt, Anhang, p. 172, has drawn up a list of the assistants who

Answer. – If these assistants carried the Buddha's bowl, it was with the miraculous intervention (*prātihāryabala*) of the Buddha. Besides, they honored and venerated the Buddha so highly that they did not find his bowl too heavy. And also, the physical strength of Ānanda was great.

Furthermore, the Buddha does not allow the use of stone bowls ( $\dot{sailap\bar{a}tra}$ ) because fine ones ( $s\bar{u}k\bar{s}ma$ ) are hard to find (durlabha) and because thick ones ( $aud\bar{a}rika$ ) retain grease. The Buddha's bowl arose spontaneously (svatas) on the four summits of the mountains on which the four kings of the gods

served the last seven Buddhas: Aśoka for Vipaśyin, Kṣemakāra for Śikhin, Upaśanta for Viśvabhuj, Bhadrika for Krakasunda (or Krakucchanda), Svastika for Kanakamuni, Sarvamitra for Kāśyapa, and finally Ānanda for Śākyamuni.

We know under what circumstances the last one chose Ānanda: in the twentieth year of his public ministry, the Buddha, feeling old age coming on, felt the need for a servant who would be attached to his residence, and he named Ānanda as his assistant. Having accepted this responsibility, the disciple set certain conditions: never to share the food and robes of the Buddha, not to accompany him among the lay-adepts but to have access to him at any hour of the day (cf. *Upasthāyakasūtra* of the Tchong a han, T 26, k. 8, p. 471c-475a; Mūlasarv. Vinaya, in W. W. Rockhill, *Life of the Buddha*, p. 88; Fo pao ngen king, T 156, k. 6, p. 155c22-25; Hien yu king, T 202, k. 8, p. 404b-c; Tch'ou tch'ou king, T 730, p. 526a-b; Vinayavinhāṣā, Y 1440, k. 1, p. 504c12-15; Comm. of Anguttara, I, p. 292-296; Comm. of Theragāthā in *Psalms of the Brethren*, p. 350-352; Sanskrit Mahāparinirvāṇasūtra, p. 192; Sanskrit Mahāvadānasūtra, p. 78; Divyāvadāna, p. 612). - Ānanda fulfilled his mission with the greatest devotion for the last twenty-five years of the Teacher's life (Tch'ang a han, T 1, k. 3, p. 19c5; T 5, k. 2, p. 169a15; *Traité*, above, p. 94F). However, the Northern Mahāparinirvāṇa (T 374, k. 40, p. 601b26) notes only twenty years or more.

Before Ānanda took charge, other disciples functioned temporarily. The Comm. of the Theragāthā (*Psalms of the Brethren*, p. 350) and that of the Udāna (p. 217) record seven of them and the old canonical sources confirm this: 1) Nāgasamāla (cf. Majjhima, I, p. 83, l. 19); 2) Nāgita (Dīgha, I, p. 151, l. 8); 3) Upavāna (Dīgha, II, p. 139, l. 1; Saṃyutta, I, p. 174, l. 25); 4) Sunakkhatta (Jātaka, I, p. 389, l. 16); 5) the novice Cunda (Saṃyutta, V, p. 161, l. 23); 6) Sāgata (Vinaya, I, p. 179, l. 26): 7) Meghiya (Udāna, p. 34, l. 4).

On the other hand, the Vinayamātṛkā of the Haimavatas (T 1463, k. 5, p. 827c12-14) knows of eight disciples who, "fan in hand, fanned the Buddha". These were: 1) Kāśyapa; 2) Hāludāyin; 3) Sāgata; 4) Meghiya; 5) Nāgasamāla; 6) [Mahā]cunda; 7) Sunakṣatra; 8) Ānanda.

In the present passage, the *Traité* mentions, by way of example, only five *upasthāyakas*, but later (k. 33, p. 303b) it will complete the list:

"When the Buddha Śākyamuni had not yet gone forth (*pravrajita*), he had Chandaka as assistant (*upasthāyaka*) and Kāludāyin as playmate (*sahakrīḍanaka*: cf. Mahāvastu, III, p. 91; Jātaka, I, p. 86); his wives Gopiyā, Yaśodharā, etc., were his close entourage (*abhyantaraparivāra*). – Having left home, during the six years of austerity (*duṣkaracaryā*), he had the group of five [Kauṇḍinya, etc.] as assistants. – Having once attained enlightenment (*abhisaṃbuddha*), Meghiyā, Rādha, Sunakṣatra, Ānanda, Guhyaka the Malla, etc., formed his close entourage (*abhyanataraparivāra*)."

(cāturmahārājakakāyikadeva) dwell. But other people do not have these bowls that arise by themselves; to try to make one would be very difficult and very complicated. This is why the Buddha did not allow [the bhikṣus] to have stone bowls but used one himself to distinguish himself from his disciples, in the same way that the king venerated by people uses special utensils (bhājana) himself. Seeing the Buddha use a special bowl, people's veneration (gurukāra) and respect (satkāra) is increased and they develop pure faith (cittaprasāda).

Question. – If it is fitting for the Buddha's bowl to be special, why should his robe  $(c\bar{v}ara)$  be the same [as those of the other bhiksus]?

Answer. – But the clothing of the Buddha is also different from that of others. Thus, when the Buddha attained bodhi, he knew that Kāśyapa's robe should be worn by the Buddha, and Kāśyapa's robe was worth ten myriad ounces of gold.<sup>833</sup>

Next, Jīvaka offered the Buddha a *chen-mo-ken* cotton robe also worth ten myriad ounces of gold. The Buddha asked Ānanda to take this robe away, cut it up and make a cloak out of it.<sup>834</sup> This being done, the Buddha put it on and this [253a] outfit differed [from all the rest].

Question. – However, it was following this event that the Buddha said to the bhikṣus: "Starting from today, provided that a bhikṣu mindfully seeks nirvāṇa and turns his back on saṃsāra, I allow him, if he so wishes, to wear a robe worth ten myriad ounces of gold, and I also allow him to eat the food of a hundred flavors (śatarasabhojana). "835 [Therefore at the beginning] his robe was different and it was only later that he

As a fee for his medical attentions, Jīvaka received a great raincoat (*bṛhatikāprāvaraṇa*) worth a hundred thousand *kārṣāpanas* from the king of the Videhas. It was in fact a piece of impermeable cloth. Jīvaka offered it to the Buddha who asked Ānanda to cut it up and make a cloak out of it. Ānanda stretched it out on the ground and measured it: the material was so long that it could be made into numerous garments. Ānanda sewed the three robes (*tricīvara*) for the Buddha, an upper and a lower garment (*sāntarottara*) for himself and a cloak (*kusūlaka*) for Rāhula. The rest, hundreds of pieces (*paṭaśatāni*), was given to the community of bhikṣus who did not know what to do with it. The Buddha said to them: "I allow the bhikṣus to keep robes offered by the householders, but only after having cut them up and dirtied them."

All this is told in the *Cīvaravastu* of the Mūlasarv. Vinaya (*Gilgit Manuscripts*, III, part 2, p. 48): *Jīvakaḥ kumārabhṛto Bhagavantam idam avocat. ācaritaṃ bhadanta mama yasya rājño vā rājāmātyasya ....anujānaṃI bhikṣubhir grhaticīvarakāni śastralūnāni duṛvarṇīkṛtya dhāraitavyāni.*835 In fact, it was after another event that the Buddha permitted his monks to wear fine robes offered to them by householders. This event is told in most of the Vinayas:

Sarvāstivādin Vinaya, T 1435, k. 27, p. 194b25-c11: Jīvaka, wearing a robe of *chen-mo-ken* (material not yet identified) worth a hundred thousand [kārṣāpanas], wished to offer it to the Buddha. Bowing down at the feet of the Buddha, he stood to one side and said to him: "When I care for a king or a great minister, everyone favors me. Today, when I have cared for the Buddha, I would like the Bhagavat to grant me a favor." The Buddha said to Jīvaka: "The Tathāgatas, arhat and

<sup>833</sup> See above, p. 1399F.

allowed [the bhikṣus to wear one similar to his]. 836 His bowl [was unique of its type] and he never allowed [the bhikṣus to have a similar one].

Answer. – Here we must repeat what has been said before (p. 1676F) in regard to the stone bowl (śailapātra). The Buddha did not receive this bowl from human hands. When he attained bodhi and when meal-time came, he needed a utensil. Knowing the Buddha's mind, the four kings of the gods (cāturmahārājakāyikadeva) brought four bowls and offered them to him. 837 Among the Buddhas of the

samyaksambuddha, are *atikrāntavara* [i.e., have unsurpassed favors, or, do not grant favors without knowing what it is about]". Jīvaka said to the Buddha: It is something fitting (*yad kalpati*) that I beg you to grant me." The Buddha said to Jīvaka: "What favor are you asking?" Jīvaka answered: "Bhadanta, here is a garment of *chen-mo-ken* worth a hundred thousand [kārrṣāpanas]: I would like the Buddha to accept it out of compassion for me." In silence, the Buddha accepted it. Knowing that the Buddha accepted silently, Jīvaka gave to the Buddha the garment of *chen-mo-ken* worth a hundred thousand [kārṣāpanas], then, having bowed his head to the Buddha's feet, he went away. Because of this, the Buddha called the Saṃgha together and, having gathered the Saṃgha, he said to the bhikṣus: "This very day Jīvaka has given me a garment of *chen-mo-ken* worth a hundred thousand [kārṣāpanas]. From today on, if someone gives a garment of this kind to a bhikṣu, he will be able to wear it as he wishes. From today on, if a bhikṣu wishes to wear rags gathered from the dust-heap (*pāṃśukūla*), I permit him; but if he wishes to wear [fine] robes received from the householders (*gṛhapaticīvarāṇi*), I permit that likewise."

Other Vinayas (Pāli Vin., I, p. 280; Mahīśāsaka Vin., T 1431, k. 20, p. 134a28-b11; Dharmagupta Vin., T 1428, k. 40, p.854c2-21) which likewise tell this episode add several details: it was Pradyota, king of Avanti, who made the gift to Jīvaka of the precious garment, or rather two pieces of cloth coming from the land of the Sivi (*Siveyyakam dussayugam*). In Pāli (Vin. I, p. 280; III, p. 172) the rule stated by the Buddha was formulated as follows: *Anujānāmi bhikkhave gahapaticīvaraṃ, yo icchati paṃsukūliko hotu, yo icchati gahapaticīvaraṃ sādiyatu*.

A passage from the Samantapāsādikā, V, p. 1119, noted by Horner, Book of the Discipline, IV, p. 296, remarks that, during the twenty tears following his enlightenment until the event related here, neither the Lord nor any monk accepted robes offered by the householders; all wore rags. However, according to the *Traité*, for some time at least, the Lord wore the fine robe of Kāśyapa.

837 See Catuṣpariṣatsūtra, p. 84-87, and the many similar texts collected by E. Waldschmidt: When the merchants Tripusa and Bhallika offered a honey-cake to the Buddha, the latter needed a bowl to receive it. Then the four great kings of the gods, understanding his wish, brought from the stone mountain (pāṣānamayāt parvatāt) four stone bowls (catvāri pātrāṇi) made and crafted by non-human beings (amanuṣyakṛtāny amanuṣyasniṣṭhitāni), completely transparent (svacchāni), pure (śucīni), with no bad odors (niṣpratigandāni), and offered them to the Buddha. But the latter needed only one vessel, and in the words of the Mahāvastu, III, p.304, with a touch of his thumb, he made the bowls dissolve into one another; thus the four bowls became one bowl, but the rims of the other three were always to be distinguished on the last bowl. Hence, comments A. Foucher, AgbG, I, p. 420, the three lines that encircle the upper rim of the bowl on many bas-reliefs at Gandhāra

three times, it has been customary to receive their bowl from the hands of the four kings of the gods. At that time, the Community (*samgha*) did not yet exist; how could the Buddha authorize [a bowl to anyone]? And if, later, [after the beginning of the Community], the Buddha had allowed the use [of a fine stone bowl], nobody could have made one. Besides, in Jambudvīpa, people do not like stone bowls, so nobody would have given him one.

Besides, the Buddha advised the bhikṣus to keep their own qualities (guṇa) secret.<sup>838</sup> If the bhikṣus received stone bowls, people would say that they had received them from the god realm or from the nāgas. If the bhikusus asked people to make them, the work would have been difficult. Furthemore, it might be feared that people would say that the bhikṣus wanted to equal the Buddha; this is why the Buddha did not permit them.

With regard to the garment, some say: "In the very midst of the Samgha, the Buddha receives magnificent garments offered to him by the dānapatis, but he is the only one to wear them and does not allow the bhikşus to have any." This is why the Buddha allowed the bhikşus to have fine ones also.

Moreover, the bhikṣus do not wear [these fine robes], given the rarity of benefactors ( $d\bar{a}yaka$ ) [so generous] and the rarity of recipients ( $pratigr\bar{a}haka$ ) [so lucky]. People do not give [such fine clothing] to impure bhikṣus: as for the pure ( $\dot{s}uddha$ ) bhikṣus<sup>839</sup>, as they had few desires (alpeccha) and were content with their lot (samtuṣṭa), they did not wear [those that had been given to them].

It is to cut people's doubts (*samśayacchedana*) that the Buddha allowed the bhikṣus to wear [fine] robes; as for the [stone] bowls that they could not expect to receive, he did not allow them.

Question. – It is said in the sūtras: "The Buddha, who has a diamond body (*vajrakāya*), has no need of food." Then why did he keep a bowl?

Answer. – The Buddhadharma consists of two Paths: i) the path of the śrāvakas; ii) the path of the Buddha. In the śrāvaka system, the Buddha conforms to human customs and needs food; in the Mahāyāna system, he resorts to skillful means ( $up\bar{a}ya$ ) to save beings; this is why he appears to eat whereas in truth he does not eat.

Ouestion. – What is this skillful means?

Answer. – Wishing to save people, the Buddha borrows the customs of humans. If he did not do this, people would take him for a non-human (*amanusya*) and would wonder why they follow his Dharma.

Moreover, there are people who find salvation in generosity  $(d\bar{a}na)$ ; out of respect for them, the Buddha accepts their offerings of food. Then these people say: "The food I offer contributes to sustaining the body

<sup>838</sup> See, for example, Pāli Vinaya, II, p. 112: *Na bhikkhave gihīnaṃ uttarimanussadhammaṃ iddhipātihāriyam dassetabbam*.

Horner, Book of the Discipline, IV, p. 449: "Suddha in such a connection means that a monk has committed no offences, or that, if he has, he has confessed them and so is 'pure' to take his place at the Pātimokkha recitation."

of the Buddha." Their mind becomes very joyful (*mahāmuditā*), and as a result of this joy, they welcome the Buddha's words with faith.

It is like a great sovereign who is invited to dine by his ministers and subjects. The king has no need for it, but to win over his people, he eats enough so they they are made happy. For similar reasons, the Buddha takes nourishment.

Question. – If the Buddha does not eat, where is the food that he does accept? [253b]

Answer. – The workings of the Buddha (buddhakārya) are inconceivable (acintya): they should not be investigated.

Furthermore, there are people who are saved when they find food for the Buddha; there are others who are saved when they hear his sounds ( $\dot{s}abda$ ), see his color ( $r\bar{u}pa$ ), touch his body ( $k\bar{a}ya$ ) or smell his smell (gandha). If they need [the Buddha's] food to be saved, the Buddha gives it to them.

It is said in the *Mi tsi kin kang king* (Guhyakavajrapāṇisūtra or Tathāgatacintyaguhya-nirdeśa): "When the Buddha brings food to his mouth, there are devas seeking the Buddhist Path who carry it to the ten directions and distribute it." <sup>840</sup>

Question. – If that is so, what did you mean when you said above (p. 1402F) in regard to Saṃghānusmṛti<sup>841</sup> that nobody can eat the Buddha's food?

Answer. – When the Buddha does not give his food away, it is because nobody is capable is able to eat to eat it, but here, if he gives it, it is because it can be eaten. How do we know that?

When the Buddha ate oats (yava), he gave this food to Ānanda,<sup>842</sup> and when the śramana Eul-che-yi-eul (Śroṇa Kotīviṃśa) offered the Buddha some good soup  $(y\bar{u}$ , $\bar{s}$ a), the latter gave the leftovers to king Bimbasāra.

Thus we know that if the Buddha makes a gift of his food after having accepted it, it is that one is able to eat it; if he does not make a gift of it, it is that it one cannot digest it.

Furthermore, if food is offered to the Buddha and the latter does not eat it, people would be unable to digest it, but if, after having eaten, the Buddha gives the leftovers, it is that people are able to digest it. Therefore, actually, the Buddha does not eat, but in order to save beings, he pretends to accept food and he keeps a bowl (*pātraṃ dhārayati*) [for that purpose].

#### G. Silence on the Fourteen Difficult Questions

The Buddha did not answer fourteen difficult questions.<sup>843</sup> -

<sup>840</sup> On these feasts of immortality, see also the *Vimalakīrtinirdeśa*, p. 319-324 and the appendix, p. 430-437.

<sup>841</sup> Adopting the variant *nien-seng*.

<sup>842</sup> See above, p. 1530F, n. 3.

The Buddha has four ways of answering (*vyākaraṇa*): *i*) answering in a categorical manner (*ekāmśena vyākaraṇam*); *ii*) answering by distinguishing (*vibhajya vyākaraṇam*); *iii*) answering by asking a question (*paripṛcchāvyākaraṇam*); *iv*) answering by not replying (*sthānanīyavyākaraṇam*). <sup>844</sup> Now these fourteen difficult questions had to be answered by not replying.

Moreover, when it is useful, the Buddha does answer. But questions asked by the heretics (*tīrthika*) do not lead to nirvāṇa (*na nirvāṇāya saṃvartante*) and increase doubt (*saṃśayān vardhayanti*). Therefore the Buddha answers by not replying to them. If he knew that they have a definite usefulness, he would reply by distinguishing (*vibhajya*), but as they have no use, he stops and does not reply. This is why we know that the Buddha is omniscient (*sarvajña*).

Furthermore, the Buddha spoke of three kinds of things: *i*) conditioned things (*saṃskṛtadhrma*), *ii*) unconditioned things (*asaṃskṛtadharma*) and *iii*) inexpressible things (*avācyadharma*): in doing this, he has spoken of all dharmas.

Furthermore, being based (āśritya) on the eternalist view (śāśvatadṛṣṭi) or the nihilist view (ucchedadṛṣṭi), the heretics asked the questions of eternalism or nihilism, but since any real nature (satyalakṣaṇa) is absent in them, the Buddha did not reply. The eternal nature (nityalakṣaṇa) and the non-eternal nature (anityalakṣaṇa) seen by these heretics have no reality. Why? The heretics grasp (udgṛhṇanti) these natures and become attached to them (āsajyante), saying: "This is eternal, that is nothingness." As for the Buddha, he too speaks of eternal nature and non-eternal nature, but merely by way of refutation (pratipakṣa).

Furthermore, people say: "Nothingness (*nāstitva*) exists; existence (*astitva*) does not exist." They are making a mistake, and the Buddha does not make a mistake by not answering.

The sun  $(s\bar{u}rya)$  lights up the earth, but it can neither lower the mountains nor elevate the valleys: it is limited to making them visible. In the same way, the Buddha has no action on dharmas. If they exist, he says that they exist; if they do not exist, he says that they do not exist. Thus he said:

"Old age and death have birth as condition (*jātipratyayam jarāmaraṇam*), etc. [253c] on up to: the formations have ignorance as condition (*yāvad avidyāpratyayāḥ saṃskāraḥ*). Whether there is a Buddha or there is no Buddha, this causality (*idaṃpratyayatā*), this nature of things (*dharmatā*), is always present in the world. Buddhas appear in the world in order to teach this Dharma to beings."845

Furthermore, if the Buddha talked about eternalism ( $\dot{s}\bar{a}\dot{s}vata$ ) or nihilism (uccheda), this would be a mistake. If you were asked what is the size or the physical appearance of the son of a barren woman and a eunuch ( $vandhy\bar{a}\dot{s}andhaputra$ ), this question would not deserve an answer. It is the same for the fourteen difficult questions: only in hypothesis do eternalism and nihilism have a basis to which response may be made, but since there is no eternity or nothingness, the Buddha does not respond.

For the fifth time, the *Traité* returns to this subject: see above, p. 154-158F, 421F, 423F, 529F.

<sup>844</sup> See references above, p. 158F, note 2; 1378F

A free citation of a canonical passage: Tsa a han, T 99, no. 296, k. 12, p. 84b-c. See above, p. 157F, note 1 and references to be added from the Nidānasaṃyukta, p. 147-149.

For all these reasons the Buddha does not make the mistake of answering the fourteen difficult questions.

#### H. Simultaneous Teaching of the Self and the Non-self

In some places the Buddha says that the atman exists and in other places he says that it does not exist. –

People who understand the meaning (artha) of the Buddhist doctrine and know the designation (prajñapti) say that the atman exists. People who do not understand the meaning of the Buddhist doctrine and do not know the designation say that the atman does not exist.

Furthermore, if a person is about to fall into the view of nihilism (ucchedadrsti), the Buddha says to him: "There is an atman which, in future existences, undergoes [the retribution] of its wrongdoings (apatti) and its merits (punya)." On the other hand, if a person is about to fall into the view of eternalism (śāśvatadrsti), the Buddha says to him: "There is neither an atman, nor someone who acts (kāraka) nor a patient (?) (vedaka), 846 and there is no autonomous dharma (svatantra) existing separate from what are called the five aggregates (pañcaskandha)."847

Ouestion. - If that is so, where is the truth?

Answer. – It is the anatman that is true, 848 for the Seals of the Dharma (dharmamudrā) say: "All conditioned dharmas are impermanent; all dharmas are without self; niryāna is peace" (sarvasamskārā anityāḥ, sarvadharmā anātmānaḥ, śantam nirvāṇam).849 Now the Dharma seal called nirvāṇa is the true nature (bhūtalakṣaṇa) of dharmas. But if someone has not yet planted the roots of good (anavaropitakuśaladharma), if his wisdom is not yet sharp (atīkṣṇaprajñā), the Buddha does not preach the profound doctrine of anātman (gambhīrānātmadharma) to him because, if he did, this person would fall into the view of nihilism (ucchedadṛṣṭi).

Question. – So be it. But in the Kia-chö-wen (Kāśyapapariprcchā), the Buddha said: "The ātman is one extreme, the anātman is the other extreme: avoiding these two extremes is called the Middle Way" (ātmety ayam eka antah, anātmety ayam dvitīya antah. ity etāv ubhāv antāv anupagamya madhyamā pratipad ity ucvate). 850 Therefore why do you say here that the anatman is true and that the atman is just a manner of speaking [that constitutes] a skillful means (*upāyapravacana*)?

Answer. – 1) The partisans of anātman (anātmavādin) are of two kinds: i) those who grasp (udgrhnanti) at the nature of anātman (anātmalakṣaṇa) and cling (āsjyante) to the anātman; ii) those who destroy the ātman

<sup>846</sup> Monier-Williams: *vedaka* = proclaiming, making known

These two apparently contradictory sūtras have been cited above, p. 32F, notes 1 and 2.

<sup>848</sup> A peremptory affirmation which ought to draw the attention of western literary circles trying desperately to introduce the notion of a soul into Buddhism.

<sup>849</sup> See above, p. 1369F.

<sup>850</sup> Cf. Saṃyutta, II, p. 17; III, p. 135: Sabbam atthīti kho Kaccāyana ayam eko anto, sabbaṃ natthīti ayam dutiyo anto. Ete te Kaccāyana ubho ante anupagamma majjhena Tathāgato dhammam deseti.

without, however, grasping at the anātman or clinging to it so that the anātman disappears by itself (svatah).

For the first, the anātman is an extreme (*anata*); for the second, the anātman is the Middle Way (*madhyamā pratipad*).

2) Furthermore, if the Buddha speaks of the ātman or the anātman, he has two reasons for doing so: *i*) if he is speaking from the conventional point of view (*saṃvṛṭitaḥ*), there is an ātman; *ii*) if he is speaking from the absolute point of view (*paramārthataḥ*), there is no ātman.

This is why he is not wrong in speaking sometimes of ātman and sometimes of anātman.

#### I. Simultaneous Teaching of Existence and Non-existence

In some places the Buddha speaks of the existence of dharmas and in other places he speaks of their non-existence. -

Question. – You should not speak separately of existence ( $astit\bar{a}$ ) and non-existence ( $n\bar{a}stit\bar{a}$ ): existence is  $\bar{a}tman$  and non-existence is an $\bar{a}tman$ . Why return [to a subject already dealt with]?

Answer. – 1) That is not correct (*ayuktam etad*). In the Buddhadharma there are two kinds of emptiness ( $\delta \bar{u}nyat\bar{a}$ ): *i*) the emptiness of beings (*sattvaśūnyatā*); *ii*) the emptiness of things (*dharmaśūnyatā*).

Saying that there is no ātman is stating the emptiness of beings; saying that there are no dharmas is stating the emptiness of things. [254a]

Saying that there is an ātman and knowing the nature of pure designation (*prajñaptilakṣaṇa*) is not clinging to the ātman; saying that there is an ātman within the five aggregates (*pañcaskandha*) is clinging to the ātman. In order to destroy this clinging to the ātman, it is said: "There is only the five aggregates. Impermanence, suffering, emptiness, non-self, peace and nirvāṇa, that is existence."

- 2) Furthermore, there are two kinds of views of nothingness (*ucchedadṛṣṭi*):
- a. "There is no future existence (aparajanman) where one undergoes suffering (duḥkha) or happiness (sukha) as a result of wrongdoings (āpatti) or merit (puṇya)." For those people, it is said: "There is an ātman that, from the present existence (ihajanman) to the future existence (aparajanman), undergoes the retribution for wrongdoings and merits.
- b. "All dharmas are empty (\$\sigmu nya\$) and without attachment (nir\sigma sanga)." This is a wrong view (mithy\sigma dr\sigma ti) and, for these people, it is said: "There are [two kinds of] dharmas, namely conditioned (samskrta) dharmas and unconditioned (asamskrta) dharmas.
- 3) For beings of dull faculties (*atīkṣnendriya*), it is said that there is no ātman; for beings of sharp faculties (*tīkṣnendriya*) and deep wisdom (*gambhīraprajñā*), it is said that dharmas are empty from beginning to end. Why? Because anātman involves the rejection of dharmas. Thus it is said:

If he knows anātman well,

Every person who thinks in this way

Does not rejoice on hearing about existent dharmas,

Does not grieve on hearing about nonexistent dharmas.

Actually, to speak about ātman is to give support (āśraya) to things; to speak about anātman is to stop any support.

- 4) Moreover, the Buddhist doctrine has two ways of expressing itself: i) if it speaks clearly, it says that dharmas are empty; ii) if it expresses itself as skillful means ( $up\bar{a}ya$ ), it says that there is no  $\bar{a}$ tman. These two ways of teaching the Dharma end up in the same nature of Prajñāpāramitā. This is why the Buddha says in the sūtra: "The paths ( $m\bar{a}rga$ ) that lead to nirvāṇa are absolutely identical: it is not that there are different paths." 851
- 5) Moreover, the existent ātman, existent dharmas, parents, wrongdoings (āpatti) and merit (punya), greater or lesser karmic retribution, are spoken of particularly to lay people (gṛhastha). Why? Because lay people generally do not seek nirvāṇa but cling to retribution of actions (phalavipāka) in future existences. On the other hand, the nonexistent ātman and non-existent dharmas are spoken of mainly to monastics (pravrajita). Why? Because generally monastics tend toward nirvāṇa, do not assume dharmas, nirvāṇa being the destruction of self.
- 6) Moreover, there are people whose spiritual faculties, faith, etc. (śraddhādīndriya) are not yet ripe (paripakva) and who first seek perceptible [benefits] and later abandon them. For these people the Buddha advises [the accumulation] of good dharmas and the rejection of bad dharmas. By contrast, there are people whose spiritual faculties, faith, etc. (śraddhādīndriya) are already ripe (paripakva) and who seek no perceptible [benefit] (upalabdha) in dharmas; they seek only to avoid the saṃsāric destinies. For these people the Buddha teaches emptiness (śūnyatā) and the non-existence (anupalabhdhitā) of dharmas.

Both teachings are true (*satya*). Thus the ring finger (*anguli*) is both long (*dīrgha*) and short (*hrasva*); compared to the middle finger (*madhyamā*), it is short and compared to the little finger (*kaniṣṭhā*), it is long; its longness and its shortness are both true. It is the same for the doctrine of existence (*astitvāvāda*) and the doctrine of non-existence (*nāstitāvāda*). To speak of existence is sometimes conventional (*samvrti*) and sometimes absolute (*paramārtha*); to speak of non-existence is sometimes conventional and sometimes absolute. That the Buddha [254b] speaks of ātman or of anātman, both are true.

Question. – If both these things are true, why, as a general rule, does the Buddha praise emptiness ( $\dot{sunyata}$ ) and criticize existence ( $astit\bar{a}$ )?

Answer. – Emptiness ( $\dot{sunyata}$ ), non-existence ( $anupalabdhit\bar{a}$ ) is the treasure of the Dharma ( $dharmanidh\bar{a}na$ ) of the Buddhas of the ten directions, noble amongst all. Thus it is said in the

1381

<sup>851</sup> For this idea, see Saddharmapuṇḍ., p. 40: Ekam evāham Śāriputra yānam ārabhya sattvānām dharmam deśayāmi yadidam buddhayānam. na kimcic Śāriputra dvitīyam vā tṛtīyam samvidyate.

Prajñāpāramitā, in the *Tchou-lei-p'in* (Parīndanāparivarta): "The Prajñāpāramitā is the treasure of the Dharma of the Buddhas of the three times and the ten directions." 852

The Prajñāpāramitā is the emptiness of non-existence (*anupalambhaśūnyatā*). If the Buddha sometimes speaks of non-existent dharmas, it is in order to ripen beings (*sattvaparipācanārtham*) who, long afterwards, will all enter into the treasure of the Dharma of non-existence.

Question. – If that is so, why does the *Prajñāpāramitā* say: "Seeing the emptiness (śūnyatā), the non-existence (anupalabdhitā) of the five aggregates (pañcaskandha) is not bodhi"?

Answer. - It is said in the Prajñāpāramitā that existence and non-existence do not exist.

[Dīrghanakhasūtra.]<sup>853</sup> – Similarly the *Tch'ang-tchao fan-tche king* (Dīrghanakha-brahmacārisūtra) says:

There are three kinds of wrong view: *i*) everything exists; *ii*) nothing exists, *iii*) things are partly existent ane partly non-existent.<sup>854</sup>

The Buddha said to the brahmacārin Dīrghanakha: The view that 'everything exists' is tied to desire, aversion and ignorance (*moha*). The view that 'nothing exists' is not tied to desire, or aversion, or ignorance. The view that 'things partly exist and partly do not exist' is partially tied and partially not tied to the aforementioned faults.<sup>855</sup>

Faced with these three views, the noble disciple has the following thought: "If I adopt the view that'everything exists', I will be in debate with two people: the one for whom nothing exists and the other for whom things partly exist and partly do not exist. If I adopt the view that 'nothing exists', I will also be in debate with two people: the one for whom nothing exists and the other for whom things partly exist and partly do not exist. If I adopt the view that 'things partly exist and partly do not exist', I will be in debate with two people: the one for whom everything exists and the other for whom nothing exists." 856

From that arises conflict, from conflict arises disagreement, from disagreement arises violence. Foreseeing conflict, disagreement and violence for himself, the disciples gives up this view of non-existence and adopt no other view.<sup>857</sup> Not taking up any view, he enters into the path.

Pañcaviṃśati, T 223, k. 20, p. 363b4: Ānanda, these six pāramitās are the inexhaustible treasure of the Dharma of all the Buddhas. The Buddhas of the ten directions who presently preach the Dharma are all derived from the six pāramitās. The same in the past and the future.

An extract from the *Dīghanakhasutta* of the Majjhima, I, p. 497-501 (cf. Tsa a han, T 99, no. 969, k. 34, p. 249a-250a; Pie yi tsa a han, T 100, no. 203, k. 11, p. 449a-b), the original Sanskrit of which is reproduced partially in the Avadānaśataka, II, p. 187 seq.

<sup>854</sup> Avadānaśataka, II, p. 188.

<sup>855</sup> Ibid., p. 188-189.

<sup>856</sup> Ibid., p. 189-190.

<sup>857</sup> Ibid., p. 190

If one does not cling to the emptiness of dharmas, the mind does not arouse debate ( $viv\bar{a}da$ ) and merely drives out the fetters (samyojana): this is true knowledge. But if one grasps ( $udgrhn\bar{a}ti$ ) the empty nature ( $s\bar{u}nyanimitta$ ) of dharmas, one provokes debate and one does not destroy the fetters; holding on to that wisdom is not true wisdom.

Everything that the Buddha says is aimed at saving beings; that is why there is not a single one of them that is not true. According to whether people cling *(abhiniviśante)* or do not cling to them to them, they are sometimes in the right and sometimes in the wrong. For all these reasons, the bodily, vocal or mental actions of the Buddha are 'preceded by knowledge' *(jñānapūrvaṃgama)* and 'accompany knowledge' *(jñānānuparivartin)*.

\*\*\* \*\*\* \*\*\*

Question. – You said at the beginning that the Buddha has neither physical defect nor vocal defect nor mental defect (cf. āveṇikadharmas no. 1-3), and here [254c] you say again that his bodily, vocal and mental actions accompany knowledge (cf. āveṇikadharmas no. 13-15). What is the difference in meaning (arthaviśeṣa)?

Answer. – The first three attributes in terms of which the Buddha has no defect did not give a reason. These do give the reason: because his actions accompany knowledge (jñānānuparivartin). If the Buddha did not reflect before carrying out his bodily, vocal or mental actions, he would make mistakes, but since the Buddha first uses knowledge before carrying out his bodily, vocal or mental actions, he is faultless.

Furthermore, the Buddha is endowed with three kinds of pure action (*pariśuddhakarman*), three kinds of pacified actions (*praśantakarma*), three kinds of actions not requiring secrecy (*ārakṣyakarman*). Some people wonder why the Buddha has such actions and this is why the Buddha says: "All my bodily, vocal and mental acts (*kāyavāgmanaskarman*) are preceded by knowledge (*jñānapūrvaṃgama*) and accompany knowledge (*jñānānuparivartin*)."

#### 16-18. The Buddha penetrates the past, the future and the present

The Buddha knows the past  $(at\bar{\imath}ta)$ , the future  $(an\bar{a}gata)$  and the present (pratyutpanna) by means of his knowledge, and his penetration is without obstacle (apratihata).

-

The physical, vocal and mental conduct of the Buddha being perfectly pure, he has no bodily, vocal or mental misdeeds to be hidden for fear that somebody should find it out: these are the three or four arakkheyya (ārakkheyya) in Pāli (Dīgha, III, p. 217;Anguttara, IV, p. 82-84), the arakṣya (arakṣana, arakṣanīya, ārakṣya, ārakṣana) in Sanskrit: Mahāvyut., no. 192-195; Bodh, bhūmi, p. 403; Sūtrālaṃkāra, XXI, v. 53; Saṃgraha, p. 287, 299; Abhidharmasamuccayavyākhyā, T 1606, k. 14, p. 761b14; Āloka, p. 915.

His threefold knowledge bears upon the three times and his penetration is without obstacles because his three actions accompany knowledge. 859

#### A. Sarvāstivādin-Sautrāntika Debate on Time

859 The author of the *Traité* finds himself in a difficult position in regard to the problem of the three times, and he must use all his subtlety to get out of it with honor.

On the one hand, he has adopted the Mahāyāna list of the eighteen *āveṇikadharmas*. But in this list, numbers 16-18 say that the Buddha knows and penetrates unobstructedly the past, present and future. If he knows them, it is because they exist. Thus the author is forced to accept the existence of the three times.

On the other hand, the author is a Mādhyamikan for whom time does not exist either as an immutable entity or in dependence on causes. Thus the author is forced to deny the existence of the three times.

Here is how the author will proceed:

1) Well before his period, the problem of time had been discussed by the great Hīnayāna schools and a controversy had opposed the Sarvāstivādin-Vaibhāṣikas to the Sautrāntlkas, a debate fully set forth in the Vibhāṣā, the Abhidharmakośa and the Nyāyānusāra, wisely translated and commented on by L. de La Vallée Poussin in his translation of the Kośa, V, p. 50-65 and in his article entitled *Documents d'Abhidharma*, MCB, V, 1936-37, p. 7-158.

The Sarvāstivādins affirmed the existence of the dharmas of the three times "because the Bhagavat said so, because the mental consciousness proceeds from the organ and the object, because it has an object and because the past bears a fruit." The Sautrāntikas criticized it "because if past and future things really existed, the dharmas coming from causes (*saṃskṛta*) would always exist and would therefore be eternal. Now scripture and logic proclaim them to be impermanent."

Brought at this point to intervene in the debate, the author of the *Traité* comes out on the side of the Sarvāstivādins and recognizes the existence of the three times. The result is that the list of the Mahāyāna *āveṇikadharmas* can legitimately claim that the Buddha knows the past, the future and the present.

2) By means of s second procedure and by referring particularly to the Prajñāpāramitāsūtras, the *Traité* claims that all dharmas, no matter to which category they belong, "have but a single nature, namely, the absence of absence." Therefore it is absurd to attribute temporal characteristics to them.

By denying now that which it previously asserted, the *Traité* is not contradicting itself in any way. When it recognizes temporal or other characteristics in dharmas, it is out of regard for the beings who are to be converted by certain considerations of temporal order. By refusing any characteristic to dharmas, it is referring simply to the universal and ungraspable emptiness ( $anupalambhaśūnyat\bar{a}$ ). In the first case and with the example of the Buddha, it is using skillful means ( $up\bar{a}ya$ ); in the second case, it is restricted to wisdom ( $praj\tilde{n}a$ ).

[The Sautrāntikan.] – Past dharmas, already destroyed, no longer exist; future dharmas, not yet come, are not formed; the present which lasts but an instant (*ekakṣaṇika*) has no period of duration (*sthitikāla*). Then how can the Buddha know the three times with an unhindered penetration?

[The Sarvāstivādin]. – The Buddha affirms unobstructed penetration of the past, the future and the present. How can his word be wrong?

Moreover, if there were no past or future and if there was only an instant of the present, the Buddha would never realize his innumerable qualities (*apramānguna*) such as the ten knowledges (*daśajñāna*) or the ten [powers (*daśabala*). There cannot be ten simultaneous knowledges in one single mind. If that were the case, the Buddha would never fulfill the ten powers. This is how we know that there is a past and a future.

[The Sautrāntika]. – If the past, the future and the present existed, what could there not be? But the Buddha preached the four truths (*catuhsatya*) and, in the truth of suffering (*duhkhasatya*), he saw the aspects of impermanence, etc. (*anityādyākāra*). Impermanence (*anityatā*) is death after birth, ruin (*viparināma*), vanishing (*anupalabdhi*). If past dharmas existed actually in truth, there would no longer be impermanence, ruin, vanishing.

Moreover, [to claim] that the past, future and present exist is to fall into eternalism ( $\dot{sas}$  vatadṛṣṭi). Why? If the dharma exists in the future, it necessarily exists in the present and from the present it goes into the past. If a man were to leave one house to enter another, we would not say that he has disappeared.

[The Sarvāstivādin]. – What is wrong in saying that he has not disappeared?

[The Sautrāntika]. – If there were no impermanence (*anityatā*), there would be neither sin (*āpatti*) nor merit (*punya*), neither birth (*jāti*) nor death (*maraṇa*), neither bondage (*bandhana*) nor liberation (*mokṣa*).

Sins (āpatti) are the ten bad paths of action (daśākuśalakarmapatha), killing (prāṇātipāta), etc. If there were no impermanence [in other woreds, if the victim of the killing were eternal], there would be no sin of killing, etc., and, as is said in the Fen-pie-sie-kien (Mithyādṛṣṭīvibhaṅga): "A knife driven into the body and impaling the seven places would do no harm."

Merits (puṇya) are the ten good paths of action (daśakuśalakarmapatha), abstaining from killing (prāṇātipātavirati), etc.

Impermanence (*anityatā*) is the distinct births and deaths. If there were no [255a] impermanence, there would be neither birth nor death, there would be neither bondage (*bandhana*) nor deliverance (*mokṣa*). These are the innumerable errors (*apramāṇadoṣa*) [resulting from the eternalist system].

[The Sarvāstivādin]. – The dharmas of the three times each have their own characteristic (*lakṣaṇa*): the past dharma has the characteristic of the past, the future dharma has the characteristic of the future, the present dharma has the characteristic of the present. If the past and the future had the characteristic of the present, there would be the difficulties [that you have raised], but here past, future and present each have their own characteristic.

Furthermore, if there really was neither past nor future, the condition of being a monastic (pravrajitasamvara) would not exist either. Why? As soon as he would be in a bad state of mind

(duṣṭacitta) and would break his earlier commitments (śīla), this monk would no longer be a bhikṣu. And as soon as a saint (āryapudgala) would return in mind to worldly things (lokasaṃvṛti), he would be just an ordinary person (pṛthagjana) since, [according to your hypothesis], there is neither past nor future nor present.

In the same way, sins (āpatti) also, beginning with the five ānantarya 'sins of immediate retribution', would not exist. Why? It is necessary for the five ānantaryas to be actions already past (atītakarman) and for their doer to be dead, for the latter to enter into hell (naraka). Now if these five ānantaryas are still to come (anāgata), there is no action (karman) and, as a result, no retribution (vipāka); and, in the present existence (pratyutpannātmabhāva), they are not 'of immediate retribution' [since the death of their perpetrator has not yet occurred]. Therefore, if the past did not exist, there would be no ānantarya sins and, still less, any other sins. The same reasoning holds for merits (puṇya). 860 To deny the existence of sin and of merit is a bad view (mithyādṛṣṭi) and those who hold it are no different from birds and beasts.

Moreover, I do not say that past and future exist like the present. I say that the past, although vanished, is capable of producing a memory (*smṛti*) and of giving birth to a mind (*citta*) and mental events (*caitasikadharma*).

Thus, the fire that was extinguished yesterday can today give rise to a memory, but it is impossible that this fire be revived by virtue of this memory. If I see that someone is gathering kindling (*indhana*), I know that they will light the fire and I say to myself that today's fire is like yesterday's fire, but it is not possible for the fire to be re-kindled by virtue of this memory that I have of the fire. It is the same for that which is things of the future. Although the present mind (*pratyutpannacitta*) is instantaneous (*kṣanika*) and without duration (*asthitika*), it re-arises in series (*saṃtāna*) and is able to recognize dharmas. Inwardly (*adhyātmam*) using the actual mind (*manas*) as cause (*hetu*) and outwardly (using the dharmas as object (*ālambana*), a mental consciousness (*manovijñāna*) takes up its job. 861 This mental consciousness, which is

\_

Kośabhāṣya, p. 295, summarizes the debate thus: Yadi cātītaṃ na syāt śubhāśubhasya karmaṇaḥ phalam āyatyām kathaṃ syāt. na hi phalotpattikāle vartamāno vipākahetur astīti, tasmād asty evātitānāgatam iti Vaibhāṣikāḥ. — "If the past does not exist, how would the retribution in the future of a good or bad action exist? Actually, at the moment when the fruit of retribution is produced, the cause of the retribution is no longer present. This is why the Vaibhāṣikas say that the past and the future exist." Kośabhāṣya, p. 295, presents the argument thus: Dvayaṃ pratītya vijñānasyotpāda ity uktam. dvayaṃ katamat. cakṣū rūpaṇi yāvan mano dharmā iti. asati vātītānmagate tadālambanam vijñānaṃ dvayaṃ pratītya na syāt. - Paraphrased translation: It is said by the Buddha (Saṃyutta, II, p. 72) that it is because of two things, [organ and object], that consciousnesses arise. What are these two things? The eye and colors for the eye consciousness, and so on up to: the mind (manas) and things (dharma) for the mental consciousness (manovijñāna). If past and future things did not exist, the mental consciousness, which has them as object and which arises as a result of two things — as the Buddha has it — would not arise.

sovereign (*adhipati*), cognizes (*vijānāti*) past, future and present dharmas. There is only the mind and the actual mental (*pratyutpanna*) events that it does not cognize; 862 it cognizes all the rest.

#### B. The Non-existence of Time According to the Mahāyāna

Question. – In the Prajñāpāramitā, in the *Jou-siang p'in* (Tathātālakṣaṇaparivarta), it is said: "The three times (*tryadhvan*) have but a single nature (*ekalakṣaṇa*), namely, the absence of nature (*alakṣaṇa*)."863 Then why is it said here that the Buddha's knowledge knows the tjhree times with an unhindered penetration?

Answer. – The Buddhas have two ways of preaching the Dharma (*dharmanirdeśa*): *i*) first, analysis of the dharmas (*dharmavibhanga*); *ii*) then, the preaching of unlimited emptiness (*atyantaśūnyatā*).<sup>864</sup>

When the Buddha claims that he penetrates dharmas of the three times without any obstacle, this is an analytical teaching (*vibhajya nirdeśa*). When he says that the three times have but a single nature, namely, the absence of nature, he is teaching unlimited emptiness (*atyantaśūnyatā*).

Moreover, those who are not omniscient (sarvajñā) come up against obstacles (pratigha) in the consciousness of the three times. Thus saints such as [255b] Avalokiteśvara, Mañjuśrī, Maitreya, Śāriputra, etc., have all encountered obstacles in the consciousness of the three times.

Therefore when it is said that the Buddha cognizes the three times with an unhindered penetration, we are not referring to emptiness [but simply to the analysis of dharmas].

Finally, there are people who produce wrong views (*mithyadṛṣṭi*) in regard to the three times and who say: "Past (*atīta*) dharmas and beings (*sattva*) have a beginning (*pūrvānta*), do not have a beginning, etc."

If they have a beginning, then there are new beings, and the dharmas also arise without cause or condition (hetupratyaya).865

<sup>862</sup> For the Sarvāstivādin, the present mind does not cognize itself: it is the manas that is just past that is cognized by the immediately following *manovijñāna*; cf. Kośa, I, p. 31; IX, p. 231 and note.

In agreement with the other Prajñāpāramitāsūtras, the Pañcaviṃśati speaks of the *adhvaśūnyatā* 'emptiness of time', excluding any beginning (*pūrvānta*), any end (*āparānta*) and any present (p. 49, 1. 5-19): it proclaims the *tryadhvasamatā* 'the identity of the three times' (p. 242, 1. 6, 10, 19) and concludes from it that all dharmas are without characteristics: *Sarva ete dharmā na saṃyuktā ni visaṃyuktā arūpino 'nidarśanā apratighā ekalaksanā vadutālaksanāh*.

<sup>864</sup> The ninth of the eighteen emptinesses. The Pañcavimśati, p. 196, l. 17-18, defines it thus: *Tatra katamātyantaśūnyatā. yasya anto nopalabhyate tad atyantam atyantena śūnyam akūṭasthāvināśitām upādāya. tat kasya hetoḥ. prakṛtir asya eṣā.* Kumārajīva translates (T 223, k. 5, p. 250c2-4): What is *atyantaśūnyatā*? *Atyanta* means that the limit of dharmas is ungraspable because they are neither eternal (*akūṭasthā*) nor destroyed (*avināśita*). Why? Because that is their nature.

If they do not have a beginning (*pūrvānta*), neither do they have an end (*aparānta*), they have neither end nor middle (*madhyānta*). Or else not having a beginning means having a middle and having an end; not having an end means having a beginning and a middle; not having a middle means having a beginning and an end.

But if beings (*sattva*) and things (*dharma*) are without beginning, they are also without middle and without end and, since the three times (*tryadhvan*) do not exist, there is nothing (*akimcid*). 866

Furthermore, if there is no beginning, how can there be this Omniscient One (sarvajñā) who, in order to destroy all these wrong views, declares that "the dharmas of the three times (tryadvadharma) have but a single nature (ekalakṣaṇa), namely, the absence of nature (alakṣaṇa)" and who, in order not to destroy the threefold time, declares that "the Buddha knows it"?

Question. – But absence of nature (alakṣaṇa) is has limits (antavat)!

Answer. – No. Absence of nature is limitless (ananta), inexpressible (anabhilāpya) and unquestionable. Why do you say it is limited? If one grasps characteristics in the absence of characteristics, this would no longer be an absence of characteristics (yady alakṣaṇe nimittāny udgṛhṇīyād alakṣaṇaṃ na syāt). By absence of nature we mean the ungraspable emptiness (anupalambhaśūnyatā). Here, absence of nature is ungraspable and emptiness itself is ungraspable. This is why absence of characteristics is called ungraspable emptiness.

Furthermore, the Buddha has two kinds of paths (pratipad):867

- 1. The path of merit (*puṇyapratipad*), if a person, hearing about the ten powers (*bala*) of the Buddha, his four fearlessnesses (*vaiśāradya*), his four unhindered knowledges (*pratisaṃvid*) and his eighteen special attributes (*āveṇikadharma*), produces minds of veneration (*satkāra*) and faith (*prasāda*).
- 2. The path of wisdom (*prajñāpratipad*), if a person hearing that dharmas coming from the complex of causes and conditions (*hetupratyayasāmagryutpanna*) are without self-nature (*niḥsvabhāva*), abandons all these dharmas, but does not become attached in mind to emptiness.

Thus the moon (*candra*) moistens objects (*vastu*) and the sun (*sūrya*) ripens them, and thanks to this twofold action, everything prospers. The path of merit (*puṇyapratipad*) and the path of wisdom (*prajñāpratipad*) do the same: the path of merit gives rise to qualities (*guṇa*), and the path of wisdom, acting on the path of merit, expels attachment to wrong views (*mithyādṛṣṭyabhiniveśa*).

This is why, although he preaches the limitless emptiness (*atyantaśūnyatā*) of dharmas, the Buddha also speaks of his unhindered penetration of the three times; there is nothing wrong in this.

An absurd consequence, for the trnasmigration of beings has had no beginning (*anamataggāyaṃ bhikkave saṃsāro*) and conditioned dharmas by definition are the result of causes and conditions (*hetusaṃpanna*, *hetuppabhāva*, *idappaccayatāpaṭiccasamuppanna*).

<sup>866</sup> Cf. Pañcaviṃśati, p. 240: Nāsya yānasya pūrvānta upalabhyate nāparānta upalabhyate na madhya upalabhyate. tryadhvasamaṃ tad yānaṃ. tasmād mahāyānaṃ mahāyānam ity ucyate.

For this twofold path, see below, k. 29, p. 274a10.

This is a brief explanation (saṃkṣepanirdeśa) of the meaning of the eighteen special attributes of the Buddhas.

# Second Section REFUTATION OF THE SARVĀSTIVĀDIN THEORIES ON THE SPECIAL ATTRIBUTES OF THE BUDDHA

## I. REFUTATION OF THE FIRST SARVĀSTIVĀDIN LIST<sup>868</sup>

[The Sarvāstivādin]. – If that is so, why did Kātyāyanīputra give the name āveṇikadharma to the ten powers (bala), the four fearlessnesses (vaiśāradya), the great compassion (mahākārūṇā) and the three special equanimities (āveṇikasmṛtyupasthāna) of the Buddha? If the eighteen special attributes that you mentioned above, [namely, nāsti tathāgatasya skhalitam, etc.] were really true, why did Kātyāyanīputra list others?

[The Mahāyānist]. – This is why he is called Kātyāyanīputra 'son of Kātyāyanī'. If he was truly Śākyaputrīya 'son or disciple of the Buddha' [like [255c] us', he would not say that. The Śākyaputrīyas have defined the real special attributes. Moreover, the attributes of the Buddha are numberless and the 36 attributes [mentioned by us, namely, the 18 non-special attributes studied in chapters XXXIX and XL, plus the 18 special attributes studies in chapter XLI] are, amongst all the Buddha's attributes, like a drop of water (bindu) in the great ocean (mahāsamudra). The attributes of the Buddha are not rare. Why enumerate eighteen [like Kātyāyanīputra]?

Moreover, the arhats, pratyekaduddhas and bodhisattvas [share to some degree in the ten *balas* that Kātyāyanīputra reserves as special attributes of the Buddha]; they too know what is possible and what is impossible (*bala* no. 1); they reveal the retribution of action in the three times (*bala* no. 2); they distinguish the *dhyānas* and the *samāpattis* (*bala* no. 3) and they reach *āsravakṣayajñāna* (*bala* no. 10). Under these conditions, how could [Kātyāyanīputra] say that these attributes are *special* to the Buddha?

[The Sarvāstivādin]. – Yes, but the śrāvakas, pratyekabuddhas and bodhisattvas do not have 'an exhaustive knowledge, a universal knowledge' (cf. above, p. 1526-7F) of these things. They have only the cognition  $(abhij\tilde{n}a)$  and the knowing (vidya) of them, but do not have the power of knowledge  $(j\tilde{n}anabala)$  like the Buddha. Only the Buddha knows all that 'in an exhaustive manner, in a universal manner', and this is why these knowledges are 'special' to him. Therefore refer back to what has been said about the ten powers (above, p. 1556-7F).

[The Mahāyānist]. – When the Buddha explained the meaning (artha) of these ten powers, he did not emphasize his 'exhaustive and universal' knowledge of them; he simply said that he knew what is possible

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>868</sup> For this first list prepared by Kātyāyanīputra, see references above, p. 1626F.

and what is impossible (*sthānāsthāna*), etc. Those who have spoken of his 'exhaustive and univeral knowledge' are the scholars (*upadeśācarārya*).

[The Sarvāstivādin]. – I beg your pardon! As you yourself said above (p. 1557F) they are spoken of in the Mahāyāna and the Buddha, being still a bodhisattva, claimed to know all 'in an exhaustive and universal way'.

[The Mahāyānist]. – Yes, we talk about them in the Mahāyāna, but what does that matter to you? You do not belive in the Mahāyāna, you refuse the evidence and you yourself say that the śrāvaka system is the [only] valid one.

Moreover, although the Buddha has this 'exhaustive knowledge', this 'univerasal knowledge' of the ten powers, the śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas have a small portion of it. [Therefore Kātyāyanīputra is wrong in considering the ten powers (*bala*) as special attributes of the Buddha.] But śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas have absolutely no part of the eighteen special attributes [which we propose in the Mahāyānist list: *nāsti tathāgatasya skhalitam*, etc]. This is why we describe them as *truly* special attributes.

[The Sarvāstivādin]. – But the practitioners of the two Vehicles, [namely, the śrāvakas and the pratyekabuddhas] also share in the eighteen special attributes [of the Mahāyānist list: nāsti tathāgatasya skhalitam, etc.]. The Buddha alone never has bodily, vocal or mental faults (attributes no. 1 to 3 of the Mahāyānist list); but sometimes the practitioners of the two Vehicles do not have them either. Therefore they share in these attributes [and these do not belong exclusively to the Buddha].

[The Mahāyānist]. – Your objections do not hold (*ayuktam etad*). Why? What constitutes the special attribute is the fact of *never* having faults and not the fact of not having them [from time to time]. The śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas do not share the *perpetual* harmlessness of the Buddha. [Thus this perpetual harmlessness is indeed a special attribute of the Buddha.]

Furthermore, the arhats are indeed said to possess the powers in question, but nowhere do they qualify them as special attributes (āveṇika). And you who do not belive in the Mahāyāna reject the eighteen truly special attributes [proposed in our Mahāyānist list: nāsti tathāgatasya skhalitam] and you count the ten powers (bala) [in the list of attributes drawn up by your Kātyāyanīputra]. This procedure is inadmissible!

Then look at these 80 secondary physical marks (aśīty anuvyañjanāni) of the Buddha in which you believe but which are not mentioned in the Tripiṭaka. Why not reject them [since you reject the powers, etc., in your list of special attributes]?

### II. REFUTATION OF THE SECOND SARVĀSTIVĀDIN LIST

[The Sarvāstivādin]. – However, we have drawn up [a list] of eighteen special attributes where we do not count [the ten powers]. What are these eighteen?

1. The Buddha knows the true nature (bhūtalakṣaṇa) of dharmas; thus he is omniscient (sarvajñā).

- 2. The nature of the qualities (guna) of the Buddha is difficult to probe  $(durvig\bar{a}hya)$ : thus his qualities are immense.
- 3. Animated by a lofty aspiration (*adyāśaya*), he thinks of others lovingly: thus he is greatly compassionate (*mahākarunika*).
- 4. He has acquired incomparable knowledges (asamajñāna): thus he has mastery in knowledge (jñānavaśita).
- 5. He penetrates well the nature of the mind (*cittalakṣaṇa*): thus he has mastery of concentration (*samādhivaśita*).
- 6. He has found the means  $(up\bar{a}ya)$  of saving beings: thus he has mastery in metamorphosis  $(nirm\bar{a}nava\acute{s}ita)$ .
- 7. He knows well the causes and conditions (*hetupratyaya*) of dharmas: [256a] thus his teaching (*vvākarana*) is immense.
- 8. He preaches the true nature (bhūtalakṣaṇa) of dharmas: thus his teaching is not wrong.
- 9. He speaks by distinguishing (vibhajya) and evaluating ( $mitv\bar{a}$ ): thus he has no vocal fault ( $n\bar{a}stitath\bar{a}gatasya\ ravitam$ ). 869
- 10. He has attained the perfection of the ten powers (*daśabalasampad*): thus he has no loss of wisdom (*prajñāparihāṇi*).<sup>870</sup>
- 11. In every conditioned dharma (*saṃskṛtadharma*) he sees only a mass of things (*dharmasaṃcaya*) and non-self (*anātman*): thus his actions are always generous.
- 13. Knowing the favorable occasion ( $k\bar{a}la$ ) and the unfavorable occasion (vikala), he has established the threefold Vehicle ( $y\bar{a}natraya$ ) for he always sees beings.
- 14. He is always mindful (sadāsmṛtimat): thus he has no lapses (muusitasmṛtitā). 871
- 14. For innumerable incalculable periods (*asamkhyeyakalpa*) he has deepened the good minds (*kuśalacitta*): thus he is free of traces of the disturbing emotions (*kleśavāsana*).
- 15. He has attained perfectly pure knowledge (*pariśuddhajñāna*): thus there is nobody who can legitimately (*saha dharmeṇa*) find any faults in him.<sup>872</sup>
- 16. From lifetime to lifetime, he has venerated honorable individuals: thus the top of his head is invisible (anavalokitamūrdhatā).<sup>873</sup>

<sup>869</sup> This is the 2<sup>nd</sup> attribute in the Mahāyānist list.

<sup>870~</sup> This is the  $10^{\text{th}}$  attribute in the Mahāyānist list.

This is the 3<sup>rd</sup> attribute in the Mahāyānist list.

This is equivalent to introducing the four *vaiśāradyas* into the list of special attributes.

This is the first of the 80 *anuvyañjanas* according to the list drawn up by the Prajñāpāramitāsūtras: see above, p. 1346F.

17. He cultivates the mind of great loving-kindness (mahāmaitrī) and great compassion (mahākaruṇā): thus he brings down his feet quietly, the soles of his feet are soft and delicate (mrdutarunapādatala)<sup>874</sup> and beings who meet him find happiness.

18. He has acquired the supernatural powers (abhij $\tilde{n}\tilde{a}$ ) and the perfections ( $p\tilde{a}ramit\tilde{a}$ ): thus he transforms the minds of beings and leads them to rejoice and find salvation. When he enters a city, he manifests the power of his transformations (vikurvanabala).

[The Mahāyānist]. - These eighteen special attributes [proposed in your list] are not mentioned in the Tripitaka and even less so in other sūtras. As some people are on the lookout for the attributes of the Buddha, the śrāvakas and the scholars (upadeśācārya) gather a few from everywhere to celebrate the qualities (guna) of the Buddha.

Thus the absence of vocal fault (nāsti tathāgatasya ravitam), the non-loss of wisdom (nāsti prajñāparihānih) and the absence of memory lapses (nāsti musitasmrtitā) [mentioned in no. 9, 10 and 13 of your list] are borrowed from the eighteen special dharmas of Mahāyānist origin [no. 2, 10, and 3 of our list], and having chosen them, you comment on them.

The invisible top of the head (anavalokitamūrdhatā) and the soft and delicate soles of the feet (mrdutarunapādatala) [mentioned in no. 16 and 17 of your list] are very frequent marks<sup>875</sup> and cannot be counted among the eighteen special attributes of the Buddha.

The [real] special attributes have knowledge (jñāna) as essence and there can be no question there either of the physical strength (kāyabala) of the Buddha – a strength comparable to that of ten myriads of perfumed white elephants (śvetagandhajastin)<sup>876</sup> – or of the strength of his supernatural powers (abhijñābala). This is why we must know that, in the eighteen special attributes, it is only a matter of the qualities of knowledge (jñānaguna) and not attributes consisting of the automatic fruits of retribution (vipākaphala).877

# Third Section CLASSIFICATION AND DISTRIBUTION OF THE EIGHTEEN SPECIAL ATTRIBUTES OF THE BUDDHA RECORDED IN THE MAHĀYĀNIST LIST

This is the 6<sup>th</sup> of the 32 *laksanas* according to the list prepared by the Prajñāpāramitāsūtras above, p. 274F

The 32 physical marks (*laksana*) in their entirety or partially, were possessed by others than the Buddha: see above, p. 285-286F and notes.

<sup>876</sup> See above, p. 1348F.

Normally the laksanas are the reward for 'actions productive of the 32 marka' (dvātrimśallakṣaṇakarman) accomplished by the Bodhisattva during the hundred kalpas following the three asamkhyeyakalpas of his career: see above, p. 246-255F.

- 1. According to the *A-p'i-t'an-fen-pie* (Abhidharmavibhanga), the eighteen special attributes [of the Mahāyāna list] are included (saṃgṛhīta) in the five aggregates (skandha):
- a. The absence of physical fault (no. 1) and of vocal fault (no. 2), the physical action accompanying knowledge (no. 13) and the vocal action accompanying knowledge (no. 14) are included in the aggregae of form ( $r\bar{u}paskandha$ ).
- b. The absence of the concept of variety (no. 4) is included in the aggregate of concept (samjñāskandha).
- c. The absence of non-concentrated mind (no. 5) is included in the aggregate of consciousness (vijñānaskandha).
- d. The other attributes are included in the aggregate of volition (samskāraskandha).
- 2. All the attributes are in the fourth *dhyāna* for it is in the fourth *dhyāna* that the Buddha attained enlightenment (*saṃbodhi*) and attained nirvāṇa.
- 3. Some say that the four material special attributes (no. 1, 2, 13, 14) are included in the desire realm  $(k\bar{a}madh\bar{a}tu)$  and the form realm  $(r\bar{u}padh\bar{a}tu)$  and that the other attributes are included in the nine levels  $[r\bar{u}padh\bar{a}tu, 4 dhy\bar{a}nas, 4 sam\bar{a}pattis]$ .
- 4. All the attributes are good (kuśala) and are pure dharmas (anāsravadharma).
- 5. The four material dharmas (no. 1, 2, 13, 14) are the result of two conditions (*pratyaya*): the causal condition (*hetupratyaya*) and the goverining condition (*adhipatipratyaya*). The other attributes are the result of four conditions [by adding to the previoue two the immediately preceding condition (*samanantarapratyaya*) and the object condition (*ālambanapratyaya*).
- 6. Four attributes (no. 1, 2, 13, 14) are without object (anālabana); the other four have an object (sālambana).
- 7. Four attributes are accompaniments to mind (*cittānuparivartin*) but are non-associated with mind (*na cittasamprayukta*). Thirteen attributes are associated with mind (*cittasamprayukta*) and accompany mind (*cittānuparivartin*). [256b] One attribute is non-associated with mind (*na cittasamprayukta*) and does not accompany mind (*na cittānuparivartin*).

All of this is explained in the Abhidharmavibhanga. To understand this is to penetrate into the Perfection of Wisdom (*prajñāpāramitā*) and the true nature (*bhūtalakṣaṇa*) of dharmas. All these dharmas have a single nature (*ekalakṣaṇa*), namely, the absence of nature (*alakṣaṇa*): in the mind of the Buddha, they have one characteristic, namely, pacification (*śanta*).

# CHAPTER XLII THE GREAT LOVING-KINDNESS AND THE GREAT COMPASSION OF THE BUDDHAS

#### PRELIMINARY NOTE

Loving-kindness and compassion are included in the four immeasureables (*apramāṇa*) also called *brahmāvihāras* which are abundantly commented on in the old canonical texts and have been treated in detail in Chapter XXXIII. The Prajñāpāramitā considers them to be complementary dharmas of the Buddhist path, usually practiced by the śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas and also advised for the bodhisattvas. It is recognized by all that the practice of the four immeasureables exclusively profits the practitioner who nourishes them in the state of meditation but is of no benefit to the beings who are their object. In other words, loving-kindness and compassion are purely platonic feelings the sole result of which is the purification of the mind of the one who experiences them.

The great loving-kindness (*mahāmaitri*) and great compassion (*mahākaruṇā*) of the Buddhas is quite different. These truly profit those who are taken as their object.

# I. GREAT LOVING-KINDNESS AND GREAT COMPASSION ACCORDING TO THE ŚRĀVAKAYĀNA

1. There is practically no mention of them in the Nikāyas and the Āgamas which adhere to the law of karma in all its strictness. If a being has his own actions as his sole good, his sole heritage and sole recourse, it is hard to see how the loving-kindness and compassion of the Buddhas would be of any benefit whatsoever to him.

But as always, an exception must be made for the Ekottarikāgama, a late text loaded with Mahāyānist interpolations In a sūtra which has no correspondent in Pāli (T 125, k. 32, p. 725c7-9), it comments that "the Tathāgata, endowed with great loving-kindness and great compassion, thinks with pity about beings, contemplates them all and everywhere, seeks to save those who are not yet saved, never abandons them like a loving mother for her child." Besides, in the Balasūtra (T 125, k. 31, p. 717b13-23), reviewing the characteristic strengths of beings, it states that the strength of a young boy are tears (ruṇḍa), that of women is anger (krodha), that of śramaṇas and brāhmanas patience (kṣānti), that of kings pride and inflexibility (mānastambha), that of arhats effort (vyāyāma), and finally, that of the Buddha Bhagavats mahāmaitrī and mahākaruṇā. – This latter comment does not appear in the correspondent Balasūtra of the Saṃyuktāgama (T 99, k. 26, p. 188a2-7) and of the Anguttaranikāya (IV, p. 223).

The Paţisambhidāmagga (I, p. 126-131), which is part of the fifth Nikāya, lists no less than 82 miseries of human society (*lokasannivāsa*), miseries provoking the great compassion of the Buddha with regard to beings, but it does not mention the practical effects of this great compassion.

2. The late Vinayas, such as that of the Mūlasarvāstivādins, and the post-canonical literature show the evidence of a growing interest in regard to these two attributes of the Buddha. In three places in the Divyāvadāna (p. 95-96, 124-125, 264-265) and in fourteen places in the Avadānāśataka (I, p. 16-17; 30-31; 72-73. etc), there is a stock phrase in honor of these great compassionate ones (mahākaruṇika) who are the Buddha Bhagavats, endowed with all the qualities and who, three times during the night and three times during the day, i.e., six times in a day and night, look at the world with their Buddha-eye (trī rātre trirdivasasya ṣatkṛtvo rātrindivasena buddhacakṣuṣā lokam vyavalokayanti) and ask themselves: In whom should I plant seeds of good not yet planted (kasyānavaripitāni kuśalamūlāny avaropayāmi), in whom should I make the roots of good grow that are already planted (kasyāvaropitāni kuśalamūlāni vivardhayāmi), etc?

This classic stock phrase is often followed by stanzas where it says that the Buddha never loses the opportunity of converting beings, watching over them and protecting them with the care of a loving mother for her only son, looks for them like a 'cow of compassion' seeking her calves that are in danger. See for example, Divyāvadāna, p. 96.

- 3. Faced with the almost complete silence of the Pāli Abhidhamma, it was the task of Kātyāyanīputra and his disciples to fix the position of the Sarvāstivādin-Vaibhāṣika school in regard to the great compassion of the Buddhas and to note the similarities and differences in the *karuṇā* practiced during the course of the four *apramāṇas* and the *mahākaruṇā* reserved for the Buddhas and great bodhisattvas. The explanation is practically identical in the Mahāvibhāṣā (T 1545, k. 31, p. 159b13-160b18; k. 83, p. 428a5-431b3), the Kośa (VII, p. 77-79) and the Kośabhāṣya (p. 414-415), the Nyāyānusāra (T 1562, k. 75, p. 749b7-29) and the Kārikāvibhāṣā (T 1563, k. 36, p. 957b13-c7).
- a. Karuṇā and mahākaruṇā are by nature conventional knowledge (saṃvṭijñāna), therefore impure (sāṣrava), because they concern beings conventionally and not really existing.
- b. Mahākaruṇā is 'great' for five reasons: i) by its accessories (saṃbhāra) for it is produced by a great accumulation of merit and knowledge (mahāpuṇyajñānasaṃbharasamudāgamāt); ii) by its aspect (ākāra) for it considers things under the aspect of the three sufferings (triduḥḥkhatākaravāt), namely, the suffering of suffering (duḥkhaduḥkhatā), the suffering of existence (saṃskāraduḥihatā) and the suffering of change (pariṇāmaduḥkahatā); iii) by its object (ālambana) for it has as object the beings of the threefold world (traidhātukālambanāt); iv) by its equality (samatava) for it concerns all beings equally; v) by its superiority (adhimātratva) for no other compassion is superior to it.
- c.  $Karun\bar{a}$  and  $mah\bar{a}karun\bar{a}$  differ in their nature  $(svabh\bar{a}va)$ , their aspect  $(\bar{a}k\bar{a}ra)$ , their object  $(\bar{a}lambana)$ , the level  $(bh\bar{u}mi)$  on which they are noticed, the mental series  $(samt\bar{a}na)$  in which they dwell, their mode of acquisition  $(l\bar{a}bha)$ , the protection  $(paritr\bar{a}na)$  which they exert or do not exert, and finally, the extent to which their impartiality (tulyatva) is extended.

Karunā is the absence of hatred (advesa); mahākarunā is the absence of delusion (amoha).

Karuṇā takes the aspect of a single suffering, namely, the suffering of suffering (duḥikhaduḥkhatā); mahākaruṇā takes the aspect of the threefold suffering, i.e., suffering of suffering, suffering of existence (saṃskāraduḥkhatā), suffering of change (pariṇāmaduḥkhatā).

*Karuṇā* has as object the beings of the world of desire (*kāmadhātu*); *mahākaruṇā* has as object the beings of the threefold world (*traidhātuka*).

*Karuṇā* is practiced in the anāgamya, the dhyānāntara and the four dhyānas; *mahākaruṇa* is practiced in the fourth dhyāna alone.

*Karuṇā* dwells in the mental series of pṛṭhagjanas, śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas; *mahākaruṇā* arises only in the mental series of Buddhas.

*Karuṇā* is obtained by detachment from the desire realm (*kāmadhātu*); *mahākaruṇā* by detachment from the threefold world including the sphere of bhavāgra.

*Karuṇā*, the simple feeling of pity, does not protect beings; *mahākaruṇā* is an efficacious compassion and protects beings from the terror of saṃsāra.

*Karuṇā* is a partial pity that sympathizes only with suffering beings; *mahākaruṇā* extends impartially to all beings impartially.

d. Why does the Buddha speak only of *great* compassion whereas he does not mention *great* loving-kindness, *great* joy, *great* equanimity? These should also be described as great because all the qualities (*guṇa*) present in the Buddha are great since they come from the wish to assure the benefit and happiness of innumerable beings...Besides, there are sutras where great loving-kindness, etc., is spoken of.

# II. GREAT LOVING-KINDNESS AND GREAT COMPASSION ACCORDING TO THE MAHĀYĀNA

Taken separately or together, the *mahāmaitrī* and *mahākaruṇā* of the Buddha literally invade the Mahāyāna sūtras where they appear on almost every page. It will suffice here to refer to the citations collected by Śāntideva in his Śikṣāsamuccaya, p. 286-290.

In their way of dealing with the subject, the śāstras of the Greater Vehicle are evidently inspired by the Sarvāstivādin masters mentioned above: see, e.g., the Abhidharmasamuccayavyākhyā, T 1606, k. 14, -p. 761c1-4, the Bodh. bhūmi, p. 247-248, and above all, the Upanibandhana on the Samgraha, p. 301-302 as note. The Two Vehicles agree on an essential point: the lesser *karuṇā* practiced in the course of the *apramānas* is of no use to beings, whereas the *mahākaruṇā* of the Buddhas and bodhisattvas is an efficacious skillful means.

There are, however, important points on the subject of which the Hināyāna and Mahāyāna scholars disagree:

- 1) The Mahāyānists did not know or, in any case, did not retain the 82 miseries of human society given by the Paṭisambhidā (I, p. 126-131) as bringing forth the great compassion of the Buddhas. In their place, they have a list of 32 *Tathāgatasya mahākaruṇāḥ* drawn up by the Brahmaviśeṣacintiparipṛcchā (T 585, k. 1, p. 9b23-10a16; T 586, k. 2, p. 41c6-42a25; T 587, k. 2, p. 72b26-73b9) and reproduced in the Mahāvyut., no. 154-186.
- 2) In contrast to the Sarvāstivādins, they do not accept that the great compassion of the Buddhas is a conventional (*saṃvṛtijñāna*) and impure (*sāṣrava*) knowledge on the pretext that it deals with non-existent beings. For the Mahāyānists, all the attributes of the Buddha are pure (*anāṣrava*).

The Sūtrālaṃkāra, p. 127 says: *Mātāpitṛprabhṛtīnāṃ hi tṛṣṇāmayaḥ snehaḥsāvadhyāḥ, laukikakaruṇāvihāriṇām niravato 'pi laukikaḥ, bodhisattvānām tu karuṇāmayāḥ sneho niravadyaś ca laukikātikrāntaś ca.* – " In the mother, the father, etc., affection, made of desire, is blameworthy; in those who dwell in worldly compassion, affection is beyond reproach, but nevertheless worldly. But among bodhisattvas, affection, made of (pure) compassion is both beyond reproach and supraworldly.

The Bodh. bhūmi, p. 247-248, says in turn: Suviśuddhā ca bhavati tadyathā niṣṭhāgatānām bodhisattvānām bodhisattvabhūmiviśuddhyā tathāgatānām ca tathāgatabhūmiviśuddhyā. — "Great compassion is also very pure as is the case among the bodhisattvas who have attained the summit and in the Tathāgatas, by virtue of their respective levels."

If the Sarvāstivādins take the great compassion and omniscience of the Buddhas to be conventional knowledges, worldly and impure, it is because they are concerned, more or less, with non-existent beings and things. But in the eyes of the Mahāyānists, the argument does not hold. Indeed, according to the Akṣayamatisūtra (see above, p. 1245F, 1272F), apart from the *mahākaruṇā* having beings and things as object, there is a *mahākaruṇā* without object (*anālambana*). It is that of the Buddhas and also of the great bodhisattvas who, beginning at the eighth bhūmi, are no longer disturbed by objects and notions: this eighth level, Acalā, is rightly called *anabhisaṃskārānābhogavihāra* or *anābhoganirmittavihāra* (cf. Sūtrālaṃkāra, p. 178; Bodh. bhūmi, p. 367; Saṃgraha, p. 202). In simple words, the great compassion of the Buddhas and bodhisattvas acts spontaneously outside of any consideration relating to beings and things. This is why it is so effective.

3) Finally, the Mahāyānists, instead of locating *mahāmaitrī* and *mahākaruṇā* in the fourth dhyāna as the Sarvāstivādins do, place it in the great samādhis of the Buddhas, the Samadhirājasamādhi and Simhavikrīditasamādhi.

These are the ideas which the *Traité* is going to develop in the following pages.

Sūtra. – [The bodhisattva-mahÔattva who wishes to cognize perfectly] great loving-kindness and great compassion must practice the Perfection of wisdom (bodhisattvena mahāsttvena mahāmaitrīṃ mahākarunām parijñātukāmena prajñāpāramitāvām śiksitavvam).<sup>878</sup>

Sāstra. –

### 1. Great loving-kindness and great compassion

Great loving-kindness (*mahāmaitrī*) and great compassion (*mahākaruṇā*) have already been explained above (p. 1242F seq.) in the chapter entitled 'The Four Immeasurables' (*caturapramaṇacitta*). Here we will repeat it briefly (*saṃkṣepeṇa*).

Great loving-kindness assures the happiness (*sukha*) of all beings; great compassion uproots the suffering (*duḥkha*) of all beings. Great loving-kindness gives beings the causes and conditions for happiness; great compassion gives beings the causes and conditions that eliminate suffering.

Suppose there is a man whose sons are in prison  $(k\bar{a}r\bar{a})$  about to undergo great torture.<sup>879</sup> If their father, with loving-kindness and compassion, uses some skillful means  $(up\bar{a}ya)$  to prevent their suffering, that is great compassion; if, having freed them from suffering, he then gives his sons the five objects of enjoyment  $(pa\tilde{n}cak\bar{a}maguna)$ , that is great loving-kindness. There are many differences of this kind.

## 2. Degrees of loving-kindness and compassion <sup>880</sup>

Question. – Great loving kindness and great compassion being so, what is lesser loving-kindness and lesser compassion?

Answer. – The loving-kindness and compassion that are part of the four immeasurables (*apramāṇacitta*) are lesser; but here the loving-kindness and compassion that are concerned in the eighteen special attributes (*āveṇikadharma*) are great.

Furthermore, the loving-kindness and compassion found in the Buddha's mind are called great: those found in the minds of other people are called lesser.

This version departs from the revised Pañcaviṃśati (ed. Dutt, p. 21, l. 4-5) where it is said that *mahāmaitrī, mahākaruṇā, mahāmuditā* and *mahopekṣā* should be cultivated by the bodhisattva.

<sup>879</sup> Adopting the variant *p'i* in place of *tsouei*.

<sup>880</sup> In this section, the *Traité* partially adopts the Sarvāstivādin views on lesser and great compassion: see above, p. 1717F.

Question. – If that is so, why is it said that the bodhisattva practices great loving-kindness and great compassion?

Answer. – The great loving-kindness of the bodhisattva is lesser compared with that of the Buddha, but compared with that of adepts of the two Vehicles [śrāvaka and pratyekabuddha], it is great. The magnitude is a question of words (*prajñapti*). <sup>881</sup> The great loving-kindness and great compassion of the Buddha are truly very great.

Furthermore, lesser loving-kindness gives happiness to beings only in theory; actually, it has no happy effect. Lesser compassion considers the various physical and mental sufferings of beings and has pity on them, but is incapable of freeing them from suffering. On the other hand, the great loving-kindness not [256c] only wishes that beings find happiness, but also assures them of happy things; and great compassion not only has pity for the suffering of beings but also frees them from sufferings. 882

Furthermore, in worldly people (*pṛthagjana*), śrāvakas, pratyekabuddhas and bodhisattvas, the loving-kindness and compassion are described as lesser, whereas in the Buddhas they attain the epithet of great.

Furthermore, great loving-kindness arises in the mind of great men (*mahāpuruṣa*), appears suddenly within the great dharmas which are the ten powers (*bala*), the four fearlessnesses (*vaiśāradya*) the four unobstructed knowledges (*pratisamvid*) and the eighteen special attributes (*āveṇikadharma*): it is able to destroy the great sufferings of the three bad destinies (*durgati*)<sup>883</sup> and can bring the three kinds of great happiness: *i*) happiness of the gods (*divyasukha*), *ii*) human happiness (*manuṣyasukha*), *iii*) the happiness of niryāna(*niryānasukha*).<sup>884</sup>

In addition, this great loving-kindness is extended to all the beings of the ten directions and three times, including insects  $(pr\bar{a}nin)$ . 885 Loving-kindness penetrates the marrow of the bones (asthimajjan) and the mind never renounces it.

Suppose that the beings of the *trisāhasramahāsāhasralokadhātu* had fallen into the three bad destinies (*durgati*) and in their place a single man underwent the sufferings of each of them; suppose that after having repaid these sufferings, this man took the happiness of the five objects of enjoyment (*pañcakāmaguṇasukha*), the happiness of the trances and absorptions (*dhyānasamāpattisukha*), the supreme happiness of this world (*laukikāgrasukha*) and distributed them liberally to beings to make up for it. Well then! This man would not reach the ten-millionth past of the loving-kindness and compassion

<sup>883</sup> The *tisso dukkhatā*, namely, *dukkhadukkhatā*, *saṃkhāradukkhgatā* and *vipariṇāmadukkhatā*: cf Dīgha, III, p. 216; Saṃyutta, IV, p. 259; V, p. 56.

<sup>881</sup> Since coarseness and subtlety, big and small, are relative notions (*parasparāpekṣika*), as has been said above (p. 729F, 1687F).

<sup>882</sup> See above, p. 1707F, 1709F.

<sup>884</sup> Cf. Commentary of the Dhammapada, III, p. 51 which also distinguishes *manussasukham*, *dibbasukham* and *paramatthabhūtaṃ nibbānasukham*.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>885</sup> In contrast to the lesser loving-kindness which bears upon only beings of Kāmadhātu

of the Buddha. Why? Because the happiness of the world is deceptive, false and does not free from samsāra.

### 3. Epithet 'great' reserved for loving-kindness and compassion

Question. - All that resides in the mind of the Buddha is great; why do you say that only his loving-kindness and compassion are great?

Answer. – All the qualities (guna) belonging to the Buddha are necessarily great.

Question. – If that is so, why do you say only that his loving-kindness and compassion are great?

Answer. – The loving-kindness and compassion are the root  $(m\bar{u}la)$  of the enlightenment (sambodhi) of the Buddhas. Why is that?

The bodhisattva sees beings tormented by all the sufferings (duḥkha): suffering of birth (jāti), old age (jarā), sickness (vyādhi) and death (maraṇa), bodily suffering (kāyika), and mental suffering (caitasika), suffering in this life and in the next life (ihaparatraduḥkha). Feeling great loving-kindness and great compassion, he comes to save beings from these sufferings, and subsequently he forms the resolution (cittam utpādayati) of seeking anuttarā samyaksambodhi. By the power of his great loving-kindness and great compassion, in the course of saṃsāra in innumerable incalculable lifetimes, his courage never sinks (cittam asya nāvalīyate). By the power of his great loving-kindness and his great compassion and although he could have attained nirvāṇa long ago, he does not give the evidence of it (na sākṣātkaroti). 886 This is why, among all the attributes of the Buddha, loving-kindness and compassion are great. If he did not have this great loving-kindness and this great compassion, he would enter nirvāṇa too soon.

Next, when he attains enlightenment, he realizes innumerable very profound concentrations (samādhi): trances (dhyāna), absorptions (samāpatti) and liberations (vimokṣa). Experiencing this pure happiness (viśuddhasukha), he abandons it and does not keep it. He goes into the villages (grāma) and the towns (nagara) and preaches the Dharma with all kinds of avadānas and nidānas. He changes his form and guides beings by an infinity of vocal sounds (ghoṣa); he endures curses, injuries, criticisms and slander on the part of beings and goes so far as to become a female musician: all that thanks to his great loving-kindness and great compassion.

Furthermore, the epithet 'great' attached to great loving-kindness and great compassion does not come from the Buddha: it is beings who describe them thus. In the same way, the lion (*simha*) that is very strong never boasts of the greatness of its strength, but all the beasts remember it. [257a]

This is what the Vijñānavādin later will call *apratiṣṭhita nirvāṇa*: cf. Sūtrālaṃkāra, p. 41, 47, 147, 171; Madhyāntavibhāga, p. 4, 108, 200.

Beings have heard speak of the many marvelous attributes of the Buddha and they know that the Buddha, in order to save beings, can accomplish austerities (*duṣkaracaryā*) for innumerable incalculable periods (*asaṃkhyeyakalpa*). Hearing and seeing such exploits, they have given the names of great loving-kindness and great compassion to these attributes.

A man who had two friends was thrown into prison  $(k\bar{a}r\bar{a})$  for some misdeed. One of his friends provided the necessities and the other died in his place. Everybody declared that the friend who died in his place was full of loving-kindness and compassion. It is the same for the Buddha who, from lifetime to lifetime has sacrificed his head (siras), eyes (nayana) marrow (majja) and skull (mastaka) for beings. Beings hearing and seeing these things in one accord have called him the great loving-kindness one and the great compassionate one.

[Śibijātaka]<sup>888</sup>. - As king *Che-p'i* (Śibi), he wanted to save a pigeon (*kapota*) by replacing his own flesh as [an equivalent] and as the piece of his flesh did not reach the weight of the pigeon, he climbed onto the balance (*tulā*) and ransomed the pigeon at the cost of his body. Then the earth shook in six ways (*pṛthivī ṣaḍvikāram akampata*), the water of the sea rose in waves and the devas offered the king perfumed flowers. Beings cried out: "He is truly a great loving-kindness one and great compassionate one to be so concerned for a little bird at this point."

The Buddha receives the epithet of great loving-kindness and great compassion from beings. There are many jātakas of the same type that could be told fully here.

#### 4. Epithet 'great' refused for the wisdom of the Buddhas

Question. – There are yet other qualities (guna) in the Buddha, such as concentration (samadhi), etc., and people do not know them, do not describe them as great. But the Buddha's wisdom (prajna), his preaching of the Dharma (dharmanirdesa), etc., make beings find the Path; why are they not called great?

Answer. – Nobody fully knows the power of the Buddha's wisdom but, in his great loving-kindness and great compassion, the Buddha, from lifetime to lifetime, sacrifices his life and abandons the bliss of the concentrations in order to save beings and this everyone knows. The Buddha's wisdom is cognizable by induction (*anumaya*), it cannot be cognized directly. But his loving-kindness and compassion are visible to the eye and audible to the ear; they are cognizable, for the Buddha has uttered his lion's roar (*simhanāda*) several times.

Furthermore, the Buddha's wisdom is subtle (*sukṣma*) and wonderful and if the bodhisattvas and Śāriputra do not know it, what can be said of other people? Loving-kindness and compassion are visible

<sup>887</sup> For this detail, see above, p. 143-144F and n.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>888</sup> Jātaka told in full above, p. 255-260F.

and audible and people can believe them and accept them. The wisdom of the Buddha is so subtle that it cannot be probed ( $durvig\bar{a}hya$ ).

Furthermore, great loving-kindness and great compassion are loved by everyone: they are like a delicious medicine (*oṣadhi*) that people like to swallow. Wisdom is like an unpleasant medicine that many do not like at all. But because they like loving-kindness and compassion so much, they have described them as great.

Furthermore, there are hardly any beings already enlightened (*abhisambuddha*) who are able to believe and accept the Buddha's wisdom. In contrast, great loving-kindness and great compassion are of such a different kind that everybody can believe them and accept them. As they have seen a picture of them or heard the voice, they can believe and accept them and, since they have derived much benefit (*hita*) from them, they call them great loving-kindness and great compassion.

Furthermore, great wisdom has as its nature the relinquishment (*parityāga*), the rejection (*parivarjana*) of dharmas; great loving-kindness and great compassion have as their nature pity for (*anukampā*) and service (*upakāra*) to beings. [257b] This pity and service are loved by all beings; that is why they call them great loving-kindness and great compassion of the Buddha.

In the *Tch'e-sin king* (Viśeṣacintisūtra or Brahmaviśeṣacintiparipṛcchā) it is said that great loving-kindness and great compassion have thirty-two ways of acting on beings.<sup>889</sup> On the extent (*samgraha*), nature (*lakṣaṇa*) and object (*ālambana*) of this great loving-kindness and great compassion, see above (p. 1269F) what has been said in regard to the four immeasurables.

### 5. Loving-kindness and compassion are pure among the Buddhas

Moreover, the great loving-kindness, great compassion and the other qualities (*guṇa*) of the Buddha should not be multiplied. The system of Kātyāyana tries to distinguish the natures (*lakṣaṇa*), and great scholars, basing themselves on Kātyāna's system, comment on these distinctions:<sup>890</sup> all of that should not be accepted. Why?

Kātyāyana says that great loving-kindness (*mahāmaitrī*), great compassion (*mahākaruṇā*), omniscience (*sarvajñatā*) are impure dharmas (*sāsravadharma*), bonds (*grantha*), worldly dharmas (*laukikadharma*). But that is not correct. Why?

Great loving-kindness and great compassion are the root  $(m\bar{u}la)$  of all the Buddha's attributes; how can it be said that they are impure dharmas  $(s\bar{a}sravadharma)$ , bonds (grantha), worldly dharmas (laukikadharma)?

\_

<sup>889</sup> See references above, p. 1269F, n. 1.

<sup>890</sup> See the preliminary note to the present chapter.

Question. – Although great loving-kindness and great compassion are the root of the Buddha's attributes, they are impure. Although the lotus (*padma*) grows in the mud (*panka*), we cannot, however, describe the mud as marvelous. It is the same for great loving-kindness and great compassion; even though they are the root of the attributes of the Buddha, they cannot be pure (*anāṣrava*).

Answer. – As long as the bodhisattva has not become Buddha, his great loving-kindness and great compassion can be called impure (\$\salpha \arrava\$) and still show faults (\$\dosa\arraya\$), but as as soon as he has attained, as Buddha, the knowledge of unhindered deliverance (\$\arrava\$) and their traces (\$\varrava\$) have disappeared. The \$\frac{1}{2}\sigma \arrava\$) and their traces (\$\varrava\$) have disappeared. The \$\frac{1}{2}\sigma \arrava\$) and pratyekabuddhas do not possess the knowledge of unobstructed deliverance and do not eliminate the traces of the disturbing emotions (\$kle\$\sarrava\$) arrays (\$\sigma \arrayva\$). Often even their doubts (\$\sigma \arrayva\$) on this subject have not been destroyed and this is why their mind is impure. The Buddhas themselves have none of that. So why then do you say that their great loving-kindness and great compassion are impure?

Question. – I do not wish to be lacking in respect but, since the minds of loving-kindness and compassion in the Buddha concern beings, they are necessarily impure (sāsrava).<sup>891</sup>

Answer. – The power (*prabhāva*) of the Buddhas is inconceivable (*acintya*). The śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas feel loving-kindness and compassion without being able to eliminate the notion of being (*sattvasamjñ*ā), whereas the Buddhas feel loving-kindness and compassion beyond any notion of being. Why is that?

In the arhats and pratyekabuddhas, the nature of 'beings of the ten directions' (daśadiksattvanimitta) does not exist (nopalabhyate) and yet, when they feel loving-kindness and compassion, they grasp the nature of being (sattvanimittam udgrhṇanti). The Buddhas would have to look hard for a single being in the ten directions and they would not find him, and when they feel loving-kindness and compassion they do not grasp the nature of being (sattvanimittam nodgrhṇanti).

This is what is said in the *Wou-tsin-yi king* (Akṣayamatisūtra): "There are three kinds of loving-kindness and compassion: *i*) those that have beings as object (*sattvālambana*); *ii*) those that have things as object (*dharmālambana*); *iii*) those that that have no object (*anālambana*)."892

Finally, Buddha is the only one among all beings to cultivate the non-deceptive Dharma exclusively (aśathyadharma). If the Buddha practiced loving-kindness and compassion among beings by way of grasping the nature of being, we could not say that he practices the non-deceptive Dharma. Why? Because beings are absolutely non-existent (atyāntanupalabdha).

It does not say that śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas cultivate exclusively [257c] the non-deceptive Dharma and this is also so in regard to beings (*sattva*) and things (*dharma*), insofar as they sometimes grasp characteristics (*nimittāny udgṛḥṇanti*) and sometimes they do not grasp them.

<sup>891</sup> Impure in that they still involve belief in the individual (*satkāyadrsti*).

<sup>892</sup> A passage already referred to above, p. 1245F, 1272F.

It is impossible to make the objection to us that the Buddha does not cultivate the non-deceptive Dharma. His omniscience (*sarvajñāna*) destroys all the impurities; it can come from impure dharmas (*sāsrava*) and itself play the part of a pure cause (*anāsrava*). How could such an attribute be impure (*sāsrava*)?

Question. – The pure knowledges (*anāsravajñāna*) each have their object (*ālambana*); there is not one that can completely bear upon all dharmas. Only conventional knowledge (*saṃvṛtijñāna*) bears upon all dharmas. 893 This is why we say that omniscience is impure (*sāṣrava*).

Answer. – That is what is said in your system, but it is not said in the system of the Buddha. If a man carrying his own bushel-measure (*drona*) went to the market and this bushel-measure did not correspond to the official bushel-measure, there would be nobody who would use it. It is the same for you. You are using a system that does not correspond to the system of the Buddha and so nobody wants to apply it.

Why would not pure wisdom (anāsravaprajñā) bear upon all dharmas? This impure knowledge [this conventional knowledge (saṃvṛtijñāna) which, according to you, bears upon all dharmas] is conventional (saṃketika), deceptive (mṛṣāvādin) and weak: consequently it cannot bear upon all dharmas correctly and exactly. It is you who claim, in your system, that it bears upon all dharmas.

Furthermore, the system of the śrāvakas includes ten knowledges (jñāna), but in the Mahāyāna there is an eleventh called 'knowledge conforming to reality (yathābhūtajñāna)'.<sup>894</sup> The ten [traditional] knowledges end up in this knowledge conforming to reality in order that they form only a single knowledge, i.e., pure knowledge (anāsravajñāna). In the same way, the rivers (nadi) of the ten directions empty into the great sea (mahāsamudra) where they all take on one and the same taste, that of salt.<sup>895</sup>

Great loving-kindness and great compassion are included (*saṃgṛhīta*) in the Samādhirājasamādhi and the Simhavikrīditasamādhi of the Buddhas.

This briefly (samksepena) explains the meaning of great loving-kindness and great compassion.

For the Sarvāstivādiins, *saṃvṛtijñāna* is impure and bears upon all dharmas. See above, p. 1474-1475F

Adopting the variant *jou che tche*. This eleventh knowledge added by the Mahāyānists to the traditional ten knowledges has been defined above, p. 1483,F, 1486F.

<sup>895</sup> Mahāsamuddo ekaraso loņaraso: cf. Anguttara, IV, p. 199, 203.